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EXAMINING MISCONDUCT AND INTIMIDATION 

OF SCIENTISTS BY SENIOR DOE OFFICIALS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

September 21, 2016 

Serial No. 114–94 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DON BEYER, Virginia 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

HON. RANDY K. WEBER, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEPHAN KNIGHT, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

September 21, 2016 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Barry Loudermilk, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Statement by Representative Don Beyer, Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Randy K. Weber, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Energy, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, Associate Director, Biological and Environmental 

Research, U.S. Department of Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Dr. Noelle Metting, Radiation Biologist, U.S. Department of Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 26 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 75 

Appendix I: Additional Material for the Record 

Statement submitted by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 106 

Statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 109 

Document Submitted by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 110 

Documents submitted by Representative Randy Hultgren, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 118 

Document submitted by Representative Don S.Beyer, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 127 

Report submitted by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ................ 139 

Document submitted by Representative Randy Weber, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 178 

(1) 

EXAMINING MISCONDUCT AND INTIMIDATION 

OF SCIENTISTS BY SENIOR DOE OFFICIALS 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barry Loudermilk 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight] presiding. 
2 

lAMAR S. SMITH, Tttxas 

CHAIRMAN 

ltongrrss of tht 'llnittd ~tatrs 

~OUIIC Of 1RcprCiltntatiUCil COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

(202) 225-6371 

WW>,V.5ci~nce.houss.gt;IV 

Subcommittees on Energy and Oversight 

!:DO!£ BERNICE JOHNSON, Texlls 

RANKING MEMilF.R 

Examining Misconduct and Intimidation of Scientists by 

Senior DOE Officials 

Wednesday, September21, 2016 

10:00 a.m.- 12:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Dr. Sharlene Weathetwax, Associate Director, Biological & Environmental Research, 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Dr, Noelle Metting, Radiation Biologist, U.S. Department of Energy 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HEARING CHARTER 

Wednesday, September2l, 2016 

TO: Members, Subcommittee on Oversight and Energy 

FROM: Majority Staff, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

SUBJECT: Joint Subcommittee hearing "Examining Misconduct and Intimidation of 

Scientists by Senior DOE Officials" 

The Subcommittees on Oversight and Energy will hold a joint hearing titled "Examining 

Misconduct and Intimidation of Scientists by Senior DOE Officials" on Wednesday, September 

21,2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2318 of Rayburn House Office Building. 

Hearing Purpose: 

This hearing will examine actions by Senior U.S. Department of Energy officials to intimidate 

scientists and withhold information from the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

during the legislative process. 

Witness List 

• Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, Associate Director, Biological and Environmental Research, 

U.S. Department of Energy 

• Dr. Noelle Metting, Radiation Biologist, U.S. Department of Energy 

Staff Contact 

For questions related to the hearing, please contact Aaron Weston of the majority staff at 

(202) 225-6917. 
4 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Energy will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of 

the subcommittee at any time. 

Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘Examining Misconduct and 

Intimidation of Scientists by Senior DOE Officials.’’ I now recognize 

myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Good morning, and welcome to today’s Oversight and Energy 

Subcommittee hearing examining the intimidation of scientists at 

the Department of Energy. 

Congressional oversight and authority to access information is a 

constitutional authority granted to Congress. Without open dialogue with the federal agencies, Congress cannot gather the information needed to effectively legislate. Today, we will examine a 

clear case of this committee’s request for information directly related to the legislative process and the executive branch’s actions 

to block Congressional access to federally funded research. 

Unfortunately, what we will learn at today’s hearing is not an 

isolated incident. It fits a pattern of intentional misinformation 

from the Obama Administration officials, ranging from FDIC to 

NIST to EPA, and now the Department of Energy. While today’s 

hearing is disturbing in many ways, I am most concerned with this 

incident because it appears that unelected DOE officials sought retribution against a DOE scientist simply for respecting the constitutional authority of Congress in order to advance political priorities. 

The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology is the authorizing committee for scientific research and development. In order to 

fully inform the legislative process, committee staff must be able to 

engage in open discussions with federal researchers to fully understand the scope and value of existing programs. In fact, this open 

dialogue is protected in each annual appropriations act we pass in 

the House. 

Federal law prohibits department and agency officials from stifling communications with Congress and penalizes those who seek 

to silence federal employees by prohibiting the payment of their 

salaries by the U.S. Treasury. I would request unanimous consent 

that this provision of law be included in the record. 

[The appears in Appendix I] 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Transparency from executive agencies is 

necessary to ensure Congress’ ability to carry out our oversight and 

legislative responsibilities effectively. In this case, communications 

with DOE are central to the Committee’s oversight of accountable 

use of taxpayer funds in scientific research. Sadly, it appears that 

politics has disrupted this important dialogue between Congress 

and the Department of Energy, and derailed important scientific 

research in the process. 

When DOE decided it wanted to redirect funds to support President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, the Department sacrificed the 

Low Dose Radiation Research Program to achieve this goal. This 

program is the federal government’s only program to investigate 

whether the types of radiation received by Americans every day are 

dangerous. This research is vital to understanding radiation doses 

to patients undergoing CT scans or PET scans, or the hazards of 

radiation to workers in the nuclear industry. 
5 

The Low Dose Program is also crucial to understanding the effects of a dirty bomb or nuclear accident on potential victims, so 

it is a key research program to protecting our homeland. This is 

clearly science in the national interest. 

But when this committee took steps to specifically authorize this 

important research, DOE pushed back. When Dr. Noelle Metting, 

the DOE scientist in charge of this program, provided honest input 

on the merits of the Low Dose Program, she was subsequently fired 

by DOE senior management, all for the ‘‘crime’’ of working to conduct what is clearly important research and explaining that research to Congressional staff. 

I want to make absolutely clear that Congress is not directing 

the technical experts on how to specifically carry out research. Instead, Congress decides the broad priorities and policy goals, and 

makes sure that taxpayer funds are spent responsibly on research 

with the greatest potential, while DOE carries out research at Congressional direction. It is disappointing that DOE’s senior management would attempt to usurp this process and silence a federal researcher to advance political goals in violation of appropriations 

laws. 

This Administration’s bullying and intimidation must stop. I 

hope at today’s hearing we will get to the bottom of the intimidation, deception, and misinformation conducted by the DOE officials 

for political priorities. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Loudermilk follows:] 
6 

+) ~,f!f~S!., SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY 

For Immediate Release 

September 21, 2016 

Media Contact: Kristina Baum 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement of Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Barry Loudermilk (R-Ga.) 

Examining Misconduct and Intimidation of Scientists by Senior DOE Officials 

Chairman Loudermilk: Good morning and welcome to today's Oversight and Energy 

Subcommittee hearing examining the intimidation of scientists at the Department of 

Energy. 

Congressional oversight and authority to access information is a constitutional 

authority granted to Congress. Without open dialogue with the federal agencies, 

Congress cannot gather the information needed to effectively legislate. Today, we 

will examine a clear case of this Committee's request for information directly related to 

the legislative process, and the Executive branch's actions to block Congressional 

access to federally funded research. 

Unfortunately, what we will learn at today's hearing is not an isolated incident. 

It fits a pattern of intentional misinformation from Obama Administration officials, 

ranging from FDIC to NIST to EPA- and now the Department of Energy (DOE). While 

today's hearing is disturbing in many ways, I am most concerned with this incident 

because it appears that unelected DOE officials sought retribution against a DOE 

scientist simply for respecting the Constitutional authority of Congress in order to 

advance political priorities. 

The Committee on Science. Space, and Technology is the authorizing committee for 

scientific research and development. In order to fully inform the legislative process, 

Committee staff must be able to engage in open discussions with federal researchers 

to fully understand the scope and value of existing programs. In fact, this open 

dialogue is protected in each annual appropriations act we pass in the House. 

Federal law prohibits department and agency officials from stifling communications 

with Congress and penalizes those who seek to silence federal employees by 

prohibiting the payment of their salaries by the U.S. Treasury. I would request 

unanimous consent that this provision of law be included in the record. 

Transparency from executive agencies is necessary to ensure Congress' ability to carry 

out our oversight and legislative responsibilities effectively. In this case, 

communications with DOE are central to the Committee's oversight of the 

accountable use of taxpayer funds in scientific research. Sadly, it appears that politics 
7 

has disrupted this important dialogue between Congress and the Department of 

Energy, and derailed important scientific research in the process. 

When DOE decided it wanted to redirect funds to support President Obama's Climate 

Action Plan, the Department sacrificed the Low Dose Radiation Research program to 

achieve this goal. 

This program is the federal government's only program to investigate whether the 

types of radiation received by Americans every day are dangerous. This research is 

vital to understanding radiation doses to patients undergoing CT scans or PET scans, or 

the hazards of radiation to workers in the nuclear industry. 

The Low Dose program is also crucial to understanding the effects of a dirty bomb or 

nuclear accident on potential victims, so is a key research program to protecting our 

homeland. This is clearly science in the national interest. 

But when this Committee took steps to specifically authorize this important research, 

DOE pushed back. When Dr. Noel Melting, the DOE scientist in charge of this 

program, provided honest input on the merits of the Low Dose program, she was 

subsequently fired by DOE senior management. All for the "crime" of working to 

conduct what is clearly important research, and explaining that research to 

Congressional staff. 

I want to make absolutely clear that Congress is not directing the technical experts 

how to specifically carry out research. Instead, Congress decides the broad priorities 

and policy goals, and makes sure that taxpayer funds are spent responsibly on 

research with the greatest potential. while DOE carries out research at Congressional 

direction. It is disappointing that DOE's senior management would attempt to usurp 

this process, and silence a federal researcher to advance political goals- in violation 

of appropriations law. 

This Administration's bullying and intimidation must stop. I hope that at today's hearing 

we will get to the bottom of the intimidation. deception and misinformation 

conducted by DOE officials for political priorities. 

### 
8 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. I now recognize the Ranking Member, 

the gentleman from Virginia, for an opening statement. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And later on, 

I’m sure we’ll have a chance to distinguish between political priorities and scientific priorities because they are different. 

I want to thank the Chairmen Loudermilk and Weber for today’s 

hearing and thank you, Doctors, for testifying. 

In February this year, the Science Committee began investigating the Department of Energy’s attempt to stop funding the 

Low Dose Radiation Research Program and the related personnel 

action that resulted in the removal of longtime Program Manager 

Dr. Noelle Metting. 

As a businessman, as a former Ambassador, as someone who’s 

been involved in transition of federal agencies and for presidential 

elections, I think I know what good and bad management looks 

like. I also represent many federal employees, and they often call 

my office when they see evidence of mismanagement or are treated 

poorly or unfairly themselves. 

From everything I know, it seems to me that in this instance the 

Department of Energy was a bit overzealous in the removal of Dr. 

Metting and badly mishandled this case. This all stems from a 

briefing October of 2014 requested by a majority staff member, and 

I’d like to note that the Democratic committee staff members were 

not present, nor were they invited to the meetings so we can’t attest firsthand to what actually happened. We can only rely on the 

accounts given during the formal transcribed interviews with only 

two of the four DOE officials that were present. 

On that note, I’m disappointed that yet another investigation by 

the committee’s majority appears incomplete. To my knowledge, 

the committee’s majority never formally interviewed Dr. Metting or 

the other DOE staff member who was present during the October 

incident. And, in addition, Dr. Weatherwax, who is also testifying 

today, was not even present for the meeting or post-meeting discussion that resulted in the removal of Dr. Metting. So good luck 

today, Dr. Weatherwax. 

While I don’t believe that Dr. Metting’s actions at the briefing 

should be characterized as that of a whistleblower, I do strongly 

support the right of federal employees to petition their government 

and speak openly about their work without fear of retaliation. As 

a federal employee, Dr. Metting should have felt unbridled in her 

answers to and interactions with Congressional staff. 

I certainly know as a sometime boss and manager I always want 

to hear all sides of an issue, yes and no, to make good decisions. 

I would strongly recommend that the Department take a closer 

look at how they handle situations like the one we’re talking about 

today. 

On that point, the scientific integrity policy that the Department 

released in 2012 could certainly use a second look or potentially an 

update. The policy leaves gray areas that can create confusion and 

misunderstanding, and relative to other executive agency branches, 

DOE’s scientific integrity policy is not nearly as robust. Agencies 

like the Department of Interior, NASA, NOAA have led the way in 

this effort. And given the quality and the quantity of scientific re-
9 

search at DOE, I’d really expect more from DOE leadership on this 

front. 

I also look forward to learning more about the future of low dose 

radiation research today. I’d urge the Department to be more clear 

with Congress about their intentions and rationale for changes in 

research priorities to make sure they’re based on science and not, 

as our Chair suggested, on politics. 

There’s been a general lack of communication from DOE on these 

particular research activities involving low dose radiation research. 

I hope we can avoid similar occurrences in the future. The clearer 

the communication early on, the better off. 

Before I conclude, I’d also like to add that I find this halfhearted 

investigation especially ironic, given that the committee’s majority 

is engaged in clear intimidation of government scientists that are 

conducting client change research at NOAA, including a issuing a 

subpoena to NOAA Administrator and former astronaut Dr. Kathryn Sullivan for emails of the scientists all because the majority 

disagreed with the results of a twice peer-reviewed scientific study. 

And I’d point out that I don’t believe the majority has ever produced a shred of evidence that would have justified the subpoena, 

although they made numerous unsubstantiated allegations of scientific misconduct by NOAA scientists. 

I think if we’re going to talk about chilling effects on scientists, 

we need to look across the complete board. 

I think we can all agree that all scientists—government, academia, private sector—should be free of undue influence, be it politics or profit. Our policy decisions should be guided by our research 

by our world-class scientists. When they speak loudly in unison, we 

should listen. I don’t think that’s always been the case in this Congress or on this committee. 

Lastly, this incident highlights the necessity of basic due process 

requirements, appeals, and federal employee protections, as well as 

the right of federal employees to have the right to union representation. If my friends on the majority are sincere about their concern for federal employees, and I hope they are, I’d encourage them 

to keep this hearing in mind next time Congress considers legislation intended to erode due process and collective bargaining rights 

for federal employees. 

My dad spent a year in Eniwetok 1956, ’57, as provost marshal 

when they were testing nuclear weapons, so I’m very interested in 

what the impact of low-dose radiation is because he’s only 92–1/2 

right now. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beyer follows:] 
10 

OPEN!NG STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Don Beyer (D-VA) 

of the Subcommittee on Oversight 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittees on Oversight and Energy 

"Examining Misconduct and Intimidation of Scientists by Senior DOE Officials" 

September21, 2016 

Thank you Chairmen Loudermilk and Weber for holding today's hearing and thank you to the 

witnesses for testifying. 

In February of this year, the Science Committee began investigating the Department of Energy's 

intent to stop funding the Low Dose Radiation Research Program and the related personnel 

action that resulted in the removal of the long-time Program Manager, Dr. Noelle Metting. 

As a businessman, former Ambassador, and someone who has been involved in the transition of 

federal agencies after Presidential elections, I know what good and bad management looks like. I 

also represent many federal employees and they often call my office when they see evidence of 

mismanagement or are treated poorly or unfairly themselves. 

From everything I know, it seems to me that in this instance the Department of Energy was a bit 

over-zealous in the removal of Dr. Metting and badly mishandled this case. 

This all stems from a briefing in October 2014 requested by a Majority staff member. I would 

like to note that Democratic Committee staff members were not present nor were they invited to 

the meeting, so we cannot attest first-hand as to what occurred during the briefing in question. 

We can only rely on the accounts given during the formal transcribed interviews from two of the 

four DOE officials that were present. 

On that note, I am disappointed that yet another investigation by the Committee's Majority 

appears incomplete. To my knowledge, the Committee's Majority never formally interviewed 

Dr. Metting or the other DOE staff member present during the October incident. Moreover, Dr. 

Weatherwax, who is also testifying today, was not even present for the meeting or post-meeting 

discussion that resulted in the removal of Dr. Metting. 

While I do not believe Dr. Melting's actions at the briefing should be characterized as those of a 

whistleblower, I do strongly support the right of Federal employees to petition their government 

and speak openly about their work without fear of retaliation. As a Federal employee, Dr. 

Metting should have felt unbridled in her answers to and interactions with Congressional staff. 

I would strongly recommend that the Department take a closer look at how they handle situations 

like the one before us today. On that point, the scientific integrity policy that the Department 

released in 2012 could certainly use a second look and potentially an update. The policy leaves 

gray areas that create confusion and misunderstanding. Relative to other Executive Branch 

agencies, DOE's scientific integrity policy is not nearly as robust. Agencies like the Department 
11 

oflnterior, NASA, and NOAA have led the way in this effort. Given the quality and quantity of 

innovative scientific research at the Department, I would expect more leadership from DOE on 

this front. 

I also look forward to learning more about the future of the Low Dose Radiation Research 

Program today. I would urge the Department to be more clear with Congress about their 

intentions and rationale for changes in research priorities going forward. There has been a 

general lack of communication from DOE on these particular research activities involving low 

dose radiation research. I hope we can avoid similar occurrences in the future. The clearer the 

communication from the start the faster we can work together to settle our differences. 

Before I conclude I would like to add that I find this half-hearted investigation especially ironic 

given that the Committee's Majority has engaged in clear intimidation of government scientists 

that are conducting climate change research at NOAA, including issuing a subpoena to NOAA 

Administrator and former astronaut Dr. Kathryn Sullivan for the emails of scientists all because 

the Majority disagreed with the results of a twice peer-reviewed scientific study. l would point 

out that I do not believe the Majority has ever produced a shred of evidence that would have 

justified that subpoena, although they made numerous unsubstantiated allegations of scientific 

misconduct by NOAA's scientists. 

I think we can all agree that all scientists, whether in government, academia, or the private sector 

should be free of undue influence, be it politics or profit. Our policy decisions should be guided 

by our research and our world-leading scientists. When they speak loudly and in unison, we 

should listen. Unfortunately, I don't think that is always the case in Congress or on this 

Committee, but we'll save that conversation for another day. 

Lastly, this incident highlights the necessity of basic due process requirements, appeals, and 

federal employee protections, as well as the right of federal employees to have the right to union 

representation. If my colleagues in the Majority are sincere about their concern for federal 

employees, I would encourage them to keep this hearing in mind next time Congress considers 

legislation intended to erode due process and collective bargaining rights for federal employees. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
12 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Beyer. And for the 

record, I agree with you. It is very important that we have the true 

testimony from the others that were in that meeting. And for the 

record, this committee did invite Dr. Julie Carruthers and Dr. Todd 

Anderson, who were present during the briefing October 16, 2014, 

but the Department of Energy chose not to provide those witnesses 

for today’s hearing. 

At this point I’d like to recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy, Mr. Weber, for his opening statement. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

And good morning. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy, 

I have spent this Congress focusing on basic research that can benefit our nation by enabling technology breakthroughs. 

Throughout its history, the Department of Energy (DOE) has 

conducted research in support of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons complex. It has also explored the impact of radiation so that 

our nation’s researchers, industry, and military can safely handle 

nuclear material—I bet you’re all about that, Dr. Metting—also 

maintain the nation’s nuclear weapons program, and dispose of 

that same nuclear waste. In my opinion not only good energy policy 

but good national security policy that the Chairman alluded to. 

This use-inspired basic research leads to scientific discoveries and 

long-term benefits for the energy industry and for our national defense. 

Today, we will examine the Department’s decision to terminate 

the Low Dose Radiation Research Program, and may I add the only 

federal program currently conducting research in this area. 

This program does three things. It provides research that can inform authorities setting nuclear safety standards for the public. 

Low dose research can also provide, number two, new data to enable federal emergency response agencies to more accurately set 

evacuation zones from radiological incidents. And number three, it 

provides research to enable practicing physicians to decide when 

and how to use diagnostics to detect cancer in patients. The research conducted in the Low Dose Program can also facilitate, I 

guess a fourth thing, medical research efforts to even combat cancer. Other than that, the research is really not useful. 

I’m being facetious obviously. When DOE chose to close down the 

Low Dose Program, this committee began to examine this research 

program. Why was that? Committee staff contacted DOE specifically to hear from technical experts about the broad impact of this 

basic research program and the potential value this research could 

yield for domestic energy, medical discovery, and national security 

to put it in a nutshell. And as this committee took steps to authorize the Low Dose Program through the legislative process, we relied on these open conversations with DOE researchers to draft legislation that would prioritize this important research and responsibly invest American tax dollars. 

These kinds of frank discussions between researchers and Congressional staff are absolutely vital in this legislative process. 

Members of Congress must be able to trust that the information 

they receive from DOE is nonpartisan and, quite frankly, is delivered without political bias. Congress must get access to these facts. 

We have to make good policy. There’s no way around that. 
13 

Unfortunately, the Department violated Congressional trust by 

attempting to censor information provided to committee staff. And 

what’s worse, a DOE scientist was punished for speaking to Congress. That is simply unacceptable. 

Congress must be able to expect a high standard of accountability and honesty from federal agencies to effectively legislate 

and fulfill our constitutional duty to the public. When scientists get 

fired for speaking honestly about their work, it is clear that politics 

are negatively impacting the work of Congress and stifling public 

dialogue, not to mention stifling research in those key areas that 

I alluded to. 

I want to thank our witnesses for testifying today, particularly 

Dr. Metting for being willing to share her unfortunate experience 

with the committee. I hope that by exposing DOE’s misconduct in 

this case, we can prevent this kind of inappropriate action in the 

future and preserve scientific integrity and transparency at the Department. American taxpayers deserve nothing less. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weber follows:] 
14 

COMMITTEE ON 

SCIENCE, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY 

Lamar Smith, Chairman 

For Immediate Release 

September 21,2016 

Media Contact: Kristina Baum 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement of Energy SubcommiHee Chairman Randy Weber (R-Texas) 

Examining Misconduct and Intimidation of Scientists by Senior DOE Officials 

Chairman Weber: Good morning. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy, I have 

spent this Congress focusing on basic research that can benefit our nation by 

enabling technology breakthroughs. Throughout its history, the Department of Energy 

(DOE) has conducted research in support of our nuclear energy and nuclear weapons 

complex, exploring the impact of radiation so our nation's researchers, industry, and 

military can safely handle nuclear material. maintain the nation's nuclear weapons 

program, and dispose of nuclear waste. 

This use-inspired, basic research leads to scientific discoveries and long-term benefits 

for the energy industry and our national defense. Today, we will examine the 

Department's decision to terminate the Low Dose Radiation Research program, the 

only federal program currently conducting research in this area. 

This program provides research that can inform authorities setting nuclear safety 

standards for the public. Low dose radiation research can also provide new data to 

enable federal emergency response agencies to more accurately set evacuation 

zones from radiological incidents, or provide research to enable practicing physicians 

to decide when and how to use diagnostics to detect cancer in patients. The 

research conducted in the Low Dose program can also facilitate medical research 

efforts to combat cancer. 

When DOE chose to close down the Low Dose program, this committee began to 

examine this research program. 

Committee staff contacted DOE specifically to hear from technical experts about the 

broad impact of this basic research program, and the potential value this research 

could yield for domestic energy, medical discovery, and national security. 

And as this committee took steps to authorize the Low Dose program through the 

legislative process, we relied on these open conversations with DOE researchers to 

draft legislation that would prioritize this important research and responsibly invest 

American tax dollars. 

These kinds of frank discussions between researchers and Congressional staff are 

absolutely vital in the legislative process. Members of Congress must be able to trust 
15 

that the information they receive from DOE is non-partisan and is delivered without 

political bias. Congress must get access to the facts. 

The Department violated Congressional trust by attempting to censor information 

provided to committee staff. 

And what's worse, a DOE scientist was punished for speaking to Congress. That is 

simply unacceptable. 

Congress must be able to expect a high standard of accountability and honesty from 

fede~l agencies to effectively legislate. When scientists get fired for speaking honestly 

about their work, it is clear that politics are negatively impacting the work of Congress 

and stifling public dialogue. 

I want to thank our witnesses for testifying today, particularly Dr. Melting for being 

willing to share her unfortunate experience with the committee. I hope that by 

exposing DOE's misconduct in this case, we can prevent this kind of inappropriate 

action in the future and preserve scientific integrity and transparency at the 

Department. 

### 
16 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. I thank the gentleman from Texas. 

And now, I’d like to introduce our witnesses. Our first witness 

today is Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, Associate Director for Biological 

Environmental Research at the U.S. Department of Energy. She 

has previously served in a number of different positions within the 

DOE, including as the Division Director and Program Manager for 

the Biological System Science Division of the Office of Biological 

and Environmental Research, and Program Manager in the Office 

of Basic Energy Sciences. 

Dr. Weatherwax received her bachelor of science in biochemistry 

from the University of California at Los Angeles and her Ph.D. in 

biochemistry from the University of California at Berkeley. 

Our final witness today is Dr. Noelle Metting, Radiation Biologist 

at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Environment, Health, 

Safety, and Security within the Office of Public Radiation Protection. Dr. Metting previously worked in the DOE’s Office of Science, 

Office of Biological and Environmental Research where she managed the DOE’s Low Dose Radiation Program. In addition, she 

worked for 20 years as a laboratory research scientist at Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory. 

Dr. Metting received her master’s degree in radiological sciences 

from the University of Washington and her doctor of science in cancer biology from Harvard. 

I now recognize Dr. Weatherwax for five minutes present her testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. SHARLENE WEATHERWAX, 

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today to discuss the Department of Energy’s Low Dose 

Radiation Research Program and the decision to end the program 

in fiscal year 2016. 

My name is Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, and I’m the Associate Director for Science and Biological and Environmental Research, or 

BER, in DOE’s Office of Science. I have earned my Ph.D. in biochemistry from the University of California at Berkeley, and I have 

research expertise in microbial enzymology and plant molecular biology. 

I joined the Department of Energy in 2001 as a career federal 

employee and—first as a Program Manager for the Office of Basic 

Energy Sciences and then in BER. I rose to the Senior Executive 

Service position of Biological System Science Division Director in 

2008 and became the Associate Director for BER in 2011. I am responsible for strategic program planning, budget formulation and 

execution, and coordination with other DOE program offices and 

other federal agencies. 

BER supports fundamental research in scientific user facilities to 

support DOE’s energy, environment, and basic research missions, 

drawing upon the scientific expertise of researchers at academic 

and industrial institutions and the DOE national labs. 
17 

The BER Biological Systems Science Division supports a diverse 

portfolio of fundamental research and technology development, 

serving as the basis for the competent redesign of microbes and 

plants for sustainable biofuel production, improved carbon storage, 

and controlled biological transformation of materials such as nutrient and contaminants in the environment. 

There is a very competitive environment for funding within BER 

with exciting new scientific opportunities due to the rapidly changing nature of biological science. Since completion of the human genome sequence in 2003, the genome sequencing and analysis tools 

at the DOE’s Joint Genome Institute have enabled BER’s Genomic 

Science Program to be at the forefront of developing the scientific 

basis for translating genetic parts list for plants and microorganisms into scientific knowledge about biological system functions. 

This research is exemplified in the Bioenergy Research Centers, 

which were started 2007. The centers continue to produce the innovative science needed to foster production of fuels and chemicals 

from renewable biomass and are working to translate these basic 

science results to practical outcomes for industry and society. 

BER is also at the forefront of deciphering the underlying principles of genomic expression in order to design new biological functions. With continued understanding of the genomic potential of 

plants and microbes comes the ability to manipulate and design 

new pathways into plants and microbes work. Biosystem design 

concepts are at the heart of the ongoing biotechnology revolution 

and key to maintaining international leadership. 

In addition to these major efforts in bioenergy-related research, 

BER has managed a basic research program in low-dose radiation 

research since 1998. Over the past 18 years, the program has provided new type technological advances and fundamental scientific 

understanding of the mechanisms cells use to sense, repair, and 

adapt the impacts of low-dose radiation. Research investigations 

have included a number of critical biological phenomena induced by 

low-dose exposure, including adaptive response, bystander effects, 

genomic instability, and genetic susceptibility. 

The program was not intended to address regulatory policy but 

rather to advance the fundamental science of radiation impacts on 

biological processes. To date there are no studies that have been 

able to establish with sufficient certainty a threshold level of radiation below which the risk for cancer is zero despite decades of research in this area. Any changes to the current protection standards would require strong and compelling evidence that a higher 

amount of radiation exposure is safe. 

The low-dose—the DOE Low Dose Radiation Research Program 

is ending in fiscal year 2016 as BER’s biology portfolio continues 

to shift more towards bioenergy, biodesign, and environmental 

microbiology research missions. Funding levels have been steadily 

decreasing since 2012 with $1 million appropriated to complete the 

program in fiscal year 2016. 

The total amount of appropriated funding that the DOE Office of 

Science has devoted to the Low Dose Research from its inception 

is over a quarter of $1 billion, and the program outcomes and data 

are available to the community and other interested agencies 

through peer-reviewed scientific publications. 
18 

Biology is rapidly transforming to a more quantitative and predictive science, and the BER biology portfolio continues to extend 

its genome science efforts to plants and microbes to develop the 

fundamental scientific understanding needed for solutions to energy challenges of the future. 

Thank you for inviting me to speak about the Low Dose Radiation Research Program. I look forward to answering the committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Weatherwax follows:] 
19 

Testimony of Associate Director Sharlene Weatherwax 

Office of Biological and Environmental Research 

Office of Science 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

U.S. House of Representatives 

September 21, 2016 

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE) Low Dose 

Radiation Research Program and the decision to end the program in FY 2016. 

My name is Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, and I am the Associate Director for Science in Biological 

and Environmental Research (BER), in the Department of Energy's Office of Science. My 

formal education and PhD are in biochemistry, and I have been with the Department for over 15 

years, first in the office ofBasie Energy Sciences and then in BER. The Low Dose Radiation 

Research Program is one portfolio element within BER's Biological Systems Science Division. 

The Biological Systems Science Division supports a diverse portfolio offundamental research 

and technology development to achieve a predictive systems-level understanding of complex 

biological systems to advance DOE missions in energy and the environment. By integrating 

genome science with advanced computational and experimental approaches, the Division seeks 

to gain a predictive understanding of living systems, from microbes and microbial communities 

to plants and other whole organisms. This foundational knowledge serves as the basis for the 

confident redesign of microbes and plants for sustainable biofuel production, improved carbon 

storage, and controlled biological transformation of materials such as nutrients and contaminants 

in the environment. 

BER strategic science directions are guided by input from the research community, scientific 

workshops, the National Science and Technology Council, the National Academy of Sciences 

and the Office of Biological and Environmental Research Advisory Committee (BERAC). There 

is a very competitive environment for funding within BER, with exciting new scientific 

opportunities identified in workshop reports, DOE's Quadrennial Technology Report, and other 

sources. One reason for BER's competitive portfolio is the rapidly changing nature of BER 

science. BER has been instrumental in accelerating the development of DNA sequencing 

technology over the past 20+ years, culminating in the completion of the human genome 

sequence in 2003. This scientific and technological triumph of the human genome project, 

conducted in partnership with the Nationallnstitutes of Health, has sparked a revolution in 

biotechnology that continues to this day with a modest $4 billion Federal investment yielding an 

enormous economic impact estimated (in 20 II) at $796B 1

• 

1 http://www.battelle.org/docs/default-document-library/economic_impact_of_the_human_genome_project.pdf 

1 
20 

Over the last 15 years, DOE has transformed its genome science toward DOE-mission relevant 

efforts in energy and the environment. The DOE Joint Genome Institute (JGl) is a direct 

descendent of sequencing projects initially funded to sequence the human genome. Building 

upon genome sequencing production at the JGI, providing the genetic "parts lists" for plants and 

microorganisms, BER's genomic science program has been at the forefront of developing the 

fundamental knowledge needed to efficiently convert plant biomass into fuels and chemicals as 

replacements for those currently derived from petroleum. BER basic research is developing the 

scientific basis for producing the fuels and chemicals needed for a modem society from more 

sustainable, renewable biomass resources. For example, BER supports basic research to develop 

new bioenergy crops and improved biofuel production processes2 • This research is exemplified 

in the Bioenergy Research Centers (BRCs)3

, started in 2007. The BRCs, now in their ninth year 

of operation, continue to produce the science needed to foster production of fuels and chemicals 

from renewable biomass by: 1) developing dedicated bioenergy crops across a range of plant 

species (ex. grasses, trees); 2) improving methods to breakdown biomass into its component 

parts (cellulose, hemicellulose, lignin); 3) genetically modifying microorganisms for efficient 

conversion of cellulosic sugars and/or lignin to fuels and chemicals; 4) developing the integrative 

knowledge needed to sustainably support a biofuels industry, and; 5) working with industry to 

translate basic science results to commercial practice. To date (Aug. 2016) the BRCs have 

produced 2314 peer-reviewed manuscripts that have been cited over 70,000 times and I 098 

intellectual property disclosures, applications, or patents. 

Additionally, BER science continues to be at the forefront of deciphering the underlying 

principles of genome expression in order to design new biological functions. With continued 

understanding of the genomic potential of plants and microbes comes the ability to manipulate 

and design new pathways into plants and microbes for beneficial purposes. Biosystem design 

concepts are at the heart of the ongoing biotechnology revolution and key to maintaining 

international leadership in a very competitive biotechnology field. 

More recent integrative science within BER combines efforts across the portfolio to develop a 

deeper understanding of sustainable practices for bioenergy production. BER's efforts in plant 

and microbial systems biology is being combined with environmental process understanding to 

develop new sustainability research approaches for bioenergy production. Better understanding 

of complex plant-soil-microbe interactions that drive sustainable bioenergy crop production will 

Lignocellulosic Biomass for Advanced Biofuels 

and Bioproducts workshop report: 

http://science.energy.gov/-/media!ber/pdf/workshop%20reports!Lignocellulosic Biomass for Advanced 

Biofuels and Bioproducts.pdf 3 2014 Bioenergy Research Centers report available online: 

http:/ I genom icscience.energy.gov /centers/B RCs20 14 HR. pdf 

2 
21 

enable reliable predictions of bioenergy crop yield under differing environmental conditions 

and/or geographic regions, important for sustaining a bioenergy industry. 

In addition to these major efforts in bioenergy-related research, BER has also managed a basic 

research program in Low Dose Radiation Research since 1998. At that time there was ample 

evidence from atomic bomb survivor studies to clearly indicate a statistically significant linear 

response between observed human health effects (cancer) and radiation at relatively high doses 

but no statistically significant data available at the low doses (less than I OOmSv) more 

commonly experienced by most people. The low dose program was developed to specifically 

address what if any effects low doses of radiation could have on human health below 100mSv4

• 

Over the past 18 years the program has provided new technological advances and fundamental 

scientific understanding of the mechanisms cells use to sense, repair and adapt to the impacts of 

low dose radiation. Research investigations have included a number of critical biological 

phenomena induced by low dose exposure including adaptive responses, bystander effects, 

genomic instability, and genetic susceptibility. The program has supported the development of 

systems genetic strategies, including the role of epigenetics in integrated gene function and 

response of biological systems to environmental conditions, with a goal of translating molecularscale effects of low dose radiation to whole model organisms. The program outcomes and data 

are available to the community and other interested agencies through peer-reviewed scientific 

publications. 

The program more recently has also supported epidemiological research such as the "Million 

Worker Study" being conducted by the National Council on Radiation Protection and 

Measurements. The health effects of low dose radiation are subtle and very difficult to 

experimentally discern. Very large sample sizes are needed to lend sufficient statistical power to 

the analysis of the experimental observations. This large epidemiological study is evaluating data 

collected and available from over a million radiation workers; funding is provided not only by 

DOE, but also by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Environmental Protection Agency, and 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Analysis of the results could provide the 

necessary statistical power to draw conclusions and make recommendations on the health effects 

of low dose radiation. This study focusing on analysis of former radiation workers and veterans 

complements research from the Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics of the National 

Cancer Institute (NCI), one of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The Division's Radiation 

Epidemiology Branch specifically focuses on identifying, understanding, and quantifying the risk 

of cancer in populations exposed to medical, occupational, or environmental radiation, and to 

advance our understanding of radiation carcinogenesis. The total amount of funding that the 

4

Millisievert. The sievert is the S! unit for dose of ionizing radiation on the human body. The average person 

receives about 3.1 mSv per year from natural radiation. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheetslbio-effects-radiation.html 

3 
22 

DOE Office of Science has devoted to the Low Dose Research Program from its inception is 

over a quarter of a billion dollars. 

The program was not intended to address regulatory policy but rather to advance the fundamental 

science of radiation impacts on biological processes. The Environmental Protection 

Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) bear the responsibility for establishing 

generally applicable and legally enforceable standards for the protection of human health and the 

environment from radioactive materials. EPA standards set protective limits on the 

radioactivity in soil, water and air that comes from human use of radioactive elements. The NRC 

licenses and regulates the Nation's civilian use of radioactive materials to protect public health 

and safety and promote the common defense and security. The NRC sets dose limits for both 

mem.bers of the public and workers in the nuclear industry. 

Current radiation protection standards are based on the presumption that any exposure to 

radiation presents some risk of cancer to the exposed individual. That is, the relationship between 

cancer risk and radiation exposure is linear and there is no threshold level of radiation below 

which there is not some risk of cancer. Any changes to the current protection standards would 

require strong and compelling evidence that a higher amount of radiation is safe. 

The "EPA Radiogenic Cancer Risk Models and Projections for the U.S. Population" book 

describes EPA's methodology for estimating cancer risks from radiation exposure based on the 

National Research Council's 2006 report "Biological Effects oflonizing Radiation (BEIR VII)," 

as well as on other updated science. The book calculates cancer risk estimates separately by age 

at exposure, sex and potentially affected organ. Its risk estimate methodology reflects the 

scientific consensus of the BEIR VII committee and presents the scientific basis for the 

estimates. The book takes into account recommendations made by EPA's Science Advisory 

Board (SAB), which completed its review in January 2010. 

The SAB relied on advice from its Radiation Advisory Committee panel of non-EPA scientists 

chosen for their objectivity, integrity and expertise in radiation science and protection; 

additionally, the book has undergone an extensive peer review process, which included 

opportunities for the public and stakeholders to provide comment 

(https://www.epa.gov/radiation/blue-book-epa-radiogenic-cancer-risk-models-and-projectionsus-population#tab-l ). EPA risk assessment regarding other cancer-causing exposures also 

follows the linear no-threshold (LNT) methodology in the absence of mode-of-action and/or 

biological data to the contrary as a public-health-protective measure 5. 

5 https://www.epa.gov /sites/production/files/20 13-09/documents/cancer _guidelines_ final_ 3-25-

05.pdf 

4 
23 

To date, there are no studies that have been able to establish with sufficient certainty a threshold 

ievel of radiation below which a risk of cancer is zero, despite decades of research in this area. 

In the absence of sufficient data to the contrary, the LNT model continues to be the accepted, 

albeit conservative, standard on which current radiation worker protection standards are based. 

Current National and International bodies (National Council on Radiation Protection and 

Measurements, NCRP; International Commission on Radiological Protection, (ICRP)) continue 

to recommend the use of the LNT. 

The DOE Low Dose Radiation Research program is ending in FY 2016 with a substantial record 

of fundamental research that has been disseminated in the primary research literature. Despite the 

program's many research accomplishments, there are no definitive research results sufficient to 

revise the linear no-threshold model for cancer caused by low dose radiation exposure, and 

BER's Biological System science portfolio continues to shift more towards bioenergy, biodesign, 

and environmental microbiology missions. Funding levels for the Low Dose Radiation Research 

program have been steadily decreasing since 2012, with $1M appropriated to complete the 

program in FY 2016. 

In June 2015, the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board (SEAB) was asked by the Secretary to 

provide a perspective on whether DOE should continue low dose radiation research. SEAB 

provided a response letter to the Secretary indicating that a small focused program should be 

maintained and asked that the Office of Science be charged with commissioning a small group of 

experts to propose a modest multi-year research program in low level radiation exposure. SEAB 

also acknowledged that "[DOE] should not assume that the results of such a research program 

would be conclusive6." 

The Biological and Environmental Research Advisory Committee, our standing advisory 

committee in BER, was charged7 in October 2015 to follow-up on SEAB's response. The 

subcommittee of discipline experts will address the SEAB recommendations and issue a letter 

report in October 2016. 

The Office of the Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety and Security 

continues to conduct and support health studies and other research activities to determine if DOE 

workers and people living in communities near DOE sites are adversely affected by exposures to 

hazardous materials from DOE operations; by enabling appropriate responses to disease 

outbreaks and radiation accidents; and to address critical research needs for important 

occupational exposures. These efforts also include international health studies and activities 

providing new knowledge and information about the human response to ionizing radiation and 

other industrial exposures encountered in the workplace or within nearby communities; and as a 

result of nuclear weapons testing, use and accidents. These activities are mandated by Congress 

or required by international agreement and include studies of human health, environmental 

6 http://energy.gov/seab/downloads/letter-low-level-radiation-research 

7 http:/ /science.energy.gov/~/media!ber/bcrac/pdf/Reports/LD _Program_ Charge_ Letter.pdf 

5 
24 

impacts, and provision of medical services in several countries including a long term study (since 

1947) of Japanese atomic bomb survivors, believed to have the longest history of any ongoing 

international research program. 

BER basic research programs continue to lead exciting and revolutionary changes in biological 

research for DOE and the Nation. Biology, as a science, is rapidly transforming to a more 

quantitative and predictive science thanks in large part to BER's pioneering efforts within the 

human genome project. BER continues to extend its genome science efforts to plants and 

microorganisms to develop the fundamental scientific understanding needed for solutions to 

energy challenges of the future. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have. 

6 
25 

Dr. Sharlene C. Weatherwax, Ph.D. 

Associate Director of Science 

for Biological and Environmental Research 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Dr. Weatherwax is the Associate Director of Science in Biological and Environmental Research (BER) 

within the Department of Energy's Office of Science, the principal federal funding agency of the Nation's 

research programs in high-energy physics, nuclear physics, fusion energy sciences, materials and 

chemical sciences biological and environmental sciences, and computing sciences. She has previously 

served in a number of different positions within the DOE, including as the Division Director and program 

manager for the Biological Systems Science Division of the Office of Biological and Environmental 

Research, and program manager in the Office of Basic Energy Sciences. In 2005, Dr. Weatherwax 

co-organized a joint workshop with DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, resulting in 

the DOE bioenergy roadmap from fundamental to applied research entitled "Breaking the Biological 

Barriers to Cellulosic Ethanol." This led to the competitive, merit-reviewed establishment ofthree Office 

of Science Bioenergy Research Centers (BRCs) to provide critical science and technology solutions for 

our energy needs. Dr. Weatherwax has managed the three BRCs, multidisciplinary partnerships 

between national laboratories, academic and industrial research institutions. She has participated in a 

number of interagency activities and is a co-chair of the NSTC Subcommittee on life Sciences. 

Dr. Weatherwax received her B.S. in Biochemistry from the University of California at Los Angeles and 

her Ph.D. in Biochemistry from the University of California at Berkeley. Her independent research 

includes the study of light- and hormone-regulated plant gene expression. She is a member of the 

American Society of Plant Biologists and the American Society for Microbiology. 

With an annual budget of more than $600 million, the Office of Biological and Environmental Research is 

the nation's leading supporter of fundamental research and facilities for energy, climate, and the 

environment. The Biological and Environment Research (BER) program mission is to understand 

complex biological, climatic, and environmental systems across spatial and temporal scales ranging from 

sub-micron to global, from individual molecules to ecosystems, and from nanoseconds to millennia. This 

is accomplished by exploring the frontiers of genome-enabled biology; discovering the physical, 

chemical, and biological drivers of climate change; and seeking the geochemical, hydrological, and 

biological determinants of environmental sustainability and stewardship. 

As Head of the Office of Biological and Environmental Research, Dr. Weatherwax serves as one of the 

Associate Directors of the Office of Science. She is responsible for strategic program planning, budget 

formulation and execution, program integration with other Office of Science activities and with the DOE 

technology offices, and interagency integration. 
26 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. I now recognize Dr. Metting for five 

minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. NOELLE METTING, 

RADIATION BIOLOGIST, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Dr. METTING. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, 

and other Members of the Subcommittees on Energy and Oversight. Thank you for this opportunity to testify at the hearing this 

morning. 

I’m a scientist, a radiation biologist currently working for the Department of Energy Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Security. I’m actually on detail from DOE’s Office of Science and BER 

where from the year 2000 until December of 2014 I had, among 

other duties, been tasked with managing DOE’s Low Dose Radiation Research Program. 

Over the previous 20 years, I was a laboratory research scientist, 

an experimentalist working in Pacific West—Northwest National 

Lab. I have a master’s of science from the University of Washington and a doctor of science from Harvard University. 

In my remarks today I will share my personal experience of 

being fired by DOE and suffering long months of unemployment 

that occurred as a direct outcome of my participation in a briefing 

for Congressional staff. 

In a nutshell, the circumstances surrounding this intimidation 

and retaliation are these: Congressional staffers requested an overview of the Low Dose Program so my immediate supervisor, Dr. 

Todd Anderson, asked me to prepare a PowerPoint presentation. It 

was duly reviewed, amended, and finalized. 

In a pre-briefing meeting attended by myself and Drs. Anderson, 

Carruthers, and Huerta, it was decided that for the Congressional 

staff briefing I would present my slides and handouts and respond 

only to the scientific questions, while Drs. Anderson and Carruthers would handle the budget and policy issues. 

During the Congressional briefing the following day on October 

16, I presented the agreed-upon material and answered accurately 

the many scientific missions directed to me by House staff member 

Dr. Aaron Weston and Senate fellow Dr. Ron Faibish. The staffers 

were very knowledgeable in the science, their questions thorough 

and comprehensive, showing real interest in the subject. In fact, 

this deep knowledge was unexpected by all of us. 

After the briefing ended and the Hill staff had left, Dr. Carruthers accused me of advocating and lobbying for the program and 

of being too enthusiastic about research results. I was shocked. 

During the briefing, I had answered all the questions based on my 

knowledge as a scientific subject matter expert, all the questions 

based on—with no intention of lobbying for the program itself. My 

only motivation was to fully and truthfully inform Congress about 

the state of DOE’s Low Dose program research. 

Drs. Carruthers and Anderson repeatedly accused me of lobbying. Confronted with this unwarranted and unjustified onslaught, I reminded them that they had already—that they already 

knew I disagreed with their plan to end support of the program. 

I also mentioned my concern as to how SC management had han-
27 

dled a specific Congressional directive to designate an extra $16 

million to the fiscal year 2012 budget for Fukushima-related lowdose research. 

Thus began an unjust and painful saga of unrelenting intimidation. In just over one uncomfortable month—week after the briefing—one uncomfortable week Dr. Anderson removed me as Manager of the Low Dose Program and detailed me to unclassified duties. My management obviously did not want me answering any 

more questions, scientific or—the questions about the Low Dose 

Program. 

A month later on December 4, 2014, a notice of proposed removal 

was issued, charging me with insubordinate defiance of authority 

and inappropriate workplace communication. I was put immediately on administrative leave, subsequently denied access to the 

contents of my former office. There followed a very long period of 

stressful activity at my home, alone during the usual workweek, 

cut off from my peers, trying to build a defense to the charges, 

guided by my NTEU representative. 

In early January, I filed a disclosure and complaint with the Of- fice of Special Counsel regarding the $16 million budget directive, 

also sending information to DOE’s Inspector General. Five months 

later, a final decision of removal was issued by the deciding official 

Dr. Steven Binkley and effective May 16 of 2015. 

I’m sorry I’m going over. Shall I continue? 

On the next business day, Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, Associate 

Director of BER, was seen rolling a dumpster to my old office, and 

thus began or perhaps continued the removal of the contents, including irreplaceable hardcopy notes, files, and documents and 

some of my personal possessions. You may now appreciate that intimidation and retaliation in this case is somewhat self-evident. 

It’s revealing that after an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board and just before the appeal hearing started, DOE 

reached settlement with me. I’m currently employed but feel there’s 

continuing intimidation of scientists. 

To this day I’ve not been granted the right to inspect remaining 

materials from my old office or to retrieve missing personal items. 

I suggest it’s unacceptable that scientists are put under pressure 

to espouse views that are not their own and that federal scientists 

are persecuted for presenting accurate information, professional 

opinion to those charged with providing funds for this research. 

Now, in my written testimony I have a lot of information, 

timeline, and information about the Low Dose Program. 

Thank you for inviting me to share this experience. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Metting follows:] 
28 

TESTIMONY OF 

Noelle F. Metting, Sc.D. 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY'S 

ENERGY SUBCOMMITTEE & OVERSIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE 

HEARING ON 

Examining Misconduct and Intimidation of Scientists by Senior DOE Officials 

September 21, 2016 

Good morning Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, and other Members of the Subcommittees on 

Energy and Oversight. Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. 

I am a scientist, a Radiation Biologist, currently working for the Department of Energy Oftice of 

Environment, Health, Safety and Security within their Office of Public Radiation Protection 

(DOE/EHSS/AU-22). I am actually on detail from DOE's Office of Science, Office of Biological and 

Environmental Research (DOE/SC/BER), where, from the year 2001 until December \)f2014, I had, 

among other duties, been tasked with managing DOE's Low Dose Radiation Research Program. For the 

previous 20 years, I had been a laboratory research scientist working at Pacific Northwest National Lab. 

I have a Master of Science from the University of Washington, and a Doctor of Science from Harvard 

University. In my remarks today I will share my personal experience of being fired by DOE, and 

suffering long months of unemployment, that occurred as a direct outcome of my participation in a 

briefing for Congressional Staff. 

In a nutshell, the circumstances surrounding this intimidation and retaliation are these: 

Congressional stafters requested an overview of the Low Dose Program, so my immediate supervisor, 

Dr. Todd Anderson, asked me to prepare a PowerPoint presentation which was duly reviewed, amended, 

and finalized. In a pre-briefing meeting attended by myself and Drs. Anderson, Carruthers, and Huerta, 

it was decided that for the Congressional Staff briefing I would present my slides and handouts, and 

respond only to scientific questions, while Drs. Anderson and Carruthers would handle the budget and 

policy issues. 

During the Congressional briefing the following day, Oct. 16, I presented the agreed upon 

material and answered accurately the many scientific questions directed to me by House Energy 

Subcommittee staff member and Council Mr. Aaron Weston and Senate Fellow, Dr. Ron Faibish. The 

staffers were very knowledgeable in the science, their questions thorough and comprehensive, showing 

real interest in the subjects. This deep knowledge was unexpected. 
29 

After the briefing ended and the Hill staff had left, Dr. Carruthers accused me of advocating and 

lobbying for the Program and of being too enthusiastic about the research results. I was shocked. 

During the briefing, 1 had answered all the questions based on my knowledge as a scientific subjectmatter expert, with no intention of lobbying for the Program itself. My only motivation was to fully 

and truthfully inform Congress about the state of DOE's Low Dose Program research. Drs. Carruthers 

and Anderson repeatedly accused me of lobbying. Confronted with this unwarranted and unjustified 

onslaught, I reminded them that they already knew I disagreed with their plan to end support of this 

research field. I also mentioned my concerns as to how SC/BER management had handled a specific 

Congressional directive to designate an extra $I6 million to the FY2012 budget for Fukushima-related 

low dose research. 

Thus began an unjust and painful saga of unrelenting intimidation. In just over one 

uncomfortable week after the briefing, Dr. Anderson removed me as Manager of the Low Dose Program 

and detailed me to unclassified duties. My management obviously did not want me answering any more 

questions about the Low Dose Program. A month later, on Dec. 4, 2014, a Notice of Proposed Removal 

was issued, charging me with "Insubordinate Defiance of Authority" and "Inappropriate Workplace 

Communication". I was put immediately on administrative leave and subsequently denied access to the 

contents of my former office. There followed a very long period of stressful activity at my home, alone 

during the usual work week, cut off from my peers, trying to build a defense to the charges and guided 

by my NTEU union representative. 

In early January I filed a Disclosure and a Complaint with the Office of Special Council 

regarding the $16 million dollar budget directive, also sending information to DOE's Inspector General. 

Five months later, a final decision of Removal was issued by the Deciding Official, Dr. Steven 

Binkley, and effective May 16,2015. On the next business day, Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, Associate 

Director for BER, rolled a dumpster to my old office and thus began, or perhaps continued, the removal 

ofthe contents, including irreplaceable hardcopy notes, files and documents, and some of my personal 

possessions. 

The Subcommittee may now appreciate that intimidation and retaliation in this case is selfevident. 

It is revealing that after I appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and just before the 

Appeal Hearing started, DOE reached a settlement with me. I am currently employed, but feel there is 

continuing intimidation. To this day I have not been granted the right to inspect the remaining materials 

from my old office or to retrieve missing personal possessions. 

I suggest it is unacceptable that scientists are put under pressure to espouse views that are not 

their own, and that federal scientists are persecuted for presenting accurate information and professional 

opinion to those charged with providing funds for the research, Con!,'Tess. 

In my Written Testimony I have appended a detailed Time Line and a Statement of Facts and 

Issues prepared originally for my Appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. I also include narrative 
30 

from the Office of Special Council (OSC) Whistleblower Disclosure and the OSC Complaint of Possible 

Prohibited Personnel Practice forms that were filed in January of 2015, the decision Jetter from the OSC 

Disclosure Unit, and some background on DOE's Low Dose Radiation Research Program. 

Thank you again for inviting me to share my experience. 
31 

Time Line-- Congressional· Staff Briefing of 16 Oct 2014 

2014 

01 Oct 2014- Received email from Aaron Weston asking for overview and question period regarding 

Low Dose Program. Forwarded note immediately to my manager, Dr. Todd Anderson. 

15 Oct 2014- Pre-briefing meeting, Germantown Building; Drs. Anderson, Julie Carruthers, and me in 

Todd's office with Dr. Marcos Huerta on telephone 

16 Oct 2014- Briefing in Forrestal Building with Hill staffers Aaron Weston and Ron Faibish 

16 Oct 2014- Post-briefing meeting with Todd, Julie, Marcos, and me 

27 Oct 2014- Todd's office for scheduled performance appraisal; I signed electronically on 29'h 

29 Oct 2014 -Detail to Other Duties within BER (memo dated October 29, 2014) 

04 Dec 2014- Notice of Proposed Removal (same day as Christmas party!) 

04 Dec 2014 Notice of Administrative Leave 

December 2014 until May 2015- Represented by NTEU for defense (Barry Clark) 

2015 

-30 January 2015 Sent forms to Office of Special Counsel (OSC); Disclosure Unit (form OSC-12, 

disclosure of possible wrongdoing in handling of designated $16M) and Complaint Unit 

(fonn OSC-11, complaint of possible retaliation for disclosing suspicion of mishandling 

of$16M at post-briefing) 

13 May 2015- Letter of Decision from Dr. Steve Binkley (Deciding Official), removal from position 

effective beginning May 16 (Saturday) 

18 May 2015- Sharlene was seen rolling dumpster down hall to my old office-filling dumpster..! 

Email to Barry Clark to ask for help 

20-21 May 2015 --Barry sent strong email protesting the ransacking of office; seemed to have halted 

the activity 

22 May 2015- OSC Disclosures Unit informed me by letter that information provided on Form OSC12 is not sufficient to determine with "substantial likelihood" that wrongdoing was 

committed. 

May-June 2015- Unexpectedly received some of my possessions from office; several boxes delivered 

to my home on different days 

9 June 2015- Retained the firm of Alan Lescht and Associates for appeal to Merit Systems Protection 

Board (MSPB) 
32 

12 June 2015 Appeal filed with MSPB 

6 Oct 2015 - Received first draft of settlement offer from DOE 

Oct/Nov 2015 -No agreement was reached, my lawyer determined we should proceed to MSPB 

Hearing 

12 Nov 2015-- MSPRHearing date. Just before the hearing started, settlement was reached, eventually 

signed, then approved by MSPB 

14 Dec 2015- Reported to work again, DOE Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, 

Forrestal Building 

15 Dec 2015 Called BER to ask about remaining office contents, was invited to come in and look for 

possessions. When I arrived, I was told that AD Dr. WeathetWax was on vacation and 

had left word that I could NOT look at office contents until she had spoken to me 

personally on her return. I passed by old office, and it was completely empty. 

21 Dec 2015 My new supervisor, Edward Regnier, Director of AU-22 informed me that Dr. 

WeathetWax said she would not allow me to see remaining office materials; did not want 

to speak with me or to visit her in Germantown Building too disruptive. 
33 

MSPB Prehearing Statement- Narrative Summary 

Taken from APPELLANT'S CORRECTED PREHEARING STATEMENT 

Dated: Novembcr4, 2015 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

WASHINGlDN REGIONAL OFFICE 

NOEIJ.E METriNG, Appellant, 

v 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Agency 

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ISSUES 

A. Facts 

Appellant was previously employed by the U.S. Department of Energy (the "Agency"') as a Senior 

Radiation Biologist, EJ-0401-04, with the Office of Science ("SC"). Appellant has been a radiation 

biologist since 1981, and she worked for the federal government for more than 13 years. Throughout 

her career, she has had no history of discipline or performance issues. As a federal employee, she 

always received at least fully successful ratings on her performance evaluations. 

During her employment with the Agency, Appellant served as the Program Manager of the Low Dose 

Radiation Research Program ("LDRRP"). Her first-line supervisor was Dr. Todd Anderson, Director, 

Biological Systems Science Division, SC. On October I, 2014, Appellant received an email from Aaron 

Weston, a Congressional staffer. Mr. Weston asked if Appellant would meet with him and Dr. Ron 

Faibish, Fellow, Senate Energy and National Resources Committee, to discuss the LDRRP. Pursuant to 

the Agency's policies and procedures, Appellant did not reply directly to the email and forwarded it to 

Dr. Anderson. 

Dr. Anderson sent it to his supervisor, Sharlene Weatherwax, and to the Agency's Congressional Affairs 

Office. Dr. Anderson asked Appellant to develop a PowerPoint presentation to provide a high-level 

overview of the LDRRP to Mr. Weston and Dr. Faibish. Appellant sent her draft presentation to Dr. 

Anderson and Dr. Julie Carruthers for review and implemented all changes they requested. 

On October 15, 2014, Appellant met with Dr. Anderson and Dr. Carruthers, and Dr. Marcos Huerta via 

teleconference, to prepare for the briefing. At that meeting, Dr. Anderson and Dr. Carruthers told 

Appellant that she would share handouts with the briefing participants, present her slides, and answer 

scientific questions. It was understood that Dr. Anderson and Dr. Carruthers would handle questions 

about the budget and policy. 

Dr. Anderson, Dr. Carruthers, Dr. Huerta, and Appellant presented the briefing to Mr. Weston and Dr. 

Faibish the following day, October 16,2014. Appellant handed out the approved materials and began 

presenting her slides. Almost immediately, Mr. Weston and Mr. Faibish began asking Appellant 

complicated questions about the effects of low dose radiation (e.g., adaptive response, radiation-induced 
34 

cancer, hormesis, low dose-rate epidemiology). They wanted to know what results were obtained from 

the research Congress funded. 

Before Appellant answered questions, she looked pointedly at Dr. Anderson and Dr. Carruthers to give 

them an opportunity to interject, but they did not. As Dr. Anderson and Dr. Carruthers had instructed 

her on October 15,2014, Appellant answered the questions about scientific and research-related issues, 

and deferred all questions about the budget to Dr. Anderson. On two occasions, Dr. Carruthers asked 

Appellant to continue with her slides, and she did. 

However, the Congressional staffers continued to ask Appellant questions about the details of the 

research. When asked to elaborate about the adaptive response research, Appellant mentioned a newly 

published paper on research conducted in 2014, which she had recently received from Program 

Investigator Zhi-Min Yuan. One of the staffers asked Appellant to confirm that the research discussed 

in the paper was conducted in 2014; he sounded surprised that the LDRRP still had ongoing research. 

Appellant had a copy of the paper in her briefcase because she had been reading it earlier, and she gave 

the paper to Dr. Faibish. Mr. Weston also asked for a copy of the paper, and it was agreed that 

Appellant would send a copy to Mr. Weston via Janine Benner. 

One of the staffers asked Appellant if she believed 100 mSv was a reasonable level to define as a "low 

dose." Appellant truthfully responded that she believed 150 mSv might be more appropriate, but that 

the LDRRP defined "low dose" as I 00 mSv. When questioned about animal research, Appellant 

answered that new results showed the critical need to study whole biological systems (the "systems 

biology" approach) in order to see subtle biological effects, such as radio-adaptive responses in normal 

tissues. 

In response to a question about how the Million US Worker Epidemiological Study (the "Million 

Worker Study") was relevant to the LDRRP, Appellant confirmed that the Million Worker Study was 

relevant to the very low radiation doses that had been experienced after the Fukushima nuclear accident 

in the wake of the recent Japanese earthquake and tsunami. Either Mr. Weston of Dr. Faibish asked 

Appellant about the progress of the Million Worker Study and when it would be completed. Appellant 

answered that the completion date was uncertain because the project was not fully funded. 

The staffers discussed H.R. 5544 with Drs. Anderson and Carruthers. One of the staffers turned to 

Appellant and asked whether, in her scientific opinion, a National Academies report on low d~se 

research would be appropriate at that time. Appellant said that, in her opinion, it would be appropriate. 

After the briefing ended, Dr. Carruthers confronted Appellant and accused her of advocating for LDRRP 

and being too positive about the research results. Appellant was shocked and asked why no one had 

interrupted to redirect the conversation as they saw fit. The discussion became heated. Dr. Carruthers 

told Appellant had made a big mistake by communicating her enthusiasm for the LDRRP to 

Congressional staffers, and she and Dr. Anderson accused Appellant oflobbying and refusing to follow 

their instructions. Appellant felt attacked and cornered. She was clearly upset and said that she 

disagreed with the Agency's plan to end the LDRRP, which Dr. Carruthers and Dr. Anderson already 
35 

knew. Appellant also questioned them about how SC management handled a specific Congressional 

directive to designate an extra $16 million to the LDRRP budget for FY2012. 

Appellant did not inappropriately communicate enthusiasm, lobby, or refuse to follow instructions. 

Rather, she truthfully answered the questions posed by Mr. Weston and Dr. Faibish because she felt 

obligated to provide honest answers to Congress. Based on Dr. Carruthers' and Dr. Anderson's 

criticism and accusations, it is clear that they expected Appellant to either misrepresent the LDRRP 

results or withhold information from Congress. 

Appellant never refused to "subordinate herself to the SC management position" or said that she would 

"take every opportunity to undermine SC management decisions." She never did anything to oppose SC 

management for the remainder of her employment with the Agency. 

On or about October (29) 2014, Dr. Anderson removed Appellant as Program Manager for LDRRP and 

detailed her to a position with unclassified duties. On December 4, 2014, Dr. Anderson issued a Notice 

of Proposed Removal (the "Proposal"), proposing to terminate Appellant for one charge of 

"Insubordinate Defiance of Authority" and one charge of"lnappropriatc Workplace Communication." 

Appellant, by her National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU") representative Barry Clark, submitted 

a written response to Deciding Official Dr. Steven Binkley, Associate Director, Advanced Scientific 

Computing Research, SC, on or about December 17,2014. Appellant, via Mr. Clark, provided an oral 

reply on February 3, 2015. In her written and oral replies, Appellant asserted that the Agency had 

proposed her removal in retaliation for her whistleblowing activity. Appellant alleged that the charges 

could not be sustained, that the penalty was unreasonably harsh pursuant to the factors set forth in 

Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981), and that she was being retaliated against 

for whistleblowing. Specifically, Appellant made protected disclosures when she refused to 

misrepresent and withhold information about the LDRRP from Congressional staffers during the 

briefing on October 16, 2014. Appellant alleged that she also made protected disclosures on October 16, 

2014, when she questioned SC management's handling of a Congressional directive to increase funding 

for the LDRRP in FY2012. 

On May 13,2015, Dr. Binkley issued a Letter of Decision (the "Decision"), in which he stated that he 

had decided to sustain both charges and remove Appellant from the federal service effective May 16, 

2015. Dr. Binkley incorrectly found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that Appellant had 

engaged in the alleged misconduct. He also failed to properly consider the Douglas factors and imposed 

an unreasonable penalty of removal. Appellant filed the instant appeal with the Board on June 12,2015. 

B. Issues 

I. Whether the Agency proved by preponderant evidence that Appellant engaged in 

"Insubordinate Defiance of Authority" on October 16, 2014, as specifically stated in the 

Proposal; 
36 

2. Whether the Agency proved by preponderant evidence that Appellant engaged in 

"Inappropriate Workplace Communication" on October 16,2014, as specifically stated in the 

Proposal; 

3. Whether removal was a reasonable penalty for the charged misconduct; and 

4. Whether Appellant's removal was a product of retaliation for whistleblowing. 

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RETALIATION FOR WHISTLEBLOWING 

... etc ... not included here 

Dated: November 4, 2015 
37 

NARRATIVE FROM THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNCIL FORMS 

After the briefing I voiced my doubts concerning a $16M funding decision made by SC/BER 

management in FY2012. 

I believed I was fired because after the briefing Drs. Carruthers and Anderson confronted me, accusing 

me of lobbying. During the ensuing heated discussion, I revealed my discomfort with the handling of 

some extra funding tbat had been directed by Congress to be used for low dose research having 

relevance to the recent Fukushima nuclear disaster. The Notice of Proposed Removal refers to my 

remarks in rather exaggerated language: " ... You also disparaged BER management of the LDRRP and 

insulted BER Associate Director Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax .... regarding the.fimding of the million man 

project .... ·· 

Here I provide the following account of suspicions, taken from the disclosure of possible wrongdoing 

that I filed with the OSC (form OSC-12) late in January of2015: 

I believe and disclose that The Department of Energy's Office of Science (SC) management, and 

particularly the Office of Biological and Environmental Research (BER) failed ,to follow the 

express direction of the !12th Congress as regards the use of funds specifically designated to be 

spent on Fukushima-related radiobiology research. As the long-time Program Manager for 

DOE's Low Dose Radiation Research Program, funded within BER's Radiological 

Sciences/Radiobiology Subprogram/ Activity, I have direct personal knowledge of the events and 

records involved. 

On March II, 20 II, a devastating earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, resulting in huge loss of life 

from the tsunami flooding, and a subsequent nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi power 

plant. In one of many efforts by the United States Government to respond to the public's 

concern over the uncertainties of this ongoing health risk, legislation was initiated to fund new 

research relating to low dose human exposure to radiation. The budget for FY 2012 had been 

delayed in a continuing resolution, but was resolved in Conference between the House and the 

Senate. CONFERENCE REPORT 112-331 (Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and 

Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 20 12) was the vehicle for making appropriations for most 

federal government operations for the remainder ofFY2012. It includes the following paragraph 

on page 854 for DOE/SC/BER: 

"Within available funds, $16,000,000 is provided for radiobiology to help determine 

health risks from exposures to low levels of ionizing radiation to properly protect 

radiation workers and the general public, and to conduct studies of health impacts at 

and around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant." (Conference Report 112-331) 

As Program Manager for the Radiobiology Activity in BER (the Low Dose Radiation Research 

Program), I was told there would be substantial additional funds available for new DOE research 

in this activity. In discussions with BER Associate Director Dr. Sharlene Weatherwax, she told 

me that she would not support actual research in Japan. I then suggested that we use the $16M to 

support the major cost of a large US-based epidemiology study that had successfully proven 

itself as a pilot project: The Million U.S. Worker Study. The Study looks at the health of over a 
38 

million radiation workers from the beginning of the nuclear age (including ~365,000 former 

DOE workers) who had received very low doses in the range of those expected from Fukushima. 

Dr. Weatherwax approved this idea, the full project proposal was successfully reviewed, and the 

appropriate paperwork was obtained, including the official signature of Dr. William Brinkman, 

then our Director (SC-1) for Office of Science. This signature was necessary because the budget 

for the five-year project was over a $10M administrative limit, and thus needed the SC-I 

approvaL Coordination of the effort for approvals between Dr. Brinkman (SC-I), Dr. Dehmer 

(SC-2) and BER was handled by Dr. Julie Carruthers (working for SC-2) and Dr. Steven Binkley 

(tben working directly for Dr. Brinkman). Ms. Joanne Corcoran within BER coordinated the 

research budget under direction ofBER AD Dr. Weatherwax. Ms. Corcoran is still in BER and 

can verify this information. At the last possible moment, Dr. Weatherwax informed me that she 

had decided against committing to fund the Million US Worker Study for the entire period, due 

to budget concerns, and that DOE/BER had less than $1 M to spend on the Study for that year. 

She implied that we would pick up the funding in the out years, but did not allow me to write the 

revised Selection Statement to say as much. 

I maintained hope that the special funding would be carved out in the next fiscal year, as Dr. 

Weatherwax had implied. However, the outcome was that the specified $16 M was never fully 

allocated for its intended purpose. I now believe it was wrongly redefined to cover the alreadyfunded ongoing research projects of the Low Dose Program for FY2012. I finally realized this 

when !looked up the FY 2013 Congressional Budget Request from DOE (February 2012). The 

detailed budget justification for BER (page 143) stated in part: 

" ... Funding is completed in FY 2012 for studies of DNA damage and repair in 

response to low dose radiation of specific gene targets in single cell culture models and 

for studies informing the exposure risks at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant .... " 

This statement is simply not the truth-- the critical study that was to better inform the scientific 

community and the public on the exposure risks at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant had only 

just barely begun to be funded. The DOE/SC/BER management seems to have brazenly ignored 

the clear wishes of Congress (laid out in Conference Report 112-331), and then actually lied 

about completing the work in the FY 2013 Congressional Budget Request. Rather than accept 

that Congress might want to decide how best to spend our scarce research budget, they 

purposefully misinterpreted the words in Conference Report I 12-331, in order to fund research 

of their own choosing. 

I trust there is a rule against such conduct, and that it can be applied in this egregious instance of 

wrongdoing. It is very disillusioning to know that at least some of our federal management 

cannot be trusted to carry out the letter and the spirit of the expressed wishes of Congress. 

Please note that it was very hard for me to believe at first that this incident really happened, but 

my resolve to report it became sufficiently strong when I realized that my knowledge of the 

incident was perceived to be a possible threat by my managers, such that I am now being 

unreasonably targeted for removal. I am concurrently submitting a form OSC-11 Complaint of 
39 

Possible Prohibited Personnel Activity, based on a previous informal disclosure to my 

management o~the information now contained in this Whistleblower Disclosure. 

(NOTE: The full text of Conference Report 112-331 is at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt331/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt331.pdf. The 

Conference Report pertained to H.R. 2055, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 

(Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both House and Senate]); which became Public Law .112-74 

on 12/23/2011. The full text of the FY 2013 Congressional Budget Request (Feb 2012) is at 

http://energy.gov/cfo/reports/budget-justification-supporting-documents. 

The following is taken from the complaint of retaliation that I also filed with the OSC (fonn OSC-11) in 

January of2015: 

"On 12/04/2014 I was served with a Notice of Proposed Removal in connection with an event 

that warrants no such extreme action. I believe the proposed extreme action is retaliation due to 

a perceived threat to my management that I would submit a disclosure of wrongdoing, after I had 

privately told SC management of my suspicions about a possible misuse of funds in FY2012-

FY2013. 

At a post-briefing meeting on I 0/16/2014 in the presence of my SC/BER Division Director Todd 

Anderson, Office of Science (SC), advisor for SC-2 (Patricia Dehmer) Julie Carruthers, and DOE 

special advisor for SC-1 (P Dehmer, Acting) Marcos Huerta, I voiced my concerns on how BER 

Associate Director Sharlene Weatherwax had managed funds meant to be spent on new research 

related to Fukushima in FY2012-13. As Program Manager for the program involved with this 

research, I knew that less than $1M of the $16M designated by Congress was finally allocated 

by Dr. Weatherwax for the purpose. I told them that I suspected my management had not 

represented the matter truthfully in subsequent communications with higher management and 

with Congress. On 12/04/2014 I received a Notice of Proposed Removal in connection with the 

briefing itself that I believe is completely unwarranted. I believe the proposed firing is 

preemptive retaliation for my comments and their perception that I would submit a disclosure of 

wrongdoing. NOTE: I am submitting OSC-12 Disclosure of Wrongdoing concurrently with this 

retaliation disclosure. 

I believe it is retaliation because the charges made in the Notice of Proposed Removal are gross 

exaggeration, misstatement, and deliberate misinterpretation of the events of, and surrounding, 

the briefing of Hill staffers that took place 10/16/2014. I am in the process of rebutting the 

outrageous allegations with the help of Union (NTEU) representation, but have filed no formal 

grievances concerning their allegations or acts of retaliation. Witness statements provided to me 

are not to be trusted, because with the possible exception of Dr. Huerta, the witnesses and their 

bosses are all implicated in the FY2012-13 wrongdoing. Other persons at the briefing did not 

provide, or were not asked to provide statements, only those who would naturally have an 

interest in the FY2012 wrongdoing. 
40 

As a final indication and evidence of retaliation, I frankly find it highly suspicious that Dr. 

Steven Binkley was chosen to be the Deciding Official for my Notice of Proposed Removal, as 

he is also implicated in my disclosure of wrongdoing, having been (I believe) the closest advisor 

of our then SC-1 in FY2012-13, Dr. William Brinkman. Dr. Binkley could easily have been a 

critical party in the funding decisions leading to the wrongdoing. 
41 

ll2m C<m~ } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { lstSesswn 

REPoRT 

112-331 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND VETERANS 

AFFAIRS AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2012 

CONFERENCE REPORT 

TO ACCOMPANY 

H.R. 2055 

DEcE:M:IlER 15, 2011.-0rdered to be printed 
42 

854 

In order to increase transparency and accountability across all 

Science activities, the Department is direeted, not later than September 1, 2012, to create a perfOrmance ranking of all ongoing 

multi-year research projects across the six major Science research 

programs, including those at universities, national laboratories~ 

Energy Frontier Research Centers, Energy Innovation Hubs ana 

other recipients, by comparing current performance with original 

project goals. The report shall .. include an inventory of the number 

and dollar amount of awards that have been terminated in fiscal 

years 2011 and 2012 before their multi-year awards have concluded. 

The conferees direct the Department to provide to the House 

and Senate Co:mmittees on .Appropriations, not later than February 

10, 2012, a budget scenario for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 with the 

Office of Science funded at the fiscal year 2012 level, highlighting 

funding levels for each major program and project, including activities, such as ITER, with scheduled changes in funding requirements. · Advanced Scientific Computing Research.-The conferees pro· 

vide $442,000,000 for Advanced Scientific Computing Reselll'ch. 

The conferees support the exascale initiative, but note that future 

funding for the mitiative is contingent upon delivery of the joint 

exascale plan, as directed. The conferees provide the budget request for the Leadership, Computing Facilities .. and for High .Performance Production Computing, in support of continuing petascale 

upgrades at the three facilities. 

Basic Energy Sciences;-The ·conference" agreement· provides·· 

$1,694,000,000 for Basic Energy Sciences. The conference agreement includes $24,300,000 to continue the Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hub, and $20,000,000 to establish the Batteries 

and Energy Storage Energy·Innovt:dian·Hnb-. The-·oo:nferenee-apee• · ment includes up to $100,000,000 for the existing Energy Frontier 

Research Centers; $10,000,000. for predictive modeling of internal 

combustion engines; $8,520,000 for the Experimental Program to 

Stimulate Competitive Research; and no funding for gas hydrates 

research within the Offu::e of Science. 

The conference agreement includes $97,000,000 to fund each 

major item of equipment at the level provided in the budget re~ 

quest. Funding provided for the Linac Coherent Light Source II at 

SLAC is for the exploration and design of the two-tunnel option. 

Biological and Environmental Research.-The conference 

agreement provides $611,823.000 .for, Biological. and Environmental 

Research. Within available funds, the conference agreement in~ 

eludes $12,000,000 to continue nuclear medicine research with 

human application. The conferees direct the Department to report 

to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, not later 

than June 1, 2012, on the Administration's strategy to continue . funding this research through more appropriate federal agencies 

with health-focused missions. 

C Within available funds, . $16,000,000 is provided foD radiobiol~ to help determine health risks from exposures to Iow 

levels of Ionizing radiation to properly protect radiation workers 

and the general public, and to conduct studies of health impacts at 

and around the Fulmshima Daiicbi nuclear plant. 
43 

DOEICF-0074 

Volume4 

Department of Energy 

FY 2013 Congressional 

Budget Request 

·Science 

Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy 

2012 Volume4 
44 

Biological and Environmental Research 

Funding Profile by Subprogram and Activity 

Biological Systems Science 

Genomic Science 

Foundational Genomics Research 39,260 

Genornics Analysis and Validation 10,000 

Metabolic Synthesis and Conversion 39,912 

Computational Biosciences 12,683 

Bioenergy Research Centers 75,000 

Total, Genomic Science 176,855 

Radiological Sciences 

Radiochemistry and Imaging Instrumentation 17,540 

Radiobiology 23,926 

Total, Radiological Sciences 41,466 

Ethical~ legal, and Societal Issues 1,000 

Medical Applications 4,000 

Biological Systems Facilities and Infrastructure 

Structural Biology Infrastructure 15,765 

Joint Genome Institute 68,932· 

Total, Biological Systems Facilities and Infrastructure 84,697 

SBIR/STTR 0 

TotaL Biological Systems Science 308,018 

Climate and Environmental Sciences 

Atmospheric System Research 27,822 

Environmental System Science 

Terrestrial Ecosystem Science 28,7'i7 

Terrestrial Carbon Sequestration Research 2,966 

Subsurface Biogeochemical Research 48,838 

Total, Environmental System Science 80,531 

Science/Biological and Environmental Research Page133 

(Dollars In Thousands) 

63,111 67,292 

10,000 10,000 

19,462 19,462 

16,395 16,395 

75,000 75,000 

183,968 188,149 

19,410 17,540 

15,528 10,620 

34,938 28,160 

0 0 

0 0 

14,895 14,895 

liS,SOQ 69,187 

83,395 84,082 

9,184 9,382 

311,485 309,773 

26,392 26,392 

40,274 51,957 

0 0 

27,380 27,380 

67,654 79,337 

FY 2013 Congressional Budget 
45 

The approaches employed include genome sequencing, 

proteomics, metabolomics, structural biology, highresolution imaging and characterization, and integration 

of !~formation into predictive computational models of 

biological systems that can be tested and validated. 

The subprogram supports operation of a scientific user 

facility, the DOE Joint Genome Institute (JGI), and use of 

structural biology facilities through the development of 

instrumentation at DOE's national user facilities. Support 

Is also provided for research at the interface of the 

biological and physical sciences, and In radiochemistry 

and instrumentation to develop new methods for realtime, high-resolution imaging of dynamic biological 

processes. 

Explanation of Funding Changes 

(Dollars in Thousands) 

Genomic Science 183,968 188,149 +4,181 

Genomic Science research remains a priority activity, with Foundational 

Genomics Research increasing for the development of synthetic biology tools 

and blodesign technologies for plant and microbial systems relevant to 

bioenergy production, carbon and nutrient cycling, and environmental change. 

Targeted research in Metabolic Synthesis and Conversion on cellulosic ethanol 

and biohydrogen decreases, as the DOE Bioenergy Research Centers continue 

to conduct research on aavanced renewable bfofuels. Computational 

Biosciences continues to enable the Systems Biology Knowledgebase tools and 

integrative analysis of plant and microbial functional genomics experimental 

datasets. 

Radiological Sciences 34,938 28,160 ·6,778 

Radionuclide imaging research for real-time visualization of dynamk; biological 

processes in energy and environmentally-relevant contexts continues, while 

concluding training activities to transfer synthetic and Instrumentation 

knowledge to the nuclear medicine research community. Research is 

specifically prioritized to enable mechanism-based models that Incorporate 

both radiobiology and epidemiology, reducing activities in ceU-to-cell c communication., cell aging and senescence, and cell micmenvjronment 

Funding for research Informing the exposure outcomes of the Fukushlm~ Daiichi nuclear reactor Is completed in FY 2012. 

Biological Systems Facilities and infrastructure 83,395 84,082 +687 

Funding continues to support large-ost.ale,.complex g~nome sequen~iog i,inf:1: 

analysis at the Joint Genome Institute, with Increasing emphasis on 

understanding comparative or community-scale plant and microbial genomics. 

Support continues for the development of Instrumentation at SC's synchrotron 

light sources, neutron sources, and next~generation user facilities for analyzing 

biological structure-function relationships. 

SBIR/STTR 9,184" $,382 +198 

SBIR/STTR funding levels are a set percent of overall research funding. 

Total, Biological Systems Science 311,485 31l9,77S ·1,712 

Science/Biological and Environmental Research/ 

Biological Systems Science Page140 FY 2013 Congressional Budget 
46 

Radiological Sc~ences 

~ 

Radiological Sciences supports radionudide synthesis and· 

imaging research for real-time visualization of dynamic 

biological processes in enel'&\( and environmentally 

relevant contexts. The activity has significantly 

transltioned from its historical focus on nuclear medicine 

research and applications for health to focus rm realtime, whole organism understanding of metaboUc and 

signaling pathways in plants and nonmedical microbes. 

Radionuclide imaging,continues to be a singular tool for 

studying living organisms in a manner that is quantitative, 

three dimensionar, temporally dynamlc., and nonperturbative of the natural biochemical processes. The 

instrumentation research focuses on improved metabolic 

imaging in the living systems, Including plants and 

microbial-communities, relevant to biofuels production 

and bioremediation of interest to DOE. The activity also 

supports fundamental research oo integrated gene 

function and response of biological organisms to low 

dose radiation exposure, through systems genetics 

analysis In model systems and epidemiological studies. 

This activity contributes a scientific foundation for 

Informed decisions regarding remediation of 

contaminated DOE sites and fpr detenmining acceptable 

levels of human health protection, for both cleanup 

workers and the public, in the most cost-effective 

manner. 

funding and ActivitY Sche!lu!e 

Fiscal 

Year Activity 

fY 2011 Research supported the development and use of innOl/ative radiotracer.chem!stry.and 

Current complementary radionuclide imaging Instrumentation technologies for quantitative In vivo 

measurement of radiotracer concentration and site-specific chemical reactions. Research was 

initiated to examine epidemiological models for low dose radiation exposure. 

FY2012 

Enacted· 

( 

Core research activities in radiotracer synthetic chemistry and complementary imaging 

instrumentation continues; additional.activity.!ncludes.nudear medil:ine..research. with human 

application as directed by Congress (in the FV 2012 Energy and water Development Appropriations 

conference report lH. Rpt. 112-331]), and a report will be prepared for a strategy to continue this 

research through. more appropriate federalagenc.i.es..with.health-focused missions. Research is 

completed for integrated training in radiotracer synthetic methodology and In vivo imaging and 

detection relevant to nuclear medicine applications. Funds support a limited number of systems 

genetic studies of integrated gene function and response to the environment, drawing on prior 

studies of specific gene targets and individual cellular response and focusing only at the tissue or 

whole organism level. H. Rpt. 112-331 directs continuation of research to help determine health) 

risks from exposures to low levels of ionizing radiation, as well as studies of health impacts at and 

around the Fukushima Dailchi nuclear plant. 

fY 2013 Funding continues for core research.actlvltles In radiotracer synthetic chemistry for real-time 

Request visualization of dynamic biological processes In the energy and environmentally-relevant contexts. 

Gundlng ls completed in fY 2012 for studies of DNA damage and repair in response to low dose ::; 

adiatlon of specific gene targets in single cell cultu. re models and for studies informing the exposure 

risks at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Research will he completed for the development of a 

limited number of systems genetic reference mouse populations. Priority research begins to address 

integration ofmechanism-based mgdels that incorporate both radiobiology and epidemiology. 

Funding 

($000) 

41,466 

34,938 

28,160 

Science/Biological and Environmental Research/ 

Biological Systems Science Page143 fY 2013 Congressional Budget 
47 

(Dollars in Thousands) 

FY 2011 Current FY 2012 Enacted FY 2013 Request 

Radiochemistry and Imaging Instrumentation 

Radiobiology 

Total, Radiological Sclences· 

17,540 

23,926 

41,466 

Ethical, Legal, and Societal Issues 

19,410 

15,528 

34,938 

17,540 

10,620 

28,160 

~ 

The activity addresses ethical; legal; andsodetal'impacts 

for application of genomic research results in bioenergy, 

synthetic biology, and nanotechnology. Beginning in 

implications of DOE mission areas will be addressed 

within relevant Genomic Science programmatic activities, 

Begifirimg ih FY2013; Slltoffundlngfor synthetic biology 

and biodeslgn activities in Foundational Genomics 

Research will be directed toward tl!is research. 

FV 2012, research related to the societal benefits and 

funding and Actlvltv Schedule 

Rscal 

Year Activity 

FY 2011 Fun'dHupportedthe'completion·of.individual studies· on-the socielal.impacts.of wnthetic:_bi.ology. 

Current and bloenergy, 

FY 2012- Activity is completed. 

2013 

Overylew 

Medical Applications 

Funding 

($000) 

1,000 

0 

This activity supports the design, fabrication, integration, and testing of a 240+ mlcroelectrode visual prosthesis device (tl!e 

artificial retina). DOE's role in tl!is effort was completed in FY 2011. 

funding and Activltv Schedule 

Fiscal 

Year Activity 

FY 2011 BER research on the development of the components of an artificial retina was completl!d In 

Current FY 2010: tn· FY 2011, researchwas·completed on·the-2<W+electrQde-artlfu:iaLretlna.device. 

integration and final testing and refinement of the assembled device for readiness to transition to 

pre-tlinical testing. 

FV 2012- Activity is completed: 

2013 

Funding 

($000) 

4,000 

0 

Science/Biological and Environmental Research/ 

Biological Systems Sdence Page144 FY 2013 Congressional Budget 
48 

Dr. Noelle F. Metting 

13033 Middlebrook Road 

Germantown, MD 20874 

U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL 1730 M Sfrt<t, N.W., Suite 218 

Washington, D.C. 20036-4505 

202·254-3600 

May22,2015 

Re: OSC File No. DI-15-1807 

Dear Dr. Metting: 

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OS C) has completed its review of the information you 

referred to the Disclosure Unit. You alleged violations of laws, rules, or regulations; gross 

mismanagement; and an abuse of authority by employees of the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE), Office of Science, Office of Biological Research (BER) in the District of Columbia. 

OSC is authorized by law to determine whether a disclosure's~ol:lld·bereferredto.the 

involved agency for investigation or review, and a report. OSC may refer allegations of 

violations of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; a gross waste of funds; an abuse of 

authority; or a substantial and specific. danger to public health or safety .. Disclosures referred for 

investigation and a report by the agency must include information sufficient for OSC to 

determine· whether there is a substantia!. likelihood of wrongdoing •. lf.a.sub$tantiallikelihood 

determination cannot be made, OSC will determine whether there is sufficient information to 

exercise its discretion to refer the allegations. OSC does not have the authority to investigate 

disclos1:1res· and· therefore, does milt:sonduct its own investigations_ 

In determining whether there is a substantial likelihood that wrongdoing has occurred, 

OSC considers a number of factors, including the sufficiency and specificity of the iilformation 

provided and whether the whistleblower has reliable knowledge of the information, such as- firsthand knowledge or documentation. Information based on assumptions or speculation does not 

provide OSC with a sufficient basis to refer allegations to the head of an agency for 

investigation. Further; we do not have the authority to investigate disclosures, interview subjects 

or expertsr.or conduct audits of recQrds through the disclosure pro.cess. Rather, our review of a 

disclosure is based solely on the information the whlstleblower provides to OSC. 

You alleged that BER improperly used funding appropriated by Congress for 

"radiobiology to help determine health risks from exposures to low levels of ionizing radiation to 

properly protect radiation workers and the general public, and to conduct studies of health 

impacts, at,and.around the Fukushima.Daiichi nuclear pla1,1t:' Sp~cifically,,ypu stated that BER 

instead used the funds to fund an ongoing study of DNA damage and repair in response to low 

dose radiation, You also alleged that BER misrepresented their actions by stating that the 

designated funds would be used for "studies informing exposure risks at the Fukushima Daiichi 

nuclear plant." 
49 

Dr. Noelle F. Metting 

Page2 

After review ftnd consideration of the information you provided, we have determined that 

we are unable to refer your allegations to the Secretary of Energy for investigation. Based on the 

language of the appropriation, Congress granted the agency some amount of discretion with 

regard to what research to use the funding for. It appears that the ongoing research project on 

DNA damage in response to low dose radiation falls within the types of work permitted to be 

funded by the appropriation used because the study involves health impacts from exposure to 

low levels of radiation. Furthermore, it does not appear that BER misrepresented what the 

funding would be used for by stating· that the research being. conducted was '~informing the 

exposure risks at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant" because DNA damage is a potential 

exposure risk oflow levels of ionizing radiation. Accordingly, the information you provided is 

not sufficient to determine with a substantial likelihood that BER employees engaged in an abuse 

of authority, gross mismanagement, or violated a law, rule, or regulation. Therefore, we will not 

take further action regarding these allegations. 

Should you wish to pursue these matters further, outside of OSC, you may contact the 

DOE Office oflnspector General (OIG) as follows: mail-1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Mail 

Stop SD-031, Washington, DC 20585; e-mail- ighotline@hq.doe.gov; phone- (800) 541-1625. 

More information about DOE OIG can be found on their website at www.energy.gov/iglofficeinspector-general. 

Finally, you alleged that BER. officials have taken personnel actions against you in 

retaliation for disclosing the alleged wrongdoing described· above. W!Ustle15Iower retaliation is 

an allegation of a prohibited personnel practice and is reviewed by OSC's Complaints 

Examining Unit (CEU). I understand that you filed a prohibited personnel practices complaint 

that is currently pending review with CEU examhier James Booker. See OSC'File. No. MA-15-

1770. If you have any questions regarding your prohibited personnel practice complaint, please 

contact Mr. Booker at (202) 254·3675 or jbooker@osc.gov. Because the Disclosure Unit does 

not review allegations of prohibited personnel practices, we will take no further action regarding 

those allegations. 

Based on the above, we have closed our file on this matter. If you have any questions or 

comments, please contact me at (202) 254-3678. 

Sincerely, 

~~·t Treyer Ma:son~6ale 

Attorney, Disclosure Unit 

KPG:TMG/sss 
50 

INFORMATION ON DOE LOW DOSE RADIATION RESEARCH PROGRAM 

Briefly, two points should be made about DOE's Low Dose Program: 

• There was, and still is, a critical societal need to study the biological effects of low 

dose radiation exposure to humans 

What is low dose research? Who needs the research, and why? Here is a concise description of 

DOE's Low Dose Program that can be found on DOE's current Program webpage: 

http://science.energy.gov/ber/research/bssd/low-dose-radiation/ 

Biological Systems Science Division (BSSD) 

Radiobiology: Low Dose Radiation Research 

The Low Dose Radiation Research Program supports competitive peer-reviewed research aimed 

at informing the development of future national radiation risk policy for the public and the 

workplace. The Program supports the Department of Energy's missions in energy and 

environment and contributes to understanding of radiation-related health impacts at and around 

the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. 

Program Description 

The Low Dose Program is unique within the U.S. government in supporting experimental 

radiation biology research that studies the effects of very low dose exposures. Since its beginning 

in 1999, the focus of research has been to study cellular and molecular responses to doses of Xor gamma- radiation that are at or near current workplace exposure limits; in general, for total 

radiation doses that are less than 100 millisievert (10 rem). Currently about 40% of Program 

funds support research projects at academic institutions and the remaining 60% support programproject research at three DOE National Laboratories. LBNL, ORNL, and PNNL. An Investigators' 

Workshop is held yearly, and focused topical workshops are held as needed. 

Program Funding Opportunity Announcements 

Announcements are posted on the DOE Office of Science Grants and Contracts Website and at 

grants.go~r.l' Information about preparing and submitting applications, as well as the DOE Office 

of Science merit review process, is available at the DOE Office of Science Grants and Contracts 

Website. 

For current announcements visit BER Funding Opportunities. 

Currently funded research studies focus on radio-adaptive responses, systems genetics of interindividual variation, low dose and/or low dose-rate effects on: a) proteomic responses, b) the 

immune system, c) epigenetic regulation, and d) molecular and cellular hallmarks of aging. 

Several of the experimental projects include important mathematicaVrisk modeling components. 

The Low Dose Program is also supporting, through intra- and inter-agency efforts, a mortality 

study of the early U.S. workers of the nuclear age. The "Million U.S. Worker Study" builds on the 

investments made and foundations laid by researchers and government agencies over the past 
51 

30-40 years. These efforts had established early worker cohorts that can now provide answers to 

questions on the lifetime human health risks associated with low-level radiation exposures. 

Why the Program's Research is Important 

The Program supports the Department of Energy's missions in energy and environment It also 

contributes to understanding of radiation-related health impacts in and around a facility such as 

the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant Program research is providing high-value scientific data for 

input in determining health risks from exposures to low levels of radiation. Performing 

measurements at low doses is critically relevant because radiation exposures associated with 

human activity are almost always very low dose and/or low dose-rate exposures. Human 

exposures are mainly from medical diagnostic tests, but exposures might also occur during waste 

cleanup, environmental isolation of materials associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power 

production, catastrophic natural events, or possibly terrorism incidents. A strong scientific 

underpinning for our risk regulation is critical to adequately and appropriately protect people while 

making the most effective use of our national resources. 

Data Sharing Policy 

Low Dose Program investigators are expected to effectively communicate research results 

through publication in peer-reviewed journals, and when possible to provide data in a format 

amenable to deposition in widely held databases. Investigators are also encouraged to 

communicate with the wider community of concerned persons, so that current thinking and public 

debate incorporate sound science. 

Program Accomplishments 

Research from DOE's Low Dose Program re-examines existing paradigms and provides the 

results that support the development of new, biological paradigms. One example that challenges 

an old assumption is the finding that exposure to a low vs. high dose of radiation results in both 

qualitatively as well as quantitatively different cellular and molecular responses, thus 

demonstrating non-linear response with respect to dose. Another is the finding that in addition to 

high-dose biological damage that may lead to cancer, very low dose radiation exposure may 

participate in beneficial biological outcomes by stimulation of our natural tissue surveillance 

mechanisms. These processes are shaped by physical exposure parameters that include dose, 

dose-rate and dose-distribution. The research has underscored the importance of the Low Dose 

Program's effort to study intact-tissue biological response to a stressor such as radiation 

exposure, rather than studying only the initial events within an individual ceiL Low Dose 

investigators were responsible in 2006 for initiation of a highly valued series of International 

Systems Radiation Biology workshops. Finally, the Low Dose Program has taken a leading role 

on the world stage in arguing for the critical need for greater communication and coordination 

between the fields of radiation biology and epidemiology. 

As of March 2012, the Program has produced 737 peer-reviewed publications. Please visit 

the Program websiteri' for a list of publications and additional discussion of research findings and 

future directions. 

Last modified: 3/512016 8:04:51 PM" 
52 

I note that in checking out the link now provided for the Program website (see above), only the 

internet archive site "Wayback Machine" is accessed. 

• DOE's Low Dose Radiation Research Program is widely recognized for 

successfully addressing critical research questions related to biological effects of 

low dose radiation exposure. 

a. Formal reviews of the Low Dose Program: The DOE/BER Advisory Committee (BERAC) 

"Committee of Visitors" (COV) reviews (http://science.energy.gov/ber/berac/ber-covD as 

well as other BERAC reviews, gave consistently excellent scores and comments to the Low 

Dose Program. COV reports for 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014 include this Program. As an 

example, the 2014 COV report says in part: 

"Low Dose Radiation. The Low Dose Program currently focuses on the e.ffects of low 

dose radiation from the molecular and cellular level to the organismic level with in vivo 

(murine and porcine) models of low dose radiation effects seen as a significant and 

unique strength of the program. The research investigates both the targets of 

transformation (epithelial cells) and the stroma that impact tumor growth. Program 

productivity has been high with over 700 peer-reviewed publications in its 15-year 

history. The relative contribution of the SF As versus University-centered research was 

not determined by this COV: 

The Low Dose Prol{ram is unique in addressing issues central to potential health effects 

from environmental, occupational. and accidental as well as low-dose medical exposures 

to ionizing radiation that are a significant and continued concerned o(the US public. 

Past research has led to changes in how the risk of radiation and the mechanisms of 

radiation carcinogenesis are perceived. Most studies of radiation risk have focused on 

cancer incidence following relatively high doses to the survivors of the A-bombs in Japan 

in 1945, as well as other populations exposed to acute high doses of radiation. Much less 

is known about the risks at low doses of <0.1 Gy (1 0 cGy or 10 mSv ), which are 

frequently encountered as the result of occupational, medical or environmental exposure. 

Thus, the acquisition o(solid scientific evidence regarding the effects oflow dose 

exposure is vital to guiding public policy including exposure limits and radiation 

remediation standards. Despite the vital importance o(the infOrmation generated by this 

program the budget has been reduced from $21. 7Mto $6.2M in the time span covered by 

this review (2011-2013). The allocation has been evenly divided between National Lab 

SF As and the remaining University research groups. Unfortunately, the absence of new 

low dose SFA solicitations in this review period will compromise the future o(this 

important program. " 

b. As the premier low dose radiation research program in the world, DOE's Low Dose 

Program led the field and has become the model on which other countries based their low 

dose program research portfolios. As Program Manager, I had amassed years of 

correspondence and meeting notes recording the many interactions that I, the Chief Scientist 
53 

for the Program, and the Principle Investigators had undertaken for the purpose of 

coordinating with colleagues in the European Union, Japan, India, and China, 

(Unfortunately, as the contents of my office were discarded without my having an 

opportunity to inspect and save important records such as these, copies were not readily 

found.) 

c. Through the years, both formal and informal letters praising the quality and importance 

of the Low Dose Program have been sent to the Office of Science from upper management in 

the DOE Offices of Nuclear Energy (DOE/NE; Dr. Peter Lyons), Environmental 

Management (DOE/EM; Dr. Ines Triay), and Environment, Health, Safety and Security 

(DOE/EHSS; Mr. Andrew Wallo). Praise was also received by colleagues in several other 

federal agencies who managed radiation research portfolios that did not overlap into the low 

dose region. (Unfortunately, as the contents of my office were discarded without my having 

an opportunity to inspect and save important records such as these, copies were not readily 

found.) 
54 

I... 

CD 

0) 

I'll 

t: Q.) I'll ...... =e ~ e "'it 

'r"'" :§- e 0 0) N "a e s.. 

c: CD a.. ~ .c 

"' 0 

~ c:i 

-

0 (.) 0 Q.) 

(1,) 

·~ (0 

til 'r"'" 

~ t: 

~ 0 -

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=e 

~ 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scienc

The Low Dose Radiation Research Program 

supports competitive peer-reviewed research 

aimed at informing the development of future 

national radiation risk policy for the public and 

the workplace. 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

DOE's Low Dose Program: 

Is the only program within the U.S. government focusing on 

low dose biological research 

• DOE focuses on worker and public safety from very low dose x- and 

gamma-ray exposures encountered in energy production and 

environmental cleanup 

In contrast: 

• NASA focuses on astronaut safety from high energy particulate 

radiation exposures encountered in space flight 

• NIH (NCI, NIEHS, NIAID) mostly research focused on moderate to 

higher dose clinically-relevant exposures (200 rads and higher) 

• DOD/AFRRI focuses research on higher dose exposures, relevant to 

preserving the health and performance of U.S. military personnel and 

protecting the public 
Who is (or should be) interested in 

Low Dose Program research? 

• Department of Energy 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• Office of Nuclear Energy (NE; nuclear power sustainability) 

• Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Security (AU-20, 1 0; setting 

implementation standards for DOE workers and public) 

• Office of Environmental Management (EM; clean up levels; high cost) 

• National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA; emergency response) 

• General Council (GC-70; NEPAdocumentation) 

• Environmental Protection Agency 

• Setting of general regulatory standards 

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

• Setting of regulatory standards for nuclear power industry 

• Departments of Labor; Transportation; NASA 

• Worker safety 

• Department of Homeland Security 

• Emergency response 

• Department of Defense 

• Military action, emergency response 

• General public (fear levels: Fukushima, Chernobyl, TMI, ... ) 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

Supports basic research to decrease the 

uncertainties and shrink the confidence intervals 

around the central estimate of risk 

• 

• 

• 

• 

DOE uses risk probability as a basis for radiation protection, but it is 

not used directly to define radiation protection standards 

Regulatory standards are generally defined as a function of dose, or 

the directly measurable quantities of exposure, activity, or 

concentration 

Regulatory levels are consistent with US-NRC and EPA, and with 

recommendations from NCRP, ICRP 

The risk uncertainty rises drastically in the low dose regime (where we 

regulate) 

Regulation at the upper confidence limit of risk is 

the current policy decision 
Office of Scienc

• History: Research to develop a better scientific basis for 

understanding exposures and risks to humans 

• Biology: old assumptions, new paradigms • The low Dose Program today 

• Million U.S. Worker Study 
Bridging Radiation Policy and Science 

An international meeting of experts 

Airlie House Conference Center 

1-5 December 1999 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scienc

"The lowest dose at which a statistically 

significant radiation risk has been shown is 

100 mSv (1 0 rem) of x-rays." 

are now 

• MELODI (Multidisciplinary European Low Dose Initiative) 

• DoReMi, OPERA, RadEpiBio 

• Japan 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• Provide mechanistic data for the development of a 

scientific basis for radiation standards in the low 

dose region 

• Possible in 1999 because of 

• Extensive biological advances associated with 

• sequencing of the genome 

• the development of gene expression arrays 

• the expansion of information on cell-cell and cell 

matrix communication 

• Technologies such as single cell irradiators 

• (The first research program to emphasize whole 

tissue responses using these advances) 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OJ

ENERGY 

Office of Scienc

• Historic mega-mouse and -dog studies were conducted 

from1970s- '90s (49,000 mice, 17,000 beagle dogs) 

• Historic (and newer) studies have shown 

• A pronounced dose-rate effect for cancer 

• Strong low dose "sparing" effect 

• Data and tissue archives 

• Animal studies help determine if cellular and molecular 

observations influence disease outcome 

• Animal data still provide a link between cell and 

molecular mechanisms and human epidemiological data 

for risk assessment. 
U.S. OEPARTMEI'H Of 

ENERGY 

Office of Scienc

• Understanding biological responses to low dose 

radiation exposures 

• Low dose radiation versus endogenous oxidative 

damage 

• Thresholds for low dose radiation 

• Genetic factors affecting individual susceptibility 

• Communication of research results 

The real challenge: to do research 

at 1 0 rads or less 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

Fourteen years later- 2014 ENERGY 

Office of Scienc

(energy deposition) dictates a 

linear induction of initial events as a function of dose 

shows us that the subsequent 

biological response is much more complex 

DNA repair 

Cell apoptotic death Cell/tissue growth and replacement 

Immune system surveillance 

*Metabolic shift after low (but not high) dose exposure is 

protective - very new ... 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

Fourteen years later- 2014 ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• Biological systems detect and respond to very low doses of 

radiation 

• Cells not directly exposed can show a biological response to 

the low dose radiation exposure of neighboring cells 

• Cell-cell and cell-matrix communication are critical in the total 

response to radiation, resulting in whole tissue or organism 

responses as compared to individual cell responses 

• Qualitatively different molecular-level responses result after 

low doses of radiation vs. high doses of radiation 

• Many cellular and tissue-level responses demonstrate nonlinear responses with respect to radiation dose 

• In addition to radiation-induced DNA damage, other processes 

are induced by low dose radiation that participate in either 

increasing or deterring carcinogenesis 
Fourteen years later- 2014 

Qualitatively simifar radiation 

effects occur at high and low 

dose exposures 

All radiation effects 

contribute to the process of 

carcinogenesis 

DNA damage is the only 

mechanism responsible for increasing cancer risk 

.. 

.. 

.. 

New Paradigms 

Qualitatively different 

processes are induced by high vs. low doses/dose-rat

Many radiation effects do n

contribute to the process ocarcinogenesis 

In addition to DNA damage, 

cancer risk is highly 

dependent on the cell 

microenvironment 

We now know much more 

about biology and 

radiobiology 
\.I.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• 12th year of Program 

• Joint funding of research with NASA's Space Radiation Research 

Program 

• Cellular and molecular responses in normal tissues 

• After high LET radiation exposures • At fluences approximating the space environment (high single-cell doses 

but low tissue doses) 

• Re-analysis of Radiobiology Tissue Archive data at Northwestern 

University 

• The Woloschak laboratory hosts several radiobiology archives containing 

data and tissues from radiobiology very large (mouse, dog) studies 

conducted in the second half of the 20th century 

• Research to enable mechanism-based models that incorporate 

both radiobiology and epidemiology 
• Currently funded projects: 

• University-based 

• Three 5-yr Program Projects in 51h year 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• 21 radiobiology projects in 3rd (last) year or no-cost extensions-

• 7 of these are joint NASA-DOE projects 

• Million U.S. Worker Study 

• National Lab SFAs: LBNL, PNNL 

• Communication links with the public; science to inform 

public debate 

• Website • Workshops • Dose ranges charts 

• >700 peer-reviewed publications (www.lowdose.doe.gov) 

• New public awareness: 

• Medical diagnostic doses (CT scans) • Fukushima- evacuation/relocation 
• Currently funded projects: 

• University-based 

• Two 5-yr Program Projects in no-cost extension 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• 9 radiobiology projects in last-year or no-cost extensions-

• 3 of these are joint NASA-DOE projects 

• Million U.S. Worker Study 

• National Lab SFAs: LBNL, PNNL 

• Communication links with the public; science to inform public 

debate 

• Website • Workshops http://lowdose.energy.gov/workshops.aspx • Dose ranges charts requested; -28,000 given out to date) 
U.S. DliPARTM!iiNT OF 

ENERGY 

Office of Scien

• Coordination with DOE/HS: DOE's Office of Health, Safety and 

Security-regular meetings with colleagues in HS-13 (Office of Domestic 

and International Health Studies) [now isAU-10, AU-20] 

• Coordination with NASA: Joint support of research grants with NASA 

Space Radiation Health Program; regular meetings, reviews 

• Coordination with AFRRI: meetings, reviews • RABRAT -quarterly meetings with agency colleagues interested in 

radiobiology and emergency response to radiological events (NCI, NIAID

AFRRI, EPA, DOD, DHS, FDA, CDC, DOE) 

• ISCORS: Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards, 

regularly attend meetings as BER observer 

• Coordination with Europe: MELODI and DoReMi; representatives 

attend each other's meetings; peer reviewers 

• Coordination with Japan: representatives attend our Workshops, 

visit, peer review 
1999 

• Endogenous oxidative I 

damage 

• DNA damage and repair • Adaptive responses 

• Bystander effects 

• Genetic susceptibility • 

• Genomic instability • 

• Risk Communication 11· 

• 

• 

" 

• 

U.S. Department of Energy 

repair 

Adaptive responses 

effects 

Genetic susceptibility 

Genomic 

- -

homeostasis (2008) 

carcinogenesis 

Low dose epidemiology 

Risk Communication 

(website, Dose Ranges chart) 

2010+ 

• Adaptive responses • Genetic susceptibility • Epigenetics 

• Tissue-emergent 

carcinogenesis* 

.. U.S. workers epidemiolo

• Risk Communication (w

Dose Ranges chart) 

endogenous oxid

damage, genomic instab

aging, homeostasis, and 

metabolic studies 
U.S. Department of Energy 

• Discussed informally at the Workshop: Low Dose Epidemiology-Wha

Can it Tell Us? December 10-11, 2008 

• Considered in Office of Science call for ARRA (Recovery Act) 

• Application via the 2010 Office of Science open call -- "Pilot Study of 

One Million American Workers and Veterans Exposed to Radiation" 

funded in FY2010 

• "Epidemiologic Study of One Million U.S. Radiation Workers and 

Veterans"; funded in FY2012 along with interagency support from NRC, 

NASA, and EPA 

• The Study populations include early DOE and Manhattan Project workers

atomic veterans who participated in nuclear weapons testing in the 1940s 

and 1950s, nuclear utility workers, medical workers and others involved in t

development of radiation technologies, as well as nuclear navy personnel. 
U.S. Department of Energy 

"" 

• STUDY IS LARGE: The study is 10 times larger than the study of Japanese Atomic Bomb 

Survivors There are no other studies in the world which are as large, with good estimates of 

dose, with long term follow-up. 

• MANY HIGH-DOSE EXPOSED WORKERS: There are more high-dose workers in this 

study than among the Japanese A-bomb survivors, but the workers received their dose gradu

over time and not all at once. 

• UNCERTAINTIES WILL BE CONSIDERED: The research is designed to address the i

of uncertainties in dose estimates during the study. 

• BUILDS ON HUGE PAST EXPENDITURE BY US GOVERNMENT: The study builds 

upon a tremendous amount of research, over 50 years, and few components are de novo. 

• INTER-AGENCY SUPPORT: The Study is a national effort, with DOD, US-NRC, NCI, 

DOE already contributing to the overall vision and funding support. NRC, NASA, and EPA 

providing inter-agency funding to the DOE grant. 

• WILL CONSIDER BIOLOGICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DATA: Finally and 

importantly, the grantees intend to consider the latest radiation biology in applying biologica

sound models to help estimate risks in the low dose region. 
74 

BIOGRAPHY 

Dr. Noelle F Metting is a Radiation Biologist, currently working for the Department of Energy 

Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security within the Office of Public Radiation 

Protection (DOEIEHSS/AU-22). Formerly, she worked in DOE's Office of Science, Office of 

Biological and Environmental Research (DOE/SC/BER), where, from the year 2001 until 

December of2014, she managed DOE's Low Dose Radiation Research Program. For the 

previous 20 years, she worked at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory as a laboratory research 

scientist. Dr. Metting earned a Master of Science in Radiological Sciences from the University 

of Washington, and a Doctor of Science in Cancer Biology from Harvard University, with a 

doctoral dissertation entitled Studies of Radiation-Induced Mutagenesis and Cell Cycle Perturbation. 
75 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. And thank you, Dr. Metting. I now recognize myself for five minutes for questions. 

Dr. Metting, I appreciate your testimony. In your testimony, as 

well as your written testimony, I believe you stated that when you 

were confronted by the Department of Energy management that 

they accused you of lobbying on behalf of the program, is that correct? 

Dr. METTING. Yes. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. Weatherwax, was one of your goals for the October 16, 2014, 

briefing with the Congressional staff to dissuade the Senate from 

offering a companion bill to the House bill? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Chairman Loudermilk, I had no explicit goals 

for the briefing other than to provide information that was requested at the briefing. The briefing—I did not personally attend 

the briefing. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. So if the intention would have been to 

dissuade the Senate from introducing their own bill, then would 

you consider that a form of lobbying? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I am not aware of the official definition of lobbying, but since I had no intention of doing any of that activity, I 

can’t really answer to it. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Well, someone in the DOE must know 

what the official definition of lobbying is since they accused Dr. 

Metting of doing the same. 

Could we bring up the slide, please? 

[Slide.] 
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.. 

From: Weatherwax, Sharlene 

To: Anderson, Todd 

Cc: Riches, Mike 

Subject: RE: HR5544 

Date: Thursday, October 09,2014 2:30:52 PM 

That's why you need to brief the Senate folks so t

don't develop their own bill. These are technically 

different staffers than the ones who introduced the 

Yes, when it was officially introduced it had spon
77 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Dr. Weatherwax, in this email from you 

to Todd Anderson to whom I understand—and according to Dr. 

Metting’s testimony—was the one that you preferred to speak to 

the Congressional staff. In this email you directed Dr. Anderson to 

conduct the briefing so that he would dissuade the Senate from offering their own bill with regard to low-dose radiation research. 

Now, that seems contrary to what you just told me in answering 

that question. In fact, the email says, ‘‘That’s why you need to brief 

the Senate folks so they don’t develop their own bill. These are 

technically different staffers than the ones who introduced the bill. 

Yes, when it was officially introduced, it had sponsors.’’ 

Can you explain the purpose of this email if it wasn’t to lobby 

Congress to do something? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So in the body of the email the question arises 

around a House bill, so my understanding is that the briefing was 

designed to inform the staffers about the Low Dose Radiation Program in general. So my understanding is that scientific issues are 

presented by the Program Manager, but the responsibilities of the 

Division Director, who was Dr. Anderson, are to communicate the 

strategic direction and the portfolio balance that he has developed 

so—— 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Well, I appreciate that but that is not 

what the text of the email says. The text of the email says, ‘‘That’s 

why you need to brief the Senate folks so they don’t develop their 

own bill.’’ 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So since it’s Dr. Anderson’s responsibility to 

communicate what is in his portfolio and to convey the program 

priorities that he has balanced for all of the competing scientific opportunities, his job was to present that to House and Senate so 

that they can see how he arrived at his conclusions for presenting 

his particular portfolio. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Okay. I’d like to go to Dr. Metting now. 

And I think it’s clear that—and I think that’s why you’re having 

a hard time answering the question is that this was indeed an intention of going and persuading Congress to do something, which 

is a practical definition of lobbying, which Dr. Metting was fired for 

doing. I think there’s some hypocrisy here. 

Dr. Metting, is the narrative that Dr. Weatherwax instructed Dr. 

Anderson to lobby against H.R. 5544 consistent with your memory 

of how the briefing went? 

Dr. METTING. Actually, the briefing—it wasn’t. It wasn’t because 

I believe that my management—and Todd is my—Todd Anderson 

is my manager and with the help of Dr. Carruthers, I think they 

were trying to inform—they were trying to lobby against this bill 

itself. They were trying to—they told me to—— 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Okay. To make clear that you were directed to basically lobby against the Senate introducing their own 

bill? Are we clear? Or that was the intention? 

Dr. METTING. Actually, I don’t think anything was mentioned to 

me about the Senate in any way. I was told that I would be doing 

the science and that’s it, but I was told in the pre-briefing that we 

are against this bill and we don’t want this bill to pass. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. So as you stated in your testimony that 

the result of you being released—or fired was that you honestly an-
78 

swered the questions by the staff, which you said you were impressed that they had the knowledge they had, and you were not 

lobbying to—or you—they felt you were lobbying to keep the program just because you were answering the questions honestly? 

Dr. METTING. Yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was only answering the 

questions. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Dr. Weatherwax, Congress relies on 

briefings with federal agencies and in particular a scientist like Dr. 

Metting to provide candid technical expertise on matters. Would 

you agree with that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. It also seems that when it came to a 

briefing on the Low Dose Radiation Research project you viewed 

this briefing not as an attempt to inform Congress with technical 

expertise but an attempt to prevent legislation. Is that accurate? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. As I stated previously, our intent was to provide information about how we develop our budget priorities to balance the program portfolio that includes many broad elements of 

which the low-dose radiation research is one. So we were there to 

provide a full accounting of all of the science that’s presented so 

that Congress can make its own determinations about how we 

come to our decisions. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Thank you. And I have exceeded my 

time. I apologize, members of the committee, but I’ll extend that 

same latitude to the other members because I was not very well 

in managing my own time. 

I now recognize Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Over 40 years of managing employees, I’ve had the unfortunate 

responsibility of sometimes having to fire people. Rarely though do 

I fire people on the spot. It’s usually—on the spot it tends to be because they just got into a fistfight with somebody or were caught 

lying outright to a customer. 

So, Dr. Metting, we’ve heard a lot about your firing. Is it your 

sense that you were removed because you were advocating for a 

program that you lead for more than ten years or were you removed because of ‘‘insubordinate defiance of authority,’’ that you 

were argumentative, that you called their actions idiotic? Was it 

basically because you disagreed with them on the science or because they saw you as unmanageable? 

Dr. METTING. I—at the time I thought that they were actually 

reacting to the $16 million question that I talked to them with 

after the briefing, but I also knew that they were very upset with 

me talking about the science in the briefing itself, which was a 

wonderful—actually a good opportunity to talk about the program 

and I was—that’s why I was just very surprised when they were 

upset about that. That was not lobbying. That was talking to the 

science. 

Mr. BEYER. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Weatherwax, it’s hard for us 

it—for any of us here to know what happened in that briefing after 

the fact. We have the transcripts and stuff, but I’m curious to know 

what you and others took at DOE to help mediate this and resolve 

the tensions between Dr. Metting and Dr. Anderson and other DOE 

employees. 
79 

You know, it’s a big step to take someone out of a career they’ve 

devoted a significant part of their life to. So did you seek mediation? Was there anything else that attempted to resolve the bad 

blood between Dr. Metting and the other folks at DOE? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So, Congressman Beyer, so the process works 

to actually defend the rights of the employee and also the interests 

of the Department. And in this case, the supervisor, Dr. Todd Anderson, submitted the proposal to remove Dr. Metting. So he issued 

the proposal. At that point, it was deemed that it had to go for 

human resources to actually advise on what the process—what the 

next steps would be, and so we followed the process at the Department, which is that the proposing official submits some kind of request and then the human resources and general counsel provide 

advice as to whether or not there are sufficient grounds to take any 

action, any kind of personnel action. 

And so in this case it’s a process as with all personnel actions 

is that it has to be then handed over to HR and GC, and at that 

point if they feel that it’s—there is sufficient grounds to warrant 

further action, then the process—the entire matter goes to the deciding official, who is a neutral third party. 

Mr. BEYER. Well, let me simplify. Does it seem to you in retrospect that it’s an overreaction to fire somebody for advocating for 

a program that she spent perhaps 14 years of her life working on? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So I believe that the proposal to dismiss Dr. 

Metting enumerated a number of issues, and some of those issues 

obviously—there are a number of those issues which are not related at all to the briefing. And so I think that that was something 

then that the process had to look at, and that’s what the deciding 

official was viewing. And so I feel it’s not my position to make the 

determination of what course of action should be taken on something that is so serious, and so we relied on HR to advise us. 

Mr. BEYER. So who was the deciding official? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. In this case the deciding official was Dr. Steve 

Binkley. He’s another Associate Director in the Office of Science. 

He manages the Advanced Scientific Computing Research Office. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you. Dr. Metting, prior to October 2014, had 

you ever been disciplined or reprimanded by your supervisors at 

DOE? 

Dr. METTING. Mr. Congressman, actually never. I have never had 

anything written against me or had any disciplinary action neither 

at the—at—as a fed or—— 

Mr. BEYER. So was the first time in your career then that any 

supervisor had sought to reprimand or punish you? 

Dr. METTING. Oh, yes. That’s the first time. I was shocked. 

Mr. BEYER. Do you feel your actions immediately after the briefing, that heated exchange, were appropriate? 

Dr. METTING. The heated exchange was in response to what they 

were saying, and after Dr. Anderson had raised his voice and then 

we—it was—there was actually some scientific content there. We 

were actually talking about the use of the—you know, of science in 

BER, so it was under the rubric of a scientific exchange after everyone was gone in the privacy of the—of BER really. 

And it was—I was—I really actually feel like I was goaded, and 

I did say that I thought the—I thought their decision was idiotic 
80 

on there and I was—I was also not—I didn’t like the way some of 

the questions were in the briefing itself. The question of—well, actually, Dr. Carruthers brought up the fact that DOE does not have 

regulatory—does not set regulatory standards and that was not 

true. And so I did correct that in a—kind of a collegial fashion, and 

I think that was what Dr. Carruthers was reacting to at the—after 

the briefing in the post-briefing. 

Mr. BEYER. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Beyer. 

I now recognize the fine gentleman from the great state of Texas, 

Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Weatherwax, you stated in your discussion with Chairman 

Loudermilk that you didn’t go there to lobby, you were—you didn’t 

go there at all to the meeting but that you felt like your intent was 

to actually impart the scientific facts. And in your opening statement, in your testimony you went through a litany of scientific 

facts. 

But let me ask you this. At what point did you become aware of 

the fact that there—this was indeed—there was a lobbying attempt 

going on, to use the term ‘‘subtly yet firmly’’ dissuade the Senate 

from filing their companion bill? When did you become aware of 

that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I can’t recall when I became aware of any—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, let me help you with that. It—— 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. —lobby. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me help you with that. On your email—can we 

put the email back up on the slide? 

[Slide.] 
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From: Weatherwax, Sharlene 

To: Anderson, Todd 

Cc: Riches, Mike 

Subject: RE: HR5544 

Date: Thursday, October 09, 2014 2:30:52 PM 

That's why you need to brief the Senate folks so t

don't develop their own bill. These are technically 

different staffers than the ones who introduced the 

Yes, when it was officially introduced it had spon
82 

Mr. WEBER. It says—Dr. Carruthers writes—and this is, by the 

way, October the 4th, 2014. That’s the exact date. ‘‘I think this is 

an opportunity to subtly yet firmly let the Senate know’’ blah, blah, 

blah, blah, blah. So you did become aware on October the—you 

knew at least before October the 4th, 2014, or on that date that 

there was this effort going on. Is that accurate? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So, yes, I obviously knew—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, let me move on. 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. But I don’t see the word ‘‘lobby.’’ 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move on. Well, to let the Senate firmly know, 

I mean that is the definition, as our Chairman pointed out. Dr. 

Metting had said she—in the pre-briefing she had been informed 

of some things. Did you attend any kind of pre-briefing? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. WEBER. Did you have emails about the pre-briefing? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I might have been copied on them, but I don’t 

recall actually engaging—— 

Mr. WEBER. So if we sent you a request for more emails about 

this briefing, you could find this for us? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Of course. If you inquired about any emails, 

we would provide them. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, let me do it this way then. Why was it 

thought that Dr. Anderson was better on staying on message in 

this particular instance? Do you have any knowledge of that, email 

written communication as to why Dr. Anderson needed to be chosen? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So typically, when we have briefings to Congressional staff, it is the Division Director who usually attends. 

And so in this case the Division Director is more experienced. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. That’s what I need. So if he’s more—and if he 

can stay on message, particularly if the message is to subtly yet 

firmly—to use the email’s terminology—basically lobby the Senate 

against filing the companion bill, he was the logical choice? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So he’s the appropriate choice to convey what 

our program priorities are. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. It’s my understanding committee staff meets 

with technical experts all the time. Our gentlemen over here on the 

other side of the aisle said it was unusual or the Democrats 

weren’t—but I’m sure that they’ve met with committee—their staff 

has met with technical experts, too. In your opinion is Congress entitled to the opinion of experts or just the ones that maybe Dr. 

Todd Anderson and the others in this instance agree with? Are we 

entitled to the opinions of experts or just the ones that you all 

agree with? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Congress is entitled to what they ask for. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So you would agree with me, then, that this 

lobbying effort—apparent lobbying effort to subtly yet firmly dissuade the Senate was inappropriate? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I don’t believe that’s what my statement says. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, I wasn’t asking you about your statement, Dr. 

Weatherwax. I’m asking you about what occurred in the email and 

your obvious apparent attempt to convince the Senate—dissuade 

them from not filing their companion bill. That is lobbying in its 

truest form. Do you think that’s inappropriate? 
83 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So since I never actually said that Dr. Anderson should lobby, his job is to provide—— 

Mr. WEBER. But that’s—I didn’t ask—that’s not my question. My 

question is this attempt to subtly yet firmly influence the Senate, 

is that not improper to you? Yes or no? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Dr. Anderson was there to convey the overall 

program priorities. 

Mr. WEBER. You’re not going to answer the question. I’m going 

to move on. 

Dr. Weatherwax, it appears that you and other DOE officials 

wanted to ensure that Congress would not receive information 

about the Low Dose Radiation Program in an attempt to prevent 

legislation, and thus, that’s the subject hearing matter for this 

hearing. Is that accurate to say? It at least appears that you all 

wanted to dissuade this Congress from getting—Senate particularly from getting that information. Would you agree that it appears that way? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. The Senate—if the Senate asked us to provide 

information, we provided the briefing. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, according to this, you have to have someone 

staying on message to subtly yet firmly let the Senate know. You 

did read that in the email, I take—you do read your emails? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. That did not raise a red flag for you? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. If the intent is to provide information about 

the science, we did not interfere with that whatsoever. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Let me do it this way real quick. On your 

testimony—you referred to your testimony on page one. You say 

competitive funding on their BER—I’m going from memory now— 

programs. Was is so competitive that it seemed to justify an attempt to lobby the Senate not to file a companion bill and in order 

to direct that funding that Congress was seeking to establish? Is 

it that competitive? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. It is a very highly competitive funding—— 

Mr. WEBER. So it sounds like that you all might have thought 

it was justifiable. I get that. And then on page three you go into 

the technical stuff and you say that a lot of the things that you all 

do is to ‘‘provide an analysis’’ and then you list some groups that 

can draw their own conclusions. And I won’t go through it and bore 

you. It’s on page three if you want to read it. 

So my question is should Congress be allowed to draw conclusions as well? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Of course. 

Mr. WEBER. So you admit that. And so—but you don’t say that 

the attempt to subtly yet firmly dissuade the Senate was a contravention of that idea that they can draw their own conclusions? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. WEBER. Wow. Okay. Very good. Let me go to you very quickly, Dr. Metting. You said that somebody was your boss. ‘‘Todd Anderson is my manager.’’ Is that still true today? 

Dr. METTING. Well, he’s not supervising me today. I’ll just say 

that I’m still a member on—of BER in Todd’s—in Dr. Anderson’s 

division—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 
84 

Dr. METTING. —but I am on detail with the Office of Environment, Health, and Safety. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And you still as of this date have not been 

able—allowed to get your personal effects back? 

Dr. METTING. No, not at all. When I—the second day after I got 

back—actually finally got back to DOE I asked—I called up BER. 

I was calling Kathy Holmes, Dr. Weatherwax’s admin person, to 

see if I could go—come in finally and get my things. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And I don’t mean to pry but do you have 

grandchildren? 

Dr. METTING. Yes, I do. 

Mr. WEBER. Were there pictures of your grandchildren included 

in that? 

Dr. METTING. There could have been some pictures. There could 

have been so—— 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. Yes. Okay. So you mentioned that somebody 

was seen pushing a dumpster into your office to get rid of this 

stuff. And who was that? 

Dr. METTING. I’m sorry, that—I have to admit it’s hearsay but 

I have the email from a colleague—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. METTING. —in BER who watched my Associate Director actually personally pushing a dumpster—— 

Mr. WEBER. Is it the norm that they push around these 

dumpsters and do these kinds of things? 

Dr. METTING. I have never heard of such a thing. 

Mr. WEBER. No? Okay. Thank you, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LOUDERMILK. I thank the gentleman from Texas. 

I find it very interesting that the statement was that it was appropriate for Dr. Anderson to brief Congressional staff, but the 

DOE did not find it appropriate for Dr. Anderson to be here for the 

Full Committee. 

At this point I’d like to recognize the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Rohrabacher, five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And so you do have 

grandchildren? You know, I have children and I got married later 

on in life and one of my daughters has had some health problems. 

And I just want you to know that this research on low-dose radiation is vital to a lot of people’s grandchildren and children, including my daughter. And I thank you for your dedication to finding 

out about this issue because it is just essential for the health of so 

many people. And thank you very much for—my daughter had leukemia so we know what that’s about. 

And I am very, very honored and pleased that we have someone 

like yourself that is going to withstand pressure to go beyond your 

scientific responsibilities but to basically try to achieve a political 

end, meaning that they—trying to stop someone from achieving a 

political end by compromising your scientific commitment because 

that’s what it sounds like to me. 

And what this whole thing sounds like, Mr. Chairman, to me is 

that what we have here is an example of where scientists are feeling, at least in the Department of Energy and this Office of Science 

are feeling that they have to go in a certain direction in order to 

placate the—basically the priority of the Administration and— 
85 

which obviously did not—was not holding low-dose radiation research as a priority. 

I am a cosponsor of the legislation that would have basically formalized that the money being spent—this money that’s being spent 

be spent there in the Department of Science on low-dose radiation 

research. 

Dr. Weatherwax, could you tell me, do you agree that those of 

us who are elected officials have the right to have those kind of— 

set those type of priorities with the spending—with money that’s 

being spent on federal research? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Congress certainly has the right for—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So we have the right—— 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. —generating legislation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And so we do and it’s recognized, yet we have 

someone here who has dedicated her life to a specific research area 

that is being talked about now and she is being given direction beforehand as what direction her answers should be to the people 

who constitutionally have responsibility of making the decision. 

This type of—you know we hear all the time from our colleagues 

on the other side of the aisle that we because we have doubts about 

manmade CO2 warming the planet that we are politicizing science, 

and I will have to tell you my feeling here is what we’ve got is an 

example of politicizing science. Someone there in the Department 

in your Office of Science, although not a political appointee, feels 

compelled to try to placate the rest of the Department of Energy’s 

commitment to global warming as being a manmade situation that 

they’re going to—and that goes all the way down that—what I call 

fanaticism on the global warming issue is being felt the effects of 

that all the way down to this very honorable scientist who spent 

14 years of her life trying to do something that would be important 

for her grandchildren and my children and children all over the 

United States. 

This is—and I realize that you’re trying to be as honest with us 

as you can, but it also—quite frankly, your answers indicate to me 

that there’s a lack of willingness to take on other people in the Department of Energy who would be upset if you said anything to 

back her up. 

And, Mr. Chairman, this type of politicization has impacts not 

only in our responsibility because what we’re talking about now 

today is our responsibility as elected people in a democracy, the 

people elect someone to make major decisions as to how money will 

be spent. Not only does it undermine democracy, but in the end it 

hurts people. In the end this research, which we believed was vital, 

much more vital than proving that CO2 causes the earth to get 

warm, that we felt that that money should go to low-dose radiation 

research. And instead, someone in the Department of Science tried 

to pressure her so that we couldn’t back up that concept that we 

have, that that scientific investigation is more important than 

spending it on manmade global warming. 

So with that said, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing, 

and I would like to compliment Dr. Metting for your courage, for 

your willingness to say the truth as you see it which is what all 

science has to be. And undermining that and having someone trying to tell you what you should emphasize and shouldn’t emphasize 
86 

in order to obtain a political goal, which is basically to influence 

the decision-makers who are elected to make the decision, you 

showed great courage and great patriotism. Thank you very much 

for being with us today. 

Dr. METTING. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. WEBER. [Presiding.] The Chair now recognizes Congressman 

Randy Neugebauer from also the great State of Texas. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Well, thank you, Chairman. 

Dr. Weatherwax, you’re a scientist, is that correct? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. That’s correct. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. At the Department of Energy? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. And so I think your title is Associate Director 

of Science for Biological and Environmental Research, is that correct? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. That’s correct. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Yes. So when you’re doing research or investigations, are the facts important? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Why are they important? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So scientific research is all predicated on obtaining facts. Facts obtained from experiments, often using controlled hypotheses, and collecting the facts helps us to refine our 

theories and then suggests further experiments. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So what if you were working on a scientific 

project and you were evaluating some previous projects that had 

been done, scientific research, and someone was directing you as to 

what science that you were able to view and precluded you from 

looking at, say, other experiments that had been done in the same 

area? Would that be productive to your work? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I don’t think that typically that’s how science 

is done so—— 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Well, no, but I mean answer the question. I’m 

not asking your opinion on how you think it’s a done or not. Would 

that be productive to your scientific research? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. No. So if you’re a Member of the United States 

Congress and you’re trying to evaluate how we spend the taxpayers’ money and what are the things that are in the best interest 

of the American people, wouldn’t you think the facts are important? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Now, you know, do you think your opinion on 

an issue should influence the facts that you’re willing to share with 

me? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I—if you ask me for a fact, then I’ll provide 

it. I don’t think my opinion—— 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Yes. Yes. 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. —matters. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Well, that’s what we asked for, and I think 

that’s what we expect. And I think what members of this committee find very troubling is that there was an effort here that we 

had an oversight committee trying to, you know, do its job and 

then we had people within the Administration—and what’s more 
87 

troubling it’s—I expect it from the Administration, but from professional scientists I don’t expect that. 

And I think what’s discouraging here is that we had professional 

scientists trying to filter or influence the information and how that 

was presented to the United States Congress. And, you know, I 

find that distasteful, and I also find it very unprofessional that you, 

from the scientific community, don’t rely on the facts. It’s important to have the facts because we’re counting on you to—both in 

your research and in your investigations to make sure that, you 

know, we are doing everything we can to keep the American people 

healthy and safe and that this kind of behavior is counterproductive to that. 

And so I would say that I’m hopeful that this is not a pervasive 

culture within the Department of Energy or any other department 

of the United States Government. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California is now recognized for five minutes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’m sorry I’m 

late. The Judiciary Committee is having a hearing at the exact 

same time. 

You know, I want to explore how we can improve our scientific 

integrity policy at the agency. As you know, I’m sure the Union of 

Concerned Scientists has made an observation that the policy is 

rather short and it’s just three pages. And although I think it hits 

all the high points, it—compared to the scientific integrity outlines 

of some other agencies, you know, it’s on the short side. 

And I’m wondering how we might move forward and use this observation as a way to further improve the agency and whether you 

have comments on that, either one of you? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I can’t comment on how the Department has 

developed the scientific integrity policy, but I can certainly say that 

as a scientist and the daughter of a scientist who worked on the 

space missions, I certainly agree that scientific integrity is important. 

Dr. METTING. I’m just a scientist. I’m not a—in the management 

chain, but I would think that management could do better at Department of Energy. 

Ms. LOFGREN. All right. So it’s not something that you as scientists would necessarily want to weigh in on. I just think, you 

know, the need—when you get to scientific integrity or any integrity policies, it’s important that they be robust, but it’s also important that they be communicated to—not only to management but 

to every person in the institution so that everybody knows what 

the rules are. 

And I think that, you know, I have great regard for the current 

Secretary of Energy. I mean, he’s a fabulous scientist and individual. Steve Chu was—and also, I mean, a Nobel Prize-winner, I 

mean, was the Energy Secretary when the current integrity policy 

was adopted. And I think that to ask—well, I don’t know if there’s 

time left in this Administration, but to ask that this be reviewed 

and amplified would be a good outcome from this hearing, a productive outcome rather than just a negative one. 
88 

And I’m hoping that we might—I’ll—if I could, I would ask unanimous consent that we put into the record the analysis undertaken. 

It’s entitled ‘‘Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies, A Comparative Analysis’’ and it’s done by the Union of Concerned Scientists. It’s dated March 2013, but I think it’s still pertinent and 

would be helpful to be part of the record. 

Mr. WEBER. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix I] 

Ms. LOFGREN. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I think my time is 

nearly expired and I’d be happy to yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from Illinois is recognized. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you both for being 

here. 

Mr. Chairman, at this time I’d also ask unanimous consent to be 

able to insert into the record three different letters. The first is 

dated March 18, 2013. It’s from a group of researchers in Madison, 

including Columbia University, which states ‘‘Our limited understanding of low-dose health risks seriously impairs the nation’s decision-making capabilities both in the short- and long-term after a 

large-scale radiological event.’’ 

The next—I’d also like to include letters from the American College of Radiology and the Health Physics Society supporting my 

legislation, which passed the House in January 2015. This bill is 

H.R. 35, the Low Dose Radiation Research Act of 2015. This is another quote from the Health Physics Society letter. ‘‘A greater understanding of the effects of low-dose radiation on humans will not 

only add to our body of knowledge on the subject but it would also 

enable us to make better decisions on what are the proper levels, 

procedures, and protections needed when our citizens are subject to 

exposure to sources of low-dose radiation.’’ 

So I’d ask for unanimous consent to be able to enter those into 

the record. 

Mr. WEBER. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information appears in Appendix I] 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you. Questions—if I could direct initial 

questions, Dr. Weatherwax, if I could direct it to you. Was it your 

intention and the intention of other such as Dr. Anderson, Dr. Carruthers, and Dr. Huerta to attempt to prevent the benefits of lowdose radiation research from being presented to Congress? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Dr. Weatherwax, if Dr. Metting provided that information in response to questions from Congressional staff, then 

why was she removed from her position? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So my understanding is that the proposal to 

dismiss Dr. Metting details all of the issues, and those were the 

issues that were actually reviewed by general counsel and human 

resources, and the procedures were followed. The deciding official 

is the one who viewed the entirety of all of those issues and made 

the decision. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Dr. Weatherwax, is it the role of the federal 

agency officials to prevent information from being accurately presented to Congress, as it was in this case? 
89 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I don’t believe that the federal government inaccurately presented information in this case. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Well, clearly, there was a slide that was removed 

and I guess—I think I have a slide that we can put up. 

[Slide.] 
-

... 

.. 

-

-

-

-

-----

--,., __ 

_.._ 

For bfftit:y,l think we could dtop Slides 14-15 and 20-22: and still have a eood ofthf! 

pqram tunorv and currettt status. Also, 1 slide 25 we could brtnC as a separate baaup, ff needed. 

From: Anderson, Todd 

To: Metting, Noelle 

Cc: Carruthers, Julie; Huerta, Marcos; Weatherwax, Sharle

Subject: RE: Update slides 

Date: Thursday, October 16,2014 9:04:00AM 

Attachments: Update Oct 2014.pdf 

Also, (slide 4) while I know that many DOE entities would 

{$!ide 4} wt'!de I \noW that many DOE would certatnty be ltr!Pbal!'d by a cMnJ:t> in • • • • • • "'"'"'"'""'"'.""'"rta,.,...wrPAmovodmthatdir.alon,NEbwonlVentiiV<hottknow certamly be 1mpacted by a change m rad1at10n protect10n or,,.,..,.-,..nv,.,_...,..,.log,..nsc•"""''"etowao..Prognm. standards if EPA moved in that direction, NE is the only en

Also, rw the us ciW:f:my bun askmc for ZJ re-laxation o1 EPA rad protection mrnsards?l 

s.uspea:not. 

I'm copying everyone on this ::ince we wift be makirlc modifK:ations: w mrs 

quiCkl'lthiSmOf'lllllC. 

Thank> 

Todd 

fftiiiiOiiiiiiiiiliiiili' 

s.lb Odlat:w lS.lD14 &15 PM 

T.:,..,._._ Todd ----

Tocil. 

llao:islboupldo. lstill1hiol:itis--odo:oce,ml......tedslides,but pleatet.tbalool<.l.....,.weCIIIcllalpdliDp-. 

'l1llob. 

Nodle 

NF M..,;.,. S..D. 

that I know of that has engaged in any substantive dialogue 

SC about the Low Dose Program. 
91 

Mr. HULTGREN. Dr. Weatherwax, this is an email from Dr. Anderson to Dr. Metting, which you were copied. It appears to suggest 

that Dr. Metting remove slide 4 from the briefing documents, a 

slide that lists all the federal agency uses for low-dose radiation research. Isn’t that precisely the information that Congress would 

want to know in a briefing about the program? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So I cannot comment as to why Dr. Anderson 

recommended removal of a particular element within a briefing. It 

could have been for brevity. I can’t actually speak to why he suggested removal. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Yes, I wish Dr. Anderson again were here to be 

able to respond to that directly. 

Also, I guess I think I’ve got another slide. 

[Slide.] 
• 

e Nlldinnllll N!.ICIEJ<:Ii 

• 

• Environmental Protection Agency 

• Setting of general regulatory 

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

• of regulatory standards 

• Departments of Labor, Transportation; NASA 

• WOlrKal' 

• Department of Homeland Security 

• response 

Defense 
93 

Mr. HULTGREN. There it is, the slide that notes the beneficial nature of low-dose radiation research for Homeland Security and the 

Department of Defense in responding to radiological attacks. 

Dr. Metting, in your scientific opinion could the research developed by the Low Dose Radiation Research Program benefit federal 

emergency response agencies? 

Dr. METTING. Yes, very much so in setting evacuation standards, 

the levels at which we need to address different types of emergencies, yes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Again, it’s a great disappointment. I do look towards these hearings and the requests that we make to agencies 

as our ability to be able to be educated on what is happening, how 

funding ought to happen, what important programs ought to continue to be funded. And in this case it seems like we were not given 

that opportunity. In fact, very directly certain things were excluded 

from our ability to see. 

Dr. Metting, last question. Is this the sort of information that 

you think DOE management preferred to keep from committee 

staff during the briefing? And did the DOE management tell you 

to stick to talking points that excluded the sort of information? 

Dr. METTING. Yes, it did. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Again, thank you so much. This is disturbing. 

This is frustrating. And I hope we can continue to get to the bottom 

of this and make sure that this never happens again but also that 

there is justice in this. 

So with that, I will yield back. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Virginia is recognized. No? You’re good? 

Okay. 

All right. The gentleman from—on my right here from Virginia, 

which is not often you’re on my right. He wants to do another 

round so we will do that. 

Let me start by simply saying—I’ll tell you what. You go. 

Mr. BEYER. You sure? 

Mr. WEBER. You bet you. You go. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d first like to respond to my friend Mr. Rohrabacher from California who talked about the fanaticism of climate change science 

and just point out that 97 percent of the scientists in the world— 

China, India, Europe, et cetera—believe often reluctantly that climate change is real and that it’s manmade and that we represent 

an enormous threat to mankind. This is not fanaticism, nor is it 

politics. It’s just what the science is. 

I know there are three percent that agree that it’s—believe it’s 

not real. Two good friends of mine sent me pieces that believe that 

climate change is not manmade or there’s nothing we can do about 

it. I don’t think they’re fanatics either. These are—we should let 

the science be what the science is and then together try to make 

good decisions about how to move forward. 

Dr. Weatherwax, is it the responsibility of the Department of Energy to communicate the Administration’s science priorities to Congress? And would—it seems like we got off on the wrong foot when 

someone accused of Dr. Metting of lobbying, which then led to lots 

of accusations of you and Dr. Anderson of lobbying. Isn’t this more 
94 

just the responsibility to communicate what the executive branch 

believes the priority should be and then the legislative branch can 

do what they want to do? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you. Let me ask this, the same question of 

both of you. Dr. Weatherwax, is there obviously more to learn from 

the Low Dose Radiation Program after a quarter billion dollars’ 

worth of research or have we had a plateau period where we know 

most of what we think we need to know? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So I believe that, as with many scientific 

areas, always more can be gained. However, in this case the program’s priorities were certainly shifting more towards large epidemiological studies, which is studies of humans and populations and 

their exposure. And so those kinds of studies are probably the future of where this research is—field is going, and I believe that 

that type of research is ongoing. We are continuing to support a 

study, and those studies are being done by entities such as the National Cancer Institute. 

Mr. BEYER. So, Dr. Metting, the same question. Do you believe 

that the research had plateaued after a quarter billion dollars or 

did you feel you were on the cusp of dramatic new insights? 

Dr. METTING. Actually, I don’t believe there was a plateau at all. 

We were—we had basically gone through all of what we could do 

with cell culture and we were going into whole systems biology. 

And when—once we started moving into that, what we did—what 

we realized is that for very low doses there’s really not a cancer 

aspect to it. There is real interesting science that is asking what 

is actually—what does the low-dose actually do. And so we were 

looking at adaptive responses, we were looking at really excellent— 

like the metabolic shift that occurs at very low doses that actually 

triggers an adaptive response. 

And it has very exciting directions to go because low doses—they 

affect your immune surveillance and at the very low doses it’s 

much different from the types of mechanisms that occur at very 

high doses. 

And I’m—I agree with Dr. Weatherwax that we need a new way 

to look at the epidemiology. We’ve been only having the high-dose 

epidemiology for so long. Now, we’re looking at low-dose epidemiology, and that is exactly the type of science that we need to compare our new biology to, that the old—the A-bomb survivor epidemiologists are still using old biological assumptions. We have a 

whole new set of assumptions. The low-dose area is getting very exciting. 

Mr. BEYER. I’m about to run out of time. I’d like to submit for 

the record, if there’s no objection, the Department of Energy’s response to the Inspector General and the Office of Special Counsel 

regarding the $16 million disclosure where the Department of Energy details how that $16 million was spent according to the Congressional appropriation if there’s no objection, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. WEBER. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix I] 

Mr. BEYER. And then one last question for you, Dr. Metting. Is 

there anything inappropriate with both you for radiation, the lowdose radiation, Dr. Weatherwax, Dr. Todd Anderson, and others 
95 

communicating those understandings to Congress and then let 

Congress authorize and allocate the money it wishes to spend in 

its legislative wisdom? I mean, shouldn’t—— 

Dr. METTING. I don’t—— 

Mr. BEYER. Is there a reason why it’s bad to have the necessary 

conflict between the Administration’s perspective and Congress’ 

perspective? 

Dr. METTING. Mr. Congressman—Ranking Member, I really don’t 

think there is anything wrong with a conflict. Both sides should be 

looked at. Both sides should be heard but—— 

Mr. BEYER. And hopefully the wisdom will emerge, right? 

Dr. METTING. Yes. 

Mr. BEYER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair from Ohio is recognized. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Weatherwax, I’m curious what is the process like when you 

prepare for meeting for Congress? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So typically, when the request comes in, it will 

come to the Department’s Congressional Affairs and they will then 

notify us as to what the request is and direct it to the appropriate 

office. If it’s a matter of briefing appropriation staffers, then it 

would be budget-related and then the most senior person will typically go, the person has who has authority to develop the budget 

priorities and responsibility for justification. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Okay. So when you come to a hearing before Congress, do you have objectives for the meeting? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So this is actually my first meeting with Congress, so clearly my objective is just to answer your questions. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Okay. So how—in the Department of Energy 

when you talk about the culture and you talk about—surely you’ve 

prepared others to come and give testimony before Congress. 

What’s considered success? What’s that like in the—you know, hey, 

you did a good job or you didn’t do a good job? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I think if Congress is satisfied with the information that the Department has provided, then that would be a 

successful outcome. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Why then was Dr. Metting’s testimony before 

Congressional staffers not viewed as success? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I don’t believe that we actually made any kind 

of decision about success or no success after that particular briefing. I believe that the decision to—the proposal to remove, as I 

said, included other aspects that were not related to the specific 

briefing to Congress. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. Dr. Metting, after your October 16 

briefing were you officially removed from your position at the Department of Energy? 

Dr. METTING. Yes, I was. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Without objection, I’d like to share an email exchange between Dr. Weatherwax and Dr. Anderson. They appear 

to be debating whether to provide Dr. Metting with an official notice of proposed removal from federal service on the day of the office holiday party. So this was December. 
96 

Dr. Metting, when were you informed about your dismissal from 

the Department, and could you please elaborate on how that happened? 

Mr. WEBER. Without objection, so ordered. You wanted that in 

the record? 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. 

[Slide.] 
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From: Anderson, Todd 

To: Weatherwax, Sharlene 

Subject: RE: Metting Proposal 

Date: Wednesday, December 03,2014 2:52:0

Or Friday morning. Tomorrow is awful with t

party and All Hand's meeting. Not sure if Ric

prepared for today but I could ask. 

.....lrilr.. Should we do it today? Tomorrow is the holid

.....,..- party--awkward 
98 

Dr. METTING. Yes, Mr. Congressman. I—okay. So it had been 

very tense, you know, since the October 16 and then when I was 

taken off of my duties as managing the Low Dose Program. And 

I had talked to my union representative, and everyone knew I was 

a little upset, but then there wasn’t anyone who would really—Dr. 

Anderson, Dr. Weatherwax would not talk to me about the subject 

so it was very tense. 

The morning of the—of December 4 we had a big potluck. It’s a 

lot of fun. We’re out in Germantown so we can bring large amounts 

of food. And I was tasked—or I volunteered to bring the turkey 

dressing, the mashed potatoes and gravy, and we had our party. 

And then directly after the party I was informed that there would 

be a personnel action in 2 hours and that—or something like that. 

I don’t really remember the exact thing I was so shocked, and that 

you should probably bring your union representative with you at 

that time. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Was this consistent with the culture that something like this would happen or was this kind of a new trend or 

new event, new single data point in the culture? 

Dr. METTING. Oh, you mean the personnel—— 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Yes, just the—you know, you’re coming right off 

of a holiday party, you’re coming off of testimony where you 

gave—— 

Dr. METTING. It was shocking. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. —testimony? 

Dr. METTING. It was shocking and it was out of the ordinary for 

me. I mean, I’ve never, ever had anything even against anything 

that I’ve done. I’ve always had very fully successful program reviews. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. Dr. Weatherwax, in your experience 

at the Department of Energy is it general practice for an agency 

scientist to be told what they can and cannot say during their Congressional testimony? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Have you ever been instructed to censor scientific 

opinions when communicating with Congress or other agencies? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. So is it your opinion that this was an outlier of 

an event with Dr. Metting? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. We never told Dr. Metting to—we never attempted to censor scientific content. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Okay. It does appear that you—you were dissatisfied with the way the conversation went and took action, and it 

seems to have potentially had a stifling effect. 

So my time is expired. Thank you. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. 

Dr. Weatherwax, in your exchange just—the last exchange with 

the gentleman from Virginia, he talked about an opinion on climate 

change and it’s okay if the Administration has an opinion and you 

think they ought to be free—he asked you didn’t you think they 

ought to be free to pursue what they thought was important. Do 

you remember that exchange? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Yes. 
99 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So the gentleman from—well, let me do it this 

way. Just hold that thought. Dr. Metting, did you feel attacked 

after that meeting and obviously leading up to the party you were 

talking about? 

Dr. METTING. After the briefing? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. 

Dr. METTING. I was completely attacked. And at the time it felt 

like it was—you know, it was a surprise and it was—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. METTING. —unforeseen. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, I apologize to you for that. And from what I 

know, that should not have occurred and you should not have to 

endure that. And I hope you get the pictures, if there are some, of 

your grandchildren back. 

But suffice it to say that I agree with an earlier comment. Thank 

you for coming up here because more—as important is the fact that 

the process has been attacked, and I think we’re seeing that today. 

Now, Dr. Weatherwax, we talked earlier and you—I asked you 

a couple questions about the lobbying intent and you said you 

didn’t have an opinion and you weren’t sure that was lobbying, but 

we have another email. And I use the word subtle, you know, to 

keep the Senate from filing a bill. Can we get that email up on the 

screen? Can we get that one up on the screen? The email I had 

originally, yes. There you go. 

[Slide.] 
--

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.. 

From: Weatherwax, Sharlene 

To: Anderson, Todd 

Cc: Riches, Mike 

Subject: RE: HR5544 

Date: Thursday, October 09, 2014 2:30:52 PM 

That's why you need to brief the Senate folks so t

don't develop their own bill. These are technically 

different staffers than the ones who introduced the 

Yes, when it was officially introduced it had spon
101 

Mr. WEBER. So, you know, I talked about the subtly yet firmly, 

which is the third bullet point, but if you go up to the second—or 

fourth bullet point, but if you go up to the second bullet point, it 

says ‘‘If the goal is to squash the prospects of Senate support for 

the HSST.’’ So I want to come back and say to you now you’ve expressed an opinion about climate change and what the Administration ought to be free to do or not do. Now do you also have an opinion that the goal to squash the prospects of Senate is inappropriate? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. Dr. Anderson is responsible for conveying the 

program—— 

Mr. WEBER. But I’m not asking about—I’m asking you, Dr. 

Weatherwax, do you have—you expressed an opinion with Congressman Beyer about whether or not we disagree on global warming. We can get into that later. So there’s discussion about that. Do 

you have an opinion that the goal to squash the Senate action is 

inappropriate? The email—now, this email came to you, I will remind you. 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. That’s correct. The email came—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. —to me. 

Mr. WEBER. So did you not have an opinion at that point that 

this might not be the best policy of this department? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. So my interpretation of that comment was 

that Todd’s job was to provide the broad overall context—— 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. —for how the program priorities within this 

area of—— 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, it’s not about his—your interpretation of him. 

It’s about the attempt to squash—it clearly says squash it. You’re 

a scientist. You have a Ph.D. You know what squash is. Do you 

have an opinion on that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I guess—— 

Mr. WEBER. You’re just not going to—you’re not going to offer an 

opinion on that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I think I did not interpret that comment as 

squashing any scientific content. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, then, let’s—let me move on. So Congressman Beyer and yourself had the exchange about whether or 

not you agree with global warming. I think you said the 

fantasism—— 

Mr. BEYER. Fanaticism. 

Mr. WEBER. There we go. Thank you. I have to get—according 

to Mr. Rohrabacher, yes. But the fanaticism in their opinion—and 

there’s been some Attorneys General, as you’re probably aware 

from reading the news accounts, that have gone after ExxonMobil 

because in their opinion they think they’ve suppressed some things. 

But isn’t the fanaticism of suppressing what a scientist can say in 

a Congressional committee meeting as dangerous as the purported 

climate change no matter where you fall on that side of—isn’t that 

fanaticism just as dangerous? Do you have an opinion about that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I don’t see that Dr. Anderson was squashing 

the conveying of science. 
102 

Mr. WEBER. It’s interesting that you bring him back up because 

I was asking about a broad overall perspective about the fanaticism 

of suppressing a scientist from testifying before Congress committee staffers. That’s just as bad as the purported fanaticism of 

denying global warming. Wouldn’t you say that’s just as bad? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I don’t believe that we ever squashed a scientist presenting scientific views to Congress. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Well, let’s do it this way. There’s another— 

there’s actually an excerpt from Dr. Todd Anderson in the transcribed interview that the question—and it’s up on the screen that 

says, question, ‘‘Is President Obama’s Climate Action Plan a priority for the Department of Energy?’’ Can you see the answer 

there? Are you able to read that? What does it say? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. The answer that Dr. Anderson gave is yes—— 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, it is. And what’s that second question? Can you 

read that for us? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. The second question says, ‘‘And is that a 

greater priority than the Low Dose Radiation Program?’’ 

Mr. WEBER. And he says, ‘‘To the extent that we align our basic 

research efforts toward that goal, yes.’’ So clearly they’re 

prioritizing, right? Now, the question is this. This is testimony provided by Dr. Todd Anderson in a transcribed interview with committee staff. Dr. Anderson asserts, if you’re following his questionand-answer here, ‘‘Research that benefits the President’s Climate 

Action Plan is a higher priority than low-dose radiation research.’’ 

So here’s my question. Is the DOE ending the Low Dose Radiation 

Research Program to divert funds—and I would say to subtly yet 

firmly encourage—if that’s a better word for you—the Senate to divert funds towards research in furtherance of the Climate Action 

Plan? Does that look like that to you? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. WEBER. It doesn’t? Okay. Well, then, Dr. Weatherwax, the 

DOE fired an employee—in your exchange with Mr. Davidson of 

Ohio, he said, did you think that the meeting was a success or a 

failure? She got fired because of it, so obviously somebody thought 

that what occurred in the meeting was bad. Do you have opinion 

on that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I believe that the justification for dismissal 

was outlined in the proposing documents and that there were 

issues greater than—— 

Mr. WEBER. So—— 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. —what transpired during the briefing. 

Mr. WEBER. So the operation was a success but the patient died. 

Okay. So you don’t have an opinion that that was a bad meeting. 

Is the Department of Energy in this process sending a message 

to research scientists that they better somehow tow a political 

party—a particular—I’ll do it that way—party line? And if they 

don’t agree, if they express a difference of opinion, it is in peril of 

their careers. Would you agree with that? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. No. 

Mr. WEBER. You don’t agree with that? Okay. Last question, 

that’s for you, Dr. Weatherwax. In your opinion is it okay for the 

Department of Energy to lobby the Senate to firmly but subtly prevent them from filing a bill? 
103 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. If the Department of Energy actually lobbied 

for something, then I—you know, I don’t believe that that’s what 

happened. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And so to follow up the last email, the goal 

to squash the Senate prospects is inappropriate, of filing that bill? 

Dr. WEATHERWAX. I think that the goal is to convey the broader 

context of how we set our budget priorities. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, there certainly seems to be some control there. 

Dr. Weatherwax, I appreciate your testimony but it just looks like 

you’re more focused on, I guess, the science—your part of the 

science research instead of the topics here today that would say, 

look, this is inappropriate. 

There is some inappropriate behavior going on, as one of my 

members over here said earlier, and we want to make sure that 

that stops. And the fact that you don’t recognize that and won’t 

provide at least an opinion that it was categorically inappropriate 

and that it might need to be a little attitude adjustment in the Department of Energy is frightening to me. 

But anyway, I appreciate you being here. 

Dr. Metting, anything you’d like to say before we close? 

Dr. METTING. Mr. Chairman, I think you’ve done a fabulous job 

at laying out all of the issues. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, thank you. How many grandchildren do you 

have? 

Dr. METTING. I do have two grandsons. 

Mr. WEBER. Two grandsons. They need a sister. 

Dr. METTING. That’s what I’m telling my other son. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, thank you both for being here, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(105) 

Appendix I 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
106 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY FULL COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN LAMAR SMITH
107 

Filling those gaps for former astronauts will encourage their expanded participation in 

the data research, evaluation, and assessment program. 

The "TREAT Astronauts Act" is also fiscally responsible. It establishes NASA as a 

secondary payer to existing obligations of the United States or any third party. 

I again thank Chairman Babin and urge my colleagues to support the TREAT 

Astronauts Act. 

The second bill we will consider this afternoon is H.R. 6066, the "Cybersecurity 

Responsibility and Accountability Act of 2016." I thank the sponsor, Congressman 

Ralph Abraham, for taking the initiative on this legislation. 

During this Congress, the Science Committee has held close to a dozen hearings 

related to oversight, policy and budgetary aspects of federal cybersecurity issues. 

The hearings included the examination of data breaches at the Office of Personnel 

Management the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation. 

These hearings have underscored a need for accountability, responsibility and 

transparency within these agencies and within the federal government as a whole 

relative to the cybersecurity of information and information systems. 

The Science Committee's jurisdiction over the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology [NIST) has broad and meaningful potential for improvement of federal 

government IT security. 

The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 [FISMA 2002) and the 

Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 [FISMA 2014) task NIST with 

establishing cybersecurity standards, guidelines, and associated methods and 

techniques for use by the federal government through research and development. 

The hearings held by this Committee have identified several shortcomings by agencies 

in fulfilling FISMA requirements. Dr. Abraham's bill serves an important purpose and 

addresses these shortcomings through more research, agency-head accountability, 

and Office of Management and Budget enforcement. 

I thank Dr. Abraham for his work and I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6066. 

The final bill we will consider is H.R. 5829, the ADVISE Now Act. This bill requires the EPA 

to finally create an already authorized Agriculture Committee to its Science Advisory 

Board [S-A-B) within 30 days of enactment. 
108 

If the EPA fails to meet the deadline, the authority is transferred to the Secretary of 

Agriculture who then has 15 days to appoint members to the EPA S-A-B Agriculture 

Committee. 

The establishment of the EPA Agriculture Science Committee will provide farmers with 

an important and strong voice in the federal rule-making process and gives them a 

seat at the table. 

The EPA has a history of advancing regulations that impact the agriculture community 

without proper input from those who are directly affected by the EPA's regulations. 

The ADVISE Now Act is an important first step to help remedy this situation. 

I thank my colleagues, Agriculture Committee Chairman Michael Conaway and 

Congressman Rodney Davis, for their work on the bill. I support it and urge my 

colleagues to support it as well. 

Committee approval of these three bills will advance America's future security through 

increased space activity, hardened information infrastructure, and an expanding food 

supply. 

### 
109 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY FULL COMMITTEE

RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON
110 

DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE ZOE LOFGREN

Knopinski, Jenny 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Cc: 

Subject: 

Attachments: 

Hi Pat, 

Venneri, Janet 

Friday, August 28, 2015 8:51 AM 

Dehmer, Patricia 

Carruthers, Julie 

RE: New Sensitive IG Management Referral 

SC response 15-0201-C.PDF 

Attached is the response we sent back to the IG. It was prepared by BER and Kathleen reviewed it. On February 18, the 

IG sent me an e-mail saying that based on our response they plan no additional action, and the matter will be closed. 

Janet 

-----Original Message-----

From: Dehmer, Patricia 

Sent: Thursday, August 27, 2015 7:42 PM 

To: Venneri1 Janet 

Cc: Carruthers, Julie 

Subject: FW: New Sensitive IG Management Referral 

Janet, 

Can you tell me what the followup was on this IG Management Referral? I don't seem to have the response in my 

electronic archives. 

Thanks, 

Pat. 

Patricia Dehmer 

Acting Director1 Office of Science 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20585-1290 

Phone: (202)586-5430 in Forrestal 

Phone: (301) 903-5316 in Germantown 

Fax: (202)586-4120 in Forrestal 

E-mail: patricia.dehmer@science.doe.gov 

-----Original Message-----

From: Dehmer, Patricia 

Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2015 3:50PM 

To: Venneri, Janet 

Cc: Weatherwax, Sharlene; Klausing, Kathleen; Dehmer, Patricia; Carruthers, Julie 

Subject: FW: New Sensitive IG Management Referral 

00003132 
111 

Janet, 

Please send this one to Sharlene Weatherwax In BER, with a copy to Kathleen Klausing. 

Thanks, 

Pat. 

************************************* 

Patricia Dehmer 

Acting Director, Office of Science 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20585-1290 

Phone: (202) 586-5430 in Forrestal 

Phone: (301) 903-5316 in Germantown 

Fax: (202) 586·4120 in Forrestal 

E-mail: patricia.dehmer@science.doe.gov 

-----Original Message-----

From: Venneri, Janet 

Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2015 8:24AM 

To: Dehmer, Patricia 

Cc: Carruthers, Julie 

Subject: New Sensitive IG Management Referral 

Pat, 

Attached is a new IG management referral which requires a response back to the IG within 30 days. 

Who should handle this one? 

Thank you. 

Janet 

--·--Original Message---·· 

From: Mapeso, Bella [mailto:Bella.Mapeso@Hq.Doe.Gov] 

Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2015 8:17AM 

To: Venneri, Janet 

Cc: Schaible, Jean-Marc (HQ); Gardner, Nicole (HQ) 

Subject: Referral letter 15-0201-C 

Good morning Ms. Venner! 

Please see the attach referral letter for your review and response. 

Please reply to Agent-in-Charge Nicole.Gardner@HQ.DOE.gov 

Thank you, 

Bella Mapeso 

00003133 
112 

Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

202-586-1050 

00003134 
113 

00003135 
114 

Department of Energy 

Office of Science 

Washington, DC 20585 

January 30,2015 

MEMORANDUM FOR John Hartman 

FROM: 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Investigations 

Deputy 

PatriciaM. 

Director 

Dehmer 

for 

L'Z!t{. 

Science Programs 

~ 

Office of Science 

SUBJECT: Response to Management Referral Concerning Possible Misuse of 

Funds (OIG File No, 15-0201-C) 

In response to your memo of January 16,2015, the Office of Science (SC) has evaluated the 

issues concerning the alleged misuse of funds intended for research related to the Fukushima 

plant disaster in 2011. Our response follows. 

FY 2012 appropriations stipulated in the Conference Report: 

"Within available funds, $16,000,000 is provided for radiobiology to help determine health risks 

from exposures to low levels of ionizing radiation to properly protect radiation workers and the 

general public, and to conduct studies of health impacts at and around the Fukushima Daiichl 

nuclear plant." ' 

The table on the next page provides a relevant breakdown of SC spending of FY 2012 

appropriated funds; all projects were relevant to radiobiology research. Some funding was 

provided for scientific workshops on radiobiology topics, and some for ensuring adequate 

oversight of funded research on human subjects (Institutional Review Board). 

This inf01mation was communicated by the SC Budget Office Director to the Senate Energy and 

Water Development committee on September 5, 2012, in response to a specific inquiry on how 

the funds were allocated. Since no response requesting further information or disputing the 

relevance of any funded activity was received, the budget execution was deemed acceptable and 

responsive to the appropriation. 

@ Ptlnted \>Ath 001 Ink on recycled paper 

00003136 
115 

,----- At"VIOUNT 

(in 

INSTITUTION PI thousands) TITLE 

LBNL Blakely 120 Non-Invasive Early Detection & 

Molecular Analysis of Low Dose 

Effects in the Lens 

LBNL Pluth 68 Systems Biology M~d~l~flnteractions 

Between Tissue Growth Factors and 

DNA Damage Pathways 

LBNL-SFA Karpen 5,600 Low Dose Scientific Focus Area 

ORNL-SFA Palumbo 945 ORNL Lowdose SFA 

ORJSE Viator 17 Central DOE Institutional Review 

Board 

PNNL Bolton 2,502 Linear and Nonlinear Tissue Signaling 

Mechanisms in Response to Low Dose 

and Low Dose-Rate Radiation 

American Statistical Assn Crank 28 The ASA Conference on Radiation and 

Health, June 10-13,2012 --

California, Univ of SF Balmain 344 A System Genetics Approach to 

IdentifY Low Dose Radiation-Induced 

Lymphoma Susceptibility 

Duke University Jirtle · 345 Epigenomic Adaptation to Low Dose 

!---:=--- Radiation 

Gordon Research Conf Demple 10 2012 Mutagenesis Gordon Research 

Conference, August 19-23 2012 

Lovelace Biomedical & Scott 1,500 Biological Bases for Radiation 

Environmental Research Adaptive Responses in the Lung 

Institute 

NASA Cucinotta 133 Systems Biology Model ofinteractions 

Between Tissue Growth Factors and 

DNA Damage Pathways: Low Dose 

Response and Cross-Talk in TGFBeta 

and ATM SiJmaling 

Northwestern University Woloschak 1,466 Effects of Low Dose Irradiation on 

NFKB Signaling Networks and 

Mitochondria 

Oxford Brooks University Kadhim 11 International Workshop to Address the 

Application F Systems Biology 

Approach in Radiation Research, 

September 2012 

00003137 
116 

Radiation Research Williams 70 Student TraveVWorkshop Support for 

Society Meeting of Radiation Research Soci~ 

Steward Research & Hlatky 1,500 Multi-Scale Systems Biology of LowSpecialty Dose Carcinogenesis Risk 

14,659 Subtotal 

Epidemiologic Study of 

One Million U.S. 

Rad~ation Workers and 

Veterans ProJects 

National Council Rad Prot Boice 444 Epidemiologic Study of One Million 

American Workers and Military 

Veterans Exposed to Ionizing 

Radiation 

ORNL (with Boice) Leggett 200 Dose Reconstruction for One Million 

US Workers and Veterans Exposed To 

Radionuclides 

ORISE (with Boice) Ellis 225 Scientific Support to the Study of One 

Million American Workers and 

Veterans Exposed To Radiation 

8§9 Subtotal 

SBIR/STTR 472 

16,000 Total 

The exact language in the Office of Science's FY 2013 Congressional Budget (page 140) states 

"Funding for research informing the exposure outcomes of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor 

is completed in FY 2012." 

SC awarded $2.9M (DE-FG02-12ER65387) over 24 months for an epidemiology project (shown 

in the above table as "Epidemiologic Study of One Million U.S. Radiation Workers and Veterans 

Projects." All DOE funding was provided in FY 2012; other federal agencies (NASA, NRC, and 

EPA) contributed subsequent funding to the project. 

The project objectives state the relevance of the work to determining the health impacts at and 

around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant: 

"The single most important question in radiation epidemiology is determining the level of risk 

associated with exposures that occur gradually over time. The nuclear reactor accident at 

Fukushima, Japan has emphasized the scientific and societal interest in understanding the health 

risks of low-level radiation exposures. Existing studies, however, have not provided robust 

estimates of risk following low dose rate exposures. The study of one million early U.S. radiation 

workers and veterans will provide informatiof! on risk following chronic exposures by focusing 

00003138 
117 

on five occupational groups with differing radiation exposure patterns, including intakes of 

radionuclides: (1) uranium workers at multiple Department of Energy (DOE) locations; (2) 

nuclear weapons test participants (atomic veterans); (3) nuclear power plant (NPP) workers; (4) 

industrial radiographers, radiologists and other medical practitioners; and (5) plutonitun workers 

at multiple DOE locations. The study is cost efficient because it builds on the investments made 

and foundations laid by investigators and government agencies over the past 30-40 years, which 

have established early worker cohorts that can now provide answers to questions on the lifetime 

human health risks associated with low-level radiation exposures." 

We find no evidence of misuse of appropriated funds. 

If you have any questions, please contact Sharlene Weatherwax at 301-903-3251. 

00003139 
118 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE RANDY HULTGREN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

College of Physicians 

and Surgeons 

The Honorable John P. Holdren 

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology 

Center for Radiological Research 

630 West 168'h Street, 

New York, NY 10032 

212.305.5660 Tel 

212.305.3229 Fax 

www.crr.columbia.edu 

March 18,2013 

Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 

Eisenhower Executive Office Building 

1650 Pennsylvania Avenue 

Washington, DC 20504 

Dear Dr. Holdren: 

The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 emphasized major gaps in our understanding of the health 

effects of low doses of ionizing radiation. These gaps seriously impact our ability to make optimal 

science-driven decisions in response to a major nuclear event in the United States, accidental or 

otherwise. It follows that the United States has a critical need to enhance research on low-dose health 

effects and to ensure that the nation maintains a sufficient pool ofrelevant expertise. Because these 

issues are of such national significance, and the potential health and economic consequences so major, 

we have joined together to outline our concerns and to suggest a practical way forward. 

Our limited understanding of low-dose health risks seriously impairs the nation's decision- making 

capabilities, both in the short and the long term, after a large-scale radiological event. For example, 

differing strategies for evacuation after Fukushima ultimately relate to our limited quantitative 

knowledge of low-dose radiation risks. But it is also true of our understanding of the long-term health 

consequences of a radiological event involving large populations: while the regulatory agencies 

assume that there is no radiation dose below which the health risk is zero, we really do not have 

sufficient data or sufficient understanding to know whether this is really the case, or whether, as some 

assert, low radiation doses may even be beneficial. Setting permissible standards too stringently will 

result in a major and unnecessary economic burden to the nation, whereas setting standards too low 

would present an unacceptable cancer burden for the population. 

While a large-scale radiological event is perhaps the most obvious issue of concern here, other issues 

such as the rapid increase in medically-based radiation exposures, cleanup of radioactively 

contaminated sites, as well as the need for science-based policies regarding the possible expansion of 

nuclear power, require a level of research and scientific expertise that the US is rapidly losing - in 

universities, in national labs, and in industry. Apart from the human health issues, all these topics have, 

of course, major economic consequences for our nation. 

Columbia University Medical Center 
119 

For many years the US has been the world leader in the field of low-dose radiation research, but more 

recently the US has lost significant momentum, noticeably so in comparison with Europe and Asia. 

Whilst a few small US research programs still exist in this area, such as at NASA and NIAID, the 

single US program principally dedicated to supporting US-based extramural low-dose radiation 

research, the Department of Energy's Low Dose Radiation Research Program, is clearly winding 

down. The overall outcome will not only be a diminution of research on the key issues outlined above, 

but also a critical decrease in the pool of US subject-matter experts who will be available to assist in 

high-level policy and decision making. 

Moving forward, therefore, we suggest that the National Academy of Sciences be asked to prepare an 

expert report on the future of low-dose radiation research in the US. The objectives of such a report 

would be to: 

• assess the current status of low-dose radiation research in the US at all levels; 

• formulate overall scientific goals for the future of low-dose radiation research in the US; 

develop a long-term strategic research agenda to address these scientific goals, ideally in concert 

with programs in other countries; 

• define the essential components of a sustainable program that would address this research agenda 

within the universities and the national labs; 

• assess the cost-benefit effectiveness of such a program. 

We would of course be happy to meet with you at your convenience to discuss these issues in more 

detail. 

Yours Sincerely, 

y;J5~ 

David J. Brenner, Ph.D., D.Sc., 

Higgins Professor of Radiation Biophysics, Columbia University 

Director, Columbia University Center for Radiological Research 

John D. Boice Jr., Sc.D., 

Professor of Medicine, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine 

President, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 

~ William F. Morgan, Ph.D. 

Chair, Committee I, International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 

2 Columbia University Medical Center 
120 

cJan<tJ f Ctaver 

James E. Cleaver, Ph.D. 

Professor Emeritus, University of California, San Francisco 

Member, US National Academy of Sciences 

Tom K. Hei, Ph.D. 

Professor and Vice-Chairman of Radiation Oncology, Columbia University Medical Center 

President, U.S. Radiation Research Society 

J~Jc}LIL- Hedvig Hricak, M.D. 

Chair, Department of Radiology, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, NY, NY 

Member, Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 

/·\.~ S. James Adelstein, M.D., Ph.D. 

Paul C. Cabot Distinguished Professor of Medical Biophysics, Harvard Medical School 

Former Chair, NAS Board on Radiation Effects Research 

Member, Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 

10A~ 

Jonathan M. Samet, M.D. 

Professor and Chair, Department of Preventive Medicine, University of Southern California 

Member, National Cancer Advisory Board 

Member, Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 

c. c. Dr. Ralph J Cicerone, National Academy of Sciences 

Mr. Charles F. Boden Jr., NASA 

Dr Steven Chu, US DOE 

Mr. Daniel B. Poneman, US DOE 

Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, NIAID 

Dr. Thomas Frieden, CDC 

Dr. Nicole Lurie, ASPR 

Dr. Allison M Macfarlane, NRC 

Mr. Kenneth A. Myers Ill, DTRA 

3 Columbia University Medical Center 
121 

c.c (coni) Dr. Tara 0 'Toole, DHS 

Dr. Bob Perciasepe, EPA 

Dr. Arati Prabhakar, DARPA 

Dr. Robin Robinson, BARDA 

Dr. Harold E. Varmus, NCI 

4 Columbia University Medical Center 
122 

HEALTH PHYSICS SOCIETY 

"Specialists in Radiation Stifety" 

February 10,2015 

Sen. Lisa Murkowski 

Chairperson 

Energy and Natural Resources Committee 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Sen. Maria Cantwell 

Ranking Member 

Energy and Natural Resources Committee 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Senators, 

Barbara L. Hamrick, CHP, JD 

President, Health Physics Society 

1313 Dolley Madison Blvd, Suite 402 

McLean, VA 22101 

Tel: (703)790-1745 

fax: (703)790-2672 

Email: HPS@Burklnc.com 

As the President of the Health Physics Society, I am writing you to express the 

Society's strong support of H. R. 35, the Low-Dose Radiation Research Act of 2015, 

which passed the House of Representatives on January 7, 2015. 

The Health Physics Society is a nonprofit scientific professional organization with 

over 4,000 members nationwide whose mission is excellence in the science and 

practice of radiation safety. Since its formation in 1956, the Society has represented 

the largest radiation safety society in the world, with a membership that includes. 

scientists, safety professionals, physicists, engineers, attorneys, and other 

professionals from academia, industry, medical institutions, state and federal 

government, the national laboratories, the military, and other organizations. Society 

activities include encouraging research in radiation science, developing standards, 

HEALTH PHYSICS SOCIETY 
123 

and disseminating radiation safety information. Society members are involved in 

understanding, evaluating, and controlling the potential risks from radiation relative 

to the benefits it offers the general population. 

As passed by the House of Representatives, H.R 35 ensures the continuance and 

enhancement of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Low-Dose Radiation Research 

Program, which focuses on the health effects of ionizing radiation in the low dose 

range. The' bill also directs the National Academies of Science to formulate a longterm strategy to resolve the extent to which low-dose radiation may pose health 

risks to humans, and requires DOE to develop a five-year research plan that 

responds to the Academies' recommendations. 

A greater understanding of the effects oflow dose radiation on humans will not only 

add to our body of knowledge on the subject but it will also enable us to make better 

decisions on what are the proper levels, procedures, and protections needed when 

our citizens are subject to exposure to sources oflow dose radiation. 

Previously, while the program was fully funded by DOE, great strides were made in 

understanding the biological responses of human (and other animal) cells to low 

dose radiation. The research identified several protective responses by the cells 

exposed to low dose radiation, in contrast to the damaging changes in cells induced 

by high radiation dose. It is critical that additional research be conducted to link 

these responses at the cellular level to changes in cancer frequency in humans. The 

United States was once the leader in radiobiology research, but due to DOE's 

decision to withhold funding from the program, we have fallen woefully behind, and 

the vast amounts of data generated by the research already performed is sitting idle, 

waiting for more study and analysis. 

HEALTH PHYSICS SOCIETY 
124 

Please feel free to get back to me with any questions you may have on this 

legislation or any subject involving radiation safety. Both the entire Health Physics 

Society and myself stand ready to assist you as issues of radiation safety come 

before you and your staffs. 

Sincerely, 

Barbara L Hamrick, CHP, JD 

President, Health Physics Society 

HEALTH PHYSICS SOCIETY 
125 

QUALITY IS OUR IMAGE 

tames A. Brink, MD, FACR 

Choifi 8oard of Chancellors 

Massachusetts General Hospital 

Juan M. Taveras Professor of Radiology Harvard Medical School 

55 Fruit Street, FND-216 

Boston, MA 02114·2699 

Phone: 617-724~9634 

Fax: 617·726.31)77 

Email; jabriok@partners.org 

August!, 2016 

The Honorable Lamar Smith 

Chainnan 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

23 21 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chainnan Smith: 

acr.org 

The American College of Radiology (ACR), representing more than 35,000 radiologists, radiation 

oncologists, medical physicists, interventional radiologists and nuclear medicine physicians, supports 

HR35, the Low-Dose Radiation Research Act of 2015. As such, I am writing to you in your capacity as 

conferee for S.2012 to urge that the language ofHR35 be retained in conference. 

As you know, HR 35 would require the Director of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science to 

carry out a research program on low dose radiation for the purpose of enhancing the scientific 

understanding of and reduce uncertainties associated with the effects of exposure to low dose radiation. 

Further, it would require the Director to enter into an agreement with the National Academies to conduct a 

study assessing the current status and development of a long-term strategy for low dose radiation research. 

The National Academies Board on Radiation Effects Research has played an integral role in the study of 

the biological effects of ionizing medicine over the last several decades, having published a series of 

reports (BEIR report series) that are frequently cited in professional literature, regulatory and policymaking venues. However, its most recent report was issued in 2006. Given the extensive volume of 

research that has occurred since the publication of the last BEIR report, there is a need for an update to the 

BEIR report series that critically looks at the research and provides a balanced perspective on the 

significance of research and knowledge in this field over the past decade. 

As medical providers who utilize ionizing radiation in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, we value the 

role the National Academies has played in distilling volumes of research related to ionizing radiation. The 

HEADQUARTERS 

1891 Preston White Drive 

Reston, VA 20191 

703-648-8900 

GOVERNMENT RElATIONS 505 Ninth St. N.W. 

Suite 910 

Washington, DC 20004-2173 

202-223-1670 

CLINICAl RESEARCH 1818 Market Street St,iib;! 1720 

Philadelphia, PA 19103~3604 

215-574-3150 

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR RADIOlOGIC PATHOLOGY 

1100 Wayne Ave., Suite 1020 

Sliver Spring. MD 20910 

703-648..S90(} 
126 

knowledge garnered from BEIR studies helps to guide our understanding and decision-making as we strive 

to optimize the care we provide our patients. 

The ACR urges your support in including the language of HR 35 in the conference of the energy bill. 

Sincerely, 

James A. Brink, MD, F ACR 

Chair, ACRBoard of Chancellors 
127 

DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE DON S.BEYER

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: 

A Comparative Analysis 

Prepared by Francesca T. Grifo 

Senior Scientist and Science Policy Fellow 

Union of Concerned Scientists 

March 2013 

The following pages contain analysis of 22 federal agency scientific integrity policies 

developed in response to a December 9, 2010 memorandum by Dr. John P. Holdren, 

director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

We evaluated the policies to see how effectively they would advance the goals we outlined 

in our 2009 comments on President Obama's March 2009 memo to Dr. Holdren, which 

began this process: protecting government scientists, increasing the transparency of 

government science, and strengthening the quality of government scientific information and 

advice. 

Six agencies submitted policies that actively promote and support a culture of scientific 

integrity; five submitted policies that also promote and support scientific integrity but need 

additional work to ensure long-term change at the agencies. Eleven agencies submitted 

policies that do not make adequate commitments to achieve the preservation and 

promotion of scientific integrity. The agencies are presented on the following pages in 

alphabetical order within these three groups. 

To find out more about our scientific integrity work, visit www.ucsusa.orgfscientific_integrity 
128 

2 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Summary: Great policies on releasing and sharing data. Although it does not explicitly allow scientists the right 

of last review, it has many useful aspects to its media and communications policies. 

Strengths 

Media and communications policies are broad and detailed 

Thorough guidance regarding timely dissemination of data to 

the public 

Establishes clear procedures for how allegations of scientific 

misconduct will be investigated and resolved 

• Contains specifics on how to make scientific information 

more accessible and transparent 

Addresses conflicts-of-interest in the peer review process and 

on federal advisory committees 

Excellent provisions for training 

Repeats the principles from December 9. 2010 Holdren 

memorandum 

Department of the Interior 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

This passage is a red flag "Although CDC may conduct 

research in areas relevant for making policy decisions, the 

goal of such research is to provide the best evidence to drive 

policy in the light direction." 

Although the clearance process is initiated by the first author, 

there is no explicit provision allowing scientists the right to 

review, approve and comment publicly on the final version of 

any scientific document for which they are not authors but 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

Although the policy states CDC accepts scientific debate, we 

could find no procedure for reporting and resolving differing 

scientific opinions outside of or before the clearance process. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases 

of confirmed misconduct 

Summary: One of the most detailed and comprehensive policies. It explicitly states that it applies to all 

employees - not just scientists! 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including political appointees, 

supervisors, contractors, and career employees. 

Establishes clear procedure for how allegations of scientific 

misconduct will be investigated and resolved 

Contains procedures for reporting and resolving differing 

scientific opinions 

Asks employees to distinguish between official public 

communications and other communications made in their 

private capacity 

• Provides supplemental forms and procedures including 

conflict of interest statements and waivers and scientific 

misconduct notifications. 

Repeats the principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum 

Weaknesses 

Missing details in the communications policy (470 DM) such 

as disclaimer language and publication policy. 

Supports but does not adequately explain scientist and 

researcher rights to express personal opinions with 

appropriate disclaimers. 

Right of last review limited to news releases to the extent 

practicable and no explicit rights regarding allowing scientists 

the right to review, approve and comment publicly on the final 

version of any scientific document that relies on their research 

or identifies them as a contributor. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases of 

confinned misconduct. 

No user-friendly online portal dedicated to scientific integrity 

where the policy and supplemental information could be 

found. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis • Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
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3 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Summary: Breaks new ground in the areas of personal views exception and giving scientists the right of last 

review. 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including political appointees, 

supervisors, contractors, and career employees. Makes roles 

and responsibilities of each explicit. 

States clearly and comprehensively scientist and researcher 

rights to express personal opinions with appropriate 

disclaimers. 

Grants scientists the responsibility to review, approve and 

comment on the final version of any scientific document that 

relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

Repeats pnnciples from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Made a draft policy available for public comment and 

incorporated many comments into the final policy. 

NASA 

Weaknesses 

While the Scientific Integrity Policy "mandates the Scientific 

Integrity Official to develop a transparent mechanism for 

Agency employees to express differing scientific opinions" we 

could not locate this on EPA's website. This poHcy should also 

include more details on procedures for resolving differing 

scientific opinions. 

The Scientific Integrity Policy promises "the EPA Scientific 

Integrity Committee will develop an Agency wide framework 

tor the approval of scientific communications". We could not 

locate this document on the EPA website. 

Commits to developing procedure for how allegations of 

scientific misconduct will be investigated, resolved and 

publicly reported. 

Provides for annual publicly available reporting on the status 

of scientific integrity within the agency but these reports could 

not be located on the website. 

Summary: This is a list of existing policies with little narrative. Although there are good elements, agency 

scientists would have to spend hours to find and understand them. 

Strengths 

References strong NASA policies with regard to 

communications and whistleblower protections. 

Provides clear and concise guidance on data sharing. 

Referenced media policy allows scientists to express 

personal opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

Repeats some pnnciples from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum 

Weaknesses 

Policy is a list of extant policies. Many agencies such as the 

CDC drew on multiple existing policies, but they summarized 

them into a user-friendly document. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on thelr research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis • Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
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4 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Summary: Excellent policy that is easy to access on the NOAA website; so long as the weaker Department of 

Commerce policy does not supersede. 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including political appointees, 

supetvisors, contractors, and career employees and makes 

roles and responsibilities of each explicit. 

Exceptionally easy to understand FAQ section on website. 

Released an annual report on implementation of the policy. 

States clearly and comprehensively scientist and researcher 

rights to express personal opinions with appropriate 

disclaimers. 

Includes procedural handbook for addressing allegations of 

scientific misconduct 

Draft policy was available for publlc comment and 

incorporated many comments into the final policy, 

Has a Scientific Integrity Commons section of its website with 

links to multiple resources. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum 

National Science Foundation 

Weaknesses 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

No data sharing specifics or firm commitments. 

• Should release a procedure for reporting and resolving 

differing scientific opinions. 

Less well intentioned Administrations could use Department 

of Commerce policies to restrict scientific integrity at NOAA. 

Summary: The strongest media policy of all the agencies but missing some other key protections. 

Strengths 

Very strong communications policy. 

States clearly and comprehensively scientist and researcher 

rights to express persona! opinions with appropriate 

disclaimers. 

Establishes responsibilities for both scientists and public 

affairs officials. 

Cites procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

will be investigated and managed. 

Information is easy to find on the NSF website. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases 

of confirmed misconduct 

Research publication guidance is weak. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis , Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
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5 

Department of Commerce 

Summary: Cedes important details to its bureaus with an interest in science so don't look here to see how the 

department will ensure the integrity of science. 

Strengths 

Confirms scientist and researcher rights to express personal 

opinions to the public and the media. 

Repeats some principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Department of Homeland Security 

Summary: This policy is missing many key elements. 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that the policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, contractors in addition to career employees. 

Fails to address many guidelines put forth in the December 9, 

2010 memorandum. 

Lacks specifics and details as to how stated principles wil! be 

enforced and upheld. 

Implies the scientists must seek approval from public affairs 

officials. 

Lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

wiU be investigated, managed and reported. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases of 

confirmed misconduct. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

Fails to provide specifics on open government requirements, 

research dissemination and data sharing. 

Strengths Weaknesses 

Repeats some principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren Fails to address most of the guidelines put forth in the 

memorandum December 9, 2010 memorandum. 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, and 

supen~isors, in addition to career employees. 

Policies excessively restrictive and vague, even given the 

nature of the Office. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express 

personal opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

No procedure for data sharing with other agencies or 

commitment to timely releases of scientific information. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases 

of confirmed misconduct. 

Very scientist focused with little mention of the role of nonscientist supervisors. 

Fedewl 1\gency Scientific 1ntegrfty Policies: A Comparative Analysis • Union of Concerned 
132 

6 

Department of State 

Summary: This policy fails to address many of the guidelines put forth in the December 9, 2010 memorandum 

and its communications policy is excessively restrictive. 

Strengths 

Applies to a!! employees including, supervisors, contractors, 

and career employees. 

Allows scientists the right to review, approve and comment 

publicly on the final version of any scientific document that 

relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

Refers to established procedures for how allegations of 

scientific misconduct will be investigated and managed. 

Repeats some principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 

Weaknesses 

Fails to address many of the guidelines put forth in the 

December 9, 2010 memorandum. 

A!! communication of scientific topics, policies, and research 

to the media must be cleared through the Bureau of Public 

Affairs. 

Unofficial scientific communications of official concern must 

be approved by the Bureau of Public Affairs and requires a 

disclaimer. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases 

of confirmed misconduct 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

Summary: Principles are there but specific provisions and guidance are missing. 

Strengths 

Taking strong steps toward limiting conflicts of interest on 

scientific advisory panels. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

Promises FDA written media relations policy but this could not 

be found on the FDA website. 

Requires permission from public affairs to speak to the media 

in an official capacity. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

No procedure detailing how allegations of scientific 

misconduct will be investigated, managed and reported. 

No data sharing and dissemination specifics. Unnecessary 

hurdles prevent data and research from being made public. 

Especially important at the FDA- scientific integrity principles 

should pertain to scientific information submitted to the 

agency from interested parties. 

Lacks specifics as to how stated principles will be enforced 

and upheld. 

Less well-intentioned Administrations could use Department of 

Health and Human SeNices policies to restrict scientific 

integrity. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparatlve Analysis • Union of Concerned Scientists 
133 

Marine Mammal Commission 

Summary: Commissions were not required to create scientific integrity policies. Although some key features 

are missing, everything in here is good. 

Strengths 

Confirms scientist and researcher rights to express personal 

opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

Contains dear and concise guidellnes for the selection and 

retention of Commission staff. 

Has clear data quality and dissemination guidelines. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren. 

Mandatory financial disclosure for commissioners and 

have financial conflicts of interest. 

Department of Defense 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supeNisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

Supports but does not adequately explain scientist and 

researcher rights to express personal opinions with 

appropriate disclaimers, 

Scientists must seek approval from public affairs officials to 

speak to the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

Lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

will be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions, 

Summary: This policy is excessively restrictive and vague, even given the nature of the Office, 

Strengths 

Repeats some principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum 

DOD approval to speak to the media or the public shall not 

be unreasonably delayed or withheld. 

Weaknesses 

Fails to address most of the guide!lnes put forth in the 

December 9, 2010 memorandum. 

Not explicit that policy applies to po11tica1 appointees, 

contractors, and supeJVisors, in addition to -career employees. 

Policies excessively restrictive and vague, even given the 

nature of the Office, 

Scientists may only speak to the media or the public with 

appropriate coordination with their organization. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express 

persona! opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

wm be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

No procedure for data sharing with other agencies or 

commitment to timely releases of scientific information. 

Policy is difficult to find on DOD website. 

Federa! Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: Compurative Analysis • Union of Concerned 2013 
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8 

Department of Education 

Summary: This policy was released in draft form nearly a year ago and we could not locate a final policy or the 

draft policy on the department's website. The draft lacked many crucial details. 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including, supervisors, contractors, 

and career employees. 

Repeats pnnciples from December9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Made draft policy available for public comment. 

Department of Energy 

Weaknesses 

lacks specifics and details as to how stated principles will be 

enforced and upheld. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express 

personal opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

will be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

Fails to provide specifics on open government requirements, 

research dissemination and data sharing. 

Summary: This policy is less than three pages long and hence has many significant gaps. Does not fully 

embrace the principles in the OSTP guidance memo and has many additional missing elements. 

Strengths 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supeNisors, contractors in addition to career employees. 

Fails to address many of the guidelines put forth in the 

December 9, 2010 memorandum. 

Lacks specifics and details as to how stated pnnciples will be 

enforced and upheld. 

Weak media and communications policy. 

States but does not adequately support scientist and 

researcher rights to express personal opinions with 

appropriate disclaimers. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

Lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

wlll be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

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135 

9 

Department of Health and Human Services 

~ 

Summary: HHS could have set the gold standard by calling on the depth of experience with scientific integrity 

at the NIH. But they did not. 

Strengths 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Allows individual HHS agencies to develop agency·specific 

scientific integrity principles, policies, and procedures of their 

own. 

States scientist and researcher rights to express personal 

opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

Department of Justice 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supe!Visors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

Does not allow use of HHS title or affiliation even for 

identification purposes when presenting personal or individual 

views. 

Scientists must seek approval from public affairs officials to 

speak to the media. 

• This policy does not address how allegations of scientific 

misconduct will be investigated, managed and reported. 

No HHS- wide guidance for reporting and resolving differing 

scientific opinions. 

Defers to HHS agencies for specifics on open government 

requirements, research dissemination and data sharing. 

Leaves all specifics and details as to how stated principles 

will be enforced and upheld to individual HHS agencies. 

Summary: Very decentralized draft policy that could lead to problems for scientists and very limited 

commitments to transparency. No final policy could be found on the DOJ website. 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including, supervisors, contractors, 

and career employees. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Commitments to maintaining and strengthening scientific 

integrity and credibility are strongly stated. 

Prohibits employees from inappropriately suppressing or 

altering scientific research. 

Weaknesses 

Implementation plans are left up to individual offices rather 

than establishing a department-wide policy. 

Communications policy is excessively restrictive even given the 

DOJ's position. The policy requires public affairs officers to 

coordinate all interactions with the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve 

and comment publicly on the final version of any scientific 

document that relies on their research or identifies them as a 

contributor. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express 

personal opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

Commits to developing a procedure for reporting and resolving 

differing scientific opinions but does not indicate when it will 

be released. 

Lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct 

will be investigated, managed and reported. 

limited transparency commitments. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis · Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
136 

10 

Department of Labor 

Summary: The final policy is exactly the same as the draft policy in spite of a large response to a public 

comment period. Although the principles from the December 9, 2010 memorandum are repeated, there are 

many flaws, weaknesses, and gaps. 

Strengths 

Establishes clear procedure for how allegations of 

scientific misconduct will be investigated and 

managed. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Department of Transportation 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that the policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

Scientists may only speak to the media on matters related to their 

official work and only if assigned by their immediate supervisor and 

in coordination with their public affairs office. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve and 

comment publicly on the final version of any scientific document 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

Supports but does not adequately explain scientist and researcher 

rights to express persona! opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

No procedure to publicly report the aggregate number of scientific 

misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases of confirmed 

misconduct. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

No data dissemination commitments. 

Lacks specifics and details as to how stated principles will be 

enforced and upheld. 

Summary: The draft policy is no longer available on the department's website, and it was not replaced by a 

final policy. The draft failed to address most of the guidelines put forth in the December 9, 2010 

memorandum. 

Strengths 

Repeats some principles from December9, 2010 

Holdren memorandum 

Weaknesses 

Fails to address most of the guidelines put forth in the December9, 

2010 memorandum. 

Lacks specifics for any of the commitments. 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, supervisors, 

and contractors in addition to career employees. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express personal 

opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

Scientists must coordinate with public affairs officials prior to 

speaking to the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve and 

comment publicly on the final version of any scientific document 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

Lacks procedures on how allegations of scientific misconduct will 

be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific opinions 

Commits to developing an implementation guide but has not made 

this public. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis • Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
137 

11 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

Summary: The final policy could not be located on their website. There was a public comment period but there 

is no evidence these comments were ever used to create a final policy. Many important features are missing 

from this draft. 

Strengths 

The March 27, 2012 draft policy: 

Confirms scientist and researcher rights to express 

persona! opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

• Establishes that allegations of scientific misconduct will 

be investigated and managed in accordance with Federal 

Policy on Research Misconduct. 

Makes strong commitments to transparency and the 

dissemination and publication of scientific infonnation. 

Repeats principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Made draft policy available for public comment but we 

could not locate a final policy on their website. 

Weaknesses 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

Scientists must seek approval from public affairs officials before 

speaking to the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve and 

comment publicly on the final version of any scientific document 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

No commitment to publicly report the aggregate number of 

scientific misconduct allegations and the specifics on cases of 

confirmed misconduct 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Summary: This policy could not be found on the ODNI website and had to be obtained through FOIA. The policy 

is excessively restrictive and vague, even given the nature of the Office. 

Strengths 

Repeats some principles from December 9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum 

In principle supports the separation of fundamental 

scientific and technological information from nationals 

intelligence capabilities so that more science may be 

released. 

Weaknesses 

Fails to address most of the guidelines put forth in the December 

9, 2010 memorandum. 

Lacks specifics for any of the commitments. 

Not explicit that policy applies to political appointees, 

supervisors, and contractors in addition to career employees. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express 

personal opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

Scientists must coordinate with public affairs officials prior to 

speaking to the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve and 

comment publicly on the final version of any scientific document 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

Lacks procedures on how allegations of scientific misconduct will 

be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions 

Commits to developing an implementation guide but has not 

made this public. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis • Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
138 

12 

USAID 

Summary: Implies that scientists must seek approval from public affairs before speaking to the media which 

could have a chilling effect on transparency. 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including, supervisors, 

contractors, and career employees. 

Confirms scientist and researcher rights to express 

personal opinions. 

Repeats pnnciples from December 9, 2010 Holdren. 

Contains strong principles to protect science from 

inappropriate interterence. 

USDA 

Weaknesses 

Weak communications and media policies. 

Scientists must seek approval from public affairs officials to 

speak to the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve and 

comment publicly on the final version of any scientific document 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

Lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct will 

be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

Summary: This policy has significant gaps and expired over a year and a half ago with no indication of plans 

for revisiting it. 

Strengths 

Applies to all employees including, supervisors, 

contractors, and career employees. 

Repeats some principles from December9, 2010 Holdren 

memorandum. 

Makes some good commitments regarding federal 

scientific advisory committees 

Weaknesses 

Fails to address many of the guidelines put forth in the 

December 9, 2010 memorandum. 

Implies scientists must seek approval from public affairs officials 

to communicate with the media. 

No provision allowing scientists the right to review, approve and 

comment publicly on the final version of any scientific document 

that relies on their research or identifies them as a contributor. 

No provision for scientist and researcher rights to express 

personal opinions with appropriate disclaimers. 

lacks procedure on how allegations of scientific misconduct will 

be investigated, managed and reported. 

No procedure for reporting and resolving differing scientific 

opinions. 

lacks specifics and details as to how stated principles will be 

implemented, enforced and upheld. 

States that the policy wi!! only be in effect for one year defeating 

the purpose of the policy. 

Federal Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis · Union of Concerned Scientists 2013 
139 

REPORT SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN LAMAR S. SMITH

Regulation under Uncertainty 

Use of the Linear No-Threshold Model in 

Chemical and Radiation Exposure 

Dima Yazji Shamoun, Edward Calabrese, 

Richard A. Williams, and James Broughel 

September 2016 

MERCATUS WORKING PAPER 

MERCATUS CENTER 

George Mason University 

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor, Arlington, Virginia 22201 

www.mercatus.org 
140 

Dima Yazji Shamoun, Edward Calabrese, Richard A. Williams, and James Broughel. "Regulation under 

Uncertainty: Use of the Linear No-Threshold Model in Chemical and Radiation Exposure." Mercatus 

Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, September 2016. 

Abstract 

This paper examines the use of the linear no-threshold (LNT) model in chemical and radiation exposure. 

The LNT model assumes that exposure to any level of a chemical or radiation is harmful, down to even 

the last molecule. Used primarily to be "public health protective," the model has been the backbone of 

chemical and radiation risk regulation for many decades. Given the current state of science and risk 

management tools, we challenge the notion that using the LNT as the default model is public health 

protective. First, more and more research has uncovered dose-response relationships that reveal either a 

threshold or, more importantly, a hormetic response, where exposure to low doses of a hazard actually 

yields health benefits. Second, given these more realistic alternative dose-response models, risk 

management tools including risk-risk analysis and health-health analysis show that regulating down to 

extremely low levels can have negative health consequences when ancillary risks are considered. Riskrisk analysis focuses on how reductions in target risks can lead to increases in risk from substitute 

chemicals or activities. Health-health analysis explores how costs of compliance are borne in part by 

consumers who are forced to reduce their own private risk-mitigating activities. Overestimating risk, a 

common feature of the LNT model, upsets the careful balancing of risks required of risk managers. 

JEL codes: D62, D8l, I18 

Keywords: linear no-tl1reshold, dose-response, health and safety regulations, benefit-cost analysis, risk 

assessment 

Author Affiliation and Contact Information 

Dima Yazji Shamoun 

Associate Director of Research 

Center for Politics and Governance 

Lecturer, Economics Department 

University of Texas at Austin 

dshamoun@utexas.edu 

Edward Calabrese 

Professor of Toxicology 

University of Massachusetts at Amherst 

Richard A. Williams 

Director, Regulatory Studies Program 

Mercatus Center at George Mason University 

James Broughel 

Research Fellow, State and Local Policy Project 

Mercatus Center at George Mason University 

All studies in the Mercatus Working Paper series have followed a rigorous process of academic evaluation, 

including (except where otherwise noted) at least one double-blind peer review. Working Papers present an 

author's provisional findings, which, upon further consideration and revision, are likely to be republished in an 

academic journal. The opinions expressed in Mercatus Working Papers are the authors' and do not represent 

official positions of the Mercatus Center or George Mason University. 
141 

Regulation under Uncertainty: 

Use ofthe Linear No-Threshold Model in Chemical and Radiation Exposure 

Dima Yazji Shamoun, Edward Calabrese, Richard A. Williams, and James Broughel 

1. Introduction 

The linear no-threshold (LNT) model has been the standard risk assessment model used for both 

chemical and radiation exposure for decades, particularly for low-dose exposure. While many 

assume that using the model provides for a public health-protective risk management decision, 

this remains to be proven. This paper challenges the notion that the LNT model is protective of 

the public health under conditions of uncertainty, in particular with modeling low-dose exposure. 

The meaning of"public health-protective" becomes less clear when there are offsetting increases 

in risk either to the target population or to an entirely different population. 

We argue that there are three related assumptions, which are central to many risk 

assessments, that may lead to poor public health decisions: the LNT assumption, which might be 

thought of as a zero threshold assumption; the zero substitution effect assumption; and the zero 

income effect assumption. The LNT model, a widely applicable dose-response model in risk 

assessment-especially in cancer risk assessment-hypothesizes that exposure to even a single 

molecule of a hazard is sufficient to induce harm. By contrast, a threshold model assumes that 

exposure up to a certain dose is harmless, and a hormetic model hypothesizes that exposure to 

low doses of stressors is protective (i.e., beneficial) and only becomes harmful at higher doses. 

The zero substitution effect assumption is that there arc no risk-risk tradeoffs and, thus, a 

reduction in a target risk yields no unintended increases (or decreases) in other risks. Finally, the 

zero income effect assumption is that there arc no health-health tradeoffs, meaning that 

3 
142 

regulatory efforts to mitigate a target risk yield no offsetting increases in personal risks when 

private income is reduced by regulatory spending on health and safety. 

If any one of these assumptions (or a combination of them) is found to be false, then 

public health may be compromised. The use of the LNT model, especially with its emphasis on 

conservatism, may lead to choices that increase the expected cost of risk-risk and health-health 

tradeoffs. Its widespread use could, for example, contribute to a culture among regulators 

whereby focus is aimed narrowly at target risks, but to the exclusion of countervailing risks, 

without consideration of diminishing marginal returns to public risk-reduction attempts, and in 

ignorance of private risk-reduction efforts. 

We begin this paper with a background discussion of the history and origin of the LNT 

model. We then present a brief review of the recent scientific literature on horrnesis, DNA" repair, 

preconditioning, and adaptive responses in biology, challenging the foundational validity of 

linearity. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of tradeoff analysis, namely risk-risk analysis 

(RRA) and health-health analysis (HHA), which sheds light on the role of unintended 

consequences and opportunity costs in magnifYing the potential health consequences of using the 

LNT model. Despite its widespread use, the LNT model is due for a reevaluation. In addition, 

because much of the health effect we are discussing occurs in the very low dose range, doseresponse uncertainty, risk -risk tradeoffs, and health-health tradeoffs should be analyz~d as part of 

risk management to improve public policy decisions and outcomes. 

2. Background of the LNT Model 

When estimating the risk from exposure to chemical hazards, neither epidemiological nor 

animal studies generally provide dose-response data in the relevant region for the average 

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human level of exposure, that is, the low-dose region. Due to the limitations of existing study 

protocols, extrapolations to possible responses in the relevant low-dose region are usually 

made from the level of response observed in the high-dose region. The LNT model 

assumption, which roughly connects the lowest dose-response point observed in animal studies 

to the origin, is the most common model used for extrapolation. For cancer risk assessments, in 

particular, it is the regulatory default, 1 and, in effect, it implies that there is no safe threshold 

for exposure to a carcinogen; exposure to even a single molecule of a carcinogen could cause 

harm proportional to the dose. 

The adoption of the LNT model for cancer risk assessment stands at odds with the 

founding principle of toxicology that "the dose makes the poison." To quote Paracelsus in full: 

"All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison. The right dose differentiates a 

poison from a remedy" (Kirsch-Voiders, Aardema, and Elhajouji 2000). Y ct the LNT model 

assumption eliminates consideration of a threshold and focuses only on the level of "presumed" 

poisonous effects. Recent work, however, continues to affirm the presence of repair, as the body 

has "demonstrated response to mitigate or eliminate [the] damage" from low dose radiation. 

(Sacks, Meyerson, and Sigel2016). 

Abandonment of the previously held threshold assumption constituted a significant 

paradigm shift in toxicology. Although "extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof,"2 the 

LNT model was accepted as the default model for cancer risk assessment by US regulatory 

agencies without an extraordinary justification. In the following two subsections we provide a 

1 Some noncancer risk' assessments make use of the LNT model as well, though they are more aberrational than 

customary. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency applies the LNT model to estimate the risk of 

exposure to low doses of some air pollutants, such as fine particulate matter (PM25) and more recently to ozone 

(03). 

2 The original quote may have been from Marcello Truzzi ( 1987): "The more extraordinary a claim, the heavier is 

the burden of proof demanded." 

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brief history of the LNT model and its application by regulatory agencies to ionizing radiation 

and then to chemical carcinogens in general (a historical summary is provided in the table in the 

appendix). 

2.1. Adoption of the LNT model in the Assessment of Risk of Ionizing Radiation 

Ever since the publication of Darwin's 1859 work, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 

Selection, the question as to the cause of genetic change by which natural selection takes place 

has occupied the biology community (Calabrese 2013b). Evolution was seen to be driven by 

random mutations to individual genes, which would then be passed on to future generations 

(Muller 1922). But what was inducing the mutations? 

Geneticists raced to discover this mechanism of evolution. They applied stressors ranging 

from temperature to ionizing and nonionizing radiation. In 1927, Nobel Prize-winning geneticist 

Hermann J. Muller initiated a discussion on the possibility that X-;ays could lead to heritable 

mutations. Though the doses he used in his study were extremely high (200,000 times the 

background dose), he found a significant mutation rate, which led Olson and Lewis (1928) to 

speculate that naturally occurring ionizing radiation may be the process behind evolution 

(Calabrese 2013b). 

Even given linearity in the low-dose region, however, the inducible mutation theory was 

ambitious, as it hypothesized that small doses of natural radiation could explain the full extent of 

evolution driven by genetic mutation. Despite the need for extraordinary proof and the 

emergence of several studies rejecting the LNT model interpretation (Patterson 1928), genetic 

mutation in response to ionizing radiation came to be the common assumption, requiring a new 

framework to accompany it. 

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This novel framework would emerge from a collaboration of geneticists and physicists. 

Before Muller's theory of inducible mutation, medical physicists had envisioned that each cell 

has a sensitive area, or a heart, and that when the heart dies, the cell dies. According to this 

theory, known as target theory, cells arc dosed with radiation that may result in "hits" that can 

then kill the cell. A cell can potentially survive a number of radiation doses, as not every dose 

will hit the heart (of a cell); also the heart may withstand several hits before it dies. Thus, target 

theories are modeled as x-hit target theory, where "x" denotes the number of hits it takes to kill 

the heart of the cell. For example, a single hit theory implies that the heart will be killed on the 

first hit (Nomiya 2013)-that is, response occurs in proportion to the dose. 

Applying target theory to radiation-induced mutation advanced both the state of target 

theory and the LNT model for ionizing radiation. The formal justification of the linear dose 

response within the target theory framework appeared in an influential paper by radiation 

geneticist Timofeeff-Ressovsky and physicists Delbruck and Zimmer (1935). The paper 

hypothesized a binary reaction mechanism where an observable response (i.e., mutation) takes 

place when units of energy are absorbed (or ionized) by the target region (the particularly 

sensitive region, or the heart) of a gene. Once an X-ray treatment excites an electron in the target 

region of the gene, a permanent effect takes place in the form of a mutation (Calabrese 2013b). 

The units of energy are generally referred to as hits and thus the target theory of ionizing 

radiation is often referred to as the one-hit target theory. 

The one-hit target theory of mutation stood at odds with the general physiological 

understanding of the time that the elimination of one molecule out of a very large number of 

molecules does not generate an observable effect. Even after the 1953 discovery of the structure 

of DNA (Watson and Crick 1953) came to replace most of what had been assumed about gene 

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structure (e.g., its molecular stability), the one-hit target theory continued to be applied. And in 

1956 the theory even made its way to the Biological Effects oflonizing Radiation I (BEIR I) 

committee formed by the National Academy of Sciences. There the geneticists comprising the 

BEIR I panel made the seminal recommendation to switch from a threshold model to a linear 

model to estimate the risk of mutation from ionizing radiation (Calabrese 2013b). 

Still, as understanding oflow-dose-induced DNA repair and recovery was making its 

way through the scientific community, some challenged the BEIR I decision. These challenges, 

however, did not succeed in reversing the BEIR I decision, and regulatory agencies in America 

and around the world followed BEIR I's lead, adopting linearity in cancer risk assessment 

(Calabrese 2013b). 

2.2. Adoption of the LNT Model in the Assessment of Risk of Other Stressors 

In !961 Nathan Mantel and W. Ray Bryan used a probit model to estimate the risk of developing 

cancerous tumors when exposed to carcinogens (Calabrese 2013b). They recommended a "safe 

dose" of 1 in 100 million. The common regulatory "tolerated" level of risk from exposure to 

carcinogens traces its origin to this publication. This safe-dose recommendation was adopted by 

the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in its publication of the 1973 risk guidelines, but it 

was modified to 1 in 1 million in 1977.3 In 1979, the FDA revised its cancer risk assessment 

policy, replacing the probit model used by Mantel and Bryan with the LNT model. 4 

3 The l in 1 million level was the threshold below which no regulatory action was necessary. 4 In fact, there have been many mathematically based models used to extrapolate from high to low dose for 

carcinogenesis. One significant method used by the EPA early on came from K. S. Crump (1984). There were 

two-stage models (Armitage and Doll 1957), three-stage models (Neyman and Scott 1967) and the one-hit model 

from Moolgavkar and Venzon ( 1979) and Moolgavkar and Knudson ( 1981 ). These are discussed in Thorsland, 

Brown, and Charnley ( 1987). A more general discussion can be found in Anderson and the Carcinogen 

Assessment Group of the EPA (1983). For a thorough analysis of the history and evolution of dose-response 

modeling, see Calabrese (20!3b). 

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The EPA took several measures in the 1970s to limit exposure to carcinogens.5 In its 

1976 proposed guidelines on carcinogenic risk, the EPA recommended the use of quantitative 

risk assessments to estimate the risk of exposure to carcinogens. Based on limited 

epidemiological evidence on ionizing radiation and the link between smoking and lung cancer, 

the EPA also endorsed the use of the one-hit model (and thus a linear dose response) (Calabrese 

20l3b). According to EPA Administrator Douglas Costle, the one-hit model was chosen due to 

its conservative nature, that is, its perceived bias toward overestimation of risk in the presence of 

uncertainty (EPA 197 6). Overestimation of risk was (and still is) considered consistent with the 

agency's mission to protect public health from environmental chemical exposures. A later 

publication suggested that wide application of the LNT model in regulatory risk assessment was 

due in part to its attractiveness to regulators, namely, "It is easy to apply and ... it will generate 

an upper bound on the unknown, underlying cancer risk in most instances." (Office of Science 

and Technology Policy 1986). And the timing for the regulation of chemical carcinogens was 

simply right, following as it did on the heels of ionizing radiation, a mutagen with a readily 

available and widely used framework of analysis. So while the one-hit model was initially 

proposed for the mutational effects of ionizing radiation, it eventually became the default model 

for all chemical carcinogens. 

In 1977 the Safe Drinking Water Committee (SDWC) ofthe National Academy of 

Sciences (NAS) recommended to the EPA the adoption of the LNT model in cancer risk 

assessment (Calabrese 2013b). The EPA followed this recommendation in 1979 in its assessment 

of the risk of chloroform in drinking water (Environmental Protection Agency 1979). The 

5 The EPA's website has a Quantitative Risk Assessment for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride (Kuzmack and McGaughy 

1975) and Interim Procedures and Guidelines for Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected 

Carcinogens (Train 1976). 

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SDWC expressed skepticism on the grounds that the LNT model did not incorporate biological 

characteristics of the animal studies nor did it anticipate "newer developmental methodologies" 

(Calabrese 2013b). As a result, the SDWC briefly withheld its endorsement of the LNT model 

only to endorse it again in 1983, since the model was still in use by the EPA. From there, the 

LNT model became the default methodology for the assessment of risk of chemical 

carcinogens. These endorsements and the application of the LNT model, first by the FDA (1979) 

and then by the EPA ( 1979), were foundational steps in the history of regulatory risk 

assessments. 

3. Recent Developments in Dose Response 

Regardless of the reasons why regulatory agencies initially decided to use the LNT model, the 

debate should now be on whether there is sufficient evidence to justifY maintaining its use. As 

we argue, there is mounting evidence in biology and toxicology (as well as risk management 

theories) to support reevaluation of the choice of dose-response model to optimize public health. 

The LNT model is difficult, if not impossible, to validate and, therefore, integrating other default 

models may allow for conducting validation exercises. Evidence of alternative dose-response 

models (e.g., hormesis) and biological mechanisms (e.g., DNA repair, preconditioning, and 

adaptive response) suggest that adherence to the LNT model may be imprudent, as it prevents 

public policy from achieving its full potential in protecting public health. 

In fact, due to these issues of validation and plausibility, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission has recently started examining the validity of the LNT model as compared to the 

hormctic model for ionizing radiation (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2016). In the next 

section we briefly outline three challenges from toxicology and biology to the LNT model, 

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namely, validation issues, hormcsis as an alternative model, and, finally, researc~ on DNA 

repair, preconditioning, and adaptive responses in biology. 

3.1. Validation Issues 

As noted above, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible in some instances, to validate the 

dose-response function at low doses, since thousands of subjects are required to uncover either a 

small response or a relatively infrequent event. This is particularly true when the adverse effect, 

such as cancer, occurs in both the test and the control group (Scala 1991). This task is made even 

harder when one potential response in the test group is a decrease in the incidence of the adverse 

event, that is, a hermetic response. To uncover such an effect would require a study design that 

would allow for such a response. Another difficulty for a dose-response researcher, and the more 

familiar one, is extrapolation. Extrapolation problems exist for both animal and human 

(epidemiological) studies. Even the most sophisticated epidemiological and animal studies are 

incapable of detecting low levels of risk, for example, below I percent, and so these risks must 

be imputed based on data at higher doses. 

The validation issue is further magnified with the LNT model, as it predicts 

proportional risk to ever smaller and smaller doses. Much of the current justification for using 

LNT as the default dose-response model for exposure to ionizing radiation and chemical 

carcinogens is rooted in epidemiological studies. However, epidemiological studies are 

difficult to reproduce, hard to map to the general population due to the presence of 

confounders, and are often focused on cases where the population in question is exposed to 

high dose levels (Taubes 1995). Examples of such cases are studies of the effect of ionizing 

radiation that rely on evidence from radiation exposure following Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 

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Chemobyl, and Fukushima; occupational radiation studies; and medical studies on highly 

exposed individuals (Calabrese and O'Connor 2014). 

Such high-dose exposure events and studies are therefore unsuited for extrapolation to the 

relevant day-to-day low-dose eve~ts like the use ofX-rays and CT scans for medical purposes 

(Berrington de Gonzalez et al. 2009). Even some of the more recent articles in the medical 

literature that predict high rates of disease and cancer-related deaths due to medical imaging in 

the United States rely on extrapolation from high-dose exposure to radiation (Berrington de 

Gonzalez et al. 2009; Abbott 2015). 

Moreover, there is a sizable stock of scientific research (epidemiological and medical) 

suggesting the possibility of a threshold model for radiation exposure for doses below 100 mSv 

(Ropeik 2013), while other studies have detected a beneficial response to low-dose exposure. For 

example, four epidemiological studies of subjects who are naturally exposed to background 

radiation did not detect any increase in cancer risk, with one study detecting a positive response 

to low-dose radiation (Tao et al. 1999).6 Another study on the effect of radon exposure revealed 

beneficial effects to low-dose exposure (Cohen 1995). These results were affirmed in another 

more recent study on radon exposure, which detected the possibility of positive effects from low 

doses of radiation on lung cancer (Thompson et al. 2008). A multiple-country analysis of 

occupational exposure to X-rays and gamma-rays in nuclear power plants also did not detect 

negative health effects from exposure in workers; instead it showed a rate of all cancer mortality 

lower in the exposed workers relative to the general population (Cardis et al. 2007). A quick 

search on Google Scholar for horrnesis alone generates 23,800 articles. 

6 The lack of statistical significance in these studies is nonetheless important, as it means that the effect of exposure 

to low-dose radiation on cancer risk is not different from zero. This finding of non-significance may imply a 

possible threshold and not an LNT model. 

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Much of the aforementioned research, which was unable to validate a linear response, 

also relies on epidemiological, occupational, and ecological investigations, which naturally 

suffer from the same shortcomings as the studies supporting linearity. Yet, regulatory risk 

assessment has lacked a systematic review of the evidence in support of each model. Such a 

review could shed light on the weight of evidence in support of each model while accounting for 

study design and quality. For example, lack of a systematic review is illustrated by the seventh 

committee on the Biologic Effect oflonizing Radiation (BEIR VII) that attributed the beneficial 

response in the multiple-country study of occupational exposure to X-rays and gamma-rays to a 

"healthy worker effect and unknown differences between nuclear industry workers and the 

general public" (Calabrese (lnd O'Connor 2014). These kinds of assertions are not helpful when 

equally plausible alternative explanations exist, but are ruled out without any review of the 

existing evidence. 

The difficulty of validating models at very low doses drove the Health Physics Society 

and the American Association of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) to conclude in December 

2011 that the effects of radiation at very low doses (50-100 mSv) are either too minuscule to 

detect or virtually nonexistent. As a result, the two organizations issued statements 

recommending against quantitative estimation of health risks for doses of radiation below 50 

mSv annually or below I 00 mSv above that of background radiation in a lifetime. In the words 

of the AAPM (2011), 

Risks of medical imaging at patient doses below 50 mSv for single procedures or l 00 

mSv for multiple procedures over short time periods arc too low to be detectable and 

may be nonexistent. Predications of hypothetical cancer incidence and deaths in patient 

populations exposed to such low doses are highly speculative and should be 

discouraged. These predictions are harmful because they lead to sensationalistic articles 

in the public media that cause some patients and parents to refuse medical imaging 

procedures, placing them at substantial risk by not receiving the clinical benefits of the 

prescribed procedures. 

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As outlined, the low-dose region is one saturated with uncertainties and the choice of one 

model to estimate health risks gives "a false sense of precision" (Office of Management and 

Budget 2007) where none currently exist. Given that the usc of the LNT model may lead to poor 

public health decisions, then integrating it with other plausible dose-response models moves us 

closer to optimizing public health protection (Calabrese ct al. 2015). 

The issue of model uncertainty and model validation in the low-dose region has been a 

challenge for decades. Ever since the publication of Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: 

Mdnaging the Process in 1983 by the National Research Council (NRC), the choice of the lowdose model must be given to the one with the most biological plausibility (National Research 

Councill983). 

In the next subsection, we present recent developments in biology that support another 

low-dose model, namely, horrnesis, or the biphasic dose-response model. In addition to having 

more biological support than the LNT model, horrnesis, if correct, casts doubt on the supposed 

conservative nature ofLNT. 

3.2. Hormesis 

In contrast with the LNT model, the horrnetic dose-response model is a biphasic model where 

direction of response is not constant across doses. While response to exposure to a high dose of 

some substance may indeed be proportional to dose (i.e., harmful), response to exposure to a low 

dose of the same substance may be inversely related to dose (i.e., protective). In other words, 

exposure to a low dose of a carcinogen may-up to a certain threshold-/ower the risk of 

developing a particular cancer. These characteristics arc sometimes described as low-dose 

stimulation and high-dose inhibition. 

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As previously mentioned, all dose-response models encounter validation problems in the 

low-dose region; hormesis faces this issue as well. In hormesis, the hormetic effect is generally 

modest, that is, 30-60 percent greater than control values (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003). Given 

the small ratio of signal to noise and the modest effect, it is difficult to replicate hormesis and to 

distinguish between a threshold and a hormetic model in the low-dose region respectively 

(Calabrese and Mattson 2011). Considering, however, the significance of health implications of 

correctly identifYing the type of dose-response model, efforts to design better studies have 

continued. As described in one paper, "The use of different default models has important 

implications in many areas, including the establishment of limits for chemical exposures" 

(Calabrese 2008). 

Recent advances in clinical studies have begun to allow researchers to overcome some of 

the aforementioned obstacles. For example, shifting focus from whole-animal to cell-level 

investigation has allowed for more doses to be tested and results to be replicated, in addition to 

both allowing results more relevant to humans and to relying less on extrapolation (FDA 1993). 

These and other recent advances suggest that the dynamics of the low-dose region may be more 

nuanced than is predicted by the default LNT model. 

Hormesis has been found to make more accurate predictions than both the LNT and 

threshold models using large independent data sets (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003). Some 

research has provided an explanation for the mechanism of action of hundreds of hermetic dose 

responses, suggesting that hormesis may be more of a rule than an exception. This claim was 

extended to both cancer and noncanccr end points and is said to be independent of the biological 

model and the stressors tested (Calabrese and O'Connor 2014). 

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Studies in toxicology have revealed horrnetic dose responses for both ionizing radiation and 

chemical carcinogens. One estimate for chemicals found a horrnetic response in 37-50 percent of 

chemicals tested and also found that the horrnetic responses exceeded those of the threshold by 2.5 

to 1 (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003). In fact, a horrnetic response is detected in nearly 2,000 chemical 

agents from a broad range of chemical classes (Calabrese et al. 2008, Calabrese 2013a). Some of the 

studies showing a beneficial health effect of ionizing radiation at low levels of exposure (discussed 

in the previous subsection) may also be an example of a horrnetic dose response. 

A major FDA-funded study (the mega-mouse EDOl study), which included 24,000 

animals exposed to a known carcinogen (2-acetylaminofluorene, a derivative of fluorene), found 

evidence supporting a horrnetic, or biphasic, dose response (Bruce et al. 198 i ). Additionally, a 

reassessment of the effect of DDT in an animal study--on which regulatory agencies had based 

their risk assessment-revealed a horrnetic dose response (Sukata et al. 2002). Horrnesis has also 

been detected in exposure to low doses of air pollutants, namely particulate matter (Cox 2012). 

The LNT model is often argued for and justified on the basis that it is a conservative 

approach (EPA 2005). 7 However, horrnesis alone casts doubt that adherence to linearity is 

necessarily conservative as we intervene to maintain lower doses. As recent research on model 

7 Some claim that the LNT model is not conservative. For example, Bailar eta!. (1988) argue that a supralinear 

dose-response relationship is possible for some chemicals. Others have argued that the human population is 

heterogeneous in its susceptibility to cancer risks (Finke12014), such that some individuals will experience higher 

than average cancer responses. Bailar eta!. ( 1988), however, did not consider the possibility of a J-shaped dose 

response in his study due to its lack of support at the time. Now, however, ample support for a J-shaped dose 

response is available, as mentioned above. Regarding variation in human susceptibility, at least for the purposes of 

calculating benefits in a benefit-cost analysis, it is the mean response in the population that should be considered. 

Some individuals will no doubt experience higher than average cancer responses, just as others will be lower than 

average. As will be discussed in more detail below, taking an upper bound of risk that accounts for humans having 

higher than average susceptibility or having a higher exposure is not conservative because there is a balance to be 

struck between target risks and the risks associated with risk-risk tradeoffs and health-health tradeoffs. Such 

balancing is impossible when upper bounds arc used il) place of mean population responses. Further, research on the 

integration ofhomtesis and the LNT model shows that setting a protection standard based on the response of the 

most sensitive populations can lead to a net negative health outcome (see Calabrese eta!. 2016). 

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uncertainty suggests (Calabrese et al. 2015), the optimal hormetic response occurs at the nadir of 

the hormetic curve, which is illustrated in figure 1. As argued, the dose corresponding to a I 0-4 

response according to the LNT model is roughly aligned with the dose yielding the optimal 

hermetic response. Therefore, seen in light of model uncertainty and if the hermetic model is 

correct, then pushing exposure to a dose smaller than the dose corresponding to a I 0-4 response 

as predicted by the LNT model will yield net health harm. Taking bladder cancer as an example, 

the health gains achieved by pushing exposure to a dose corresponding to a 1 0-6 LNT response 

(i.e., I 00 bladder cancers less than a dose corresponding to a 10-4 LNT response), will be 

dwarfed by the health harm induced by eliminating the potential for protective hom1etic effects 

(i.e., 3,150 more incidences of bladder cancer) (Calabrese et al. 20 15). 

Figure 1. Model Uncertainty and Health Protection when Accounting for Hormesis 

t 

'" c 

(X 

~ 

LINEAR MODEL (LNT) 

\ 

Optimized Benefit/Hormesis 

Dose-Jo. 

Source: Edward J. Calabrese, Dima Y. Shamoun, and Jaap C. Hanekamp. 2015. "Cancer Risk 

Assessment: Optimizing Human Health through Linear Dose-Response Models." Food and Chemical 

Toxicology 81: 137-40. 

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3.3. DNA Repair, Preconditioning, and Adaptive Responses in Biology 

When the LNT one-hit model was first proposed, it was assumed that a single change of DNA 

could initiate the carcinogenesis process and damage could not be reversed. In other words, DNA 

repair was ruled out. Scientific understanding has come a long way since then. In addition to 

recent developments indicating that displacing a large number of molecules is required to affect a 

mutational event (Weiss 1944 ), several types of cells are now found to successfully repair 

mutated DNA (Hanawalt 1994). And even if a carcinogen can initiate a carcinogenesis process in 

a linear fashion, the development of tumors may not necessarily follow. For instance, in one 

study Driver, White, and Butler (1987) demonstrated that a single administration of the 

mutagen/carcinogen dimethylnitrosamine (DMN) induced a linear dose response for renal 

mesenchymal DNA adducts (early cancer process stage), as well as for mesenchymal foci (later 

cancer process stage), observations consistent with the LNT model. However, the linear 

transition to the occurrence of tumor formation was not observed, as the foci at the lower doses 

failed to proceed to the tumor stage, yielding a threshold, rather than a linear dose-response 

relationship. 

A similar point was made in a 1990 paper by Ames and Gold. The authors argued that 

cell division plays an important role in the carcinogenesis process, as cell division increases the 

vulnerability of DNA to mutation. Since animal testing is very expensive, rodents are generally 

subjected to chronic doses of hazards in order to better detect a carcinogenic effect. However, 

when high doses of a carcinogen are being administered in an acute manner-causing the 

destruction of some cells-then cell division is the natural bodily reaction to replace these dead 

cells, making DNA mutation more likely. As Ames and Gold have observed, 

By causing chronic cell division, a high percentage of all chemicals might be expected to 

be carcinogenic at chronic, ncar-toxic doses .... About half of all chemicals tested 

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chronically at the MTD [maximum tolerated dose] are carcinogens. The fact that about 

40% of rodent carcinogens are not mutagens is consistent with our understanding of the 

important role of cell division in carcinogenesis. Although toxicity at or near the MTD 

often induces cell division, below a certain dose no such effect is observed. (Ames and 

Gold 1990) 

Research on DNA repair offers a significant challenge to the LNT paradigm: The notion of 

self-repair is inherently inimical to a linear theory. But while it could be argued that DNA repair 

docs not on its own resolve the debate over the dose-response model, recent biological research 

on preconditioning and adaptive response seems to make a convincing case for hormesis. 

Preconditioning and adaptive response research explores whether a low dose of a stressor 

induces a protective reaction in the body against higher doses of the same stressor and, in some 

cases, higher doses of other stressors. In other words, low doses of a stressor can increase 

resilience and promote survivability in the environment. Stressors can vary from environmental 

pollutants to chemical carcinogens to exercise to intermittent fasting. The ability of organisms to 

react adaptively to low doses of stressors has recently been argued to play a fundamental role in 

evolution (Mattson and Calabrese 201 0). In fact, preconditioning and adaptive response is 

challenging two fundamental implications of the LNT model, namely that dose is cumulative and 

damage is irreversible (Calabrese 2015, Calabrese 2016). 

Research on preconditioning and adaptive response is now proposing less invasive methods, 

both to treat present diseases and to prevent susceptibility to future ones. Recent studies argue that 

low doses ofX-rays can induce a protective effect to treat pneumonia by promoting an antiinflammatory response (Calabrese, Dhawan, and Kapoor 20 14). Moreover, low-dose radiotherapy is 

argued to be highly effective on patients with shoulder tendonitis or bursitis (Calabrese, Dhawan, 

and Kapoor 20 14). Low-dose X -rays have also been asserted not only to initiate an adaptive 

response to higher doses of radiation but also to nonradiation stress, such as oxidative damage, 

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which constitutes a major cause of diabetic complications. Low-dose radiation has been found to 

induce a maximal protective effect against kidney damage in diabetic patients (Shao et al. 2014). 

Other research examines low-dose light therapy administered to the front lobe of the 

brain to stimulate brain and muscle activity and to sharpen memory (Hayworth et al. 201 0). 

Additionally, low-level light therapy (LLLT) has been shown to be an effective treatment against 

subsequent heart attacks, and when administered to patients before surgery, it can promote 

healing of surgical wounds. In addition, LLLT administered on normal muscles may increase the 

amount of physical work that can be performed by extending the time that the muscle can 

function comfortably before fatigue starts (Agrawa12014). 

A comprehensive review of all the recent research on preconditioning and adaptive 

response and the biological basis ofhormesis is beyond the scope of this paper, but one such 

study is Calabrese (2008). It is clear, however, that hormesis and preconditioning play substantial 

roles in public health. While massive uncertainties may fog up the low-dose region and make 

model selection a challenging endeavor, biological plausibility-as advocated by regulatory 

agencies and the NRC for many decades-must be the tiebreaker. 

4. A Methodology to Alleviate the Uncertainty of Regulation in the Low Dose 

Guidelines from the National Academy of Sciences can assist when reevaluating critical 

assumptions such as the LNT model. In addition, the NRC has dedicated numerous publications to 

risk assessment over the past three decades. For example, in 2009 the Council released Science and 

Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment in which an entire chapter was dedicated to the "Selection 

and Use of Defaults." Choosing scientific defaults has been defined as "trans science," that is, 

"questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science" (Wagner 

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1995). By their nature, then, many of the default assumptions on which regulatory agencies 

generally rely in their risk assessments have been subject to controversy over the years (National 

Research Council2009). This problem has been recognized in NRC publications dating back to the 

1983 Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process-the famous Red 

Book-and the 1994 Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment. In the chapter on defaults in the 

2009 publication, the NRC makes the case for selecting sound default assumptions as summarized 

in the following four recommendations (National Resource Council2009): 

I. Have a clear choice of defaults to prevent inconsistency resulting from an ad hoc 

interpretation of the data across the agency's analysis. Further, a default assumption may 

be well chosen in general, but it is necessary to maintain flexibility in the application of 

defaults, as substance-specific data may justify a departure from defaults. 

2. Invoke defaults for the steps of the risk assessment where it is necessary to make 

"inferences beyond those that can be clearly drawn from the available data or to 

otherwise fill common data gaps." "Inferences are needed when underlying biologic 

knowledge is uncertain or absent." 

3. Maintain criteria "available for judging whether, in specific cases, data are adequate for 

direct use or to support an inference in place of a default." 

4. Report and compare alternative risk estimates in the presence of a "comparably 

plausible" alternative assumption; abandon a default assumption in favor of an alternative 

assumption when the latter is determined to be "clearly superior" to the former, that is, 

"its plausibility clearly exceeds the plausibility of the default." 

The NRC makes the analogy between the "clearly superior" standard for alternatives to 

the legal concept of"evidence beyond reasonable doubt." A similar analogy can be drawn for 

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this point where "comparably plausible" can be interpreted as the legal parlance 

"preponderance of evidence," or the 50 percent range of plausibility. The two points can be 

reasonably summarized as follows: when an alternative is comparatively plausible, 

quantitative model uncertainty should be characterized and presented in the risk assessment; 

on the other hand, when an alternative is clearly superior, it should, then, replace the default. 

The NRC further clarifies the clearly superior standard by saying, "The term clearly superior 

should not be interpreted quantitatively, but the committee notes that statistical P values can 

also be used as an analogy. For example, rejecting the null in favor of the alternative only 

when P < 0.05 could be viewed as insisting that the alternative hypothesis is 'clearly superior' 

to the 'default null."' 

In a manner consistent with the recommendations from the NRC outlined above, 

regulatory agencies can make a well-justified fresh assessment of their LNT default assumption. 

Though choosing a default may be necessary in cases where data is lacking, the NRC encourages 

abandoning a default for an alternative when evidence accumulates and identifies the alternative 

as a more appropriate assumption. To follow an objective process for determining the 

appropriate default, regulatory agencies should consider both bodies of evidence validating the 

LNT, threshold, and hormetic models. Specifically, regulatory bodies can base their decision on 

a systematic review of evidence methodology8 to determine whether hormesis is a 

"comparatively plausible" or "clearly superior" alternative model to LNT. 

If neither the LNT nor the hormetic model are deemed "clearly superior," and the 

systematic review instead reveals them to be "comparatively plausible," then regulatory agencies 

8 Systematic review of evidence, instead of weight of evidence, is the latest recommendation from the NRC 

(National Research Council 2011 ). 

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161 

can develop a quantitative model uncertainty analysis in their risk assessment and update their 

protection standards accordingly.9 

The LNT model has long been the model of choice for cancer (and since 2009, for PMz.s) 

risk assessment. Choosing and adhering to a particular dose-response model may have been 

necessary for many reasons: to ensure consistency in analysis and avoid ad hoc interpretation of 

the data; to prevent halting valuable scientific inquiry in the face of scientific uncertainty or lack 

of technical ability; or to ensure protection of public health and safety when knowledge and 

consensus are lacking. As argued in this paper, however, since certain assumptions may drive 

much of the results of a risk assessment, periodic reflection on the choice of assumptions is 

necessary to ensure that the resulting risk management decision is optimal, given the existing 

information. 

5. Implications of Tradeoff Analysis 

The analysis of tradeoffs is foundational to economics and sound decision-making. Tradeoff 

analysis looks at the consequences of making a choice or taking an action. Every choice taken 

eliminates another choice that could have been taken instead, and every choice taken has both 

intended and unintended consequences. Tradeoff analysis, therefore, attempts to calculate how the 

weight of the intended consequences of an action taken compares to the weight of the unintended 

consequences of that action as well as the weight of consequences of forgone alternative actions. 

Below we will discuss two types oftradeoffs, namely, risk-risk and health-health 

tradeoffs, which are essential for consideration in any risk analysis based on an LNT hypothesis. 

9 One proposal on how LNT and hormetic models can be harmonized to maximize public health protection is 

suggested in Calabrese, Shamoun, and Hanekamp (20 15). 

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162 

5.1. Risk-Risk Tradeojfs 

The doctrine of better safe than sorry is commonly invoked to justifY the use of the LNT model 

because the "conservative" LNT is more likely to overestimate average risk than a threshold or a 

honnetic model, but it isn't so simple. Any regulation of risky behavior can push consumers into 

other, sometimes riskier, behavior. Thus, it is important not to develop tunnel vision, focusing 

only on the risk at hand. Risk policies must always take risk tradeoff's into account and, at a 

minimum, ensure that there are no negative public health consequences. 10 

A risk-risk tradeoff happens when risk-reducing actions increase (or decrease) a nontarget risk at the same time that a target risk is decreased. These changes in non-target risks-socalled countervailing and coincident risks-are usually unintended but are also often 

discoverable. Any risk management action will cause people to make different choices, whether 

because of a change in relative prices or because of a need to employ a different technology 

(Williams and Thompson 2004). 

Risk-risk analysis (RRA) is a formal analytical framework that compares reductions in 

target risks with unintended increases or decreases in other risks resulting from the mitigation 

efforts. Countervailing risks are the negative side effects of risk mitigation efforts, while 

coincident risks are those risks that are likely to fall in tandem with the target risk. A popular 

example of a risk-risk tradeoff is the increase in the risk of a stomachache as a consequence of 

taking aspirin to reduce the risk of a headache continuing (Graham and Wiener 1995). 

RRA frequently involves both risk assessment and economic analysis, so it must involve 

a combined effort of risk assessors and economists (Williams and Thompson 2004). Risk-risk 

'"There may be an overall positive public health change resulting from a risk decision that may still fail a benefitcost test because of non-health-related costs. 

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163 

tradeoffs add to the uncertainty surrounding the choice of a dose-response model because they 

complicate the effort to identify a public health-protective policy. Just as there are many lowdose response functions that could be derived from high-dose animal studies, so too there could 

be many behavioral responses induced by a new regulation. Exposure to new risks as one takes 

actions to avoid proscribed risks can tum a regulatory action into a public health hazard. 11 

Thus, the issue of whether changes in exposure to risks are producing public health 

negative or positive outcomes is complicated. As we move to reduce exposure to one hazard, 

other risks will increase; the crucial risk management question is whether countervailing risks 

will increase by more than the targeted and coincident risk reductions. We suspect, as do Graham 

and Wiener, "that risk tradeoffs are quietly hindering the effectiveness of the national campaign 

to reduce risk" (Graham and Wiener 1995). If we ignore these countervailing risks, we increase 

the chances of moving in the wrong public health direction. The uncertainty with LNT models 

acknowledged by considering risk-risk tradeoffs is illustrated in figure 2. 

Often, a countervailing risk will result from people using a substitute compound for the 

one being regulated. Looking at figure 2, if we presume that the target and the substitute both 

have LNT dose-response curves, then our concern is how the reduction in exposure to the target 

hazard (from A to B)-which results in a change in risk (here a decrease in response from 1 to 

2)-compares to the risk posed by the usc of the substitute compound (here an increase in dose 

from C to D with an increase in response from 3 to 4). The issue becomes even more 

complicated when there is the possibility that the target or the substitute compound or both 

might possibly have a hormetic dose-response function. This possibility is illustrated in figure 3. 

II For example, an FDA warning label requirement for raw unpasteurized juice resulted in juice being pasteurized or 

ceasing to be produced rather than in the addition of the warning labels (Food and Drug Administration 1998). 

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164 

Figure 2. Uncertainty Created by Risk-Risk Tradeoffs, Assuming an LNT Model 

Response 

Target 

Substitute 

c 8 A D Dose 

Figure 3. Uncertainty Created by Risk-Risk Tradeoffs, Assuming Hormesis 

Response 

More 

Cancer 

Normal 

Less 

Cancer 

B 

Hormcsis 

c 

' 

I 

~ 

Target 

Substitute 

--- ----------···-·r···········-i·---··-·--········--·-

l ~ 

I I 

i i ~ ! 

A D Dose 

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The stars at the bottom of the two curves represent the apex of the hormetic effect-that 

is, the optimal health response point. In this example, a decrease in exposure to the target 

compound from A to B not only decreases risk, it also increases the likelihood of a positive 

hormetic response, although past the optimal level. For the substitute compound, moving from C 

to D loses both the protective hormetic response and increases risk. Predicting the net effect on 

risk requires a great deal of information. Without such information, uncertainty may be so great 

as to make it unclear whether reductions in exposure to the target risk arc producing public 

health positive or negative outcomes. Furthermore, the uncertainty involved in the shape and 

position of these functions on the two-dimensional dose-response plane makes decisions to 

improve public health considerably more uncertain. 12 

5.2. Health-Health Tradeofft 

As a general rule, the lower the level at which the mandated exposure to a risk is set, the higher 

the marginal cost of that mandate is likely to be, due to the economic phenomenon known as 

diminishing marginal returns. Since a large percentage of regulatory costs are translated into 

higher prices for goods and services, consumers will have lower real incomes and thus be less 

able to afford reducing the risks most relevant to them. The lower the levels of exposures chosen, 

the more it costs to comply (per unit of risk reduced) and the resulting higher prices reduce 

expenditures on private risk mitigation. 

A subset of risk-risk analysis, known as health-health analysis (HHA), focuses on those 

countervailing risks that occur when regulatory costs reduce private expenditures that address 

12 Of course. consideration of the combined effects of multiple stressors, i.e., additive, antagonistic, and synergistic 

effects on either risk or hormetic effects, only further complicates the uncertainty. 

27 
166 

personal health risks (Lutter and Morralll994). This effect alone can render a policy harmful to 

public health and, as discussed below, can also be regressive. 

Vanderbilt Professor Kip Viscusi estimates that for each additional dollar of income 

earned (or lost), people tend to increase (or reduce) health-related expenditures by 10 cents; that 

is to say, an individual's marginal propensity to spend on health is roughly equal to 10 percent 

(Viscusi 1994). As people are obligated to incrementally spend more and more resources 

complying with regulations addressing public risks, they will respond by reducing expenditures 

on mitigating risks that they face in their private lives. At some point, if one takes enough 

income away from people and these losses are spread out across a large enough group, 

countervailing risks will increase by an amount sufficient to result in expected fatalities. One 

estimate of the magnitude of burden sufficient to induce one expected fatality is $92 million in 

2016 dollars (Viscusi 1994).13 

Such fatalities arc not likely to be distributed evenly across society. Ralph Keeney has 

shown that such cost-induced fatalities fall disproportionately on those with lower incomes, 

including some minority groups (Keeney 1994). Conversely, if health and safety goods have 

diminishing marginal effectiveness, then spending the first dollars yields the largest return (e.g., 

spending on doctor's visits before spending on a car with a rear-view camera), which, in turn, 

means that the dollars spent by the lower-income population are the most effective at reducing 

health and mortality risks. As such, it is important to consider distributional effects in tern1s of who 

is bearing the costs and who is enjoying the benefits of risk mitigation. This is a more compelling 

13 This is known as a "statistical fatality" and refers to the adding up of small probabilities of death to one. That is, if 

I ,000 people stop making expenditnres that will prevent a I in I ,000 risk of death. then there is the expectation that 

one "statistical death" will occur, although the identity of the deceased is unknown. The $92 million estimate is 

adjusted for inflation from $50 million in 1990 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index. 

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reason why inter-individual variability may be important. Indeed, presidential executive orders 

currently in effect also require agencies to consider such distributional impacts of regulations. 14 

Since many of the benefits of reducing target risks will accrue to concentrated groups of the 

exposed population, while dispersed populations will realize increases in countervailing risks in 

addition to the costs of regulatory action, 15 policies with these kinds of differential impacts may be 

more likely to yield negative public health outcomes in the aggregate. 

5.3. Risk and Health Tradeoff..~ in Practice 

An example of how risk-risk and health-health tradeoffs can inform a decision to manage 

pathogenic risks comes from the consumption of raw oysters. Raw oyster consumption, 

especially from the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, results in approximately 30 deaths each 

year and more than twice that number of illnesses (Kuchler et a!. 1999). One option to reduce 

this risk would be to restrict consumption of raw oysters during certain months of the year (e.g. 

March through November) when the pathogen is present at high doses. With perfect 

enforcement, this would essentially eliminate the target risk of vibrio Vulnificus, the pathogen in 

question. But two tradeoffs arise. 

The first is a risk-risk tradeoff from switching to substitutes, that is, what people eat 

instead of raw oysters. All foods contain some risk from exposure to microbial, chemical, 

nutritional, and physical hazards, and there may be other kinds of raw seafood, such as sushi, with 

which people would replace oysters. One must account for the risks posed by these substitutes. 

14 See, for example, President Clinton's Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 76 (1993); President Obama's Exec. Order 

No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 58 (2011). 15 For example, US ethanol rules increased com prices, which reduced purchasing power for lower-income 

households around the world (Ahdukadirov 20 15). The general phenomenon of concentrated benefits and dispersed 

costs is discussed in Olson (1965). 

29 
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The second is a health-health tradeoff from reduction in income. Because the typical 

oyster harvester's job skills arc not readily transferable, these individuals would suffer an income 

loss-perhaps for prolonged periods-if oyster consumption were restricted (Kuchler et aL 

1999). Research by Ralph Keeney and others has shown how income loss can cause health 

problems due to increased alcoholism, depression, and even suicide. Such income effects can 

lead to a reduction in expenditures meant to reduce personal risks, such as buying safer cars, 

living in safer neighborhoods, purchasing smoke detectors and baby gates, paying for preventive 

medical visits, and other risk-reducing products (Keeney 1994). 

Pesticide standards are another nuanced example. If banning certain pesticides forces a 

switch to more expensive pesticides, the price of fruits and vegetables will increase (Gray and 

Graham 1997). Higher-priced fruits and vegetables may induce marginal consumers to switch to 

a cheaper but less healthful substitute. The inframarginal consumers, on the other hand-those 

who elect to keep eating fruits and vegetables despite the higher price-are now made poorer 

and less able to address their personal risks. Farmers' incomes may suffer as well, due to the 

higher production costs or a net decrease in demand. 

6. Conclusion 

Risk assessments were originally meant to give risk managers information that would allow them 

to choose policies that would unambiguously reduce risks and thereby protect public health. Risk 

assessments for both radiation and chemical exposure that employ conservative defaults, most 

particularly the LNT model, seemed to provide a ready-made safe level of exposure to a target 

risk to achieve this goaL The so-called "safety factors" were also meant to be conservative 

divisors to accomplish the same effect. 

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169 

But as regulation has expanded and regulatory exposure limits have reached lower and 

lower levels, it is no longer possible to iguore the evidence of the biological implausibility of the 

one-hit model as well as the increasing evidence in favor of hormesis. A default model that 

inaccurately characterizes risk is a problem not just because the model could be wrong, but also 

because it could lead to adverse consequences to public health. This follows from the fact that 

risk management choices must take into account the health consequences of countervailing risks 

and health-health tradcoffs. These tradeoffs, in some cases, can be sufficient to offset the positive 

effects of target risk reductions, a consequence that becomes more likely when already-low 

target risks are overestimated. 

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Appendix: Major Historical Points Leading to the Adoption of the LNT Model 

Year Author/institution 

1859 Charles Darwin 

1927 Hermann J. Muller 

1928 Olson and Lewis 

1930 Hermann J. Muller 

1935 Timofeeff-Ressovsky et al. 

Biological Effects of Ionizing 

1956 Radiation Committee (BEIR 1), 

Genetics Panel 

1961 Mantel and Bryan 

1973 FDA 

1976 EPA 

1977 FDA 

US National Academy of 

1977 Science's NAS) Safe Drinking 

Water Committee 

Event 

• Publishes On the Origin of Species. 

• Initiates interest in the biological community to determine the 

cause of genetic change that drives natural selection. 

• X-rays induce mutation in fruit flies. 

• LNT model proposed to account for evolutionary changes. 

• Follows Muller's discovery that X-rays can induce mutations in 

fruit fly germ cells. 

• Develops proportionality rule (i.e., linear dose response) for 

ionizing radiation-induced mutagenicity. 

• Application of radiation target theory for mutagens. 

• Use target theory to propose a one-hit theory for ionizing 

radiation-induced mutation. The hit mechanism is used to 

explain the LNT dose response. 

• Proposes the use of the linear dose-response model for germ 

cell mutation, using the "doubling rule." 

• Develop carcinogen risk assessment model based on the probit 

model. 

• This is undertaken to advise US government agencies on 

chemical risk assessment. 

• Proposes a probit-based quantitative risk assessment method 

for cancer risk based on the 1961 Mantel and Bryan paper. 

• Proposes guidelines for cancer risk assessment based on 

quantitative risk assessment. 

• Recommends a linear dose-response model. 

• Retains the_ Mantel-Bryan model with some modifications, 

• Acceptable risk value is changed to 10·•. 

• Recommends that EPA adopt LNT model for carcinogen risk 

assessment. 

• This recommendation is significant, given the widespread 

multimedia regulatory functions of EPA. Within two years of the 

recommendation, EPA applies LNT model to the regulations of 

trihalomethanes (e.g., chloroform) in drinking water. 

continued on next page 

32 
171 

Year Author /institution 

1979 FDA 

1979 EPA 

Event 

• Replaced the modified Mantel-Bryan model with the LNT 

model for carcinogen risk assessment, based on the following 

reasons: 

o linear procedure is least likely to underestimate risk. 

o linear extrapolation does not require complicated 

mathematical procedures. 

o No arbitrary slope is needed to carry out linear 

extrapolation, 

o Several significant limitations had been found with the 

application of the Mantel-Bryan model. 

• Establishes a national drinking water standard for 

trihalomethanes (including chloroform). 

• This is based on an LNT methodology as recommended by the 

US NAS Safe Drinking Water Committee (1977). 

Note: Table is constructed from discussion in Edward J. Calabrese, 2013. "Origin of the Linearity No Threshold 

(LNT) Dose-Response Concept." Archives ~{Toxicology 87 (9): 1621-33. 

33 
172 

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39 
Æ 

Q Is President Obama's climate action plan a priority for the 

Department of Energy? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q And is that a greater priority than the low-dose radiation 

program? 

A To the extent that we align our basic research efforts towards that 

goal, yes. 

Transcribed Interview of Dr. Todd Anderson by Committee Staff July 12,