IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 51558-0-II

Respondent,

v.

SHAWN DEE MORGAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

WORSWICK, J. — Shawn Morgan appeals various sentencing conditions imposed 

following his guilty plea to eight counts of first degree unlawful possession of depictions of a 

minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He argues that the five conditions should be struck 

because they are not crime related, and that two conditions should be struck because they are 

unconstitutionally vague. The State and Morgan both argue that certain legal financial 

obligations (LFOs) are no longer authorized. We affirm some conditions, but remand to the trial 

court to modify community custody conditions relating to entering drug areas, bar, taverns, or 

lounges and requiring Morgan to obtain an alcohol evaluation, and to strike certain LFOs

consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

Law enforcement officers discovered child pornography on Morgan’s computer and in 

Morgan’s residence. The State initially charged Morgan with 47 counts of first degree unlawful 

possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.1 As part of a plea deal, 

 

1 RCW 9.68A.070(1).

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 1, 2019
No. 51558-0-II

2

the State amended the information to charge Morgan with eight counts of first degree unlawful 

possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, which he pleaded 

guilty to.

In the presentence investigation, Morgan reported that he first drank alcohol in 

elementary school, but that it had “never caused a problem for him.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 156. 

He also reported that methamphetamines had been “the most problematic controlled substance 

for him.” CP at 156. The presentence investigation report listed Morgan’s drug dependency as a 

risk for reoffending.

The court imposed a term of confinement of 102 months, and community custody. The 

court imposed various community custody conditions. Relevant here, the court imposed the 

following conditions:

SPECIAL CONDITIONS – SEX OFFENSES RCW 9.94A.703 & .704

. . . . 

5. Inform the supervising [community corrections officer] CCO and sexual 

deviancy treatment provider of any dating relationship.

. . . .

11. Do not use or consume alcohol and/or Marijuana.

. . . .

Offenses Involving Alcohol/Controlled Substances -

19. [X] Do not purchase or possess alcohol.

20. [X] Do not enter drug areas as defined by court or CCO.

21. [X] Do not enter any bars/taverns/lounges or other places where alcohol is 

the primary source of business. This includes casinos and or any locations 

which requires you to be over 21 years of age.
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22. [X] Obtain [X] alcohol [and] [X] chemical dependency evaluation upon 

referral and follow through with all recommendations of the evaluator.

CP at 112-13.

The court also imposed LFOs, including criminal filing fee, DNA2collection fee, and 

interest. Morgan appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Morgan argues that conditions 11, 19, 21, and 22 are not statutorily authorized and that 

conditions 5 and 20 are unconstitutional. We hold that (1) the conditions prohibiting Morgan’s 

use of alcohol (condition 11) and purchase of alcohol (condition 19) are authorized, (2) the 

condition restricting Morgan’s access to locations where alcohol is the primary source of 

business (condition 21) is not authorized, (3) the portion of the condition requiring Morgan to 

undergo alcohol dependency evaluation (condition 22) is not authorized, (4) the condition

requiring Morgan to inform his CCO of any dating relationship (condition 5) is not 

unconstitutionally vague, and (5) the condition prohibiting Morgan from entering “drug areas as 

defined by court or CCO” (condition 20) is unconstitutionally vague. Consequently, we affirm 

conditions 11, 19, and 5, but remand to the trial court to strike or modify conditions 21, 22, and 

20.

A. Legal Principles

The trial court can only impose community custody conditions authorized by statute. 

State v. Kolesnik, 146 Wn. App. 790, 806, 192 P.3d 937 (2008). Before determining a sentence, 

the court “shall consider the risk assessment report and presentence reports,” and allow 

 

2 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
No. 51558-0-II

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arguments from the State, defense counsel, the offender, victim(s), and law enforcement. RCW 

9.94A.500(1). 

We review de novo whether the trial court had statutory authority to impose a sentencing 

condition. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). If the trial court had 

statutory authority, we review the trial court’s decision to impose the condition for an abuse of 

discretion. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d at 110. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s 

imposition of a condition is manifestly unreasonable. State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 

671, 678, 425 P.3d 847 (2018). The imposition of an unconstitutional condition is manifestly 

unreasonable. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 678. 

Due process precludes the enforcement of vague laws, including sentencing conditions. 

State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752-53, 193 P.3d 678 (2008); State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 

652, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). A community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if the 

condition does not define the prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 

can understand what conduct is proscribed or if the condition does not provide ascertainable

standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53. If the 

condition fails either prong of the vagueness analysis, the condition is void for vagueness. Bahl, 

164 Wn.2d at 753. A condition is not vague, however, merely because a person cannot predict 

with complete certainty the exact point at which his or her actions would be classified as 

prohibited conduct. State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010).

“[A]ll that is required is that the proscribed conduct is sufficiently definite in the eyes of an 

ordinary person.” Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681.
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RCW 9.94A.703(3) authorizes a trial court to impose discretionary community custody 

conditions. The trial court may order an offender to 

(a) Remain within, or outside of, a specified geographical boundary; 

(b) Refrain from direct or indirect contact with the victim of the crime or a specified 

class of individuals;

(c) Participate in crime-related treatment or counseling services;

(d) Participate in rehabilitative programs or otherwise perform affirmative conduct 

reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense, the offender’s risk of 

reoffending, or the safety of the community;

(e) Refrain from possessing or consuming alcohol;

(f) Comply with any crime-related prohibitions.

RCW 9.94A.703(3).

Crime-related prohibitions disallow conduct that directly or reasonably relates to the 

circumstances of the offense. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 683-84; Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at

657. “The prohibited conduct need not be identical to the crime of conviction, but there must be 

‘some basis for the connection.’” Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 678 (quoting Irwin, 191 Wn. 

App. at 657). 

1. Conditions 11, 19—Prohibiting Use and Purchase of Alcohol

Morgan argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by prohibiting him from using 

alcohol (condition 11) and purchasing alcohol (condition 19) because prohibitions on the “use” 

and “purchase” of alcohol are not authorized by statute.3 Br. of Appellant at 8. We disagree.

A trial court has authority to prohibit the consumption and possession of alcohol as a 

community custody condition regardless of the underlying offense’s nature. RCW 

9.94A.703(3)(e). 

 

3 The condition also prohibits the use or consumption of marijuana, but Morgan does not offer 

argument related to marijuana.
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Morgan acknowledges that the trial court had discretion to prohibit his possession or 

consumption of alcohol, but argues that the “use” and “purchase” are distinct from possession or 

consumption. Morgan has not explained how it is possible to use an item without also being in 

possession of the same. Moreover, it is difficult to purchase an item without also being in 

possession of that item. This is particularly true for alcohol, which is highly regulated in order to 

limit access by end users. The trial court’s restrictions on using alcohol and purchasing alcohol 

were logically related to the restriction on possession and consumption. Accordingly, we hold 

that the trial court’s decision to prohibit the use and purchase of alcohol is reasonable and was 

not a manifest abuse of discretion.

2. Condition 21—Prohibiting Entry Into Establishments Where Alcohol is Primary 

Business

Morgan argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by prohibiting him from entering 

establishments where alcohol is the primary source of business (condition 21). We agree. 

Courts are authorized to impose crime-related prohibitions on defendants. RCW 

9.94A.703(f). Crime-related prohibitions prohibit conduct that directly or reasonably relates to 

the circumstances of the offense. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 683-84. 

Here, the court exceeded its authority and ordered Morgan to “not enter any

bars/taverns/lounges or other places where alcohol is the primary source of business.” CP at 

113. However, nothing in the record indicates that alcohol contributed to Morgan’s offenses.

Therefore, the court’s community custody condition prohibiting Morgan’s entry into “places 

where alcohol is the primary source of business” is not a crime-related prohibition and was not 

properly imposed.
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3. Condition 22—Alcohol Evaluation and Chemical Dependency Evaluation 

Morgan argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by requiring him to complete an 

alcohol dependency and chemical dependency evaluation (condition 22) because there is no 

evidence that alcohol or controlled substances contributed to his offense. We hold that the 

portion of the condition requiring alcohol dependency evaluation is not authorized, but that the 

portion requiring chemical dependency evaluation is authorized.

The court may require a defendant to participate in crime-related treatment, counseling 

services, rehabilitative programs, or other “affirmative conduct reasonably related to the 

circumstances of the offense, the offender’s risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community.” 

RCW 9.94A.703(3)(c)-(d); see State v. Warnock, 174 Wn. App. 608, 612, 299 P.3d 1173 (2013); 

see also State v. Munoz-Rivera, 190 Wn. App. 870, 893, 361 P.3d 182 (2015). 

The State argues that because the record shows that Morgan has a history of substance 

abuse issues, particularly methamphetamine, the conditions related to alcohol are reasonably 

related to the circumstances of his crime. The State’s argument assumes that abuse of alcohol is 

interchangeable with the abuse of other substances. But, alcohol abuse is not interchangeable 

with the abuse of other substances, like methamphetamine. Munoz-Rivera, 190 Wn. App. at 893; 

see State v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 207, 76 P.3d 258 (2003). 

Here, there is no evidence that alcohol played a role in Morgan’s offenses, or evidence 

demonstrating a reasonable connection between alcohol and Morgan’s offenses or his risk of 

reoffending. Thus, the portion of the condition that Morgan complete an alcohol dependency 

evaluation is not authorized. 
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Conversely, the portion of the condition requiring Morgan to complete a chemical 

dependency evaluation is authorized.4 Morgan asserts that the certification of probable cause 

does not mention alcohol or controlled substances. But, it is clear from Morgan’s offender 

history and current offenses score that Morgan manufactured methamphetamines during the 

period of his offenses, and the presentence investigation report lists methamphetamine use

among Morgan’s risks for reoffending. Thus, the portion of the condition requiring Morgan to 

undergo chemical dependency evaluation is related to his offense and to his risk of reoffending. 

This portion requiring a chemical dependency evaluation is authorized. 

4. Condition 5—Notification of Dating Relationship

Morgan argues that the condition requiring him to inform his CCO of any dating 

relationship (condition 5) is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.

Morgan argues that the condition requiring him to inform his CCO of “any dating 

relationship” is unconstitutionally vague because it is unclear what type of relationship 

constitutes a “dating relationship.” Br. of App. at 12. His argument fails. The Supreme Court 

recently rejected his precise argument. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 682. The court held

that the term “dating relationship” provided sufficient information for a person of ordinary 

intelligence to distinguish it from other types of relationships.5 Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 

682. 

 

4 Morgan does not separately address the portion of the condition requiring him to complete a 

chemical dependency evaluation. 

5 Morgan cites United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 2010) in support. But the Hai 

Minh Nguyen court distinguished Reeves, and held that the appellant’s reliance on Reeves was 

unpersuasive. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 682-83. 
No. 51558-0-II

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5. Condition 20—Prohibiting Entry Into Drug Areas

Morgan argues that the condition prohibiting him from entering drug areas is 

unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, he argues that a “drug area[] defined by court or CCO” is 

not sufficiently definite. Br. of Appellant at 10. We agree.

Washington courts have held that conditions that leave significant discretion to the 

individual CCOs is unconstitutionally vague. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 795. Division 

One of this court held that a similar community custody condition that required further definition 

from a CCO was unconstitutionally vague. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 655. Irwin concerned a 

community custody condition barring the defendant from places where “children are known to 

congregate,” as defined by his CCO. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 649. The Irwin court concluded 

that “[w]ithout some clarifying language or an illustrative list of prohibited locations . . . the 

condition does not give ordinary people sufficient notice to understand what conduct is 

proscribed.” Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted). The authority 

given to the CCO to interpret the condition also allowed for unconstitutionally arbitrary 

enforcement. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 655. Thus, the condition was unconstitutionally vague. 

Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 655. 

Here, the State concedes that the portion of the condition allowing the CCO to define 

“drug areas” is unconstitutionally vague. Br. of Resp’t at 26. The State argues, however, that 

the portion allowing the court to define “drug areas” is proper because it is not left to the 

discretion of the CCO. We accept the State’s concession, but reject the State’s distinction 

between the court and the CCO.
No. 51558-0-II

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The constitutional deficiency identified in Sanchez Valencia and Irwin is not based on the 

fact that the CCO instead of the court had discretion. See Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 795; 

Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 654-55. Rather, the deficiency is that condition does not provide 

sufficient notice of prohibited areas and allows for arbitrary enforcement. See Irwin, 191 Wn. 

App. at 649, 655. 

Here, the condition prohibiting entry into an undefined area does not provide ordinary 

people fair warning of the proscribed conduct, and does not provide standards that are definite 

enough to protect against arbitrary enforcement—regardless of whether the court or the CCO has 

the discretion to define the drug areas. Leaving the definition of “drug areas” open to the 

discretion of the court and CCO deprives Morgan of fair warning and allows for arbitrary 

enforcement.6 

B. LFOs

Morgan argues, and the State concedes, that we should strike the criminal filing fee, 

DNA collection fee, and interest accrual on nonrestitution LFOs. We agree. 

The State concedes that the criminal filing fee, DNA collection fee, and the interest 

provision are improper under recent legislative amendments and State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 

732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). We accept the State’s concession and remand to the trial court to 

strike the criminal filing fee, DNA collection fee, and interest accrual on nonrestitution LFOs.

 

6 Morgan also argues that this condition is not statutorily authorized because it is not crime 

related. Because the condition is unconstitutionally vague, we do not address whether the 

condition is statutorily authorized.
No. 51558-0-II

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We affirm conditions 11, 19, and 5, but remand to the trial court to strike or modify 

conditions 21, 22, and 20, as consistent with this opinion.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Worswick, J.

We concur:

Lee, A.C.J.

Cruser, J.