A Journal of International Security Cooperation Management

Annual, Vol. 2
This hard copy edition of The DISAM Journal of International 

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highlighting past articles from the online DISAM Journal

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The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management

Editor

LCDR Dale Klan

Managing Editor

Ms. Emily M. Broadwater

Art and Graphics

Mr. Danny L. Palmer
i The DISAM Annual, August 2013

The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management

Welcome to the second DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management. 

We circulate this annual hard copy publication as a supplement to our online journal, which can 

be accessed at www.disamjournal.org. We hope the online journal is a benefit to you in your daily 

activities and welcome any feedback you may have for improvement at: DISAM.Journal@disam.dsca.

mil. We had hoped to be able to provide greater detail in the article on security assistance legislation 

and policy; however, the lack of an approved FY 14 budget has limited the values presented to that 

of the proposed Presidential budget request as developed by the US State Department. Since this is at 

least a starting point for the year, we did not want to delay getting the word out any further.

Also, we have included a copy of an interview with the recently retired Director of DSCA, VADM 

William Landay, who departed his post on 6 September 2013. As the Director with three years of 

experience in that position, he is uniquely positioned to provide insights on the current and future 

state of our security cooperation and assistance programs. This interview was originally published 

in the DSCA publication Defense Solutions for America’s Global Partners. There are a number of 

excellent articles that members of the community may want to read through in that publication, which 

can be viewed online at http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/defense-security-cooperationagency-defense-solutions-for-americas-global-partners-premiere-edition. 

There is also a very informative article from the American Forces Press Service where Gen Carter 

Ham (USA, Ret) describes how AFRICA Command is helping grow partner nations’ capabilities, 

and another wherein Gen Ham and ADM James Stavridis (USN, Ret) praise the State Partnership 

Program’s contributions to the Combatant Commands.

We hope you will find our topical articles on the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), 

FMS Logistics Communication, and a number of training articles authored by our DISAM faculty of 

interest and benefit in your daily activities. Also, please take a look at the article on Lessons Learned/

Best Practices—this can provide the SC community a significant tool to optimize organizational goals 

and learn from past activities in a variety of areas—FMS cases, Joint Exercises, Humanitarian and 

Disaster Relief just to note a few. We welcome any lessons learned/best practice inputs from the field 

in hopes of circulating them to assist other organizations better their processes/practices.

Finally, we have a wide variety of topics in the “Perspectives” section with something of interest 

to all in our community—from a review of The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, to 

“French Defense Exports...,” to “Hints for the Security Cooperation Officer” and “Civilian Diplomatic 

Attire.” Please to let us know if you found this edition particularly helpful in your organization, in 

addition to any recommendations for future editions: Gregory.sutton@disam.dsca.mil.

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS

Commandant
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 ii
iii The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Table of Contents

Legislation and Policy

Fiscal Year 2013 Security Cooperation Legislation............................................................................. 1

By Kenneth Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Security Cooperation Community

Interview with VADM Landay: “Defense Solutions for America’s Partners”................................... 25

By J.R. Wilson, Faircount Media Group

AFRICOM Helps Partner Nations Grow Capability, [Gen] Ham Says............................................. 31

By Karen Parrish, American Forces Press Service

The Call Letter: CAD/PAD Purchase via FMS ................................................................................. 33

By Orlando Vilches, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)............................................................................... 41

By John O’Connor, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

FMS Logistics Communications........................................................................................................ 47

By John O’Connor, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Combatant Commanders Praise State Partnership Program.............................................................. 55

By SFC Jim Greenhill, National Guard Bureau

Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Action—Tell a Buddy, Be a Friend ..................................... 57

By Jeff Fourman, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

FMS Training

What is Military Training?................................................................................................................. 67

By Aaron Prince, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

IMET Study, Phase II, Part I, and Its Application to the Results of the Arab Spring ....................... 71

By Ferrelle Rodriguez-Perez Smith, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Mobile Education Teams: Bringing DISAM Expertise to the Customer........................................... 81

By LCDR Dale Klan, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Perspectives

French Defense Exports Towards the United States: Understanding the Environment .................... 83

By COL Nicolas Lovelace, US Army War College

The Arab Spring and the Future of US Foreign Military Sales ......................................................... 91

By Tom Williams, PhD, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 iv

Does US Security Assistance to the Egyptian Military Warrant Continued Engagement? ............... 95

By LTC Michael Wright, US Army War College Fellow, University of Denver

The Transfer/Surplus Paradox: The Case of Bandaria..................................................................... 101

By Eric Patterson, PhD, Georgetown University

Civilian Diplomat Attire for Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs)............................................... 107

By Timothy Burke, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Enhancing National Security Cooperation Policy With Remotely Piloted Aircraft ........................ 109

By Lt Col Ken Callahan, US Air Force

A Few Hints for the New Security Cooperation Officer.................................................................. 119

By Clay Crawford, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Review of The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity ...................................................... 123

By Roger Scott, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
1 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

www.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf. 

Late passage and enactment of P.L.113-6 precluded 

inclusion of any detailed FY2013 funding.

The National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, was enacted on 2 January 

2013 as P.L.112-239. No foreign affairs or foreign 

relations authorization acts were passed and enacted 

for FY2013.

The following three pieces of legislation are to be 

further summarized in this article as they related to 

US security assistance and security cooperation. The 

highlights of the three laws are provided:

• National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 

Fiscal Year 2013, P.L.112-239, 2 January 2013

◊ Authorizes $211,000,000 in Missile Defense 

Agency funding to be used for the Israeli Iron 

Dome program

◊ Extends Section 1021, NDAA, FY2005, 

authorizing assistance during FY2013 to 

Colombia to combat narcotics trafficking and 

terrorism

◊ Extends Section 1022(d), NDAA, FY2004, 

authorizing assistance to law enforcement 

agencies during FY2013 conducting counterterrorism activities

◊ Authorizes the transfer of surplus MRAPs 

and spare parts to non-profit US humanitarian 

demining organizations

◊ Authorizes the provision of small-scale 

military construction under the “Section 

1206 BPC” program and extends the entire 

authority through FY2014

◊ Extends Section 1207(f), NDAA, FY2010, 

authority for non-reciprocal exchange of 

foreign defense military or civilian personnel 

through FY2016

◊ Replaces the expired 1207(n), NDAA, 

FY2012, authority for BPC counterterrorism 

forces in East Africa and Yemen with Section 

1203, NDAA, FY2013, BPC assistance 

Fiscal Year 2013

Security Cooperation Legislation

By Kenneth W. Martin

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Please note that this summary is not legal advice 

and may not be relied on for official purposes. The 

reader should confer with one’s assigned general 

counsel for any related legal analysis or advice.

Introduction

Each year, The DISAM Annual publishes a 

summary of the legislation that impacts US security 

assistance, security cooperation, and other related 

international programs. This report is intended to 

alert all security assistance and security cooperation 

community members to the collective changes 

or continued requirements in legislation that will 

influence program planning and implementation for 

the coming years. As has been done in the past, the 

report is in outline form, with key topics highlighted 

to facilitate locating specific statutory references.

This article does not include the funding 

allocations for FY2013 security assistance pending 

a required discretionary spending report by the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to the 

congressional appropriations committees. This year’s 

appropriations legislation was finally enacted as the 

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations 

Act, 2013, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013. DOD 

appropriations for FY2013 was included as Division 

C of P.L.113-6 as a “complete appropriation” and the 

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs appropriations (S/FOAA) for FY2013 was 

included in Title VII, Division F of P.L.113-6 as a 

continuing resolution for the entire year based on 

FY2012 appropriations. As a reference, this FY2012 

appropriation is the Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act (S/FOAA), 2012, Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 

December 2011, which was included The DISAM 

Annual, volume 1. However, final security assistance 

funding for FY2012 and proposed funding for FY2014 

can be viewed within a 200-page Secretary of State 

Executive Summary distributed on 10 April 2013 and 

be viewed on the Department of State website: http://
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 2

◊ Earmarks $30,000,000 in defense-wide O&M 

for the Combatant Commander Initiative 

Fund (CCIF)

◊ Appropriates $108,759,000, but with a 

rescission of $35,000 to be applied, for the 

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid (OHDCA) program

◊ Appropriates $519,111,000, but with a 

rescission of $166,000 to be applied, for 

the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

program

◊ Earmarks not less than $8,000,000 of Defense 

Health Program appropriations for HIV 

prevention educational activities in connection 

with US military training, exercises, and 

humanitarian assistance activities conducted 

in African nations

◊ Appropriates $1,159,263,000, but with a 

rescission of $370,000 to be applied, for the 

DOD drug interdiction and counter-drug 

activities

◊ Continues the prohibition of no DOD funds 

to be used to approve or license the sale of 

F-22A aircraft

◊ Continues the prohibition of DOD funding any 

training program involving a unit of a nation’s 

security forces or police if the Secretary of 

Defense has received credible information 

from the Secretary of State of gross human 

rights violations being committed

◊ Authorizes the transfer of not more than 

$200,000,000 in DOD O&M during FY2013 

to the DOS Global Security Contingency 

Fund (GSCF)

◊ Authorizes the use of FY2013 DOD 

appropriations for the Israeli Cooperative 

Program

◊ Authorizes the transfer of up to $15,000,000 

in Navy O&M to the USPACOM Asia Pacific 

Regional Initiative (APRI) program

◊ No FY2013 appropriations for DOD, IMET, 

FMFP, EDA, PKO, or “1206 BPC” or 

DCS licenses are to be made available for 

Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, or Burma to support 

military training or operations that include 

children soldiers

◊ Earmarks not more than $1,650,000,000 in 

FY2013 OCO DOD O&M for payments to 

reimburse key cooperating nations providing 

through FY2014 or until the “1207” Global 

Security Contingency Funds (GSCF) is fully 

operational 

◊ Authorizes the use of not more than 

$508,000,000 in FY2012 or FY2013 Air Force 

O&M to support operations and activities 

of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq 

(OSC-I)

◊ Also authorizes OSC-I to conduct nonoperational, institutional training activities 

during FY2013

◊ Extends Section 1234, NDAA, FY2008, 

authorizing not more than $450,000,000 in 

logistical support during FY2013 to coalition 

forces in Afghanistan

◊ Authorizes the use of up $200,000,000 in 

DOD O&M to support the Commanders’ 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) in 

Afghanistan

◊ Authorizes DOD, with concurrence of DOS, to 

transfer already in-country, no longer needed, 

non-excess defense articles and related 

services to Afghanistan military and security 

forces to be exercised by 31 December 2014

◊ Extends Section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, 

authority to use DOD O&M to reimburse key 

cooperating for logistical and military support 

in connection with US military operations in 

Afghanistan

◊ Extends the DOD Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Fund (PCF) authority through FY2013

◊ Amends Section 1513, NDAA, FY1999, for 

the removal of satellites and related items 

from the USML

◊ Authorizes US participation as staff members 

of Headquarters EURCORPS

◊ Authorizes US participation the European 

Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling and other 

Exchanges of Services ATARES) program

◊ Authorizes the pilot program through FY2015 

on Special Defense Repair Fund (SDRF)

◊ Authorizes the FY2013 Cooperative Threat 

Reduction (CTR) program to be funded at 

$519,111,000

◊ Authorizes the Afghanistan Security Forces 

Fund (ASFF) to be funded.

• Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 

2013, Division C, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.
3 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

◊ However, the Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) funding levels for FY2013 

(no rescissions are to be applied) are slightly 

modified as follows:

support to US military forces in Operation 

Enduring Freedom

◊ Appropriates $325,000,000 in DOD 

FY2013 OCO funding for the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund (AIF)

◊ Appropriates $5,124,167,000 in DOD 

FY2013 OCO funding for the Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

◊ Authorizes not more than $200,000,000 

in Army O&M to fund the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Fund (CERP) in 

Afghanistan

◊ The DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight 

Council (AROC) is to approve the financial 

and activity plans for any ASFF project in 

excess of $50,000,000, any CERP project in 

excess of $5,000,000, and all AIF projects

◊ Authorizes up to $508,000,000 in Air Force 

O&M for use of DOD to support the funding 

of operations and activities of the OSC-I and 

security assistance teams.

• Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 

Related Programs (S/FOAA), [for FY2013], 

Title VII, Division F, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013 

◊ Continues FY2012 security assistance funding 

levels into FY2013 as follows (includes any 

rescissions to be applied):

Program Appropriations

Economic Support Fund (ESF) $3,001,745,000

International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE) 1,061,100,000

Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR) 509,113,000

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 302,818,000

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) 5,210,000,000

International Military Education & Training (IMET) 105,788,000

Program Appropriations

Economic Support Fund (ESF) $3,119,896,000 

(vice 2,761,462,000)

Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs (NADR) 120,657,000 (no change)

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 81,000,000 (no change)

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) 1,102,000,000 (no change)
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 4

• P.L. 99-239: Compact of Free Association, P.L. 

99-239, 14 January 1986.

• P.L. 99-415: Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act 

of 1986, P.L. 99-415, 19 September 1986.

• P.L. 101-179: Support for East European 

Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179, 

28 September 1989.

• P.L. 101-510: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 

1990.

• P.L. 102-484: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484, 6 October 

1992.

• P.L. 102-511: Freedom for Russia and Emerging 

Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 

(FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) of 1992, P.L. 

102-511, 24 October 1992.

• P.L. 103-160: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-160, 30 

November 1993.

• P.L. 104-164: To amend the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 

to make improvements to certain defense and 

security assistance provisions under those Acts, 

to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to 

certain foreign countries, and for other purposes, 

P.L. 104-164, 21 July 1996.

• P.L. 104-201: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, 23 

September 1996.

• P.L. 105-85: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1998, 18 November 1997.

• P.L. 105-261: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 1999, 17 October 1998.

• P.L. 106-113: Making Consolidated 

Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending 

September 30, 2000, and for Other Purposes, 

P.L. 106-113, 29 November 1999.

• P.L. 106-429: Making Appropriations for Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

Programs for the Fiscal Year ending September 

30, 2001, and for Other Purposes, P.L. 106-429, 

6 November 2000.

• P.L. 107-115: Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2002, 

P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002.

• P.L. 108-136: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2004, P.L. 108-136, 24 

November 2003.

◊ The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 

Fund (PCCF) is to receive no funding in 

FY2013.

◊ Amends Section 451, FAA, authorizing up to 

$100,000,000 in assistance for unanticipated 

contingencies during FY2013.

◊ Authorizes FY2013 funding assistance for 

the purpose of demilitarizing or disposal of 

cluster munitions.

◊ Requires consultation with Congress prior 

to funding any promotion of democracy or 

protection of human rights in Syria.

◊ The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 

Fund (PCCF) is to receive no funding in 

FY2013.

◊ Amends Section 451, FAA, authorizing up to 

$100,000,000 in assistance for unanticipated 

contingencies during FY2013.

◊ Authorizes FY2013 funding assistance for 

the purpose of demilitarizing or disposal of 

cluster munitions.

◊ Requires consultation with Congress prior 

to funding any promotion of democracy or 

protection of human rights in Syria.

Reference Sources

The following abbreviated titles will assist in 

identifying principal sources of information used in 

this article. The laws and associated congressional 

reports can be viewed at the Library of Congress 

“Thomas” web page located at http://thomas.loc.gov.

• SAMM: Security Assistance Management 

Manual, DSCA 5105.38-M, 3 October 2003, 

with changes. It is maintained electronically and 

can be viewed on the DSCA web page at http://

www.dsca.mil/samm/.

• FAA: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended, Public Law (P.L.) 87-195, 4 September 

1961 [22 U.S.C. 2151, et seq.].

• P.L. 87-510: Migration and Refugee Act of 1962, 

P.L. 87-510, 28 June 1962 [22 U.S.C. 2601]

• AECA: Arms Export Control Act, as amended, 

P.L. 94-329, 30 June 1976 [22 U.S.C. 2751, et 

seq.].

• P.L. 96-8: Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 10 

April 1979.

• P.L. 96-533: Peace Corps Act, Title VI, P.L. 96-

533, 16 December 1980.

• P.L.99-177: Balanced Budget and Emergency 

Deficit Control Act of 1985, Title II, P.L.99-177, 

12 December 1985.
5 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

• P.L. 108-287: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-287, 5 

August 2004.

• P.L. 108-375: Ronald W. Reagan National 

Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005, 

P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004.

• P.L. 109-163: National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, 6 January 

2006.

• P.L. 109-364: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, 17 October 

2006.

• P.L.109-469: Office of National Drug Control 

Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L.109-

469, 29 December 2006.

• P.L. 109-472: Department of State Authorities 

Act of 2006, P.L. 109-472, 11 January 2007.

• P.L. 110-116: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2008, Division A, P.L. 110-

116, 13 November 2007.

• P.L. 110-161: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2008, Division J, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 

2007.

• P.L. 110-161: Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense, 2008, Division 

L, P.L. 110-161, 26 December 2007.

• P.L. 110-181: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 

2008.

• P.L. 110-417: Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-

417, 14 October 2008.

• P.L.110-457: Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 

2008, Title IV, P.L. 110-457, 23 December 2008.

• P.L. 111-08: Department of State, Foreign 

Operation, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2009, Division H, P.L. 111-08, 11 March 

2009.

• P.L. 111-32: Supplemental Appropriations Act, 

2009, P.L. 111-32, 24 June 2009.

• P.L. 111-73: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan 

Act of 2009, P.L. 111-73, 15 October 2009.

• P.L. 111-84: National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 

2009.

• P.L. 111-88: Further Continuing Resolution, 

2010, Division B, P.L. 111-88, 30 October 2009.

• P.L. 111-117: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2010, Division F, P.L. 111-117, 16 December 

2009.

• P.L. 111-118: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2010, Division A, P.L. 111-

118, 19 December 2009.

• P.L. 111-383: Ike Skelton National Defense 

Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2011, P.L.111-

383, 7 January 2011.

• P.L.112-10: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2011, Division A, P.L.112-

10, 15 April 2011.

• P.L.112-10: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2011, Division B, Title XI, P.L.112-10, 15 

April 2011.

• P.L.112-74: Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2012, Division A, P.L.112-

74, 23 December 2011.

• P.L.112-74: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act, 2012, Division I, P.L.112-74, 23 December 

2011.

• P.L.112-81: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.112-81, 31 December 

2011.

• P.L.112-239: National Defense Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Year 2013, P.L.112-239, 2 January 

2013.

• P.L.113-6: Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013, 26 March 2013.

• P.L.113-6: Department of Defense Appropriations 

Act, 2013, Division C, P.L.113-6, 26 March 

2013.

• P.L.113-6: Further Continuing Appropriations 

Act, 2013, Division F, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.

• P.L.113-6: Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs, [Continuing 

Resolution for 2013], Title VII, Division F, 

P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013.

Legislation for Fiscal Year 2013

National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, P.L.112-239, 2 

January 2013

• HR4310 was introduced in the House on 29 

March 2012 to be later reported out of the House 

Armed Services Committee (HASC) on 11 May 

2012 with H.Rpt. 112-479 and with H.Rpt. 112-

479, Part II, on 15 May 2012. The House passed 

the bill on 18 May 2012.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 6

defense capability to the Director of the Missile 

Defense Agency for the use by the Director in 

the AEGIS Ashore System for installation in the 

country designated as “Host Nation 1.”

Title X—General Provisions

Subtitle B—Counter-Drug Activities

Section 1008—Extension of the Authority 

to Establish and Operate National Guard 

Counterdrug Schools

• Amends Section 901(c), Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, 

P.L. 109-469, 29 December 2006, originally 

authorizing the Secretary of Defense to prescribe 

regulations for the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau to establish and operate, or provide 

financial assistance to the States to establish and 

operate not more than five “National Guard 

counterdrug schools.”

◊ The Western Regional Counterdrug Training 

Center, Camp Murray, WA, replaces The 

National Interagency Civil-Military Institute 

(NICI), San Luis Obispo, CA as one of the 

five schools.

◊ The four remaining training schools 

authorized by Section 901(c) include:

» The Multi-Jurisdictional Counterdrug Task 

Force Training (MCTFT), St. Petersburg, 

FL

» The Midwest Counterdrug Training Center 

(MCTC), Johnston, IA

» The Regional Counterdrug Training 

Academy (RCTA), Meridian, MS

» The Northeast Regional Counterdrug 

Training Center (NCTC), Fort Indiantown 

Gap, PA

• The purpose of these schools is for the National 

Guard to provide training in drug interdiction and 

counterdrug activities and drug demand reduction 

activities by federal, state, local, and foreign 

counter-drug/counter-narcotics law enforcement 

agencies IAW Section 1004, NDAA, FY1991, as 

amended, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 1990.

• Further, authorizes the Secretary to expend no 

more than $30,000,000 for these five schools in 

any fiscal year. 

• HR4310 was discharged by the Senate Armed 

Services Committee (SASC) on 4 December 

2012 with amendments. No accompanying SASC 

report was filed. The Senate passed the amended 

bill on 12 December 2012. A conference was 

held and reported out on 18 December 2012 with 

H.Rpt. 112-705. The House and Senate approved 

the conference report on 20 and 21 December 

2012 respectively.

• HR4310 was enacted on 2 January 2013 as 

P.L.112-239 with Division A being the DOD 

authorization for FY2013.

◊ Division B was the military construction 

authorization.

◊ Division C was the Department of Energy 

National Security Authorizations and Other 

Authorizations.

◊ Division D provided the Funding Tables.

Division A–Department of Defense 

Authorizations

Title II – Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation

Subtitle C – Missile Defense Programs

Section 221 -- Prohibition on the Use of 

Funds for the MEADS Program

• No funds authorized to be appropriated by this 

Act or otherwise made available for FY2013 

may be obligated or expended for the medium 

extended air defense system (MEADS).

Section 222—Availability of Funds for 

Iron Dome Short-Range Rocket Defense 

Program

• Of the funds authorized to be appropriated for 

FY2013 for research, development, test, and 

evaluation, defense-wide, and available for the 

Missile Defense Agency, $211,000,000 may be 

provided to the Government of Israel for the Iron 

Dome short-range rocket defense program.

Section 223—Authority for Relocation of 

Certain AEGIS Weapons Systems Assets 

between and within the DDG-51 Class 

Destroyer and AEGIS Ashore Programs in 

order to meet Mission Requirements

• The Secretary of the Navy may transfer AEGIS 

weapon systems equipment with ballistic missile 
7 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

◊ A description of all actions required, including 

any impediments to such actions, to offering 

retired C-5A or retired C-17A aircraft as 

excess defense articles (EDA) to US allies 

or for sale to Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

carriers.

◊ A description of the actions required for 

interested allies or CRAF carriers to take 

delivery of such aircraft, including the 

actions, modifications, or demilitarization 

necessary for such recipients to take delivery 

of such aircraft, and provisions for permitting 

such recipients to undertake responsibility for 

such actions.

Title XII—Matters Relating to Foreign 

Nations

Subtitle A—Assistance and Training

Section 1201—Modification and Extension 

of Authorities Relating to Program to Build 

the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces

• Amends Section 1206(b)(1), NDAA, FY2006, as 

amended, P.L.109-163, 6 January 2006, to also 

authorize the provision of small-scale military 

construction activities.

◊ Not more than $750,000 may be obligated or 

expended under a small-scale construction 

program, and

◊ Not more than $25,000,000 may be obligated 

or expended under all small-scale construction 

programs.

• The DOD $350,000,000 annual “Section 1206” 

program is extended through 30 September 

2014 (vice 2013).

Section 1202—Extension of Authority for 

Non-Reciprocal Exchanges of Defense 

Personnel between the US and Foreign 

Countries

• Amends Section 1207(f), NDAA, FY2010, 

P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009, authorizing 

by agreement the non-reciprocal exchange of 

foreign defense ministry military or civilian 

personnel by extending the authority through 30 

September 2016 (vice 2012).

Section 1010—Extension of Authority 

to Support Unified Counterdrug and 

Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia

• Amends Section 1021, NDAA, FY2005, as 

amended, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004, 

authorizing DOD to provide assistance to 

Colombia during FY2013 (vice FY2012) to 

combat both narcotics trafficking and terrorism.

Section 1011—Extension of Authority for 

Joint Task Forces to provide Support to Law 

Enforcement Agencies Conducting CounterTerrorism Activities

• Amends Section 1022(b), NDAA, FY2004, as 

amended, P.L. 108-136, 24 November 2004, 

authorizing DOD to provide support to law 

enforcement agencies during FY2013 (vice 

FY2012) conducting counter-terrorism activities.

Subtitle F—Miscellaneous Authorities and 

Limitations

Section 1053—Authority to Transfer Surplus 

Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) 

Vehicles and Spare Parts

• Authorizes the transfer of surplus MRAP vehicles 

and spare parts to non-profit US humanitarian 

demining organizations for purposes of demining 

activities and training of such organizations.

• The transfer is to be made on a loan basis with 

the costs of operation and maintenance of the 

vehicles to be borne by the recipient organization 

and any other conditions as determined by the 

Secretary of Defense as being appropriate.

• The congressional defense committees are to be 

notified in writing not less than sixty days prior 

to transfer of such vehicles or spare parts.

Section 1063—Report on Strategic Airlift 

Aircraft

• Note: less than ninety days after enactment of 

this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a 

report to Congress to include, inter alia,

◊ An assessment of the feasibility and 

advisability of obtaining a Federal Aviation 

Administration certification for commercial 

use of each of the following: (1) commercial 

variant of the C-17A, retired C-17A, and 

retired C-5A aircraft.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 8

Section 1207, NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 112-81, 

31 December 2011, achieves full operational 

capability, or

◊ 30 September 2014.

Section 1204—Limitation on Activities 

under State Partnership Program (SPP) 

Pending Compliance with Certain ProgramRelated Requirements

• No SPP activities are to be carried out after 28 

February 2013 until the Secretary of Defense 

submits the final regulation required by Section 

1210(a), NDAA, FY2010, P.L.111-84, 28 October 

2009, to the congressional armed services and 

foreign relations committees regarding the use 

of DOD funds to pay the costs incurred by the 

National Guard in conducting SPP activities.

◊ DODI 5111.20, State Partnership Program 

(SPP), was promulgated on 14 December 

2012 by USD(P).

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan

Section 1211—Authority to Support 

Operations and Activities of the Office of 

Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I)

• Amends Section 1215(c), NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 

112-81, 31 December 2011, authorizing the 

use of not more than $508,000,000 in USAF, 

FY2012 or FY2013 O&M, to support operations 

and activities of OSC-I and security assistance 

teams in Iraq.

• Also provides a new Section 1215(f) in NDAA, 

FY2012, authorizing the Secretary of Defense, 

with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, 

to authorize OSC-I to conduct non-operational 

training activities during FY2013 in support of 

the Iraqi MoD and Counter Terrorism Services 

personnel in an institutional environment.

Section 1216—Extension and Modification 

of Logistical Support for Coalition Forces 

Supporting Certain US Military Operations

• Extends Section 1234, NDAA, FY2008, as 

amended, P.L. 110-181, 28 January 2008, 

authorizing the use of not more than $450,000,000 

in FY2013 DOD O&M to provide supplies, 

Section 1203—Authority to Build the 

Capacity of Certain Counterterrorism 

Forces in Yemen and East Africa

• Essentially replacing the now expired Section 

1207(n), NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 

December 2011, authority to the Secretary of 

Defense, with Secretary of State concurrence, to 

enhance: 

◊ The ability of the Yemen Ministry of 

Interior Counter Terrorism Forces to conduct 

counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda 

and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula, 

◊ The capacity of national military forces, 

security agencies serving in a similar defense 

function, other counterterrorism forces, and 

border security forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, 

and Kenya to conduct counterterrorism 

operations against al Qaeda, al Qaeda 

affiliates, and al Shabaab, and

◊ The capacity of national military forces 

participating in the African Union Mission 

in Somalia to conduct counterterrorism 

operations against al Qaeda, al Qaeda 

affiliates, and al Shabaab.

• Authorized assistance is to include the provision 

of equipment, supplies, training, and minor 

military construction.

◊ Value of minor construction provided to 

Yemen in a fiscal year may not exceed 

$10,000,000, or

◊ Value of minor construction provided to 

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and to countries 

participating in the African Union Mission 

in Somalia in a fiscal year may not exceed 

$10,000,000.

• In general, DOD O&M for this program in a fiscal 

year may not exceed $75,000,000 ($150,000,000 

in total) for:

◊ Yemen, or

◊ Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and to 

countries participating in the African Union 

Mission in Somalia.

• The congressional armed services, foreign 

relations, and appropriations committees are 

to be notified not later than thirty days prior to 

providing this assistance.

• This authority is to expire the earlier of either:

◊ The date on which the Global Security 

Contingency Fund (GSCF) authorized by 
9 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

• The aggregate replacement value of all such 

defense articles transferred and the provided 

defense services in any fiscal year may not 

exceed $250,000,000.

• Defense articles eligible for transfer are to 

include those that:

◊ Were present in Afghanistan as of the date of 

the enactment of this Act (2 January 2013),

◊ Immediately before transfer were in use to 

support operations in Afghanistan, and

◊ Are no longer required by US forces in 

Afghanistan.

• Any transfers are subject to the authorities and 

limitations of Section 516, FAA, except:

◊ Section 516(b)(1)(B)—DOD funds are not to 

be expended in regard to the transfer

◊ Section 516(e)—DOD funds are not to be 

expended for crating, packing, handling, and 

transportation

◊ Section 516(f)—Advance 30-day notification 

of significant military equipment (SME) 

or articles valued $7,000,000 (original 

acquisition cost) or more

◊ Section 516(g)—Aggregate value of articles to 

be transferred may not exceed $450,000,000.

• No articles may be transferred or services may 

be provided under this authority until fifteen 

days after a report to the congressional armed 

services, foreign relations, and appropriations 

committees is provided by the Secretary of 

Defense describing the DOD equipment and 

other properties in Afghanistan. This report is to 

include, inter alia, 

◊ An assessment of the ability of Afghanistan 

to sustain the costs associated with receiving, 

possessing, and using the articles to be 

transferred, and 

◊ A determination and certification by the 

Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State, that the transfers are in 

the US national interest, and the articles are 

required by Afghanistan to build its capacity 

to restore and maintain peace and security in 

that country.

• Afghanistan units eligible to receive these articles 

are to include national army, air force, navy, and 

guard forces; police forces; and border security 

forces.

◊ Nongovernmental or irregular forces (such as 

private militias) are specifically not included.

services, transportation (including airlift and 

sealift) and other logistical support to coalition 

forces supporting US military and stabilization 

operation in now just Afghanistan. Former 

authorities included Iraq.

Section 1218—One-Year Extension of 

Authority to use Funds for Reintegration 

Activities in Afghanistan

• Amends Section 1216, NDAA, FY2011, as 

amended, P.L. 111-383, 7 January 2011, extending 

the Afghanistan Reintegration program authority 

through FY2013, limiting the funding to 

$35,000,000 (vice $50,000,000) in DOD O&M, 

and amending the funding closure to “obligate at 

the close of 31 December 2013” (vice “ultitize at 

the close of 31 December 2012”).

Section 1219—One-Year Extension and 

Modification of Authority for Program 

to Develop and Carry Out Infrastructure 

Projects in Afghanistan

• Amends Section 1217, NDAA, FY2011, as 

amended, P.L.111-383, 7 January 2011, to 

authorize the use DOD O&M for the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund (AIF) as follows:

◊ Up to $400,000,000 in FY2012 funding to be 

available through FY2013, and

◊ Up to $350,000,000 in FY2013 funding to be 

available through FY2014.

Section 1221—Commanders’ Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan

• Amends Section 1201, NDAA, FY2012, P.L. 

112-81, 31 December 2011, authorizing the 

use of up to $200,000,000 (vice $400,000,000) 

in DOD FY2013 O&M funding for CERP in 

Afghanistan.

Section 1222—Authority to Transfer 

Defense Articles and Provide Defense 

Services to the Military and Security Forces 

in Afghanistan

• Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to transfer 

non-excess defense articles from DOD stocks 

without reimbursement, and provide defense 

services in connection with such transfers to the 

military and security forces of Afghanistan.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 10

extending the DOD program authority for 

counterinsurgency assistance to Pakistan security 

forces through FY2013.

• No PCF funding is to be provided until the 

Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Secretary of State, certifies to the congressional 

armed services and foreign relations committees 

that Pakistan is making significant efforts to 

counter IEDs and is cooperating with the US in 

countering terrorism.

◊ This certification may be waived if the 

Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary 

of State, that it is in the US national security 

interests to do so.

Subtitle E—Satellites and Related Items

Section 1261—Removal of Satellites and 

Related Items from the US Munitions List 

(USML)

• Amends Section 1513, NDAA, FY1999, 

P.L.105-261, 17 October 1998, for the removal 

of satellites and related items from the USML, 

required by section 38, AECA. 

• Accompanying but separate from the submission 

to Congress of the first notification after the date 

of the enactment of this Act under Section 38(f), 

AECA, requiring a thirty day congressional 

notification prior to the removal from the USML, 

the President is to provide a determination that the 

removal is in the US national security interests.

• No satellites or related items may be exported, 

re-exported, or transferred, directly or indirectly, 

to:

◊ The governments of the Peoples’ Republic of 

China or North Korea, or any government that 

is a state sponsor of terrorism,

◊ Any entity or person in or acting for or on 

behalf of such government, entity, or person, 

or 

◊ May be launched in the country of such 

government, or as part of a launch vehicle 

owned, operated, or manufactured by such 

country or any entity or person in or acting 

for or on behalf of such government, entity 

or person.

• The President may waive such export or transfer 

prohibition on a case-by-case basis if not later 

than thirty days before doing so, the President:

◊ Determines it is in the US national interest to 

do so, and

• This authority may not be exercised after 31 

December 2014.

• This authority is in addition to the Section 516, 

FAA, grant EDA authority, and not to be counted 

in the annual aggregate worldwide ceiling value 

of Section 516(g), FAA, for $425,000,000.

Section 1227—Extension and Modification 

of Authority for Reimbursement of Certain 

Coalition Nations for Support Provided to 

US Military Operations

• Amends Section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, as 

amended, P.L.110-181, 28 January 2008, in the 

use of FY2013 DOD O&M funding to reimburse 

key cooperating nations for logistical and military 

support provided by those nations in connection 

to US military operations in Afghanistan. 

• The value of this authority for FY2013 is not 

to exceed $1,650,000,000 with the amount for 

Pakistan not to exceed $1,200,000,000.

◊ Additionally, none of this funding or prior fiscal 

year funding is to be used for reimbursement 

to Pakistan for claims of support when the 

ground lines of supply through Pakistan were 

closed.

◊ No funding may be used for reimbursements 

to Pakistan until the Secretary of Defense 

certifies to the congressional armed services 

committees that Pakistan:

» Is maintaining security along the ground 

lines of communications (GLOC) through 

Pakistan to Afghanistan, and

» Is taking demonstrable steps to:

 Support counterterrorism operations 

against various militant extremist 

groups in Pakistan,

 Disrupt the conduct of cross-border 

attacks from bases in Pakistan against 

US, coalition and Afghanistan security 

forces located in Afghanistan, and

 Counter the threat of IEDs to include 

their flow into Afghanistan.

» This certification may be waived by the 

Secretary if certified, with justification, to 

be in the US national security interests.

Section 1228—Extension and Modification 

of Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)

• Amends Section 1224(h), NDAA, FY2010, 

as amended, P.L. 111-84, 28 October 2009, 
11 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

◊ Notifies the appropriate congressional 

committees of such determination.

• Any license or other authorization to export 

satellites and related items to a country 

with respect to which the US maintains a 

comprehensive arms embargo shall be subject to 

a presumption of denial.

Section 1264—End-Use Monitoring of 

Certain Satellites and Related Items

• As a result of moving satellites and related 

items from the International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations (ITAR) USML and being subject the 

Export Administration Regulations (EAR, the 

President [Secretary of Commerce] shall provide 

for the end-use monitoring of such satellites and 

related items.

Subtitle F—Other Matters

Section 1274—Administration of the 

American, British, Canadian, and Australian 

Armies’ Program

• Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to enter 

into agreements with Australia, Canada, New 

Zealand, and the United Kingdom land forces 

program known as the American, British, 

Canadian, and Australian Armies’ Program.

• Any required funding for US participation shall 

be made from DOD O&M. 

• Any agreement under this program shall expire 

not later than five years after enactment of this 

Act.

Section 1275—US Participation in 

Headquarters EUROCORPS

• The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State, may authorize participation 

of members of the armed forces as members of 

the staff of Headquarters EURCORPS for the 

purpose of supporting the NATO activities of the 

NATO Rapid Deployable Corps EUROCORPS.

◊ Not more than two armed forces members may 

participate as members of the headquarters 

staff until Secretary of Defense submits a 

report to the congressional armed services 

committees with the following:

» Certification that participation of more 

than two members is in the US national 

interests,

» Any benefits to be gained by the 

participation of additional members,

» Description of participation plans for the 

additional members to include grades and 

posts to be filled, and

» Description of the costs associated with 

the additional participation.

• DOD O&M funds are available to pay the US 

share of operating expenses of the headquarters 

and to pay the costs of armed forces member 

participation.

◊ No funds may be used under this Section to 

fund the pay or salaries of armed forces who 

participate as members of the staff of the 

NATO Rapid Deployable Corps.

• For the purpose of this Section Headquarters 

EURCORPS refers to the multinational military 

headquarters, established on 1 October 1993, 

which is one of the High Readiness Forces 

(Land) associated with the Allied Rapid Reaction 

Corps of NATO.

Section 1276—DOD Participation in 

European Program on Multilateral 

Exchange of Air Transportation and Air 

Refueling Services

• The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence 

of the Secretary of State, may authorize the 

participation of the US in the Air Transport, 

Air-to-Air Refueling and other Exchanges of 

Services program (ATARES Program) of the 

Movement Coordination Centre Europe.

• Participation is limited to reciprocal exchange 

or transfer of air transportation and air 

refueling services on a reimbursable basis or 

by replacement-in-kind or the exchange of 

transportation or refueling services of equal 

value.

• US balance of executed flight hours may not 

exceed 500 hours and the US balance of executed 

flight hours for air refueling may not exceed 200 

hours.

• The US participation in ATARES shall be IAW a 

written arrangement entered into by the Secretary 

of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary 

of State, and the Movement Coordination Centre 

Europe.

◊ The agreement is to include detailed equitable 

cost sharing or other arrangement
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 12

◊ Any unequal exchange or transfer of air 

transportation or refueling services shall be 

liquidated not less than once every five years.

◊ US equitable share of operating expenses of 

the Movement Coordination Centre Europe 

and the ATARES consortium may come from 

DOD O&M.

• The authority in this Section shall expire five 

years after first entering into a written agreement.

Section 1285—Pilot Program on Repair, 

Overhaul, and Refurbishment of Defense 

Articles for Sale or Transfer to Eligible 

Foreign Countries and Entities

• Authorizes the Special Defense Repair Fund 

(SDRF) to repair, overhaul, or refurbish instock defense articles in anticipation of sale or 

transfer of such articles to eligible countries or 

international organizations under law.

• For initial funding, the following shall be credited 

to the SDRF: 

◊ Not more than $50,000,000 from amounts 

authorized to be appropriated for FY2013 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as 

determined by the Secretary of Defense may 

be reprogrammed.

◊ Any collection from the sale or transfer of 

defense articles from DOD stocks that were 

repaired, overhauled, or refurbished with the 

SDRF that are not intended to be replaced in 

which the sale or transfer is made pursuant 

to Section 21(a)(1)(A), AECA, , the FAA, or 

another provision of law.

◊ Notwithstanding Section 37(a), AECA, any 

cash payment from the sale of DOD stocks 

repaired, overhauled, or refurbished with 

SDRF tha are intended to be replaced.

• The total amount in the SDRF at any time may 

not exceed $50,000,000.

• SDRF may not pay for storage and maintenance 

of such articles or pay any other costs associated 

with the preservation or preparation for sale or 

transfer.

• Any sale or transfer of articles repaired, 

overhauled, or refurbished by the SDRF shall be 

IAW the AECA, FAA, or another provision of 

law authorizing such sale or transfer.

• The authority for the SDRF shall expire on 30 

September 2015.

Title XIII—Cooperative Threat Reduction

Section 1301—Specification of Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Programs and Funds

• Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

programs are programs specified in Section 

1501, NDAA, FY1997, P.L. 104-201, 23 

September 1996 [50 U.S.C. 2362 note].

• Specified CTR programs include the following 

with respect to states of the former Soviet Union 

(FSU):

◊ Programs to facilitate the elimination, and the 

safe and secure transportation and storage, 

of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and 

their delivery vehicles.

◊ Programs to facilitate the safe and secure 

storage of fissile materials derived from the 

elimination of nuclear weapons.

◊ Programs to prevent the proliferation of 

weapons, weapons components, materials, 

and weapons-related technology and 

expertise.

◊ Programs to expand military-to-military and 

defense contacts.

• Specified CTR programs include the following 

with respect to states outside the former Soviet 

Union:

◊ Programs to facilitate the elimination, and the 

safe and secure transportation and storage, 

of chemical or biological weapons, weapons 

components, weapons-related materials, and 

their delivery vehicles.

◊ Programs to facilitate safe and secure 

transportation and storage of nuclear weapons, 

weapons components, and their delivery 

vehicles.

◊ Programs to prevent the proliferation of 

nuclear and chemical weapons, weapons 

components, and weapons-related military 

technology and expertise.

◊ Programs to prevent the proliferation of 

biological weapons, weapons components, 

and weapons-related military technology and 

expertise, which may include activities that 

facilitate detection and reporting of highly 

pathogenic diseases or other diseases that 

are associated with or that could be utilized 

as an early warning mechanism for disease 

outbreaks that could impact the Armed Forces 

of the US or allies of the US
13 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

◊ Programs to expand military-to-military and 

defense contacts.

• The CTR Program is often referred as the “NunnLugar Program.”

Section 1302—Funding Allocations

• Of the $519,111,000 authorized to be 

appropriated to DOD for FY2013 CTR programs, 

the following amounts may be obligated for the 

purposes specified:

◊ Strategic offensive arms 

elimination—$68,271,000

◊ Chemical weapons destruction—$14,630,000

◊ Global nuclear security—$99,789,000

◊ Cooperative biological engagement 

—$276,399,000

◊ Proliferation prevention—$32,402,000

◊ Threat reduction engagement—$2,375,000

◊ Activities designated as other assessments/

administrative costs—$25,245,000.

Title XIV—Other Authorizations

Subtitle A—Military Programs

Section 1404—Drug Interdiction and 

Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-Wide

• Funds are authorized to be appropriated for 

DOD for FY2013 for expenses, not otherwise 

provided for, for Drug Interdiction and CounterDrug Activities, Defense-Wide, as specified in 

the funding table in Section 4501 of this Act—

$1,025,263,000.

Section 1406—Defense Health Program

• Funds are authorized to be appropriated for DOD 

for FY2013 for the Defense Health Program, as 

specified in the funding table in Section 4501 of 

this Act—$32,620,718,000.

Title XV—Authorization of Additional 

Appropriations for Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO)

Subtitle A—Authorization of Additional 

Appropriations

Section 1507—Defense Health Program

• From funding table in Section 4502 of this Act 

—$993,898,000.

• Section 1508—Drug Interdiction and CounterDrug Activities, Defense-Wide

• From funding table in Section 4502 of this Act 

—$469,025,000.

Subtitle B—Financial Matters

Section 1522—Special Transfer Authority

• Upon a national interest determination by the 

Secretary of Defense, FY2013 OCO funding not 

to exceed $3,000,000,000 may be transferred to 

another FY2013 OCO authorized program. This 

authority is in addition to the transfer authority 

provided under Section 1001 of this Act.

Subtitle—Limitations and Other Matters

Section 1531—Afghanistan Security Forces 

Fund

• Funds available to DOD for the Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for FY2013 

shall be subject to the conditions contained in 

subsections (b) through (g) of Section 1513, 

NDAA, FY2008, as amended, P.L. 110-181, 28 

January 2008.

• Section 1531(c)(3)(F) requires as a part of the 

Secretary of Defense semi-annual Afghan Public 

Protection Force (APPF) certification that there 

is a mechanism in place sufficient to:

◊ Account for the transfer of any USG-owned, 

contractor-acquired defense articles to the 

APPF, and 

◊ Conduct end-use monitoring, of such 

defense articles, including an inventory of 

the existence and completeness of any such 

defense articles.

Section 1533—One-Year Extension of 

Project Authority and Related Requirements 

of Task Force for Business and Stability 

Operations in Afghanistan

• Amends Section 1535, NDAA, FY2011, as 

amended, P.L. 111-383, 7 January 2011, which 

authorized a task force for business and stability 

operations in Afghanistan to carry out project to 

assist the US Forces – Afghanistan and the US 

Ambassador in Afghanistan to reduce violence, 

enhance stability, and support economic normalcy 

in Afghanistan through strategic business and 

economic activities.

◊ Funding may not exceed $150,000,000 in 

FY2012 except that not more than 50 percent 

may be obligated until the Secretary of 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 14

Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 

State, submits the Report on Implementation 

of Transition Action Plan (TAP) required 

by amended Section 1535(a)(7), NDAA, 

FY2011, and

◊ Funding may not exceed $93,000,000 

in FY2013 except that not more than 

$50,000,000 may be obligated until the TAP 

report is submitted.

Section 1534—Plan for Transition in 

Funding of US Special Operations 

Command from Supplemental Funding 

for Overseas Contingency Operations to 

Recurring Funding under the Future-Years 

Defense Program

• Not less than ninety days after enactment of this 

Act, the Secretary of Defense is to submit a report 

to the congressional armed services committees 

regarding the plan to transition USSOCOM 

funding from the OCO budget to the recurring 

DOD operations budget.

Division D—Funding Tables

Title XLI—Procurement

• Sections 4101-4102

Title XLII—Research, Development, Test, 

and Evaluation

• Sections 4201-4202

Title XLIII—Operation and Maintenance

• Sections 4301-4302

Title XLIV—Military Personnel

• Sections 4401-4402

Title XLV—Other Authorizations

• Sections 4501-4502

Title XLVI—Military Construction

• Sections 4601-4602

Title XLVII – Department of Energy 

National Security Programs

• Section 4701

Defense of Defense Appropriations Act, 

2013, Division C, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013

• Introduced on 25 May 2012 as HR5856 and 

referred to the House Appropriation Committee 

(HAC). Immediately approved by the HAC 

and reported out with H.Rpt. 112-493 of 25 

May 2012. Approved by the House on 19 July 

2012 and forwarded to the Senate. The Senate 

Appropriations Committee (SAC) approved and 

reported out with S.Rpt. 112-196 of 2 August 

2012. No further action was taken by the 112th 

Congress.

• On 3 March 2013, HR933 was introduced as the 

Department of Defense, Military Construction 

and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013. The House approved 

the bill on 6 March 2013 and forwarded to the 

Senate. The bill was approved by the Senate on 

20 March 2013 with amendments. The House 

approved the Senate version of HR933 now 

entitled the Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013. The bill is organized 

as follows:

◊ Division A—Agriculture, Rural Development, 

Food and Drug Administration, and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012

◊ Division B—Commerce, Justice, Science, 

and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 

2013

◊ Division C—Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2013

◊ Division D—Department of Homeland 

Security Appropriations Act, 2013

◊ Division E—Military Construction and 

Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Appropriations Act, 2013

◊ Division F—Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013

» Title I—General Provisions

» Title II—Energy and Water Development

» Title III—Financial Services and General 

Government

» Title IV—Interior, Environment, and 

Related Agencies

» Title V—Labor, Health and Human 

Services, and Education, and Related 

Agencies

» Title VI—Legislative Branch
15 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

» Title VII—Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs

» Title VIII—Transportation and Housing 

and Urban Development, and Related 

Agencies

◊ Division G—Other Matters

• The 113th Congress HR933 was enacted on 26 

March 2013 as P.L. 113-6.

Division C—Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2013

Title II—Operation and Maintenance

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

• Appropriates $31,862,980,000 for DefenseWide O&M, with not more than $30,000,000 to 

be used for the Combatant Commander Initiative 

Fund (CCIF) for use as authorized by 10 U.S.C. 

166a.

◊ A rescission of $10,283,000 is to be applied to 

non-OCO DOD O&M.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid

• Appropriates $108,759,000 for OHDCA to 

be available through 30 September 2014 for 

programs authorized by 10 U.S.C. 401, 10 

U.S.C. 402, 10 U.S.C. 404, 10 U.S.C. 2557, and 

10 U.S.C. 2561.

◊ A rescission of $35,000 is to be applied to 

ODCA

Cooperative Threat Reduction Account

• Appropriates $519,111,000 for cooperative threat 

reduction (CTR) assistance for the republics of 

the former Soviet Union (FSU) with appropriate 

authorization by DOD and DOS, and to countries 

outside of the FSU.

◊ A recission of $166,000 is to be applied to the 

CTR

Title VI—Other Department of Defense 

Programs

Defense Health Program

• Appropriates $32,715,304,000 for medical and 

health care programs of the DOD, with not 

less than $8,000,000 shall be available for HIV 

prevention educational activities undertaken in 

connection with US military training, exercises, 

and humanitarian assistance activities conducted 

primarily in African nations.

◊ A rescission of $10,457,000 is to be applied to 

non-OCO Defense Health Program.

Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug 

Activities, Defense

• Appropriates $1,159,263,000 for DOD drug 

interdiction and counter-drug activities.

◊ A rescission of $370,000 is to be applied to 

non-OCO Drug Interdiction and CounterDrug Activities, Defense.

Title VIII—General Provisions

Section 8002—Compensation to DOD nonUS Citizen Employees

• During FY2013, provisions of law prohibiting 

the payment of compensation to, or employment 

of, any person not a citizen of the US shall not 

apply to DOD personnel.

• Salary increases granted to direct and indirect 

hire DOD foreign national employees funded 

by this Act shall not be at a rate in excess of the 

percentage increase authorized by law for DOD 

civilian employees whose pay is computed under 

the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 5332, or at a rate in 

excess of the percentage increase provided by 

the appropriate host nation to its own employees, 

whichever is higher.

• This section shall not apply to DOD foreign 

service national employees serving at US 

diplomatic missions whose pay is set by the 

Department of State under the Foreign Service 

Act of 1980.

• The limitations of this provision shall not apply 

to DOD foreign national employees in the 

Republic of Turkey.

Section 8011—Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance

• Within the funds appropriated for the operation 

and maintenance of the armed forces, funds 

are hereby appropriated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 

401 for humanitarian and civic costs under 

10 U.S.C., chapter 20. Such funds may also 

be obligated for humanitarian and civic costs 

incidental to authorized operations and pursuant 

to 10 U.S.C. 401. These obligations shall be 

reported as required by 10 U.S.C. 401(d).
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 16

• Funds available for operation and maintenance 

shall be available for providing humanitarian 

and similar assistance by using Civic Action 

Teams in the Trust Territories of the Pacific 

Islands (TTPI) and freely associated states 

of Micronesia pursuant to the Compact of Free 

Association authorized by P.L. 99-239.

• When determined by the Secretary of the Army 

that such action is beneficial for graduate medical 

education programs conducted at army medical 

facilities located in Hawaii, the Secretary may 

authorize the provision of medical services at 

such facilities and transportation, on a nonreimbursable basis, for civilian patients from 

American Samoa, the Commonwealth of 

the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall 

Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 

Palau, and Guam.

Section 8021—Contributions from the 

Government of Kuwait

• During FY2013, DOD is authorized to incur 

obligations not to exceed $350,000,000 for 

purposes specified in 10 U.S.C. 2350j(c) in 

anticipation of receipt of contributions only from 

the government of Kuwait. Upon receipt of such 

contributions, the funding shall be credited to 

the appropriations or fund which incurred such 

obligations. 

Section 8025—Congressional Defense 

Committees

• For the purposes of this Act, congressional 

defense committees include the armed services 

committees of the House (HASC) and Senate 

(SASC) and the appropriations subcommittees 

for defense of the House (HAC-D) and Senate 

(SAC-D).

Section 8038—F-22A Advanced Tactical 

Fighter

• No FY2013 DOD funds may be used to approve 

or license the sale of the F-22A advanced tactical 

fighter to any foreign government.

• DOD may conduct or participate in studies, 

research, design and other activities to define 

and develop a future export version of the F-22A 

that protects classified and sensitive information, 

technologies and US war fighting capabilities.

Section 8042—Assistance for the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

• No funds appropriated or otherwise made 

available in this Act may be obligated or 

expended for assistance to the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea unless specifically 

appropriated for that purpose.

Section 8045—Drug Interdiction or 

Counter-Drug Activities

• No funds available to DOD for any fiscal year for 

drug interdiction or counter-drug activities

may be transferred to any other US department 

or agency except as specifically provided in an 

appropriations law.

• No funds available to the CIA for any fiscal year 

for drug interdiction or counter-drug activities 

may be transferred to any other US department 

or agency except as specifically provided in an 

appropriations law. 

Section 8049—Defense Funding for the 

Transfer of Defense Articles or Services 

to another Country or International 

Organization 

• No FY2013 DOD funds may be obligated 

or expended to transfer defense articles or 

services (other than intelligence services) to 

another country or international organization for 

below specified activities unless the defense and 

foreign relations committees are notified 15 days 

in advance of the transfer.

◊ The specified activities include any 

international peacekeeping, peaceenforcement or humanitarian assistance 

operation, or similar U.N. activities under 

an authority of the U.N. Security Council 

resolution or any other international 

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or 

humanitarian assistance operation.

• This notification shall include a description of the 

transfer, value of the transfer, a statement whether 

the inventory requirements of all elements of 

the US armed forces, including the reserve 

components, for the type of transfer have been 

met; and whether the items to be transferred will 

have to be replaced. If replacement is required, 

how does the President propose to provide the 

funds for such replacement.
17 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Section 8056—Procurement from Foreign 

Sources

• The Secretary of Defense, on a case-by-case 

basis, may waive with respect to a foreign 

country each limitation on the procurement of 

defense items from foreign sources provided 

in law, if determined that the application of the 

limitation with respect to that country would 

invalidate cooperative programs entered into 

between DOD and the foreign country, or would 

invalidate reciprocal trade agreements for the 

procurement of defense items entered into 

under 10 U.S.C. 2531, and the country does not 

discriminate against the same or similar defense 

items procured in the US for that country. This 

Section applies with respect to:

◊ Contracts and subcontracts entered into on or 

after enactment of this Act, and

◊ Options for the procurement of items that are 

exercised after such enactment date under 

contracts that were entered into before such 

enactment if the option prices are adjusted for 

any reason other than the application of this 

waiver authority.

• This wavier authority does not exist for certain 

listed items.

Section 8057—Training with Foreign 

Security Forces or Police

• No FY2013 DOD funds may be used to support 

any training program involving a unit of 

the security forces or police of a country if 

the Secretary of Defense has received credible 

information from the Department of State that the 

unit has committed a gross violation of human 

rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have 

been taken.

• The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, shall ensure that prior 

to a decision to conduct any such training, full 

consideration is given to all credible information 

available to the Department of State relating 

to human rights violations by foreign security 

forces.

• The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with 

the Secretary of State, may waive this prohibition 

if determined that such waiver is required by 

extraordinary circumstances.

• The congressional defense committees are to 

be notified not more than fifteen days after 

such waiver describing the extraordinary 

circumstances.

Section 8068—Transfer of DOD Funds to 

the Global Security Contingency Fund

• During FY2013, not more than $200,000,000 

in DOD O&M funding may be transferred to 

the DOS Global Security Contingency Fund 

(GSCF).

• This authority is in addition to any other transfer 

authority available to DOD.

• The Secretary of Defense shall, not fewer than 

thirty days prior to making transfers to the GSCF, 

notify the congressional defense committees in 

writing with the source of funds and a detailed 

justification, execution plan, and time line for 

each proposed project.

Section 8070—Israeli Cooperative Programs

• $429,736,000 in FY2013 appropriations for 

Procurement, Defense-Wide and Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation shall be for 

Israeli Cooperative Programs.

◊ $211,000,000 shall be provided for the 

procurement of the Iron Dome defense system 

to counter short-range rocket threats.

◊ $149,679,000 shall be for the Short Range 

Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD).

» Of which $39,200,000 shall be for 

production activities of SRBMD missiles 

in the US and in Israel to meet Israel’s 

defense requirements consistent with each 

nation’s laws, regulations, and procedures.

◊ $74,692,000 shall be available for an uppertier component to the Israeli Missile Defense 

Architecture.

◊ $44,365,000 shall be for the Arrow 

System improvement Programs including 

development of a long range, ground and 

airborne, detection suite.

Section 8084—Asia Pacific Regional 

Initiative Program

• Up to $15,000,000 in funding appropriated under 

Operation and Maintenance, Navy may be made 

available for the Asia Pacific Regional Initiative 

(APRI) Program for the purpose of enabling the 

Pacific Command to execute Theater Security 

Cooperation activities such as humanitarian 

assistance and payment of incremental and 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 18

personnel costs of training and exercising with 

foreign security forces.

• This funding made available for this purpose 

may be used, notwithstanding any other funding 

authorities for humanitarian assistance, security 

assistance, or combined exercise expenses.

• None of this funding may be obligated to 

provide assistance to a country that is otherwise 

prohibited from receiving such assistance under 

any other provision of law.

Section 8115—Non-Support of Military 

Training or Operations that include Child 

Soldiers

• No funds made available by this Act for IMET, 

FMFP, EDA, assistance IAW Section 1206, 

P.L.109-163, issuance [of export licenses] for 

DCS of military equipment, or PKO for the 

countries of Chad, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 

Burma may be used to support any military 

training or operations that include child soldiers 

as defined by the Child Soldiers Prevention Act 

of 2008, Title IV, P.L.110-457, 23 Dec 2008.

Title IX—Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO)

• FY2013 rescissions are not to be applicable to 

OCO appropriations.

Operation and Maintenance

Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

• An additional amount of $7,714,079,000, of 

which not to exceed $1,650,000,000 to remain 

available until 30 September 2014 for payments 

to reimburse key cooperating nations for 

logistical, military, and other support, including 

access, provided to the US military operations 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and 

post-operation Iraq border security related to the 

activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in 

Iraq, notwithstanding any other provision of law.

• Such reimbursement payments may be made in 

such amounts as the Secretary of Defense, with 

the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and 

in consultation with the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget, may determine, 

in his discretion, based on documentation 

determined by the Secretary of Defense to 

adequately account for the support provided, 

and such determination is final and conclusive 

upon the accounting officers of the US, and 

following fifteen days following notification to 

the appropriate congressional committees.

• These funds may be used for the purpose of 

providing specialized training and procuring 

supplies and specialized equipment and 

providing such supplies and loaning such 

equipment on a non-reimbursable basis 

to coalition forces supporting US military 

operations in Afghanistan, and fifteen days 

following notification to the appropriate 

congressional committees.

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund

• $325,000,000 for the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund (AIF) to remain available 

until 30 September 2014.

◊ Such funds shall be available to the Secretary 

of Defense for infrastructure projects in 

Afghanistan, notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, which shall be undertaken by 

the Secretary of State, unless the Secretaries 

of State and Defense jointly decide that a 

specific project will be undertaken by DOD.

◊ Any projects to be funded shall be jointly 

formulated and concurred in by the Secretaries 

of State and Defense.

◊ Funds may be transferred to the Department 

of State for purposes of undertaking projects 

shall be considered economic assistance under 

the FAA for purposes of making available the 

administrative authorities contained in the 

FAA.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

• $5,124,167,000 for the Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (ASFF) to remain available until 

30 September 2014.

Other DOD Programs

Defense Health Program

• An additional $993,898,000 for the Defense 

Health Program, which shall be for operation 

and maintenance.

Drug Interdiction and counter-Drug 

Activities, Defense

• An additional $469,025,000 for the Drug 

Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, 

Defense, to remain available until 30 September 

2014.
19 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

General Provision—This Title

Section 9005—Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program

• Not to exceed $200,000,000 of Operation 

and Maintenance, Army may be used, 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, to 

fund the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) in Afghanistan.

Section 9009—Afghanistan Resources 

Oversight Council

• No funds provided for ASFF may be obligated 

prior to approval of a financial and activity 

plan by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight 

Council (AROC) of the DOD.

◊ The AROC must approve the requirement and 

acquisition plan for any service requirements 

in excess of $50,000,000 annually and any 

non-standard equipment requirements in 

excess of $100,000,000 using ASFF.

• Additionally, the AROC must approve all 

projects and execution plan under AIF and any 

project in excess of $5,000,000 from CERP.

• The DOD must certify to the congressional 

defense committees that the AROC has 

convened and approved a process for ensuring 

compliance with the requirements in this Section 

and accompanying report language for the ASFF, 

AIF, and CERP.

Section 9011—Task Force for Business and 

Stability Operations

• Up to $93,000,000 of Operation and Maintenance, 

Army may be obligated and expended, 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, for 

the purposes of the Task Force for Business and 

Stability Operations, subject to the direction 

and control of the secretary of Defense, with 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to carry 

out strategic business and economic assistance 

activities in Afghanistan in support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom.

Section 9012—Office of Security 

Cooperation in Iraq

• Up to $508,000,000 of Operation and 

Maintenance, Air Force may be used by the 

Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, to support USG transition 

activities in Iraq by funding the operations and 

activities of the Office of Security Cooperation 

in Iraq (OSC-I) and security assistance teams.

• To the extent authorized under the NDAA, 

FY2013 [Section 1211], the operations and 

activities that may be carried out by OSC-I may, 

with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, 

include non-operational training activities in 

support of Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Counter 

Terrorism Service personnel in an institutional 

environment to address capability gaps, integrate 

processes relating to intelligence, air sovereignty, 

combined arms, logistics and maintenance, 

and to manage and integrate defense-related 

institutions.

Section 9013—Rescissions

• Inter alia, $1,000,000,000 in Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF), 2012/2013, is 

rescinded.

Section 9014—Reimbursement to the 

Government of Pakistan

• No funds appropriated or otherwise made 

available by this Act under Operation and 

Maintenance, Defense-Wide, for payments 

under Section 1233, NDAA, FY2008, P.L. 110-

181, 28 January 2008, for reimbursement to 

Pakistan may be available unless the Secretary 

of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of 

State, certifies to the congressional appropriations 

committees that the government of Pakistan is:

◊ Cooperating with the US in counterterrorism 

efforts against the Haqqani Network, the 

Quetta Shura Taliban, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, 

Jaish-e-Mohammed, al Qaeda, and other 

domestic and foreign terrorist organizations, 

including taking steps to end support for such 

groups and prevent them from basing and 

operating in Pakistan and carrying out cross 

border attacks into neighboring countries,

◊ Not supporting terrorist activities against 

US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies 

are not intervening extra-judicially into 

political and judicial processes in Pakistan,

◊ Dismantling improvised explosive device 

(IED) networks and interdicting precursor 

chemicals used in the manufacture of IEDs,

◊ Preventing the proliferation of nuclear-related 

material and expertise, 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 20

◊ Issuing visas in a timely manner for US 

visitors engaged in counterterrorism efforts 

and assistance programs in Pakistan, and 

◊ Providing humanitarian organizations access 

to detainees, internally displaced, persons, 

and other Pakistani civilians affected by the 

conflict.

• This certification may be waived, in coordination 

with the Secretary of State, on a case-by-case 

basis by certifying, with justification, in writing 

to the congressional appropriations committees 

that it in the national security interest to do so.

Division F—Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013

Title I—General Provisions

Section 1101—Continuation of Applicable 

FY2012 Appropriations Acts

• Section 1101(a)(6) applies the Department of 

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Appropriations Act (S/FOAA), 2012, Division I, 

P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2011, being continued 

through FY2013 as the S/FOAA for FY2013.

Section 1102—Availability of 

Appropriations

• Appropriations made by Section 1101 shall be 

available to the extent and in the manner that 

would be provided by the pertinent appropriations 

Act.

Section 1104—No New Projects

• No appropriations of funds made available 

or authority granted pursuant to Section 1101 

shall be used to initiate or resume any project or 

activity for which appropriations, funds, or other 

authority were not available during FY2012.

Section 1105—Funding Conditions and 

Limitations

• Except as otherwise expressly provided in 

this Division F, the requirements, authorities, 

conditions, limitations, and other provisions of 

the appropriations Acts referred to in Section 

1101 shall continue in effect through the date 

specified in Section 1106.

Section 1106—Funding Availability

• Unless otherwise provided for in this Division 

F or in the applicable appropriations Act, 

appropriations and funds made available and 

authority granted pursuant to this Division F 

shall be available through 30 September 2013.

Section 1113—Spending, Expenditure, or 

Operating Plan for FY2013

• Not later than thirty days after enactment of 

this Division F, The Department of State and 

US Agency for International Development 

(USAID), among others, shall submit a spending, 

expenditure, or operating plan for FY2013 to 

the congressional appropriations committees.

• This plan is to be submitted detailed at the 

program, project, and activity level. For foreign 

assistance programs funded in Title III [bilateral 

economic assistance], Title IV [International 

Security Assistance], and Title VIII [Oversea 

Contingency Operations/Global War on 

Terrorism]; the plan is to be detailed at the 

country, regional and central program level, and 

for any international organization.

Title VII, Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs (S/FOAA)

[FY2013 Continuing Resolution]

Section 1701—Contributions for 

International Peacekeeping Activities

• Amends the same program under Title I, 

Division I, P.L. 112-74, to $2,006,499,000 (vice 

$1,828,182,000).

◊ A rescission of $642,000 is to be applied to 

the FY2013 contributions for international 

peacekeeping activities.

Section 1702—Economic Support Fund 

(ESF)

• While continuing the total Economic Support 

Fund (ESF) at $3,001,745,000, amends the same 

program under Title III, Division I, P.L.112-74, 

a new proviso: Not less than $325,400,000 in 

under this ESF heading shall be transferred to, 

and merged with, funds appropriated under the 

heading Development Assistance.

◊ A rescission of $961,000 is to be applied to the 

FY2013 non-OCO Economic Support Fund.
21 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Section 1703—International Security 

Assistance

• The FY20012 funding level for International 

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

(INCLE) remains unchanged for FY2013 at 

$1,061,100,000.

◊ A rescission of $340,000 is to be applied to 

the FY2013 INCLE program.

• While continuing the FY2012 NonProliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and 

Related Programs (NADR) funding level at 

$590,113,000 for FY2013, amends the funding 

to remain available until 30 September 2014.

◊ A rescission of $189,000 is to be applied to 

the FY2103 NADR program.

◊ Amends the NADR sixth proviso with: 

That funds made available for demining, 

conventional weapons destruction, and 

related activities, in addition to funds 

otherwise made available for such purposes, 

may be used for administrative expenses 

related to the operation and management of 

demining, conventional weapons destruction, 

and related programs.

• The FY2012 funding level for Peacekeeping 

Operations (PKO) of $302,818,000 remains 

unchanged for FY2013. However, the earmark 

for payment of assessed expenses of international 

peacekeeping activities in Somalia is amended 

to $161,000,000 (vice $91,818,000) to remain 

available through 30 September 2014 (vice 

2013).

◊ A rescission of $97,000 is to be applied to the 

FY2013 PKO program.

• The FY2012 funding level for Foreign Military 

Financing Program (FMFP) of $5,210,000,000 

remains unchanged for FY2013. However, the 

earmark for Israel is amended to $3,100,000,000 

(vice $3,075,000,000) and the amount for 

Israel for offshore procurement is amended to 

$815,300,000 (vice $808,725,000).

◊ A rescission of $1,667,000 is to be applied to 

the FY2013 FMFP program.

• The FY2012 funding level for International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) of 

$105,788,000 remains unchanged for FY2013.

◊ A rescission of $34,000 is to be applied to the 

FY2013 IMET program.

Section 1704—Zeroing out of Certain 

Accounts

• Inter alia, amends the funding leveling of 

Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central 

Asia (vice $626,718,000); and the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) 

(vice $850,000,000) to zero for FY2013.

Section 1706—Miscellaneous S/FOAA 

Changes for FY2013

• Section 1706(b) amends Section 7034(f), 

S/FOAA, FY2012, to $100,000,000 (vice 

$50,000,000) authorizing the use of up to 

$100,000,000 for assistance in during a fiscal 

year for unanticipated contingencies IAW 

Section 451, FAA.

• Section 1706(c) amends Section 7054(b), S/

FOAA, FY2012, authorizing an exception for 

military assistance for cluster munitions if “such 

assistance, license, sale, or transfer is for the 

purpose of demilitarizing or disposing of such 

cluster munitions.”

• Section 1706(c) amends Section 7063, S/

FOAA, FY2012, authorizing the Secretary of 

State to waive the prohibition of US assistance 

to Uzbekistan for six month periods through 

FY2014 (vice FY2013) if determined to be in the 

US national security interest and is necessary in 

obtaining access to and from Afghanistan.

• Section 1706(e) amends:

◊ Section 7070(a), S/FOAA, FY2012, 

prohibiting Global Health Programs, 

Economic Support Fund, and International 

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

funding assistance (vice Assistance for 

Europe. Eurasia and Central Asia) to the 

government of an Independent State of the 

FSU if that government directs any action in 

violation of the territorial integrity or national 

sovereignty of any other Independent State of 

the FSU.

» However, per section 1706(g), ESF may be 

used, notwithstanding any other provision 

of law, for assistance and related programs 

for countries identified in Section 3(c), 

Support for Eastern European Democracy 

(SEED) Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179, 

28 September 1989, and Section 3, 

FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) of 1992, 

P.L. 102-511, 24 October 1992.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 22

Division G—Other Matters

Section 3001—Rescissions

• The following rescissions (reductions) are to be 

applied:

◊ Non-security categories:

» Divisions A and E – 2.513 percent

» Division B – 1.877 percent

◊ Security categories – 0.1 percent

• These rescissions are not to apply to amounts 

designated by Congress for Overseas 

Contingency Operations/Global on Terrorism or 

for Disaster Relief

• Within thirty days after enactment of this Act, the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to 

submit a report to the congressional appropriations 

committees specifying the account and amount 

of each rescission to be made.

◊ This rescissions report was submitted by the 

OMB on 25 April 2013.

Section 3002—Sequestration

• Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

Act, if, on or after the enactment of this Act, a 

sequestration is ordered by the President, the 

reductions in each discretionary account under 

such other shall apply to the amounts provided in 

this Act and shall be in addition to any reductions 

required by Section 251(c) of the Balanced 

Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 

1985, Title II, P.L. 99-177, 12 December 1985.

Section 3004—Discretionary Spending 

Limits

• If, for FY2013, the amount of new budget 

authority provided in appropriations Acts exceeds 

the discretionary spending limits set forth in 

Section 251(c)(2), P.L.99-177, on new budget 

authority for any category due to estimating 

differences with Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO), the OMB shall increase the applicable 

percentage of rescissions for the budget authority 

for any discretionary account in both the nonsecurity and security categories for FY2013.

◊ This is not to amounts designated by Congress 

for Overseas Contingency Operations/

Global War on Terrorism or the amount 

made available by Division F of this Act for 

Social Security Administration, Limitation 

on Administrative Expenses for continuing 

◊ Section 7072(a), S/FOAA, FY2012, likewise 

is amended regarding the same programs for 

the government of the Russian Federation 

if in violation of discrimination against 

religious groups or communities, freedom 

of expression, assembly, and press or due 

process within the Federation.

• Section 1706(i), amends Section 7041(h), S/

FOAA, FY2012, requiring the Secretary of State 

to consult with the congressional appropriations 

and foreign relations committees prior to funding 

any assistance for the promotion of democracy 

and protecting human rights in Syria.

• Section 1706(j) further amends the fifth 

proviso under ESF, Title III, S/FOAA, FY2012, 

authorizing the use of ESF for the cost of loan 

guarantees for Jordan.

Section 1707—Amendments to Title VIII, 

Overseas Contingency Operations / Global 

War on Terrorism, S/FOAA, FY2012, Division 

I, P.L. 112-74, 23 December 2012

• FY2013 rescissions are not to be applicable to 

OCO appropriations.

• Section 1707(e) amends the following FY2012 

accounts for FY2013:

◊ International Disaster Assistance 

—$774,661,000 (vice $150,000,000)

◊ Migration and Refugee Assistance 

—$1,152,850,000 (vice $229,000,000)

◊ Economic Support Fund (ESF)—

$3,119,896,000 (vice $2,761,462,000)

◊ The following FY2012 OCO accounts remain 

unchanged:

» Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, 

Demining, and Related Programs 

(NADR)—$120,657,000

» Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 

—$81,000,000

» Foreign Military Financing Program 

(FMFP)—$1,102,000,000.

» No IMET funds were appropriated for 

OCO in FY2012 under this Title.

Section 1708—Funding for Jordan

• Provides a new Title VIII, Section 8006, S/

FOAA, FY2012, stating that funds appropriated 

by this Title shall be made available for Jordan, 

in addition to amounts otherwise made available 

by this Act.
23 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Conclusion

This article for FY2013 included a summary 

of three pieces of legislation that impacted US 

international programs especially those of security 

assistance and security cooperation. FY2013 security 

assistance funding allocations were not available at 

the time of publication of this article. The Secretary 

of State did publish an executive summary on 10 

April 2013 to include actual funding allocation 

by program, by country for FY2012 and proposed 

funding for FY2014.

The National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013, was one of the last pieces 

of legislation passed by the lame duck 112th Congress 

and was enacted on 2 January 2013. Major items in 

this law included:

• Authorization of small-scale military construction 

within the “Section 1206 BPC” program

disability reviews under Titles II and XVI 

of the Social Security Act, and for the cost 

associated with conducting redeterminations 

of eligibility under Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act.

• Within thirty days of enactment of this Section, 

OMB shall submit a report to the congressional 

appropriations committees specifying the 

account and amount of each rescission made 

pursuant to this Section.

◊ The OMB rescissions report of 25 April 

2013 provided the required data and appllied 

an overall rescission (or reduction) of .032 

percent of the following security cooperation 

applicable non-Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) security-categorzied 

programs as follows: 

• Continued DOD support for counterterrorism 

operations in East Africa and Yemen until the 

“1207 GSCF” program becomes operational

• Authority for OSC-I to provide non-operational 

training during FY2013 to Iraq but in an 

institutional environment

• Authority to establish a program for the transfer 

of no longer needed, already in-country, nonexcess defense articles to Afghanistan before 31 

December 2014

• Authority to remove satellites and related items 

from the USML.

All twelve required appropriations for government 

operation during FY2013 were included by the new 

113th Congress into a single piece of legislation, the 

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations 

Program Reduction

DOD O&M, defense-wide $10,283,000

DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities 37,000

DOD Cooperative Threat Reducation (CTR) Account 166,000

DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDCA) 35,000

DOS International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 340,000

DOS Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 97,000

DOS Economic Support Fund 961,000

DOS Non-Proliferation, A/T, Demining, Related Programs (NADR) 189,000

DOS International Military and Education (IMET) 34,000

DOS Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) 1,67,000
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 24

About the Author

Ken Martin has been at DISAM for over 

twenty-five years as an associate professor for the 

management of security cooperation. In addition 

to teaching, his duties include being the security 

cooperation programs functional manager and a 

contributing author for the annually republished 

DISAM “greenbook,” The Management of Security 

Cooperation. He is a retired US Navy surface warfare 

officer. His education includes an undergraduate 

degree in the field of economics from the Illinois 

Institute of Technology in Chicago and a master’s 

degree in administration from Central Michigan 

University.

Act, 2013, P.L.113-6, 26 March 2013, essentially half 

way into the fiscal year. The Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2013, was Division C of P.L.113-

6 to include the following major items:

• Authority to transfer $200,000,000 of DOD 

O&M during FY2013 to the DOS GSCF

• Authority to transfer $429,736,000 in DOD 

FY2013 funding for use in the Israeli Cooperative 

Program

• Earmarking of up to $1,650,000,000 in FY2013 

DOD OCO O&M funding for reimbursement to 

key cooperating countries providing support to 

US forces in OEF

• Appropriation of $5,124,167,000 in DOD OCO 

for the ASFF.

The Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs appropriations act (S/FOAA) 

for FY2013 was provided as Title VII, Division F, 

P.L.113-6, a continuing resolution through the rest of 

the fiscal year using the funding levels and guidance 

provided within S/FOAA, 2012, Division I, P.L.112-

74, 23 December 2011.

• The security assistance funding levels for 

FY2013 are initially the same as for FY2012. 

The only exception was that S/FOAA OCO 

funding for ESF is increase to $3,119,896,000. 

The OMB has yet to provide direction regarding 

the actual program funding levels.

• The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund 

(PCCF) is to receive no new funding in FY2013

• Amends Section 451, FAA, authorizing up to 

$100,000,000 in assistance for unanticipated 

contingencies during FY2013.

Finally, the Secretary of State executive summary 

of 10 April 2013 addressing program funding levels 

to be requested for FY2014 includes the following:

• Economic Support Fund (ESF)—$5,458,254,000

• International Narcotics Control & Law 

Enforcement (INCLE)—$1,473,727,000

• Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & 

Related Programs (NADR)—$616,125,000

• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)—$347,000,000

• International Military Training & Education 

(IMET)—$105,573,000

• Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)—

$5,956,959,000.
25 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Interview with VADM Landay: “Defense 

Solutions for America’s Partners”

By J.R. Wilson

Published by Faircount Media Group

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA) plays a key role in US foreign relations, 

national security, and global security, yet may be 

one of the least known and understood parts of the 

Department of Defense (DoD).

DSCA’s mission is to provide timely and 

effective direction, supervision, and oversight of 

Security Cooperation (SC) programs in support of 

US national secu- rity and foreign policy objectives. 

In so doing, DSCA seeks, through its established 

security cooperation and other activities, to enhance 

US influence in all regions of the globe, carry out 

US national security strategy, and promote military 

interoperability with foreign partners.

These programs include training and education; 

disaster relief; and helping friendly nations acquire 

the right military equipment to meet their security 

needs. All of that is often coordinated with DoD, 

State, US military regional combatant commands 

(COCOMs), recipient nations, individual US military 

services, allies, US industry, Congress, and more.

As DSCA’s director since August 2010, Vice Adm. 

William E. Landay III is responsible for coordinating 

all of the agency’s efforts, including working to 

ensure and balance the needs and requirements of 

one of the most diverse sets of “stakeholders” facing 

any military leader. He recently discussed the DSCA 

operations with senior writer J.R. Wilson.

J.R. Wilson: From a broad-brush philosophy 

perspective, what are DSCA’s primary objectives 

in support of the security of the United States and 

US military across the globe?

Vice Adm. William E. Landay III:

We’re primarily responsible for overseeing and 

managing the majority of Security Cooperation 

programs for DoD. Security Cooperation has four 

primary goals, and we focus on ensuring all those 

goals are accomplished.

First, it provides support for countries to enable 

them to be able to secure their own borders against all 

threats, including terrorism.

Second, to ensure interoperability between US 

military forces and those of our partner countries. 

We know, today and in the future, we will operate 

together, and the ability to do so is critical. That 

includes equipment that can communicate with 

other [equipment], how each of us operates, training 

doctrine, etc. So the training piece is just as important 

as the equipment.

Third, is developing military-to-military 

cooperation. Through that we build an understanding 

of each other and a confidence in how both operate, 

so when we do come together we can accomplish our 

missions.

Finally, support the larger US effort to build 

relationships with other countries. For us, that is 

mostly on the military side.

How did DSCA support to the unique 

challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan affect the 

overall defense Security Assistance process?

What Iraq and Afghanistan did for the FMS 

[Foreign Military Sales] process was put a demand for 

urgency and flexibility into the system that probably 

did not exist as strongly in the past. We were directly 

supporting combat operations and the country’s 

ability to conduct combat operations, so we had to 

make the system work faster and be more responsive.

We have been able to do that throughout the 

system for other nations, as well. So the system today 

is much more responsive, flexible and capable than 

even in the 2005–06 time frame.

How does DSCA interface with DoD as a whole?

Taking FMS as a great example of that, it, and 

Security Cooperation in general, are really focused 

on building and maintaining relationships between 

countries and militaries. So much of our involvement 

is consistent with the goals, strategies, and strategic 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 26

What is DSCA’s relationship with the 

individual armed services?

They are critical key partners. Through them we 

execute the Security Cooperation programs in terms 

of providing equipment, training, services, etc. So 

the services and other implementing agencies are the 

engines that drive these programs because, in the end, 

they provide the capabilities we are offering to these 

countries.

They also have their own goals in each nation and 

region, so we take aboard service objectives, as well. 

But it really is the tight linkage we have in terms of 

executing the programs; we could not do this without 

the efforts of the services.

What about working with allies?

Quite frankly, that relationship generally occurs 

more through the COCOMs, State and OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense], who build the strategy 

for a region and how the US will work with our 

foreign partners in an area. Our job is to support their 

strategies.

How does DSCA interface with 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)?

Humanitarian assistance is a major program area 

within DSCA. There is a wide range of humanitarian 

efforts and programs we support. We often work 

those in partnership with NGOs and other relief 

agencies. Under our Disaster Relief authorities, when 

a disaster does occur such as the earthquake in Haiti, 

our disaster relief organization, working closely with 

USAID and other government agencies as well as 

NGOs and other relief agencies, determines how 

best to support the needs of that nation. Often that is 

providing transport of relief materials. So we work 

with them to determine how the US can help, then 

work with our services to determine how best to 

execute that assistance.

What is the working relationship with the host 

nations themselves?

They have a lot of input. They set the requirements, 

tell us what they need, and when and how they plan 

to use it. In most cases, they also provide the money. 

In some cases, the US government will provide 

equipment and resources, but for the vast majority, the 

host nation comes to us with their needs and funding, 

seeking to partner with us to meet their needs. So we 

work very closely with them.

objectives of the Undersecretary of Defense for 

Policy and the Joint Chiefs.

However, much of what we do is providing 

equipment, goods, services, capabilities, which we 

do through the DoD acquisition process.

How does DSCA work with the COCOMs?

Our primary focus there is the regional 

COCOMs. Their goals and objectives, their theater 

Security Cooperation plans and their efforts to 

build relationships with each country in their region 

provide the framework which we work to support. In 

addition to routine discussions on a daily basis at the 

staff level, I generally go at least twice a year to all 

COCOMs and sit down with their senior leadership 

to make sure we understand what their requirements 

are. We also have a program where the COCOMs 

identify key SC cases that are their highest priority 

and we bring the DSCA and service implementing 

agencies together monthly to ensure their cases are 

being executed satisfactorily.

What is the nature of DSCA’s connection with 

the State Department?

State has the US government responsibility for 

broad oversight for all Security Assistance programs. 

There are some additional programs for which DoD 

has primary responsibility, but most are overseen by 

State. So we execute for the State Department, and 

under its authority, programs such as FMF [Foreign 

Military Financing], FMS, IMET [International 

Military Education and Training], etc.

We have a very tight connection with them—

primarily through their Political-Military Affairs 

[Pol-Mil] bureau—in terms of making sure we 

comply with their guidance, provide input on how 

we see the system can be used or modified, work with 

them to notify Congress when required on a sale, etc.

Does that also apply to ambassadors and 

envoys?

Yes, we work closely with our Security 

Cooperation Offices in the embassies as well as the 

country teams. I always meet with them whenever I 

visit a country. We also sit down with the ambassador 

to ensure we are working together on their goals and 

what they are trying to accomplish in that country. We 

fund a Security Cooperation Office in almost every 

embassy. Their charter is to work directly with the 

country and the embassy on SC cases and issues.
27 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

In this world of coalition operations, it is 

absolutely critical. The one thing we know is the US 

military by itself is not going to be in a position to 

address every issue around the world and does not 

desire to address issues alone. So we will operate 

with partners, whether in combat operations such as 

Afghanistan and Iraq, or counterpiracy off the coast 

of Somalia or counternarcotics or counterterrorism.

To effectively operate together requires being 

able to talk with each other, understand each other, 

and know how each country operates. So, as a result, 

a lot of our Security Cooperation efforts are not just 

focused on equipment, but also training and education. 

We are most effective when we go the same schools 

together, and exercise together, building camaraderie 

between militaries and individuals. So when we 

do come together for an operation, we have the 

confidence to know we can work together to address 

the mission.

How are the concept and processes of BPC 

changing—and where do you see that going 

through the end of this decade and beyond?

I have seen a lot of changes, mainly as the US 

government has focused more and more effort into 

the area of Security Cooperation and Building Partner 

Capacity, recognizing there is much more we need to 

do than we were doing in the past. So, we have seen a 

growth in programs and authorities to specifically go 

after areas of Security Cooperation and BPC that we 

were not able to do in the past. That includes greater 

flexibility and responsiveness to address individual 

nation issues.

How will NATO’s “smart defense” concept 

and cap on member nation defense budgets affect 

Security Assistance efforts, especially in Eastern 

Europe?

There are a couple of areas there. In Eastern 

Europe, there are opportunities for us to work with 

them to help develop or modernize their capabilities 

as they move into the next generation of equipment, 

whether it is US or NATO-origin equipment that 

obviously enhances interoperability.

As budgets get tighter, we expect to see countries 

looking to partner with other countries to provide a 

capability or focus on niche elements of Security 

Assistance. As a result, we must be prepared to support 

both individual country capacity requirements as 

What changes to Security Assistance are you 

seeing/anticipating as the US focus begins to shift 

to Africa and Asia/Pacific?

Because Security Cooperation is about building 

partnerships, we already have many programs that are 

underway in those areas. Our emphasis is on trying to 

build on existing programs and relationships, maybe 

expand or broaden them, but ultimately to maintain 

and build on programs we have been maintaining in 

the past; and at the same time, where opportunities 

exist to develop new relationships or renew previous 

ones, we will work to do so.

What is the nature of Security Cooperation 

efforts in Latin America—and what changes are 

taking place or anticipated there?

Again, I don’t believe there will be any significant 

changes. The US and certainly DoD, through many of 

its Security Cooperation initiatives, has had a robust 

presence in parts of Central and South America for 

some time. Much of that has been driven by issues 

such as counter-narcotics, or illicit trafficking, and I 

expect us to continue putting a strong emphasis on 

those. As some of those nations’ militaries continue 

to develop, we will expand our Security Cooperation 

and assistance programs to support their needs.

Overall, how important is building partner 

capacity (BPC)—even with those who are not 

traditional US partners—to the national security 

of the United States?

It’s very important. Part of the reason we want to 

build partnership capacity—which is ensuring those 

nations have the ability to secure their own borders 

against a variety of threats—is that it shows up in a 

number of ways, not just military, but enabling a more 

stable economy, attracting new business to come in 

as the area is more stable, which improves global 

trade. So even if they are not traditional partners or 

major military partners, building partner capacity has 

advantages to the US in a number of areas—not just 

in terms of military aid, but building relationships and 

helping other parts of the global economy to work 

there as well; all of which is in our best interests.

And to enhancing interoperability with US 

forces in maintaining a global military presence, 

from training exercises to coalition combat 

operations?
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 28

While many people think of Security Assistance 

only in terms of military equipment, what are the 

scope and intent of DSCA’s Humanitarian and 

Disaster Relief and efforts to help deal with land 

mines?

Humanitarian and Disaster Relief is a DoD 

program, with projects generally coming out of 

embassy country teams and the COCOMs, who make 

proposals for efforts to help a given nation address 

its humanitarian needs. That can range from building 

roads to equipping hospitals, digging wells, and in 

some cases helping a country put in place the ability 

to coordinate their response to a disaster before the 

disaster occurs.

It is very powerful when we help a nation support 

itself.

When it is in response to a disaster, it’s a bit 

different—how can we provide support, including 

to NGOs and other relief agencies. Typically, that is 

money on our part, funding military disaster relief 

and helping facilitate those efforts.

We have three warehouses around the world 

with emergency meals and supplies we can tap into 

as needed.

On mine action, we have a school under DSCA 

to teach countries that are dealing with mines strewn 

about from previous conflicts how to find and 

eliminate those mines. We don’t find or eliminate 

them ourselves, but train them on how to do so and 

how to train others in their own countries.

One of the areas that we have been focused on as 

a result of our efforts to support Security Cooperation 

efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is how we can deliver 

equipment more quickly to our customers—a key 

component of our effort to be more flexible and 

responsive.

To meet countries’ equipment requests, we use 

the existing DoD acquisition system and processes. 

Because the US tends to have longer range planning 

and budgeting time lines, that process does not always 

support a partner country’s needs. So we looked at 

ways we might be able to get the equipment to them 

quickly, even if we could not speed up the acquisition 

process. We found that in many cases we knew the 

requirement was coming, but would wait until we 

received the formal request before we would even 

begin actions with the acquisition program managers. 

We thought that if we could identify items that were 

going to be bought and could start the procurement 

well as multi-country initiatives. Since our FMS 

system has been primarily a bilateral process, we are 

working to adapt to this new reality.

If tighter budgets among our major allies 

reduces their role in global Security Assistance, 

what do you expect FMS, FMF, IMET, and other 

DSCA efforts to look like through the next decade?

I think they will continue to be very highly 

regarded and sought after. Certainly FMF and IMET 

are US-funded security assistance programs, which 

will see pressure from our own budget challenges. 

We are working very hard with State, the services, 

and other agencies to define, as well as possible, 

the benefits we derive from those programs, which 

I think are clearly seen in terms of BPC and building 

relationships; and I think we will continue to see 

them as key parts of our Security Cooperation efforts 

as we go forward.

How are you changing or expecting to modify 

those efforts with respect to poorer nations, which 

often have far more basic needs?

Those are key components of building BPC. 

People tend to get enamored with the big dollar sales 

and programs, but we have established thousands 

of programs with more than 224 nations and 

international organizations around the world, from 

very well-off nations to those just starting to emerge 

or who are just developing professional militaries. So 

we are able to tailor our cooperation efforts across 

a wide range of needs. Often those initiatives start 

with training, helping them build institutions within 

the country, outfit their militaries—all of which are 

often just as important to building our relationships 

as selling a country a ship or an aircraft.

For example, a program we began last 

year involved sending ERGTs [Expeditionary 

Requirements Generation Teams] to sit down early 

in the process with nations, especially [a nation] 

trying to determine what capability it needs and how 

much money it will have. We also bring in the State 

Department and other agencies to help determine 

what might meet a country’s needs without going with 

the most expensive solution. In the past, nations had 

to figure that out pretty much by themselves, but now 

we bring all our people in to sit down with their best 

people to determine what they want to accomplish—

rather than what they might like to buy.
29 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

process even as the formal requests were being 

developed, we could potentially take months off of 

the time it would take to get the equipment to the 

country. Obviously if a country did not make the 

formal request, we would have equipment we needed 

to find a buyer for, but we thought if we emphasized 

high- volume items that multiple countries were 

expected to buy, we would be able to manage that 

issue. So we focused specifically on high-demand 

items such as radios, spare parts, small arms, body 

armor, etc., and implemented the Special Defense 

Acquisition Fund. While we are in our first year 

of this effort and much of the equipment is still in 

production, we have already had three cases where 

we were able to significantly improve our ability to 

meet a country’s needs through this process.

Any final thoughts?

All of our Security Cooperation programs 

are vitally important to our ability to build strong 

relationships with our partner nations. Through the 

efforts of many people in DSCA, the services and 

other agencies, we have been able to improve the 

flexibility and responsiveness of our execution of 

those programs. We have improved response time, 

driven down the cost of doing business and improved 

the countries’ insight in to the progress of their cases. 

These are significant achievements and I am very 

proud of the people who worked so hard to meet our 

customer and stakeholders expectations. While we 

have come a long way, we are not done and the team is 

off looking at even more innovative ways to improve 

our performance. This is incredibly important work, 

and the US Security Cooperation team is proud to play 

such an important part in building strong relationships 

between the US and the rest of the world.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 30
31 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

AFRICOM Helps Partner Nations 

Grow Capability, [Gen] Ham Says

By Karen Parrish

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 15, 2013—Now in its 

fifth year, US Africa Command brings “markedly 

increased” capabilities to its mission of defending 

US interests and developing regional militaries, the 

command’s leader told Congress today. During a 

House Armed Services Committee hearing, Army 

Gen. Carter F. Ham said both positive progress and 

emerging threats have this year demonstrated Africa’s 

strategic importance to the United States and its allies. 

In prepared testimony, Carter said AFRICOM 

staffs work closely with the State Department and the 

US Agency for International Development to train 

African militaries and support development. “Our 

integrated approach seeks to address the greatest 

near-term threats to our national security while 

simultaneously building long-term partnerships and 

fostering regional cooperation,” he said. 

Ham explained the command focuses on 

five major areas: countering violent extremist 

organizations; strengthening maritime security and 

countering illicit trafficking; strengthening defense 

capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and 

preparing for and responding to crises. Countering 

terrorism is the command’s highest priority and will 

remain so for some time, he added. 

The general said three violent extremist 

organizations are of particular concern in Africa: 

al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, active 

in northern and western Africa; Boko Haram in 

Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia. “The growing 

collaboration of these organizations heightens the 

danger they collectively represent,” he said. “Of 

the three organizations, AQIM, which exploited the 

instability that followed the coup d’état in Mali and 

seeks to establish an Islamic state in northern Mali, 

is currently the most likely to directly threaten US 

national security interests in the near term.” 

Ham said AFRICOM is aiding French and African 

military operations against AQIM and other terrorist 

organizations in northern Mali. “We are supporting 

French efforts with information, airlift, and refueling, 

and are working with the Department of State to 

support the deployment of West African forces to the 

African-led International Support Mission to Mali,” 

he said. “Recently, we began unarmed, remotely 

piloted aircraft operations from Niger in support of 

intelligence gathering efforts in the region.” 

Ham told committee members French, Malian, 

and AFISMA forces have driven AQIM fighters 

from population centers, but eliminating the group 

as a long-term threat will require restoring Malian 

governance and territorial integrity, reconciling with 

northern indigenous groups and establishing security. 

Ham noted AQIM is not solely a Malian challenge, 

but is spread across the Sahel region of north-central 

Africa south of the Sahara Desert and requires a 

regional approach to effectively address the threat. 

AFRICOM, the State Department and USAID work 

to support regional counter-terrorism efforts under 

the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism 

Partnership, Ham added. 

The partnership involves 10 northern and western 

African nations and the United States, he said, and 

aims to develop partner militaries’ counter-terrorism 

capabilities and build regional cooperation against 

AQIM and related extremist groups. 

In Nigeria, AFRICOM is partnering with Nigerian 

forces to counter Boko Haram’s campaign of violent 

attacks focused in the northern part of the country, 

Ham said. “If pressure on Boko Haram decreases, 

they could expand their capabilities and reach to 

pose a more significant threat to US interests,” he 

cautioned.

The general said al-Shabaab has been greatly 

weakened in Somalia by the operations of African 

Union Mission in Somalia, Ethiopian and Somali 

forces. “While al-Shabaab is less effective, the 

group is still dangerous and capable of conducting 

unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM 

operations and the newly formed Somali government,” 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 32

Ham said. Somalia is on a positive path, he added, but 

warned that “focus must be maintained on Somalia 

to sustain security progress made to date.” Ham said 

he believes AFRICOM’s efforts to counter violent 

extremist organizations are having a positive impact. 

“Our African partners are demonstrating 

strengthened capabilities and are increasingly 

cooperating with other nations to address shared 

security challenges, including supporting African 

Union and United Nations operations and programs,” 

he said. “The leadership of the African Union and 

the Economic Community of West African States 

in addressing the security challenges in Mali is 

indicative of the growing willingness and capability 

of Africans to address African security challenges.” 

The African continent presents a complex and fluid 

set of challenges and opportunities, Ham concluded. 

“At US Africa Command, we will continue to engage 

with our African partner militaries to strengthen 

their skills and capabilities, so they are better able 

to address shared security concerns and are able to 

contribute to regional stability and security,” he said. 
33 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

The Call Letter: CAD/PAD 

Purchase via FMS

By Orlando Vilches

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Every year in July, the Air Force Security 

Assistance and Cooperation (AFSAC) Directorate 

(AFSAC-D) sends out a call letter to all countries 

participating in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 

program with the United States Air Force (USAF). 

This call letter is an invitation and will reach them 

via their foreign liaison office or command country 

manager; it is highly anticipated. The event advertised 

in this letter is not what you might expect; it is not a 

social event. Nonetheless, it is an invitation none of 

them would want to miss.

Once a year, countries are invited to join the USAF 

in its annual purchase of Cartridge Actuated Devices 

and Propellant Actuated Devices (CADs/PADs). If 

you are not familiar, CADs/PADs are relatively small 

explosive devices that are used to safely eject items—

or pilots—from missiles or airplanes in the event of 

an emergency.

Figure 1: Photo of Thunderbird no. 6 ejection at Mt. Home airshow 

in 2003 [Photo by SSgt Bennie J. Davis III, USAF]

Several years ago while doing some FMS 

consulting, I received such a letter. I entered this 

world of CAD/PAD without a full appreciation for 

how complex it was, and paid the price in frustration 

and headaches. Later on, when I had the chance to do 

some research, I was astonished at the complexity of 

it and swore one day to write an article on the subject. 

I came to the conclusion back then that an ounce of 

information would have saved me a ton of frustration. 

With that in mind, in this article I intend to document 

the FMS annual CAD/PADs procurement cycle, 

and suggest some ideas that might alleviate some 

frustration for both newcomers and seasoned CAD/

PAD customers.

Most customers are very familiar with the 

invitation letter and the process to submit requisitions, 

but there is so much more to the story. I have identified 

and documented several components to this process 

that should be understood by those who intend to take 

part in it. I will address what is in the invitation letter, 

describe the process in general terms, define the 

participants and their roles, and explain a few factors 

that add complexity to the process. I also gathered a 

few suggestions from the process owners, which, if 

heeded, will undoubtedly make any customer a more 

effective and efficient participant. 

The Invitation Letter

The invitation letter actually is a package 

containing six attachments:

a. Annual Buy Schedule: A simple list of all major 

events and deadlines related to the annual buy. 

It also includes a note that warns of several 

undesirable situations that can complicate the 

process. The warning includes what could 

happen if the customer misses the requirements 

submission deadline. Also, how prices and 

deliveries are affected if the total combined 

requirement quantity for a single item falls short 

of a minimum procurement quantity (MPQ). 

Finally, it also addresses the possibility of no 

bids for a specific item.

b. Requirements Information: as its name 

indicates, this document describes important 

considerations related to a country’s submitted 

requirements:
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 34

f. CAD/PAD Spreadsheet: Comprehensive 

document listing all the National Stock Numbers 

(NSNs) available for purchase this year. They are 

organized by weapon system, which helps the 

costumer focus their search. Among other things, 

it includes the NSN, nomenclature, part number, 

estimated unit cost based on last purchase, lead 

time, shelf life and service life. This spreadsheet 

is put together by the Joint Program Office (JPO) 

once a year with the information provided by 

vendors at the time the contracts are let. 

Process 

In very general terms, the process goes something 

like this: the invitation letter goes out each year 

around July. Each participating country goes through 

a requirements computation process and determines 

their CAD/PAD requirements for the present purchase 

cycle before March. Participating countries will 

ensure that there is an FMS case or case line in place 

with sufficient funds to cover those requirements. This 

step could involve creating a new case or amending 

an existing one. Considering the time it takes to get 

a new case or an amendment fully implemented, 

it is in a country’s best interest to submit the LOR 

several months ahead of the February deadline. With 

the case or line in place, the countries forward their 

requirements to AFSAC-D before March.

1. How to take into consideration lead-times and 

deadlines

2. Implications of quality forecasting

3. Accounting for cataloguing data in particular 

Quantity Unit Pack (QUP) and use of alternate 

NSNs

4. Submission process expectations such as 

formats and confirmation notices

5. Agreed upon conditions for the use of USAF 

stock

6. Cancellations rules

7. Funding of non-mission capable supply 

(NMCS) conditions

c. CAD/PAD forecasting: This is a basic guide 

for how to conduct requirements computations 

while taking into consideration the service and 

shelf life of the item. It includes examples. 

d. Transportation: A short couple of paragraphs 

describing options to transport these explosives, 

such as the Defense Transportation System 

or pilot pick up, and how either should be 

documented in the LOA via the appropriate 

delivery term code. 

e. Temporary Service Life Extension Request: A 

one-page document including the format and the 

instructions to request a temporary life extension 

recommendation.

RQM

CMPT

LOA

FWD to

AFSAC

Negotiations

and Contracts

New Prices and

EDD tp JPO

AFSAC relays

Data to Buyers

JPO post Data/

creates new

Excel sheet

Previous Cycle

Present Cycle

Next Cycle

Combine

FMS RQM

Delivery

LEGEND

Tracking Time

FWD to

JPO

Combine

USAF and

FMS RQM

FWD to

PK

Invitation

Letter

Invitation

Letter

Figure 2: Depiction of the CAD/PAD purchase cycle developed by author
35 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

CADs/PADs to final destination. For those items with 

a lead time of twenty-four or thirty-six months, four 

or more years could pass before actual delivery. In the 

meantime, another cycle has started. Thus, at any one 

point, there could be three cycles at different stages 

of execution.

Participants

By looking at the process, the key players become 

evident. They include the customers, AFSAC-D, the 

CAD/PAD Joint Program Office, contracting, and 

vendors. Now let’s consider their specific roles and 

how they can potentially impact the entire outcome. 

a. Customers: the customer’s role can’t be 

overemphasized. They are the reason the 

invitation goes out. Their involvement in the 

annual buy ensures all participants, including 

USAF, benefit from economies of scale. It is their 

responsibility to provide accurate requirements; 

those requirements will define the process’ 

potential for success. While there is always 

a chance for an unforeseeable circumstance 

to affect the process later on, it is virtually 

impossible to recover from a faulty start resulting 

from an inaccurate requirements computation. 

There are commercial products as well as support 

from the JPO to assist customers. The objective 

is to ensure they arecomfortable with their ability 

to compute requirements accurately.

b. AFSAC-D: the CAD/PAD section publishes 

an updated version of the invitation letter every 

year and ensures all potential participants receive 

a copy. Case managers and Country Program 

Directors work together to ensure a case or a line 

is available to finance the purchase. If they see 

a potential problem such as insufficient funds or 

an expired or expiring case, they will inform the 

country immediately. Their prompt actions give 

customer the time needed to submit a new LOR 

and have the document implemented ahead of 

the March requirements submission deadline. 

AFSAC-D accepts the customer’s requirements, 

loads them into SAMIS, and prepares a package 

sorted by NSN to be sent to JPO at HAFB. 

Later, they will receive from the JPO the actual 

contracted prices and Estimated Delivery Date 

(EDD) information; with that data they will 

publish the invitation letter for the next cycle. 

Occasionally, they may have to work emergency 

amendments when case or line funding proves 

inadequate to cover price increases.

The CAD/PAD case managers at AFSAC-D 

combine all FMS requirements and enter them into 

the Security Assistance Management Information 

Systems (SAMIS), which is the legacy FMS 

information management system at AFSAC-D. The 

consolidated list of requirements is then forwarded to 

the CAD/PAD Joint Program Office (JPO) at Hill Air 

Force Base (HAFB) Utah; the JPO resides within the 

Munitions Directorate at HAFB.

Items Managers at JPO collect those FMS 

requirements and merge them with USAF requirements. 

Jennifer Struhs, head of the requirements office at 

JPO, estimates that for the 2012 purchasing cycle, the 

value of FMS requirements will be near 50 percent of 

the total procurement cost; the balance will represent 

USAF requirements. Historically, FMS requirements 

have fluctuated between 20 and 40 percent of total 

value. By April, the total requirement computations 

including FMS and USAF are finalized, and JPO will 

forward the entire package to the base contracting 

office or other applicable procurement agency.

Contracting officers at base contracting (PK) 

or other applicable procurement agency will start 

the procurement process. This involves publishing 

invitations for bids, receiving proposals, selecting 

providers, and finalizing contracts. These newly 

established contracts will define the real unit price 

of the items and the expected delivery dates (EDD).

Starting in July, price and delivery data will be 

relayed by contracting back to JPO to create the new 

excel spreadsheet that will go to AFSAC-D. AFSAC-D 

in turn will attach it to the other documentation 

discussed earlier and publish next year’s invitation 

letter; this signals the start of a new procurement cycle. 

In case you didn’t notice, the invitation letter contains 

last year’s procurement prices. Considering that 

customers base their requirements computations on 

those prices, it is understood that those values will not 

cover the cost that will be established when the current 

year’s requirements are negotiated and included in 

new contracts. To prevent a funding shortage which 

could derail the entire effort, AFSACD encourages 

countries to include an additional 20 percent of the 

estimated cost in the case or line to cover any price 

increases and other contingencies. 

What is left of the present cycle is neither minor 

nor short. Contract administrators, item managers, 

line managers and engineers at JPO, command 

country managers at AFSAC-D, and the country 

representatives will stay busy tracking progress, 

acceptance of lots, and eventual delivery of the 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 36

The data collected from these tests are eventually 

used to make final decisions on temporary service 

life extension requests.

Equipment specialists work hand-in-hand with 

the rest of the team to ensure technical support for 

each weapon system. Their tasks are many and 

varied. Program managers lead weapon systems 

focus teams and make recommendations on a 

variety of issues including temporary service life 

extensions, abatement plans, and lot acceptance.

An entire article could easily be written to 

provide a fair coverage of what goes on at the 

Munitions Division at Hill AFB.

d. Contracting: Contracting officers at base 

contracting and other procurement agencies 

receive requirements from JPO and, in 

accordance with federal acquisition regulations, 

select vendors and award contracts to satisfy 

requirements. Contracting officers convey the 

prices and EDD established in the contracts back 

to JPO. 

e. Vendors: Vendors are those companies that 

compete for the contracts, produce CADs/PADs, 

provide samples for acceptance testing, and 

deliver items as required by the contracts. Any 

issues that could impact the vendor’s process 

such as availability of raw materials, faulty 

mixtures failing an acceptance test, and delays 

in manufacturing, will have an unavoidable and 

significant ripple effect resulting in delivery 

delays. Vendors work closely with JPO to ensure 

that, at the first sign of problems, JPO can develop 

and deploy abatement plans. 

c. Joint Program Office (JPO): JPO resides 

in the Munitions Division at HAFB. In this 

organization you will find item managers, 

engineers, equipment specialists, contracting 

officers, country line item managers (IMs), 

transportation specialists, and program managers. 

Individuals from both Navy and USAF, civilians 

and contractors, come together to make it all 

happen—truly the heart of the entire operation. 

It all starts with item managers combining both 

FMS and USAF requirements, then passing 

them to base contracting for final procurement. 

IMs as well as country case line managers will 

be tracking those purchases as well as purchases 

from the two previous cycles. When contracts 

are awarded and pricing and delivery data are 

agreed upon, IMs will enter that data into their 

information systems, which in turn will feed 

into AFSAC-D’s SAMIS. Additionally, country 

case line managers will constantly keep the 

information current and make updates in SAMIS 

for command country managers and customers 

to see.

The focus of engineers is to ensure proper fit, 

form, and function; to that end they work closely 

with vendors throughout the cycle to ensure the 

requirements are technically adequate and that 

final products can pass the acceptance inspection. 

Additionally, they conduct the surveillance 

program, which entails performing tests on 

CADs/PADs taken from operating systems. The 

results are then compared to original test data. 

 NSN

1377-00-403-4827ES

Remarks:

1377-00-607-0306ES

Remarks:

1377-00-845-1058ES

Remarks:

1377-01-044-0367ES

 Nomenclature

INITIATOR, PROPELLANT (JAU-8/A25)

REMOVER, AIRCRAFT (M4)

INITIATOR, CARTRIDGE (M26)

SQUIB, ELECTRIC

DOD

M758

M251

M710

MT41

Part Number

117317373

8595439

8597941

30903823

QTY

1

1

1

1

Proc

Lead

Time

30

36

24

18

QTY

PE

2

1

2

6

Est Unit

Cost 

$941.42

$6,878.73

$1,031.03

$106.23

Figure 3. A screen capture of the CAD/PAD Excel Spreadsheet from JPO.
37 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

b. Transportation: The formal lead time ends 

when the accepted lots are at the vendor dock or 

shipping facility; however, the items are not yet 

in the customer’s hands, so there is an informal 

lead time from that point until the CADs/PADs 

arrive in country. If we were talking about most 

other spare parts, we could consider that time as 

largely irrelevant, since the parts could be loaded 

in the next commercial vessel destined for the 

country. However, it’s not that simple for CADs/

PADs. Two issues that impact the transportation 

of CADs/PADs are the special handling required 

for explosives, and the diminishing frequency of 

MILAIR missions.

A country moving explosives from CONUS 

has many restrictions to deal with. These 

restrictions limit how and by what entities 

these items are transported. They can’t be 

shipped via a traditional package handler as 

you would many other spares. If countries are 

using freight forwarders or plan a pilot pick 

up, a Competent Authority Authorization letter 

is required for each NSN. These are permits 

issued by the Department of Transportation, and 

allow a country representative to coordinate the 

transportation of explosives within CONUS. If 

the vessels transporting CADs/PADs will transit 

in any other country, the customer must secure 

similar permits from those countries’ Competent 

Authorities. 

In the past, the Defense Transportation 

System (DTS) alleviated this transportation 

burden by moving CADs/PADs on space 

available MILAIR missions. However, in the last 

few years DTS missions have been reduced and 

almost disappeared from some regions, leaving 

the customer to seek new ways to transport 

CADs/PADs. In many instances CADs/PADs 

can’t be shipped with other sensitive, explosive, 

or flammable materials; justifying a flight or 

ship for a partial load is just a small measure 

of the difficulty a country has to overcome 

when securing transportation. In the end, it all 

translates into further delays for the items to 

reach their destination.

c. Zero spare inventories: When the contracting 

officers at Hill AFB conclude negotiations, the 

providers begin the intricate process of creating 

the volatile explosive mixtures that will allow 

them to make enough CADs/PADs to match the 

Key Factors 

By now there is no question that the annual CADs/

PADs purchase is a very complex process. There 

are many factors that contribute to its complexity 

and while trying to look at each one in detail may 

prove exhausting, we can certainly consider the 

most significant ones. A short list includes timings, 

transportation, zero spare inventories, and yearly 

price volatility.

a. Timings: lead times and expiration dates are 

time-associated issues that complicate the 

management of CADs/PADs. 

First let’s consider at lead times. The screen 

capture below, of the excel spreadsheet from JPO 

included in the invitation letter, helps to illustrate 

the point. The lead-time column is highlighted 

by the downward pointing arrow and varies 

anywhere from eighteen to thirty-six months.

The lead time clock starts when the customer’s 

requirements are entered into SAMIS by CAD/

PAD case managers at AFSAC-D. These 

requirements are entered by mid-March of each 

year. Let’s consider the cycle that started March 

of 2012. For items with the shortest lead time (18 

months), the customer can expect vendors will 

be ready to start shipments somewhere around 

September 2013. Deliveries related to this cycle 

will continue on for those items with longer lead 

time stretching until March 2015. This assumes 

everything goes as planned, and for the most 

part, this is exactly what will happen.

On the topic of expiration dates, we need 

to consider that each CAD/PAD has both a 

shelf life and a service life. Shelf life is based 

on the manufacturing date and is tracked by 

lots. Service life is based on the date the item is 

actually installed in the system. The service date 

needs to be tracked by the customer as they are 

the only ones who will know when the CAD/PAD 

is installed in the system. You can see how things 

can get complicated as items from the same lot, 

originally having the same shelf life and service 

life, will end up with different expiration dates 

based on the date they are installed in the aircraft. 

In summary, a country’s CAD/PAD purchase 

plan must cover many significant dates over a 

period of years. A country needs to coordinate 

their maintenance schedule, replacement dates, 

and budgets over five or more years to ensure 

continuous system availability. 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 38

year to the next. During my time as a consultant, I saw 

the unit price of certain CADs/PADs increase from a 

couple of hundred dollars to several thousand dollars 

in one year. No amount of planning can account for 

this price volatility, even with the 20% safety margin 

recommended during cost planning. 

The customer then faces a short fuse situation 

where it needs to secure significant additional funding, 

along with a case modification quickly enough to 

remain in the purchase cycle. Both AFSAC-D and 

country line managers work closely with customers 

who find themselves in such an ordeal to ensure their 

requirements remain part of the purchase cycle. The 

munitions country line managers and Command 

Country Managers will work with AFSAC-D to 

process the modification under emergency priority 

protocol, and JPO will negotiate with vendors to 

provide the additional time needed.

The worst case scenario in such a situation is for 

the customer to decide to cancel a requirement. It is 

very possible that a cancellation from one customer 

may force a re-negotiation of the contract, potentially 

delaying deliveries and generating additional price 

increases for other customers. Because a delay in 

delivery has such a significant impact on a country’s 

operation and budget, steps are taken to avoid 

cancellation-driven delays. There is a warning on the 

invitation letter clarifying that cancellation requests 

may not be honored if they will result in delays to 

other users.

Suggestions

Because going through a steep learning curve 

was so painful as a newcomer to this world of CADs/

PADs, I wanted to provide some suggestions to help 

both new and seasoned users to be more efficient and 

better prepared to handle the curve balls this process 

may throw at them. I asked Jennifer Struhs, based 

on her extensive experience and present trends, what 

a customer could do to maximize their chances of 

success in the CADs/PADs process. Here is what 

she suggested: Good requirements computations, 

benchmark USAF procedures, process temporary 

extensions early, track deliveries frequently, and 

finally, maintain good communication.

Good requirements computation. In order to do 

an accurate requirements computation, it is necessary 

to track when the items will expire. Remember, 

CADs/PADs can expire based on shelf life or service 

life. Expiration dates, whatever they are based on, 

production required for that year’s order. There 

is no incentive for vendors to produce additional 

items. First, it is understood the annual order 

includes all users, foreign and domestic, so no 

additional orders are expected. Even if vendors 

wanted to produce additional units, which of 

the nearly 2,400 NSNs would they bet will have 

additional requirements above and beyond the 

annual buy? Thus, additional production would 

almost certainly lead to financial loss for the 

vendors. As a result, each CAD/PAD produced 

has a purpose and an owner; there is no spare 

inventory. If after the orders are placed for that 

year, a customer discovers it will have a shortage, 

there is no way to accommodate the extra 

requirement. In the event of shortage, JPO along 

with the USAF Global Ammunition Control Point 

POC will go to extremes to formulate a solution. 

Without spares inventory though, solutions tend 

to be costly and time consuming. 

d. New contract and prices every year: Earlier it 

was mentioned that new contracts are negotiated 

and awarded every year. New and higher prices 

for each item result, as vendors need to account 

for higher costs of labor and raw material. There 

are also other less obvious factors that could send 

prices soaring from one year to the next. Some 

of these include diminishing manufacturing 

resources (DMR), shrinking FMS requirements, 

and lower demand from US sources that fail 

to meet minimum order quantities. DMR is 

addressed in greater detail by Mr. Barton Chess 

in the 2012 edition of The DISAM Annual.

1

 The 

other two factors are related, and discussed 

below.

When we say FMS only or non-standard systems, 

we are referring mainly to older aircraft already 

retired from the US military inventory. They may 

still be operated by FMS customers, however. The 

FMS-only fleet shrinks every year as some users 

find themselves retiring a few planes to be able to 

support the operational units remaining in their 

own inventories. Others users will retire their entire 

fleet and get out of the market permanently. The 

consequence is a smaller global fleet, resulting in a 

smaller demand for certain CADs/PADs unique to 

these systems. Lowerdemand clashes with the need 

of the vendor to meet a minimum order quantity to 

remain profitable. As a direct result of this conflict, 

prices may increase 3, 4 and even ten times from one 
39 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

previous suggestion, identifying a delay in deliveries 

should trigger a protocol of actions to abate its impact. 

A customer’s early and constant tracking helps them 

have a better replacement schedule plan, triggering 

quicker reactions to contingencies and leading to less 

downtime for their aircraft.

Maintain good communication. Maintaining 

good communication channels in FMS is important, 

but it is vital when it comes to the CAD/PAD process. 

An expired or unavailable item can ground a plane 

or a fleet. With that in mind, AFSAC-D and JPO 

not only understand the need for a good dialog, but 

actually encourage it and look for ways to improve 

it. A significant effort to improve communication is 

the user’s conference that takes place around May 

of every year at the College of Southern Maryland. 

Here, all significant issues affecting the CAD/PAD 

program are briefed in detail to customers.

Conclusion

The annual call letter goes out to FMS customers 

around the world and invites them to join the US Air 

Force in its annual CAD/PAD procurement cycle. 

The process itself is extremely complex and laden 

with challenges. However, FMS customers are not 

left alone to deal with these complexities. First, 

within AFSAC-D, the customer has their CCM and 

case managers assisting them with requirements 

submission and case development in time to meet 

deadlines. Second, the customer has the entire JPO 

staff to ensure those requirements are passed to 

qualified vendors via contract, progress is tracked, 

and deliveries completed. Country line managers 

at Hill AFB, will respond to customer inquiries and 

inform the customer of the latest status of their CADs/

PADs purchase. 

Avoid frustrations! We’ve all been faced with 

difficult and unexpected situations. Being familiar 

with the entire process of purchasing CADs/PADs 

via FMS, understanding its strengths, weakness, 

and critical milestones should prevent “blindside” 

moments. To help the customer make better decisions, 

several ideas have been suggested, including 

generating a solid requirement computation, 

processing temporary extensions early, tracking 

deliveries early and often as a way to provide early 

warning of delays, and finally, maintaining good 

communication.

In the CAD/PAD procurement cycle, a customer 

could face many difficulties, I submit that an informed 

are the main factors to consider when planning 

replacement times. This tracking information is an 

integral part of the requirements computation. To 

help with this burdensome tracking and projection 

process, there are sophisticated commercial software 

products available in the market. Additionally, JPO is 

ready and willing to provide assistance in this area to 

customers who request it. An accurate requirements 

computation is the right way to start the process, and 

guarantees the best chance for success.

Benchmark USAF procedures. The idea here is 

that the USAF has excellent CADs/PADs management 

techniques, and customers could benefit from adopting 

some of them. The USAF is constantly evaluating 

and adjusting their maintenance schedule to coincide 

both with the expiration and delivery of their CADs/

PADs. For example, is not rare to see scheduled 

maintenance delayed or accelerated by weeks if 

feasible, to coincide with CAD/PAD deliveries. A 

major period of inspection and/or maintenance is 

adjusted to coincide with the replacement of CADs/

PADs, reducing labor and down time of the aircraft. 

Process temporary extensions early. Sooner or 

later, a customer will discover a gap between the 

expiration date and the delivery date. The correct 

responseis to process a request for a temporary 

extension. Those requests are routed via AFSAC-D 

to JPO, where the case line manager, engineers, 

technicians, and program managers will work 

together and study relevant data to come up with a 

final solution. Allowing as much time as possible for 

this to happen is always best, so customers should 

submit an extension request the moment they realize 

a gap issue is imminent. Early submission ensures 

JPO has the appropriate time to complete the review 

and provide a solution. Additionally, in the event 

an extension cannot be granted, early submission 

ensures time for all interested parties to work on an 

abatement plan. 

Track deliveries frequently. This suggestion goes 

hand in hand with the previous one. The earlier a 

customer detects a problem, the sooner they can start 

working a solution. As soon as the item managers 

at JPO receive information that may impact an 

item’s availability, they will contact the country line 

manager, who will enter notes in SAMIS. These notes 

become available immediately to those customers 

who are tracking their requisitions. The country line 

manager also submits updated spreadsheets with 

current status to the CCM at AFSAC-D. As in the 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 40

customer can avoid many of those problems and 

react quickly and efficiently to those that cannot be 

avoided.

Notes

1. Barton D. Chess, “The Impact of Diminishing 

Manufacturing Sources on FMS Logistics 

Support,” The DISAM Annual (2012): 95–96.

About the Author

Orlando E. Vilches is an instructor or Security 

Cooperation Management with the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). He 

retired from the Air Force after twenty years of service 

in 2007 with final assignment as logistics instructor 

at DISAM. After retirement, he became an FMS 

consultant for the Chilean Air Force. Mr. Vilches 

entered civil service as a Command Country Manager 

at AFSAC and was responsible for the FMS programs 

of Colombia, Chile, Uruguay and El Salvador. In June 

2010, he returned to DISAM as instructor and deputy 

Seminar Director for Western Hemisphere. He holds 

a bachelor’s degree from Southern Illinois University 

and a master’s degree from Troy State University. 

The author wishes to express his gratitude to AFSAC 

and the Munitions Directorate at Hill AFB and in 

particular to Mrs. Jennifer Struhs whose support 

made this article possible.
41 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Security Cooperation 

Information Portal (SCIP)

By John O’Connor

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Introduction

Did the US Air Force receive my country’s latest 

Letter of Request (LOR)? When is the US Navy 

going to complete the development of the Letter of 

Offer and Acceptance (LOA)? Is there a way that I 

can track a requisition to determine when the material 

will be shipped, and to also get specific details on the 

shipment once it occurs? Is there a way to develop 

metrics reports (e.g., implemented cases, open offers, 

Anticipated Offer Date performance, etc.) for all my 

cases of interest? Is there a system to manage my End 

Use Monitoring (EUM) responsibilities?

Answers to these questions and many other 

related ones can be obtained with a Security 

Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) account. 

This article provides an overview of the SCIP system 

with details on how it can provide case management 

support to authorized users. For many of those users 

(e.g., Foreign Purchasers, United States Security 

Cooperation Organizations—SCOs, Geographic 

Combatant Commanders—GCCs, etc.), SCIP will be 

the primary, if not only, automated means to obtain 

such answers for the cases of interest that they are 

managing or involved with. For other users, it will 

augment additional systems that they have access 

to with important data and reports that they need to 

effectively manage the Security Cooperation cases 

for which they are responsible.

System Description

SCIP (https://www.scportal.us/home/) is a secure, 

controlled, unclassified US Department of Defense 

(DoD) web-based computer information system that 

provides authorized users with access to Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) and Building Partner Capacity 

(BPC) programs case-related data and reports to 

support management responsibilities for those cases. 

All USG personnel (including Locally Employed 

Staff —LES, and contractors), and Foreign Purchasers 

(including their authorized Freight Forwarders) that 

have job responsibilities requiring access (i.e., need 

to know) to the SCIP system information are eligible 

to obtain SCIP accounts. DSCA’s policy is that “USG 

personnel and SCOs are encouraged to become 

familiar with SCIP’s full capabilities.”

PBAS

(Army)

CISIL

(Army)

CMCS

(Air Force)

SAMIS

(Air Force)

Portal

Communications

Server

End Users

International

USG Portal

Database

Server

Daily

Data

Extracts

except

for EFTS

which is

24/7

MISIL

(Navy)

DSAMS

(DSCA)

DIFS

(DFAS)

EFTS

(DSCA)

EUM

(DSCA)

Figure 1: SCIP Authoritative Data Sources
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 42

Case Information Community—Provides a 

query capability to view all FMS and BPC case 

information that the user has been authorized to have 

access to. SCIP displays region, country, or case 

data of interest depending upon the application and 

filter options that the user chooses. The application 

is chosen by the user via the Case Information menu 

bar. Each community has a unique menu bar (located 

directly below the Community navigation menu 

bar and available once the desired community is 

selected) that provides the user with the capability to 

select their desired community application or report. 

In the Case Information Community, some of those 

applications include real-time metrics (that can be 

quickly exported to a PowerPoint slide if desired), 

data inputs (requisitions, supply discrepancy reports 

[SDRs], freight transactions), Financial Management 

Reviews FMRs, Ad Hoc reports, and a Case Status 

filter to enable the user to quickly find cases of 

interest. For all cases that the user is authorized to 

see, the user is presented with a “Pyramid of Choices” 

(see figure 3) for all the case’s Letter of Offer and 

Acceptance (LOA) documents (Basic, Amendments, 

Modifications). Selecting any one of those pyramid 

levels will provide the user with specific case details 

(e.g., what is the LOA Anticipated Offer Date, when 

is the requisition material expected to be shipped, are 

there any unprogrammed case funds remaining, etc.) 

pertaining to that level. A summary report of all or 

a portion of that case data can be exported to a MS 

Excel file.

Figure 3: Case Status Menu Options - A “Pyramid of Choices”

The SCIP data extracts are obtained (automatically 

for most of the data) from multiple authoritative DoD 

and US military department (MILDEP) financial 

and logistic systems (See figure 1 for reference). 

The majority of data is updated daily via a batch 

process at 0700 US East Coast time. Refresh status 

indicators and info are provided to users in the Case 

Info Community to document the date/time of the last 

data refresh from those systems. Depending on the 

data being sought and the user’s permissions, having 

a single SCIP account can save time from having to 

obtain that data from each individual source system. 

SCIP became operational in 2003 and has been 

significantly expanded and improved upon since then. 

SCIP system access is available world wide from any 

computer (i.e. does not have to be from a USG or 

DoD domain) as long as there is adequate internet 

access and an active authorized SCIP user account.

Functionality

SCIP capabilities, applications, and reports are 

separated by tabs into different “communities.” See 

figure 2 for reference. Some of the SCIP communities 

are only authorized for USG users. A brief description 

of each community (and the related capabilities and 

applications) follows.

Figure 2: SCIP Community Menu Bar

Home Community—The first page users see 

when they successfully logon to SCIP. Like all the 

SCIP communities, there are announcements to 

inform the user of all the recently completed and 

planned changes to that community. Users can use 

the community navigation bar (figure 2) at the top of 

the web page to navigate to any of their authorized 

communities.

EUM Help Home Partner Info tner Info

The SCIP User’s ”Communities” will be listed as tabs 

on top of the screen following the user’s login. 

”Communities” that are listed (and available info) will 

depend on the User’s account and their 

signed/approved SAAR

Each SCIP “Community” has different (but related) 

capabilities and applications ISO SC/SA programs
43 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

and civilian users globally from all branches of the 

US armed forces and associated support Commands, 

which increases joint communication resulting in 

enhanced decision making. SCMS provides USG 

personnel with key information used to track high 

priority FMS programs, and is especially useful 

during the oversight process for expiring funds and 

those FMS cases that are funded via US appropriated 

sources. SCMS allows data input and customization 

through its multiple reports, showing information 

by appropriation and program, which allows for 

intense information sharing among multiple program 

participants. Although initially conceived to support 

the war effort in Iraq, the utility of SCMS has since 

been recognized by additional communities within 

DSCA. SCMS has been expanded for use with all the 

Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, which 

proved to be of great benefit to US decision makers 

when planning how to best build partner nation 

capacity.”

Corporate Info Community—Provides 

information to US Government personnel regarding 

metrics, Lean Six Sigma/Continuous Process 

Improvement, organizational charts, Security 

Cooperation Business Forum (SCBF) minutes, and 

Lessons Learned – Best Practices.

SCO/COCOM Community—Is authorized only 

for USG personnel and provides an information 

sharing (e.g., General Information, Lessons Learned 

& Best Practices, etc.) for the USG SCO and COCOM 

personnel.

Navy Community—Provides numerous 

capabilities (e.g. Case Execution Performance Tool—

CEPT, Case Reviews, Information Warehouse, 

Supply Discrepancy Reports, etc.) pertaining to 

US Navy-managed cases. Case and line financial 

commitments, obligations, and expenditures details 

are also provided.

Help Community—The help desk was developed 

to provide all users of SCIP a common location and 

interface for submitting and reading SCIP help desk 

requests. Having the help desk embedded within SCIP 

provides users with more security and privacy and 

prevents unauthorized viewing of requests. There are 

also numerous online help guides (Help Desk User 

Guide, Case Information User Guide, SCIP Help 

Descriptions, Corporate Info User Guide, International 

Customer Token Access Guide, Logon Guide, SCIP 

Acronyms, SCIP Background, Token Administrators 

Guide, US Government (USG)/SCO Token Access 

Case Execution Community—Provides 

links to several tri-service applications including 

the Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS), 

EMALL, Asset Visibility (AV), and the recently 

added WebRoR (formerly a Navy only application 

that automates the repair of repairable process). 

“EFTS is a secure web-based application, resident 

in the SCIP, and serves as a consolidated source for 

Security Cooperation material in-transit information. 

EFTS does not replace existing shipment systems, 

but rather provides a clearing house of all available 

shipment information in a single supplemental 

tracking system to provide additional visibility of 

equipment and material shipment. EFTS receives 

data from DLA, contractors, depots, Defense 

Transportation System, carriers, freight forwarders, 

consolidation points, and ports of embarkation and 

debarkation. This allows EFTS to provide visibility of 

the SC material distribution pipeline for all classes of 

supply and modes of transportation either outbound 

from the United States to the purchaser’s country or 

materiel returning to the United States or US facility 

overseas.”

EUM (End-Use Monitoring) Community—

Provides authorized users with specific information, 

reports, and capabilities to the DoD End-Use 

Monitoring (EUM) Program. The EUM applications 

within SCIP provides inventory reports that will help 

inspectors plan for upcoming inventories and isolate 

items that are considered ‘delinquent.’

Partner Info Community—Provides an 

information sharing type of community vice a business 

process or business application community. It includes 

(among other items) documents, presentations, and 

files related to the Foreign Procurement Group (FPG), 

and International Customer User Group (ICUG).

National Geospatial Agency (NGA) 

Community—Allows authorized SCIP users to 

access, review, and download navigation charts 

(e.g., aeronautical en route and approach charts, 

terminal procedures, etc. for necessary international 

navigation and flight safety).

SCMS (COP) Security Cooperation Management 

Suite Community—Is authorized only for USG 

personnel to support case management responsibilities 

for Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) cases. “SCMS resides within 

the SCIP and is a joint service, web-based capability 

that provides US officials with a common operating 

picture of the SC process. SCMS has joint US military 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 44

Firefox can be used to access SCIP although SCIP 

functionality appears to work best on IE. The browser 

advanced security settings and certificates need to be 

correct to get access. Contact the SCIP Help Desk 

(SCIPHelp@dsadc.dsca.mil) if you have SCIP logon issues. If you are logging into SCIP with your 

USG Common Access Card (CAC) certificate (which 

is the usual means for USG DoD users to log-on to 

SCIP if the account has been CAC enabled), select 

your non-email certificate. Logging in to the SCIP 

system with a token (vice a USG DoD CAC, DoS 

Smart Card, or commercial PKI certificate) will be 

via the subsequent SCIP login screens requiring entry 

of the SCIP user’s user ID and passcode. To keep the 

SCIP account active, users need to periodically logon. If you do not log in to SCIP for 45 days, you will 

receive an automatic e-mail, advising you to log in or 

risk the loss of SCIP account privileges. If you fail to 

log in for 60 days, your account will be suspended, 

requiring your USG supervisor or country HNTA to 

contact the SCIP Help desk to reactivate the account. 

If you fail to log in for 180 days, your account will 

be permanently deleted, requiring you to submit a 

complete new registration form to obtain another 

account.

SCIP Training

DISAM provides SCIP training (basic through 

advanced topics) in the majority of the DISAM 

offered classes. The DISAM SCIP classroom training 

(which includes in-residence and Mobile Education 

Teams—METs) has expanded by 125 percent in 

the last year due to the increasing importance of 

SCIP to the Security Cooperation users. Electronic 

copies of all the current DISAM SCIP presentations 

are posted on the SCIP Corporate Info Community 

and are accessible via the “Training...DISAM 

Presentations...SCIP” links to authorized USG 

users. The DISAM SCIP training maximizes the 

online demonstration (vice ‘screen shots’) of the 

system capabilities by the instructors and the ‘handson’ practical exercises by the students. There is 

additional SCIP information and training that can 

be accessed on the DISAM home page (http://www.

disam.dsca.mil/) via the “SC Tools” link on that page. 

Those DISAM SCIP training resources (See figure 4 

for reference) includes an overview presentation, a 

SCIP exercise handbook, DSCA SCIP Policy Letters, 

SCIP frequently asked questions (FAQs), and a link 

to access the SCIP system. The SCIP handbook is a 

Guide, and the Partner Info User Guide) posted there 

to assist SCIP users with understanding how to fully 

use the numerous SCIP capabilities. Note: In addition 

to the guides and reference documents listed above, 

there are also other Community specific guides that 

are posted on SCIP that can be accessed via the Help 

links on the applicable community navigation menu.

Obtaining a SCIP Account

The online SCIP registration form for both US 

and international users can be found by accessing the 

SCIP web site (https://www.scportal.us/home/) and 

‘clicking’ the “REGISTRATION INFO” link on that 

page. All USG SCO and GCC students that attend the 

DISAM Security Cooperation Management Overseas 

(SCM-O) course are registered for their individual 

SCIP accounts while in that class per the DSCA Policy 

Memo 11-58 (Policy Update Regarding Security 

Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) Account 

Access for Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs)). 

For all other SCIP account applicants, follow the 

instructions in the SCIP “REGISTRATION INFO” 

introduction to submit your form for processing by 

the SCIP Program Office/Defense Security Assistance 

Development Center (DSADC). An important note 

for international (i.e. non USG) SCIP applicants is that 

a pre-requisite to completing the registration form is 

be issued a secure SCIP token by their country’s Host 

Nation Token Administrator (HNTA). DSCA Policy 

Memorandums 03-11 (Enrollment Process for the 

SCIP), and 05-17 (SCIP Electronic Token Issuance 

and Replacement Processes) are the policy references 

for details regarding issuance and management of 

SCIP tokens. The SCIP International Customer Token 

Access Guide (posted on the SCIP “REGISTRATION 

INFO” web page), provides further details on SCIP 

token operations and processes. Additional SCIP 

DSCA Policy Memorandums are posted on the DSCA 

web site. For additional SCIP assistance, users (and 

prospective users) can contact the SCIP Help Desk 

at SCIPHelp@dsadc.dsca.mil or via phone at (717) 

605-9200.

Accessing the Security Cooperation 

Information Portal (SCIP) Website

To access the SCIP system (once a user has 

obtained a SCIP account), type https://www.scportal.

us/home/ in the address line of your Internet browser 

and then click the “SCIP Logon” link on top of 

that page. Both Internet Explorer (IE) and Mozilla 
45 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

About the Author 

John O’Connor is an instructor at the Defense 

Institute of Security Assistance Management 

(DISAM—http://www.disam.dsca.mil/) where he 

has been teaching (Process, Finance, Logistics, 

Acquisition, Tech Transfer/Exports, Navy Seminars, 

SCIP, etc.) since 2010. He is the DISAM SCIP project 

lead responsible for developing, maintaining, and 

integrating SCIP lessons in the DISAM curriculum. 

Prior to working at DISAM, he was a US Navy Officer 

(Naval Aviation) for twenty-six years, and a systems 

and financial analyst in industry for four years. He has 

a master’s degree in Computer Systems, is certified 

by DSCA as Level III in International Affairs, has a 

Level II DoD certification in Program Management, 

is a DoD Acquisition Workforce member, and is a 

former Country Program Director (CPD at Navy 

International Programs Office) (http://www.nipo.

navy.mil/). He can be contacted at John.OConnor@

disam.dsca.mil.

familiarization tool and training guide for Security 

Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) users to 

better understand the capabilities of the SCIP system. 

It is intended for both initial system instruction, 

and also to provide users with future reference 

handbook when utilizing the SCIP system. All the 

exercise questions (Process, Logistics, Financial, 

Miscellaneous Advanced) in that handbook are based 

on information provided in the DISAM class lessons, 

and can be completed even without a SCIP account 

using the training case examples in the handbook. 

A basic understanding of the Security Cooperation 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, logistics, 

and finance subjects is needed to understand and 

interpret the materials, and complete the exercises 

in that handbook. Future DISAM SCIP training will 

include online training module ‘vignettes’ (e.g., how 

do I login...develop a real time metrics...develop an 

Ad Hoc report...track a requisition shipment, etc.) 

that students can access and complete via the DISAM 

web page.

DISAM SCIP Pactical Exercises and

Handbook, Policy Letters, FAQ,

Presentation, etc.

Figure 4: SCIP on DISAM Web Page
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 46
47 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

FMS Logistics 

Communications

By John O’Connor

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Introduction 

To successfully accomplish all the material and/

or service requirements that the United States (US) 

and other countries have agreed to when they sign 

and fund a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letter of 

Offer and Acceptance (LOA) requires effective 

logistics communications. This article will discuss 

some of the significant FMS logistic communications 

options available, with a focus on the capabilities 

and processes for each of those systems (to include 

Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation 

Directorate (AFSAC) Online, Security Cooperation 

Information Portal (SCIP), Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA) International Logistics Communication 

System (ILCS), and the Supply Tracking and the 

Repairable Return (STARR/PC) program).

Background

FMS logistics communication occurs between 

the FMS customer (i.e., Foreign Purchaser) and the 

US Military Departments (MILDEPS—Air Force, 

Army, and Navy) International Logistics Control 

Organizations (ILCOs) as depicted in figure 1. That 

FMS logistics communication occurs either directly 

or is routed via the DLA Transaction Services. DLA 

also receives and processes incoming requisitions 

from purchasers worldwide and coordinates direct 

shipment of goods from their depots back to their 

customers. However, for FMS customers, the 

logistics communications (e.g., requisitions, status, 

shipment information, etc.) for that DLA material 

are typically also relayed (with exceptions such as 

the Excess Defense Articles provided by the DLA 

Disposition Services via their website) to/from the 

MILDEP ILCOs [Note: For additional information 

on the ILCOs and their functions, refer to DISAM’s 

textbook, The Management of Security Cooperation, 

chapter 10, “Logistics Support of International 

Military Sales.”

Figure 1: Logistics Communications between FMS Customer and 

US DOD

FMS Logistics Communication

There are multiple logistics communications 

options available to the FMS customer to communicate 

with the MILDEP ILCOs. While international mail, 

faxes, e-mails, and phone calls can and are certainly 

used as options, all of those are “still subject to 

manual processing at the ILCO. This intervention 

slows down the request and subjects the document to 

potential transcription errors.”1

 Fortunately, there are 

several very capable and effective options available 

(that will be discussed in the following paragraphs) 

that offer much higher levels of automation for 

logistics communication processing.

• AFSAC Online: One such option is the US 

Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation 

Directorate (AFSAC) Online (https://afsac.

wpafb.af.mil/) system which provides numerous 

logistics communications options including 

online requisition and Supply Discrepancy 

Reports (SDRs) inputs, status updates, etc. 

Access to the customer’s AFSAC Online account 

is via the internet using secure HTTPS protocol 

on the user’s workstation web browser. Customer 

inputs are received and processed by AFSAC. 

CISIL

(Army)

SAMIS

(AF)

MISIL

(Navy)

U.S. DoD International Logistics Control Organizations

(ILCOs)

Bandaria
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 48

depends upon numerous factors including 

whether or not the requisitioned material has 

been shipped, the SCIP Community that is 

being used for the report, what country the 

requisition is supporting, and a couple of 

other criteria. In the SCIP Case Information 

Community, there are always details “on all 

requisitions that are unshipped or have been 

shipped or canceled within the last ninety 

days. There is an exception to the 90 day 

rule, however, for certain countries where 

authorized users are able to access multiple 

years’ worth of data. Another exception to 

the ninety-day requisition rule in the SCIP 

Case Information Community pertains to 

“split shipments.” For “split shipments,” 

even if one or more suffixed portion(s) was/

were shipped over ninety days ago, that/those 

suffixed requisition(s) will still be in SCIP 

Case Information Community. Additionally, 

if an authorized SCIP user wants to get details 

on shipped requisitions older than ninety 

days for a country that is not one of the above 

exceptions, they are able to either request an 

Information Extract (which they can do for one 

case a day to obtain ALL requisition info for a 

case), or go to the Case Execution Community 

Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS), 

or Security Cooperation Management Suite 

(SCMS) Community (USG users only) to run 

transportation reports.”2

◊ Supply Discrepancy Reporting (SDRs): 

SDRs can be submitted on the SCIP system 

(by FMS Customers and USG personnel for 

Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, 

http://www.dsca.mil/samm/ESAMM/

Chapter15.htm). Any SDR entered on SCIP 

will be sent (as discussed previously in the 

Requisitions section) via direct and secure 

FTP from SCIP to the applicable MILDEP 

legacy system. There are some differences 

between the US MILDEPS on how they will 

process SDRs submitted via SCIP. See the 

following paragraphs for details.

» US Navy will officially process and 

review international logistics a SDR that 

is submitted via SCIP (either through the 

Case Information Community Inputs, or 

Navy Community SDR applications).3

The biggest limitation to the FMS customer is 

that the AFSAC Online system can only be used 

for USAF managed FMS cases, which then 

requires an alternative system(s) for any Navy 

and Army managed cases that the customer has.

• SCIP: The US Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) managed Security Cooperation 

Information Portal (SCIP, https://www.scportal.

us/home/) is another computer information system 

available to the FMS customers for logistics 

communications. It also includes multiple 

input, output, and report options including 

online requisitions (single or batch), SDRs, 

status updates, etc. Access to the customer’s 

SCIP account is via the internet using secure 

HTTPS protocol on the user’s workstation web 

browser. FMS Customer accounts can be set-up 

(if authorized and approved) on SCIP to access 

data and send/receive logistics communications 

to all three US MILDEPs (Air Force [USAF], 

Army [USA], and Navy [USN]) via a single 

user’s account. SCIP logistics communications 

data (with some notable exceptions including 

the Enhanced Freight Tracking System—EFTS) 

is exchanged via daily ‘snapshots’ to/from the 

applicable MILDEP and DOD computer systems. 

Additional details (e.g., system description, 

functionality, accounts, training, etc.) about 

the SCIP system are included in the following 

paragraphs and are also available in the in the 

DISAM Journal (http://www.disamjournal.org/

articles/security-cooperation-information-portalscip-788), and in appendix 1 of the 32nd edition 

of The Management of Security Cooperation, 

appendix 1.

◊ Requisitions: International logistics 

requisitions can be submitted by FMS 

Customers on SCIP. Those online inputs 

will sent via direct and secure File Transfer 

Protocol (FTP) from the SCIP system to the 

applicable MILDEP legacy systems (Security 

Assistance Management Information System 

(SAMIS) for the USAF, Centralized Integrated 

System for International Logistics (CISIL) 

for the USA, and Management Information 

System for International Logistics (MISIL) 

for the USN) for official processing by each 

of the MILDEP ILCOS (AFSAC, USASACNC, and NAVSUP-WSS). Requisition status 

and visibility on SCIP to the customers 
49 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

• ILCS/DAMES: “The DLA managed 

International Logistics Communication System 

(ILCS)/DLA Automated Message Exchange 

System (DAMES) is another tri-service 

automated system available to FMS customers for 

Logistics Communications. ILCS/DAMES were 

established in 1979 and currently have connections 

operating throughout the world. ILCS/DAMES 

is a PC-based software communications system 

designed for routing transactions providing a 

means for FMS customers to input requisitions 

into the DOD Logistics ‘pipeline’ and receive 

status transactions responses. Users may also 

use ILCS/DAMES to send and receive narrative 

messages. DAMES’ users, connect via an Internet 

Service Provider (ISP) using Secure File Transfer 

Protocol (SFTP), or Async (Asynchronous 

Interfaces) to Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) 

dial up connection. DLA Transaction Services 

can procure hardware/software through an FMS 

case, or the country can elect to purchase their 

own, or use an existing PC at their site.

◊ Minimum System Requirements:

» Pentium or Higher Processor PC

» 128 MB RAM

» 100 MB Hard Disk Drive

» SVGA Color Monitor 800 x 600 minimum

» Suggested resolutions 1024 x 768 or higher 

Microsoft Windows XP, VISTA, Windows 

2000, Windows 7

» Read/write/delete access to hard drive 

» Mouse (Microsoft Compatible)

» Printer

◊ Network connectivity required: 

» Secure communications on the PC uses 

TCP/IP running custom SFTP developed 

by Transaction Services especially for 

DAMES. 

» For Network Connectivity: 

 Internet connectivity

 WINSOCK.DLL (Supplied by your 

Network Provider)

» For Modem Connectivity: 

 SFTP using Point to Point Protocol 

(PPP) communications

◊ Requisition/Message Traffic: Narrative 

messages will be sent directly to the addressee. 

MILSTRIP transactions will be processed 

individually and forwarded to the appropriate 

service (Air Force transactions to the SAMIS 

» US Army official position on SDR 

submissions is that “The country may input 

SDRs to SCIP and it is the recommended 

method to do so.”4

» US Air Force has stated that while 

“customers can submit SDR to the 

USAF thru SCIP, it is not recommended. 

Attachments cannot be transmitted to 

AFSAC Online and not all information 

required to process SDR is entered into 

SCIP. USAF recommendation is for 

USAF customers to use AFSAC Online 

SDR-A (which provides a direct webservices interface to DLA’s WebSDR) to 

submit their SDRs.”5 USAF customers 

SDR submissions via SCIP “creates only 

a skeleton record and the customer must 

still manually provide hard copy and 

supporting documents to the ILCO so 

record can be updated prior to routing to 

the supplier for action.”6

◊ Navy Community: The SCIP Navy 

Community provides authorized users 

with significant additional logistics 

communications capabilities (e.g., Supply 

Discrepancy Reports [SDRs] full history 

of reviews, remarks and decisions; Case 

Reconciliation and Reviews; Information 

Warehouse; Case Execution Performance 

Tool [CEPT], etc.) for all cases that are 

managed by the Department of the Navy.

◊ Future Enhancements and Capabilities: 

The DSCA-managed SCIP system has 

improved significantly since its operational 

introduction ten years ago, and it continues to 

be regularly updated to meet user’s operational 

requirements. Future potential SCIP logistics 

communication improvements in-work 

includes the initiative by the USAF to “re-host 

AFSAC Online tools under the SCIP login 

‘umbrella,’ and an expansion of the USAF 

SDR-A capabilities for use by all services.”7

“Air Force’s SDR-A or a tri-service re-write 

of that application are potential solutions 

for international logistics communication 

SDR processing in the Security Cooperation 

Enterprise Solution (SCES) era that DOD is 

working towards.”8
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 50

developed by the USAF (AFSAC) and 

“became operational in 1988. The USA 

(USASAC) and USN (NAVSUP) began 

supporting its use as a customer logistics 

communication option in 1990 and 1994 

respectively for the FMS cases those 

organizations managed.”10 “The STARR/

PC2 system is designed around a data 

download from SAMIS, CISIL and/or 

MISIL. Each day as status data is received 

by SAMIS, CISIL and/or MISIL, they 

produce a series of “master records” that 

duplicate the current status of a country’s 

updated requisitions. These records are 

then transmitted, via the International 

Logistics Communication System (ILCS) 

to STARR/PC2 at the customer’s location. 

This new set of records replaces the last 

set of master records for the affected 

requisitions. All processing of the 

MILSTRIP transactions is accomplished 

by SAMIS, CISIL and MISIL. STARR/

PC2 merely updates its databases with 

the same status as found in the DOD 

systems. This method of overlaying the 

STARR/PC2 master records eliminates 

the need for duplication of system logic 

between STARR/PC2 and DOD. It also 

eliminates the need for continuous updates 

to the customer’s software as MILSTRIP 

changes occur. While every effort has been 

made to provide a usable tool for logistics 

management, STARR/PC2 is not the 

answer to all problems. It is not intended 

to be an in-country logistics or supply 

system.”

» Computer Software: “Software required 

includes the STARR/PC2 software 

(provided by the USG) operating on PC 

Windows based (including Windows 

XP, Windows 2000, Windows Vista, 

or Windows 7) operating system. 

Additionally, since STARR/PC2 is written 

utilizing ORACLE, a registered ORACLE 

software license is required for the version 

of STARR/PC2 software package that will 

be installed. A STARR/PC2 user must also 

use the DLA VOLTS/DAMES software for 

logistical communications and data transfer 

to ILCS and the MILDEP ILCOs.”11 See 

system, Army transactions to CISIL, and 

Navy transaction to MISIL) for further 

service-specific processing. After passing 

validation edits, requisitions will be sent to 

the appropriate Source of Supply (SOS). 

Messages and/or transactions containing 

narrative text, MILSTRIP/ FEDSTRIP 

logistics transactions, nonstandard part 

number requisitions and other data may be 

built interactively at the keyboard and/or 

imported from other systems. MILSTRIP 

uses JANAP 128 data pattern formatted 

communications messages for transmission. 

The DLA Transaction Services DAMES 

website at https://www.transactionservices.

dla.mil provides details on DAMES system 

requirements, connectivity (Network and/or 

Modem), benefits, and message capabilities 

(creation, receiving, and processing).

◊ ILCS / DAMES System Options and Costs:

» The cost of ILCS/DAMES is reimbursed 

by the FMS country to the US Government 

annually under an established FMS case. 

The fees (which can vary) are determined 

by the number of connections associated 

to the FMS case. There is no charge to 

the FMS Customer for DAMES software 

acquisition, installation or training. Should 

user want in-country training, there would 

be a cost for travel (includes Per Diem/

Flight), but no cost for training.

» Once the applicable FMS Case is 

implemented, the FMS Customer would 

request ILCS/DAMES through the 

appropriate US MILDEP ILCO Country 

Case Manager who is managing their FMS 

Case. That Case Manager will initiate a 

call to DLA Transaction Services. The 

time frame for a customer to be fully 

operational with their ILCS/DAMES 

capability once they initiate the request 

depends on various customer dependencies 

and their requirements (e.g., ten days to six 

months).”9

◊ Supply Tracking and Repairable Return 

(STARR/PC2):

» Background: STARR/PC is PC based 

software that can be used by an FMS 

Customer for logistics communications 

with the US MILDEP ILCOs. It was 
51 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

modifications, cancellations and 

receipts (XDF) to SAMIS/CISIL/

MISIL.

 The Case/Financial Management 

module is used to query the financial 

status of FMS cases established with 

the US Air Force, Army or Navy and to 

delete them after they are completed.

 The Supply Discrepancy Report 

Management module is used to prepare, 

submit, follow-up and resubmit SDRs 

and to track the status of SDRs once 

established with the USG.

 The Publications/Technical Orders 

Management module is used to input 

US Army, US Navy publications and 

US Air Force technical order (TO) 

requests.

 The Reparable Management module is 

used to process Component Exchange 

Request (XD6—manual MRRL 

[Material Repair Requirements List] 

request), Material Return (Repair/

Return and Component/Exchange), 

and Receipts (XDF) transactions to the 

USG services.

 The System Management module is 

used for the input and output process, 

system housekeeping, archive process, 

and batch processing (the batch process 

is not available in this version).”12

figure 2 below for graphical reference of 

the communications link between the FMS 

Customer’s STARR/PC2 software and the 

MILDEP ILCO international logistics 

systems via DAMES / ILCS.

» Capabilities: The STARR/PC2 software 

includes the following logistics capability 

modules. See Figure 3 below for reference 

on how the user accesses those modules 

from the STARR/PC2 software.

 “The Acquisition Management module 

is used to process requisitions (standard 

or non-standard orders), follow-ups, 

CISIL

STARR/PC2 SAMIS

MISIL

D

A

M

E

S

/

I

L

C

S

Figure 3: STARR/PC2 Software Main Menu

Figure 2: STARR/PC2 Connectivity Diagram
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 52

and use an alternative or additional system(s) for those 

country logistical communication requirements.

The Security Cooperation Information 

Portal (https://www.scportal.us/home/), like 

AFSAC Online, also provides numerous logistics 

communications options including online requisition 

and supply discrepancy reports inputs, status updates, 

financial status of cases, etc. It also provides repair 

of repairable items and freight tracking capabilities. 

There is also no additional user software required to 

access the system other than a standard web browser, 

internet access, and SCIP account, nor any additional 

cost or fees that the FMS Customer must pay to 

access SCIP. The biggest advantage that SCIP has 

compared to AFSAC Online though is for countries 

that have implemented FMS Cases with multiple 

US Implementing Agencies (IAs). Those countries 

can have their personnel use their individual SCIP 

account for the logistic communication requirements 

that they have with all of the IAs that they have 

implemented FMS Cases with.

The DLA-managed International Logistics 

Communication System (ILCS) also provides the 

FMS Customers (like SCIP), with a consolidated 

option to fulfill logistic communications requirements 

for their cases that are being managed by USAF, 

USA, and USN. To transmit and receive logistics 

communications via the DLA ILCS, FMS Customers 

need to either use their own logistics management 

system to communicate with ILCS via the DAMES 

software, or use the Supply Tracking and Repairable 

Return (STARR/PC) program to communicate 

with ILCS via the DAMES software. Each of those 

options though requires additional software and 

costs (including an annual subscription fee based on 

connections) for the FMS Customer to implement 

and operate those logistic communication systems. 

For an FMS Customer country that already has a 

STARR/PC (with DAMES / ILCS connectivity) 

system installation(s), their familiarity and expertise 

with those systems may be a strong reason to continue 

using them. Similarly, an FMS Customer country that 

has their own logistics supply system may decide its 

capabilities (along with their familiarity and expertise 

with that system would probably make a compelling 

case to establish a DAMES / ILCS capability to 

connect that system to the MILDEP ILCOs for all 

the logistics communication requirements that they 

need to transmit and receive from their own logistics 

supply system to manage their FMS cases that they 

have with the US.

» STARR/PC2 Point of Contact: Additional 

STARR/PC2 information can be obtained 

by contacting the following:

HQ AFSAC/SCP, ATTN: STARR/PC2

5454 Buckner Road 

WPAFB, OH 45433-5350

DSN: 986-1950

Commercial: 937-656-1950 

Telefax: 937-257-9102 / 787-9102 

ILCS/DAMES: RC919AA 

E-mail: STARRPC2@wpafb.af.mil

or Oran.Sine@wpafb.af.mil 

Summary and Conclusions

To successfully accomplish all the material and/

or service requirements that the United States (US) 

and other countries have agreed to when they sign and 

fund a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letter of Offer 

and Acceptance (LOA) requires effective logistics 

communications. The growth of options available 

to the FMS Customers to accomplish those logistics 

communications requirements has paralleled the 

growth of the internet and mass communications over 

the last twenty years. Each of the significant FMS 

logistics communications options (AFSAC Online, 

Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) International 

Logistics Communication System (ILCS), and the 

Supply Tracking and Repairable Return (STARR/PC) 

program) this paper has discussed provide similar 

capabilities but have some distinct differences, 

requirements, advantages, and disadvantages.

The US Air Force Security Assistance and 

Cooperation Directorate (AFSAC) Online system 

(https://afsac.wpafb.af.mil/) provides numerous 

logistics communications options including online 

requisition and supply discrepancy reports inputs, 

status updates, financial status of cases, etc. No 

additional user software is required to access the 

system other than a standard web browser, internet 

access, and an AFSAC Online account. There is also 

no additional cost or fees that the FMS Customer 

must pay to access AFSAC online. The biggest 

potential limitation for an FMS Customer’s logistics 

communication requirements is that AFSAC Online 

can only be used to access US Air Force-managed 

FMS cases. The impact of that limitation is that if 

the FMS Customer also has US Army and US Navy 

managed FMS Cases, then they will need to identify 
53 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

since 2010. He is also the DISAM SCIP project 

lead responsible for developing, maintaining, and 

integrating SCIP lessons in the DISAM curriculum. 

Prior to working at DISAM, he was a US Naval 

Aviator for twenty-six years, and a systems and 

financial analyst in industry, supporting DOD and 

Homeland Security, for four years. He has a bachelor 

of science degree from the US Naval Academy in 

engineering/resource management, and a master of 

science degree from the Naval Postgraduate School 

in computer/information systems. He is certified by 

DSCA as Level III in International Affairs, by DOD 

as a Level III Program Management Acquisition 

professional and Acquisition Workforce member, 

and he served as a Country Program Director (CPD) 

at Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO)

(http://www.nipo.navy.mil/). He can be contacted at 

John.OConnor@disam.dsca.mil.

The choice of the optimal FMS logistics 

communication system(s) must ultimately be decided 

by each individual FMS Customer. They should 

consider their own supply system infrastructure, 

system costs, hardware, software, expertise, and 

training requirements when making their decision on 

which system(s) to use.

Notes

1. The Management of Security Cooperation

Chapter 10 (Logistics Support of International 

Military Sales)

2. SCIP Senior Analyst (Emily Butler) Help Desk 

response dated 15 April 2013

3. NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support Systems and 

Planning (Michael Gindraw) e-mail dated 08 

November 2012

4. AMSAC-LAL-SPM SDR Process Manager 

Process Management Office (Kim Paumer) 

e-mail dated 14 May 2012

5. AFSAC input to DISAM Associate Professor 

(William Rimpo) dated 25 October 2012

6. Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation 

Directorate Technical Lead (Anita Smith) e-mail 

dated 16 April 2013

7. Air Force Security Assistance & Cooperation 

Directorate Technical Lead (Anita Smith) e-mail 

dated 16 April 2013

8. SCIP Program Manager (Tom Sippel) e-mail 

dated 15 November 2012

9. DLA Transaction Services/Dawn L. Kohlbacher/

April 26, 2013

10. Kent Wiggins, “STARR/PC: Supply Tracking 

and Reparable Return Systems,” DISAM Journal, 

Summer 1995 (http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/

Vol%2017_4/Wiggins.pdf)

11. “STARR/PC2” brochure dated 1 November 

2011 provided by Oran Sine (AFLCMC/WFSZ) 

STARR/PC Manager

12. STARR/PC2 “Training Handout” provided 

by Oran Sine (AFLCMC/WFSZ) STARR/PC 

Manager

About the Author 

John O’Connor is an Assistant Professor at the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

where he has been teaching (Process, Finance, 

Logistics, Acquisition, Tech Transfer/Exports, Navy 

Seminars, SCO Operations, Legislation, SCIP, etc.) 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 54
55 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Combatant Commanders Praise 

State Partnership Program

By SFC Jim Greenhill

National Guard Bureau

Army Gen. Frank J. Grass, chief of the National Guard Bureau, 

talks with Mongolian soldiers serving in Afghanistan, Jan. 15, 2013. 

Mongolia is partnered with Alaska in the National Guard State 

Partnership Program. US Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jim Greenhill

WASHINGTON, March 18, 2013—The 

National Guard’s State Partnership Program is 

an extraordinarily effective, enduring, low-cost 

tool to advance the national security objective of 

building partnership capacity, two veteran combatant 

commanders told Congress last week. 

“You probably have the co-chairs of the State 

Partnership Program fan club seated here,” Army Gen. 

Carter F. Ham, commander of US Africa Command, 

told the House Armed Services Committee, speaking 

for himself and Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, 

commander of US European Command and NATO’s 

supreme allied commander for Europe, who also 

testified at the March 14 hearing. 

Ham and Stavridis testified at a hearing on the 

posture of their commands related to the nation’s 

defense budget for fiscal year 2014, which begins 

Oct. 1. Since its inception more than 20 years ago, 

the State Partnership Program has paired the National 

Guard in US states and territories with forces from 

more than one-third of world’s countries.

“What we tried to do was take those Eastern 

European nations that were formerly part of the 

Warsaw Pact and bring them closer to the West and 

eventually integrate them into NATO, which we’ve 

successfully done,” US Rep. Bill Enyart of Illinois 

noted at the hearing. Enyart is the former adjutant 

general for Illinois. The program has since expanded 

to sixty-five nations around the world. 

“It’s a very powerful tool. . . . It is unmatched,” 

Stavridis told the Senate panel, noting he has seen the 

program in action in assignments in Europe, Latin 

America and the Caribbean. “They are, bang for the 

buck, one of the best things going. . . . Anything that 

enhances state partnership is money in the bank for 

the regional combatant commanders,” he said. 

AFRICOM has eight partnership pairings, and 

Ham said the command is seeking to expand. “The 

real benefit in the State Partnership Program is the 

enduring nature of the relationship, that sergeants and 

lieutenants and captains grow up together and have 

multiple engagements,” he said. 

In some cases, the relationships are two decades 

old. States with a mature relationship with an Eastern 

European country have considered adding second 

partners in other combatant commands, such as 

AFRICOM, forming multilateral partnerships where 

the more mature relationship helps to guide the newer 

one. Ham called the multilateral partnership among 

Michigan, Latvia and Liberia “a model for what 

might be possible in the future.” 

In other National Guard news from the hearing, 

Stavridis called short—perhaps two-month—

rotations of National Guard Brigade Combat Teams 

in Europe “a terrific idea.” He also noted that the next 

peacekeeping rotation in Kosovo will be by an activeduty unit after a decade of National Guard missions 

there.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 56
57 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

as he finds his way to his new desk. As he logs into 

his workstation, he remembers someone mentioning 

DSCA’s new Lessons Learned and Best Practices 

program. Maybe he can find some info about his new 

role that can orient him in the right direction for the 

next couple weeks while he is waiting for the new 

Chief to arrive.

Lt. Col. Smith googles “DSCA Lessons Learned” 

and finds instructions in the DISAM Online Journal 

directing him to www.jllis.mil. After he registers 

his CAC he clicks “View Observations” and scrolls 

down to check mark the “DSCA” box under Available 

Organizations. He clicks the “Search Observations” 

button and begins browsing the latest Lessons 

Learned and Best Practices.

He finds a document that looks very promising. 

Lt. Col. Smith clicks on the document titled “First 60 

Days as A New SCO Chief.” He feels like he struck 

gold. The document includes a detailed checklist, 

made by a SCO Chief, to help those who would follow 

in his footsteps. Though he is only the Deputy Chief, 

this document will give him a leg up and will help 

him tread water until his Chief arrives in a few weeks. 

His new Chief will definitely want this checklist too. 

He prints off two copies and pins one of them to the 

bare corkboard above his workstation. Now he can 

put all his training to work.

Three years later, Lt. Col. Smith has nearly seen 

it all from the perspective of a Security Cooperation 

Officer. The foreign partners now trust his judgment, 

and his Chief relies on him heavily to navigate the 

numerous authorities, strategies, and plans at their 

disposal. Simply put, he is good at his job and will be 

severely missed as his rotation date is approaching. 

He thinks back to his first day on the job, and how 

anxious he felt when he realized that he was going to 

be called upon to do both his and his boss’ job until 

the new Chief arrived. He remembers how that “first 

60 days” checklist gave him a little sliver of relief so 

he decides to record his own lessons learned and best 

Lessons Learned and Best Practices 

in Action—Tell a Buddy, Be a Friend

By Jeff Fourman

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

It’s the last day of DISAM training for over fifty 

soon-to-be security cooperation officers. Soon after 

graduation they will be on their way to the airport enroute to their next training assignment before leaving 

the country.

Lt. Col. Smith is among the graduates. He was 

selected to be the new Deputy Chief for the Office of 

Defense Cooperation in a South East Asian country 

that seems to be getting more and more attention 

lately in the news. It should be a good assignment for 

him. Aside from his new found confidence as a result 

of the hands-on exercises he completed in training, 

he has a working knowledge of the language; he has 

been previously deployed to other countries in the 

same region. By chance, he was also lucky enough 

to meet his soon-to-be new boss over lunch one day 

who was state-side on other business. His new boss 

told him to remember his DISAM training, and when 

he gets in-country, he will show him the ropes and get 

him up to speed on all the details of the job that no 

amount of training could ever teach.

Three weeks later, Lt. Col. Smith arrives incountry ready to settle in and begin his new job. The 

first thing he learns upon arriving at the embassy is 

that he will no longer be reporting to the Chief he had 

lunch with while at DISAM. His presumed boss was 

apparently needed elsewhere and has since moved on 

to another position in a larger country to help manage 

a surge in Security Assistance requirements there. 

This news doesn’t sit well with him. His boss seemed 

very knowledgeable, and he was really looking 

forward to following his lead. Worse yet, his boss’ 

replacement has yet to arrive as he is likely back in 

the States receiving much of the same training that he 

completed himself over the past couple months.

Lt. Col. Smith has been in situations like this 

before, but this time it is different because nobody 

else in his small office performs the same function 

as he does. Thank goodness for the DISAM training 

he received. He starts thinking back to his training 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 58

technique to gauge the level of networking of our 

Joint SCO personnel was by how many partnernation people showed up at their farewell parties.

3. Update your biography on any SCO and GCC 

websites. There is a correct military biography 

format, and it can be found at any of the service 

home pages. Visiting DVs (both US and partnernation) will ask for them in advance of any visit, 

and having electronic copies handy saves time.

As for updating biographies on the GCC page, 

beyond the professionalism of not having the 

previous SCO Chief’s picture on the page for 

a few extra years just above your name, it will 

become important as you reach out to other 

SCOs for information, Best Practice sharing, or 

when one of your partner-nation high-ranking 

acquisition leaders visits another country.

4. Ask your personnel to update their bios. Some 

SCOs use a single format for all Joint personnel. 

For ours, we kept the service-specific format for 

each individual but added our Office of Defense 

Cooperation (ODC) symbol to the top of each 

one. The SDO’s bio format should also work. 

One standard for the entire Office of Military/

Defense Cooperation.

5. Look at medium and long-range calendar for 

events for which you must start planning (DV 

or IG visits, next bi- or multi-lat exercise, trade 

show, etc). This level of strategic planning gives 

you a picture of your operations tempo and 

can be compared with any manning shortfalls, 

crunch times, etc. Pick POCs if not already 

accomplished. Also, without going into too 

many details on the long-lead items for an IG 

inspection, this might be a good time for your IG 

inspection POC to start checking out the Lessons 

Learned page on the GCC IG web page. PreIG information will be covered in next month’s 

Lessons Learned from the Field article, “Hi, I’m 

with the IG and I’m here to help.”

6. This job is about building relationships. If you 

have any overlap with the previous. SDO/DATT, 

ask him/her to introduce you to the partnernation leadership the SDO/DATT works with 

the most. Then ask your immediate, next-level 

of staff to introduce you to the partner-nation 

people they work with often. This strengthens 

your personnel’s credibility in the eyes of the 

partner-nation, and it also provides you a firstlevel of access without you having to build it 

from scratch.

practices that he observed over the past three years. 

Hopefully the next guy will find his observations 

useful as well.

Lt. Col. Smith logs into www.jllis.mil, goes 

to the DSCA home page and clicks “Add Detailed 

Observation.” He begins to record all of the lessons 

learned that he observed and fills out all of the pertinent 

and relevant information. He clicks “submit” and 

feels as though he did his good deed for the day.

Meanwhile, back at DISAM, the newly submitted 

lessons learned are being reviewed and vetted by 

Subject Matter Experts for curriculum, policy, and 

strategy impact. Within three days they will be 

distributed to every possible channel in the Security 

Cooperation Community so that everyone can learn 

from Lt. Col. Smith’s invaluable experience as a 

Security Cooperation Officer.

The following Lessons Learned is the actual first 

60 days checklist submitted by an Office of Defense 

Cooperation Chief as he prepared to leave his position 

in country:

1. Write a personal note to your boss thanking him/

her for the leadership opportunity, and also send 

a short e-mail. This will not only be the right 

thing to do and makes a good impression, but 

also establishes your e-mail address with that 

individual in their computer. Then send one to 

each of your mentors and thank them as well. 

Then send one to the Ambassador and DCM, 

thanking them for the opportunity. Leading 

in today’s military is a privilege, and the 

opportunities are limited. This also lets you take 

a look at your card stock levels and design. Send 

a SIPR email to establish connectivity with your 

boss.

2. During any overlap time with the outgoing SCO 

Chief, arrange for them to introduce you to 

any key partner–nation personnel you need to 

know. Rather than starting a new network from 

scratch, take advantage of their existing network 

and build on the work of previous SCO Chiefs. 

You will also be creating partnerships amongst 

the right organizations (US and partner-nation) 

and it’s important to understand the airspace 

(battlefield) in which you find yourself. Building 

on the network of others creates persistence of 

US government support for the partner-nation; 

this leads to acquiring what they need through 

FMS and Training. Also, mentors come in 

all shapes and sizes (and nationalities). One 
59 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

the embassy/ODC is unavailable. I took this for 

granted. Then, on 1 Feb 13, a suicide bomber 

killed one of our Embassy guards. State has a 

great checklist, recently improved by last year’s 

Benghazi attack that killed the US Ambassador 

to Libya. However, what you may find in other 

State Department/Embassy post–incident 

checklists is that, other than the Marine guards, 

the military might be rarely mentioned. In Turkey, 

because the ODC is so large (more than 70), we 

are not co–located with the Embassy. So our 

checklist was adequate, but chair–flying (USAF) 

or performing a rock–drill (Army) added a few 

items to our checklist, as did practicing scenario 

responses, which was invaluable in adding 

critical items to our post–incident checklist.

14. Know your mission. You’d be surprised how 

many take it for granted. You are there to build 

partnerships. We do it through networking, 

engagements, and relationship building, all with 

the partner-nation (not with Americans, which 

is easier to do). To what end? Access to the 

Partner Nation during times when Americans 

need access (military, political, and business); 

Foreign Military Sales; International Training; 

Armaments Cooperation, Exercise participation; 

mil-to-mil and mil-to-political/economic 

leadership relations; information flow to the 

ambassador, GCC commander, etc. I echoed 

this mission at every opportunity, to ensure 

everyone understood it and there were no doubts 

in anyone’s mind.

15. Vision—develop one early and define it to 

everyone at every opportunity. I envision the 

partnership between the SCO and the partnernation to be so good, they will feel comfortable 

asking us for assistance first, in anything, to 

include an LOR build. Also, they would feel 

comfortable coming to us for any and all questions 

after the LOA is presented and any time they had 

a question or concern about a case. I envision the 

leaders of each US service having full basing/port 

rights in-country if and when they needed them, 

without negotiation or additional payments for 

use (support/logistics is always a different story), 

and we ensure that access continually. I envision 

the partner-nation leaders asking the ODC to 

escort them to the US for official visits. I see 

us identifying ways we could help the partnernation save money or build capability, and then 

7. When does the FY for your partner-nation end? 

If not for several months, then don’t sweat it. 

If it’s one or two months away, you may be 

crunching to finalize any signatures so they can 

spend remaining FY dollars before they lose the 

money with the new FY. Know this information 

by asking the FMS experts on your team.

8. Whoever answers the main office phone 

represents your office to the world. Who is the 

primary phone answering person and do they 

know this? Who is the backup? What happens 

when the office is closed? Do the phones get 

forwarded to a Command Post? Cell phone? 

Voice mail? Answering machine? What’s your 

answering machine message?

9. Enter your office numbers in the contact list of 

your Blackberry and set up your Blackberry 

voice mail. Nothing like hearing the voice of 

the previous SCO Chief answering voice mails. 

Regarding the office numbers, entering in 

numbers will make it easier to reach your team 

during in-processing.

10. Business cards will be a necessity on Day One 

If you can get a starter batch created before 

arriving, that would be best. Most I’ve seen from 

ODCs and OMCs around the world are double 

sided, meaning English on one side and partnernation language on the other side.

11. Set up your dashboard. I’d love to go into an 

in-depth discussion about the dashboard a SCO 

leader can set up to make life easy, but there just 

isn’t enough room in this article. Suffice it to say, 

I will cover this in a future article (see Toolkits 

article).

12. Ensure you know, and have designated in 

writing, you’re buying official (to buy things/

spend money). Also, find out who is the TDY 

certifying official? If it’s you, grab the DISAM 

DVD and/or contact your GCC support staff 

for the required training, and do the certifying 

official course. Make sure your office supplies 

buyer is accurate with the books. The IG will 

need to see the authorizing certificates during the 

next IG visit, and knowing this information will 

help keep you within budget and on top of any 

budget concerns, especially during sequestration.

13. Read the Emergency Action Plan (EAP). Does 

SDO/DATT do emergency exercises? Learn 

where your safe havens are and where the 

alternate command center is in case access to 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 60

yourself over, it’s easy to copy/change the names 

for other visits. They wanted letters...we gave 

them lots of letters, asking if we could meet 

routinely. Eventually, they stopped asking for 

letters and just said, “come on over.”

18. Contact ODC support at the GCC (they should 

not have to call you) to look at OPR/EPR/

FITREP/NCOER currency, upcoming boards, 

and physical fitness test currency for your folks. 

Ask them about any classes out there, your 

personnel require (AF Negotiations courses, 

ACQ courses, JPME II, DISAM, INTAC, etc). 

Ask them about due dates for upcoming awards 

and get on their distro list. This establishes comm 

with them and gets you added to their distro lists 

for all conferences and events.

19. Set your calendar for the next year, to remind 

you four weeks before any evaluation is due. 

This allows the ratee time to provide some data 

for you to write it. I recommend you also pre-set 

it for any paperwork due, for example, weekly 

activity reports, white papers, Javits report, etc.

20. Get your expectations to your folks every 

six months, except Army personnel, which is 

required quarterly. That way, if you are TDY or 

on Leave, they know what’s expected of them 

and they know what responsibilities they have. 

Once you set expectations (I do it in writing), 

you have established everything from basic SCO 

rules to performance expectations. Some basic 

SCO ROE include but are certainly not limited 

to: dress code, punctuality, language, physical 

fitness supplementary training requirements, 

etc. Some performance expectations can include 

more: cultivate a network of partner-nation 

contacts; 100 percent complete on EEUM; know 

all major US business reps in the area; no missing 

information on partner-nation LORs before they 

go to the IA for LOA build; escort two DVs 

per semi–annual period; connect tasks to Lines 

of Activity to Lines of Effort; etc. If you don’t 

set expectations, your personnel will start doing 

things that take them away from your mission of 

building partnerships.

21. Obtain expectations of the SDO/DATT. I once 

worked for an individual who provided me 

with one expectation at our initial meeting. He 

said flat out, he needs leadership in a particular 

Division. He emphasized it had been run by 

poor leadership for two years and he needed 

make these a reality. I envision our personnel 

developing innovative ways in which the SCO 

could save money yet still accomplish our 

mission. I envision hearing about a welcoming 

atmosphere whenever one of our SCO personnel 

calls a partner-nation counterpart, and I saw 

partner-nation attendance at all of our personnel’s 

farewell parties before a PCS. I envision all our 

spouses being comfortable calling the office, or 

stopping by whenever, and participating in SCO 

family events, as well as feeling comfortable 

calling me or my spouse at any time for anything. 

I envision officers and NCOs seeking leadership 

positions or leadership responsibilities (non-solo 

projects) in order to highlight themselves for 

higher levels of responsibility, promotions and 

PME in-residence pushes. Yet another vision, 

one becoming more prolific as sequestration hits, 

is envisioning the partner-nation at the functional 

level so they need little help from the SCO; teach 

them to fish, then get out of the way. This is 

truer for developed nations or nations in which 

the partner-nation acquisitions-personnel are 

DISAM trained, remain consistently in the job, 

understand and are well trained to perform FMS 

tasks with the Implementing Agencies (SAF/IA, 

NIPO, USASAC). The problem that comes to 

light with this vision is, a reduction in FMS for 

one nation, while itself negligible, impacts the 

whole of FMS with reduced US participation in 

mil–to–mil relationships and certainly decreases 

US business participation.

16. Be aware of and use social media. Friend the 

GCC commander on his Facebook page. A great 

DISAM instructor, referring to Admiral Stavridis 

in EUCOM, once told me, “The Admiral knows 

his friends.” When the GCC Commander has 

something to say about Security Cooperation 

or something good to say about your partnernation, this is where he or she will say it. 

This is their comm channel to the command, 

and communication is critical to successful 

leadership. Sometimes you’ll see new news on 

their Facebook (social media) page first.

17. Start building relationships: ODC and embassy 

staff (personalities count...first impressions last), 

go meet your partner-nation rank-equivalents. 

In Turkey, a letter to the Turkish General Staff 

was required to do this. OK. Accept that process 

and do it. Besides, after doing one letter inviting 
61 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

grog)/Dining Out, AF and/or USMC Ball; host 

retirement dinners at your house for O-5s or 

O-6s and E-8s and 9s assigned to you who will 

soon be retiring; some event (last Fri/month 

party) for your office; post-IG inspection party 

should ALWAYS be the biggest party of the year 

(never skimp on a post–inspection party); Round 

Metal Objects (unit coins); decorate offices of 

newly selected E-8s or E-9s, 0-6s, or GOs; Aloha 

Fridays (everyone gets out early); monthly PTFriday; hails and farewells; hose down honoree 

at fini flight (if you have a C-12); it’s a travesty 

that this one is waning, but your whole staff/

unit should attend E-8 or E-9/O-6 and above/

your boss’s retirement or change of command 

if these happen at your location. Also, consider 

a monthly lunch with leader of local retiree 

organization (MOA, NCOA, etc) if applicable; 

hitting the Marine house on party Fridays, and 

staying there late. Doing this really opened up 

a line of communication with others around the 

building/Embassy I would never get to know 

otherwise, and gives you a chance to inspire 

people to do things (National CGOC, volunteer 

for leadership roles, advanced education, etc) to 

better themselves and their unit, which, in turn, 

bettered the military.

25. Get on social media (get Facebook). May sound 

trivial, but it is a great way to connect with the 

families of the people in your organization. For 

the younger crowd, it is their communication lifeline. Now, I say this with a bit of trepidation...

nothing beats face-to-face communication, and I 

much prefer face-to-face leadership any day, but 

to break the ice with the 25s and below, and to 

connect families of that crowd, use social media 

as a tool and supplement it with face-to-face 

“analog” leadership I can’t count the number of 

times spouses have thanked me for answering 

questions over social media that they didn’t 

want to ask the boss of their husband (or wife) in 

person. As time went by, this barrier broke down 

and they were comfortable calling me directly 

with questions, which was always OK. I also 

discovered that social media makes a fantastic 

communication tool when you need to get 

information to everybody in your organization 

and their families, fast...like in the aftermath of 

a suicide bombing when phone lines go down, or 

you need to get short updates out quickly. Plus, 

someone who could re-motivate and re-focus the 

military and civilians in the Division and lead 

them towards achieving a common goal. It took 

about 1 month for me to realize, he didn’t want 

leadership, he wanted an O-6 action officer. No 

wonder people in the Division had been all over 

the map; they were under the wrong impression 

regarding what was expected of them for two 

years! Four weeks after I started that job I sat 

down with that commander and we talked about 

some additional expectations of me that he 

would see (besides leadership). You will be able 

to tell how well an SDO/DATT knows both jobs 

by how well that individual defines expectations 

for the SCO.

22. Start mentoring sessions with personnel. This 

will require an understanding of the Joint system 

as well as how different services promote their 

people, or just understand the assignment process 

for each service. This is where you contact your 

connections from other services from DISAM 

course and ask them how for their opinion on 

how they would mentor or vector your Joint 

service personnel.

23. Start holding quarterly gatherings (for example, 

dinners) at your house, and invite small groups 

from your SCO to talk with visiting guests 

(E–8/9s, general officers, the ambassador or 

DCM, visiting DVs, SCO leadership from 

neighboring countries, NATO leaders in the 

same country or city, etc). Your personnel will 

appreciate your concern for their development 

and the “face time,” and these special guests will 

appreciate the opportunity to mentor, learn about 

you, learn what’s going on out in the field, give 

you a perspective you don’t see every day, and 

not just talk shop/business.

24. What are your loyalties towards military 

traditions? Traditions are getting lost in today’s 

fast–paced military, and can easily be lost when 

you are in the outskirts of a small country in a small 

SCO. Many Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors don’t 

understand that traditions are critical to defining 

our military. Amongst other things, traditions 

define your personality as an organization more 

than most other things. Pick a few and broadcast 

your tradition loyalties early, so your personnel 

have time to assimilate. Examples vary based 

on size of the military contingent, and include, 

but are certainly not limited to: Dining In (with 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 62

someone in your unit has already died or been 

injured. Motorcycle fatalities are one of the top 

three causes for military deaths for the under 

30 crowd. Are your motorcycle riders certified, 

insured, trained? Are the bikes in good repair, 

registered, street legal for your partner-nation? 

You need eyes on the bikes and the driver’s 

credentials. Several SCO chiefs I have met tell 

me, their personnel are adults and can handle 

this responsibility themselves. My answer—

your personnel are not working for the military, 

they are in the military...which means, they 

abide by an additional set of rules and principles, 

to include leadership authority and a chain of 

command. You can tell them to ride or not ride, 

but by validating training, registration, bike 

condition, etc, you are telling them, as a military 

leader you care about their well-being outside the 

office as well, and not just their job performance. 

In the military, leadership responsibilities don’t 

end at the end of the work–day.

33. Make an appointment and get to know all E-8/9s, 

your secretary, other O-6s in your facility or 

Embassy, and on any nearby bases (also learn 

their promotion potential/timing). As with 

success in any assignment you’ve ever had in the 

military, a key to success as a SCO leader will 

be dependent on the relationships you build with 

Americans (civilians and military) to help you 

get your job done.

34. As a professional courtesy, call the previous SCO 

leader or ODC Chief to see which folks he/she 

brought into the SCO for a reason, or are fasttracking for command or promotion. 

35. Take a look at where all major FMS cases are 

in LOR process, for situational awareness. This 

will give you a pulse on the organization and 

let’s you see where the emphasis areas might 

be. Partner-nation will be asking about status of 

case-builds, sometimes in the same meeting as 

your introduction.

36. In writing or e-mail (or, for small SCOs, do this 

yourself), change the safe combinations, and find 

out how many people have access to each safe. 

Also check to find out when door locks were 

changed last, for rooms with safes, and have 

them changed again if it has been awhile (in 

accordance with appropriate regulations).

37. Complete a unit compliance inspection 

(mandatory within the first sixty days). The best 

when you control the message, less RUMINT 

gets started.

26. Know when the mandatory meetings are with 

the: SDO/DATT; your GCC; staff meetings; 

Country Team meetings; Director’s meetings; 

monthly VTCs with the J5; etc.

27. Obtain an electronic copy of current recall 

rosters (for your Blackberry and/or computer) 

and start loading your Blackberry with contact 

information. I’m sure there are numerous regs 

out there that cover storage of this type of 

information, but for Air Force personnel, this 

type of information must be stored in a FOUO 

labeled folder, which BlackBerry can do.

28. Air Force personnel, arrange Email-4-Life 

e-mail to go to your local base account. As the 

AF migrates to a common email server, this may 

change, but for now, E4L must be re–registered 

every time you move, to sink up with your new 

server location. To do this, go to the AF Portal, 

at the top click the email button and follow the 

directions.

29. Run a recall to ensure the names and numbers are 

correct. The first time you want to find out your 

recall tree is screwed up is not during the first 

crises. If you are Air Force, then concurrently, 

run a Personnel Accountability Event for the 

AFPAAS system. It will let you register Joint 

personnel under your charge, and satisfies AF 

accountability requirements in the event of a 

natural disaster.

30. Round Metal Objects: back in WWI, allied pilots 

who were supported by civilians would present 

them with gold coins in return for the assistance. 

That tradition has manifested itself today in the 

form of unit coins, or RMOs. Put your new RMO 

in your pocket. Order more after changing the 

design from previous leadership; expect to pay 

for these yourself. Plan to trade out with visiting 

military GOs. Don’t get caught without one 

when a Flag Officer coins you as a thank you for 

a good visit.

31. Expand your e-mail inbox capacity and/or create 

.pst for larger files. Inevitably, rather than getting 

the, “YOUR MAILBOX IS ALMOST FULL” 

message, you can head this one off.

32. What’s your motorcycle program? Hit it 

constantly! You must be proactive––there is no 

such thing as being ‘reactive’ with motorcycle 

safety policies and programs. Reactive means 
63 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

you know how they are doing with Professional 

Military Education, advanced academic degree, 

flying gate months, and their last deployment, 

etc. For C-12 pilots, check their 30/60/90 flight 

times.

43. Establish a personal PT time on schedule and 

notify the office you wish to stick to it, so they 

don’t schedule/plan any meetings during those 

times.

44. Schedule time with med folks, OSI, JA, Chaplain, 

DAO, and Mental Health to determine if you 

have any unit problems you need to know about 

(this is NOT immersion in their unit but a bigpicture look at your SCO)

45. Call or make contact with previous SCO Chiefs 

to ask them of any pet projects/programs/civilian 

connections they started and why, so that you 

can continue to cultivate that same program or 

network. This helps you avoid the same problems 

they had, and not have to re-invent the wheel. 

They will also want to know how the unit is doing 

and latest news from the front. Also, legacy is 

important in the military. Former SCO leaders 

will support you in their circles if they know 

you are seeking their advice and continuing their 

name/legacy. This, in turn, will build a network 

so you can help your personnel get their desired 

jobs after the SCO assignment.

46. Within the first sixty days, it’s important to obtain 

a copy of the Theater Campaign Plan, Country 

Cooperation Plan, and the Ambassador’s ICS/

MRR or MSRP. The GCC desk officer can help 

and can sometimes provide the unclass version, 

as well. The items in common between all three 

are where you should focus your efforts, and the 

reason is, it’s more easily justifiable to everybody 

in the decision–making process. Now, not every 

nation thinks more than a year or two ahead, so 

they may or may not have their own strategic 

plan. Turkey has a ten-year procurement plan. If 

a strategic or procurement plan exists, compare 

the partern-nation’s plan with the common 

elements of the three plans you already have 

and find commonalities amongst them. Consider 

writing an unclassified white-paper, or something 

that highlights only the common areas amongst 

the four plans and translates them into training/

equipment/exercises, etc.

47. Look at State’s USAID plan.

way to do this would be to go to the GCC IG 

website and download the recent IG checklist, 

and then run it for your SCO. If any questions 

come up, call or e-mail the IG and ask. This 

gives you a baseline as to how you are doing, and 

provides you with areas for improvement.

38. Look at last promotion board results for all your 

personnel. For the ones who didn’t get promoted, 

figure out why. Chances are there won’t be any 

surprises. Rarely, the system doesn’t work as 

it should and someone who should have been, 

wasn’t. That’s when you go to work and elevate 

the correct potential and performance picture of 

this individual to the higher rating chain.

39. What is your alternate work location if 

something happens to your office/facility? For 

example, air conditioning fails (in summer); 

the building/office catches fire/tornado damage; 

suicide bomber takes out the office next door, 

etc. Schedule/practice a move to this alternate 

work location. Your mission should not grind to a 

standstill if the building or office is inaccessible.

40. Ask a Safety person (either internal or from 

the GCC) to inspect all offices (unless done 

recently, in which case ask them to check for 

safety compliance). Ask a Security person to do 

the same thing. You don’t want a preventable 

incident or accident to pop up out of nowhere 

because the last time your office was screened 

was several years ago.

41. Check to see how Partner Nation military 

budgeting system is organized. Does the military 

go directly to you? Is there an Acquisition corps? 

Is there a civilian arm in the partner-nation that 

approves/signs LORs? New personnel will need 

to know, US businesses will need to know, and 

the smart–person you ask will appreciate the 

opportunity to teach the boss something. Also, 

it cages your brain as to who is who in the 

procurement world.

42. You’ll need a “picture” of your personnel; not a 

photo, but data points to help you see how their 

careers are progressing. Pull their last two or three 

OPR/OER/Fitrep/NCOER. Check their physical 

fitness currency. Check the amount of use/lose 

Leave that will be remaining on 1 Oct. Obtain the 

file on all the personnel (called a SRF in USAF) 

that directly report to you from the GCC ODC 

assistance folks, to see how they are looking: 

for upcoming boards and assignments; and so 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 64

out as you go along. I also highly suggest you 

contact buddies from DISAM or other ODCs and 

obtain their ideas.

51. Morale is a big thing with me and I highlighted 

the individuals I saw reflecting high unit/office 

morale at every opportunity. This set a tone 

quickly within the ODC.

52. Your OGE 450 Financial Disclosure form will 

be due within sixty days of your arrival. Go to 

the Financial Disclosure Management website at 

https://www.fdm.army.mil.

53. 53. Establish your Critical Information 

Requirements (CIR)(or at least review the 

previous. SDO/DATTs or ODC Chief’s). This 

is basically a list of items you should be woken 

up for if they happen in the middle of the night. 

Some examples include: death or serious injury 

of any SCO person or defense attaché, or their 

immediate family member; arrest of any SCO 

person or defense attaché, or their immediate 

family member; major damage to USG property; 

discovery of violation of US law (Leahy vetting 

discovery) or partner-nation law; attack on any 

American in your partner-nation, crash of any 

partner-nation military aircraft; loss of life of any 

Partner Nation active–duty military leadership; 

etc. The next step would be, for each CIR, list 

who you would contact, with a phone number. 

The middle of the night is not the time to go 

fishing for phone numbers when information 

needs to flow up the chain.

54. Each GCC will be different, but find out 

and take the required online, annual training 

courses. Some include: Joint AT/FP course (you 

can access it at https://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/); 

Combating Trafficking in Persons (go to http://

ctip.defense.gov, select Training and find the ctip 

course); Social Networking Awareness course; 

GCC OPSEC course; SHARP training—Sexual 

Harassment; DTS Approver course; wheeledvehicle course certificate in order to get a 

U-Drive-It; Information Assurance course.

DSCA now collects and disseminates Lessons 

Learned and Best Practices that are relevant to the 

Security Cooperation Community. CAC holders 

can submit lessons learned and best practices using 

the new DSCA page in the Joint Lessons Learned 

Information System (JLLIS) at www.jllis.mil. You 

can also submit directly to the DISAM Directorate of 

Research: gregory.sutton@disam.dsca.mil (Primary) 

48. Obtain a listing of your personnel who have 

relatives or family friends that are flag officers 

or O-6s, E-9s, elected officials, SESs, retired 

any of the above, etc. When MGen Richardson 

shows up and walks through your SCO offices 

to say hello to his daughter-in-law...or my 

all time favorite—when the Speaker of the 

US House of Representatives is visiting your 

country and, without warning, stops by to say 

hello to her Godson—this is not the time to find 

out who the DV relatives are in your unit. Put 

these folks on your radar scope. Are they on 

track for next board, PME, advanced academic 

degree, leadership positions, opportunities for 

development, or are they being shoved aside? If 

so, why? The reasons may be legitimate but you 

will need to justify it when their DV parent calls 

or the GCC Vice asks you (because he is close 

friends with the DV parent). Also, some folks 

were brought into that office specifically to be 

groomed for the next promotion and leadership 

position under the previous SCO or SDO/DATT, 

and you should know this to carry on the intent 

as a professional courtesy.

49. Ask your Chaplain and NCOIC for a list of 

personnel that have: non-mainstream religions, 

officer/enlisted marriage, EFMP, single parents 

with kids, Unfavorable Information File (quality 

force indicators, Article 15s, etc), total SNCOs 

(by rank). For smaller SCOs, it may be easier to 

look the information up yourself, in personnel 

records.

50. Create Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC). Have 

all your personnel’s living addresses handy in 

case of emergency, so you’re not fishing. With 

these QRCs, I also had a personal checklist of 

what initial steps to take/think about if there was 

a personnel death (step 1 was always to notify 

SDO/DATT, step 2 was the ambassador, step 

3 was our NCOIC). Lastly, know the steps to 

get a person emergency-shipped to the States. 

This involves a ton of calls if you don’t know 

what to do, and it is not the State Department’s 

responsibility. Besides, they don’t use Red Cross 

like the military does. Some QRC examples 

include, death in office, death of a family member 

of an individual in your office, and suicide 

bombing adjacent to our building. Deaths are the 

worst thing that could happen to your unit, and 

you need to be ready for it rather than figure it 
65 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

jeffrey.fourman.ctr@disam.dsca.mil (Alternate). If 

you find something that is particularly helpful to you, 

be a buddy, tell a friend!

About the Author

Jeff Fourman is an analyst and research 

consultant for the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management. He has a bachelor’s degree 

in international studies from the University of Dayton 

and is currently completing his master’s thesis on 

external support for insurgent groups. He also works 

on several security cooperation workforce initiatives, 

and his research focuses on the study of terrorism, 

European integration, and other international security 

issues.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 66
67 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Cooperation Office (SCO), and vetting the student 

for criminal activities and human rights abuses (i.e. 

Leahy Vetting). If the event is not considered training, 

the above SC/SA requirements and processes may 

not apply, though other organizational guidance may 

exist which is outside the scope of this article.

This article will help the reader determine 

whether or not an event fits the definition of Training 

for International Military Partners, thus requiring 

specific SC/SA processes to be followed. At the 

very least, this article will point out the policies 

and directives which currently exist in order to help 

determine what international military training is.

The broad definition for international military 

training comes from the Foreign Assistance Act 

(FAA), as amended, as well as the Arms Export 

Control Act (AECA), as amended.

Para n, Sec 644, chapter 3, of the FAA, as 

amended, states that the definition of ‘‘Military 

education and training’’ includes:

“formal or informal instruction of foreign 

students in the United States or overseas by 

officers or employees of the United States, 

contract technicians, contractors (including 

instruction at civilian institutions), or 

by correspondence courses, technical, 

educational, or information publications and 

media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, 

and military advice to foreign military units 

and forces.”

The AECA, as amended, has a very similar 

definition for “Training.” AECA, Section 47(5) (22 

U.S.C. 2794(5)), as amended, states that “Training” 

includes:

“formal or informal instruction of foreign 

students in the United States or overseas 

by officers or employees of the United 

States, contract technicians, or contractors 

(including instruction at civilian institutions), 

or by correspondence courses, technical, 

What is Military Training?

By Aaron Prince

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

What is training, or more specifically, what is 

international military training from a US perspective?

Believe it or not, this is not always an easy question 

to answer when it comes to International Military 

Training that falls under Security Assistance (SA) 

or Security Cooperation (SC) authorities. Training is 

when you teach something to someone, right? Well, 

what constitutes teaching? Depending on how you 

look at it, what is considered teaching (or training) can 

fall into a very “grey area.” A joint military exercise 

between the US and an international country—is 

this training? When a US military organization does 

an “outreach” event or a conference with a foreign 

partner—is this training? When the Geographical 

Combatant Command (GCC) asks a US military 

organization to hold a seminar for an international 

military customer, is this considered training? As you 

ponder these questions, it comes to light that what is 

and what is not official training may not be as cut and 

dried as originally thought.

Why do we need to even concern ourselves 

with the term training? Who cares if an international 

partner participates in a military exercise or even in 

a Professional Military Education (PME) class at the 

Naval Postgraduate School? If it is determined that 

an international military student is attending training 

under a Security Assistance or Security Cooperation 

Authority, the training must be accounted for, 

that student and the unit they come from must be 

identified, the training must be paid for, and certain 

processes and procedures must be accomplished 

according to established Security Cooperation/

Security Assistance (SC/SA) processes. This must be 

accomplished both before the student can attend the 

training event, as well as during the training event 

itself. An illustration of just a handful of these SC/SA 

processes includes, but is not limited to: documenting 

the student’s biographical information, ensuring the 

student has been medically screened, creating the 

Invitational Travel Orders by the applicable Security 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 68

program guidance of their own that is outside the 

scope of this article).

DOD training does not include these types of 

events:

1. Exercise (Incidental training is permitted as part 

of an exercise, including familiarization, safety 

and interoperability training with a force when 

necessary to permit conducting the exercise. This 

limited “incidental training” does not equate to 

providing a new capability for the international 

partner).

2. Individual and Collective Interface Activities, 

which include:

• Individual or Subject Matter Expert 

Exchanges

• Mil-To-Mil Contacts

• Seminars and Conferences

• Partnership and other small unit exchanges 

where the primary focus is interoperability 

or mutually beneficial exchanges and not 

training of foreign security forces

3. Bona fide familiarization and orientation visits

4. Pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) or other 

planning and coordination visits supporting the 

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) or 

training event

In the first section above, related to item 7 

(US-Sponsored training programs), chapter 15, a 

relatively new chapter, has been added to DSCA 

Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management 

Manual (SAMM). This chapter describes the 

various Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs 

(such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 

(ASFF), DOD Counternarcotics (CN) Program, 

Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) 

etc.) which, “encompass security cooperation and 

security assistance activities that are funded with 

US Government appropriations and administered 

as cases within the FMS [SC/SA] infrastructure.” 

Nearly all of the BPC programs outlined in SAMM 

C15.1.4 include the word “training.” Therefore, 

training events under BPC programs must follow SC/

SA training procedures and processes unless other 

program specific regulatory guidance exists.

As mentioned earlier, when looking at the 

DOD definition for international military training, 

the phrase “result in the improvement of their 

capabilities” is a key concept. The US Army’s 

Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School 

attempts to explain this concept further in their 2012 

educational, or information publications and 

media of all kinds, training aid, orientation, 

training exercise, and military advice to 

foreign military units and forces.”

These two “training” definitions are quite broad 

and could include just about any kind of information 

exchange. As the Department of Defense (DOD) 

is responsible for managing and implementing 

international military training and education for 

foreign countries, the DOD Joint Staff attempted to 

narrow down the definition of training and provide 

more specific details. They accomplished this in a 

policy message disseminated in June 2004. (Yes, the 

policy is now over eight years old, but the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA] has confirmed 

that the policy is still in effect). This policy message 

was distributed to the DOD international training 

community with the following subject line: Human 

Rights Verification for DOD-Funded Training of 

Foreign Personnel.

In this policy message, military training of 

foreign personnel is defined to mean, “instruction of 

foreign security force personnel that may result in 

the improvement of their capabilities.” The wording 

“result in the improvement of their capabilities” is a 

very important aspect of this definition as we will see 

later. This message, as illustrated below, goes on to 

further spell out specific events that DOD considers 

training, and which must follow established SC/SA 

procedures. 

DOD training does include (among other things) 

the following events:

1. Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)

2. Counternarcotics Training

3. Counternarcoterrorist Training

4. Humanitarian Demining Training

5. DOD Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 

(CTFP)

6. Any training activities conducted under the 

Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund

7. US-Sponsored training programs, to include the 

International Military Education and Training 

Program (IMET) and FMS-purchased training at 

DOD educational institutions

This policy message goes on to identify events 

that are not considered to be training of international 

partners, and thus do not need to follow SC/SA 

training procedures (the events should have specific 
69 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

primary purpose is safety and interoperability 

of the foreign troops. Additionally, it is a short 

duration (2 hours) training event, the cost is 

not significant, and their level of training is 

not significantly enhanced (since the foreign 

troops are already airborne qualified). 

Therefore, this would likely be classified as 

Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization 

Training, and DOD may fund this training 

with its own O&M funds.”

“On the other hand, training foreign troops on 

airborne operations, including the provision 

of DOD trainers for a month-long airborne 

school to qualify all the individual foreign 

troops in airborne jumps, would likely be 

classified as Security Assistance Training 

(“Big T” training). In this case, the duration 

of the training is long (one month), the cost 

is likely significant, and most importantly, 

the level of training of the foreign troops 

is significantly increased. As a result, the 

primary purpose of the training is not the 

Interoperability, Familiarization, and Safety 

of the foreign troops, and this training should 

be classified as Security Assistance training” 

(Operational Law Handbook).

Even with current guidance, regulations, policies, 

and handbooks regarding the definition of international 

military training, it can still be difficult to determine 

“Big T” training from “Little t” training in certain 

circumstances. When does a seminar or conference 

cross over to training? Military Exercises might also 

include an element of training that would increase 

the foreign country’s military capabilities; does this 

then cross over into the “Big T” training definition? If 

there are still lingering questions regarding whether 

an event is “Big T” training or not, contact your 

service’s International Affairs/Security Cooperation 

Policy and/or legal office (who may contact DSCA 

for further assistance) for a determination. In an 

effort to improve definitions and guidance for “Big 

T” training, it was determined during the November 

2012 DSCA Training Policy Meeting that DSCA 

would put together a working group to add language 

to the SAMM that would provide clarification on 

circumstances under which SC training processes are 

required for SC-funded foreign military personnel 

undergoing other than institutional training by the 

DOD.

Operational Law Handbook when they differentiate 

“Big T” training (that provides new capabilities) from 

“Little t” training (which provides no new capability, 

but ensures safety and interoperability during an 

event). Although, the handbook specifically mentions 

Security Assistance Training, Department of State 

(DOS) authorizations and DOS appropriations, 

the same qualification would apply to Security 

Cooperation Training, DOD authorizations and DOD 

appropriations. If “Big T” training applies, then SC/

SA processes must be followed unless other program 

specific regulatory guidance exists.

Chapter 14, section IX.A.1.a(1) of the handbook 

states, “If the primary purpose of the training of 

foreign forces is to improve the operational readiness 

of the foreign forces, then this is Security Assistance 

[or Security Cooperation] Training (“Big T”) and 

should be funded with DOS [or appropriate DOD] 

authorizations and appropriations. On the other hand, 

if the primary purpose of the training of foreign forces 

is for interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization, 

then this is Interoperability Training (“Little t”) and 

is NOT security assistance [or security cooperation] 

training.”

Factors to consider when determining if an event 

is “Big T” or “Little t” training include, “the cost of 

the training, the current level of training of the foreign 

troops before the training vs. the expected level of 

training of the foreign troops after the training is 

complete, and the amount of time and resources that 

DOD will need to expend to provide the training. 

As these factors increase, it becomes more likely 

that the training envisioned is Security Assistance 

[or appropriate Security Cooperation] Training, as 

opposed to Interoperability Training” (Operational 

Law Handbook). 

Furthermore, the Operational Law Handbook 

attempts to give examples of the difference between 

providing “improved operational readiness” to 

foreign forces and providing incidental training “for 

interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization” which 

would not be considered real training and would not 

be held to SC/SA requirements and processes: 

“A month-long Combined Airborne 

Parachute Exercise with other countries, 

whose participating troops are all airborne 

qualified in their own countries, a two-hour 

block of instruction on C-130 entry and egress 

safety procedures would be Interoperability 

Training (“Little t” training), since the 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 70

Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, US 

Army Charlottesville, Virginia, 2012. http://www.

loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/LCS-Internationaland-Operational-Law-Dept.html

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 

Manual 5105.38. Security Assistance 

Management Manual (SAMM). http://www.

dsca.mil/samm/Default.htm

About the Author

Aaron Prince is an Assistant Professor and has 

been teaching at the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management (DISAM) since 2001. He is 

the Functional Coordinator for International Training 

Management at DISAM. He holds a master of science 

degree in administration from Central Michigan 

University.

As described at the beginning of this article, it 

does make a difference if an event is considered to be 

“Big T” training that falls under Security Assistance 

or Security Cooperation Authorizations. If the event 

is “Big T” training, then certain SC/SA processes 

and requirements apply to make sure the training 

is appropriately accounted for and carried out. In 

this case, it is essential that the applicable Military 

Service Training Agency (i.e., Air Force Security 

Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT), Security 

Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA), Naval 

Education and Training Security Assistance Field 

Activity (NETSAFA), Marine Corps Security 

Cooperation Group (MCSCG), and the Coast 

Guard Director of International Affairs and Foreign 

Policy (CG-DCO-I)) be made aware of the training 

requirement and that they program the training into 

the Standardized Training List (STL). In addition, 

the SCO is responsible for such actions as, but not 

limited to: recording the biographical information of 

the student, ensuring proper medical screening and 

coverage requirements are met, vetting the student 

for criminal activity and human rights abuses, and 

creating the Invitational Travel Order. DSCA Manual 

5105.38-M, SAMM chapters 10 and 11, as well as the 

Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training 

regulation (JSCET) contain the complete procedures 

that must be followed when DOD provides “Big T” 

training to an international partner that enhances their 

capability.

References

Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. 

http://www.dsca.mil/programs/LPA/2010/faa_

aeca.pdf

DOD Joint Staff policy message, Human Rights 

Verification for DOD-Funded Training of 

Foreign Personnel, DTG 071300Z Jun 04. http://

www.disam.dsca.mil/documents/itm/functional_

areas/human_rights/dod_memo_human_rights_

verification.pdf

Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended. http://

www.dsca.mil/programs/LPA/2010/faa_aeca.pdf

Joint Security Cooperation Education and 

Training (JSCET), Army Regulation 12–15, 

SECNAVINST 4950.4B, AFI 16–105, 3 January 

2011. http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r12_15.

pdf

Operational Law Handbook, International and 

Operational Law Department, The Judge 
71 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

in the United States. Finally, this article will outline 

a road map for the future of IMETP studies to justify 

Congressional financial support of the IMETP. 

Background

The IMETP, a Security Assistance program 

administered by the Department of State but 

executed by the Department of Defense, encourages 

mutually beneficial relations between the US and 

foreign countries, furthers the goals of international 

peace and security, and develops host-nation skills 

to operate and maintain US-origin equipment.3 

Additionally, a section of the IMETP, known as 

Expanded-IMET, outlines specific training objectives 

to include: “contributing to responsible defense 

resource management; fostering respect for and 

understanding of democracy and civilian rule of 

law, including the principle of civilian control of 

the military; contributing to cooperation between 

military and law enforcement personnel with respect 

to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts; and 

improving the military justice system and promoting 

an awareness and understanding of internationally 

recognized human rights.”4

 Finally, the IMETP is 

partially intended to provide long-term influence 

to hopefully help change the military culture in 

countries that participate in the program. Tunisian 

military leaders’ (long-time participants in the 

IMETP) actions suggest a culture change. This shift, 

however, is best seen in the change in the Egyptian 

military’s culture.

According to a June 2011 paper written by a 

team of West Point faculty, when civil protests broke 

out in Egypt, high-ranking Egyptian civilian and 

military leaders were in Washington, DC attending 

a conference with the US military. Throughout the 

visit and once the Egyptian leaders returned to Egypt, 

US civilian and military diplomats kept in constant 

contact with senior Egyptian leaders, urging them 

to exercise restraint. Key US officials were able to 

rely on strong lines of communication, which were 

IMET Study, Phase II, Part I, and Its 

Application to the Results of the 

Arab Spring

By Ferrelle Rodriguez-Perez Smith

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Introduction

Imagine a country with a powerful autocratic 

regime, an equally strong military, and a festering 

insurgency ready to act at a moment’s notice. Imagine 

a people downtrodden, disenfranchised, and rife with 

poverty. The tension is so thick you can cut it with 

a knife; a powder keg ready to explode. All it will 

take is a spark...BOOM! On December 17, 2010, 

Tarek al-Tayed Mohamed Bouazizi both literally and 

figuratively provided that spark by setting himself on 

fire in the middle of traffic in front of the governor’s 

office in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.1 This one act of 

defiance by a street vendor led to a chain reaction 

of demonstrations, violence, ousting of long-standing 

leaders, and wide-spread death and destruction that 

became known as the Arab Spring. However, the one 

thing that did not happen is the Tunisian military did 

not act against the protesters. Tunisia, Egypt and a few 

other Arab nations’ military leaders made a decision 

that they would respect the human rights of their 

people.2 What is it about these military leaders that 

may be different from the military leaders who chose 

a different course of action? A reasonable conclusion 

is that the military leaders from Tunisia and Egypt 

have been a part of the United States’ International 

Military Education and Training Program for decades. 

This foreign policy program stresses key concepts 

including civilian control of the military, democracy, 

and international human rights. 

This article will explore how the United States’ 

International Military Education and Training 

Program (IMETP) provides access and influence 

for the United States to some of the most turbulent 

countries around the globe. Additionally, this article 

will update and validate the previous 2007–2009 

DoS/DSCA/DISAM IMET Phase I Study findings 

pertaining to the effectiveness of the IMETP by 

continuing to show the link between IMET graduates 

and their understanding of civilian control of the 

military, international human rights, and democracy 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 72

personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic 

values and protect internationally recognized human 

rights.”10

Phase I

Despite the difficult nature of ascertaining the 

quantitative benefits of the IMETP, in 2007 the US 

Department of State and DSCA funded several studies 

to tackle the Congressionally-mandated performance 

evaluation procedures. The first project, a joint effort 

between the Center for Civil-Military Relations 

(CCMR) and the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), 

provided some positive findings relating to senior 

officers attending graduate education under IMETP. 

However, it failed to deliver results evaluating the 

entire IMETP.11

A second effort, known as the IMET Survey 

Phase I, was developed to look comprehensively at 

the program and evaluate the effectiveness of the 

entire IMETP. The IMET Survey Phase I relies on 

questions developed by the Department of State and 

implemented by the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management.12 The major focus of the 

IMET Survey Phase I is an attempt to measure 

the change in perspective of military leaders by 

measuring the IMET students’ “self-described change 

in behavior.”13

The aforementioned IMETP Phase I survey 

findings were concluded based on IMETP students’ 

likert scale responses to evaluate how well the US has 

achieved the purposes of the IMETP. According to this 

2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM study, the technique 

of the Phase I Survey relies upon, “international 

relations theory to determine positive results for the 

US based upon the students’ experiences in the US.”14

The study describes how the results from all the 

student surveys have meaning in several dimensions. 

The second dimension, or reviewing select subsets 

of data in an effort to influence decisions about the 

future uses of IMET, provides a more meaningful 

look at the data collected from the IMETP students. 

Specifically, looking at survey data for questions 

relating to an understanding of US democracy, 

International human rights, and civilian control of 

the military offers quantitative analyses of how well 

the US is doing in meeting the IMETP objectives.15

The DoS/DSCA/DISAM report looked at data 

from IMETP students for 2007–2009. Results from 

the study are as follows:

built on years of personal interaction between the 

leaders of both nations.5

 This paper goes on to say 

that, “Quantitative measures do not reflect the real 

value of education programs. Rather, education 

programs often translate in actions and behaviors, 

rarely recorded in the annals of history, but rooted 

in values, norms and practices that are formed over 

years of in-depth education and character building.”6

It is this in-depth education and character building 

that is the crux of the International Military Education 

and Training Program. LTC Michael Wright, US 

Army War College Fellow, demonstrates the effect 

of US influence through aid to Egypt by documenting 

the Egyptian military’s history in dealing with civilian 

unrest in his paper “Does US Security Assistance to 

Egyptian Military Warrant Continued Engagement?” 

According to Wright, the Egyptian Military was asked 

to intervene in three separate civil unrest situations 

from 1977 to 2012. In the first, the Bread Riots of 

1977, the military was responsible for an estimated 

800 dead and hundreds others wounded. In 1986, the 

military stepped in to quell an insurrection involving 

conscripts, resulting in hundreds dead and thousands 

missing. Finally, during the Arab Spring of 2011 and 

the Morsi Presidency of 2012, the military was again 

asked to intervene to suppress civil discord. This 

time, the military responded with professionalism and 

restraint, yielding less than ten overall deaths during 

the entire period of turmoil.7

 Wright attributes the 

change in military response to the fact that mid-level 

officers who graduated from US Professional Military 

Education (PME) schoolhouses under IMETP were 

able to influence senior decision makers; some of 

whom had also attended US PME under IMETP.8

IMETP Significant Research

According to the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency’s (DSCA) website, “The IMET program 

exposes students to the US professional military 

establishment and the American way of life, including 

amongst other things, US regard for democratic 

values, respect for individual and human rights and 

belief in the rule of law.”9

Additionally, the IMET program’s overall 

objectives are “To further the goal of regional stability 

through effective, mutually beneficial military-tomilitary relations which culminate in increased 

understanding and defense cooperation between the 

United States and foreign countries,” and “to increase 

the ability of foreign national military and civilian 
73 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

1.0

Civilian

Control

US

Democracy

Human

Rights

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Pre-Training

Post-Training

Civilian Control of the Military, 2008 Data

Question (mean score)

(1=very negative; 4=very positive)

Region (N)

Pre-training view 

of Civilian control 

of military

Post-training view 

of Civilian control 

of military

Pre to Post 

difference

Western Hemisphere 3.14 3.45 .31

European and Eurasian 3.21 3.44 .23

Near Eastern 3.03 3.53 .50

African 3.03 3.68 .65

South and Central 

Asian 3.11 3.61 .50

East Asian and Pacific 3.14 3.55 .41
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 74

Question (mean score)

(1=very negative; 4=very positive)

Region (N)

Q14. Pretraining view of 

democracy in US

Q15. Post-training 

view of Civilian 

control of military

Mean Difference

Western Hemisphere 3.45 3.66 .21

European and Eurasian 3.42 3.53 .11

Near Eastern 3.58 3.69 .11

African 3.47 3.78 .31

South and Central 

Asian 3.40 3.68 .28

East Asian and Pacific 3.57 3.70 .14

Question (Question mean score and sample size for each region)

(1=very limited; 4=extensive)

Region (N)

Q17. Pre-training 

knowledge of 

international 

human rights 

standards

Q15. Post-training 

knowledge of 

international 

human rights 

standards

Mean Difference

Western Hemisphere 3.26 3.54 .28

European and Eurasian 3.27 3.63 .36

Near Eastern 3.17 3.72 .56

African 3.16 3.73 .57

South and Central 

Asian 2.98 3.58 .59

East Asian and Pacific 3.12 3.44 .33

Change in View of Democracy in the US, 2008 Data

Change in Knowledge of International Human Rights, 2008 Data
75 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Based on the results, the DoS/DSCA/DISAM 

report concluded that IMET has a significant positive 

impact on student perceptions about civilian control 

of the military, democracy in the United States, and 

international human rights. Additionally, the regional 

breakout results indicate that there are marked 

differences in how students from different regions 

perceive civilian control of the military, democracy in 

the US, and international human rights. For example, 

the DoS/DSCA/DISAM report interpreted the 

regional results to show that although regions with 

a longer history of civilian control of the military 

(European and Western Hemisphere) show a positive 

change in understanding the importance of civilian 

control of the military, they show much less change 

than regions where there was significant historical 

military control of civilians (Near Eastern nations). 

Accordingly, IMET in the US significantly changes 

the military members of these Near Eastern nations’ 

perception of the importance of civilian control of the 

military.16

Phase I Results Update

Do the IMETP Phase I study trends continue 

with recent data? 2010–2012 numbers for the same 

categories as the 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM 

study are as follows:

1.0

3.16

3.56 3.49

3.68

3.21

3.61

Civilian

Control

US

Democracy

Human

Rights

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Pre-Training

Post-Training

Civilian Control of the Military, 2010–2012 Data

Question (mean score)

(1=very negative; 4=very positive)

Region (N)

Pre-training view 

of Civilian control 

of military

(2007–2009 numbers)

Post-training view 

of Civilian control 

of military

(2007–2009 numbers)

Pre to Post 

difference

(2007–2009 numbers)

Western Hemisphere 3.31 (3.14) 3.57 (3.45) .26 (.31)

European and Eurasian 3.24 (3.21) 3.49 (3.44) .25 (.23)

Near Eastern 2.98 (3.03) 3.51 (3.53) .53 (.50)

African 3.10 (3.03) 3.66 (3.68) .56 (.65)

South and Central 

Asian 3.10 (3.11) 3.60 (3.61) .50 (.50)

East Asian and Pacific 3.07 (3.14) 3.61 (3.55) .53 (.41)
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 76

Question (mean score)

(1=very negative; 4=very positive)

Region (N)

Q14. Pretraining view of 

democracy in US

(2007–2009 numbers)

Q15. Post-training 

view of Civilian 

control of military

(2007–2009 numbers)

Mean Difference

(2007–2009 numbers)

Western Hemisphere 3.59 (3.45) 3.74 (3.66) .15 (.21)

European and Eurasian 3.49 (3.42) 3.59 (3.53) .10 (.11)

Near Eastern 3.42 (3.58) 3.67 (3.69) .25 (.11)

African 3.49 (3.47) 3.77 (3.78) .28 (.31)

South and Central 

Asian 3.43 (3.40) 3.71 (3.68) .28 (.28)

East Asian and Pacific 3.48 (3.57) 3.73 (3.70) .25 (.14)

Change in View of Democracy in the US, 2010–2012 Data

Question (Question mean score and sample size for each region)

(1=very limited; 4=extensive)

Region (N)

Q17. Pre-training 

knowledge of 

international 

human rights 

standards

(2007–2009 numbers)

Q15. Post-training 

knowledge of 

international 

human rights 

standards

(2007–2009 numbers)

Mean Difference

(2007–2009 numbers)

Western Hemisphere 3.36 (3.26) 3.65 (3.54) .29 (.28)

European and Eurasian 3.31 (3.27) 3.56 (3.63) .25 (.36)

Near Eastern 3.23 (3.17) 3.65 (3.72) .42 (.56)

African 3.16 (3.16) 3.74 (3.73) .58 (.57)

South and Central 

Asian 3.08 (2.98) 3.60 (3.58) .52 (.59)

East Asian and Pacific 3.04 (3.12) 3.62 (3.44) .58 (.33)

Change in Knowledge of International Human Rights, 2010–2012 Data
77 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Of note, the research team’s concern that data 

collected from in-country IMETP graduates years 

post-US studies during Phase II would invalidate 

conclusions reached from data collected in the US 

from IMET graduates during Phase I was proven to 

be unfounded. In all areas, Phase II IMETP graduates 

showed not only a higher understanding of HR, CCM 

and DUS after their IMETP experience, but with an 

even better result than students in the US during Phase 

I. This indicates that upon return to their home nation, 

the value of HR, CCM and DUS is further amplified.

The charts below summarize the initial results. 

The first chart shows the difference between 

assessment of understanding by IMETP students pretraining and the final assessment of IMETP graduates 

in-country years after training. The second chart 

shows the difference between IMETP students after 

training in the US as compared to IMETP graduates 

in-country years after training.

The updated results validate the 2007–2009 

DoS/DSCA/DISAM report’s previous findings that 

IMET significantly impacts student perceptions of 

civilian control of the military, democracy in the US, 

international human rights, and the regional results 

analyses. Of note, in most regions, including the Near 

East, these measures of success of the IMETP are 

even stronger with the updated data.

Phase II

In 2012, Phase II of the IMETP Study began. 

During this phase, studies of multiple countries of 

IMETP graduates were conducted to gather additional 

information on these students years after completing 

IMET-funded training in the US. After conducting 

studies in two countries, the initial review of the data 

is positive and supports the Phase I conclusions that 

the IMETP does meet its Congressionally-mandated 

purposes. 

The initial review of Phase II data focused on 

three questions of particular interest to Congress:

1. Understanding of internationally-recognized 

human rights by IMET graduates (HR);

2. Understanding of the importance of civilian 

control of the military by IMET graduates 

(CCM); and

3. Understanding of the value of democracy as 

practiced in the United States by IMET graduates 

(DUS).

1.0

3.22

3.67

3.43

3.75

3.25

3.72

Civilian

Control

US

Democracy

Human

Rights

IMET Phase II

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Pre-Training

Post-Training
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 78

human rights. If the premise proves accurate, 

there will be even further validity that the IMETP 

positively influences foreign students’ perceptions 

for civilian control of the military, democracy in the 

US, and international human rights, and thus warrants 

continued Congressional funding.

Conclusion

The IMETP is a beneficial foreign policy 

instrument that provides influence and access to 

our foreign partners. IMETP’s premise to provide 

long-term influence to help change foreign military 

cultures with respect to civilian control of the military, 

democracy in the US and international human rights 

was a contributing factor in the actions exhibited 

by the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries (long-time 

participants in IMETP) during the recent Arab Spring 

events. The 2007–2009 DoS/DSCA/DISAM IMETP 

Phase I study used changes in IMETP students’ 

perceptions about civilian control of the military, 

democracy in the US, and international human rights 

to demonstrate that our foreign partners’ military 

leaders are being influenced as a result of their 

participation in the IMETP. 2010–2012 updates to 

the survey continue to show quantitative measures 

validating this success. Some may argue that it is 

difficult to show a definitive cause/effect of the 

IMETP. However, it is reasonable, using historical 

actions of foreign partners participating in the 

IMETP as well as the past and continued IMETP 

study efforts, to conclude that the IMETP is having a 

positive impact on the military leaders of our allies.

Future Phase II Study reports will focus on all 

three Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) IMET Purposes 

assessed in the Phase I study:

FAA IMET Purpose One: Encourage effective 

and mutually beneficial relations and increased 

understanding between the United States and foreign 

countries in furtherance of the goals of international 

peace and security.

FAA IMET Purpose Two: Improve the ability 

of participating foreign countries to utilize their 

resources, including defense articles and defense 

services obtained by them from the United States, 

with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to 

greater self-reliance by such countries.

FAA IMET Purpose Three: Increase the awareness 

of nationals of foreign countries participating in such 

activities of basic issues involving internationally 

recognized human rights.17

Phase III

In the future, a Phase III data analysis will be 

conducted. This phase establishes a control group 

comparison using PME Staff College and War 

College students in-country who have never attended 

IMETP or any other US-funded training. Their 

results will be compared with Phase I and Phase II 

results. The research team’s premise for Phase III is 

that international students who have not participated 

in IMET or other US-funded training will have 

less favorable perceptions for civilian control of 

the military, democracy in the US and international 

1.0

3.56 3.67 3.68 3.75 3.61 3.72

Civilian

Control

US

Democracy

Human

Rights

IMET Phase I

vs

IMET Phase II

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

IMET Phase I

Pre-Training

IMET Phase II

Post-Training
79 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

About the Author

Ferrelle Rodriguez-Perez Smith is a retired 

Air Force Officer and an Assistant Professor at the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 

specializing in International Training Management. 

Mr. Smith was an International Training Manager at 

the Office of Military Cooperation–Egypt, American 

Embassy, Cairo. He has also been an Instructor at the 

United States Air Force Academy and the Squadron 

Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Notes

1. “Map of the Arab Spring Protests,” Tripline, 

http://tripline.net/trip/Map_of_the_Arab_

Spring_Protests-2173004375451003A9EC

A90105EA623D).

2. Daniel Steiman, “Military Decision-Making 

During the Arab Spring.” Muftah: Free & 

Open Debate from Morocco to Pakistan. 

http://muftah.org/military-decision-makingduring-the-arab-spring/.

3. DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, Security 

Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), 

chap 10. http://www.dsca.mil/samm/.

4. Ibid.

5. Nelly Lahoud, et al., “The ‘Arab Spring’: 

Investing in Durable Peace.” (New York: 

Combating Terrorism Center, 2011). 

6. Ibid.

7. Michael Wright, “Does US Security 

Assistance to the Egyptian Military 

Warrant Continued Engagement?” The 

DISAM Journal of International Security 

Cooperation Management (2013). http://

www.disamjournal.org/articles/does-ussecurity-assistance-to-the-egyptian-militarywarrant-continued-engagement-868.

8. Ibid.

9. DSCA, “International Military Education 

and Training (IMET).” Last modified 

November 15, 2010. http://www.dsca.mil/

home/international_military_education_

training.htm

10. Ibid.

11. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management and Air Force Institute of 

Technology, “State Department and Defense 

Department Study on the Effectiveness of 

IMET Program 2001–2009,” (2010):3–4.

12. Ibid., 4.

13. Ibid., 5.

14. Ibid., 5.

15. Ibid., 7.

16. Ibid., 11.

17. Ibid., 4.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 80
81 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

country team training coordinator, Office of Defense 

Cooperation (ODC), or Military Advisory Group 

(MILGRP) representative. The country team training 

manager will review the Training Military Articles 

and Services List (T-MASL) with the host nation 

training manager to determine which DISAM course 

offering best meets the host country requirement. 

This may be an in-country MET or a residence 

course. Once it’s determined the country requires 

a MET, due to financial considerations and larger 

student audience, a training request is submitted 

by the US country team training manager to the 

Air Force Security Assistance Training squadron 

(AFSAT) AFSAT is the Implementing Agency (IA) 

for DISAM METs. The AFSAT country program 

manager will coordinate with DISAM to determine 

the availability of requested dates and details of the 

MET. Once complete, the AFSAT country program 

manager can input the request onto the country’s 

Standardized Training List (STL). The country team 

training manager and host nation are notified of the 

approval of the request, and directed to the DISAM 

MET coordinator to arrange the details of the MET. 

According to Mr. Roger Scott and Mr. Barton 

Chess, DISAM Assistant Professors of Security 

Cooperation, METs are both challenging and 

rewarding. Pre-MET preparation is detailed and 

lengthy. Shot records reviewed and updated, antimalaria medication, and physician’s approval 

are required for certain METs. In addition, travel 

complications are common with METs; delays in visa 

and passport requests (sometimes in excess of two 

months), security incidents in country, and difficulty 

coordinating student availability with proposed 

training dates are common.

LT Brittany Kaluscak, Instructor of Security 

Cooperation, emphasizes the importance of 

flexibility and planning to a successful MET. Local 

holidays, such as Ramadan, must also be factored 

into scheduling. Mailing of projectors, printers, 

Mobile Education Teams: Bringing 

DISAM Expertise to the Customer

By LCDR Dale Klan

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Thousands of Security Assistance and Security 

Cooperation professionals around the globe are 

familiar with the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management’s (DISAM) various 

residence and online course offerings. Every year, 

DISAM hosts US and allied-nation military and 

civilian personnel for training tailored to everyone 

from Security Cooperation Officers to senior 

civilians. Tutorials are provided for general and 

flag officers assigned to various overseas billets, 

and on-site training is held at various agencies 

around the country. However, fewer personnel are 

familiar with DISAM’s Mobile Education Teams 

(METs). Each year, DISAM subject matter experts in 

finance, logistics, training, technology transfer, and 

International Program Security Requirements bring 

DISAM training to US and host-nation personnel 

around the globe. Funded by the requesting country, 

METs are tailored to provide the training and 

instructor expertise requested by each customer. They 

may last anywhere from three days to three weeks 

and cover topics ranging from an introduction to SA/

SC programs up to Advanced Finance, Logistics, and 

Training. METs are scheduled up to ten times per 

year and have been conducted in locations such as 

Iraq, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Qatar, India, Australia, 

and Mexico. METs are a cost-effective way to deliver 

training to allied nations, without the requirement for 

the country to fund travel, lodging and per diem for 

fifty or more students to attend courses in residence at 

Wright Patterson AFB. Customers may use a variety 

of methods to fund METs, including grant funding, 

defined or blanket order Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) cases, and International Military Education 

and Training funds, with a waiver.

According to LCDR Will Scarborough, DISAM 

MET Coordinator, the MET request and coordination 

process can be fairly lengthy and complex. The 

requesting nation’s training coordinator will 

identify a requirement and coordinate with the US 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 82

FY 2013

Taiwan 28 Jan–8 Feb 2013

(Conducted in Washington, DC)

Australia 28 Jan–8 Feb 2013

Denmark 25 Feb–8 Mar 2013

Colombia 6 May–17 May 2013

Mexico 15 Jul–26 Jul 2013

Afghanistan 20 Aug–4 Sep 2013 (Pending)

Iraq 9–28 Sep 2013 (Pending)

India 16 Sep–27 Sep 2013 (Pending)

About the Author

LCDR Dale Klan is an instructor of Security 

Assistance Management at DISAM with a 

concentration on Logistics and Logistics Process. His 

experience includes an assignment as the Logistics 

Directorate Head for Special Operations Command 

Forward Yemen, and six months as an instructor at 

DISAM. He is a Navy Logistics Officer with tours 

onboard USNS Concord (T-AFS 5), USS Boone 

(FFG 28), and USS Underwood (FFG 36). He has 

deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom, the Mediterranean in support of 

NATO Operation Active Endeavor, and the Eastern 

Pacific in support of maritime counter-narcotic 

operations. He was awarded a master of science 

degree in international management from Troy State 

University in Troy, AL, and a master of arts degree in 

national security and strategic studies from the Naval 

War College in Newport, RI.

diplomas, student rosters, and other course materials 

may require one to two months to arrive in a country 

like Afghanistan. Translation of slides and exercises, 

along with the availability of in-class translators, are 

also a complication. Advance coordination between 

the MET Team Chief and the US representative in 

country, including threat briefings, force protection 

plans, and travel plans, is imperative. These often 

require hundreds of emails and hours of video 

teleconferences and phone conversations. 

The challenges for DISAM MET members 

have only just begun once they arrive in country. 

Instructors have been on station during mortar 

attacks, indirect fire, and protests such as those during 

the Arab Spring. Living conditions may be quite 

austere, with twenty personnel living and sleeping 

in one bay. Communications and Internet access, 

taken for granted stateside, can be a luxury in the 

MET environment. Despite these difficult conditions, 

student feedback tends to be quite enthusiastic. METs 

are routinely described as invaluable, not only by host 

nation personnel, but also US students who may not 

have been able to attend DISAM training en route to 

their overseas assignments. 

While the US combat mission in Iraq is 

complete, and is winding down in Afghanistan, our 

commitment to training, equipping, and developing 

those countries’ military and security units is not. As 

long as there is a need for SA/SC training, DISAM 

personnel will continue to bring their expertise to 

wherever it is needed.

FY 2012

Afghanistan 4–17 Oct 2011

Israel 7–11 Nov 2011

(Conducted in New York City)

Iraq 6–30 Mar 2012

Mexico 19–30 Mar 2012

Netherlands 16–27 Apr 2012

Afghanistan 15–30 May 2012

Colombia 16–27 Jul 2012

Australia 10–24 Aug 2012

Iraq 10–21 Sep 2012
83 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

US Army’s program to further improve the AN/TPQ37’s performance, maintainability and reliability. 

ThalesRaytheonSystems, created in 2001, employs 

over 1,600 people and is equally owned by Thales 

(French) and Raytheon (US), so interpreting the 

awarding of a $44.9 million contract without having 

complete access to the company’s financial reports 

is not feasible. Thales Communications, Inc.2

, a 

US proxy company owned by the Thales Group 

(French), produces the AN/PRC-148 Multiband 

Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) used by the US 

Special Operations community, US Army, and US 

Marine Corps. Because of its proxy moniker, it is 

considered a 100 percent American company by the 

US Government.

Understanding the difficulty of acquiring such 

data, the primary data source for this article comes 

from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next 

Generation (FPDS-NG)3, which is used by the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (OUSD AT&L) to publish 

annual defense procurement activity information. 

Data concerning arms sales are also available from 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

(SIPRI) in their annual report of conventional arms 

sales as well as national sources such as France’s 

annual report to the parliament on arms exports.4

In FY2011, the US Government obligated almost 

$304 million in defense items and services from 

French owned companies.5

 Some contracts were for 

items worth a few thousand dollars, such as washers, 

nuts, and bolts from Messier-Bugati-Dowty, a Safran 

subsidiary, destined for US aircraft landing gear. 

Other contract obligations were in the millions of 

dollars, such as those signed with Thales Avionics 

SA in which the DOD obligated over $27 million for 

UH-72A Lakota helicopter avionics. If the FY2011 

base contracts and multi-year options for many of 

these contracts are honored, the value of all DOD 

contracts signed with French firms in 2011 could 

French Defense Exports Towards the 

United States: Understanding the 

Environment

By COL Nicolas Lovelace

US Army War College

Introduction

France has historically purchased few major 

weapon systems from the United States, owing to 

its “Gaullist” policy of developing an independent 

defense industry with a full-spectrum force made up 

mostly of French designed and produced weapons 

systems. The exception lies in fixed-wing aviation 

where the French Air Force operates the E2CHawkeye, KC-135 Tanker, C-130 Hercules and 

E3-AWACS. Less well known are the purchases 

of Hellfire and Javelin missiles, tactical radios and 

night vision goggles. What receives less visibility is 

what the United States military acquires from French 

defense firms. While most defense enthusiasts can 

point to the US Coast Guard’s (U.S.C.G) Dolphin 

helicopter as a helicopter of French origin, or even 

the Army’s newly acquired UH-72A Lakota1, there 

is little visibility outside the acquisition world of 

Department of Defense (DOD) purchases from French 

defense firms. This article highlights those purchases, 

while showing the difficulty in acquiring data related 

to those sales and the challenges of breaking into the 

US defense market. 

Interpreting the Data

Understanding and interpreting data from arms 

and defense technology sales is a highly complex 

and monumental task. Defense acquisition is never 

evenly spread across sectors and systems, and the true 

origin of a product is sometimes quasi-impossible to 

determine. A “widget” destined for a US weapons 

platform, which appears to be produced by a French 

company, may actually be produced by a Frenchowned subsidiary in the United States that employs 

US workers, pays US taxes, and can be categorized 

as part of the US Defense Industrial and Technology 

Base (DITB). Recently, ThalesRaytheonSystems 

was awarded a $44.9 million contract by the US 

Army to upgrade the Receiver Exciter (REX) in the 

Improved AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar as part of the 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 84

Army did much more than eliminate the immediate 

arms shortage in General Washington’s army.7 When 

the fighting finally ended in 1781, the young American 

republic found itself in possession of a large stockpile 

of surplus muskets—more than enough to meet the 

Army’s needs well into the 1790s. 

French Defense Industry Today

To supply cost-effective systems to maintain 

its nuclear deterrent and deployable military 

forces, France has long relied on an autonomous 

defense-industrial base partially subsidized by the 

Government. This autonomy and competitiveness 

in certain defense sectors comes from the Gaullist 

policy of independence which mandated a high level 

of technical invention and innovation within the 

military-industrial complex, fueled by a high level of 

engineers and scientists formed by France’s Grandes 

Ecoles.

8

 This autonomous defense industrial base has 

the world’s fourth-largest defense expenditure behind 

the United States, Russia, and the UK, and claimed 

8.5 percent of the global weapons export market 

between 2006 and 2011. The brunt of these exports 

can be attributed to fewer than a dozen large firms 

such as Thales, EADS, Nexter, MBDA, Safran and 

DCNS, but behind them are thousands of small and 

medium firms dependent upon the larger firms for 

work. These companies produced industry sales of 

€17.5 billion ($22.1 billion) in 2011 and accounted 

for over 80,000 direct jobs and another 85,000 indirect 

jobs as reported by the French Defense Industries 

Council (CIDEF).9

Understanding the Environment 

The international nature of the flow of capital 

within the arms industry makes it difficult to identify 

the notions of a company’s “nationality’’—an 

important consideration in the defense procurement 

world. As previously stated, information can be 

difficult to extrapolate when researching various data 

sources from the US Government, European Union, 

and non-governmental organizations, and dissecting 

shareholder ownership.

Since the 1980s, French defense firms have 

slowly shifted away from complete state ownership 

and through a sometimes-complex set of mergers 

and acquisitions, have included a greater percentage 

of private and public shareholders. Safran, Thales, 

Aerospatiale (now EADS) and even DCNS, France’s 

well-known naval shipbuilder which until 2007 

was 100 percent state owned, have shifted toward 

reach $932 million. Appendix 1 shows a sampling of 

French suppliers and the products they have supplied 

to the DOD in the last five years (2007–2011). 

The data show that purchases and acquisitions 

from France grew from $131 million in 2007 to $414 

million in 2010, before dropping to $376 million in 

2011. These purchases were mostly in avionics and 

electro-optical (optronics) systems. The Army’s 

Light Utility Helicopter Program, not included in 

these figures and awarded to American Eurocopter, is 

a 345 helicopter program that could be worth between 

$2–3 billion between 2006 and 2017. Over 240 UH72A aircraft have been delivered to the US Army as 

of November, 2012.

The French Arms Industry 

The French city of Saint-Étienne, located in the 

Rhone-et-Loire department in east-central France, 

has been recognized since 1764 as the epicenter of 

the French arms industry, producing firearms for 

the French imperial army.6 French archives show 

that weapons were made not only for the French 

army but also the Order of Malta, the French West 

Indies Company and American “insurgents”—the 

term used in the 18th century to refer to American 

revolutionaries. Renamed ARMEVILLE at the turn 

of the 19th century, the imperial arms factory in 

Saint-Étienne produced a new rifle in 1816 based on 

the use of Silex (black) powder. Initially capable of 

producing 15,000 to 30,000 rifles per year, by 1866, 

with new construction and improved technology, the 

arsenal of Saint-Étienne reached an annual production 

of 150,000 firearms with another 50,000 sabers and 

bayonets.

At the outbreak of the American Revolution 

the colonies possessed virtually no capacity to 

manufacture small arms suitable for military 

use (muskets). As was the case with virtually all 

manufactured goods, especially those requiring 

either high levels of artisan skills or large volume 

production, the colonies depended exclusively on 

imports from Britain. This reliance on Britain was 

particularly problematic once Baron von Steuben 

began training George Washington’s Continental 

Army in European military tactics.

Despite the efforts of several state governments 

to organize armories, the situation remained desperate 

until the Continental Congress managed to arrange 

the purchase of muskets from France. The delivery of 

80,000 French Charleville muskets to the Continental 
85 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

The 2010 Ashton Carter “Better Buying Power” 

memo challenged the defence acquisition community 

to rethink how the DOD procures goods and services 

with ever decreasing budgets.12 The mandate to be 

smarter with how we buy lends itself to looking 

outside traditional US supply channels. The purchase 

of French produced ammonium perchlorate (AP) 

composite propellant for rockets recently led to a 

$1.5 million investment in a major French supplier. 

All DOD Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) use 

thermal batteries and the US defence thermal battery 

market has been dependent upon one US supplier. 

Thanks to a French supplier, Bourges Aerospatiale,13

the US now has a second source for these critical 

batteries. During the past six years, due mostly 

to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD flare 

(countermeasures to protect aircraft from air or 

ground infrared heat-seeking missiles) requirements 

have averaged more than $275 million annually. A 

French company, which entered the US market in 

2009, now has a US Navy contract to design, develop, 

and manufacture off-shore flares. These examples 

support Dr. Carter’s initiative as Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

and serve not only to provide quality products to our 

military but strengthen our alliances. 

The role of the French Government in Exports

 As a result of declining procurement budgets in 

the 1990s and a sense that too many external agencies 

and services were involved in weapons development 

and procurement, the French Government decided 

to empower one single executive agency within 

the Ministry of Defense responsible for weapons 

research, contracting, procurement and acquisition 

from inception to delivery, to include exports.

The Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) 

serves as the Ministry of Defense’s procurement 

and acquisition directorate, and reports directly 

to the Minister of Defense. Comprised of over 

13,000 employees, in 2011 the DGA managed a 

little over eighty armaments programs representing 

almost €8 billion ($10.5 billion) with €695 million 

($916 million) spent on development studies and 

demonstrations. In addition to Franco-French 

research and development and acquisition initiatives, 

the DGA is involved in over fifteen cooperative 

armaments programs with other European partners 

in the context of the European Defense Agency. 

While the DGA does not set stringent export 

regulations on French manufacturers, it does have 

privatization. The French State now has a 27 percent 

interest in Thales, 30 percent in Safran and 74 percent 

in DCNS. In the case of Safran, they have been active 

in the United States for more than forty years operating 

in twenty-two States and supporting over 6,500 jobs. 

In 1974, a Joint Venture was created between Snecma, 

now part of the Safran group, and General Electric 

(GE), which led to a successful partnership providing 

Safran with substantial contracts in the US Defense 

market. In 2009, it acquired 81 percent of GE’s 

Security Division, which is active in the homeland 

security sector and further bolsters Safran’s ties with 

GE. Today, the US Air Force is the single largest enduser of Safran products due mostly to the CFM56 

re-engining of the KC-135, E-3 and E-6 aircraft. 

Safran’s Turbomeca provides engines for the HH-65 

and LUH-72 helicopters and Sagem, also part of the 

Safran Group, is the primary supplier of avionics for 

the LUH-72A.

Why Buy French?

The US defence market is characterized by strong 

domestic competition, a fairly complex bureaucratic 

system which involves multiple agencies,10 and 

a somewhat superior view of US indigenous 

technologies and products often described as the “not 

invented here syndrome,” and magnified during the 

post-9/11 period. France, which did not participate 

militarily in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, may have 

suffered indirectly through the “freedom fries” prism, 

which did not give French commercial or military 

products a competitive edge.11

Coalition warfare, interoperability, and reduced 

defense budgets will remain the trend in the 

foreseeable future. France is, and will remain, a 

major world player in defence. It has one of the most 

forward-deployed armed forces in the world after the 

US and has been strongly engaged in Afghanistan, 

the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and recently played 

a major role in combat operations in Libya. With the 

exception of Iraq, French forces are or have been 

almost everywhere that US forces have deployed, 

and in certain places where the US is not strongly 

present. To this end, the old adage that an arms deal is 

a way of buying a diplomatic and political guarantee 

and not simply buying weapons from an outside 

supplier remains relevant. With joint ventures and 

French companies operating with US subsidiaries, 

buying French can mean supporting job creation 

in certain states, while promoting innovation and 

broader competition. 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 86

dollars to develop a comparable capability from 

scratch, and would have taken at least three to five 

years to develop.

Unfortunately, funding for FCT has been reduced 

as part of a 2011 initiative to cut spending within DOD, 

resulting in a 42 percent cut overall in the program. For 

the Army alone, nine FCT proposals were submitted 

in FY 12 and only two were selected for funding. The 

FCT program was funded at $19.1 million in fiscal 

year 2012, with proposed funding of $18.1 million 

in 2013, and $18.7 million in 2014. Pentagon budget 

documents show the program’s budget for fiscal years 

2015 and 2016 is projected to increase to $29 million 

and $30.8 million, respectively.17

Conclusion

Several studies by the defense acquisition 

community have suggested that US defense 

acquisition is in desperate need of an overhaul and 

that many of our policies discourage global suppliers 

from participating in the US supplier base. This 

competition is necessary to yield greater quality items 

at lower costs. While this article does not advocate 

that the US should have purchased the Rafale fighter 

in lieu of developing the Joint Strike Fighter, there 

is a strong argument to be made for the continued 

exploration of French technology and niche defense 

platforms which are already in production and could 

support our competitive advantage in many defense 

sectors. The benefits of leveraging US resources 

through cost sharing and economies of scale afforded 

by international cooperative research, development, 

production, and logistics support programs are well 

documented and should remain a key tenant of our 

acquisition strategy.

While it is highly unlikely that French President 

Hollande will reverse the decision of his successor to 

re-integrate into NATO, France will continue to push 

for a common European defense while remaining a 

strong ally and an innovative partner in the defense 

world. Continued investment in French, and by 

default European Defense systems and technology, 

is good for the US military, our defense industry and 

our relationship with our NATO partners.

Notes

1. The USCG’s HH-65 and the Army’s LUH-72 

helicopters are built by American Eurocopter. 

The UH-72A is manufactured in Columbus, 

Mississippi.

representation on the Inter-Ministerial Commission 

for the Study of Exports of War Materials, known 

by its French acronym the CIEEMG-Commission 

Interministérielle pour l’Étude des Exportations de 

Matériels de Guerre.

Weapons and defense related technology 

exports are done under the authority of the Prime 

Minister with the advice of the CIEEMG. Chaired 

by the Secretary General of National Defense, the 

commission is composed of the Ministry of Foreign 

and European Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, 

and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and 

Employment. The CIEEMG expresses its opinions 

in the framework of general directives approved by 

national political authorities. In rendering a decision 

to grant an export license, it makes use of general 

criteria such as embargoes, conflict areas and human 

rights violations for the denial of licenses. In the case 

of exports to the United States, French companies do 

not view the CIEEMG as a particular burden to doing 

business with the Department of Defense. 

Foreign Comparative Testing

The entry point for some of DOD’s French 

acquisitions lies in the Foreign Comparative Testing 

program (FCT).14 The mission of the FCT program is 

to test items and technologies of our foreign allies and 

friends that have a high Technology Readiness Level 

(TRL) in order to satisfy valid defense requirements 

more quickly and economically. Since 1980, the FCT 

program has served as a catalyst for cross-Atlantic 

industry collaboration and by leveraging foreign 

research, has benefited the US taxpayer and provided 

improved operational performance to the US military. 

One recent example that could affect not only the 

performance but also the morale of warfighters is 

the Osmofood meat processing system designed 

by a French company which uses a unique drying 

process to produce improved flavor Ready-to-Eat 

Meals.15 This system will allow for greatly expanded 

menus and supplemental nutrients to improve 

cognitive and physical performance with the added 

benefit of creating American jobs. A new product 

line incorporating this French technology has been 

installed by Georgia-based FPL Food, LLC, at their 

West Columbia, South Carolina plant. The Army’s 

Research, Development and Engineering Command 

(RDECOM) estimates that research and development 

costs to the government would have been 2-3 million 
87 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

2. Thales Communications was incorporated 

as Racal Communications (UK) in 1964 and 

became part of Thomson-CSF (French) in 2000. 

In 2001, it was renamed Thales Communications 

and belongs to the French Thales Group even 

though it is recognized as a US owned company

3. http://www.fpds-ng.com/

4. Rapport au Parlement Octobre 2012 sur les 

exportations d’armement de la France, http://

www.defense.gouv.fr/

5. GAO defines an obligation as “a definite 

commitment that creates a legal liability of 

the government for the payment of goods and 

services ordered or received, or a legal duty on 

the part of the United States that could mature 

into a legal liability by virtue of actions on 

the part of the other party beyond the control 

of the United States. Payment may be made 

immediately or in the future. An agency incurs 

an obligation, for example, when it places an 

order, signs a contract, awards a grant, purchases 

a service, or takes other actions that require the 

government to make payments to the public or 

from one government account to another.

6. The FAMAS-Fusil d’Assault de la Manufacture 

d’Armes de Saint-Étienne remains the standard 

issue assault rifle for the French military and is 

assembled in Saint-Étienne but is now owned by 

the government firm NEXTER.

7. After France officially entered the war in early 

1778, it continued to send vast amounts of 

war materials to the colonies. The avalanche 

of arms and their components, ammunition, 

accouterments, naval vessels, clothing, loans, 

technical advisors, volunteer officers and regular 

army regiments that France poured into America 

from 1777 until 1783 played a key role in the 

success of the Revolution.

8. Grandes Écoles are very selective and prestigious 

institutions of higher education, offering degree 

programs in a variety of fields, from engineering 

to business to political science. A list of public 

and private Grandes Écoles that are members of 

the Conférence des Grandes Ecoles (CGE) can 

be found at http://www.cge.asso.fr/cadre_ecole.

html.

9. CIDEF is the French defense industries council, 

an umbrella association for the main French 

defense industry trade associations: GIFAS (Air), 

GICAT (Land) and GICAN (Maritime).

10. See appendix 2 for a list of regulatory agencies 

and legislation

11. In the context of the “War on Terror” French 

support to US counter-terrorism (CT) efforts 

blossomed post-9/11. The CIA and FBI, 

recognizing this, were quick to establish CT 

liaison offices in Paris

12. http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD_ATL_

Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_FINAL.

PDF

13. ASB Aerospatiale Batteries specializes in the 

research, design and manufacture of thermal 

batteries. ASB has provided over 5,000 thermal 

batteries for the GMLRS, ATACMS, and MLRS 

programs, while maintaining a 100% combined 

performance rating since 2004. 

14. There is a complementary domestic program to 

FCT called the Defense Acquisition Challenge 

Program (DAC). The purpose of DAC is similar 

to FCT, but DAC focuses on getting domestic 

solutions rapidly to the warfighter. For more 

information on DAC and FCT go to, https://cto.

acqcenter.com/osd/portal.nsf/

15. See online article entitled, “DoD Considers 

Foreign Technologies to Save Dollars,” at http://

www.army.mil/article/82386/DOD_considers_

foreign_technologies_to_save_dollars/

16. The FCT proposed budget appropriation can be 

found at: http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/

Y2013/OSD/stamped/0605130D8Z_6_

PB_2013.pdf

About the Author

COL Nicolas Lovelace is a US Army War College 

Fellow at the French Institute for Higher Defense 

Studies for Armament and Defense Economy-IHEDN 

(session nationale armement et économie de défense) 

in Paris, France. He was commissioned as an Infantry 

Officer in 1988 and has been a sub-Saharan Africa 

Foreign Area Officer since 2000. While attending 

his Fellowship, COL Lovelace works closely with 

the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and US 

Army International Technology Center (ITC) at the 

US Embassy and is grateful for their assistance in 

writing this article.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 88

Appendix 1. 

US Government Agencies and Arms Import Related Laws and Regulations

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), Department of State

http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/

Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce

http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.htm

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Regulations, (19 CFR, chapter 1, parts 1–199)—Regulations that are 

administered by CBB that detail the import process, including the procedure for the evaluation and classification 

of merchandise

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Regulations (27 CFR parts 447, 478, 479)—Regulations that 

detail the import license process for the permanent import of defense articles contained on the US Munitions 

List

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Regulations (21 CFR, chapter 1)—Regulate all imported electronic 

products that emit radiation or contain lasers

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Regulations (47 CFR parts 1–199)—Regulate all imported digital 

devices, examples include: transponders, monitors, turning units with transceivers installed/radar components, 

alarm system devices that can transmit a signal for help

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Regulations (40 CFR section 707.20)—Regulate all imported 

regulated chemicals

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfarspgi/

current/index.html

Customs Modernization Act (Mod Act)—Shifted many responsibilities from CBP to importers, which placed 

new requirements on importers and levied heavy fines for noncompliance

ITAR (22 CFR parts 120–130)—Regulations administered by the State Department which require that all 

exports and temporary defense imports and services be authorized by a US State Department approved license, 

an approved agreement, or a valid ITAR exception

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)—Agency that controls the sanctions and embargos authorized by the 

US, which prohibit exports to, or the conduct of business with certain countries and/or governments

Berry Amendment (U.S.C., Title 10, section 2533a), requires the Department of Defense to give preference in 

procurement to domestically produced, manufactured, or home-grown products, most notably food, clothing, 

fabrics, and specialty metals

Restrictions on Specialty Metals (U.S.C., Title 10, section 2533b), The United States has implemented extensive 

and complex rules aimed at restricting the use of non-domestic “Specialty Metals” in the defense acquisition 

process. The stated goal is to protect the US defense industry from becoming overly dependent on foreign 

sources of supply, especially in times of conflict
89 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Appendix 2. 

French Defense Articles and Technology Purchased by the United States 

Airbus-EADS HC-144A Ocean Sentry Aircraft to U.S.C.G. 14 delivered by 2012

Cassidian-EADS Eagle Vision Satellite imaging/ISR to USAF

Dassault 3D modeling, visualization, and interoperability software for Joint Strike Fighter

CILAS SLD 500 Counter-Sniper Detection Systems to USMC

Deschamps Mobi-Mat removable helicopter landing pads to US Army

Eurocopter/EADS LUH-72 Lakota helicopter to US Army HH-65 Dolphin to U.S.C.G

*EUROMIDS Multi-Functional Low Volume Tactical Airborne Terminal to USAF

*Cassidian-EADS/Thales/Indra-Spain/SELEX ELSAG-Italy

HGH Systems Surveillance systems. Long range infrared panoramic camera to US Army

*Labinal Electrical wiring systems for aircraft. Bell Helicopter AH-1 Cobra, UH-1 Huey, CH-47, 

H-46 , Boeing B767 Tanker, V-22, F-22,C-130 AMP, A-10, Lockheed Martin F-16, Northrop 

Grumman E2D Hawkeye

* Safran Group

Latécoère Vertical and horizontal stabilizers on E-2C Hawkeye to USN

Lacroix Airborne missile countermeasures and pyrotechnics to USAF

Metravib Acoustic gunshot detections systems to US Army

*MicroTurbo Engine in MQM-107 drone but production ended in 2003 USA, USAF). 08/12 won US Navy 

Subscale Subsonic Aerial Target competition

*subsidiary of Turbomeca

Osmo Foods For dehydration/processing of foods—Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) with Natick 

Soldier RD&E Center for improving quality of MREs

Paul Boyé Techs NBC Suits to US Army

Sagem Handheld laser designators to US Army

Sofradir SADA II (Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly) deployed in Bradley and Abrams for US 

Army. 3rd-generation dual-band detectors and camera cores in UAVs

(40% Thales, 40% Sagem)

Snecma CFM56-7B Engine (F108 designation) for KC-135 to USAF

Snecma Propulsion 

Solide (SDS)

Composite divergent seals for General Electric’s F414 (F/A-18E/F) and Pratt & 

Whitney’s F100 engines (F-16)

TDA (Thales/EADS) 120MM Mortars to USMC

Thales Flash dipping Sonar (low freq-wide band) to USN

Thales AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) to USMC and US Army

*Turbomeca Arriel Turbine engines in HH-65 helicopter to U.S.C.G and LUH-72 to USA

*Safran Group

Safran Group:

Snecma, Turbomeca, Techspace Aero, Sagem, Morpho, Aircelle, Labinal, Hispano-Suiza, Messier-BugattiDowty, Herakles
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 90

Bibliography

Bialos, Jeffrey P. Fortress and Icebergs: The Evolution of the Transatlantic Defense Market and the Implications 

for US National Security Policy, Volume II. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2009.

Deni, John. “The American Role in European Defense Reform,” Orbis 56, Fall 2012.

European Commission. Decision- US Crest. The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United 

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files/final_report_trans_en.pdf

France: 2012 Defense Business Overview, US Commercial Service/Office of Defense Cooperation Joint 

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France. Rapport au Parlement sur les Exportations d’Armement de la France en 2012, November 2012, http://

www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/international2/exportations/les-exportations-d-armement.

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cp/docs/DOD_FY_2011_Purchases_from_Foreign_Entities_(Approps_May_2012).pdf
91 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

The Arab Spring and the Future 

of US Foreign Military Sales

By Tom Williams, PhD

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The start of the Arab Spring can be traced back 

to 18 December 2010 when Mohamad Bouazizi 

of Tunisia set himself on fire to protest corruption 

and mistreatment by government officials; he later 

died from his self-inflicted burns. This suicide by 

self-immolation was especially shocking to the 

Arab/Muslim world that treats such self-inflicted 

deaths as particularly sinful, as opposed to those 

who knowingly sacrifice their lives as part of a 

Jihad, which is considered a noble and virtuous 

way to die. To understand why this so shocking to 

people of the Middle East, one has to understand 

the religious condemnation that Islam places on 

suicide. According to the Hadith, the second most 

important Islamic document after the Quran, which 

is supposed to contain the actual sayings and doings 

of Muhammad as reported by those who knew him 

in life, Muhammad said that “Whoever strangles 

himself strangles himself into fire, and whoever 

stabs himself with a spear stabs himself into fire.”1

So according to the amount of authenticity that you 

place in this Hadith, not all Islamic Scholars agree on 

all portions of the Hadith, Mohamad Bouazizi will be 

burning himself in protest for all eternity.

After this, protests rocked Tunisia and major 

protests also took place in Algeria. Less than a month 

later, in mid-January 2011, the Tunisia government 

was overthrown. Later that month, thousands of 

mostly young unemployed men gathered in Tahrir 

Square in Cairo to protest unemployment, high 

food prices, corruption, and the heavy handed rule 

of President Hosni Mubarak. In February, Mubarak 

transferred his powers to the Egyptian Supreme 

Council of the Armed Forces and resigned. That 

same month protests broke out in Benghazi, Libya, 

threatening the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Also in 

the early months of 2011 there were corresponding 

protests in Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, 

Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria. 

In Tunisia and Egypt the Arab spring stayed 

mostly peaceful with the occasional violent episode 

marring the somewhat orderly change of regime. 

One such incident occurred in October 2011, when 

Egyptian Coptic Christians protested the destruction 

of a church, and the Army responded with tanks. 

Nonetheless, by late May 2012 the first democratic 

Egyptian vote in decades was held, which placed 

Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and 

Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s former Prime Minister, 

in a runoff election. On June 24, 2012 Morsi was 

announced the winner by a narrow margin, becoming 

the new president of Egypt. In the same year, a new 

Islamist-leaning government was also elected in 

Tunisia.

In contrast, the protests in Libya turned into a 

full blown civil war. In August of 2011 the Battle of 

Tripoli took place, where Rebel forces captured major 

portions of the city and toppled Gaddafi’s government. 

A couple of months later Gaddafi was captured and 

killed by rebels, ending the civil war. Since then, there 

have been clashes between different groups of rebels, 

oil production is struggling to return to pre-civil war 

levels, Islamists have gained political ground. This 

culminated on September 11, 2012 when an attack 

on the American Consulate in Benghazi by terrorists 

killed four, including the American Ambassador to 

Libya, Chris Stevens.

Yemen and Syria also had very violent protests. 

In Yemen there was a series of large protests and 

some protesters were killed. Then on June 3, 2011 

the President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was 

critically injured in a failed assassination attempt. 

After recuperating in Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdullah 

Saleh returned to Yemen where on February 27, 2012 

he resigned, transferring control of Yemen to his 

Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi. Syria, 

like Libya, has evolved into a full scale civil war. 

However, unlike Libya, the civil war in Syria is still 

going strong and as of the writing of this article, the 

death toll is estimated to exceed 60,000.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 92

Storm” to create a political environment ripe for 

upheaval, which was waiting for just the right event 

to start a revolution.

Some of the more prominent regional factors 

include high unemployment, poor economic growth, 

trade imbalances, rampant corruption, a large gap 

between the rich and poor, oppressive and unresponsive 

regimes, religious intolerance, a high birth rate, high 

levels of pollution, poor public health programs, soil 

exhaustion, and water scarcity. Anyone of these issues 

alone would be difficult to address; the Middle East 

has all of them. For example, look at the difficulty 

the US is having in lowering an unemployment rate 

that currently stands around 8 percent (depending on 

where one lives in the US); how much more difficult 

is it to lower unemployment when the rates range 

from a low of 10 percent to a high of 35 percent, 

as they do in the Middle East. Additionally, Middle 

East unemployment numbers mostly under-represent 

youth unemployment and are often out of date, which 

make the actual unemployment rates higher than 

officially acknowledged.

Reviewing Egypt in regard to these issues, it 

has one of the better 2010 official unemployment 

rates for the region—12 percent (most likely a good 

bit higher). It had a growth rate of 1.8 percent for 

2011; a trade imbalance of $21 billion for 2010, 

and a corruption rating in 2009 that placed Egypt it 

in the median for the Middle East (based upon the 

Transparency International Corruption Perception 

Index). To put this corruption in context, according 

to Transparency International, about 2 percent of the 

North American population reports paying bribes over 

the past several years, the average for the Middle East 

is 40 percent. Remember, that is how many people 

report paying bribes. Finally, the gap between the rich 

and the poor is very large and is increasing every day. 

In summary, Egypt has economic problems that some 

would consider almost insurmountable.

The Mubarak regime was oppressive, and the 

new regime is on its way to becoming religiously 

intolerant, which further worsens the already 

poor conditions for the general public. Additional 

hardship is dumped on ordinary Egyptians because 

of the high birth rate (the Middle East on average 

has the highest birth rate in the world outside of Sub 

Saharan Africa). This continues to stretch the already 

exceeded carrying capacity of the land, resulting in 

increasingly expensive imports of basic food stuffs 

such as wheat and corn. Compounding these difficult 

In Iraq and Iran, there were protests. Where the 

Iraq protests were mainly over high food prices and 

quickly sputtered out once the Iraqi government 

addressed these concerns, the Iran protests 

were mainly about the lack of participation and 

representation in government, and they continued 

for some time. These protestors, mainly unemployed 

young Persian men, were suppressed through violent 

and harsh means.

Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Morocco, Lebanon, 

Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain all had Arab Spring 

protests of various types in 2011, resulting in 

differing levels of change. In Jordan, the King has 

dismissed and reformed portions of the government. 

In Kuwait, the National Assembly was stormed by 

protesters and the Cabinet has resigned. The Sultan 

of Oman has dismissed several ministers. The King 

of Morocco has promised reforms. In Lebanon, a new 

government was formed. In Saudi Arabia, women are 

in the process of getting the right to vote in Municipal 

elections, although they are still not allowed to drive. 

Bahrain, outside of Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, 

has probably seen the most disruption. Here the 

majority Shiite population has staged large protests 

for greater freedom and more equality; these were 

harshly put down by Gulf Cooperative Council 

security forces.

In the two-year period from January 2011 to 

January 2013, four Middle East regimes have been 

toppled—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and indirectly, 

Yemen. One is currently in the middle of a violent 

civil war—Syria. Several are still experiencing 

various levels of violent protest—Egypt, Yemen, 

Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain. Many other Middle East 

Countries have changed their government policies in 

an attempt to pacify the protesters, including Kuwait, 

Oman, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia has 

invested billions of dollars in domestic programs 

designed to keep the peace. Bahrain has had ongoing, 

albeit smaller scale, Shiite protests and Iran may see 

a renewal of protests with the upcoming presidential 

election. In other words, the Arab Spring of 2011 

has turned into the Arab Spring, Summer, Fall, and 

Winter of 2012 and is still going strong today.

What is the cause of this so-called “Arab Spring?” 

Well, there are as many answers to that question as 

there are so-called “Middle East experts.” But instead 

of identifying one issue as the main cause behind the 

Arab Spring there were several economic, social and 

environmental factors that combined in a “Perfect 
93 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

What could negatively impact future US FMS 

sales in the Middle East? There are many possibilities, 

but if the most scenarios are removed, such as price 

of oil falling and staying at record lows, then the 

assumption is that recent history will most likely 

become the near future. Three possibilities become 

probable: 

1. A war between US allies in the region breaks 

out and, in an attempt to end the conflict, the US 

reduces sales to those involved and in the region 

2. New civil wars break out in various countries of 

the Middle East and the US reduces sales in an 

attempt to prevent US weapons from being used 

on civilian populations 

3. Islamist leaning groups, like Hamas, Hezbollah, 

or the Muslim Brotherhood gain such a level of 

influence in newly formed governments that US 

no longer feels comfortable providing the same 

level of FMS support 

If any of these events (or more than one) occur, 

they will have the potential to greatly limit or reduce 

future FMS in Middle East. These same events could 

also increase sales to surrounding countries in the 

region who would now be nervous about the unrest 

and instability on the other side of their borders, 

partially offsetting the loss in sales. 

What could increase sales in the near term for 

the Middle East? Taking a similar tack as the above 

approaches; some other scenarios come to mind. First, 

the civil war in Syria gets worse and that country 

breaks apart; the increased instability in the region 

would probably prompt surrounding countries such 

as Iraq, Jordan and Israel to spend more on US FMS 

to increase their security. A similar outcome could 

occur to countries surrounding Yemen and Libya if 

the ongoing conflicts between the tribal, ethnic, and 

sectarian interests in those nations degrade and cause 

Libya and Yemen to fall back into civil war. Finally, 

the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf (including Iraq) 

could increase their purchase of US weapon systems 

if Iran continues to increase its bellicose behavior in 

the region.

Sans one of the scenarios presented above, FMS 

in the Middle East and the world will most likely stay 

around current levels, but for how long? Probably as 

long as the Arab Spring continues, but unfortunately, 

the longer the Arab Spring lasts, the greater the 

chance that one of the above scenarios could occur. 

Since none of these scenarios are something that the 

US would like to see happen, what can be done to 

issues are poor public health, the loss of arable land, 

and the shrinking of water resources. What water is 

left is becoming increasingly unclean; with all of 

these factors, one begins to wonder why it took so 

long for the Arab Spring to sprout in Egypt. Until all 

these Middle East issues are addressed, there may be 

no end in sight for the Arab Spring. This could cause 

the Arab Spring to evolve in to one long, continuous 

and unending uprising (some scholars claim this has 

already happened).

How will the repeating cycle of instability, 

protest, and violence in the Middle East impact US 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sales? Well if the past 

two fiscal years serves as a guide, the Arab Spring has 

not depressed total US FMS at all. In fact, FY2012 

was a banner year, with sales exceeding $65B.2

FY2011 was also very good with sales that exceeded 

$34B, closer to the previous five-year average of 

$30B. Nearly half of the sales for 2012 came from 

one massive buy from Saudi Arabia in December of 

2011. This $30B sale was for eighty-four advanced 

F-15s, and assorted equipment and services.

Why are US FMS sales still going strong in a 

region of the world that is seeing such a high level of 

unrest? First off, sales in the region were going strong 

before the Arab Spring. For instance, the annual level 

of FMS for the first five years of the 21st century 

was $12.5B, which is much closer to the historical 

average. Why did world-wide US sales begin to 

increase by nearly threefold in 2006, and remain 

elevated? No one is quite sure but it is probably 

due to a combination of trends: the world’s GDP 

increased over the last decade, so military spending 

increased accordingly, various major weapon systems 

(especially in the Middle East) were aged and needed 

recapitalization, and Middle East governments were 

responding to increased regional instability brought 

about by America’s invasion of Iraq. 

Middle East sales in near term will probably 

continue to show strong growth, in part because each 

country in the region is nervously looking across their 

border and seeing unrest or potential future instability 

(in some cases they are looking within their borders). 

Combine this nervousness with recent historical 

trends discussed earlier, and it becomes apparent to 

the casual observer that Global US FMS will not be 

dipping much below the $30B average of the last 

couple of years (not including the December 2011 

$30B one-time sale to Saudi Arabia).
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 94

bring the Arab Spring to a peaceful and beneficial 

conclusion. Furthermore, how can stability be 

restored in the region? To bring closure to the Arab 

Spring one must adequately address the underlying 

causes of the unrest. Long term solutions for the 

complex web of Middle East problems must be 

found, including high unemployment, poor economic 

growth, trade imbalances, rampant corruption, the 

large gap between the rich and poor, oppressive 

and unresponsive regimes, religious intolerance, 

unsustainable birth rates, pollution, poor public 

health, soil exhaustion, and water scarcity. 

Looks like FMS will stay at current levels for a 

while.

Notes

1. Maulana Muhammad Ali, A Manual of Hadith, 

Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam Lahore USA 

Inc., 2001: 162–163.

2. Global FMS figures include the $3–8B 

(depending on the year) in foreign military aid 

granted by the US to various countries of the 

world for FMS purchases. The vast majority 

of this aid has been going to Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Israel, and Egypt. 

About the Author

Dr. Tom Williams is an assistant professor at the 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. 

He spent over a year in Iraq managing Foreign Military 

Sales construction cases and currently teaches classes 

in FMS, security cooperation offices operations, and 

middle regional studies. He has a PhD in public 

administration. 
95 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Does US Security Assistance to the Egyptian 

Military Warrant Continued Engagement?

By LTC Michael Wright

US Army War College Fellow, University of Denver

The United States spends $1.5 Billion each fiscal 

year in assistance to Egypt. Over one billion of that 

is Foreign Military Financing (FMF) designated 

for the purchase of US military goods and services, 

and $1.8 million of assistance funds to International 

Military Education and Training (IMET). Egypt 

ranks as one of the top five nations receiving such 

support from the United States.1

 Many Americans 

question this expenditure for a country in seemingly 

constant turmoil with a history of frequently defying.

US democratic values.2

 This question has rightly led 

to an examination of the value, effectiveness, and 

return on this investment; yet no quantifiable measure 

exists for determining the United States’ return on its 

investment, and even a qualitative metric is difficult 

to develop. This problem is especially acute when 

assessing the value of IMET. Unlike FMF, where 

sales of goods and services provide a tangible benefit 

to both nations, IMET is a training and education 

program whose value is not readily evident. In 1990 

Congress approved the Enhanced-IMET (E-IMET) 

program to focus on respect for civilian control of 

the military, responsible resource management, and 

military justice in accordance with internationallyrecognized human rights. In addition to its formal 

curriculum and other goals, congresses’ most valued 

objective for IMET is “to build positive relationships 

between civilian and military officials from the 

United States with counterparts in other countries.3

These relationships are difficult to quantify, but are 

especially critical in Arab culture, which prioritizes 

relationships as an avenue to wield influence.4 A 

historical comparison of the Egyptian military’s 

actions toward its government prior to US assistance 

and after provides a contrast that suggests continued 

support for the program is warranted. 

The modern Egyptian military, comprised of 

over 430,000 personnel, is largely professional and 

viewed by most Egyptians in favorable terms.5

 The 

military evolved into its current form as modern Egypt 

emerged with the 1952 overthrow and dismantling 

of the Egyptian monarchy. During this transition, the 

military assumed governance in addition to other roles 

not traditionally associated with defense and security. 

Military members assumed cabinet and senior 

government positions, including Prime Minister, and 

President.6 Under President (and Colonel) Gamal abd 

al-Nasser, the military maintained this control until 

1967. Nasser oversaw the nationalization of private 

industry and empowered the military with strong 

police powers.7 The constitution, established under 

Nasser in 1956, specifically states the “Egyptian Army 

shall belong to the People” despite his use of it to quell 

dissent.8 During this time, much of the government 

and military came under Soviet influence.9 The 

military’s influence in government faltered in 1967 

when Nasser’s antagonism provoked the Arab-Israeli 

war that ended with the loss of the Sinai to Israel. 

This failure reflected badly upon the military and 

the government, resulting in the military’s decline 

from direct rule.10 Nasser’s era of rule ended with the 

military’s transition to a traditional national-security 

focus and away from the oppression of opposition.11 

Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, implemented 

a program to professionalize the armed forces 

that coincided with the post Camp David Accords 

agreement, resulting in the rise of US influence both 

politically and militarily.12 This developing reputation 

and professionalism were quickly tarnished by 

the “Bread Riots” that occurred in January 1977. 

The riots were a product of Sadat’s new economic 

policies to de-nationalize industry; a key component 

of his “open-door” policy included the reduction of 

government subsidies. The riots primarily sparked 

from this action. The government reversal of the 

decrees to reduce foodstuff subsidies did not stop the 

riots, which lasted two days before the Army directly 

intervened against the people and popular will.13 The 

government ordered the military to quell the unrest 

and do so “ferociously.”14 In some accounts, the 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 96

military responded reluctantly to this order and would 

not intervene until the cancellations of subsidies were 

reversed.15 Ultimately, they sided with the regime and 

intervened with extreme violence against the people. 

The crisis ended with an estimated 800 dead and 

hundreds more injured.16

 In 1986 the military was again asked to intervene, 

this time under President Hosni Mubarak. Conscripts 

of the Central Security Forces (CSF), subject to low 

pay, long hours, and high stress, responded to rumors 

of a one year extension to their two-year conscription 

with riots and fires. The military was called in to 

suppress the uprising and protect the regime.17 The 

result was hundreds dead and nearly 8000 conscripts 

ominously missing; another 20,000 were dismissed.18

This response contrasts markedly to the way in 

which the Egyptian military reacted to recent events, 

including the sudden end of the Mubarak regime 

during the Arab Spring in 2011, the recent challenge 

to the interim government led by Field Marshal 

Hussein Tantawi, and Morsi’s Presidency in 2012. 

The military was called to protect these governments 

from thousands of rioting protestors. In response to 

Mubarak’s call to put down the uprising, the military 

took five days to respond, then provided a nationally 

televised announcement that, “the armed forces will 

not resort to use of force against our great people.”19

In response to President Morsi’s request that the Army 

quell widespread rioting directed against his attempts 

to expand presidential power, the military maintained 

its neutral stance, positioning tanks around the 

palace instead of reacting violently.20 Even during 

the transitional military rule, when the Supreme 

Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) declared it 

would preserve a decisive political role for itself in 

the government, the military did not suppress the 

subsequent protests; Field Marshal Tantawi said, “the 

military was able to respond to insults with “violence 

from ‘an iron fist,’ but that [it] would not do so in 

order to keep Egypt safe,” reaffirmind his intention to 

turn over control of the government after elections.21

The military’s policy to refrain from violence against 

the populace was not perfect. In November and 

December of 2011, military police clashed with 

protestors and rioters and in one instance reportedly 

ripped the clothes off of and beat a woman.22 Seven to 

ten protesters were killed and numerous wounded in 

the outbreaks. The military’s response with beatings, 

tear gas, and water cannons indicate a significant 

restraint when one considers the prolific use of live 

ammunition and 800 dead during the bread riots. 

Additionally, the reports on the triggers and methods 

of the response coupled with the minimal loss of life 

indicate a policy, or climate, of restraint rather than 

an official order to disperse the crowds and maintain 

military rule at any cost.23

There are many possible explanations for such 

restrained responses. These include: the military’s 

desire to maintain its rapport with the population; an 

evolved loss of respect and confidence in the regime; 

outside perceptions from constant media coverage; 

the more peaceful nature of the protests compared 

to 1977 and 1986; fear of civil war; or, as one West 

Point study suggested, a “low interest” in intervening 

despite “little restraint” against doing so, implying a 

purely self-serving motive to protect its autonomy, 

resources, or power.24

All of these reasons likely factored into the 

response. However,.US engagement should not 

be excluded as a factor in that change. Contrasting 

changes in behavior in 1977 and 1986 to 2011 and 

2012, suggests that engagement played a role in 

that gradual change. Many of mid-level officers in 

position to influence senior decision makers were 

educated and exposed to these ideals.25 This influence 

manifested itself in the relationships built through 

exposure to Western views of civilian rule, education 

in international humanitarian ideals, exposure to other 

professional militaries, and through professional 

military education since 1979. Of these, exposure 

to Western ideals through our military assistance 

program, specifically the IMET program, warrants 

examination as a key part of that change given “the 

IMET program is based upon a belief that educating 

militaries in the areas of IMET emphasis will change 

national behavior.”26

Has E-IMET successfully reached those key 

leaders, which are in, or rising to, positions of 

prominence in the Egyptian military? Since February 

2010, a total of 141 E-IMET Human Rights Courses 

were offered. Professional military education 

accounted for nearly 50 percent of the IMET program 

costs.27 From 2000 to 2009, Egypt sent over 11,500 

students, 2.49 percent of its officers, to training.28

Since 1979 Egypt has sent a minimum of twenty 

students per year professional military education. 

From 1998 on, the numbers surge from fifty to one 

hundred students.29 The duration of the average 

program is forty-two weeks, giving some opportunity 

for sustained exposure to western culture and ideals 
97 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

September 28, 2012, article. http://www.nytimes.

com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/white-housemove-to-give-egypt-450-million-in-aid-meetsresistance.html?_r= 1& (accessed January 5, 

2013).

3. US Government Accountability Office, Report 

to the Committee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives (Washington, DC: 

US Government Accountability Office, April 

2006); AllGov Everything Our Government 

Really Does, “International Military Education 

& Training (IMET); History,” 2012, http://www.

allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/

international-military-education-trainingimet?agencyid=7378 (accessed January 1, 2013).

4. Carlos Braziel, “Security Cooperation Officers 

In the Middle East,” The DISAM Annual, vol. 1 

(May 2012): 199.

5. Stephen H. Gotowicki, The Role of the Egyptian 

Military in Domestic Society, Foreign Military 

Studies Office Publication (Washington DC, VA, 

Institute of National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University, Summer 1997). 

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.; James Feuille, “Reforming Egypt’s 

Constitution: Hope for Egyptian Democracy,” 

Texas International Law Journal Volume 47, 

Issue 1 (2011): 240.

9. Gregory H. Bradford, The Rise and Fall of Soviet 

Influence in Egypt, Master’s Thesis, (Monterey, 

CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 

1976), 35; AllGov Everything Our Government 

Really Does, “International Military Education 

& Training (IMET); History”, 2012, http://www.

allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/

international-military-education-trainingimet?agencyid=7378 (accessed January 1, 2013). 

10. James Phillips, “Options for the US As Egypt’s 

Time of Reckoning Nears,” November 10, 

1986. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 

#546, http://www.heritage.org/research/

reports/1986/11/options-for-the-us-as-egyptstime-of-reckoning-nears (accessed January 1, 

2013).

11. Sarah Mousa, “How Nasser Shaped the 

Arab Spring,” Aljazeera, February 22, 

2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/

opinion/2012/02/2012221135257602109.html 

(accessed January 6, 2013). 

and for the development of relationships between 

Egyptian and US military members.30 In a study of 

E-IMET effectiveness, international students’ selfdescribed changes in behavior pre- and post-training/

PME indicate a meaningful, positive development. 

The results of students from the Near East indicated 

that E-IMET training altered their perceptions about 

civilian control of the military and knowledge of 

human rights to a statistically significant degree.31

While the data only indicates a linkage to the 

military’s decision not to intervene, it does show 

exposure to these ideals through E-IMET is reaching 

a critical audience and provides anecdotal evidence 

the recent responses were not coincidental. 

In a recent study, noted expert Gregory 

Aftandilia, asserts, “the development of personal 

contacts between US and Egyptian Army officers, 

which such schooling provides, can enhance bilateral 

military cooperation, especially when regional crises 

arise.”32 Continued engagement between the US and 

Egyptian military was considered so valuable by the 

current administration that it rebuffed congressional 

pressure to reduce assistance to the Egyptian military 

throughout the Arab Spring Crisis.33 Among the many 

arguments for funding and continuing these programs, 

the strongest endorsement is the formalized directive 

in the Quadrennial Defense Review’s Defense 

Objective, “Prevent and Deter Conflict,” which calls 

for all services to “Build Partner Capacity,” of which 

IMET is a critical component.34

Considering the changes in Egyptian military 

responses for the past thirty years, indications are 

Congress’s most important objective is being met, 

that the data on E-IMET is accurate, and the positive 

relationships built over this duration are making 

a tangible difference. Most notably, by fostering 

appropriate military restraint and professionalism for 

a relatively low cost compared to other alternatives.35

While future study may develop a metric to measure 

this influence more accurately, for now the continued 

engagement with programs such as IMET seems 

worth the investment. 

Notes

1. Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and US 

Relations (Washington, DC: US Library of 

Congress, Congressional Research Service, 

December 6, 2012), 7.

2. Steven Lee Myers, “US Move to Give Egypt 

$450 Million in Aid Meets Resistance,” 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 98

23. Ibid.

24. William Parsons, William Taylor, “Arbiters 

of Social Unrest: Military Responses to The 

Arab Spring,” paper on line, The US Air Force 

Academy, 2011, http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/

Research%20Papers/2011/Arbiters%20of%20

Social%20Unrest (accessed 31 December, 2012).

25. Christian Science Monitor Editorial Board, 

“America’s Best Agents in Cairo: US-Trained 

Egyptian Officers,” February 3, 2011, The 

Christian Science Monitor, The Monitor’s 

View. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/

the-monitors-view/2011/0203/America-s-bestagents-in-Cairo-US-trained-Egyptian-officers 

(accessed January 1, 2013).

26. Mark Ahles et al., “State Department and 

DISAM Study on the Effectiveness of the 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) Program,” The DISAM Annual, vol. 1 

(May 2012): 197. 

27. US Government Accountability Office, 

International Military Education and Training: 

Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights 

and Improve Evaluations (Washington DC; US 

Government Accountability Office, October 

2011), 10. 

28. William Parsons, William Taylor, “Arbiters 

of Social Unrest: Military Responses to The 

Arab Spring,” paper on line, The US Air Force 

Academy, 2011, http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/

Research%20Papers/2011/Arbiters%20of%20

Social%20Unrest (accessed 31 December, 2012).

29. Nathan W. Toronto, US Army School of 

Advanced Military Studies, Active Inaction 

Interagency Security Assistance to Egypt, Inter 

Agency Paper No. 6 (Fort Leavenworth KS: 

Col. Arthur D. Simmons Center for Study of 

Interagency Cooperation, November 2011), 10. 

30. Ibid., 11.

31. Mark Ahles et al., “State Department and 

DISAM Study on the Effectiveness of the 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) Program,” The DISAM Annual, vol. 1 

(May 2012): 194.

32. Gregory Aftandilian, Egypt’s New Regime 

and the Future of the US-Egyptian Strategic 

Relationship, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army 

War College, August 2012), 44.

33. Ibid., 11. 

12. Jonathan Oakman, “The Camp David Accords,” 

January 8, 2002. Woodrow Wilson School of 

International Studies, Princeton University, Case 

Study 01/02, WW 547-Final Project, http://wws.

princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf 

(accessed 5 January, 2013), 10.

13. Alex, “1977: Egypt’s Bread Intifada,” December 

29 2009, Post, http://libcom.org/history/1977-

egypts-bread-intifada (accessed 5 January, 2013). 

14. Gotowicki, The Role of the Egyptian Military in 

Domestic Society.

15. Ibid.

16. Alex, “1977: Egypt’s Bread Intifada,” (accessed 

6 January, 2013).

17. Gotowicki, The Role of the Egyptian Military in 

Domestic Society.

18. Helen Chapin Metz, eds., US Library of 

Congress, Federal Research Division, “Egypt: 

a Country Study,” 1991. Egypt Country Study, 

Edition 5, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/egtoc.

html (accessed 3 January, 2013).

19. “UPDATE 1-Egypt Army: Will Not Use Violence 

Against Citizens,” January 31, 2011, article. http://

www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/egyptarmy-idAFLDE70U2JC20110131(accessed 

January 1, 2013). 

20. Morsi Widens Army Powers Ahead of 

Referendum,” December 11, 2012, article. 

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-10/

morsi-widens-army-powers-ahead-ofreferendum/4420052 (accessed January 1, 2013). 

21. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egypt Islamists Demand 

the End of Military Rule,” The New York 

Times, November 18, 2011; Egypt’s Military 

Ruler Speaks Out After Protests,” April 22, 

2012, article. http://www.thehindu.com/news/

international/egypts-military-ruler-speaks-outafter-protests/article3341886.ece (accessed 

January 1, 2012).

22. “Egypt’s Military Clashes With Protesters 

For Third Day,” Associated Press Release, 

December 18, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/

world/2011/12/17/eight-killed-almost-300-

injured-in-cairo-violence/ (accessed February 

1, 2013), “Egypt’s Military Clashes With 

Protesters;7 Dead,” Associated Press Release, 

December 17, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.

com/8301-202_162-57344203/egypts-militaryclashes-with-protesters-7-dead/ (accessed 

February 1, 2013).
99 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

34. Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review 

(Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 

February 2010), 13. 

35. AllGov Everything Our Government Really 

Does, “International Military Education & 

Training (IMET); History”, 2012, http://www.

allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/

international-military-education-trainingimet?agencyid=7378 (accessed January 1, 2013).

About the Author

LTC Michael T. Wright is currently a US Army War 

College Fellow at the University of Denver’s Korbel 

School of International Studies, Denver Colorado. 

He previously served as a Security Assistance Officer 

for the Office of Military Cooperation, US Embassy, 

Kuwait and prior to that, as the commander of the 

2nd Battalion, 401st Army Field Support Brigade. 

He has a bachelor’s degree in business management 

from Eastern Washington University and a master’s 

degree in Organizational Leadership from Gonzaga 

University. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer 

Basic Course, the Combined Logistics Officers 

Advanced Course, the Army Airborne School, the 

Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School, 

and the Army Command and General Staff College.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 100
101 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

The Transfer/Surplus Paradox: 

The Case of Bandaria

By Eric Patterson, PhD

Georgetown University

Introduction

Recent events, from the proliferation of Libyanorigin weapons stockpiles following the fall of 

Moammar Qadhafi to the massive detonation of a 

military munitions depot in the Republic of Congo’s 

capital on March 3, 2012, to the proliferation of weapons 

in destabilized Mali continue to remind the world of 

the problem of excess military conventional weapons 

stockpiles. That being said, sovereign governments 

continue to have legitimate defense concerns and 

national militaries will continue to need to upgrade 

and modernize their equipment over the long-term. 

The US government (USG) has an important role to 

play in supporting our partners’ efforts in these areas, 

particularly with regard to legal arms sales and the 

modernization of national militaries. The USG is also 

the world leader in assisting countries deal with their 

legacy conventional weapons stockpiles. However, at 

times these two goals are disconnected, particularly 

in those rare cases where new US military sales/

transfers to a foreign partner cause an excess. This 

article discusses how the USG, particularly the 

Departments of State and Defense, can better link 

these objectives.

USG Goals: Smart Military Sales, Stockpile 

Security, and Destruction of Surplus

The USG has good reasons to sell military 

articles to foreign countries.1 The USG knows that 

selling superior American defense articles means a 

higher level of capability on the part of our allies and 

partners. When the US military is in the field with 

allies, it wants the systems in allied hands to work well.

Furthermore, if our allies and partners choose to utilize 

American weapons, this makes interoperability much 

easier (e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq). Interoperability 

of hardware usually means a deepening of militaryto-military relationships, which is an important way 

for governments to broaden and deepen their bilateral 

ties. The US and US corporations benefit from the 

sale of such weapons, undergirding a critical national 

asset—the future viability of America’s know-how 

and technical capacity to defend the nation.

The USG also has robust programs designed to 

monitor and dispose of excess defense articles. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) has a multitude of 

internal mechanisms for handling the full life cycle 

of its weapons inventory, from R&D to procurement 

of new items to the ultimate retirement of obsolete, 

outdated, worn, and excess materials. The USG also 

has programs designed to assist foreign countries with 

the life cycle of their national stockpiles (physical 

security and stockpile management (PSSM)). One 

such program, located in the State Department’s Office 

of Weapons Removal and Abatement, helps countries 

secure national stockpiles and funds destruction 

activities. More specifically, the State Department 

program funds highly trained NGOs and contractors 

to destroy excess land mines, unexploded ordnance, 

munitions, conventional weapons, and small arms/

light weapons such as rifles and man-portable air 

defense systems (MANPADS).2

 Since 1993, WRA 

and its predecessor offices have destroyed over 1.3 

million at risk weapons and 50,000 tons of unstable 

and unsecure ammunition; disposed of nearly 33,000 

MANPADS, and helped more than 80 countries 

in their quest to become mine impact-free at an 

investment of approximately $2 billion.3

In the US, the notion of a life cycle for national 

arms inventories is rational, institutionalized, and 

long-standing. But, such is not the case in many 

countries, particularly those with new governments 

following regime change (e.g., Libya), those that 

amassed huge stockpiles during the Cold War (e.g., 

the Warsaw Pact), lesser developed countries with 

poor physical security and stockpile management 

safeguards (e.g., Republic of Congo), and countries 

limping out of civil war (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone). 

In those inventories, weapons may sit for long 

periods of time and the records and planning for 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 102

in Bandaria? If so, what will the Bandarians do with 

their existing capacity, which will now be surplus?

In our fictional example, the Bandarians respond 

to our demarche that they are going to equip their 

national military with the new made-in-USA thirdgeneration weapons. Subsequently, they will hand 

down the yet-operational second-generation systems 

to the Bandarian military reserve forces. But if the 

reserves are getting the second generation weapons, 

what will happen to the reserve’s existing inventory? 

What the US does not want is for Bandaria to re-sell 

its sturdy though somewhat outdated weapons on the 

gray market. Nor does anyone want those items—

particularly if they include explosives—to be put 

back in the national stockpile and forgotten beyond 

their shelf life.

In short, is the USG thinking about the unintended 

consequences of creating this surplus? How can we 

do a better job of managing this process so that a 

part of some new military hardware deals includes 

a disposition of excess and obsolete defense items?

Modifying Our Approaches

In many US defense article sales, the conundrum 

described here is simply not an issue. Foreign 

militaries expend uniforms, vehicles, ammunition, 

and weapons during routine training and national 

missions and thus need replacements. Many 

purchases are first-time orders or major upgrades to 

old systems that are now obsolete and for which there 

is a disposition plan in place. Furthermore, it is clear 

that not every type of military sale need consider this 

(e.g., field-grade kitchen gear). Nonetheless, what 

steps can be taken in order to ensure that the US does 

not unwittingly create undesirable surpluses in such 

cases? The following are some modest observations 

and suggestions that will raise awareness and deepen 

interagency communication when planning the 

transfer or sale of defense articles.

Update Training

One of the key nodes for training defense export 

professionals are courses under the aegis of the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

(DISAM). DISAM’s goals are:

• Develop a professional security cooperation 

workforce and build partner capacity through 

education and career development programs.

• Provide research and consultation services 

to the security cooperation community and 

international partners.

their future is likely nil. Many of those charged with 

supervising the weapons are low-ranking conscripts 

without training or experience. Risks abound, 

including pilferage or the temptation to resell these 

items illicitly. In the most horrendous of such cases, 

these stockpiles result in humanitarian catastrophes 

when unstable ordnance spontaneously combusts, 

as happened recently in Brazzaville (Republic of 

Congo) or as has occurred previously in Ukraine, 

Albania, Nigeria, Mozambique, Bulgaria, Tanzania, 

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere.4

These are the worst case scenarios, and although 

they happen at the alarming rate of about three per 

month (thirty-five such incidents January–October 

2011), they are not the norm for thousands of military 

arms depots world wide.5 Nonetheless, the question 

remains: what to do with excess military items? 

Perhaps of greater urgency is what to do in situations 

where potential US sales of military goods will make 

the older weapons “excess.” What should the US 

do to prevent legitimate military sales to sovereign 

governments from creating surpluses of weapons 

that could be resold on gray arms markets or end up 

stockpiled and dangerous (and forgotten) over time?

Imagine such a scenario where US sales contribute 

to foreign surplus. The USG receives a request to 

supply Bandaria6 with an advanced weapons system. 

This third-generation system is state of the art and 

useful for the legitimate defense needs of Bandaria. 

With the formal request in hand, the thoughtful 

processes of the US governing such sales and 

transfers, regulated under the Arms Control Export 

Act,7

 begin to move forward. To simplify, imagine 

a checklist handled by the Department of State’s 

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.8 Is Bandaria a 

sovereign government? Check. Does the government 

have a legitimate defensive need for these items? 

Check. Are we certain that the Bandarians do not plan 

to use these weapons on their own or their neighbors’ 

civilians? Check. Have the Bandarians agreed to sign 

an end-user certificate solemnly promising that they 

will not transfer these weapons to a third party ( e.g., 

another government or a non-state actor) without our 

consent? Have the Bandarians agreed to US end-use 

monitoring requirements? Check. Check. Check.

However, the process, as it currently stands, 

misses a crucial point—one that historically has 

not been a significant part of our thinking about the 

third-order effects of overseas transactions. Will this 

transaction create an excess of this type of weapon 
103 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Security Assistance programs support 

US national security and foreign policy 

objectives. They increase the ability of 

our friends and allies to deter and defend 

against possible aggression, promote the 

sharing of common defense burdens, and 

help foster regional stability. Security 

Assistance can be the delivery of defense 

weapon systems to foreign Governments; 

US Service schools training international 

students; US personnel advising other 

Governments on ways to improve 

their internal defense capabilities; US 

personnel providing guidance and 

assistance in establishing infrastructures 

and economic bases to achieve and 

maintain regional stability; etc. When 

we assist other nations in meeting their 

defense requirements, we contribute to 

our own security.12

With this in mind, a revision of the SAMM or, 

more likely, an up-to-date policy letter could capture 

the nexus of US security assistance objectives (e.g., 

“support US national security” and “help foster 

regional stability”), legitimate arms sales, and 

scrutiny of the disposition of excess and/or obsolete 

weapons stockpiles. This would be in-line with many 

of the contemporary policy letters, which tend to be 

titled “Policy Update Regarding...” and “Revision 

of DSCA Policy Concerning...” Taking a cue from 

the Bandaria case, a policy update clarifying policy 

considerations, agency involvement, and coordinating 

actions for dealing with the sales/surplus paradox 

seems to be appropriate, and such a document could 

be folded into future iterations of DISAM training.

Use the Sale as Leverage on Stockpile 

Management from the Beginning

In some cases it may be appropriate that an arms 

sale that would clear all the US regulatory hurdles 

should be considered as having a secondary potential: 

to spur a careful inventory of national stockpiles and 

assess physical security and stockpile management 

considerations. In such cases, highlighting the US 

desire to see weapons life cycle management for the 

arms sale from the outset may provide the leverage 

necessary to improve safety conditions and practices 

as well as determine, and ultimately ameliorate, 

potential weapons excesses. Of course, the tenor of 

the “sales pitch” and the right message for the partner 

• Conduct a public information program for 

the security cooperation community and 

international partners.

• Develop and maintain selected IT programs 

for the security cooperation community and 

international partners.9

Much of the DISAM training is rooted in the 

Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), 

and a host of short courses as well as extensive 

training is available through DISAM for both DOD 

and State Department employees such as the “Security 

Cooperation Familiarization Course,” “International 

Programs Security Requirements Course,” and 

more in-depth courses on Case Management, 

Financial Management, Logistics Support, and 

Advanced Training Management.10 Moreover, it is 

not uncommon for DSCA to take the “show on the 

road” and visit combatant commands with primers 

on security assistance: such are perfect venues to alert 

country teams about dealing with the sales/surplus 

paradox.

A simple modification of training, which is 

currently under discussion, would be to look at realworld cases where the transfer-surplus paradox has 

been at play and how it has been (or should have been) 

resolved. In addition to theory and real-world cases, 

the training should provide a venue for interagency 

collaboration and a set of contacts across military, 

intelligence, and diplomatic communities so that the 

final whole-of-government response to an arms sales 

request is rooted in early cross-agency conversation 

and information-sharing.

Revise the SAMM

The Security Assistance Management Manual 

(DSCA Manual 5105.38-M [April 30.2012]) is a 

600-page document that outlines the full-range of 

possibilities and foundational policies for security 

assistance writ large. The SAMM’s five appendices 

and dozens of “annual policy letters” (seventeen in 

the first quarter of CY 2012 alone) demonstrate that 

not only is this a wide-ranging document, but also 

it is a living one that constantly attempts to respond 

to changing economic, strategic, and political trends. 

In short, the SAMM is the bible for many security 

assistance professionals at the Department of Defense.

On the first page of its first chapter, the SAMM 

makes a compelling case for US security assistance 

to foreign governments:
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 104

in Multilateral Security Institutions,” in British 

Journal of Political Science 27, no. 3 (Jul., 1997). 

Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194122; 

Michael Lipson, “Transaction Cost Estimation 

and International Regimes: Of Crystal Balls 

and Sheriff’s Posses,” in International Studies 

Review 6, no. 1 (Mar., 2004). Available at: 

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186537. See for 

instance, Edward W Kratovil, et al “Department 

of the Navy Risk Management Program for 

the Safe Manufacture, Storage and Handling 

of Ammunition and Explosives.” Conference 

Paper for the Twenty-Eighth DOD Explosives 

Safety Seminar Held in Orlando, FL (18-20 

August 1998); James Bevan, ed. Conventional 

Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide, copublished with BICC, FAS, GRIP, and SEESAC 

with support from the German Federal Foreign 

Office (January 2008). A related issue is the life 

cycle of nuclear components; see D. Crawford 

et al, “A Perspective on the Alliance Program’s 

benefits,” Computing in Science & Engineering

2, no. 2 (March–April 2000).

2. A complementary program that provides partner 

nations with PSSM assessment and seminars is 

found within DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA). A snapshot of their work can 

be found at: http://www.dtra.mil/Libraries/

System_Documents/SALWScorecard.sflb.ashx.

3. To Walk the Earth in Safety: Documenting 

10 Years of the United States’ Commitment 

to Conventional Weapons Destruction. US 

Department of State Publication (July 2011). 

Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/

walkearth/index.htm.

4. Adrian Wilkinson, 2011. ‘The threat from 

explosive events in ammunition storage areas,” 

2nd edition. (Kent: Explosive Capabilities 

Limited, 2011). 

5. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites,” 

Research Note No. 6. Geneva, Switzerland: 

Small Arms Survey, 2011. Available at: http://

www.smallarmssurvey.org/?uems.

6. Bandaria is a fictional country not based on any 

single state.

7. 22 U.S.C. 2778 of the Arms Export Control 

Act (AECA) provides the authority to control 

the export of defense articles and services, and 

charges the President to exercise this authority. 

government is critical, lest the US’ tedious process 

and apparent double-speak result in both a lost sale 

(in favor of a foreign competitor) and a missed 

PSSM opportunity. A sophisticated approach means 

coordinated activity by embassies, the intelligence 

community, various offices in Washington, and 

especially DSCA, the State Department’s PoliticalMilitary Affairs Bureau, and perhaps the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency.

Conclusion

In the case of Bandaria, a clever Foreign Service 

Officer or Security Cooperation Officer stationed at 

the US embassy in the Bandarian capital recognized 

a comparable transfer/surplus situation as an 

opportunity. He was able to alert both DSCA and 

the State Department’s Political-Military Affairs 

Bureau as to reports of overflowing Bandarian arms 

storage depots as well as a pending request for a sale 

of advanced US weapons. In this unique instance 

not only did the US provide the defense articles—a 

legitimate need of the Bandarian government—but 

also provided training on PSSM and assisted in 

the disposition and destruction of some excess and 

obsolete conventional weapons and munitions. The 

ease of the process (which nonetheless took the 

better part of a year) was due to good training, a high 

level of communication and transparency between 

offices at DOD and the State Department, thoughtful 

policies in the SAMM and other regulatory and 

procedural manuals, and good will (rather than turf 

wars) in Washington. Multiple US objectives were 

met, and the US-Bandarian bilateral relationship was 

strengthened.

Notes

1. It is important to note that the US has long been a 

global watchdog against the transfer of high value 

armaments and dual-use technologies (hi-tech 

items that are critical components to weapons as 

well as non-weapons systems, such as advanced 

gyroscopes or computing technologies). Such 

leadership is beyond the bounds of this essay, but 

in short it began in earnest with the Coordinating 

Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 

(“CoCom”) arrangement of 1949 and extends to 

this day in the subsequent Wassenaar Arrangement 

and other fora. For more, see Richard T. Cupitt 

and Suzette R. Grillot, “COCOM is Dead, 

Long Live COCOM: Persistence and Change 
105 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Executive Order 11958, as amended, delegated 

this statutory authority to the Secretary of State.

8. For more information about US arms exports 

regulations and about the State Department 

entities who handle them, see http://pmddtc.

state.gov/index.html.

9. See the DISAM Journal of International Security 

Cooperation Management website: http://www.

disamjournal.org/about-us.

10. Many of these DISAM courses fall under 

DOD’s High Priority Performance Goal/Security 

Cooperation Training Initiative (HPPG/SCTI). 

For more information and a link to the complete 

course offering guide, see http://www.disam.

dsca.mil/hppg/.

11. For the 2012 policy letters and links to 

previous years, see http://www.dsca.mil/samm/

PolicyMemoList-2012.htm.

12. DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance 

Management Manual (SAMM). http://www.

dsca.mil/ samm/. 

About the Author

Dr. Eric Patterson is Dean of the Robertson 

School of Government at Regent University and 

Senior Research Fellow at Georgetown University’s 

Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. 

His interest in this issue comes from two stints 

working at the US Department of State’s Bureau 

of Political-Military Affairs: in the bureau’s Office 

of Weapons Removal and Abatement and on the 

Interagency MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense 

Systems) Task Force. His most recent book is Ending 

Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in 

Contemporary Post-Conflict (Yale University Press, 

2012).
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 106
107 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Ambassador’s residence to celebrations of your host 

nation, and perhaps invitations to dine with foreign 

nationals in their homes.

Event Types

Determine the type of event from the invitation: 

Formal (rare, but certainly the Marine Birthday Ball 

would be one), Informal (most often worn at the 

embassy and dealing with the host nation, and for 

receptions, parties, dinners when not in uniform), 

and Casual (acceptable for around the house and 

travelling). Note that the style of dress at an event, 

whether formal, informal, or casual, also is driven 

by the time of day. In general, any event beginning 

at 6:00 p.m. or later would have an expectation of a 

higher level of formality in clothing.

Style Basics

As mentioned earlier, a great way to be 

comfortable in civilian clothing is to consider it to 

be just another uniform. Neither gender would wear 

outrageous colors, jewelry, or other decorations on 

their military uniform, so it would not be appropriate 

with a civilian suit/uniform.

For formal events, a tuxedo or service equivalent 

of a mess dress is appropriate. If you learn from 

speaking to your predecessor that you will attend 

formal events and are required to wear a tuxedo but 

don not own one, the rule of thumb is that it is better 

to rent if there are two or fewer occasions.

The majority of the time will be at informal events; 

this is not “casual.” For both gender’s informal style, 

if you are not restricted to wearing your uniform 

at all times, plan on having at least two suits. By 

definition, a suit is the same fabric in the jacket and 

bottom (pants or skirt). Your wardrobe should have 

one charcoal gray, and one navy blue (women can 

also add brown). Shirts should be primarily white, 

but one can add very subtle light blue or light gray, 

and some white with fine pinstripes. For the men, 

Civilian Diplomat Attire for Security 

Cooperation Officers (SCOs)

By Timothy Burke

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

As a member of the US Embassy team, your 

role in the SCO will entail not only dealing with the 

administration of foreign military sales and training, 

but you will also be expected to interact with the host 

nation and work closely with representatives from 

across the US government in your daily interactions 

with the embassy country team. We all know the 

cliché about first impressions; an effective SCO 

presents a professional image in every encounter.

What to wear in the SCO and around the local 

area will depend on a number of factors, e.g., the 

desires of the Chief of Mission, the SDO/DATT, 

the GCC, and the local environment. Also, you may 

receive invitations to attend meetings, functions, 

receptions, parties, dinners, etc., from host nation 

representatives. Your attire at these functions, if not 

your service dress uniform, will reflect greatly on the 

United States.

No doubt you know when your uniform needs 

updating. It is relatively easy for military members 

to notice someone in an out-of-date uniform; civilian 

clothing also has a “style” lifespan, if you will. 

Professional diplomats and politicians who wear 

suits daily can recognize one that is no longer in 

style. Therefore, it is important for you to have a 

relatively up-to-date wardrobe to project the image 

of a competent diplomat/warrior. Women’s runway 

fashions change with the seasons, but conservative 

business attire will stay relevant for much longer. 

Men’s fashion designers change business suit 

characteristics on a three- to five-year cycle. 

An effective SCO will understand how to wear 

civilian attire correctly. SCO counterparts in the 

Defense Attaché Office receive multiple hours of 

clothing instruction and a personal evaluation of 

their wardrobe. SCOs will generally not receive 

such exhaustive instruction. Therefore, some simple 

rules will be useful in preparing your wardrobe for 

activities ranging from office wear to functions at the 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 108

About the Author

Timothy Burke is DISAM’s European Regional 

Seminar Director and Instructor of Security 

Cooperation Management. His SC experience includes 

a three-year tour in the US embassy in Warsaw, 

Poland as Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache 

and Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation. He 

is a retired USAF Colonel and former F-4G, F-16CG 

and AT-38B fighter pilot with combat time over Iraq 

and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He commanded the 435th 

Fighter Training Squadron, and served as Deputy 

Operations Group Commander at the Euro-NATO 

Joint Jet Pilot Training Wing. He received his master’s 

degrees in Strategic Studies from Air War College 

in-residence, and Aviation Operations from EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University, and a bachelor of 

science in physics and astronomy from the University 

of Massachusetts at Amherst. While on active duty, 

he earned the Defense Superior Service Medal twice, 

the Distinguished Flying Cross, five Meritorious 

Service Medals, and five Air Medals among other 

awards. He also was presented the Silver Medal of 

the Polish Army for his security cooperation team’s 

work in Poland.

the “variety” in the wardrobe is created by having 

multiple ties in the closet from which to choose. 

Start with deep red for the most professional look, 

then blue (often seen on the President), then some 

metallic colors. Small repeating patterns on the tie 

are acceptable. Men’s socks will be darker than 

their slacks; women should always plan on wearing 

subtle hosiery. Women’s skirts must reach the knee 

and should not climb high on the thigh when seated. 

Leather shoes are appropriate for both genders; men 

wear oxfords or wingtips, women wear low-heeled 

“pumps” (no boots or stilettos, no open-toes, no white 

shoes). Keep jewelry to a minimum for both genders. 

Men’s belts will match the color of their shoes.

For casual events, men may feel comfortable 

with a blazer and a button down shirt (probably no tie, 

but be aware of the level of formality at the event). 

Dockers and casual shoes work for both genders. 

It is extremely rare to wear denim, but should the 

occasion arise, be sure there are, no holes, tears, or 

fading. Women can wear a blouse with long sleeves, 

or a wrap to cover exposed skin (certainly hostnation culture dependent). Slacks and casual shoes 

are acceptable. 

In many locations the SCO is “weight-restricted” 

due to travel regulations and host-nation realities. 

Therefore, when choosing your wardrobe, strive 

for mix-and-match outfits where you can get the 

most wear out of multiple combinations of the same 

clothes.

In summary, it is important to realize that how you 

dress at diplomatic functions is a direct reflection of 

the United States and your professionalism. Always 

strive for a sharp, classic, conservative look (both men 

and women). Both men and women need to know their 

body type and choose clothes that complement that 

body type while enhancing their image. By making 

smart choices, you can limit your expenditures and 

maximize your clothing flexibility. Lastly, ensure you 

speak with your predecessors and future coworkers 

to gain an understanding of the environment and how 

often you will be expected to wear different outfits, 

military or civilian. Your objective is to blend in 

with the other professional diplomats, not stand out. 

For reference, the entire Civilian Diplomat Attire 

computer-based training is available at the DISAM 

web page under Online Learning.
109 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Enhancing National Security 

Cooperation Policy With Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft

By Lt Col Ken Callahan

US Air Force

Introduction

The global security environment has 

changed dramatically since the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001. The new environment is 

characterized by a spectrum of threats ranging 

from non-state actors based in failed states,2

 to 

the rise of new regional powers, to continued 

concern about the spread of weapons of mass 

destruction.3 Responding to these threats 

requires a new approach directed by our national 

security strategy that includes “an adaptive 

blend of diplomacy, development, and defense” 

and a realization that the United States must 

learn to accept partnerships of varying degrees 

of commitment to ensure our own security. 4,5

Building partnerships includes strengthening 

relations not only with like-minded democratic 

allies but also with nations that have “little in 

common except for the desire to defeat al-Qaeda 

and its affiliates and adherents.”6

From a military perspective, building a spectrum 

of security partnerships requires the Department 

of Defense to enhance nation-specific security 

cooperation programs in an effort to leverage their 

unique capabilities. However, in the new security 

environment, nation-specific programs must be 

linked to a global security strategy that responds 

to increasingly global threats. Security cooperation 

programs should promote United States security 

interests, improve allied and partner capacity, facilitate 

information and intelligence sharing, and provide 

access to forward basing and en route infrastructure.7

Each of these criteria are easy to understand, but 

increasingly difficult to apply to the wide spectrum of 

complex relationships ranging from strong traditional 

allies to weak partnerships with nations who wish to 

defeat radical ideology but have little else in common 

with the United States.8

Two unique technology systems that can achieve 

Department of Defense security cooperation goals 

across a spectrum of tailored relationships are the 

Air Force’s fleet of MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). These ISR RPA 

systems can be globally postured and regionally 

focused in a manner that enhances global security 

cooperation efforts. Unfortunately, there is not 

currently an overarching strategic plan in place to 

provide specific nations with ISR RPA capabilities to 

promote security cooperation. In addition, the thirtyfour-member international body Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR) led by the United States has 

placed restrictions on the proliferation of ISR drones 

in an effort to limit the spread of vehicles that can 

deliver weapons of mass destruction.9

 Despite this 

restriction, the United States should reconsider its 

position on the proliferation of ISR RPA systems and 

include these systems in a global security cooperation 

plan that accounts for a wide-range of nation-tonation relationships. 

The purpose of this research paper is to provide a 

baseline discussion for how Air Force MQ-1 and MQ-9 

ISR RPA platforms can enhance security cooperation. 

Following a brief overview of Department of Defense 

security cooperation programs, a specific approach 

to integrating MQ-1 and MQ-9 ISR RPA systems 

across a range of partnerships will be proposed. It is 

recognized that there are current prohibitions in place 

that prevent the proliferation of these systems. These 

prohibitions will be discussed as challenges to United 

States strategic choices and will be considered in the 

recommendation portion of this paper.

Security Cooperation

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations discusses 

security cooperation and military engagement 

activities together as the means by which the 

Department of Defense interacts with other nations 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 110

to ensure security, deter conflict, and enable future 

contingency operations. Joint Publication 3-0 defines 

security cooperation as:

All DOD interactions with foreign defense and 

security establishments to build defense relationships 

that promote specific US security interests, develop 

allied and friendly military and security capabilities 

for internal and external defense and for multinational 

operations, and provide US forces with peacetime 

and contingency access to the HN [host nation].”10

Likewise, Joint Publication 3-0 states, “Military 

engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, 

but also extends to interaction with domestic 

civilian authorities.”11 For simplicity, throughout this 

discussion, the term security cooperation will include 

interactions with both military and domestic civilian 

authorities.

Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense

figure I-4 lists fifteen activities with the last being 

“other programs and activities,” implying some 

leeway.12 However, despite the multiple number of 

activities that can occur under the umbrella of security 

cooperation, all of the activities can be grouped 

under four broad categories: stability operations, 

preparing for coalition operations, information and 

intelligence sharing, and strategic access.13 Grouping 

all the security cooperation activities into these four 

broad categories is non-doctrinal, but forms a good 

framework for consideration. 

Stability Operations

The primary purpose of security cooperation 

programs is to promote US interests abroad. In most 

situations, US interests are best served by ensuring the 

stability of allied and partner nations and the global 

regions those nations are in. Joint Publication 3-07, 

Stability Operations defines stability operations as:

various military missions, tasks, and activities 

conducted outside the US in coordination with 

other instruments of national power to maintain 

or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 

provide essential governmental services, 

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief.14

Security is a key part of stability operations 

and a lack of security often generates the need 

for stabilization operations to begin.15 Generally, 

security is thought of as an external consideration or 

“a condition that results from the establishment and 

maintenance of protective measures that ensure a 

state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.”16

Yet, security concerns may also arise from internal 

sources such as an insurgency, organized crime, or 

drug trafficking.

When the US has an alliance with another nation, 

stability and security support arrangements are 

generally codified in a treaty or formal agreement. 

Security Cooperation Activities

Stability Operations Preparing for Coalition Ops Information and 

Intelligence Sharing Strategic Access

• Counter-narcotics 

Assistance

• Counter/NonProliferation

• Defense Support to 

Public Diplomacy

• International 

Armaments 

Cooperation

• Security Assistance

• Humanitarian 

Assistance

• Multinational Education

• Multinational Exercises

• Multinational Experimentation

• Multinational Training

• Intelligence 

Cooperation

• Information Sharing

• Defense & Military 

Contacts

• Facilities & 

Infrastructure Projects
111 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

with foreign governments to anticipate events, 

respond to crises, and provide safety and security.”20

Unlike security, stability, and coalition warfare, the 

US is not always the strongest partner when it comes 

to information and intelligence gathering. The 2008 

National Defense Strategy notes, “Often our partners 

are better positioned to handle a given problem because 

they understand the local geography, social structures, 

and culture better than we do or ever could.”21 Due 

to the strengths of our allies and partners, it is vital 

to US interests to establish structures and agreements 

to facilitate information and intelligence exchanges.

Responsibility for information and intelligence 

sharing protocols is given to commanders, but 

restricted by law. Joint Publication 3-0 highlights 

the importance of information and intelligence 

exchanging:

The sharing of information with relevant 

USG [US government] agencies, foreign 

governments and security forces, interorganizational partners, NGOs [nongovernment organizations], and members 

of the private sector, has proved vital in 

recent operations. Commanders at all levels 

should determine and provide guidance on 

what information needs to be shared with 

whom and when. DOD information should 

be appropriately secured, shared, and made 

available throughout the information life 

cycle to appropriate mission partners to 

the maximum extent allowed by US laws 

and DOD policy. Commanders, along with 

their staffs, need to recognize the criticality 

of the information-sharing function at the 

outset of complex operations and not as an 

afterthought.22

Strategic Access

The 2010 National Military Strategy states, 

“Global posture remains our most powerful form 

of commitment and provides us strategic depth 

across domains and regions.”23 Security cooperation 

programs improve global posture by engaging host 

nations in order to obtain strategic access to facilities 

and sovereign space during both peacetime and 

contingency operations.24 Additionally, strategic 

access includes making contacts with appropriate 

local agencies, establishing support contracts and 

improving host nation facilities when necessary. 

However, when the US deals with less formal 

partners, a consideration of US interests must be 

made on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the US 

must evaluate the motives of a partner nation. As 

William Lambert notes, a partner nation’s definition 

of security might be different than that of the US. The 

US may seek to protect a nation from external threats 

while the leadership of the partner nation may simply 

want to stay in power. A controlling regime may view 

with more concern threats from internal rather than 

external sources.17 Under such circumstances, careful 

consideration must be given to supporting a country 

that may use support (especially military support) for 

an unintended purpose.

Preparing for Coalition Operations

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

highlighted the importance of building allied partner 

capacity to meet the challenges of the current security 

environment during his tenure as head of the Defense 

Department. He noted that the effectiveness and 

credibility of the US would rely on the effectiveness 

and credibility of local partners. Gates commented:

This strategic reality demands that the US 

government get better at what is called 

building partner capacity: helping other 

countries defend themselves or, if necessary, 

fight alongside US forces by providing them 

with equipment, training, or other forms of 

security assistance.18

In order to accomplish Gates’ vision, the US 

must provide allies and partner nations with both 

the equipment and the training required to operate 

in a coalition environment. In many cases this task 

requires the US to transform and optimize foreign 

militaries in an effort to raise their capabilities to 

a level where they can effectively contribute to an 

operation.19 Long-term allied nations (for example, 

many NATO partners) already have significant 

capabilities, but less developed partners may require 

a long-term investment to raise their capabilities to 

an effective level.

Information and Intelligence Sharing

Since September 11th, 2001, the US has placed 

a greater interest on information and intelligence 

sharing with foreign governments. The 2010 National 

Security Strategy states, “...our intelligence and law 

enforcement agencies must cooperate effectively 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 112

Data-links comprise many different systems 

available to control and monitor the aircraft and its 

payload. MQ-1 and MQ-9 RPAs can be controlled 

using various technology and methods to fit the 

needs of the mission being performed. The control 

technology and methods can be tailored to balance 

information access with security, and autonomy with 

failsafe control, as desired by the commander.

Types of Control

There are four basic ways of operating MQ-1 

and MQ-9 RPAs: pre-programmed missions, line-ofsite control, beyond line-of-site satellite control, and 

remote split operations. Pre-programmed missions 

are uploaded to a computer in the aircraft, which then 

flies the programmed mission until a new mission 

is reloaded. Often, emergency missions are preprogrammed in the event the primary control link is 

broken so the aircraft can fly to a specific location 

where another control link can be established. Preprogrammed missions are not usually the primary 

method of control because they limit tactical 

interactivity.28

Line-of-site control requires a ground-based signal 

to be sent to an aircraft. This type of control limits the 

range of the aircraft due to the strength of the control 

signal, terrain, and atmospheric conditions, but does 

not limit the RPAs endurance. Line-of-site control 

is especially useful for base defense operations and 

limited range but high endurance targets (urban or 

border patrol). In addition, line-of-site control tends 

to be more responsive and less expensive that satellite 

control options.29

Beyond line-of-site control uses a satellite link 

to fly the aircraft. Typically, a line-of-site signal will 

be used to launch the aircraft and then the crew will 

establish a secure satellite control link to increase 

the range of the aircraft. Using this type of control, 

aircraft range is limited only by fuel and satellite 

signal limitations. This type of control is very useful 

with limited airfield infrastructure and geographic 

challenges (large border areas, difficult terrain, 

remote locations, etc.).30

Remote split operations expand on the beyond 

line-of-site concept by adding an additional crew 

in a different location. Using this type of control, a 

crew launches an aircraft using line-of-site control 

and then passes control via a hand-off procedure to 

a flight crew at a different location using a secure 

satellite control link. The US currently uses this 

This type of strategic access to allied and partner 

nations frequently requires enduring relationships 

based on trust and commitment to long-term 

security. Fortunately, the Air Force now possesses a 

flexible technology that can permit tailored security 

cooperation across all four broad areas with partners 

of diverse capabilities and capacities.

ISR RPA Systems

There are many tools available to conduct 

security cooperation activities, but few have the 

ability to conduct all security cooperation activities 

as comprehensively as Air Force ISR RPAs. Although 

the Air Force ISR RPA portfolio is large and growing, 

the most commonly known and widely requested 

systems are the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. 

Both the Predator and the Reaper are unique because 

they are systems that are more extensive than the 

aircraft itself.

The MQ-1 and MQ-9 systems are complex, but 

the main elements are the aircraft, ground control 

station (flight controls), video distribution and 

exploitation system, and data-links. The aircraft are 

relatively low technology airframes with a highresolution camera. In addition to the camera, the 

MQ-1 and MQ-9 are designed to carry weapons to 

include the AGM-114 Hellfire laser guided missile 

and the GBU-12 500-pound laser guided bomb. The 

aircraft can be modified to carry additional payloads 

at the expense of fuel and overall endurance.25

The MQ-1 and the MQ-9 systems are remotely 

piloted from a ground control station. The ground 

control stations consist of the same hardware for both 

the MQ-1 and the MQ-9, but each requires different 

software. The basic crew for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 

consists of a pilot (responsible for flying the aircraft) 

and a sensor operator (responsible for operating the 

camera). A third crew member, mission intelligence 

coordinator, is added when needed to operate in a 

complex tactical environment.26

Both the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 systems can 

provide real-time full motion video direct to the 

battlefield or to a command center anywhere in the 

world. This allows command and control elements 

to maintain some direct awareness of and remote 

access to the battlefield. Information and intelligence 

gathered during operations can also be shared and 

exploited real-time permitting decisions to be made 

at a faster rate.27
113 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

for both peace and wartime coalition operations. 

Conversely, a crew from the United States could 

get real-time training in European airspace without 

leaving CONUS. This type of training is much less 

expensive than deploying squadrons for military 

training, but still realizes the same benefits of multinational training exercises. 

Information and Intelligence Sharing

Information and intelligence sharing represents 

the greatest potential gains in security cooperation for 

the United States. Local partners often know the area, 

terrain, and customs better than American analysts 

and can provide crucial inputs about what to look 

at and when.35 In addition, when an MQ-1 or MQ-9 

video feed is distributed across a network, command 

centers around the globe can simultaneously access 

information and full-motion video real-time. In Haiti, 

full motion video was shared directly with government 

and non-government agencies in both the United 

States and Haiti. This provided good awareness of 

the problem by allowing relief participants to view 

stricken areas, determine the extent of damage, and 

prioritize relief efforts.36

In addition, intelligence sharing is valuable during 

allied and coalition operations and can be restricted 

to permit access from secure areas and approved 

partners. One approach to intelligence sharing may 

be to have a US air crew fly the RPA but give an 

allied or partner nation access to the video feed and 

exploitation resources. The ally or partner nation can 

even participate in the targeting or maneuvering of 

the aircraft or sensor through direct communication 

with a US command center or the crew. In addition, 

an allied or partner nation might also be able to fly the 

aircraft and provide intelligence back to the United 

States in the same manner. Different relationships 

and capabilities with the host country will dictate 

different approaches. 

Strategic Access

Obtaining strategic access to regions, airspace, 

and host-nation facilities is an important part of the 

United States global engagement strategy. The 2011 

National Military Strategy states, “With partner 

nation support, we will preserve forward presence 

and access to the commons, bases, ports, and airfields 

commensurate with safeguarding our economic and 

security interests worldwide.”37 An integrated RPA 

plan can facilitate and improve the forward basing 

options.

construct effectively to fly its ISR RPA fleet and 

the advantages are numerous. Using remote split 

operations, a CONUS-based crew can fly an RPA 

anywhere in the world. CONUS basing improves 

support structures, limits risk to aircrews, and permits 

real-time reallocation from one theater of operations 

to another within a short period of time.31

ISR RPAs and Stability Operations

The MQ-1 and MQ-9 ISR RPA systems are well 

suited for a variety of stability operations in allied 

and partner nations. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review states, “Long-dwell UASs [Unmanned 

Aerial Systems] such as the Predator, Reaper, and 

other systems, have proven to be invaluable for 

monitoring activities in contested areas, enhancing 

situational awareness, protecting our forces, and 

assisting in targeting enemy fighters.”32 An allied or 

partner nation could easily realize the same benefits if 

trained and equipped with MQ-1 and MQ-9 aircraft. 

In addition, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 

notes, “Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces 

by exploiting ungoverned and under-governed areas 

as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, 

and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on US and 

allied interests.”33 Because of their ability to monitor 

such areas, both the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 provide a 

capability for a country to deny terrorist access to 

ungoverned space. 

In addition, the MQ-1 and MQ-9 have proven 

to be useful in humanitarian assistance missions. 

After the Haiti earthquake in 2010, the United States 

provided MQ-1 support to monitor supply movements 

and direct the limited Haitian police force to troubled 

areas. Although this operation was flown using US 

crews employing remote split operations control, 

if trained and equipped, Haitian forces could have 

flown the operation using line-of-site control directly 

from their own airfield.34

ISR RPAs and Preparing for Coalition 

Operations

Perhaps the most unique aspect of ISR RPAs is 

the ability for a crew to fly an aircraft from anywhere 

in the world. This has great utility for training with 

allied partners. For example, utilizing remote split 

operations, a NATO ally could participate from their 

home station in an exercise being conducted in United 

States military training airspace. This type of training 

would greatly enhance interoperability of forces 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 114

2005 Air Force RPA strategic vision document noted 

the restrictions and advocates their removal:

The Air Force must continue to address RPA 

and UAV export policy. The sale of USmanufactured, interoperable RPAs and UAVs 

to key allies and foreign partners enhances 

coalition capability, and an integrated 

production strategy provides advantages to 

the US industrial base. Currently, the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) limits 

the export of the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 

[Reaper], and RQ-4 Global Hawk, severely 

constraining RPA security cooperation 

activities with allies and foreign partners. The 

Air Force must continue to advocate updates 

to the MTCR and the US government export 

policy to fully develop interoperable coalition 

capabilities that support US national security 

objectives.40

Network Security

The second challenge for the Air Force to 

overcome prior to exporting MQ-1s and MQ-9s is 

network security. As Pentagon spokesman Bryan 

Whitman noted in 2009:

Every capability comes with its advantages, 

disadvantages, benefits as well as potential 

weaknesses. As you develop those 

(technologies) you have to be mindful of how 

the enemy can counteract any technology 

that you have. That’s why you always have 

a constant review process in place to not 

only improve that capability but address any 

vulnerabilities it may have.41

In the past five years, there have been two network 

security vulnerabilities publicly acknowledged and 

fixed by the Air Force in the ISR RPA system. The 

first was the discovery that insurgents in Iraq had 

found a way to hack into data feeds and monitor full 

motion video from MQ-1 aircraft. In December 2009, 

a Pentagon spokesman acknowledged the breach and 

indicated the problem had been fixed.42 A second 

vulnerability was discovered in September 2011, 

when a credential-stealing virus was discovered on 

ground control station hard drives at Creech Air Force 

Base. The Air Force described this virus as a nuisance

and reportedly isolated and removed the virus from 

the system.43

For example, a country located in a region 

sensitive to a large presence of US military forces 

could be equipped with lower signature MQ-1s or 

MQ-9s as part of a foreign military sales package. 

The host-nation could then fly the aircraft to observe 

areas of interest like a disputed border or ungoverned 

territory, and the video feed could be sent to a 

coalition command center for exploitation. Another 

alternative application would be to ask the allied 

or partner nation to launch and recover the aircraft 

while US crews fly the missions from CONUS. This 

arrangement would leverage the host nation’s ability 

to work airspace, logistics, and billeting issues, but 

give the US access to the region. In either example, 

the approach taken can be tailored to meet the needs 

of the mission.

Challenges

Despite the advantages of using ISR RPAs to 

enhance security cooperation, there are significant 

challenges the Air Force must overcome before MQ-1 

and MQ-9 systems can be integrated into security 

cooperation programs. Three specific challenges are 

the Missile Technology Control Regime’s (MTCR) 

export limitations, network security, and system 

standardization. Each issue requires significant 

changes by the Air Force, and the Department of 

Defense before ISR RPAs can be exported to global 

allies and partners. 

MTCR Restriction

The MTCR was established in 1987 by the 

United States, Canada, France, West Germany, 

Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom to “prevent 

the proliferation of missiles and unmanned aerial 

vehicle capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”38

In 1993, the MTCR expanded its charter to limit 

the “proliferation of missile delivery systems for all 

weapons of mass destruction.”39 Since the creation 

of the organization, the MTCR has grown to 34 

partner nations. Currently, the MTCR does not permit 

the sale of MQ-1 or MQ-9 aircraft to other nations 

because these weapons systems have the capability 

of delivering a 500-kg payload to a range of 300-km. 

This restriction has been in-place for over 20 years 

but will be reconsidered at the next MTCR meeting 

in April 2012. 

The MTCR restrictions on the export of ISR RPA 

technology are problematic for using MQ-1 and MQ-9 

RPAs as part of security cooperation programs. The 
115 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

delivery platforms. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 systems 

do not employ stealth technology or self-defense 

capabilities and are relatively slow moving vehicles 

that can easily be defeated by air defense systems.46

The security benefits gained by exporting MQ-1s or 

MQ-9s outweigh the limited risk of them possibly 

being used to deliver a weapon of mass destruction.

In addition, nations with the ability to manufacture 

weapons of mass destruction are likely to have 

the ability to manufacture their own unmanned 

platforms. For example, Iran, India, Russia, Pakistan, 

China and the European Union have already built 

and marketed unmanned aircraft and are benefitting 

from national sales and partnerships with interested 

nations.47 Restricting exports of unmanned aircraft 

systems among friendly nations does not eliminate 

the threat from more aggressive nations and damages 

United States efforts to establish security cooperation 

relationships.

Recommendation #2

In the absence of a fully secure network, the Air 

Force should pursue the sale of MQ-1 and MQ-9 

systems with limited line-of-site control technology 

that would isolate partners from secure networks. 

Although limiting access will reduce the ability for 

partner nations to integrate with the United States, 

some limited security cooperation goals can still 

be accomplished. For example, restricting network 

access will prevent nations from participating in 

intercontinental multinational training and exercises 

but will permit stability operations to be performed 

by the host nation.

Recommendation #3

The United States is the global leader in unmanned 

systems, but standardized operating procedures 

and regulations have not caught up with the rapid 

growth of the program. The Air Force should take 

the lead in developing operating procedures that are 

acceptable to other services, the Federal Aviation 

Administration, and the international airspace system. 

By leveraging its leadership position in unmanned 

systems, the Unites States has the opportunity to 

pioneer standards for the global community that are 

in our national interest and include safety, equipment 

specifications, and crew qualifications. If the United 

States does not take the lead in exporting unmanned 

systems, other nations (to include adversaries) will. 

By forfeiting the leadership role, the United States 

will have less influence in establishing global rules 

Unfortunately, network security will only get 

more difficult as allies and partners are given access 

to the system. However, access to the network is only 

required when RPAs are fully integrated and satellite 

technology is in-use. By limiting integration or 

employing line-of-site control, RPAs can be isolated 

from the network. Implementing restrictions on 

integration and control methods increases network 

security but decreases the overall effectiveness of the 

systems.

System Standardization

System standardization is another significant 

issue the Air Force must address prior to implementing 

a comprehensive security cooperation program 

with ISR RPAs. As noted with network security, 

standardized equipment, network monitoring, and 

security protocols are important to the health and 

effectiveness of the entire system. In addition, the 

Federal Aviation Administration has raised specific 

concerns over the lack of standardization with 

displays, controls, response to system failures, crew 

composition, and crew qualifications. Although 

these concerns are specific to national airspace in the 

United States, many of the same concerns will need 

to be addressed to operate in international airspace.44

Recommendations and Conclusions

The 2010 National Security Strategy directs the 

Defense Department to enhance relationships with old 

allies and create new partnerships with other countries 

seeking to defeat Al Qaeda.45 The Department of 

Defense uses nation and region-specific security 

cooperation programs to promote stability, prepare 

for coalition operations, exchange information 

and intelligence, and ensure strategic access when 

needed. Air Force ISR RPA systems have the ability 

to enhance all of the outcomes desired by security 

cooperation programs, but are currently restricted by 

the MTCR, network security concerns, and the lack 

of global operating standards. In order to overcome 

the current challenges and limitations, the Air Force 

should consider advocating three recommendations.

Recommendation #1

The United States should open discussion 

with MTCR members to reconsider the ban on the 

proliferation of ISR RPA systems. Although MTCR 

concerns about delivery systems for weapons of mass 

destruction are shared by the United States, MQ-1 and 

MQ-9 ISR RPA systems are not the most threatening 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 116

25. 432d Air Expeditionary Wing Mission Briefing, 

Creech Air Force Base, NV Jun 2011.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report, Feb 2010, p. 22.

33. Ibid, p. 27.

34. 432d Air Expeditionary Wing Mission Briefing, 

Creech Air Force Base, NV, Jun 2011.

35. National Defense Strategy, 2008, p. 8.

36. Ibid.

37. The National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America, 2011, p. 10.

38. Mary Beth Nikitin, Paul Kerr, and Steven 

Hildreth, Proliferation Control Regime: 

Background and Status, Congressional Research 

Service, October 2010, p. 33.

39. Ibid, p. 34

40. The Secretary of the Air Force, The US Air Force 

Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Strategic Vision, 2005 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office) 2005, p. 34.

41. Phil Stewart, “US Military Drone Security Breach 

Fixed,” Reuters, December 17 2009, http://www.

reuters.com/assets (accessed 4 December 2011).

42. Ibid.

43. Noah Schachtman, “Air Force Insists: Drone 

Cockpit Virus Just a Nuisance,” Wired 

Magazine, October 2011, http://www.wired.

com/dangerroom/2011/10/drone-virus-nuisance/ 

(accessed 4 December 2011).

44. Jason S. McCarley and Christopher D. Wickens, 

“Human Factors Concerns in UAV Flight,” 

Institute of Aviation, Aviation Human Factors 

Division, University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign IL, retrieved from http://www.FAA.

gov on 4 December 2011.

45. National Security Strategy, 2010.

46. 432d Air Expeditionary Wing Mission Briefing, 

Creech Air Force Base, NV Jun 2011.

47. J.R. Willson, “UAV Worldwide,” Aerospace 

America, April 2009, retrieved from: http://

www.aiaa.org/aerospace/images/articleimages/

pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf on December 6 2011.

and standardization. In combination, reevaluating 

MTCR restrictions, improving network security, 

and standardizing procedures and regulations will 

strengthen security cooperation with other nations 

and improve overall national defense. 

Notes

1. National Security Strategy, 2010.

2. Robert Gates, Helping Others Defend 

Themselves. Foreign Affairs. May/Jun 2010, Vol. 

89 Issue 3, p. 2-6.

3. National Defense Strategy, 2008, p. 1.

4. Department of Defense, The National Military 

Strategy of the United States of America. 2011, 

p. 1.

5. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Jun 

2011, p. 6.

6. Ibid, p. 7.

7. Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International 

Engagement Security Cooperation and the 

Changing Face of the U.S. Military. Georgetown 

University Press (Washington D.C., 2010), p. 

105.

8. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Jun 

2011, p. 6.

9. Missile Technology Control Regime official 

website, Feb 2012, http://www.mtcr.info/english/

guidelines.html

10. Joint Publication 3-0, p. V-10.

11. Ibid.

12. Joint Publication 3-22, p. I-11.

13. Derek Reveron, p. 105.

14. Joint Publication 3-07, p. I-2.

15. Ibid, p. I-19.

16. William Lambert, US-Central Asian 

Security Cooperation: Misunderstandings 

Miscommunications & Missed Opportunities, 

Security Assistance: US and International 

Historical Perspectives, ed. Kendall Gott and 

Michael Brooks, Combat Studies Institute Press, 

Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2006, p. 127.

17. Ibid.

18. Robert Gates, p. 2.

19. Derek Reveron, p. 105.

20. National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 17.

21. National Defense Strategy, 2008, p. 8.

22. Joint Publication 3-0, III-14.

23. The National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America, 2011, p. 10.

24. Joint Publication 3-0.
117 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

About the Author

Lt Col Ken Callahan is a US Air Force pilot 

assigned to the Air War College, Air University, 

Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the US Air 

Force Academy in 1992 with a bachelor of science 

degree in history, Troy State University in 1993 

with a master’s of management, and University of 

Phoenix in 2007 with a doctorate of management. He 

earned his pilot wings in 1995 and has over 2,700 

flying hours in the C-141, C-5, T-37, and MQ-1. He 

has served at USTRANSCOM and is a graduated 

squadron commander.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 118

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2-6.

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Comments,” 17-3, 1-3, Mar 2011. Retrieved on September 15 2011 at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788

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Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, September 29, 2011.

Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 12, 2010.

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aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf on December 6 2011.
119 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

and determine the best option, you are now ready to 

ascertain if nirvana is reachable. The chart below 

depicts additional questions you must ask at this time. 

Specifically, what does the US want, what does the 

HN want, what can the US resource and what can the 

HN absorb?

A key aspect that must be examined when 

determining the HN’s ability to absorb a platform or 

program is the ability to sustain it. Is the HN willing 

to program sustainment funding? Is there an FMS 

case established for support, training, and spares, or 

will this be addressed with organic HN capabilities 

or a private contractor? When all of these issues are 

resolved and a plan is developed, you are well on 

your way to implementing a successful program. The 

bottom line should be that you are doing everything 

possible to help the HN “be all they can be.” 

A Few Hints for the New 

Security Cooperation Officer

By Clay Crawford

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Today is your first day on the job as a new 

Security Cooperation Officer (SCO). Your sponsor 

is whisking you around the Embassy completing 

paperwork and meeting people. You finally end up 

meeting your boss and he welcomes you and says 

get to work! While clearly no two countries are the 

same, this article will lay out a few ideas you might 

find helpful when starting your SCO duties. Further, 

it will discuss several additional responsibilities that 

will test your time management skills and finally 

address some relationship-building tips, which are 

key to accomplishing the SCO goals and objectives.

The first priority is to determine specifically what 

you need to do to help build host nation capacity. 

This will take some time, but it is an important step 

to ensure your efforts are in line with the overall US 

country strategy. As you learned at DISAM, it is best 

to start with the Strategic Guidance and work your 

way down to the country and SCO specific plans. 

Focus on the Embassy Integrated Country Strategy 

(ICS) so you understand how all the assistance 

programs fit together to achieve the country-wide 

goals and objectives (Diplomacy, Development, 

Defense, etc). Then analyze the SCO plans to ensure 

they are consistent and support the Embassy ICS and 

Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) strategies. 

One superb source for additional information is your 

GCC desk officer. Contact him/her early and often 

to make sure you stay abreast of GCC activities and 

recognize which SC programs are working well across 

the region. Additionally, it is critical to meet with the 

Host Nation (HN) personnel to gain an understanding 

of their plans and priorities. The combination of these 

will provide a clear picture of the short- and long-term 

program goals and objectives. It will also highlight 

where the capability gaps exist. The challenge then 

becomes figuring out the best way to fill those gaps. 

Would an equipment upgrade or new procurement 

solve this problem? Is it simply a training issue? Is it 

a doctrine problem? Once you answer these questions 









	





	










 
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 120

takes time and effort—developing trust, knowing 

who makes the key decisions, understanding the 

culture (not everyone operates like us), etc. Here are 

some areas to think about that may help the new SCO 

build and sustain these vital relationships:

Unit Visits

It is extremely difficult to “really” know what is 

going on if you stay in the Embassy. It is important 

and necessary to conduct your first visit to the HN 

General Headquarters (or Joint Staff equivalent). 

These introductory meetings are the first step in 

relationship building. Recommend you review the 

principal’s biography and mention something you 

have in common. Also, make sure you convey your 

appreciation to them for hosting you and always have 

a business card readily available. Conduct the same 

type of meeting with your Service HQ, specifically 

focusing on your core counterparts (e.g. G-3, G-5, 

etc.). Ensure you meet and get all the contact info for 

your primary counterparts, normally at the O-4/O-5 

level. Once these HQ-level visits have taken place, 

you will be cleared to meet with lower level units 

outside of the capital region. It is highly recommended 

that you meet with the base/wing/post commander or 

designee before meeting with lower level units on his/

her facility. When conducting unit visits, be sure to 

make it clear any requests for training or equipment 

must be vetted through the HN Service HQ and Joint 

Staff before it reaches the SCO. These visits are key 

to building relationships and, understanding unit 

level challenges, and they are a superb tool for getting 

feedback from previously implemented programs. 

Be prepared to spend most of your time addressing 

challenges facing the unit and developing options to 

resolve them. It is also important to pay attention to 

what is working well and be ready to share that when 

visiting other units. Moreover, positive feedback from 

the field, captured in an e-mail to the country team/

GCC/IAs/Defense Security Cooperation Agency as 

appropriate, is always well received, builds morale, 

and helps justify resources spent. 

Representational Events

SC organizations have representational funds 

because they work! A representational event is 

a great icebreaker for the newly assigned SCO 

and is important to furthering already developed 

relationships. While representational events can 

take on many forms (luncheon, golf outing, etc.), I 

found that an informal dinner with a few individuals 

The SCO’s life would be simple and easy if 

reaching nirvana was all you had to do. However, 

the SCO’s environment is dynamic and beset with 

challenges across the board, with time management 

ranking at or near the top. The SCO is inundated 

with additional requirements coming from all 

directions—GCC, different Embassy sections, 

Military Service HQs, Implementing Agencies (IAs), 

State Department, HN, Industry, etc. The following 

is a small sampling of fixed requirements influencing 

the SCO’s time management:

• Strategic Plan

• LOR Processing

• Ship Visits

• Pol-Mil

• JAVITS Report

• Humanitarian Assistance

• Senior-level Visits

• Monthly GCC Report

• ACSA Coordination

• Human Rights Vetting

• In-Country Team Oversight

• Exercise-Related Construction

• Performance Plan

• Financial Management Reviews

• Community Relations Projects

• Country Team

• EUM Reports 

• Exercise Conferences

I would like to take a moment to discuss seniorlevel visits from the chart above. Coordinating and 

executing a senior-level (GCC Cdr, CJCS, SecDef, 

CODEL, etc) visit with the HN takes an enormous 

amount of time and energy. Multiple coordination 

meetings are required to detail everything from the 

motorcade lineup to the formal dinner seating chart. 

Moreover, it is vital to remain patient and flexible 

throughout the planning and execution process. 

Anticipate the HN making last-minute scheduling 

changes and take it in stride and with a smile—

remember, you will need to work closely with 

them to reach nirvana, and building and sustaining 

relationships is central to your success as an SCO.

Perhaps the most important aspect of building 

partner capacity is the relationship between the SCO 

and the HN. It will be very difficult to attain the SCO 

goals and objectives without developing and sustaining 

key relationships with the HN counterparts. Of course, 

this will not happen overnight. Relationship building 
121 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

In summary, this article covered a few tips the 

new SCO may find helpful. My experiences are 

from a friendly/allied nation that looks to the US 

for assistance. While your situation may be very 

different, the basics of understanding how the strategic 

guidance, Embassy and GCC plans, and the HN 

strategies flow down to the individual program level 

remain important. It is also critical to determine where 

the gaps exist and the best way to fill them to build 

partner capacity effectively. It is easy to get bogged 

down with the additional duties, so finding the proper 

balance is crucial. Finally, building and sustaining 

relationships continues to be the key ingredient for 

successful SCOs. Unit visits, representational events, 

and going the extra mile will all play a significant role 

in enhancing the SCO & HN relationship. Now, get to 

work and have fun!

About the Author

Clay “Crawdad” Crawford earned a commission 

through the Florida State University’s Air Force 

Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1986. He 

was a career pilot logging over 3,200 hours in C-130, 

T-37 and T-38 aircraft and served twenty-four years 

before retiring from the United States Air Force. His 

career included assignments in Texas, Arkansas, 

Illinois, Washington DC, Alabama, Japan, and the 

Philippines. His last five years of service were at the Joint 

United States Military Assistance Group–Philippines 

where he served as Chief, Air Force Programs and 

was designated as an Honorary Command Pilot in 

the Philippine Air Force. Mr. Crawford is currently 

a Security Cooperation instructor and Asia-Pacific 

Regional Seminar Assistant Director at the Defense 

Institute for Security Assistance Management located 

at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

worked best. If possible, the outgoing SCO should 

set up an introductory event with the key players. 

A small, informal dinner with your counterparts 

provides a wonderful opportunity to begin the 

relationship building process. Once the relationship 

is established, representational events may also be a 

good venue to introduce issues that may be difficult 

or problematic—a testing of the waters. In addition, 

you may want to consider keeping leadership events 

separate from action officer level occasions. It might 

be a good idea to have the SDO/DATT attend when 

hosting HN leadership. Finally, make sure you 

understand any cultural peculiarities and be sensitive 

to the HN customs and courtesies. This will ensure 

you further the relationship rather than hindering it.

Go the Extra Mile

There are some little things the SCO can do that will 

go a long way toward building a good relationship. Do 

your homework during the pre-LOR stage. Research 

the item, talk to the program office, talk to industry, 

review the Security Assistance Management Manual 

(SAMM) pre-LOR checklist on the web, and seek out 

other experts to ensure you have as much information 

as possible to assist the HN. Your counterparts will 

notice and appreciate your efforts. Additionally, be 

properly prepared for meetings. Once you get to 

know the key players, you will be able to anticipate 

questions – be ready beforehand. For instance, if you 

know a certain HN official will ask about a specific 

program during the upcoming meeting, contact the 

IA for that case in advance to get the latest status. 

Then when the question arises, you can say you 

just spoke to the IA Case Manager and provide the 

updated information. This gives the HN confidence 

you are being proactive. Depending on the country, it 

may be a good idea for the SCO to remain appraised 

of items available through the Excess Defense 

Articles (EDA) program. You might be able to fill 

a capability gap with EDA equipment, which will 

result in significant savings, increased capacity, and 

furthered relations. Another area where the SCO can 

build rapport is by covering the upcoming exercise 

conference and International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program course schedules. Most 

HN personnel covet going to the US for training and 

planning meetings. Discussing these schedules with 

appropriate HN personnel well in advance of the 

execution dates (so they can select the best attendee) 

goes a long way toward relationship building.
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 122
123 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

Ulama religious scholars

Jihad exert effort in the path of God

Allah akbar God is great or greater than all

Al-Islam Surrender—“the peace that issues from our 

surrender to God” (8)

Haram Forbidden

Halal Dietary regulation—that which can be 

eaten

Imam Person who heads the daily prayers

Eschatological The end of time

Dar al-Islam Abode of Islam, where Muslims are the 

majority

Nasr also does a tremendous job of explaining 

numerous critical tenets in the Islamic religion. 

When bearing witness as a Muslim, the believer says, 

“There is no god but God,” and, “Muhammad is the 

messenger of God.”2

 “The One God...is the central 

reality of Islam in all of its facets, and attestation 

to this oneness, which is called tawhid, is the axis 

around which all that is Islamic revolves.”3 He 

stresses oneness with God, total surrender to God, 

returning to God, and remembering God at all times. 

God has many different names (e.g., Beauty, Majesty, 

Perfection).

Islam is very tolerant and accepting of other 

religions. For example, Muslims believe in Moses, 

Abraham, Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and other people 

from Judaism and Christianity. “In the conscience 

of many devout Muslims, a pious Christian or Jew 

is still seen as a believer.”4 Muslims, Christians, 

and Jews are all known as “Children of the Book.” 

They all believe in many of the same things. Islam 

despises secularism. It is true, however, that Muslims 

do not allow non-Muslims in a certain area around 

Mecca, which is similar to equivalent sacred spaces 

in Hinduism and several other religions.5

The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values 

for Humanity

By Roger Scott

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for 

Humanity, Seyyed Hossein Nasr

New York: HarperOne, 2004

352 pp, $13.99

In the world of Security Cooperation and Security 

Assistance, relationships are crucial. Since the US 

has a plethora of Muslim international partners in the 

Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, it is crucial we US 

workers gain a better understanding of their religion, 

culture, beliefs, and way of life, so we can build even 

stronger relationships.

It is in this spirit that I highly encourage you to 

read The Heart of Islam by Seyyed Hossein Nasr. 

This book is Nasr’s answer to those vilifying the 

religion of Islam after 9-11, because of an extremely 

miniscule number of radical Muslims who perverted 

the religion of Islam with their extremist violence. 

The author writes, “May this humble effort serve as a 

small step toward bringing about better understanding 

between people of good will in the West and in the 

Islamic world.”1

 This book explains who Muslims 

really are: extremely religious, devout, and loyal to 

their families—among other things.

The author does an outstanding job of introducing 

readers to crucial terms in the Islamic religion. 

These are terms that people need to know in order to 

understand Islam and Muslims. Here are some of the 

many introduced in this book:

Allah The Arabic name for the One God

Muhammad God’s prophet—the most praised one, the 

trusted one

Sharia Divine law/God’s law

Quran (spelled “Koran” in the West): God’s word

Haddith Sayings of Muhammad (God’s prophet)

Mecca, Medina, 

and Jerusalem

The three holy cities in Islam

Ummah Community

Sunnah of the 

Prophet

The teachings and doings of God’s prophet
The DISAM Annual, August 2013 124

great power and authority.”11 To me, this view 

is very consistent with the way America was in 

the 1950s and before. He contends that many 

Western women would love to stay home with 

their children but can’t because of their economic 

situation.

Islam is a religion that stresses “compassion 

and love, peace and beauty.”12 Nasr argues 

that defending justice and Islam is critical, but 

Muslims must strive to do so peacefully. He 

then addresses responsibilities and rights within 

Islam, commenting that human beings’ main 

responsibility is to God, without whom we 

wouldn’t even exist—after that, our responsibility 

is to ourselves, our family, and society.

Having worked in Saudi Arabia for a year, 

Afghanistan for over a month, Iraq for three 

weeks, Malaysia for a week, and having spent 

a few nights in Dubai, Bahrain, and Kuwait, 

and also interacting with a multitude of Muslim 

students here at DISAM, I have had a great 

deal of exposure to Muslims, and I have found 

them to be, on the whole, fun-loving, devout, 

gregarious, and giving people. I have always 

enjoyed my time with them, drinking chai and 

telling stories. I value Muslims as allies and 

friends, I have learned about them, and this book 

does an outstanding job capturing the essence of 

Islam and Muslims.

Notes

1. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam: 

Enduring Values for Humanity, xiv

2. Ibid., 3

3. Ibid., 3

4. Ibid., 45

5. Ibid., 51

6. Ibid., 63

7. Ibid., 65

8. Ibid., 66

9. Ibid., 183

10. Ibid., 190

11. Ibid., 197

12. Ibid., 236

There is a strong sense of unity in Islam—at its 

epicenter is the Quran. The Sunnah and the Hadith of 

the Prophet are also unifying. Also, divine oneness 

(tawhid), prophecy (nubuwwah), and eschatology 

(ma’ad) join Muslims together. Islamic law (known 

as Sharia) also conjoins Muslims. Muslims also 

practice the rites of the religion: five daily prayers, 

the annual pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at least once 

in their lifetime (if able), the fast during the month 

of Ramadan, the tithe paid to the poor, and other 

religious acts.

Those Muslims of intense piety and serious 

attachment to Sharia are known as Sufis. A Sunni 

Muslim or Shiite Muslim can also be Sufi. Nasr writes, 

“The Sunni-Shiite division is the most important 

in the formal structure of Islam, although even this 

division does not destroy the unity of Islam.”6

 When 

breaking down the make-up of Muslims, 87 percent 

are Sunnis and 13 percent Shiites.7 When the Prophet 

died, many people thought Ali ibn Abi Talib should 

be the Prophet’s successor and formed the group that 

is now Shiism. According to Nasr, “The major point 

of contention between Sunnism and Shiism was not 

only the question of who should succeed the Prophet, 

but the question of what the qualifications of such a 

person had to be.”8 Wahhabism arose as a reformist 

movement in the eighteenth century in southern 

Arabia. It opposed Sufism and Shiism and became 

accepted for a while in Saudi Arabia as the official 

interpretation of Islam. It has limited influence.

The Sharia is the divine law. It is based on the 

Quran, the Sunnah, and the Hadith. Nasr writes, 

“The Quran orders Muslims to pray, and its laws and 

rules apply to all Muslims. Family is so important in 

Islamic society...One can hardly over-emphasize the 

role of the extended family in Islamic society even 

today.”9

The author then addresses the complex realm 

of men and women in Islam: “Nearly all of the 

criticism coming from secular feminists is aimed 

these days at the Islamic world without bothering 

to ask practicing Muslim women themselves...

what their problems really are.”

He says men’s and women’s roles are 

complementary: “The man is seen as the protector 

and provider of the family...The woman’s primary 

duty has been seen as that of raising children...

Within the home, Muslim women usually wield 
125 The DISAM Annual, August 2013

About the Author

Roger Scott is an assistant professor of 

Security Cooperation Management at DISAM 

with a concentration on the FMS process, training, 

BPC process, logistics, end-use monitoring, 

acquisition, finance, SC programs, SCIP, and 

cross-cultural communications. His experience 

includes the Director of Air Force Training for 

the SCO in Saudi Arabia and over two years 

as an instructor at DISAM. He is a retired Air 

Force Lieutenant Colonel who taught Air Force 

ROTC at Indiana University on two different 

occasions, for five years total. He also taught 

and commanded a squadron at the US Air Force 

Academy Preparatory School and was the Military 

Equal Opportunity Chief at Tyndall AFB, FL. He 

was awarded a master of arts degree in human 

resources development from Webster University 

in St. Louis, MO, and a bachelor of science 

degree in communications from the University 

of Southern Indiana in Evansville, IN. He also 

completed Air War College by correspondence 

and earned the Defense Meritorious Service 

Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, and 

four AF Commendation Medals, among other 

awards.
The DISAM Annual Annual Vol. 2

DISAM mourns the passing of Mr. Chris Burns, a key player in DISAM's 

rapidly growing online learning program. We acknowledge Chris' absolute 

dedication to DISAM's education mission and his commitment to 

improving and expanding the online learning program in supporting and 

executing that mission. He will be missed.