FORCE STRUCTURE

F-22 Organization and 

Utilization Changes 

Could Improve Aircraft 

Availability and Pilot 

Training

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2018

GAO-18-190

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-190, a report to 

congressional committees

July 2018

FORCE STRUCTURE

F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could 

Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training

What GAO Found

The Air Force’s organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the 

availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability is constrained by maintenance 

challenges and unit organization. For example, stealth is a central feature of the 

F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the 

outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s 

are available for missions. Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated 

by the Air Force’s decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units—18 or 21 

primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing. 

Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each 

squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, 

and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Moreover, the Air Force 

organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location. However, it 

generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to 

keep aircraft available for missions at home. Larger, traditional Air Force 

squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and 

personnel, according to service officials. The Air Force has not reassessed the 

structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010. Without conducting a comprehensive 

assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be 

foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 

fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat 

environments.

The Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train 

for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual 

training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost 

the entire year. However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly 

training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force 

training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for 

exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22’s unique 

capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. For example, 

F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. 

However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security concerns about exposing 

the F-22’s unique capabilities. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises 

and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. 

The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—a mission that requires 

certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or 

military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of 

the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently 

based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the 

F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for 

any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to 

enhance air superiority skills. Without examining and implementing options to 

improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing 

opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority 

challenges it expects to face. View GAO-18-190. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov

Why GAO Did This Study

The F-22 was designed and fielded as 

the Air Force’s premier air-to-air 

fighter. The small fleet of 186 F-22s is 

central to the Air Force’s ability to 

accomplish its air superiority mission in 

high threat areas. While the Air Force 

has focused on other missions over the 

last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying 

to refocus on overcoming advanced 

threats, even as it continues to support 

ongoing operations. Though the recent 

introduction of the F-35 gives the Air 

Force another advanced fighter, the F35 is primarily designed for the air-toground missions and so is intended to 

complement but not replace the F-22. 

Senate Report 114-255 included a 

provision for GAO to review a variety of 

issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter 

squadrons. This report examines the 

extent to which the Air Force’s (1) 

organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes 

availability of aircraft and (2) utilization 

of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air 

superiority training. GAO reviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD)

guidance, analyzed maintenance data 

and training information for the F-22, 

evaluated the use of F-22s during 

deployments, and interviewed agency 

officials. This is a public version of a 

classified report issued in April 2018. 

Information DOD deemed classified or 

sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force 

reassess its F-22 organizational 

structure to determine alternative 

approaches to organizing F-22 

squadrons, and identify ways to 

increase F-22 pilot training 

opportunities for high-end air 

superiority missions. DOD concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations.
Page i GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Letter 1

Background 4

F-22 Unit Size and Organizational Structure Constrain Aircraft 

Availability and Have Not Been Reviewed by the Air Force 

since 2010 10

Air Force Utilization of F-22s Reduces Pilot High-End Air 

Superiority Training Opportunities 17

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I F-22 Maintenance and Supply Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability 28

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Tables

Table 1: F-22 Primary and Secondary Missions 7

Table 2: Average F-22 Operational Unit Aircraft Availability (Fiscal 

Years 2014 through 2016) 14

Figures

Figure 1: Air Force F-22 6

Figure 2: Air Force Fighter Inventory as of May 2018 8

Figure 3: F-22 Force Structure and Posture (2018) 9

Figure 4: Fiscal Year 2016 Average Number of F-22s Available for 

Operations 11

Figure 5: Adversary Air Units That Support F-22 Home Station 

Training (2018) 21

Figure 6: Relative Unique Role of the F-22 in Addressing Current 

and Planned Operations 23

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Abbreviations

CAS Close Air Support

DOD Department of Defense

LO Low Observable

UTC Unit Type Code

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 19, 2018

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Widely regarded as the best air superiority fighter aircraft in the world, the 

F-22 is an integral part of the U.S. military’s ability to defeat high-end 

adversaries.1 Potential adversaries around the world are pursuing 

technologies and strategies that are reducing the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) relative advantage in a number of areas, according to 

the department, including air superiority—a primary mission for the Air 

Force. Air superiority is established when the air and missile threat is 

reduced to a degree that other operations can occur without significant 

interference.2 As such, the Air Force considers it a precondition for 

success of combat operations, and therefore a mission it must address 

first. However, fourth generation fighters are increasingly unable to 

operate in highly contested environments where advanced air defense 

 1

For the purposes of this review, we use the term high-end adversaries to mean advanced 

adversaries most able to challenge the Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities. As 

such, when we use the term high-end training, we are referring to the training against the 

capabilities of the most advanced adversaries. We have also previously reported on 

growing challenges to DOD’s ability to gain operational access. See, for example, GAO, 

Defense Planning: DOD Needs Specific Measures and Milestones to Gauge Progress of 

Preparations for Operational Access Challenges, GAO-14-801 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

10, 2014).

2

DOD defines air superiority as follows: that degree of dominance in the air battle by one 

force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without 

prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-01, 

Countering Air and Missile Threats (Apr. 21, 2017).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

systems render them ineffective, according to the Air Force. 3 A linchpin 

in the Air Force’s ability to establish air superiority in highly contested 

environments is its small fleet of F-22s. With a unique combination of 

advanced stealth and maneuvering capabilities, the F-22 is designed to 

achieve air superiority against the most advanced air and surface threats. 

The Air Force currently uses a variety of fourth generation fighters, and 

plans to use F-35s for the air superiority mission since F-22 units 

constitute only 6 of the Air Force’s 55 combat coded fighter squadrons.

Over the past 15 years, U.S. air superiority has largely gone 

unchallenged, so it has not been a main focus during ongoing operations. 

Instead, the focus has been on attacking ground targets in support of 

ground operations. With little slowdown in the pace of operations, the Air 

Force finds itself in a position where it must balance ongoing operational 

demands with the growing need to be prepared for current and future 

threats to air superiority.

To meet its assigned air superiority responsibility, the Air Force needs to 

provide the combatant commanders with, at a minimum: 1) missioncapable aircraft, and 2) pilots who are trained to fly those aircraft in the 

expected threat environments. The Senate Armed Services Committee 

report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2017 questioned whether the Air Force’s fleet of F-22s is 

optimized to deter, and if necessary, quickly defeat increasingly capable 

potential adversaries. The Senate report also included a provision for us 

to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons.4

This report evaluates the extent to which the Air Force’s (1) organization 

of its F-22 fleet maximizes aircraft availability, and (2) utilization of the F22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training.

To address our objectives, we analyzed aircraft inventory data and 

maintenance data from the Integrated Maintenance Data System from 

2012 through 2016. We used that date range so that we could observe 

any trends and because the force structure has been relatively stable 

 3

The Air Force’s fourth generation fighter fleet includes F-16s, F-15Cs, and F-15Es, many 

of which were purchased in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The F-22 and F-35 are 

considered fifth generation fighter aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft also support the 

DOD’s air superiority mission. A-10s are also a fourth generation aircraft, but for the 

purposes of our report we do not include them since they generally do not have an air-toair role.

4

S. Rep. No. 114-255, at 103-104 (2016).
Page 3 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

since 2012. We performed data reliability procedures on the information 

by taking steps including comparing that information against related 

documentation and testimonial evidence, performing logic checks, and 

interviewing knowledgeable officials on controls over the reporting 

systems. We determined that the reliability of these data were sufficient 

for the purposes of describing general trends and making proximate 

comparisons. We also analyzed pilot training information, including yearly 

memorandums produced by the F-22 operational squadrons for years 

2012 through 2016.5 We also conducted on-site interviews with Air Force 

officials from Air Force Headquarters; Air Combat Command; Air National 

Guard; Air Force Reserve Command; the four locations with operational 

F-22 squadrons; the training unit; and the operational test and evaluation 

unit. We discussed how unit organization affects aircraft availability and 

the units’ abilities to maintain their aircraft in both the short and long term, 

as well as how F-22 utilization affects pilot training for the air superiority 

mission. We also discussed issues regarding the need for aircraft that 

play the role of adversaries for F-22 training purposes, known as 

adversary air. To examine how operational utilization of the F-22 affects 

the fleet’s ability to support air superiority, we reviewed mission 

assignments and deployment information for F-22 squadrons. We also 

interviewed officials from U.S. Central Command, U.S. European 

Command, U.S. Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense 

Command, and U.S. Pacific Command, regarding F-22 requirements and

utilization. Finally, we reviewed DOD and Air Force guidance as well as 

reports and other documentation relevant to our review, such as Air 

Superiority 2030 Flight Plan and various briefings.6

This report is a public version of a classified report that we issued on April 

27, 2018.7 The classified report included an appendix describing current 

and projected operational requirements for the F-22. DOD deemed the 

information in the appendix to be classified, which must be protected from 

loss, compromise, or inadvertent disclosure. Consequently, this public 

version excludes that appendix. Further, this public report omits certain 

 5

We reviewed or analyzed several different types of Air Force training and training-related 

reports, including Air Combat Command training health summary and other training 

briefings, unit readiness information, annual squadron training reports, as well as letters of 

qualification. We also reviewed previous GAO work on Air Force training.

6

United States Air Force Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team, Air Superiority 2030 

Flight Plan (May 2016).

7

GAO, Force Structure: Changes to F-22 Organization and Utilization Could Improve 

Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training , GAO-18-120C (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2018).
Page 4 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

information that DOD deemed to be sensitive related to (1) the inventory 

of F-22, F-35, F-15C, F-15E, F-16, and A-10 primary mission aircraft 

(aircraft authorized to perform combat), (2) maintenance data on aircraft 

availability and cannibalization rates, (3) maintenance challenges related 

to the F-22’s low observable coating, (4) F-22 squadron organization into 

deployable units and related issues, (5) F-22 annual training sortie 

standards, (6) effects on pilot training of F-22 operational deployments, 

and (7) F-22 spare engine shortfalls. Although the information provided in 

this report is more limited, it addresses the same objectives and uses the 

same methodology as the classified report.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted 

from July 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

worked with DOD from April 2018 to July 2018 to prepare this unclassified 

version of the report for public release. This public version was also 

prepared in accordance with these standards.

DOD guidance states that the Air Force and other services are 

responsible for providing trained and ready forces to fulfill the current and 

future operational requirements of the combatant commands.8 The Air 

Force is specifically responsible for gaining and maintaining air 

superiority. The Air Force Strategic Master Plan states that the Air Force 

must focus clearly on the capabilities that will allow freedom of maneuver 

and decisive action in highly contested spaces, including high-end air 

capabilities.9 Fifth generation fighter capabilities and ready and trained 

Airmen who are properly equipped for their missions are central 

components of the Air Force’s ability to provide air superiority in 

contested environments.

The F-22 is the Air Force’s fifth generation, air superiority fighter that 

incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced 

 8

DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components (Dec. 21, 2010).

9

United States Air Force, United States Air Force Strategic Master Plan (May 2015).

Background
Page 5 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

integrated avionics, and engines capable of sustained supersonic flight.10

The F-22 is optimized for air-to-air combat, able to carry up to eight air-toair missiles, and equipped with a 20-millimeter cannon. After development 

began, the Air Force also added air-to-ground capabilities to the F-22. Air 

Force officials emphasized the synergistic benefits of the F-22 to the joint 

force. Specifically, the F-22’s individual capabilities, like its stealth and 

sensors, help it to coordinate and improve the performance of other 

aircraft during operations, including fourth generation fighters. The Air 

Force views the F-22 and the F-35—its other fifth generation fighter—as 

complementary platforms with some overlapping capabilities. For 

example, the F-22 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-air missions 

and the F-35 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-ground missions. 

The Air Force announced in its fiscal year 2018 budget request that it now 

intends to retain the F-22 until 2060. It has also begun an effort to define 

and develop the next generation of air superiority capabilities that it plans 

to field in 2030 and beyond. Figure 1 shows a picture of an F-22.

 10According to the Air Force, the F-22’s combination of sleek aerodynamic design, 

including its internal weapons bays, and powerful engines allow the F-22 to cruise at 

supersonic airspeeds (greater than 1.5 Mach) without using afterburner—a characteristic 

known as “supercruise”. Supercruise greatly expands the F-22’s operating envelope in 

both speed and range over current fighters, which must use fuel-consuming afterburners 

to operate at supersonic speeds.
Page 6 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Figure 1: Air Force F-22

The F-22 and the F-15C are the two operational fighters in the Air Force’s 

Air Superiority Core Function.11 The Air Force assigns two primary (air-toair focused) missions and one secondary (air-to-ground focused) mission 

to the F-22. These missions are described in table 1. The Air Force 

 11Air Force activities and budgets are managed primarily across 12 Core Functions—the 

broad capabilities the Air Force provides to the combatant commanders. The 12 core 

functions are: (1) Rapid Global Mobility, (2) Nuclear Deterrent Operations, (3) Education 

and Training, (4) Special Operations Forces, (5) Agile Combat Support, (6) Space 

Superiority, (7) Cyber Superiority, (8) Air Superiority, (9) Global Precision Attack, (10) 

Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, (11) Command and 

Control, and (12) Personnel Recovery. The Air Superiority Core Function also includes the 

EC-130H, an electronic warfare aircraft, the E-9A, and T-38 training aircraft. 
Page 7 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

requires its pilots to be proficient in their primary missions and familiar 

with their secondary missions.12

Table 1: F-22 Primary and Secondary Missions

Primary mission Descriptiona

Offensive Counter-Air—Escort/Sweep For the F-22, this mission is air-to-air focused, including defeating adversary fighters 

and escorting other fighters or bombers over hostile territory.

Defensive Counter-Air This mission is focused on defending friendly airspace against air threats, such as 

fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles.

Secondary mission

Air Interdiction/Offensive Counter-Air—Attack 

Operations 

This mission is focused on the air-to-ground role for the F-22 and includes defeating 

advanced surface-to-air missile threats and other ground targets that contribute to an 

adversary’s air power.

Source: GAO Analysis of Air Force Information. | GAO-18-190

a

The mission descriptions are summaries of the missions the F-22 conducts and are based on 

definitions in joint publications and F-22-specific details from the F-22 Ready Aircrew Program 

Tasking Memorandum and Air Force officials.

The size of the current F-22 fleet is smaller than the Air Force originally 

planned. The Air Force F-22 acquisition program began in 1991 with an 

intended development period of 12 years and a planned quantity of 648 

aircraft. The Air Force had intended to station 40 percent of the

operational fleet outside of the United States. However, schedule delays, 

cost increases, and changes to threats, missions, and requirements led 

DOD to reduce the number of F-22s it eventually purchased. The Air 

Force identified a requirement for 381 F-22s in 2002, but ended aircraft 

production in 2012 with approximately half of that number. As of May 

2018, the Air Force had a total of 186 F-22s, as shown in figure 2. The 

total aircraft inventory includes primary mission aircraft in each 

 12The Air Force defines mission proficiency and familiarity in Ready Aircrew Program 

Tasking Memorandums as follows: Proficient: Aircrew have a thorough knowledge of 

mission area but occasionally may make an error of omission or commission. Aircrew are 

able to operate in a complex, fluid environment and are able to handle most contingencies 

and unusual circumstances. Proficient aircrew are prepared for mission tasking on the first 

sortie in theater. Familiar: Aircrew have a basic knowledge of mission area and may make 

errors of omission or commission. Aircrew are able to operate in a permissive environment 

and are able to handle some basic contingencies and unusual circumstances. Familiar 

aircrew may need additional training prior to first mission tasking.
Page 8 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

community—those authorized to perform combat—as well as aircraft that 

are designated for other purposes.13

Figure 2: Air Force Fighter Inventory as of May 2018

Notes: The Air Force plans to procure a total of 1,763 F-35s by 2038 according to Joint Strike Fighter 

Program Office data from October 2016.

Also, the figure does not include A-10s since they generally do not have an air-to-air role. The Air 

Force had 281 total A-10s, as of May 15, 2018.

The operational portion of the F-22 fleet is organized into 6 operational 

squadrons at four locations. According to Air Force officials, the small 

number of F-22s provides a less than ideal fifth generation fighter 

capacity until F-35 numbers grow. However, in a June 2017 report to 

Congress, the Air Force stated that it would not make economic or 

operational sense to reopen the F-22 production line, and reported that it 

 13Many of the other aircraft are used as training aircraft or as developmental or 

operational test aircraft, but squadrons also have backup aircraft to use in place of their 

primary aircraft that are undergoing maintenance actions, and each fleet also has some 

aircraft that are designated as reserves to account for possible attrition. For the purposes 

of this review, we use the term “primary mission aircraft” to refer to aircraft in operational 

units authorized for performing the units’ missions. This does not include back-up or 

attrition reserve aircraft. The Air Force refers to these aircraft as Primary Aerospace 

Vehicle Authorized (PAA) for operational units or Primary Mission Aerospace Vehicle 

Inventory (PMAI). For further details, see Air Force Instruction 16-402, Aerospace Vehicle 

Programming, Assignment, Distribution, Accounting, and Termination (May 30, 2013). 
Page 9 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

would cost approximately $50 billion to procure an additional 194 F-22s. 

The Air Force is continuing to fund programs to modernize the F-22 and 

make reliability improvements.14

Figure 3 shows the basing locations of the F-22 fleet, and the numbers of 

aircraft at each base.

Figure 3: F-22 Force Structure and Posture (2018)

 14GAO has previously reported on F-22 modernization and reliability programs. See, for 

example, GAO, F-22 Modernization: Cost and Schedule Transparency Is Improved, 

Further Visibility into Reliability Efforts Is Needed, GAO-14-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 

15, 2014) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

GAO-17-333SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2017).
Page 10 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

The size and structure of F-22 units diminishes the Air Force’s ability to 

maximize the number of F-22s available for operations and have not been 

reviewed since 2010. The F-22 has sustainment issues due to the fleet’s 

maintenance and supply challenges. These challenges have affected 

aircraft availability rates, which have remained below Air Force standards. 

The small size of F-22 squadrons and wings has contributed to low 

aircraft availability rates. Further, the Air Force practice of deploying a 

small portion of a squadron makes it difficult for F-22 squadrons, as 

currently organized, to make aircraft available for their missions at home 

station. The Air Force would also face difficulties generating aircraft to 

support DOD’s concepts for using distributed operations in high threat 

environments with its current F-22 squadron organization. Although in 

2016 it assessed its future air superiority capability needs, the Air Force 

has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22 

organizational structure is optimized to support combatant commander 

needs.

The F-22 has sustainment issues due to the fleet’s maintenance and 

supply challenges that have affected aircraft availability rates. In fiscal 

year 2016, this resulted in the fleet having an average of 80 F-22s 

available for operations, as shown in figure 4.15 According to the Air 

Force, from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, the F-22 fleet availability rate 

was below the Air Force’s annual F-22 availability standard by 4 to 19 

percent.16

 15According to the Air Force, the aircraft availability rate is the percentage of a fleet’s total 

inventory that is available (i.e., mission capable). Air Force Logistics Management 

Agency, “Maintenance Metrics U.S. Air Force” (Mar. 20, 2009).

16The Aircraft Availability standard is based on Air Force evaluation of requirements, 

including operational and training requirements, and is not resource constrained, 

according to Air Force officials. The Air Force’s aircraft availability standard for the F-22 

was 66.7 percent for fiscal year 2012, rose to 72.6 percent in fiscal year 2015, and was 72 

percent in fiscal years 2016 and 2017.

F-22 Unit Size and 

Organizational 

Structure Constrain 

Aircraft Availability 

and Have Not Been 

Reviewed by the Air 

Force since 2010

Sustainment Issues Limit 

F-22 Aircraft Availability
Page 11 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Figure 4: Fiscal Year 2016 Average Number of F-22s Available for Operations

First, the F-22 has some unique maintenance challenges, which have 

affected aircraft availability rates. The maintenance demands of the F22’s Low Observable (LO) coating, a critical component of its stealth 

characteristic, reduces aircraft availability. Without the LO maintenance 

issues, availability would have been significantly closer to meeting the 

annual availability standard, according to the Air Force officials. Fourth 

generation fighters do not have to contend with this maintenance issue.17

The F-22’s LO coating is actually a series of coatings that require diligent 

and time-consuming application and curing, which results in extended 

 17According to Headquarters Air Force officials, F-22 availability has generally lagged 

behind fourth generation fighters by 10 to 20 percent. However, aircraft comparison is 

complicated because each aircraft is at a different stage of its lifecycle. According to Air 

Force Air Combat Command officials, fourth generation fighters are currently 

underperforming due to an intense modification schedule, heavy maintenance 

requirements, and a lack of aircraft due to deployments. They stated that the Air Force 

has initiated efforts to improve aircraft availability for its fourth generation fighters.
Page 12 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

periods of time when the aircraft are not available, according to Air Force 

officials. The F-22’s LO coating is also beginning to reach the end of its 

service live, requiring maintenance actions that further reduce aircraft 

availability. The Air Force has begun to address these maintenance 

issues by using a more durable coating and standing up additional repair 

facilities.

Second, the F-22 faces a number of supply challenges that have 

contributed to reduced and unpredictable aircraft availability. Officials 

from all four operational locations expressed concerns over low supply 

levels and difficulties with obtaining needed parts. The F-22 fleet’s small 

size and resulting low demand for parts contributes to this problem. 

Obtaining missing parts can be a time-consuming and costly process 

because some original manufacturers no longer make the parts or are 

completely out of business, according to Air Force officials. When this is 

the case, the Air Force may need to find the original aircraft and parts 

design plans, and obtain a new contractor to produce a small number of 

parts. Officials at one operational location said a simple wiring harness 

required a 30-week lead time.18

Appendix I contains additional information on F-22 maintenance and 

supply issues.

With 18 to 21 primary mission aircraft per F-22 squadron, and 1 or 2 F-22 

squadrons per wing, the Air Force has been unable to gain the 

maintenance and supply efficiencies associated with its larger traditional 

squadrons and wings, and this has contributed to low aircraft availability 

rates. According to service officials, the Air Force has traditionally 

structured its fighter wings to have 3 squadrons with 24 primary mission 

aircraft per squadron to optimize maintenance efficiency and combat 

power. The Air Force is planning to organize its active duty F-35 fleet into 

traditional sized squadrons with 2 or 3 squadrons per wing. A RAND 

study also concluded that larger squadrons and multiple squadrons per 

wing create efficiencies.19 Larger squadrons and wings create efficiencies 

because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air 

 18GAO has previously reported on challenges DOD faces with single sources of supply, 

including the lengthy parts redesign and requalification process. See GAO, Defense 

Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to 

Proactively Manage the Risks, GAO-17-768 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2017).

19RAND, Assessment of Beddown Alternatives for the F-35 (Washington, D.C.: 2013). 

Small F-22 Squadrons and 

Wings Exacerbate Aircraft 

Availability Challenges
Page 13 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Force officials. Having a multi-squadron wing is also beneficial when one 

squadron deploys a portion of its aircraft, pilots, and maintenance 

personnel and leaves another portion of the squadron at the squadron’s 

home station. In these cases, collocated squadron(s) can help backfill 

shortfalls for the portion of the squadron that remained at home station.

The Air Force recognizes that smaller F-22 operational squadrons and 

wings face sustainment challenges due to their size. Facing cuts in the 

total number of aircraft purchased, the Air Force decided in 2006 to

organize its F-22s into 7 operational squadrons, each with 18 primary 

mission aircraft. However, in 2010, the Air Force found that this plan was 

unsustainable because operational squadrons were not able to produce 

adequate sorties. The Air Force then decided to eliminate 1 squadron and 

used some of the aircraft from that squadron to increase the number of 

primary mission aircraft to 21 in its 5 remaining active duty squadrons. 

The Air Force left its one F-22 National Guard squadron with only 18 

primary mission aircraft. The Air Force’s intent with this restructuring was 

to increase fleet sustainability while retaining enough squadrons for force 

projection needs.

F-22 aircraft availability metrics have fluctuated, but have generally been 

better for operational locations with more aircraft per squadron and more 

squadrons per wing. For example, table 2 shows that the operational 

locations in Alaska and Virginia—locations with 2 operational 

squadrons—have higher aircraft availability rates than the locations with 

only 1 operational squadron. Although Air Force maintenance data shows 

that the Florida operational squadron had a lower availability rate than the 

locations with 2 operational squadrons in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 

2016, Air Force officials noted that this squadron should be able to 

leverage the maintenance benefits of having the F-22 training squadron 

on base. However, a major maintenance backlog for the training 

squadron currently limits that benefit, according to the officials.20

 20The F-22s at the training squadron are some of the oldest F-22s in the fleet and are an 

older configuration than the operational jets. According to Air Force officials at Air Combat 

Command and at the unit level, F-22s used for training were not historically required to 

maintain the LO coatings on their aircraft. However, a change in that requirement resulted 

in a large maintenance backlog for these training aircraft.
Page 14 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Table 2: Average F-22 Operational Unit Aircraft Availability (Fiscal Years 2014 through 2016)

Base location Description Difference between fleet average aircraft 

availability and base availability

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 2 squadrons +11%

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska 2 squadrons +10%

Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida 1 squadron -11%

Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 1 squadron -14%

%=percent

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force information. | GAO-18-190

The F-22 units in Alaska and Virginia are also generally able to produce 

more sorties per month. Further, F-22 squadron officials in Hawaii stated 

that increasing their squadron—the smallest in the fleet—by 4 additional 

aircraft would allow the squadron to generate 32 percent more sorties. Air 

Force officials cautioned that there are many factors that influence 

maintenance metrics for the F-22, including the age of the aircraft, climate 

and leadership. However, they agreed that larger squadrons and wings 

increase maintenance performance.

Further, the Air Force practice of deploying a small portion of a squadron 

forward makes it difficult for F-22 squadrons as currently organized to 

make aircraft available for their missions at home station, according to 

officials from all four operational locations. The Air Force organizes its F22 squadrons and other fighter squadrons based on a model where a 

squadron deploys to a single forward location, according to Air Force 

officials. In order to facilitate deployments, the Air Force has for 

approximately the last two decades organized squadrons into smaller 

deployable pieces called Unit Type Codes (UTCs). However, the UTCs 

are not the same size. For example, one of the F-22’s UTCs is designed 

to have only 6 of a squadron’s 21 aircraft but contains almost 50 percent 

of the squadron’s equipment, approximately 40 percent of the squadron’s 

maintenance personnel and 60 percent of its operational personnel.21

This organizational approach therefore creates a disproportionate split 

among UTCs in terms of equipment and personnel, making it more 

difficult for the underserved portions of the squadron to maintain 

readiness or generate sorties.

 21The equipment number is based on the number of pallet positions of equipment, not 

number of items. In 2017, Air Force officials provided the information on UTC equipment 

in terms of how many pallet positions the equipment would take up on a cargo aircraft.

Partial Unit Deployments 

Hinder the F-22 

Squadrons’ Abilities to 

Maximize the Aircraft 

Available for Operations
Page 15 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Furthermore, different UTCs will not only have unequal amounts of 

equipment and personnel, but will also tend to unevenly apportion their 

best aircraft, more experienced personnel, and critical parts, according to 

Air Force officials. The officials noted that during “split operations,” the 

portion of the squadron remaining at home struggles to keep aircraft 

available for missions. According to Air Force officials, traditional fighter 

squadrons have larger UTCs, which provides a better balance in 

equipment and personnel that lessens the strain of split operations.

With its current F-22 squadron organization, the Air Force would also face 

difficulties generating aircraft to support DOD’s concepts for using 

distributed operations in high threat environments.22 According to DOD, 

potential adversaries are increasingly capable of challenging U.S. access 

to operational areas by, for example, developing cruise and ballistic 

missiles that are able to reach U.S. forward air bases. In its Air Superiority 

2030 Flight Plan, the Air Force states that the ability to deploy and 

operate forces in non-permissive environments is essential to air 

superiority. One approach for doing this is to use distributed bases. 

Instead of operating from well-developed and vulnerable forward air 

bases, squadrons would break up into smaller units and operate 

independently from multiple locations, moving around so as to complicate 

enemy targeting. The Air Force is drafting an adaptive basing concept 

and implementation plan to help guide its efforts in this area.

Sustaining and maintaining multiple independent deployable units so that 

they have operational aircraft available for the combatant commander is 

not possible with the current F-22 squadron structure and would require 

significant investment, according to Air Force officials. F-22 squadrons 

have made a number of short exercise deployments, with small numbers 

of aircraft to provide forward presence and examine the units’ abilities to 

conduct distributed operations. These deployments showed that rapidly 

deploying small numbers of F-22s for short durations is possible. The 

deployments also identified a number of challenges the Air Force needs 

to address if it implements a distributed operations concept, including 

maintenance, logistics, spare parts, and tanker support challenges, 

according to after-action reports and service officials. Furthermore, 

according to the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, distributed 

 22For a DOD concept that includes distributed operations, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2012).

Organizing for New 

Operational Concepts 

Poses Additional Aircraft 

Availability Challenges
Page 16 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

operations requires a dynamic logistics system that is more responsive, 

agile, and flexible than DOD is used to employing.23 Air Force officials told 

us that the Air Force is early in the process of examining the implications 

of distributed operations and has not determined the extent to which F-22 

squadron organization should be adjusted to support distributed 

operations.

While the Air Force reviews F-22 operations and sustainment needs as 

part of the annual programming and budgeting process within DOD, the 

Air Force has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22 

organizational structure is the optimal structure to support combatant 

commander needs since 2010, according to Air Force officials. As 

previously discussed, the Air Force found in 2010 that operational 

squadrons were not able to produce adequate sorties and so eliminated 1

squadron and used some of the aircraft from that squadron to increase 

the number of primary mission aircraft in its 5 remaining active duty 

squadrons

DOD’s Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, states that risk 

management is the process to identify, assess, and control hazards 

arising from operational factors and make decisions that balance risk and 

cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in 

making informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing 

operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success. 

Furthermore, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government 

states that management should periodically evaluate the organizational 

structure so that it meets the entity’s objectives and has adapted to any 

new objectives for the entity.24 Furthermore, management should 

periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for 

continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives 

or addressing related risks.

However, the Air Force has not conducted a comprehensive assessment 

of the F-22 organizational structure since 2010, according to Air Force 

officials. As previously discussed, while the larger squadrons and wings 

 23Prepared statement of Admiral Harry Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, for 

the Logistics Officer Association Symposium (Oct. 13, 2016).

24GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014). 

The Air Force Has Not 

Comprehensively 

Assessed F-22 

Organizational Structure 

since 2010
Page 17 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

created after the 2010 restructuring have generally had higher availability 

rates than smaller ones, fleet aircraft availability rates remain below the 

Air Force standard for what is needed. Further, the F-22’s role has also 

evolved since 2010. For example, F-22s have begun participating in 

combat operations in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, potential adversaries 

are increasingly able to challenge U.S. air superiority, according to the Air 

Force. In 2016, the Air Force examined its future air superiority capability 

needs in its Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan, but that review did not 

include an assessment of organizational structure, according to officials 

involved with the review. Such an assessment could consider a number 

of alternatives, such as consolidating the F-22 fleet into larger squadrons 

and/or wings to improve aircraft availability or revising the design of the 

deployable units in squadrons to better support current deployment 

practices and future operational concepts, as well as any risks associated 

with those alternatives. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment 

of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and assesses 

alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, the Air Force may 

be forgoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical 

F-22 fleet to support current and future combatant commander high-end 

air superiority needs.

The Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited its pilots’

opportunities to train for their high-end air superiority missions, and 

contributed to F-22 pilots not meeting their training requirements. F-22 

pilots need extensive training in order to be prepared to execute their 

high-end air superiority missions. However, Air Force utilization of F-22 

units for exercises, the low supply of adversary air training capabilities, 

and the use of F-22s to meet combatant commander needs, including the 

alert mission, affects the ability of pilots to meet those requirements.

Air Force Utilization of 

F-22s Reduces Pilot 

High-End Air 

Superiority Training 

Opportunities
Page 18 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for 

the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and 

service officials. 25 F-22 pilots need extensive training for F-22 units to 

fulfill their air superiority role. Air Force guidance notes that a key to 

maintaining air superiority is trained and ready Airmen that must possess 

a well-honed combat edge so that they are ready to prevail even against 

the most advanced opponents.26 The Air Force strategy also notes that 

the training of Airmen must be relevant and responsive if they are to 

maintain superior agility in the future.27 Through its Ready Aircrew 

Program, the Air Force establishes annual continuation training 

requirements for F-22 pilots. These requirements focus on the training 

needed to accomplish the core missions of F-22 units. They define the 

minimum required mix of annual sorties, simulator missions, and training 

events aircrews must accomplish to sustain combat mission readiness.28

Air Force officials emphasized that the requirements outlined in the 

Ready Aircrew Program are minimums and noted that some pilots may 

need additional sorties to achieve proficiency.

In 2016, GAO reported that combat fighter squadrons were unable to 

meet annual training requirements across the full range of core 

missions.29 Further, an Air Force analysis conducted in 2016 determined 

that, based on current aircraft availability rates, pilots in an F-22 squadron 

 25We reviewed or analyzed several different types of Air Force training and trainingrelated reports, including Air Combat Command training health summary and other 

training briefings, unit readiness information, annual squadron training reports, as well as 

letters of qualification. We also reviewed previous GAO work on Air Force training.

26United States Air Force, United States Air Force, Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global 

Power for America (August 2013). 

27United States Air Force, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future (July 2014). 

28The Air Force establishes Ready Aircrew Program requirements that are unique to each 

aircraft type. The memorandums contain different minimum requirements for pilots 

depending on their experience level and depending on whether they are Air Force active 

duty, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserve pilots. The memorandums state that 

squadron commanders develop unit training programs and note that the squadron 

commanders have the authority and are expected to tailor their unit training plans when 

necessary. 

29GAO, Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve 

Effectiveness, GAO-16-864 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 19, 2016). GAO-16-864 is a public 

version of the prior sensitive report issued in August 2016, which includes information on 

the completion of annual training requirements for active duty fighter squadrons, including 

the F-22. See GAO, Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve 

Effectiveness, GAO-16-635SU (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2016).

F-22 Pilots Are Not 

Meeting Minimum Training 

Requirements Necessary 

for Their Air Superiority 

Missions
Page 19 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

with 21 primary mission aircraft need 270 days of home station training 

each year to meet their minimum annual continuation training 

requirements.30 However, F-22 pilots are generally not meeting those 

minimums, according to the officials, and F-22 operational squadrons 

have reported numerous shortfalls. For example, one squadron identified 

training shortfalls in its primary missions for four consecutive years in its 

annual training reports. Another squadron identified training shortfalls in 

one of its primary missions, offensive counter-air, in three of the last four 

annual training reports.

Although participation in exercises is an important component of F-22 

pilot training, multiple exercises can interrupt pilot training cycles and 

restrictions in some exercises can detract from F-22 pilot training for the

high threat environment. Exercises provide pilots an opportunity to train in 

a more realistic setting. At the same time, frequent participation in 

exercises can take time away from the home station training that is 

required to maintain combat mission readiness for high-end air superiority 

missions. Although high demand for exercise participation is causing 

stress across the Air Force,31 the problem is particularly acute for F-22 

pilots, according to a 2016 Air Force analysis. While F-22 pilots require 

270 days at home each year, they are getting only 191 days on average, 

according to the analysis. Pilots from other fighter aircraft, such as the F16 and F-15E, are also experiencing home station training shortfalls, but 

not as great as those faced by F-22 pilots, according to the analysis.

Furthermore, F-22 units are often directed to participate in exercises as 

part of Air Force efforts to build relationships with partners. However, due 

to security concerns regarding exposing the F-22’s unique capabilities, F22 pilots may be restricted from flying the aircraft the way they would in 

combat, according to Air Force officials. As a result, the value of the 

training is reduced and these types of exercises can result in the F-22 

pilots developing bad habits that must be corrected in future training, 

according to Air Force officials.

 30The number of days needed annually for home station training does not include 

weekends, federal holidays, family days, scheduled down days or days when on 

deployment orders. Therefore, F-22 pilots must train for almost the entire year to meet the 

annual training requirements for the high-end air superiority mission.

31Since 2001, there has been a 35 percent reduction in the number of fighter and bomber 

squadrons (from 94 to 61) and a 31 percent increase in exercise taskings, according to a 

May 2017 Air Force memorandum.

F-22 Pilots Benefit from 

Exercises, but Exercise 

Quality and Quantity Can 

Detract from Training 

Needs
Page 20 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

The Air Force recognizes that exercise demands on F-22 units and other 

fighter units make it difficult for pilots to complete their required training. 

Based on its analysis, the Air Force is planning to increase the time pilots 

have available to conduct home station training, including by establishing 

a goal of no more than 1 day on travel for every 5 days at home station. 

As a result, the Air Force will be reducing total exercise participation and 

thereby increasing the number of days F-22 pilots are at home station in 

fiscal year 2018 by 8 days. However, the Air Force projects that F-22 

pilots in fiscal year 2018 will still fall 71 days short of the 270 days they 

need to meet their yearly training requirement, based on current aircraft 

availability rates. Without exploring further reductions in exercise events 

that do not contribute to high-end air superiority training, at current aircraft 

availability rates F-22 pilots may not be fully prepared to effectively 

support combatant commander needs against the most advanced threats.

F-22 pilot training requires flying against aircraft playing the role of 

adversaries, but high demand and low supply of adversary air resources 

have resulted in training shortfalls. Due to the F-22’s unique air superiority 

role and high-end capabilities, the Air Force expects F-22 pilots to face 

and defeat numerically superior adversaries. This results in an annual 

demand of between 145 and 171 adversary air sorties for every 

operational F-22 pilot.32 The adversary air demand for fourth generation 

fighters is much lower. For example, continuation training for the Air 

Force’s other air superiority fighter—the F-15C—results in an annual 

demand of between 45 and 73 adversary air sorties. To support F-22 

training requirements, the Air Force has provided two of the four 

operational locations (Virginia and Florida) with a squadron of T-38s to 

provide dedicated adversary air support for use in training. In Alaska, an 

adversary air squadron is located at a nearby base that is able to provide 

some support for F-22 training, according to officials. The F-22s in Hawaii 

have no adversary air support on base or nearby. Figure 5 shows F-22 

operational locations and their adversary air support.

 32There is a range of requirements because the Air Force sets a lower sortie requirement 

for experienced pilots as compared to inexperienced pilots. 

Adversary Air Demands 

for F-22s Detract from the 

Ability of Pilots to Meet 

Training Requirements
Page 21 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Figure 5: Adversary Air Units That Support F-22 Home Station Training (2018)

All F-22 operational locations report that insufficient adversary air caused 

pilots to have shortfalls in their training. For example, the operational F-22 

squadron in Florida, which shares an adversary air squadron with a 

collocated F-22 training unit, reported that F-22 pilot training deficiencies 

in fiscal year 2016 were caused in part by limited adversary air support. 

Specifically, adversary air shortfalls negatively impacted the training of 83 

percent of the squadron’s pilots for the offensive counter-air mission and 

54 percent of the pilots for the defensive counter-air mission. Operational 

squadrons at other locations reported similar negative effects on training 

caused in part by the limited adversary air.

Moreover, the limited supply of dedicated adversary aircraft means that 

often F-22 pilots must fly their aircraft in an adversary aircraft role to 

support the training of the squadron’s other F-22 pilots. For example, 

according to a 2017 Air Force memo, 55 percent of all sorties generated 

by F-22s based in Hawaii were dedicated to adversary air. The F-22 
Page 22 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

squadron in Hawaii reported that this practice negatively affected the 

combat readiness of all of the squadron’s pilots. The Air Force 

categorizes adversary air sorties as useful only for maintaining basic 

flying proficiency. Officials from the Virginia unit explained that F-22 pilots 

flying adversary air do not fly like they would during combat missions and 

so these sorties are wasteful, having no or negative training value. An 

official representing the Hawaii unit indicated that the high percentage of 

sorties dedicated to adversary air leads to wasteful training and declines 

in readiness against potential threats.33 Air Force officials expect 

competing demands for limited adversary air to grow as the Air Force 

stands up more F-35 squadrons.

The Air Force recognizes and is attempting to mitigate adversary air 

shortfalls.34 For example, the Air Force has hired contractors to address 

Air Force adversary air shortfalls at exercises, as we previously 

reported.35 In addition, the Air Force has outlined a plan to provide 

additional adversary air support for its fighter units, including contract 

adversary air support for the F-22 training squadron in Florida and the 

operational squadrons at two of the four operational locations (Virginia 

and Hawaii) in the 2019 timeframe. However, the Air Force must first 

complete additional analysis and finalize funding before additional 

adversary support is provided to these locations, according to an August 

 33F-22s are also over three times more expensive to fly for adversary air than the next 

most expensive aircraft, the F-16. According to cost data provided by Air Force officials, 

the cost of one operational flying hour in fiscal year 2016 for the F-22 was $61,726 versus 

$19,168 for an F-16 and $8,946 for a T-38.

34The Air Force also notes that the service will focus more efforts on virtual training, 

including the use of simulators. In 2012, for active duty pilots, the Air Force reduced the 

required number of flight sorties and increased the number of simulator sorties. However, 

Air Force Ready Aircrew Program requirements show that the use of simulators is allowed 

to meet a small proportion of training sorties, but live sorties are required to train primary 

skillsets. Although the Air Force is currently able to supplement real flying hours and 

mitigate training shortfalls through the use of simulators, officials told us that using 

simulators is not always possible or effective. For example, from 2014 to 2016 an Alaskabased squadron noted that a combination of simulator closures and insufficient contractor 

support negatively affected the ability of all the squadron’s pilots to train using simulators. 

Further, officials from one operational location said there are clear advantages of having 

pilots fly as adversaries because they are better able to adapt and provide new and 

challenging problems for the pilot being trained.

35GAO-16-864.
Page 23 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

2017 Air Force briefing on the plan.36 Until the Air Force explores 

additional alternatives for increasing external adversary air training 

support at all of the operational locations, F-22 pilots will likely continue to 

face training shortfalls and use limited sorties on flying adversary air 

themselves. Furthermore, this may result in the F-22 squadrons not being 

fully prepared to execute the high-end air superiority missions.

The Air Force is providing F-22s in support of current combatant 

commander needs, including alert missions and operational deployments, 

but the alert mission and these operational deployments take time away 

from air superiority training. Although these missions are important, they 

take no or limited advantage of the unique capabilities provided by the F22, as figure 6 illustrates. Classified details regarding the current and 

projected operational requirements for the F-22 are included in the 

classified version of this report.

Figure 6: Relative Unique Role of the F-22 in Addressing Current and Planned 

Operations

DOD has an established risk-informed process to distribute the service’s 

operational forces to the combatant commanders. Air Force officials told 

us that combatant commanders can request a general fighter capability or 

a very specific capability that only an F-22 can provide. Air Force officials 

also said the Air Force does not set aside F-22 units for only the most 

advanced threat missions, and it does not set aside any other fighter units 

 36The Air Force briefing identifies the Commander of Air Combat Command’s priorities for 

providing additional adversary air support. They are as follows: (1) Nellis Air Force Base in 

support of combat readiness, (2) training units to support pilot production, and (3) fifth 

generation fighters to support combat readiness. The briefing also outlines a number of 

proposals for addressing adversary air shortfalls that reach out through 2030 and beyond, 

but notes the need for conducting further evaluations and securing funding. 

Current Operations 

Reduce F-22 Pilot HighEnd Air Superiority 

Training Opportunities

The Air Force Provides F-22s 

to Combatant Commanders 

through Established Processes
Page 24 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

for unique missions. The Air Force provides F-22 units to the combatant 

commands when those units address the combatant commander’s 

capability requirement and are available, according to service officials.

F-22 support for ongoing air sovereignty alert missions further reduces F22 pilots’ abilities to train for the high-end air superiority mission. The alert 

mission supports homeland defense, DOD’s top priority.37 This mission 

requires certain air bases have fully fueled, fully armed jets ready at all 

times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation.38 Two F-22 

operational locations have full time alert mission responsibilities (Alaska 

and Hawaii) and one location (Virginia) performs alert missions on an asneeded basis. According to Air Force officials, the alert mission does not 

require the high-end capabilities provided by the F-22 and currently F15C and F-16 squadrons are filling alert mission requirements in other 

parts of the United States. F-35s could also conduct this mission if they 

were assigned it, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force plans to 

start fielding 2 F-35 squadrons in Alaska beginning in 2020. However, 

there are currently no plans to use F-35s for the alert mission, according 

to U.S. Northern Command. With no other operational Air Force fighter 

squadrons currently based in Hawaii and Alaska, the alert mission falls to 

the F-22 units.

Dedicating F-22s to the alert mission reduces the ability of F-22 pilots to 

train for their primary missions. Operational squadrons in Alaska and 

Hawaii have F-22 pilots sitting alert in order to address the 24-hour per 

day alert commitment. During this time they are not able to train for their 

high-end air superiority missions. Further, the squadrons must dedicate a 

number of mission-capable aircraft to this mission, which is more 

challenging for squadrons with a smaller number of aircraft. Squadron 

officials from one location estimated that they could generate hundreds of 

additional training sorties on an annual basis if they could use the aircraft 

that are currently dedicated to the alert mission.

 37Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 

2014).

38For more information on air sovereignty alert mission see GAO, Homeland Defense: 

Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect 

U.S. Airspace, GAO-09-184 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2009), and GAO, Homeland 

Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert 

Operations, GAO-12-311 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012).

Use of F-22s for Alert Missions 

Diminishes Pilots’ Ability to 

Train for High-End Air 

Superiority Missions
Page 25 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

The Air Force also deploys F-22s outside of the United States to address 

combatant commander requirements and these deployments also reduce 

the time available for F-22 pilots to conduct home station training for their 

high-end air superiority missions. Since 2007, the Air Force has deployed 

F-22s to a number of combatant commands to address a variety of 

needs, including providing assurance to friends and allies and deterring 

potential adversaries. F-22s deployed to U.S. Central Command have 

also been supporting ongoing operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

F-22 pilots can gain valuable experience from deployments but their 

ability to train for the high-end air superiority mission can suffer. For 

example, F-22 involvement in current combat operations against ISIS 

provides pilots with experience deploying for combat, integrating with 

coalition forces, and conducting air-to-ground attack operations, 

according to Air Force officials. Although its high-end capabilities provide 

some benefits in current operations against ISIS,39 F-22s have primarily 

been used for close air support (CAS) missions in operations against 

ISIS, according to Air Force officials. However, CAS is not a primary or 

secondary mission for the F-22. As such, F-22 pilot air superiority skills 

degrade while on deployment because they are conducting CAS missions 

and not able to train for their air superiority missions, according to Air 

Force officials.

The F-22’s current availability and pilot training challenges will likely 

become more significant as fourth generation fighters become less 

survivable and the Air Force’s reliance on its small fleet of F-22s to 

execute the air superiority mission grows. Limitations on F-22 availability 

are due in part to maintenance challenges inherent to the F-22, including 

maintaining its LO coating. It is also due in part to Air Force decisions to 

organize the F-22 fleet into small wings and squadrons, resulting in lost 

efficiencies that come with larger organizations. Further, F-22 squadrons, 

designed to operate from one location, face challenges generating 

available aircraft when they are split, as current Air Force practices and 

future concepts require. The Air Force also requires well-trained pilots in 

 39The Combined Forces Air Component Commander for U.S. Central Command noted in 

a May 24, 2017, DOD press briefing that the F-22 is important for supporting ground 

troops and air domain awareness and deconfliction in the fight against ISIS. He noted that 

the F-22’s capability to fuse information and understand where friendly forces are and 

what Syrian and Russian forces are doing is unmatched. See Department of Defense,

Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Harrigian (May 24, 2017).

Operational Deployments 

Diminish F-22 Pilots’ Ability to 

Train for High-End Air 

Superiority Missions

Conclusions
Page 26 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

order to take full advantage of the F-22’s high-end capabilities. However, 

F-22 pilots’ ability to train for its air superiority missions and meet 

associated training requirements is constrained by factors including 

adversary air limitations and participation in exercises with limited training 

value. Operational use of the F-22 for missions that have no or limited 

need for the F-22’s unique capabilities, such as the alert mission, further 

limit the ability of pilots to prepare for the high-end air superiority 

challenges the nation increasingly faces.

One option for addressing these challenges would be to purchase more 

F-22s. However, the Air Force’s determination that it does not make 

economic or operational sense to restart F-22 production means that the 

Air Force has to find other ways to improve its F-22 fleet’s ability to 

address high-end air superiority challenges. Air Force efforts to improve 

F-22 capabilities and maintainability and wider efforts to address high 

exercise demand and adversary air shortfalls are examples of positive 

steps the service is taking. The Air Force has also shown a prior 

willingness to consolidate its F-22 fleet. Further, the Air Force outlined its 

commitment to addressing high-end air superiority challenges in its Air 

Superiority 2030 Flight Plan. This effort, along with the planned fielding of 

a large number of F-35s provides the Air Force with the opportunity to 

more comprehensively review and, if necessary, transform how it should 

best organize, posture, train, and utilize its fifth generation assets, 

including the F-22. However, unless the Air Force takes steps to assess 

and make necessary adjustments to the current organization and use of 

its F-22s, F-22 units are likely to continue to experience aircraft 

availability and pilot training rates that are below what they could be. As a 

result, the Air Force may be incurring increased risks in future operations 

in high threat areas.

We are making the following two recommendations to the Air Force:

The Secretary of the Air Force should conduct a comprehensive 

assessment of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and 

assesses alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons. The 

assessment could at a minimum assess the following two alternatives: 

consolidating the fleet into larger squadrons and/or wings in order to 

improve aircraft availability, and revising the design of the deployable 

units in squadrons to better support current deployment practices and 

future operational concepts. (Recommendation 1)

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 27 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

The Secretary of the Air Force should identify and assess actions to 

increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for the high-end air superiority 

missions. This effort could consider alternatives such as: reducing 

exercise events that do not contribute to F-22 pilot high-end air superiority 

training, increasing external adversary air support so all F-22 pilots can 

use their available limited sorties to conduct high-end air superiority 

training rather than having a significant portion of the F-22 pilots providing 

training support, and finding alternatives to using F-22 units for alert 

missions, and other missions that do not require the jet’s unique 

capabilities or prepare F-22 pilots for their primary missions. 

(Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for 

review and comment. That draft contained the same recommendations as 

this unclassified version. In written comments (reproduced in appendix II), 

DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted planned actions to 

address each recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee and the House Armed Services Committee and the Secretary 

of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of 

the Air Force, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: F-22 Maintenance and Supply 

Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability

Page 28 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Maintenance demands of the F-22’s unique Low Observable (LO) 

coating, along with supply challenges exacerbated by the fleet’s small 

size, limit the number of aircraft available for missions. In part because of 

these challenges, the Air Force had an average of 80 F-22s available for 

operations during fiscal year 2016.

Maintenance demands of the F-22’s unique LO coating, a critical 

component that gives the F-22 its stealth characteristics, reduces aircraft 

availability. Without the LO maintenance issues, availability would have 

been significantly closer to meeting the annual availability standard, 

according to Air Force officials. Fourth generation fighters, lacking a full 

LO coating, do not have to contend with this maintenance issue.1 The LO 

coating is actually a series of coatings that require diligent and timeconsuming application and curing, resulting in extended periods of time 

during which aircraft are not available, according to Air Force officials. 

Further, the LO coating for each F-22 requires regular and thorough 

inspection to ensure that any damaged or degraded areas are identified 

and repaired. If damage to the LO coating exceeds a threshold, the F-22 

is considered not capable of conducting its mission.2 An Air Force report 

summarizing fiscal year 2016 maintenance issues reported that LO 

maintenance was the primary reason F-22s were not considered mission 

capable due to maintenance.

Maintaining the integrity of the LO coating complicates other F-22 

maintenance actions because the LO coating must be removed and then 

restored. According to Air Force officials, removing and replacing a part 

on an F-22 and a fourth generation fighter, like an F-15C, could take a 

similar amount of time. However, the F-22 would require additional time at 

the beginning and end of the maintenance action to gain access to the 

part through the LO coating and then restore the integrity of the coating, 

significantly increasing the time aircraft would be unavailable due to 

 1

According to Headquarters Air Force officials, F-22 availability generally lagged behind 

fourth generation fighters by 10 to 20 percent. However, aircraft comparison is 

complicated because each aircraft is at a different stage of its lifecycle. According to Air 

Force Air Combat Command officials, fourth generation fighters are currently 

underperforming due to an intense modification schedule, heavy maintenance 

requirements, and a lack of aircraft due to deployments. They reported that the Air Force 

has initiated efforts to improve aircraft availability for its fourth generation fighters.

2

For further details on this process, see Air Force Instruction 21-101, Combat Air Forces 

Supplement, CAF: Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management (F-22)—Addendum 

A (Oct. 9, 2012).

Appendix I: F-22 Maintenance and Supply 

Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability

Maintenance of the F-22’s 

Unique Low Observable 

Coating Reduces Aircraft 

Availability
Appendix I: F-22 Maintenance and Supply 

Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability

Page 29 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

maintenance. The Air Force is taking steps to reduce the impact of LO 

maintenance by, for example, creating panels that can be removed 

without requiring a full recoating procedure and by developing a more 

durable coating. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the LO coating 

for its other fifth generation fighter—the F-35—uses different materials 

and processes and should be easier to maintain than the F-22’s LO.

The F-22’s LO coating is also beginning to reach the end of its service 

life, requiring maintenance actions that further reduce aircraft availability. 

According to Air Force officials, the LO coating has an 8-to-10 year life 

span, but environmental factors such as high temperatures, humidity, and 

salinity can reduce that span by 2 to 3 years. Further, the Air Force does

not house its F-22s in climate-controlled hangars at 3 of the 4 operational 

locations (Florida, Hawaii, and Virginia), thus exposing them to these LOdegrading environmental factors. The Air Force has taken action to 

address maintenance challenges by using a more durable coating and 

standing up additional repair facilities. The Air Force also plans to use 

more durable materials to make long-term corrective repairs beginning in 

calendar year 2019, but this will constitute a costly long-term effort, 

according to the Air Force.

As a result of the F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for 

parts, the F-22 faces a number of supply challenges that have contributed 

to reduced and unpredictable aircraft availability. Officials from all four 

operational locations identified low supply levels and difficulty obtaining 

needed parts as a concern. Obtaining parts can be a time-consuming and 

costly process because some original manufacturers no longer make the 

parts or are completely out of business, according to Air Force officials. 

When this is the case, the Air Force may need to find the original aircraft 

and parts design plans, and obtain a new contractor to produce a small 

number of parts. Officials at one operational location said a simple wiring 

harness required a 30-week lead time. Air Force maintenance statistics 

for fiscal year 2016 show that 14 percent of the F-22 fleet was not mission 

capable, and therefore not available, due to supply issues. According to 

Air Force officials, the F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for 

parts makes this problem more acute.

F-22 squadrons face an unenviable choice when necessary parts are not 

available, according to Air Force officials: they can make the aircraft 

unavailable until the spare part arrives and can be installed or they can 

take the part from another aircraft that may be broken for a different 

reason. The second option, called cannibalization, is an inefficient way to 

The F-22’s Small Fleet 

Size Exacerbates Spare 

Part Supply Challenges
Appendix I: F-22 Maintenance and Supply 

Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability

Page 30 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

conduct maintenance because it doubles the work. A good part needs to 

be removed from one aircraft and put into another. Once the replacement 

part arrives, it needs to be installed on the cannibalized aircraft. There is 

also a chance that the cannibalized part could get damaged in the 

process or just not work. Further, cannibalization could result in additional 

LO repairs on the donor aircraft. An Air Force report summarizing fiscal 

year 2016 maintenance issues reported that F-22 cannibalization rates 

have grown by 6 percent between fiscal years 2012 and 2016.

The F-22’s small fleet size also exacerbates supply challenges it is facing 

with its engines, potentially falling below minimum spare part 

requirements for multiple calendar years. Further, an increase in flying 

hours in 2014 resulted in engines requiring overhauls sooner than 

previously anticipated. It is taking time for the engine maintenance 

contractor to build up enough capacity to deal with this increased 

demand.3 The officials said that the F-22’s small fleet size contributed to 

this problem because, as was the case with other parts issues, low early 

demand meant that many of the vendors that built parts for those engines 

no longer build the parts or are not in business. Additionally, it takes time 

to find vendors and skilled people to build those parts again. The Air 

Force is implementing a mitigation plan that includes increasing 

production, overflying the standard engine maintenance interval, and 

borrowing engines from aircraft in long-term maintenance. According to 

Air Force officials, this kind of engine issue is not unique to the F-22. 

They noted that there was a time when B-1s, another small fleet, had a 

major engine shortfall that resulted in aircraft parked without engines in 

them. An Air Force forecast shows that mitigation efforts will avoid that 

problem, barring unanticipated increases in demand or maintenance 

problems.

 3

Pratt & Whitney is the contractor that built the F-22’s engines and maintains them.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 31 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 32 GAO-18-190 Force Structure
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 33 GAO-18-190 Force Structure

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, Michael Ferren, Assistant Director; 

Vincent Buquicchio; Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-in-Charge; Patricia 

Donahue; Amie Lesser; Tamiya Lunsford; Matthew Jacobs; Travis 

Masters; Richard Powelson; Walter Vance; and Nicole Volchko made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102363)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO’s website (https://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to https://www.gao.gov

and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and 

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering 

information is posted on GAO’s website, https://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at https://www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: https://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7700

Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director, WilliamsO@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

James-Christian Blockwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Strategic Planning and 

External Liaison

Please Print on Recycled Paper.