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S. HRG. 114–585 

THE FUTURE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 27, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

JANUARY 27, 2016

Page 

THE FUTURE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES .................................... 1 

Harvey, John R., Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs ................................ 3 

Payne, Keith B., President and Co-Founder, National Institute for Public 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 10 

Roberts, Brad H., Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory .......................................................................... 13 

Miller, Franklin C., Principal, The Scowcroft Group ............................................ 18 

(III) 

(1) 

THE FUTURE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in Room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff Sessions 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer, Donnelly, and King. 

Other Senators present: Cotton and Sullivan. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

Senator SESSIONS. The meeting will come to order. 

Senator Donnelly is on the way, and I think we’ll just proceed 

with some preliminaries. 

I thank our colleagues for coming. And it’s an opportunity today 

to examine the future of America’s nuclear force posture with a 

rock-star panel, I’ve got to say. These are four individuals who 

have served different administrations, who have been deeply involved in this issue, have thought about them, written about it, 

and, I think, will be a real asset to our committee as we go forward. 

So, we’ve asked the witnesses to provide an assessment of the 

continuities and changes in the U.S. nuclear posture, with an eye 

toward what we’ve gotten right and what policies or assumptions 

have not been borne out by recent events. 

As I believe Mr. Miller just noted as we talked about the grimness of this subject, it’s—for 60 years, there’s a lot that can be said 

as to how this policy of nuclear deterrence has helped protect the 

peace. 

More important, we’ve asked for the panel’s thoughts on how the 

current nuclear posture should be changed to address the strategic 

environment as it may evolve over the next 25 years. In other 

words, what should be the major considerations and content of any 

nuclear review to be conducted by the next President? 

From my perspective, there have been at least three constants in 

U.S. nuclear policy across Republican and Democratic administrations over the past quarter century. The first constant has been the 

enduring necessity for a triad of land, air, and sea-based nuclear 

forces to deter threats to vital U.S. interests and to assure allies 

of U.S. security commitments. 

2 

Second—and this is often forgotten by anti-nuclear groups—there 

has been a shared objective to reduce the U.S. nuclear stockpile 

from Cold War highs to the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with maintaining U.S. nuclear deterrence and assurance objectives. 

Third constant. Unfortunately, there has been a consistent decline in leadership focus and funding for America’s nuclear forces 

and the nuclear laboratory and production complex, perhaps in the 

misguided belief that, with the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was no longer a national priority. And I think we’ve observed 

that our unilateral reductions have not resulted in world reductions of nuclear weapons, but, in fact, more proliferation. 

Congress has demonstrated over the last few years a strong commitment to fund the nuclear modernization plans of the Obama administration. Now, that’s a commitment that the President has 

made, and we need to make sure it goes forward. It’s probably a 

minimum action, but it’s—essentially does, I think, where—what 

we have to do. 

Each leg of the nuclear triad is being replaced, hopefully before 

this Cold War-era force reaches the end of its service life. And a 

very large sum of money is programmed to refurbish nuclear warheads and bombs that have far outlasted their intended lifetimes 

and to replace nuclear handling facilities, some of which date back 

to the dawn of the Nuclear Age. And indeed, however, the sums of 

money spent on our nuclear warheads and our triad is relatively 

small in light of the entire defense budget. 

So, I thank our committee members from being here. 

Senator Cotton, we’re glad to have you. You’re going to find that 

you’ve got four of the truly—true experts on this subject before us 

today. 

Senator COTTON. I do thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, we’ll proceed with a 5- to 7-minute opening statement by each of our witnesses, in this order: 

Dr. John Harvey is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Clinton administration, and 

former Principal Deputy to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons in the Obama 

administration, and former Director of Policy Planning Staff of the 

NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]. He also had 

contributed valuably to our discussions about improving our laboratories and our modernization. 

Dr. Keith Payne, the CEO and President of the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Bush administration, helped write the 2001 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review in the Bush administration, and was a key member of the Perry-Schlesinger Report in, 

what, 2009, that was—really helped us reach a bipartisan consensus on nuclear posture. 

Dr. Brad Roberts is the Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, former Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense 

Policy in the Obama administration. I believe you’ve got your book 

out now. Is it—′′Care for′′—′′The Case for Nuclear Weapons in the 

21st Century.’’ It’s an important subject. Thank you for that. 

3 

Mr. Frank Miller, the Principal of the Scowcroft Group, former 

Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control for the National Security Council, 2001 through 2005, and senior civilian defense official responsible for nuclear matters in the Bush and Clinton administrations. 

So, we do have a good panel, indeed. 

Senator Donnelly, I just did a brief opening statement, and I 

would yield to you for your opening comments at this time, before 

we hear from the panel. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for agreeing to appear today before the committee. Over many years, we’ve sought your counsel on 

our Nation’s nuclear deterrent. Today is no different. 

I also understand a number of you have worked side by side with 

a prestigious Hoosier who is also my good friend, Jonathan George. 

So, he sends his best wishes. 

At the beginning of every administration, there are a host of 

pressing national security issues that must be addressed, but, as 

Secretary Harold Brown once observed, then there is also the question of nuclear weapons. No other issue garners as much debate 

and thought on their force structure and possible use. And rightly 

so. 

Today, you have the opportunity to once again give this committee advice on a topic that forms the foundation of our national 

security and that of our allies. This is a time for us to learn and 

reflect on a topic that is at the very core of our national security 

debate. 

Again, I’d like to thank Senator Sessions for arranging this hearing. I look forward to another productive year of work in this subcommittee, where we have built such a strong bipartisan consensus 

on our nuclear posture, nonproliferation efforts, and missile defense. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

All right. Dr. Harvey? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. HARVEY, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, 

CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

Dr. HARVEY. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, 

members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify before you today about the future nuclear posture of the United 

States. 

My statement today reflects almost an entire career working on 

nuclear deterrence. Most recently, from 2009 to 2013, I was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary under Ash Carter, then the Under 

Secretary. I was his go-to person for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and, more generally, for oversight of the Nuclear Stockpile 

and for programs to modernize delivery platforms and nuclear command and control. 

I request that my written statement be entered in the record. 

It—— 

4 

Senator SESSIONS. We will make it part of the record. 

Dr. HARVEY. Its basic points are as follows: 

In recent years, our government has made great progress in advancing a comprehensive strategy to sustain and modernize U.S. 

nuclear forces. The President has sought significant increases in 

modernization programs. In very large part, Congress has funded 

these programs and, as it should, has held the administration accountable for sustained progress. A bipartisan consensus on modernization, although fragile and very narrowly focused, has 

emerged, and my written statement speaks about how this has 

come to be. 

Job number one now, however, is to preserve this consensus and, 

if possible, bolster it in the face of two daunting challenges. First, 

in a decades-long modernization effort, we begin the climb up the 

bow wave of needed investment that peaks in the late 2020s. Second, and most importantly, is the challenge of sustaining momentum and consensus in the transition over the coming year to the 

next President. The nature and scope of the 2017 Nuclear Posture 

Review will be a factor in meeting these challenges. Continued 

close attention and bipartisan support from Congress will be essential. 

In light of the evolving global security environment, the next 

President will likely direct a review of nuclear posture. Congress 

has three options to consider in seeking to shape that review. First, 

it could take no action. That is, leave it up to the direction of the— 

discretion of the next President. Second, it could direct the next administration to conduct a nuclear review, with specified terms of 

reference, and deliver a report by a date certain on the way ahead. 

Third, it could establish a new bipartisan commission to inform the 

nuclear review—independent commission—to inform the nuclear 

review of the next President. 

In considering options, the three previous NPRs [Nuclear Posture 

Reviews], those concluded by Clinton in 1994, Bush in 2001, and 

Obama in 2010, reflect much more continuity than change. All concluded that a triad of strategic forces, of nuclear forces, and Europe-basing of U.S. nuclear bombs carried by NATO dual-capable 

aircraft, were essential to both strategic and extended deterrence. 

All concluded that a hedge capability was needed to respond to unanticipated technical problems or to adverse geopolitical changes 

requiring force augmentation. All agreed that deterrence could not 

be based solely on the existence of nuclear forces. Rather, it depends on the ability of forces to hold at risk assets most valued by 

an adversary. And finally, this meant that force capabilities 

mattered, and all understood that these capabilities might need to 

be adjusted as adversary target sets and employment strategies 

evolved. 

Given this continuity in policy, given the current, if fragile, consensus on modernization, and given the successful bipartisan review carried out by the Perry-Schlesinger Panel in 2009, a new bipartisan commission is not needed, nor would its work be timely. 

Rather, the next President should update the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, based on the 

global security environment as it has evolved since that review. 

5 

The committee asked for views of major considerations for the 

next Nuclear Posture Review. Very importantly, that review should 

open the aperture on issues that the Obama team has put to bed, 

based on its assessment of the future security environment. It must 

also manage the downside risk that certain recommendations could 

rupture existing consensus on today’s modernization program. 

Regarding Russia, my colleague, Keith Payne, is going to go into 

more detail about Russia, but let me make just one brief point. 

Russia has an active strategic modernization program underway. 

More of a concern than Russia’s modernization program, however, 

is its evolving nuclear strategy. If Russia really believes that it 

could escalate its way to victory, say in restoring the Baltics to 

Russian rule, then it must be set straight. No conceivable advantage and incalculable downside risks would accrue from any nuclear use against NATO. The next NPR should determine whether 

existing U.S. declaratory policy in this regard needs to be refined 

or clarified. 

I highlight other major issues for review and resolution. How 

many ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] should we deploy 

at how many bases to meet the security needs while maintaining 

a robust cadre and career path for ICBM operations? Can ballistic 

missile modernization be leveraged to reduce costs via a smart approach to common ICBM and SLBM [Submarine-launched ballistic 

missiles] components? Is additional modernization needed to convey a critical message? That is, U.S. nuclear forces cannot be neutralized by attacks, whether kinetic or cyber, on the nuclear command-and-control system. In light Asian security developments and 

the continuing challenge of assuring allies, should we seek allied 

support and concurrence on a plan to demonstrate the ability to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft to bases in the 

Republic of Korea and Japan? 

There are two looming questions regarding stockpile modernization. First, do we need nuclear warheads with new or different 

military capabilities? Second, do we need to retain capabilities to 

develop and produce such warheads, if required? My short answer 

to the first question is, ‘‘Maybe.’’ To the second, it is, ‘‘Most assuredly,’’ and we must do more to achieve this objective. 

My written statement elaborates on these issues and raises a few 

others. 

Mr. Chairman, some NPR issues will be controversial and, thus, 

pose a risk to a continuing consensus on modernization. That does 

not mean the next NPR should not study them. Rather, all of the 

security implications of alternative courses of action must be vetted 

before proceeding carefully and with transparency to any recommended changes in posture. This can best be achieved with a 

Nuclear Posture Review that integrates all elements of nuclear security, not just force posture; embraces all agencies with national 

security equities, as well as allies; and communicates clearly with 

Congress and the American public. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Harvey follows:] 

6 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JOHN R. HARVEY

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to testify before you today along with colleagues and 

friends—all of whom reflect the highest standards of public service—about the future nuclear posture of the United States. 

My statement today reflects 38 years of experience working nuclear weapons and 

national security issues, first at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, then at 

Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control and in 

senior positions in the Departments of Defense (twice) and Energy. From 2009– 

2013, I served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 

Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, initially under Ash Carter then serving 

as Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. I was his ‘‘go to’’ person 

for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review as well as for interactions with the Department of Energy on all aspects of the nuclear stockpile. I provided oversight to DOD 

acquisition programs to sustain and modernize nuclear delivery systems and systems for their command and control. Today, I consult with several organizations on 

many of these same issues. My statement today, however, reflects my views and not 

necessarily those of any organization to which I consult. 

PRIORITY ONE—BOLSTERING THE FRAGILE CONSENSUS ON MODERNIZATION

It is worthwhile to take a step back and recall the state of the U.S. nuclear posture in 2009 when President Obama took office. The prospects were grim: 

• Funding was insufficient to sustain the R&D base needed for long-term certification of stockpile safety and reliability and, at the same time, recapitalize an 

aging infrastructure. 

• Basic nuclear weapons design, engineering, and production skills and capabilities were increasingly at risk because they were not being exercised. 

• Ongoing warhead life extension activities were under funded and constrained 

in their ability to improve warhead safety, security, and reliability. 

• Operations at warhead component production facilities were at increased risk 

of safety shutdown. 

• DOD had yet to step up to its own nuclear modernization needs. 

• There was little consensus within Congress, or between the administration and 

Congress, on the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. 

• Many in Congress were concerned that a comprehensive approach to nuclear security had not been clearly articulated, and they were right! 

Today, the tide has shifted. Specifically: 

• The 2010 NPR was built on a foundation of bipartisan support; in large part, 

it adopted the recommendations of the Bipartisan Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States (aka ‘‘the Perry-Schlesinger commission’’). 

• It was achieved with unprecedented interagency cooperation and White House 

involvement, and defined an integrated/balanced strategy for reducing nuclear 

dangers. 

• Very importantly, the strategy strongly linked our nuclear deterrent to other 

elements of nuclear security including arms control, nonproliferation, threat reduction, and nuclear counterterrorism. 

• High level support across his administration for increased investments in DOE’s 

nuclear weapons programs and DOD’s nuclear delivery systems enabled the 

President to conclude, and convinced the Senate to ratify, the New START 

Treaty. 

• Recent President’s budget requests have further increased investment for modernization. To a very large degree, Congress is funding these programs and, as 

it should, is holding the administration accountable for sustained progress. 

Not everything is ‘‘fixed,’’ but there is a fragile consensus in place regarding the 

future nuclear posture and a plan (that changes a bit every year) to achieve it. 

To what do I attribute this remarkable demonstration of bipartisanship in a political environment that is as corrosive as many of us can remember? I think the answer is two-fold. First, the actions of Vladimir Putin, in essence to reestablish the 

Soviet Union, have made it clear to most Americans that optimistic assumptions 

about the future global security environment are not coming to pass. Recent Russian behavior has also muted the voices of those who sought to hijack, and misrepresent, the President’s Prague agenda in calling for unilateral reductions to small 

numbers now. 

7 

Perhaps more importantly, is the commitment of this Committee and its staff 

(both minority and majority) working together, and together with their House counterparts and with colleagues both inside and outside the Obama administration to 

do what’s right for our nation’s security. I must add that vocal support for the President’s modernization program from my colleague at the table, Keith Payne, taken 

at some personal risk, has helped to solidify support of other conservatives not inclined in general to agree with the President. 

This decades-long modernization program for all elements of the nation’s deterrent—the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure, nuclear delivery platforms, and command and control systems that link nuclear forces with Presidential 

authority—faces several challenges. The next few years are critical as we climb the 

so-called modernization ‘‘bow wave’’ of needed investment that peaks in the mid2020’s. The greatest challenge, however, is to bolster consensus, and sustain momentum, in the transition over the next year to a new administration. Continued 

close attention and bipartisan support from Congress will be essential. 

THE 2017 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

Given changes in the security environment since the 2010 NPR, it is almost certain that the next President will direct a review of the current posture, policies, and 

programs for U.S. nuclear forces and, very likely, will do this whether or not Congress passes legislation requiring it. What should Congress do? There are three primary options to consider: 

• Take no action—leave to the discretion of the next President. 

• Direct the next administration to conduct a review of U.S. nuclear posture and 

deliver, by a date certain, an unclassified report (with classified annex, if needed) on the way ahead. 

• Establish a new bipartisan commission to inform the nuclear review of the next 

President. 

In considering options, it is noteworthy that previous NPRs—those concluded by 

Clinton in 1994, by Bush in 2001, and by Obama in 2010 (informed by Perry-Schlesinger)—reflect much more continuity than change. After evaluating alternatives, all 

concluded that a strategic triad of nuclear forces—consisting of land- and sea-based 

ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers—and forward basing of B61 nuclear bombs 

carried by NATO dual capable aircraft were essential to both strategic and extended 

deterrence. All concluded that a hedge capability, held in reserve, was needed to respond to unanticipated technical problems with a warhead or delivery system, or to 

adverse geopolitical changes that required augmentation of deployed forces. All 

agreed that it is insufficient to base deterrence solely on the existence of some level 

of nuclear forces; rather, it depends on the ability of forces to hold at risk assets 

and installations most highly valued by an adversary. Thus, force capabilities 

mattered and all understood that capabilities might need to be adjusted as adversary target sets and employment strategies evolved. 

Given the trend of continuity, given the current, if fragile, consensus on modernization and given the intense bipartisan review that was carried out by PerrySchlesinger in 2008–09, a new bipartisan commission is not needed at this time. 

Even if the FY17 NDAA were to establish one, and assuming it became law in late 

Fall 2016, it would take at least another 18–24 months to get the members appointed, the commission up and running, and recommendations developed. The commission would likely be carrying out its work in parallel with the next administration’s nuclear review and would thus not be timely. 

Rather, the next administration should review and update the conclusions and 

recommendations of the 2010 NPR based on the global security environment as it 

has evolved since that review was completed. This review would benefit from the 

analyses, assessments, and contributions of experts in the think tank community. 

Examples include work of the National Institute of Public Policy in informing the 

2001 NPR, and recent work (i.e. Project Atom) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies addressing options for the future U.S. nuclear posture. 

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NEXT NPR

The Committee has requested that we provide views of ‘‘what should be the major 

considerations and content of the next NPR.’’ Most importantly, the next NPR 

should ‘‘open the aperture’’ on issues and activities that the Obama administration 

had ‘‘put to bed’’ based on its assessment of the future global security environment. 

In doing so, we must manage the downside risk that certain recommendations could 

rupture existing consensus on today’s modernization program. 

8 

Russia 

Deterring a potentially hostile Russia remains the primary focus of U.S. nuclear 

forces. Mr. Putin believes he has a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ ethnic Russians wherever they reside. He has used this argument to intervene in the internal affairs of 

Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine including the illegal annexation of Crimea. 

Putin’s modus operandi in Ukraine has not been an all-out armored assault as the 

Soviets did in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Rather, he seeks to 

achieve his political ends by introducing covert forces employing ‘‘gray ops’’ (aka hybrid warfare) to incite, or amplify, instabilities and insurgencies among fringe elements in Eastern Ukraine. He has also given increased prominence to nuclear 

forces, and to brandishing these forces in seeking to intimidate his perceived adversaries. 

What do the events in Ukraine mean for NATO members such as Latvia and Estonia with sizable ethnic Russian populations? Would NATO even recognize that a 

member state was under such covert assault? How would other members respond 

under the Article V commitment to defend that member? How should these events 

be reflected in U.S. and NATO security posture and planning? What does all this 

mean for the U.S. nuclear posture. These questions are at the top of the list for the 

next NPR. Ten years ago, few would have imagined the events of the past two years 

in Ukraine. Today, it must inform our thinking about future conflict. 

Russia has an active strategic modernization program underway. Some of it, like 

ours, involves upgrading older systems at the end of their service lives. Other modernization involves potential qualitative advancements that we must monitor closely 

so that we are not surprised and, if required, can make a timely (and possibly asymmetric) response. That said, we must be careful not to convey that U.S. modernization is being driven by Russia’s. We must modernize whether or not Russia modernizes if we are to retain basic components of an effective Triad. 

More so than its modernization program, I am concerned about Russia’s evolving 

nuclear strategy. In short, Russia seems to embrace the threat of limited nuclear 

use to deescalate a conflict, for example, to solidify near-term gains against a conventionally superior adversary. Does Russia really believe that it could escalate its 

way to victory say in restoring the Baltics to Russian rule? If it does, then we must 

set Russia straight that no conceivable advantage at all could ever accrue from nuclear use against NATO. The next NPR should determine, among other things, 

whether existing U.S. declaratory policy needs to be refined or clarified. 

Nuclear Delivery Systems and Command and Control 

Several issues involving nuclear delivery systems and nuclear command and control (NC2) are timely for consideration in a new NPR: 

• How many ICBMs should we deploy (at how many bases) to meet security 

needs while maintaining a robust cadre and career path for ICBM operations? 

• How best can ICBM and SLBM life extension program be leveraged to reduce 

costs through a smart approach to commonality (e.g., in solid rocket motors, firing systems, guidance and control, and ground components), recognizing that 

these two systems experience different operating environments? 

• What additional modernization is needed to convey credibly an important message for deterrence; that is, U.S. nuclear forces cannot be neutralized by attacks, whether kinetic or cyber, on the NC2 system? 

• In light of security developments in East Asia, and the continuing challenge of 

assuring allies of U.S. security commitments, is it time to revisit options to: 

• Establish and exercise, with allied concurrence and support, a capability to deploy U.S. dual capable aircraft, and nuclear weapons, to bases in Japan and the 

ROK? 

• Restore nuclear capability to carrier air via the F–35? 

• Develop and deploy on attack submarines a modern, nuclear, land-attack 

SLCM? 

Are New Military Capabilities Needed? 

Two looming questions involving stockpile modernization are worthy of debate 

and discussion: 

• Do we need nuclear warheads with new or different military capabilities? 

• Do we need to retain capabilities to develop and produce such warheads? 

My short answers to these question are, respectively, ‘‘maybe’’ and ‘‘most assuredly.’’ It is timely to review needed military capabilities in light of the evolution 

of the global security environment including Russia’s actions upsetting the emerging 

post Cold War international order and increased focus on the challenge of deterring 

escalation in a conventional conflict between nuclear-armed states. At least three 

options may be seen as pertinent: 

9 

• Lower yield options for ICBM and SLBM warheads, at least until a viable 

prompt global conventional strike capability is achieved. • Capabilities to hold at risk hardened, underground installations. • Warheads that provide extended service life, greater margin for enhanced reliability, modern safety and security features, and ease and rapidity of manufacture. 

These ideas are not new and I do not think it urgent to develop and field such 

warheads. That said, consideration of these and other such options should be on the 

agenda of the next NPR. 

The second question addresses the challenge of maintaining capabilities of weapons scientists and engineers to develop and field modern warheads if required by 

a future President. To maintain such readiness, designers and engineers must be 

provided opportunities to exercise critical capabilities with challenging design problems. 

Over the past decade and more, however, challenging warhead design and development opportunities have been few and far between. Most work today involves 

warhead life extension programs (LEPs) that do not present sufficiently complex design and development challenges to fully exercise skills. The B61–12 LEP offers 

challenges to the Sandia teams developing nonnuclear warhead components—e.g., 

a modern warhead electrical system—but not to the design and engineering teams 

at Los Alamos. Indeed, the bomb’s ‘‘physics package’’ (the warhead primary, secondary, inter-stage and radiation case) is essentially the same as the original bomb. 

Today, there are no requirements for new military capabilities. How then can critical skills be exercised? The LEP for an interoperable ICBM/SLBM warhead, called 

IW1, when compared to today’s refurbishment LEPs, presents a formidable challenge for training young designers. The follow-on interoperable warhead (IW2) presents an even greater challenge. Both programs, however, were delayed by five 

years in recent budgets and are late to need for retaining critical capabilities. The 

next NPR should review whether to accelerate the IW1 and IW2 LEPs. 

Prototyping is another option to exercise the entire design, development and manufacturing enterprise. Here, a modern warhead design would be taken from initial 

concept through prototype development and flight testing, up to a point where a few 

are built but not fielded. 

The FY15 and FY16 NDAAs have advanced legislation to facilitate retention of 

capabilities through expanded use of prototype development at the national laboratories, and by establishing a nuclear weapons design responsiveness program as a 

key component of stockpile stewardship. Absent these initiatives, and possibly within a decade, there is serious risk that the nuclear weapons enterprise will be unable 

to provide a timely response to unanticipated contingencies. Establishing affordable 

programs to exploit these opportunities is a challenge for the next NPR. 

Nuclear Stockpile and Supporting Infrastructure 

Several other issues involving the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure 

should be addressed with high priority in the next NPR: 

Early retirement of the B83 bomb: U.S. hedge strategy seeks to provide two separate, genetically diverse warheads for each leg of the Triad. Sufficient numbers of 

one warhead are held in reserve to provide backup in the event of an unanticipated 

technical failure of the other. There are two U.S. gravity bombs—the B61, undergoing life extension, and the B83. Current plans are to retire the B83 well before 

the end of its service life, and possibly before sufficient experience is gained with 

the B61–12 LEP to fully assess any ‘‘birth defects’’, in part to avoid a relatively 

small investment in B83 warhead surveillance. In light of the increased importance 

of extended deterrence in our security posture, it makes sense to revisit that decision. 

W76 backup: A major goal of the ‘‘3+2 strategy’’ for stockpile modernization is 

to provide a ‘‘backup’’ for the W76 SLBM warhead—the most prevalent warhead in 

the future force—in the event of unanticipated technical failure. This was to be 

achieved by fielding interoperable ICBM/SLBM warheads. That specific approach 

has been called into question, in part by the more urgent need to extend the life 

of our other SLBM warhead—the W88. In any case, there are insufficient W88s to 

back up the W76. A new approach is needed to hedge W76 failure. 

Recapitalizing uranium and plutonium manufacturing infrastructure: A responsive nuclear infrastructure to repair or rebuild warheads would relieve the need to 

maintain a large stockpile of reserve warheads to back up the deployed force. We 

have not had one since the early 1990s. Progress has been made recently on what 

seems to be affordable approaches to recapitalization. But the capability being provided, particularly regarding plutonium pit manufacture, may not be in time to 

meet the needs of future LEPs. It is time to resolve this problem. 

10 

CONCLUSION

Certain issues will be highly controversial and thus pose a risk to maintaining 

a continued consensus on modernization. That does not mean that the next NPR 

should not study them. Rather, all of the security implications of alternative courses 

of action must be understood before moving forward carefully, and with transparency, to any recommended changes in U.S. nuclear posture. This can best be 

achieved with an NPR that integrates all elements of nuclear security, not just force 

posture, embraces all agencies with national security equities as well as allies, and 

communicates clearly with Congress and the American public. 

Tool completed successfully 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Payne. 

STATEMENT OF KEITH B. PAYNE, PRESIDENT AND CO– 

FOUNDER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you. I greatly appreciate the honor of participating in today’s hearings. I thank Chairman Sessions and Ranking Member Donnelly for the opportunity. 

I’d like to start by noting that there has been an overwhelming 

bipartisan consensus on U.S. nuclear policies for the last five decades. The debates that we have had typically have not been over 

fundamental issues. For example, there is a longstanding agreement that two primary roles for U.S. nuclear weapons are to deter 

enemies and to assure allies. And from a broad agreement on those 

two goals follow many points of consensus about what we say and 

what we do with regard to nuclear capabilities. 

For example, because there are a variety of nuclear attacks that 

must be deterred, and no one knows the minimum U.S. capabilities 

necessary to deter, it is a longstanding bipartisan consensus in support of hedging, flexibility, diversity, and overlapping U.S. deterrence capabilities. Every Republican and Democratic administration for five decades, including the Obama administration, ultimately has understood the value of hedging flexibility, diversity, 

and overlapping U.S. deterrence capabilities, and ultimately rejected calls for a minimalist approach to deterrence and deterrence 

requirements. From that consensus then follows our longstanding 

support and broad agreement in favor of sustaining a nuclear triad 

of bombers, land-based, and sea-based missiles. 

Similarly, from the agreed fundamental nuclear policy goal of assuring allies follows the continuing consensus behind sustaining 

some U.S. nuclear forces that are forward-deployed, such as our 

DCA [Dual-Capable Aircraft] in Europe, or forward-deployable, depending on local conditions and history. 

These points of fundamental consensus remain with us today. 

There are, nevertheless, some recent and unprecedented developments that justify, I believe, a new DOD [Department of Defense] 

review of U.S. deterrence policy and requirements since the earlier 

Nuclear Posture Reviews. For example, we need to recognize that 

the optimistic post-Cold-War expectations about Russia that dominated earlier thinking do not reflect contemporary realities. And we 

should review U.S. policies accordingly. To be specific, Russian 

President Putin’s strategic vision for Russia is highly destabilizing. 

It includes the reestablishment of Russian dominance of former Soviet territories via Russification and the use of force, if needed, if 

11 

not by preference. Most disturbing in this regard is that Moscow 

seeks to prevent any significant collective Western military opposition by threatening local nuclear first-use. This is not the Cold War 

notion of a mutual balance of terror. It is a fundamentally new coercive use of nuclear weapons and threats not really accounted for 

in earlier NPRs. Russian military officials speak openly of preemptive use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war. And, according 

to some open Russian sources, Russia has pursued specialized lowyield nuclear weapons to make its first-use threats credible and its 

nuclear weapons locally employable. If Russia is planning—if Russia’s planning now follows this apparent policy—and I have no reason to believe that it doesn’t—it tells me that U.S. and NATO deterrence policy is now failing in a fundamental way, and the consequences of that failure could be catastrophic. Consequently, the 

unprecedented questions to be considered in a new DOD review is 

how the alliance can effectively deter this combined arms threat to 

our allies and friends. What deterrence concepts may be applicable 

in this case, in this new world? What are the corresponding metrics 

for Western conventional and nuclear force adequacy? And what 

now should be NATO and U.S. declaratory policies with regard to 

deterrence? 

We also need to consider the prioritization of our nuclear policy 

goals. The 2010 NPR explicitly placed nonproliferation as the top 

goal and said that reducing the number and reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons was a key to realizing that top goal. Yet, at this 

point, the goal of nonproliferation should no longer be used as a 

policy rationale to further reduce U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities. After two decades of deep U.S. nuclear reductions and focusing 

elsewhere, and the emergence of new nuclear—unprecedented nuclear threats, I believe we need to again elevate the priority of the 

U.S. deterrence mission and related capabilities. Its subordination 

has had some negative consequences. 

Finally, since the end of the Cold War, the study of Russia and 

the Russian language has declined dramatically in our educational 

system, in general. And the U.S. intelligence community reportedly 

has largely divested itself of the capacity to understand Russian 

nuclear weapons policy, programs, and war planning. That is a 

dangerous inadequacy. Deterrence strategies depend, fundamentally, on our understanding of the adversary’s thinking and planning and capabilities. We need both to better understand and to be 

able to explain the realities of Russia’s goal to change the international order under the cover of nuclear first-use threats. If we 

hope to deter effectively, we must consider again the intellectual 

resources necessary to perform that vital task. 

There are many other additional points that could be made on 

this subject, but, in deference to the time limit, I’ll stop there and 

thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. KEITH B. PAYNE

I greatly appreciate the honor of participating in today’s hearing. 

I would like to start by noting that there has been a near-overwhelming bipartisan consensus on U.S. nuclear policies over the past five decades. Despite the occasional flare ups, our nuclear debates typically have not been over fundamentals. 

12 

For example, there is a long-standing agreement that two primary roles for U.S. 

nuclear weapons are to deter enemies and to help assure our allies of their security. 

From the broad agreement on these two goals follow many points of consensus 

regarding what we should do and say about our nuclear capabilities. For example, 

because a variety of plausible nuclear attacks must be deterred, and no one knows 

the minimum U.S. capabilities necessary and credible to deter them, there is a longstanding bipartisan consensus in support of hedging, flexibility, diversity and overlapping U.S. deterrence capabilities. 

Every Republican and Democratic administration for five decades, including the 

Obama administration, ultimately has understood the value of these attributes and 

ultimately rejected a minimalist deterrence as inadequate and incredible. From this 

consensus has followed our longstanding consensus in favor of sustaining a diverse 

nuclear triad of bombers, land-based and sea-based missiles. 

Similarly, from the fundamental nuclear policy goal of assuring allies follows the 

continuing consensus behind sustaining some U.S. nuclear forces that are forward 

deployed, such as our DCA in Europe, or forward-deployable—depending on local 

conditions and history. 

These points of fundamental consensus remain with us today. 

There are, nevertheless, some recent and unprecedented developments that justify 

a contemporary DOD review of U.S. deterrence policy and requirements. 

For example, we need to recognize that the optimistic post-Cold War expectations 

about Russia that dominated earlier thinking do not reflect contemporary reality, 

and review United States policies accordingly: to be specific, the Putin regime’s strategic vision for Russia is highly revisionist and destabilizing. It includes the reestablishment of Russian dominance of the near abroad via ‘‘Russification’’ and the use 

of force if needed. Most disturbing in this regard is that Moscow seeks to prevent 

any significant collective Western military opposition to its offensive military operations by threatening local nuclear first use. The underlying Russian presumption 

appears to be the expectation that the United States and NATO will concede territory rather than face the possibility of Russian nuclear first use. This Russian strategy is not the Cold War notion of a mutual balance of terror: it is a fundamentally 

new, coercive use of nuclear weapons and threats. 

Russian military officials speak openly of the preemptive employment of nuclear 

weapons in a conventional war. And according to open Russian sources, Russia has 

pursued specialized, low-yield nuclear weapons to make its first-use threats credible 

and its weapons locally employable. 

If Russian planning now follows this apparent policy (and I have no reason to believe it does not), it tells me that United States and NATO deterrence policy is now 

failing in a fundamental way, and the consequences of that failure could be catastrophic. 

Consequently, the unprecedented question to be considered in a new review is 

how the alliance can effectively deter this combined arms threat to our allies and 

partners: What deterrence concepts may be applicable? And, what are the corresponding metrics for Western conventional and nuclear force adequacy? What are 

the gaps perceived by Moscow in United States will and capabilities, and how might 

those gaps be filled? Does the United States need ‘‘new’’ nuclear capabilities for deterrence and assurance, or are the existing options in the stockpile adequate? In addition, according to numerous reports, the U.S. nuclear infrastructure no longer is 

able to respond in a timely way to the possibility of new requirements for deterrence 

and assurance. That capability has been lost. If true, what level of readiness should 

be deemed adequate and what needs to be done to achieve that goal? 

We also need to reconsider the prioritization of our nuclear policy goals. The 2010 

NPR explicitly placed nonproliferation as the top policy goal, and stated that reducing the number of and reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons was a key to realizing that 

top goal. The ‘‘take away’’ from that position is that the U.S. must further reduce 

its nuclear arsenal to serve its highest nuclear policy goal. This point is repeated 

often by critics of the administration’s nuclear modernization programs. 

Yet, at this point, the goal of nonproliferation should no longer be used as the 

policy rationale to further hammer U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities. After two 

decades of reducing our nuclear deterrent and focusing elsewhere, and the emergence of unprecedented nuclear threats to us and our allies, the deterrence rationale 

for reviewing our nuclear policy priorities and the adequacy of our nuclear deterrence forces is overwhelming. 

Finally, since the end of the Cold War, the study of Russia and the Russian language has declined dramatically in our educational system in general, and the U.S. 

intelligence community reportedly has largely divested itself of the capacity to understand Russian nuclear-weapons policy, programs, and war planning. This is a 

dangerous inadequacy: deterrence strategies depend fundamentally on our underVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
13 

standing of an adversary’s thinking and planning. If we hope to deter effectively, 

we must review the intellectual resources necessary to perform this vital task, and 

begin it again. 

There are many additional points that could be made on this subject, but in deference to the time, I will stop here. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Dr. Payne. 

Dr. Roberts. 

STATEMENT OF BRAD H. ROBERTS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

GLOBAL SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. ROBERTS. And let me add my thanks to you for the opportunity to be here, and to you, Senator Sessions, for the kind plug 

for my new book. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. ROBERTS. You’ve asked us to highlight elements of continuity 

and change. And I’d like to look at the—this in two basic phases: 

the period from the end of the Cold War up to and including the 

2009 Nuclear Posture Review, and the period since. 

And in the period across the three reviews and the review conducted by the George H.W. Bush administration, but called—not 

called a Nuclear Posture Review, but, over that period, the two 

prior panelists have already hit the main point: there’s a great deal 

more continuity than change in U.S. nuclear policy. Every President has wanted to move away from Cold War approaches in nuclear strategy. Every President has wanted to reduce nuclear arsenals. Every President has wanted to reduce the role and salience 

of nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence strategies. Every President 

has also wanted to ensure that deterrence, nuclear and otherwise, 

would be effective for the problems for which it is relevant in a 

changed and changing security environment. Each administration 

has decided to maintain the triad, after, in fact, each administration considering whether or not that was the right outcome. Each 

has worked to ensure stable strategic relationships with Russia, 

China, and U.S. allies. Each has rejected mutual vulnerability as 

the basis of the strategic relationship with new nuclear armed or 

arming regional challengers, such as North Korea. This is—that 

last point is a huge driver, of course, of developments in our strategic posture. 

Let me also highlight two conspicuous changes over the first 

three Nuclear Posture Reviews. One is the steadily rising salience 

of extended deterrence and the assurance of our allies. By the end 

of the Cold War, we had almost stopped thinking about this problem. And in the 1990s, it was rare to hear a senior defense official, 

or otherwise, speak about extended deterrence and the assurance 

of our allies. This problem has come center stage again in our nuclear strategy. 

The other important change over those three NPRs relates to the 

scope of the reviews. The 1999—I’m sorry—the 1994 Review was 

very much a DOD-only look at force structuring, answering a simple question, Now that the Cold War is over, what do we do with 

this large force structure? The 2001 Review was more effective at 

taking a broader look at the fit of nuclear strategy in defense strategy more generally, and looked at how to utilize our nuclear capabilities and strategy to underwrite the objectives of assure, disVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
14 

suade, deter, and defeat. And the 2009 Review was the broadest by 

far. It was the first that was interagency in character. This, by the 

way, was mandated by the Congress. It was the first that tried to 

integrate all of the different elements of nuclear policy and strategy 

into a comprehensive hole. So, deterrence, extended deterrence, 

strategic stability, arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. That was, in part, what the Congress wanted the new administration to do, and it’s, in part, what the new administration 

wanted to do. My view is that this was helpful, that a broad interagency process was effective in, one, ensuring the needed leadership focus and ensuring the leadership buy-in in the results of the 

review. 

Now, second phase, looking back now at the period since the 

2009 NPR. Let me highlight four key changes bearing on the scope 

and content of our nuclear strategy. The first is, of course, the abrupt turn in Russian security policy in spring 2014. With this, it’s 

no longer possible to say, as we did in 2009, that the relationship 

with Russia was improving and presenting minimum risk of armed 

conflict. That’s manifestly not the case today. But, as the new 

threat is principally to our NATO allies, our national response 

needed to focus on adapting, modernizing, and strengthening deterrence in Europe. This process began with the 2013 Wales Summit, 

a few months following the annexation of Crimea, and will be accelerated at the upcoming July Warsaw Summit. Now, does this require a change in U.S. nuclear policy or posture, this change in 

Russian orientation? Does this require a change in U.S. nuclear 

policy or posture, separate and apart from NATO’s posture? I don’t 

think so. No administration moved away from parity as the guiding 

principle in our overall strategic nuclear relationship with Russia. 

We, the Obama administration, maintain an express commitment 

to strategic equivalence with Russia and to the second-to-none 

force-sizing criterion. 

Now, the argument has been made, not by anyone on this panel, 

that Russia’s nuclear assertiveness requires a comparable nuclear 

assertiveness by the United States and by NATO, and that Russia’s 

buildup of its nuclear force and development of new nuclear weapons with new military capabilities for new military purposes requires a like response from the United States and NATO. Keith 

has already discussed some of the deficiencies in NATO’s nuclear 

posture, and he almost didn’t mention hardware. The deficiencies 

in NATO’s nuclear posture are largely in the software side. And by 

that I mean how the alliance has talked about, displayed, and exercised its commitment to nuclear deterrence. I don’t think the commitment ever went away, but it’s been difficult to find amidst all 

the other noise. 

I said I’d highlight four key changes since 2009. The first is 

about Russia, of course. The second is that we have now learned, 

the Obama administration and its supporters, that the conditions 

do not now exist, and are not proximate, that would allow us to 

take substantial additional steps to reduce the role and number of 

U.S. nuclear weapons. Remember that the implementation of the 

Prague Agenda was—has been pragmatic in character. The administration set out a plan of action to try to create the conditions that 

would allow others, other nuclear weapon states, to join with us in 

15 

further steps to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. 

After 7 years, what do we have to show for that? Russia’s not willing to take the additional one-third reduction that we would be 

willing to take if they were willing to do so on a reciprocal basis. 

China hasn’t even agreed to talk about nuclear weapons or to join 

in strategic stability talks. It certainly hasn’t accepted any new nuclear transparency measures at a time of a buildup of its capabilities. North Korea has continued its steady progress towards a 

small nuclear force that will be capable of reaching out and putting 

the United States at risk. And our allies have shown themselves, 

in both Europe and Northeast Asia, unwilling to shed the last part 

of the capabilities that we uniquely associate with extended deterrence, which is our ability to forward-deploy B61 bombs in combination with dual-capable aircraft. 

So, I don’t think this means we should abandon our disarmament 

nonproliferation and arms control objectives. I think we should recognize that they are unlikely to pay any significant dividends anytime soon, dividends measured in terms of what we need in the 

way of our nuclear forces. We should not abandon the balanced approach set out by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission, but we should 

temper our expectations. 

I think, lastly, the debate will occur about whether—if Russia is 

unwilling to join us in further arms control, should we simply not 

proceed on our own, unilaterally? We see signs of that debate already. Of historical note is the fact that two Republican administrations since the end of the Cold War were willing to take unilateral steps to reduce U.S. nuclear forces. And, of note, neither 

Democratic administration has been willing to do so. So, I think 

we’ll have this debate, whichever stripe is in the White House. 

Third change. In the period since 2009, the more multidimensional nature of strategic conflict has come more clearly into focus. 

Nuclear weapons, missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, may all 

be separate domains, but they’re all part of other same strategic 

landscape, and they’re all a part of what we would face if ever 

there were to be a significant military confrontation with Russia or 

China. 

This puts a focus on the challenge of ensuring the needed degree 

of integration across these capabilities in our policy. This invites an 

important question about the scope of a possible 2017 Review. We, 

the Obama administration, conducted a QDR [Quadrennial Defense 

Review], an NPR, a Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a Cyber Review, and a Space Review. Should another administration do the 

same thing? Good question. I think integration would be important 

and valuable, but I don’t see us not doing a repeat of other Nuclear 

Posture Review as a self-standing activity. 

The fourth and final difference is in the political context. And 

you’ve already heard remarks on this from both panelists. We 

should recall the stark divisions and paralysis that marked the executive-legislative process 8 to 9 years ago. The word has been used 

around this table a number of times now about a consensus. I’m 

skeptical about this consensus. I think it’s neither broad nor deep. 

I’m not sure it extends beyond many people at this table. And I 

think preserving it and deepening it will be, and must be, a key 

objective of the next administration. And, in my view, this requires 

16 

being mindful of those initiatives that might seem rewarding in the 

development of new capabilities, but would be damaging to the political will to proceed with life extension activities. 

Lastly and briefly, let me highlight three key elements of continuity since 2009 that I think we haven’t so far discussed: 

The first is about Asia. The 2009 Nuclear Posture Review was 

really the first to give a very prominent place to thinking about 

Asia in our nuclear strategy. Our focus is always, traditionally, on 

Russia. How do we put a focus on China? Our focus on extended 

deterrence has almost always been about Europe. How do we think 

about the extended deterrence requirements of Northeast Asia and 

the particular assurance requirements of allies there? These remain important tasks, and we can’t let our focus on Russia and our 

concern about Russia distract us from the Asian environment. 

Secondly, let me put a finer point on a point John Harvey made. 

We’ve said, all three administrations, we want a hedge, we need a 

hedge, the need for the hedge is rising because the geopolitical environment is becoming more uncertain. We will—we’ve committed 

to reducing our reliance on a large stockpile of uploadable weapons 

that are aging and expensive to maintain by increasing our reliance on a flexible, adaptive nuclear infrastructure to produce new 

capabilities in the future if we need them, we don’t have it. We’re 

not getting closer to having it. We’re not even sure what that would 

cost. This is a problem that the Strategic Posture Commission in 

2009 very much emphasized, and where the problem still sits in 

front of us today. 

Lastly, each administration has debated whether new nuclear 

weapons for new military purposes with new military capabilities 

are needed. We are certain to have this debate again. We should 

have this debate. It’s an important debate to have. There is no 

unmet military requirement today. I don’t believe you’ve heard 

from the STRATCOM commander, or a former commander, indicating that there is some significant deficiency, in terms of 

STRATCOM’s ability to deliver on the guidance it’s been given. 

There is a gap in technical capability. These weapons are old. 

Where they’re deficient is in their age. 

Is there a case for new nuclear weapons? Yes. One argument 

we’ve heard is that this will reinforce deterrence because it will 

give us a lower-yield option that the President might find more 

credible to threaten. Another argument is that we need new weapons in order to enhance the ability of our laboratories to produce 

in the future. These are both valid arguments. I find, on balance, 

neither of them persuasive. I think we can move to the prototyping 

of new weapons without producing new ones, and gain the benefits 

that we need in our infrastructure. And I think there are other 

ways, other than hardware fixes, to deal with the deficiencies in 

our deterrence posture. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. BRAD ROBERTS

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this preliminary discussion of a 

possible 2017 Nuclear Posture Review. I would like to underscore that the views I 

am presenting here are my personal views, following on my service as Deputy AsVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
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sistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy from 2009 to 

2014 (in which capacity I was co-director of the 2009–10 NPR) and on my authorship of a recently published book on U.S. nuclear policy (The Case for U.S. Nuclear 

Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford University Press, December 2015). Please do 

not attribute my views to my new employer as of last spring, Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory. 

You have asked us to highlight elements of continuity and change in U.S. nuclear 

policy. Surveying the nuclear policies of all four post-cold war administrations, the 

continuities are striking. Every president has wanted to move away from Cold War 

approaches, to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the role and salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence strategies. Every president has also wanted to ensure that nuclear deterrence would be effective for the problems for which it is relevant in a changed and changing security environment. Each administration has decided to maintain the Triad. Each has worked to ensure stable strategic relationships with Russia, China, and United States allies. Each has rejected mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationship with new nuclear-armed or arming regional challengers. 

Let me also highlight two conspicuous changes over the three nuclear posture reviews. One is the rising salience of extended deterrence and the assurance of our 

allies—which has returned to as central a place in our nuclear strategy as it had 

at the height of the Cold War. The other change relates to the scope of the reviews. 

The 1994 review was the narrowest of the set, focused largely on force structure decisions. The 2001 review was broader, linking strategies for modernizing deterrence 

to a changing defense strategy. The 2009 review was the broadest. As mandated by 

Congress, it was DOD-led but interagency in character and fully elaborated the ‘‘balanced approach’’ recommended by the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission (balancing political means to reduce threats with military means to deter them 

so long as they exist). Such a broad review helped to ensure leadership focus, leadership ‘‘ownership’’ of main messages, and effective interagency implementation. 

These are important benefits of continuing value. 

From the vantage point of January 2016, what are the key elements of change 

and continuity bearing on the U.S. nuclear posture? I will briefly highlight here four 

key changes. 

1. With the abrupt turn in Russian security policy in spring 2014, it is no longer 

possible, as it was in 2009, to characterize the relationship with Russia as improving and presenting minimum risks of armed conflict. But as the new 

threat is principally to our NATO allies, our national response needs to focus 

on adapting and strengthening deterrence in Europe. This process began with 

the 2013 Wales summit and will be accelerated at the upcoming Warsaw summit. Does this require a change in U.S. nuclear policy or posture, separate and 

apart from NATO’s posture? The current posture is sized and structured to 

maintain strategic stability with Russia. The Obama administration, like its 

predecessors, has maintained ‘‘second to none’’ as a guiding principle and has 

maintained the resilience of the force so that it is not vulnerable to a preemptive strike. The argument has been made that Russia’s nuclear assertiveness 

requires a parallel nuclear assertiveness by the United States and that its 

large and diverse theater nuclear force requires a symmetric NATO nuclear 

force, along with a new generation of ultra low-yield weapons. The deficiencies 

in NATO’s nuclear posture are not in its hardware, however, which is robust 

for the deterrence of Russian de-escalation strikes. The deficiencies are in its 

software—in the ways in which the Alliance expresses its convictions about the 

role of nuclear deterrence (and which will be addressed in Warsaw). 

2. In the period since 2009, we have learned that the conditions do not now 

exist—and are not proximate—that would allow us to take additional substantial steps to reduce the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons. The Obama 

administration set out a practical agenda for seeking cooperation with other 

nuclear-armed states to move in this direction. What are the results? Russia 

has proven unwilling to take an additional one-third reduction. China has 

proven unwilling to embrace new transparency measures—or even to discuss 

strategic stability. North Korea has continued its nuclear build up. Our allies 

are unwilling to abandon the U.S. nuclear capabilities uniquely associated with 

extended deterrence (i.e., non-strategic nuclear weapons forward-deployed or 

deployable). This does not mean that the United States should abandon the 

arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament projects. Doing so would only 

further aggravate the problem. We should not abandon the ‘‘balanced approach.’’ But the United States should temper its expectations. And it should 

refrain from unilateral steps that supposedly put pressure on others to join us. 

18 

If it made no sense in 2009 to take unilateral action to eliminate a leg of the 

triad, it makes even less sense today. 

3. In the period since 2009, the more multidimensional nature of strategic conflict 

has come more clearly into focus. Nuclear weapons, missile defense, cyber, and 

space may be separate domains, but they are all part of the same strategic 

landscape. This puts a focus on the challenge of ensuring the needed degree 

of integration in policy, strategy, and execution. This invites an important 

question about the scope of a possible 2017 review. The Obama administration 

conducted a set of separate but linked reviews of these different posture elements. Might an alternative approach enable more effective integration? Possibly. But a single, comprehensive strategic review would be difficult to do on 

an interagency basis, whereas the 2009 NPR benefited significantly from that 

interagency aspect. 

4. A final key difference is in the political context. In the lead up to the Obama 

administration, executive-legislative gridlock had prevented any modernization 

decisions. The Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) helped to remedy that 

problem, with its bipartisan advice to the Obama administration to pursue 

modernization by life extension, which the administration accepted. In the interim, we have not recovered a broad and deep bipartisan consensus on nuclear 

modernization. But we have achieved sufficient agreement within and across 

the parties to enable a series of positive decisions to support modernization 

with steadily increasing investments. This needs to be preserved and nurtured. 

Repeating the SPC would not be useful or necessary toward that end. A private 

bi-partisan initiative could, however, help set the right context and provide the 

right markers for the journey ahead. 

Let me round out my introductory remarks by highlighting three key elements of 

continuity since 2009. 

1. Asia is as relevant to the United States nuclear posture as is Europe. China’s 

nuclear future has nearly as many large question marks as does Russia’s. Our 

pursuit of strategic stability with both needs to continue to adapt. Our Northeast Asian allies are as anxious about extended deterrence in a changing security environment as are our Central and Northern European allies. Don’t let 

the Russia problem distract us from this strategic truth 

2. We still don’t have the hedge we say we want. Each administration since the 

Cold War has wanted to ensure that we have a strong national capacity to respond to both geopolitical and technical surprises. Each has wanted to reduce 

reliance on a large and expensive-to-maintain stockpile of aging nuclear weapons as a hedge against uncertainty by increasing reliance on a responsive and 

adaptive nuclear weapons complex. The Strategic Posture Commission put special emphasis on this point. Fixing this problem with the proper investment 

and governance strategies should be a key priority. I know of no one who 

thinks that the risks of geopolitical and technical surprise are declining. 

3. Each administration has debated whether new nuclear weapons are needed 

–and we are certain to have this debate again. The George W. Bush administration’s pursuit of new weapons came to a political dead end. The Obama administration’s pursuit of a modern arsenal through the life extension of existing capabilities has been more successful. There are two arguments for new 

weapons—that we need them for deterrence and that we need them to sustain 

our national design competence. Both arguments have some merit. But there 

is no good reason to think that a new effort to build new weapons for new military purposes would not too come to a political dead end. Moreover, there are 

other means to strengthen deterrence and sustain design competence. 

Thank you for the opportunity to join in this discussion. I look forward to your 

questions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller. 

STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN C. MILLER, PRINCIPAL, THE 

SCOWCROFT GROUP 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the committee, it’s an honor to be in front of you. It’s an 

honor to be here with my colleagues, with whom I have spent decades working together. It’s an honor to see Senator Sullivan, with 

whom I spent time on the NSC [National Security Council] staff, 

back in the old days. 

19 

You asked me, sir, to comment on our nuclear—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Was he as brilliant then as he is today? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir, he was. 

You asked me to comment on our nuclear posture, which I understand personally to mean our understanding of the threats we face, 

our declaratory policy, and the state of our forces. And sadly, I 

must report to you that I’m deeply concerned on all counts. I believe we have declined in all three areas since the beginning of this 

century. 

It should be evident by now, although, astonishingly, it isn’t in 

all quarters of this town, that the world President Obama called 

for in his April 2009 Prague speech is not the one he’s bequeathing 

to his successor. Rather than reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, North Korea, Russia, and China have significantly increased 

the role those weapons play in their national security strategies. 

North Korea is now a nuclear weapon state. China is modernizing 

its long-range nuclear forces across the board. President Putin, 

over the last 10 years, has engaged in an across-the-board modernization of his strategic nuclear forces and his theater nuclear 

forces—in the process, violating the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and the INF Treaty. Russian Defense Minister 

Shoygu remarked last month that 56 percent of Russian nuclear 

forces are new. You know about the dangerous military activities 

that the Russians are engaged in using their strategic bombers, 

their nuclear exercises which explicitly target NATO members, and 

you’ve heard the stream of saber-rattling statements coming from 

Putin and his cadre, the likes of which have not been heard since 

the days of Nikita Khrushchev. 

Regrettably, our declaratory policy, apart from stating, quote, ‘‘As 

long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a 

safe, secure, and reliable deterrent,’’ close quote, our policy has not 

recognized the threats posed by the developments I’ve just described. Deterrence rests on getting inside the head of the potential 

aggressor. If we think of history, to the extent our unwillingness 

to respond is perceived by the Russian leadership as weakness, 

much as Hitler perceived the failure of Britain and France to respond to his reoccupation of the Rhineland and his annexation of 

Austria and Czechoslovakia, to the extent that he, Hitler, saw that 

as proof Britain and France would not defend Poland, then we, ourselves, have to be concerned whether we’ve left the door open to potential Russian miscalculations, miscalculations which could prove 

fatal in a crisis. We need to make clear to Mr. Putin that, despite 

what he says in his exercises, that any use of a nuclear weapon— 

any use—could lead to unpredictable outcomes which could result 

in the destruction of his country as well as the rest of the world. 

Moreover, in sharp contrast to both Russia and China, the 

United States has not deployed a new strategic system in this century. The bomber and ICBM legs of our triad have significant deficiencies. And yet, the modernization programs for all three legs of 

the triad remain in the planning stages, with new systems not due 

in the field until the mid- to late-2020s. Even given that, we hear 

the arms control community calling for the end of the long-range 

standoff weapon, which would take the B–52 out of the triad and 

essentially eviscerate the air leg of the triad, killing the B61 bomb, 

20 

which would end our nuclear forward presence in NATO and end 

our nuclear sharing there, calls to cancel the Minuteman ICBM 

Modernization Program, and even calls to cut back the number of 

new replacement submarines. 

As a result of all of this, I do believe a major review of our nuclear posture is required to better align us to deter foreign leaders 

whose polices, pronouncements, and investments in nuclear forces 

suggest they might actually believe in military use of such weapons 

in a crisis. 

I may have a slightly different take from my colleagues—some of 

my colleagues, however, on how that review should be carried out. 

I believe it is incumbent on any new administration to review its 

predecessor’s policies. Certainly, this is true with respect to defense 

policies and nuclear policies. But, I believe such a review should be 

conducted promptly and quietly in a highly classified manner within a select group of policymakers and senior military officials in the 

Pentagon. The results of that review should be shared with the 

President and the Vice President. Changes which the review might 

suggest, if approved by the Secretary of Defense or by the President, as appropriate, should then be implemented and announced 

when—at a time, and in a manner it achieves maximum security 

benefits for ourselves and our allies. The relevant congressional 

committees should be consulted and kept abreast of decisions 

which may have been required, and all of this well before any public rollout. 

But, the hype and publicity created by holding congressionally 

mandated Nuclear Posture Reviews tends, on the other hand, to 

create significant and early expectations that there will be opportunities for all interested parties to comment on the draft changes 

and to affect their trajectory. In particular, the inclusion of the 

State Department and the White House staff have led to an overemphasis on arms control initiatives and nonproliferation policies. 

While those are important, the basic nuclear posture which the 

United States requires to deter an attack on ourselves and on our 

allies should be decided on firm national security principles. Having decided these, an administration can expand its focus, where 

arms control may be able to help support nuclear stability on a regional or global basis. And it is here that the State Department 

will, of course, have a role. Again, however, this should be after 

basic deterrent requirements have been established. 

There are other good arguments against recreating prior NPRs. 

Full-blown interagency involvement in Nuclear Posture Reviews 

tends to increase significantly the amount of time necessary to 

reach and, therefore, to implement conclusions. Endless meetings 

of interagency working groups serve to slow the review process and 

don’t improve its results. 

Furthermore, holding NPRs on a quadrennial basis has created 

the expectation that nuclear policy needs to change with every new 

administration. Contrary to changing policy simply because a new 

administration has taken office are the facts that the basic tenets— 

as has been described, the basic tenets of our deterrence policy, as 

contrasted with their implementation, have been remarkably consistent over the decades, and this has served our country well, as 

well as our allies. And the basic tenets include deterrent threats 

21 

on the ability to convince an enemy leadership that our retaliation 

will impose costs which will outweigh any gains he hopes to make. 

To be credible, we must have a retaliatory force which can clearly 

impose the costs our policy requires, even under the worst-case conditions of a surprise attack. And our retaliation must focus on assets the enemy leadership values, not on what we value. This 

means, as Keith Payne suggested, we must always continue to 

study potential enemy leaderships to understand their value structures. 

I say all of this based on my own experiences in the Department 

of Defense. Beginning in October 1981, I became the senior-most 

official in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy tasked on 

a day-to-day basis with managing U.S. nuclear deterrence policy. 

And I maintained that position through January 2001, when I was 

detailed to the NSC. During the period 1981 to 2001, we in OSD, 

working with the Joint Staff and the Nuclear Staff in Omaha, and 

with the strong support of several Secretaries of Defense, one, corrected the perception that the Reagan administration believed in 

nuclear warfighting; two, completely reconfigured U.S. declaratory 

policy; three, weathered the nuclear freeze and nuclear winter 

movements while maintaining support for our deterrent; fourth, 

maintained the vast majority of our strategic triad modernization 

efforts on track; fifth, completely overhauled the Nation’s nuclear 

war plans twice, once during the period 1989 to 1991, and then 

again as Russia began to—as the USSR began to disintegrate, we 

did it again in 1991; and based, lastly, on a firm understanding of 

our deterrent needs, developed proposals which formed the basis of 

the 1991–1992 presidential initiatives and the START II Treaty. 

Most of this was done within the defense establishment and public mention by the then-Secretary of Defense when final decisions 

were made or approved by himself or the President. Some of the 

major changes, specifically those involving war plans, were never 

announced. We didn’t raise public expectations that change was 

necessary, nor, in both Democratic and Republican administrations, 

did we ask for public comment on what we proposed to do. Neither 

did we involve the other executive branch departments and agencies, with the exception of coordinating with the Department of Energy on developing and fielding the new nuclear warheads. The one 

NPR in which I was involved, that of 1993–94, proved a disappointment, in that it raised many expectations about radical changes in 

our posture which were not fulfilled because the international situation made such changes imprudent at best, and dangerous at 

worst. Accordingly, I would urge Congress not to mandate the incoming administration to conduct another Nuclear Posture Review, 

even though I would recommend that that review take place quietly and internally. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank the committee for asking me to testify, 

and I look forward to answering your questions on my somewhat 

different views. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY FRANKLIN C. MILLER

Committee Tasking: ‘‘We would like you to provide an assessment of the continuities and changes in the U.S. nuclear posture since the end of the Cold War, with 

22 

an eye toward what we’ve gotten right and what policies and/or assumptions have 

not been borne out by recent events. Most importantly, please provide the committee 

your thoughts about how the current nuclear posture should be changed to address 

the strategic environment as you see it evolving over the next 25 years. In other 

words, what should be the major considerations and content of the next nuclear posture review.’’ 

I am honored to be here and would like to thank the Committee for asking me 

to join my distinguished colleagues and friends on this panel. I have worked with 

each of these gentlemen for many many years and I deeply respect them and their 

contributions to the United States. 

THE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

You asked me to comment on our nuclear posture—which I understand to mean 

our understanding of the threats we face, our declaratory policy and the state of our 

forces. Sadly, I must report to you that I am deeply concerned on all counts, and 

that I believe we have declined in all three areas since the beginning of this century. It should be evident to all, although astonishingly it is not so—particularly in 

the Washington-based arms control village—that the world President Obama called 

for in his April 2009 Prague speech is not the one he is bequeathing to his successor. Rather than reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and North 

Korea have all significantly increased the role those weapons play in their respective national security strategies. North Korea is now a full-fledged nuclear weapons 

state. China is engaging in a major modernization of its intercontinental land-based 

and sea-based nuclear missile forces. 

And President Putin has increasingly over the last decade, presided over an administration which is: 

• Engaged in an across-the-board modernization of both its strategic nuclear triad 

and its shorter range nuclear forces, in the process violating both the landmark 

1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the 1991–1992 Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). In sharp contrast to our programs, which are with 

the exception of updating the antiquated B–61 bomb all in the planning phase, 

the Russians are deploying their new systems on land and at sea. Last month 

Russian Defense Minister Shoigu stated that over 50% of Russian nuclear forces 

are ‘‘new’’; 

• Using strategic bombers to engage in highly dangerous military activities and 

maneuvers adjacent to the our own airspace and that of our NATO and Pacific 

allies (in some cases actually endangering civil aviation); 

• Carrying out a series of nuclear exercises which explicitly simulate attacks on 

our NATO allies; and 

• Issuing a stream of nuclear saber rattling policy statements and specific 

threats, including many by Putin himself, the likes of which have not been 

heard since the days of Nikita Khrushchev. 

Regrettably, our declaratory policy, apart from stating that ‘‘as long as nuclear 

weapons exist the United States will maintain a safe, secure and reliable deterrent’’ 

has not recognized the threats posed by the developments I have just described. To 

the extent that our unwillingness to respond is perceived by the Russian leadership 

as weakness—much as Hitler perceived the failure of Britain and France to respond 

to his reoccupation of the Rhineland and his annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia as proof that London and Paris would not defend Poland—then we have 

left open the door to potential miscalculations by Mr Putin and his gang, miscalculations which could prove deadly in a crisis. 

Moreover, in sharp contrast to both Russia and China, the United States has not 

deployed a new strategic system in this century. The bomber and ICBM legs of our 

Triad have significant deficiencies. And yet, the modernization programs for all 

three legs of the Triad remain in the planning stages, with new systems not expected in the field until the mid-to-late 2020’s. Worse yet, the arms control community continues—despite the deal it struck to support Triad modernization in exchange for ratification of New Start—to call for slashing the modernization programs: eliminating the replacement for the air launched cruise missile (thereby taking the B52 out of the Triad and eliminating our ability to use the so-called ‘‘bomber 

discount rule’’ which then-Strategic Command head General Bob Kehler said was 

crucial to maintaining sufficient strategic weapons numbers under New Start); 

eliminating the replacement for the Minuteman ICBM; cancelling the B61 modernization program, thereby ending NATO’s forward based nuclear deterrent and its 

concurrent nuclear risk- and burden-sharing; and cutting back the number of 

SSBNs (which, in the aggregate, will carry upwards of 70% of our deterrent under 

New Start). 

23 

As a result of all this, I believe a major review of our nuclear posture is required 

in order to better align us to deter foreign leaders whose policies, pronouncements, 

and investments in nuclear forces suggest that they might actually believe in military use of such weapons in a crisis. 

REVIEWING OUR NUCLEAR POSTURE OR A HOLDING NEW NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

I believe I have a slightly different take from my colleagues, however, on how that 

nuclear review should be carried out. Let me say at the outset that I believe it is 

incumbent on every incoming Administration to review its predecessor’s policies. 

This is certainly true with respect to defense policies and particularly the case with 

respect to nuclear deterrence policy and the programs and plans which support that 

policy. Where I believe I may part company with my colleagues, however, is that 

I believe such a review should be conducted promptly and quietly and in a highly 

classified manner, within a select group of policy makers and senior military officials in the Pentagon; the results of such a review should be shared with the President and the Vice President. Changes which the review might suggest, if approved 

by the Secretary of Defense or the President, as appropriate, should then be implemented and announced when appropriate and at a time and in a manner which 

achieves maximum national security benefit for the United States and our allies. 

The relevant Congressional Committees should be consulted where appropriate and 

kept abreast of decisions which may have been required—and all this well before 

a public roll-out. 

The hype and publicity created by holding ‘‘Congressionally-mandated Nuclear 

Posture Reviews’’ tends, on the other hand, to create significant and early expectations on the Hill and elsewhere that there will be opportunities for all of the interested parties—Congressional, other Executive branch agencies, and public interest 

groups—to comment on the draft changes and to affect their trajectory. In particular, the inclusion in the past of the State Department and the White House staff 

have led to an over-emphasis on arms control initiatives and non-proliferation policies. While those are important, the basic nuclear posture which the United States 

requires to deter attack on ourselves and on our allies should be decided on firm 

national security principles; having decided these, an Administration can expand its 

focus to where arms control might be able to help support nuclear stability on a regional or global basis—and it is here that the State Department will have a role. 

Again, however, this would be after the basic deterrent requirements had been established. 

There are other good arguments against recreating prior NPRs. Full-blown interagency involvement in Nuclear Posture Reviews also tends to increase significantly 

the amount of time necessary to reach—and therefore to implement—conclusions; 

endless meetings of interagency working groups serve to slow the review process 

and do not improve its results. Furthermore, holding NPRs on a quadrennial basis 

also has created the expectation that nuclear policy needs to change with every new 

Administration. Contrary to changing policy simply because a new Administration 

has taken office are the facts (1) that the basic tenets of U.S. nuclear deterrence 

policy (as contrasted to the implementation of those policies) have been remarkably 

consistent over the decades, and (2) that such consistency has served the nation, 

and our allies, well. 

Those basic tenets include: 

• Deterrence rests on the ability to convince an enemy leadership that our retaliation will impose costs which will outweigh any gains he hopes to make through 

his aggression; 

• To be credible, we must have a modern retaliatory force which can clearly ipose 

the costs our policy requires—even under the worst-case conditions of a surprise 

attack; 

• Our retaliation must focus on assets the enemy leadership values—not on what 

we value; this means we must always study potential enemy leaderships tho 

understand their value structures; 

My views are based on my own experiences in the Department of Defense. Beginning in October 1981, I became the senior most official in OSD/Policy, tasked on a 

day-to-day basis with managing U.S. nuclear deterrence policy (with the exception 

of actual nuclear target planning). In 1985, I also assumed responsibility for nuclear 

target planning. As I advanced in my career, rising to be a Deputy Assistant Secretary, a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, and an Assistant Secretary, I maintained control of the nuclear portfolio. This continued through January 2001, at 

which point I was seconded to the White House as Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control. During the period 1981–2001, we in OSD, working with the 

24 

Joint Staff and the nuclear staff in Omaha, and with the strong support of several 

Secretaries of Defense: • corrected the perception that the Reagan Administration believed in nuclear 

war-fighting, • reconfigured U.S. declaratory policy, • weathered the nuclear freeze and nuclear winter movements while maintaining 

support for our deterrent, • maintained the vast majority of the strategic Triad modernization efforts on 

track, • completely overhauled the nation’s nuclear war plans twice (once during the period 1989–1991, and then again as the USSR was beginning to disintegrate in 

1991) • and, based on a firm understanding of our deterrent needs, developed proposals 

which formed the basis of the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives with 

Russia and of the START 2 Treaty. 

Most of this was done within the Defense establishment, and public mention was 

made by the then-Secretary of Defense when the final decisions had been approved 

either by himself or by the President. Some of the major changes, particularly those 

relating to the war plans, were never announced. We did not raise public expectations that change was necessary nor, in both Democrat and Republican Administrations, did we ask for public comment on what we proposed to do. Neither did we 

involve the other Executive Branch departments and agencies (with the exception 

of coordinating with the Department of Energy on developing and fielding new nuclear warheads.) The one NPR in which I was involved, that of 1993–1994, proved 

a disappointment in that it raised many expectations about radical changes in our 

posture which were not fulfilled because the international situation made such 

changes imprudent at best and dangerous at worst. Accordingly, I would urge Congress not to mandate that the incoming Administration conduct yet another Nuclear 

Posture Review. 

Mr. Chairman, I again thank the Committee for asking me to testify and I look 

forward to answering any questions the Committee might have for me. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Well, it’s an important situation 

we’re dealing with. 

I hope, as we go forward, maybe we’ll take turns. If somebody 

would like to follow up a little bit on what the previous questioners’ 

questions were out of turn, just raise your hand, and—if you want 

to clarify something. Let’s don’t be afraid to ask simple questions, 

because sometimes those are the best questions that get asked. 

We had Secretary James of the Air Force testify this morning. 

She repeated what others have said, that Russia represents the 

greatest threat, or the potential greatest threat, to the United 

States. It’s sort of painful to hear that said, when we were so hopeful other things might—things might be different. 

So, we’ve had some assumptions for a long time that have driven 

our nuclear strategy. And let me ask you about this. So, one of the 

assumptions I think were—is that great power conflicts—Russia/ 

United States, in particular—are a thing of the past. Another one 

was, it—the United States should lead and that others would follow to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons to their national 

security. I would say—this is one quote the President delivered in 

South Korea, under the umbrella, ‘‘As President, I’ve changed our 

nuclear posture to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons 

in our national security strategy. I made it clear the United States 

will not develop a new nuclear warhead, will not pursue new nuclear missions for nuclear weapons. We’ve narrowed the range of 

contingencies under which we would ever use, or threaten to use, 

nuclear weapons.’’ It was a pretty historic statement, I thought, 

particularly in light of where it was delivered. 

Rose Gottemoeller, in Prague in 2015—2014, December—at a— 

altered that position a bit. She says, quote, ‘‘We are seeing new and 

25 

enduring pressures on the nonproliferation regime, pressures that 

threaten global stability. We are seeing nations turn away from cooperation, turn away from the common good of nonproliferation efforts and cling ever more tightly to their nuclear arsenals.’’ 

Another early assumption was that conventional substitutes for 

nuclear weapons—conventional weapons—would diminish the need 

for nuclear weapons. It—so, here we’d like to—I’ll start with Dr. 

Harvey. You started this off. And maybe we’ll take a minute or two 

here and discuss. Have assumptions—do our assumptions need to 

be changed? 

Dr. HARVEY. I would say, first of all, that I think the greatest 

nonproliferation mechanism since the end of World War II has 

been the North Atlantic Alliance and the extension of nuclear 

forces from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States to 

that alliance so that countries—many countries in that alliance 

who had the capability, both technical and political, to produce 

their own nuclear weapons have not. In this—and by the same 

course, our extension of our deterrent to Japan and South Korea 

have provided the disincentive for those two countries to develop 

their own nuclear weapons. Another success for nonproliferation. 

So, I think you need to look at this from that perspective. 

The second point I want to make was one you made earlier, 

which is that I would say part of the continuity is—from all—since 

the end of the Cold War, all presidential administrations have 

sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. President George W. 

Bush, a fundamental part of his Nuclear Posture Review was the 

inclusion of defenses—conventional defenses and the inclusion of 

precision conventional strike to try to free up some of the needs for 

nuclear weapons to fill some of those roles. 

Senator SESSIONS. I guess that time is going to—— 

And, Dr. Payne, you—if you would respond. And—but, it does appear that the goal—the presidential policy, as the President Stated 

in South Korea, not to develop new weapons, and et cetera, et 

cetera, we have—it hasn’t had the desired result, it would seem to 

me. 

But, anyway, what’s your comment, in general? 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me comment on the first point that you made, the notion 

that conflict is a thing of the past. This was one of the great hopes 

of the post-Cold War order. We were going to be in a new world 

order that was going to be more benign. And, particularly, we and 

the Russian Federation would be able to cooperate and possibly 

even get to near-allied status. Go back and look at—that was—— 

Senator SESSIONS. That was absolutely the dream. 

Dr. PAYNE. That was the hope and, in some cases, the expectation, even. Even as recently as 2012, a former Vice Chair of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff said the idea of conflict between the United 

States and Russia is a thing of the past, not the future. 

Let me just suggest, as an extension of what I said earlier, is 

that, given what we now know the Russians are saying, both externally and to themselves in their open documents, their views are 

based on a very different understanding of how the world now 

works. They are talking about an expansion of Russian dominance 

into areas that we thought were settled in the post-Cold War order, 

26 

including the change of territorial borders by force, if necessary. 

And what they talk about is the use of nuclear threats, and, indeed, even nuclear employment, if necessary, as cover for that Russification and expansion of Russian domination. Unfortunately, 

we’ve seen conflicts come out of that. We know, at least it’s reported, that in 2008 Russia went to a nuclear alert in its operations 

against Georgia, and in 2014, President Putin said that he had 

thought about going to a nuclear alert. This is a very different 

world than we expected, post-cold-war. And so, that’s where—that’s 

the line of thinking that leads me to concur that there needs to be 

a review—a defense review of some sort, the details to be worked 

out, because the world has changed in a major way. And so, how 

we’ve looked at these things over the last two decades also needs 

to change. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, thank you. I know others would like to 

comment, but I’ll turn to Senator Donnelly. I would note your comments in your opening remarks about the very technical nature of 

their tactical weapons evidences a serious contemplation that they 

might be used. Would you agree with that? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. The open Russian press from senior Russian 

officials and scientists suggest exactly that. In fact, in an important 

case, Victor Mikhailov has said—it was a—he was head of the 

Sarov—was—at the time, was the head of the Sarov Institute—said 

that the Russians were working—making great progress on a nuclear scalpel that could be used in a conventional conflict. As we 

understand, the idea is that a nuclear scalpel could be used that 

would be at such a level that the West would not respond, because 

it would be essentially deterred from responding at a nuclear level, 

and therefore, the West would essentially back down. I mean, that 

appears to be at least part of the Russian thinking, and it’s—it 

goes by the name of ‘‘to escalate to de-escalate a conflict.’’ In other 

words, escalate to nuclear use, and that de-escalates the conflict. 

It de-escalates a conflict because the West backs down. That’s the 

notion of what’s being discussed, openly. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s a grim reality. 

Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You can’t always determine what another person thinks. You can 

influence it one way or another, but you can’t think for them. I’m 

curious, just as a starter, Do any of you believe that NATO would 

not fulfill—NATO countries would not fulfill their treaty obligations to another NATO country if they were attacked? Do any of 

you believe we would not? 

Dr. ROBERTS. No. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do any of you believe that the Russians 

think we would not respond? 

Mr. MILLER. I believe that there are reasons that they could convince themselves, however wrongly, that we would not respond. 

And that is my concern, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. And you can send signals, but you can’t, on 

your own, determine what another person thinks or how they’re 

going to behave as they move forward. Let me ask you this, to all 

of you. The ruble is worth 82, 83, somewhere between 80 and 85— 

the last week, 85 rubles to a dollar, based primarily on oil, their 

27 

economy. As their economy grows into deeper trouble, do you think 

that makes Russia more dangerous or less dangerous on this front? 

Dr. PAYNE. I think it has both effects, or it has potentially both 

effects. In other words, what the Russians have been—President 

Putin, in particular, has been saying about the reduced economic 

resources is that Russia would continue to make the military the 

first priority, and, in that context, nuclear weapons the highest priority within the defense establishment. 

That said, if the resources dwindle as much as it looks like they 

might, the question is, To what extent can they actually maintain 

that? The Russians seem to suggest that they’re going to maintain 

it. Whether they will or not, I think, is an open question. And that 

may make them more dangerous, not less dangerous. 

Senator DONNELLY. And then I guess the followup question to 

that is, As you look at this, how much of what you’re hearing from 

them is being driven by their economic conditions, the things 

they’re struggling through, that they have to have something to 

talk about, something to lead forward with? 

Mr. MILLER. Sir, I’d say that what we saw, starting about 6 to 

8 years ago, was President Putin changing the nature of the Russian political system, even when they were riding high, economically. And so, the emphasis on nationalism, the emphasis on being 

surrounded by foreign forces, the elimination of political opposition 

at home is part of the picture, whether they’re making money or 

not. 

I think, to your prior question, it’s always a concern that—Russian history shows that, when regimes are having some problems 

at home, they start to focus people’s attention abroad and to stir 

up nationalism. 

All that said, I don’t believe we’re in any serious circumstance of 

having Russia reach out and grab one of our NATO allies. Now, I’m 

not sure what would happen in a crisis, when he thought that was 

his least worst option. 

Senator DONNELLY. When you look at this on a continuing 

basis—one of the things we’ve heard in the past is that, some years 

ago, when it was clear that Russia—if there was a ground action 

in that area, Russia had—would have—had a stronger presence 

than NATO would. Now you look, and we’ve heard that NATO on 

the ground would have a much stronger presence. You don’t think 

so. 

Mr. MILLER. No, sir. Again, if you look, geographically, at the 

combination of ground forces in the Baltic region, the Russian 

forces are much stronger. The Secretary of Defense has taken great 

steps to improve our own capabilities, deploying smaller numbers 

of U.S. forces, but the conventional balance on the Russo-Baltic 

border is clearly—— 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, how far do they go before it matches 

up? 

Mr. MILLER. NATO? 

Senator DONNELLY. Yeah, before NATO forces and Russian 

forces—— 

Mr. MILLER. Tens of thousands of forces, sir, that we’re not—— 

28 

Senator DONNELLY. No, no, I’m sorry. What I mean is, on the 

ground, how far would they have to go before it becomes an even 

fight? Like heading over—in toward Europe? 

Dr. HARVEY. We have to reinforce, and then we can win the war, 

but it takes us time to reinforce. 

Senator DONNELLY. But, with the reinforcements on the ground, 

we have the advantage, at that point. 

Dr. ROBERTS. We do not. We do not—we have—the current 

NATO conventional force structure cannot be deployed in any kind 

of timely fashion to redress a Russian invasion. The reinforcements 

would have to come from across the Atlantic. 

Senator DONNELLY. So, you don’t think that any of their talks in 

regards to nuclear weapons is related to shifting forces on the 

ground and shifting advantage on the ground. 

Mr. MILLER. Well, the concern would be if—if they achieved a 

quick, limited tactical victory and we began to reinforce, that the 

threat would then come—if we didn’t stop our reinforcements and 

simply leave the situation in the status quo, then they would escalate to de-escalate and use nuclear weapons. That’s where the Russian strategy leads you. 

Dr. PAYNE. Can I mention that President Putin has said that he 

can have Russian troops in five NATO capitals in two days? I don’t 

know whether Russia plans to do that, but if President Putin believes that, that can be the type of mistake that—that Frank mentioned—that could lead to, you know, a disaster, even though we, 

on our side, believe that it would be disastrous for them to move 

in that direction. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you very much. 

Senator SESSIONS. On the China border, is the opposite the case, 

where the Russians are less able to resist the—a Chinese advance, 

and therefore, they would even be more committed to a scalpel or 

a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. Miller? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let’s see. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. I heard your—I heard Omaha 

being mentioned on the football game the other day a lot. 

Senator FISCHER. I know. We always make the news. Nebraska’s 

always the leader. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Your Mr. Manning—— 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS.—quarterback Manning—— 

Senator FISCHER. I know. Peyton Manning—— 

Senator SESSIONS.—keeps calling your name. 

Senator FISCHER. He was—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I’ve thought about you. 

Senator FISCHER. He was just the best. That helped him—and 

that helped him to win, when he yells out ‘‘Omaha.’’ 

Dr. Harvey, in your earlier statement, you referenced then-President Bush, in 1991, in some actions that he had taken. At that 

time, he unilaterally eliminated, I think, almost all the deployed 

tactical weapons—tactical nuclear weapons that we had. Did he exVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
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pect the Russians to follow suit on that? Because they did not. Did 

he expect that to happen? 

Dr. HARVEY. There was, I believe, the expectation—while the— 

President Bush’s—President Bush 1’s tactical nuclear reductions 

were unilateral—that there were be some reciprocity. There was 

some reciprocity, but some of the Russian promises on reciprocity 

have not been fulfilled. 

Mr. MILLER. Senator—— 

Senator FISCHER. And as we look at our—as—— 

Mr. MILLER. Senator, I was one of the architects of that. Yes, 

the—President Bush made a speech, in late September 1991, where 

he announced what we were going to do, and it specifically challenged the Russian leadership to do the same thing. President 

Gorbachev, in 1991, and President Yeltsin, in 1992, committed 

themselves to do virtually everything that President Bush announced for our forces. But, as Dr. Harvey indicated, they—and 

you’ve said—they failed to carry out their pledge. 

Senator FISCHER. And today, we’re faced with the tactical nuclear weapons that the Russians have. And I think that line is 

blurring between the tactical nuclear weapons and the strategic 

nuclear weapons. How do you feel that we’re going to be impacted 

by that, especially with the Russians making a number of advancements with their tactical nuclear weapons? How does—how’s that 

going to affect our nuclear posture in the future? If you would all 

like to address, specifically, the Russians, but also dealing with 

other nuclear powers that we are looking at in his world, whether 

it’s the Chinese or North Korea, or looking down the road in the 

future to even Iran. How’s that going to affect our deterrence? 

Dr. ROBERTS. So, let me start, if I may, with the Russia piece. 

So, NATO’s nuclear posture consists of two main elements: the 

independent nuclear forces of the three nuclear allies within the alliance; and the nuclear sharing arrangements, which have steadily 

come down, and we can say at the unclassified level, to 97 percent 

from their Cold War height, the number of deployed weapons by 

the United States in support of the nuclear assuring arrangements. 

So, the question for NATO is how to adopt that posture to the new 

situation presented by Russia and to its new capabilities. 

The key development in Russian military doctrine is this elaboration of the escalate-to-de-escalate strategy and the footnote to 

that, which is, they recognize that that may not be effective in 

achieving the result they would like, so they’ve introduced a vocabulary now about pre-nuclear deterrence, the use of long-range nonnuclear strike systems, whether cruise missiles or ballistic missiles, 

that would be used to escalate a conflict in order to de-escalate it, 

but below the nuclear threshold. We need to strip away their confidence that those threats are going to be effective in inducing 

NATO’s restraint. We can do that with a little bit of missile defense, a little bit of non-nuclear strike of our own, and an ability 

to retaliate if they conduct limited nuclear strikes, which we have 

with our DCA arrangements, and an ability to escalate if they continue with nuclear strikes, which we have with our strategic national assets of the three countries. 

So, this is—I don’t see the Russians solving a significant military 

problem for themselves by producing low-yield nuclear weapons. If 

30 

they use nuclear weapons, they will have crossed a dramatic 

threshold. And the fact that they have certain yields and certain 

downrange hazards will not be terribly impressing upon the alliance of the need to do something decisive in response to impress 

upon Russia the degree of its miscalculation. 

Now, the key wildcard here is where they go with INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]. If they—if their violation of 

the treaty proceeds now to the deployment of some significant force 

of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, then I think the problem 

for the NATO alliance becomes more complex. And in that circumstance, I am not sure that the existing DCA arrangements 

would be adequate to signal the resolve of the alliance, when 

threatened. 

So, with that, I’ll set us—turn to others for the additional comments. 

Dr. PAYNE. I’ll be happy to comment. 

Senator FISCHER. Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. And that is—it—the question isn’t just how the Russian nuclear weapons impact what we may or may not do; it’s how 

the Russian combined arms, conventional and nuclear weapons, 

impact what we may or may not do. And let me just give you an 

example. Defense Minister Shoygu just announced that Russia was 

going to establish three new divisions in the western district opposite NATO with permanent basing and that Russia was going to 

move the S–400 to Kaliningrad. What this suggests is a very serious buildup of conventional capability in the western districts. We 

shouldn’t be surprised by that, I guess, given what they’re saying, 

but it’s actually happening. 

So, you know, what does that mean? It means that NATO needs 

to be able to prevent conventional fait accompli by Russia, because 

we can’t allow President Putin or the Russian elite to believe that 

they can have Russian troops in five NATO capitals in two days. 

And that’s—— 

Senator FISCHER. They’ve—but, they’ve shown to us that they 

can move their forces quickly. 

Dr. PAYNE. That’s true. And that’s—and so, what I’m suggesting 

is, this is something that NATO needs to respond to. We need to 

make sure that Russian cannot—— 

Senator FISCHER. But, do we—— 

Dr. PAYNE.—produce these fait accompli—— 

Senator FISCHER.—do we respond with a—nuclear deterrents? 

That’s—you know, that’s my question. 

Dr. PAYNE. Right. 

Senator FISCHER. What is our posture going to be, going forward, 

with regards to deterrence when you’re—not just the conventional 

weapons that they have, but also—and not just Russia—but with 

their tactical? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, Senator Fischer. I think it’s a two-pronged approach. We have to be able to deter the conventional assault—the 

Russian troops in five NATO capitals in 2 days. And helping to 

counter that vision of the Russians is important. And conventional 

forces are necessary for that; not just on a rotational basis, but 

having conventional forces that can help prevent that will help 

deter that. We also need to be able to deter the nuclear escalation 

31 

threat. So, we need to be able to do both. And that’s where I believe 

there is a role for NATO and U.S. nuclear weapons to deter that 

notion that nuclear escalation will save the day for them. 

Now, what does that mean for us when you look at the basics? 

Where does the rubber meet the road? It means that we can’t remove the DCA from Europe. That would be ridiculous at this point. 

But, there have been many, many suggestions that the United 

States DCA should be removed from Europe. We should go ahead. 

We must go ahead with the B61–12 for the DCA. We need to maintain our deterrent that can help prevent the Russians from thinking they can nuclear escalate their way out of a problem that they 

create by trying to put Russia troops in five NATO capitals in 2 

days. So, it’s a two-pronged deterrence approach. 

Mr. MILLER. Could I just be—very brief, say—we have two problems. One, Putin’s rebuilt Russia’s nuclear and conventional forces. 

And two, he’s shown a propensity to use those conventional forces 

in Georgia and Ukraine when he thought there was low risk. Our 

job, as the United States, and our job, as to NATO, is to say to him, 

‘‘There is an extreme risk in using those forces of any kind against 

the alliance.’’ And that means building up some conventional capability in Europe, and it means retaining a good, credible nuclear 

deterrent, which means modernizing our forces. If he is convinced 

there will be cost to potential aggression, he’s not going there. But, 

at no cost, he could. 

Senator FISCHER. Will it take the United States to be the leader 

on that, to bring in all of the NATO partners that we have so that 

they understand the importance of having a line of defense with 

Russia? They have a big border now to protect—— 

Mr. MILLER. We are the—— 

Senator FISCHER.—whether it’s in the south, and the issues they 

face there, but—how do you convince, I think, especially Western 

European countries of the importance of having that firm border on 

the east? 

Mr. MILLER. We are the leaders of the alliance. Without us, there 

is no NATO alliance. And it makes hard work. I chaired NATO’s 

Nuclear Policy Committee for 4 years. You can do that. You can 

bring those countries along. But, it takes hard work. Brad knows 

that. My other colleagues know that, as well. We have to lead, and 

we have to be prepared to take that burden on. 

Senator FISCHER. And, Mr. Chairman, I am way over my time, 

but can I have Dr. Harvey respond? 

Senator SESSIONS. Important. 

Senator FISCHER. Since I used your name at the beginning, sir. 

Dr. HARVEY. I think it’s important that we recall that, back in 

the 1950s and the 1960s, when Russia had a massive conventional 

strength on the western—on the—confronting the western alliance, 

that we declared that we would use nuclear weapons first to repel 

conventional aggression. We want to get beyond that. We need to 

have our capabilities in place to deter conventional attack with conventional forces. And that involves, very likely, restoring some military capability from the United States to the alliance, and figuring 

out ways to exploit technology better, via offset strategies, et 

cetera, to be able to achieve military objectives, not necessarily 

32 

with stationing massive armored divisions forward, but with technology. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It seems to me there’s a real dilemma at the core of this discussion, and that is, How do we increase our deterrence in Europe 

with a NATO deterrent without at the same time feeding Putin’s 

paranoia about aggression from the West? There’s a kind of—it’s 

not really chicken-and-egg; I think it’s a downward spiral, it seems 

to me. 

Mr. Miller, would you comment on that? Because clearly part of 

what motivates Putin is a 500-year-old Russian belief that the 

West is out to get them. 

Mr. MILLER. I think he is motivated by that, Senator King, but 

I also think that he and his military experts are quite aware of 

what our capabilities are and are not. The movement of a United 

States Brigade Combat Team to the Baltics, and actually parceled 

out among those countries, is clearly not an offensive threat. I 

don’t—I think he and his military are quite clear that NATO cannot, and does not, present an offensive threat to Russia. But, as 

you say, it feeds the paranoia, and it helps him in his general political approach to dominance and eliminating opposition in Russia. 

Senator KING. How much of this new-found Russian aggressiveness, if you will, is Putin himself, as an individual, and how much 

is Russian doctrinal structural thinking? 

Dr. Harvey, you want to take a crack at that? 

I realize—we spend a lot of time around here psychoanalyzing 

Mr. Putin, so we may as well do it a bit more. 

Dr. HARVEY. If my wife were here, who—she is a Russia specialist. She’s a—an expert on the Putin stuff. But, I’m going to turn 

this over to Keith. I think he can handle this one better. 

Dr. PAYNE. Thanks, John. 

We make a mistake if we personalize this to President Putin—— 

Senator KING. Right. 

Dr. PAYNE.—because most of what we hear and see, and the kind 

of things that the—come out in the—particularly the open press 

with regard to the topic that we’ve been discussing today go back 

to 1999–2000. We see military leaders making statements that are, 

as I said earlier in my prepared remarks, preemptive use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflict. So, it’s much more of a culture and a regime position than it is narrowly personalized President Putin. My strong belief is, if President Putin for some reason 

were no longer on the scene—— 

Senator KING. We’d still be dealing with this. 

Dr. PAYNE.—we’d still be dealing with this, yes, sir. 

Senator KING. That’s important. That was the thrust of my question. 

Let me change the subject entirely, because we’ve been talking 

about Russia most of the time. Very specific question, briefly. How 

vulnerable are we, in terms of command and control, to 

cyberattack? We can have all the weapons in the world, but if we 

33 

can’t communicate because of a—some—a cyberattack of some nature—and, to the extent, in an unclassified setting, you can share 

your thoughts. 

Dr. HARVEY. I spent quite a bit of time worrying about this when 

I was working with Ash and others in the Department of Defense. 

Before he became Secretary and Deputy Secretary, he led a crusade 

within the Department to strengthen the command and control of 

nuclear forces. One of the key elements of the command and control of nuclear force is ensuring a cyber integrity of the system. We 

have an old system. 

Senator KING. That may be good. 

Dr. HARVEY. That may be good, to some degree. We’re thinking 

of—we have to modernize it. Part of Ash’s initiatives was to introduce a complete comprehensive, ongoing cyber assessment of the 

command-and-control system. And we’re starting off with the 

ICBM force, and we’re moving through the whole system. I am not 

currently current with that cyber vulnerability assessment. But, 

it’s something I worry quite a bit about. And it’s important that we 

devote the right attention to ensuring that we can get a conference 

set up with the President, we aren’t fooled into believing that the 

attack is underway, when it really isn’t—when it isn’t—or that it 

isn’t underway when it really is. We need to ensure that we can 

communicate with our forces, and that no one can disrupt those 

communications. 

Senator KING. Well, I’m glad to know that work is ongoing, and 

I hope it has a sense of urgency. 

Mr.—Dr. Roberts. 

Dr. ROBERTS. I had a comment on that. We have a commandand-control system tailored for the problem of the 1960s and—— 

Senator KING. That’s reassuring. 

Dr. ROBERTS.—which is essentially—in plain speak, it enables 

the President to take a 5-minute multiple-choice quiz and then skedaddle, which fit a world in which we worried seriously about the 

possibility of a major bolt-out-of-the-blue Soviet strike. 

If that’s the path—if that’s no longer the pathway to nuclear 

war, what might be? Well, the case that concerns all of us around 

the table, I think, is regional aggression, a regional conflict, where 

the adversary tries to escalate its way out of a failed act. And thus, 

the first decision the United States encounters about employing a 

nuclear weapon isn’t in the bolt-out-of-the-blue context. And, if you 

will, if the system is geared to enable the President to take a multiple-choice quiz in 5 minutes, what he needs to be able to do is 

to take—pass the essay test. Imagine a Korean contingency in 

which North Korea has crossed a red line of ours. We face a decision about whether and how to respond with a nuclear weapon. 

Who’s the President going to want to talk to? And—many, many, 

many people. 

Senator KING. Right. 

Dr. ROBERTS. And is the system geared to do that? Well, that’s 

not quite the nuclear command and control system, but it’s a part 

of the new landscape we’re in. And moreover, if we’re entering the 

phase of nuclear decision after some period of prolonged conventional regional war, we can expect that cyber and space assets both 

would already have been under attack. And thus, we might be enVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
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tering the nuclear phase of a conflict with a weaker command-andcontrol system than has been our assumption when we think that 

the problem is the bolt-out-of-the-blue. 

So, there’s an excellent question about the cyber vulnerability of 

the command-and-control system, but there’s a related question 

about whether the system, as it was conceived and constructed for 

the problem of the past, how it needs to evolve to be effective for 

the problem that’s emerging in front of us. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator—— 

Senator KING. Mr. Chairman, may I follow up with one additional question? 

Mr. MILLER. And you’ve got—could I just say—command and 

control, while vital, has always been an afterthought. We have to 

modernize the triad and OES—— 

Senator KING. Right. 

Mr. MILLER.—nuclear command and control, too. I would recommend to the committee that it engage in looking at that over the 

next year. This is a critical element of our—it is the most critical 

element of our force structure. 

Senator SESSIONS. The command and control—— 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. Nuclear command and control. 

Senator KING. I wanted to ask one additional question. It may 

be that you could answer very briefly and give us some thoughts 

on the record. 

Again, to change the subject utterly. We’ve been talking about 

Russia, then we’ve been talking about escalation, North Korea. 

What about terrorists? How—deterrence doesn’t work against a suicidal nonstate actor. The whole theory just breaks down. Do we 

need a—I mean, how do we deal with that? We’ve—deterrence has 

been very effective, a tremendously effective doctrine for 70 years, 

but now we’re in an entirely different situation, where if somebody 

doesn’t care about dying and they don’t represent a country—how 

do—what’s the strategic doctrine that deals with that threat? 

Dr. HARVEY. I would make one point. First of all, we can deter 

the sale or transfer of nuclear weapons from states to terrorists by 

making it clear to states that we hold them accountable for those 

transfers; and, two, that we have the capabilities to know whose 

nuclear weapon just went off and where it came from. And that’s 

an important critical aspect of deterrence in the concept of terrorism. 

Senator KING. Is that a well-known concept in the world today? 

People—other countries know that that’s our—— 

Dr. HARVEY. We have fairly robust nuclear forensics capabilities 

to be able to determine, if we acquire a nuclear weapon from a— 

that—where it came from, and, number two, if one goes off, also 

be able to understand, through debris analysis, where it came from. 

And that’s pretty well understood. I think the point of—once the 

terrorists get the bomb, yeah, you’re right, they’re going to want to 

use it, and they’re not going to care if they give up their lives to 

use it. And our job has to be able to create barriers and delay 

mechanisms to convince them they will not be able to achieve their 

objective, which is to kill a lot of Americans or a lot of allies. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Cotton, thank you for joining us. 

35 

Senator COTTON. Well, thank you for the invitation. I don’t sit on 

the subcommittee, but I believe that, while there may be more immediate threats to our national security, there’s no more fundamental issue for the safety and security of the American people 

than our nuclear forces. 

I’m occasionally asked by those on the left, as well as—who pose 

nuclear weapons—and those on the right, who look for places to 

trim spending, ‘‘Why do we spend so much on weapons we never 

use?’’ My answer, first, ‘‘On the contrary, we use our nuclear weapons every single day.’’ And, second, ‘‘We actually don’t spend that 

much on our nuclear weapons.’’ I think it’s less than 5 percent now 

of the total defense budget. That is a very valuable investment. 

To that end, when was the last time the United States designed 

a nuclear bomb? 

Dr. HARVEY. The last full-up nuclear weapons—nuclear warhead 

that we designed was the W88 SLBM warhead for the Trident ballistic missiles carried on submarines. And that was in the 1980s. 

Senator COTTON. When was the last time we built a nuclear warhead—a new nuclear warhead? 

Dr. HARVEY. It was the W88, probably—we were producing them 

through the late 1980s into the early 1990s, when President George 

Herbert Walker Bush stopped the production. 

Senator COTTON. It is the current policy of the United States 

Government not to develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new 

military missions for nuclear weapons. Should that remain the policy of the United States? 

Dr. HARVEY. That policy should be reviewed in every administration. This administration, early on, made a decision, in light of the 

difficult efforts underway to sustain the existing stockpile, not to 

go off and develop new warheads or new—new nuclear warheads 

and for nonproliferation objectives. It was not a decision, for all 

time, not to consider the possibility of having new or different military capabilities in the force. And every Nuclear Posture Review 

should revisit that decision. Indeed, all Presidents, including this 

one, has said we need to maintain the capabilities to ensure that 

we can develop new or different warheads for providing different 

military capabilities, if required from an evolving security environment. 

Senator COTTON. Mr. Miller, I saw you nodding your head? 

Mr. MILLER. Senator, I—I was not in the administration, was not 

a part of this administration, but the intent of that policy, as I understand it, as the intent of the Prague speech, was to set an example for others not to either rely more on nuclear weapons or build 

new nuclear weapons. The French, the Russians, the Chinese, the 

Indians, the Pakistanis, and the North Koreans are building new 

nuclear weapons. If the intent of our policy of self-restraint was to 

stop them from doing so, that policy has failed. To the degree that 

our stockpile requires new capabilities, then I think we ought to examine that. 

Senator COTTON. Let’s move from warheads and general policy to 

delivery systems and immediate policy. I have seen several reports, 

both in the media and in conversations, that the long-range standoff cruise missile may not be fully funded in the President’s upcomVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
36 

ing budget request. Senior civilian and military DOD officials insist 

that this is absolutely necessary. 

Mr. Miller, would you like to explain why they have reached that 

conclusion? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. The bomber leg of our triad consists of 19 

B–2 bombers and about 50-odd B–52s. The only way the B–52 is 

an effective deterrent is by carrying a cruise missile. The cruise 

missile that it carries now, the AGM–86 ALCM, first entered the 

force in about 1980–1981. It’s got reliability problems. And whereas 

it was stealthy then, it is no longer stealthy today. So, if you don’t 

have the long-range standoff weapon, you don’t have the B–52, 

and, by extension, you really don’t have a triad anymore. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Dr. Payne, do you have anything to add on that question? 

Dr. PAYNE. I would just add, as a—at a general level, that the 

more flexible our capabilities are, the more diverse they are, the 

more likely it is that we’ll have what’s necessary for deterrence 

when it becomes extremely important to have an effective deterrent. And so, the continuing reduction and narrowing of our capabilities, I believe, has a adverse effect of narrowing the potential 

that we will have what’s needed for deterrence when that crisis 

comes. And so, I think that the cruise missile is extremely important, for the reasons that Frank mentioned, but also in general, because we need to retain a flexible, diverse force structure for deterrence purposes. 

Senator COTTON. And my time is expired, here, but if I could just 

conclude, Senator Sessions, with—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Yeah. 

Senator COTTON.—one comment, since you and Senator King had 

a conversation about Vladimir Putin and his intentions, and divining those intentions. 

Operations by Russia began in earnest in Syria in late September. They continued unabated to include several violations of 

Turkish airspace, ’til Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft in its 

airspace in late November. To my knowledge, since then, Russia 

has not had any incursions into Turkish airspace. 

What do you think that tells us about Vladimir Putin’s response 

to countries or adversaries that draw a line on his aggressive conduct? 

Dr. PAYNE. I think it—what it shows is that Vladimir Putin is 

a calculating person. He has a chance to be reckless, but, when he 

sees that being reckless really will have very negative consequences, he can also pull back. That’s why, in our discussion 

today, our goal is to make sure that he doesn’t make a mistake and 

act on some of the more reckless ideas that seem to be part of what 

that regime is talking about. 

Senator COTTON. Well, I would agree with that. And I would add, 

for the record to that conversation about Russia, that 500 years of 

Russian history shows that it’s actually the West that has more to 

fear from Russian aggression than Russia from the West. The two 

main times they’ve faced a threat from the West, from Napoleon’s 

France and Hitler’s Germany, it was the West that united against 

that invader and on the side of Russia. And if you ask Sweden or 

Poland or the liberal uprisings of the 19th century where they had 

37 

the most fear from, it was from Russia; it was not from anyone in 

the West. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Well, Dr. Payne, just follow up a little bit on that and—because 

we really need to get your opinion on the necessity, or not, of a new 

nuclear weapon. What I hear you saying is, in this world of calculation by powers, that if Russia or some other nuclear state is calculating that they can take—use a small-yield—some sort of smallyield nuclear weapon, and they calculate we won’t retaliate, they 

are more likely to use that weapon. Is that—first—that’s the first 

question. If they think we won’t retaliate, they’re more likely to use 

it than if they are certain we would retaliate. 

Dr. PAYNE. If they think that they have license to do that, then 

they’re more likely to move in that direction. 

Senator SESSIONS. And if, to follow up, the flexibility you’re talking about in—if you only have, you know, a nonsurgical-type response capability, then they might increase their belief that you’re 

not going to—you don’t have the right kind of weapon to respond, 

and might, again, cause them to more—be more willing to use a 

nuclear weapon. Is that—I guess I’m—you can probably see where 

I’m going. 

Dr. PAYNE. Sure. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, the question is—— 

Senator DONNELLY. And if I could just add to that. And this is— 

I don’t want to go into any classified areas—but, don’t we have the 

ability to work with our weapons to match what they do? 

Senator SESSIONS. And so, the question—we’ll get there. The 

deal, to me, is—and we don’t talk about it much—but, we must 

have a realistic ability to respond, and our adversaries need to 

know it. And we don’t—that—and we don’t need to be put in a position where we’ve got to pour troops in, and they be vulnerable to 

a nuclear attack. There’s a—so, how do you evaluate that, in terms 

of the kind of flexibility we need—— 

Dr. PAYNE. Right. 

Senator SESSIONS.—in our system? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. I think you have hit the key question. And 

my basic answer is, we need to fill the gap that the Russians seem 

to see in our capabilities. What that gap is seems to be at the low 

end of the spectrum, low-yield nuclear weapons, very accurate nuclear weapons. Now, whether that means we need a new capability, 

or not—I hate to be an academic, but it depends on how you define 

‘‘new.’’ If I heard my colleague, Dr. Harvey, talk about ‘‘new’’ as 

something that would be outside or beyond designs—existing designs. And it may well be that—— 

Dr. HARVEY. Qualified in nuclear tests. 

Dr. PAYNE. Exactly. So, if the designs that we have, qualified via 

previous nuclear tests, are as broad as I understand them to be, 

then we may not need new nuclear capabilities. We may need 

something that’s outside of the current stockpile, but it’s not a new 

nuclear capability. But, the first thing we need to do—and this is 

where I get back to the point that Frank made earlier—is that we 

need to understand what the Russians are doing and saying, and 

what their views are, before we deem what we need for deterrence. 

In other words, we need to understand them first, because what we 

38 

have has to impress them. It doesn’t just have to impress us; it has 

to impress them. So, we need to fill a gap we see. 

Senator DONNELLY. And isn’t one of the other things we need to 

do to send a clear message, through one way or another, that any 

use of any weapon is—will clearly be countered immediately the 

same way? 

Dr. ROBERTS. So, easier said than done. 

Senator DONNELLY. No, I get that, too. But, I mean—— 

Dr. ROBERTS. You’re passing through the filter of all of their perceptions about the credibility of that threat. 

Senator DONNELLY. And it really comes down to a Clint 

Eastwood moment of, ‘‘Do you feel lucky? Do you think we’re not 

going to act?′′ 

Dr. ROBERTS. Right. 

Senator DONNELLY. And—— 

Dr. ROBERTS. And what we—— 

Senator DONNELLY.—our job is to ensure that they look at the 

weight of evidence, and the evidence is that we will, I guess. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes. And that we make it difficult for them to calculate precisely what risk they’re going to run. Putin’s shown himself to be an astute player of low-stakes poker. He’s gone up 

against us everywhere that our stake hasn’t been anywhere near 

what his stake is. That’s low-stakes poker. Going up against NATO 

would be high-stakes poker. And we need to do everything within 

our realm to demonstrate our conviction, our, just, belief, that that 

would be so. I’m not sure that new declaratory policy statements, 

new threats to Russia, new red lines in the sand would have any 

impact on a man who’s, by and large, made up his mind about our 

strategic behaviors and our strategic personality. But, to the extent 

we can expose him to risks that he can’t calculate, costs that are 

higher than he might have expected to pay, and—while at the 

same time reducing his expected benefits out of threatening and attacking NATO and trying to pull it apart, then we make it more 

and more difficult for him to convince himself that he can run 

these risks and win. 

So, I think the nuclear tool in the toolkit is fundamental, but it’s 

a much broader toolkit, and it begins with how we convey the role 

of deterrence in the alliance’s overall strategy, and how we convey 

our intent to defend the vital interests of our allies. 

And just to sort of close with a comment on the quotation you 

had, Senator Sessions, from President Obama in Seoul. What was 

missing from the quotation, which—was what he then went on to 

say, which was, ‘‘But, we want North Korea to make no mistake 

that the United States would use nuclear weapons on behalf of 

South Korea when its vital interests are at risk.’’ That’s the message that they need to hear. And they need to hear it from everybody in our political system, not just the Commander in Chief. 

Mr. MILLER. If I could, sir, since I’m the one who said we ought 

to say something in our declaratory policy. Nothing in isolation 

makes sense. It’s a combination of what we say, how we exercise, 

how we lead in NATO, and how we modernize our forces. Way back 

in the bad old days, they used to—we used to say, ‘‘We know we 

can’t win a nuclear war. Our job is to convince the Soviet leadership that they can’t win, either.’’ It’s words like that. It’s leaderVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:26 Apr 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\2016\2016 HEARINGS SENT FOR PRINTING\24800.TXT WILDA
39 

ship. It’s modernization. And it’s working with our allies to make 

clear to everybody that an attack on one is an attack on all, and 

that it’s high stakes. 

Senator DONNELLY. It’s the entire picture that you paint. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Dr. ROBERTS. May I come back to the, ‘‘Do we need new?’’ question? 

Senator SESSIONS. Right. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Since this is clearly—— 

Senator SESSIONS. You indicated previously you didn’t think so. 

And so, modernization, you favor. Is that correct, Dr. Roberts? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Absolutely. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. So, go ahead. 

Dr. ROBERTS. This is a case where the best may be the enemy 

of the good, which is to say if—if we were to set out today and to 

define the optimal nuclear arsenal for the security environment we 

sit in, in 2016, it would probably look somewhat different from the 

arsenal we have. But, do we know that anything is different politically from the circumstance of the George W. Bush administration, 

when executive-legislative agreement was not possible on even replacement warheads? I’m worried about the circumstance in which 

we go off and say, ‘‘We’re not sure that a new capacity is really 

going to just solve this problem us, but it seems like it’s the right 

thing to do,’’ and watching the political support for life extension 

programs evaporate. Then we end up in a worst-possible world. 

So, there’s a pragmatic political question, here, it seems to me, 

about whether or not going for new is an attractive option. But, 

you’re not asking the political question, you’re asking the military 

strategic question, ‘‘Does this enhance, in a fundamental way, in 

a—or a significant way, the nuclear toolkit we already have in 

place?’’ And I go back to my starting point. Is there a military commander who has said there is some deficiency in our ability to do 

what’s—guidance calls for, which is to put at risk those things that 

we believe enemy leadership values? It’s not simply to destroy 

enemy societies. It’s to do something much more complex. We don’t 

see evidence—I mean, no military leader has come forward and 

said there is an unmet requirement. 

So, the question then is, well, from a deterrence perspective, as 

opposed to a warfighting perspective, might there be some benefit? 

And you set out the case, but, if I may observe, with a series of 

‘‘mights.’’ Putin ‘‘might’’ think we might—he might interpret this, 

he might think that. It seems logical to us that he ought to be more 

impressed by the threat to employ a lower-yield weapon than a 

higher-yield weapon. But, I don’t think we should join Mr. Putin 

in trying to reduce the nuclear threshold to the lowest possible 

level with the lowest-yield nuclear scalpels. We want it to be clear. 

Nuclear weapons are brutish. They’re meant to be different, ‘‘You— 

if you cross this line, we’re not going to mess around with trying 

to match you, scalpel for scalpel. You’ve changed the conflict, and 

you’ve changed our stake, with crossing the nuclear threshold.’’ 

So, I don’t see a deterrence rationale that’s strong and credible 

for going for new. There you have it. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Dr. HARVEY. Could I elaborate on that one point? 

40 

Senator SESSIONS. Caused us all to think. 

Who else would like to comment on that? 

Dr. HARVEY. I’d like to comment on the point that—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Harvey. 

Dr. HARVEY.—Senator Donnelly made. And I—it reinforces, I 

think, Frank’s comment—is that—I personally am not optimistic 

that a—that you can manage escalation once nuclear weapons are 

used. That’s my view. And I believe that’s our—that’s the view of 

many in the United States. I’m not sure that’s Mr. Putin’s view. 

And that’s the question. How do I convince him that he—he may 

think he can manage escalation. So, what do I need to do to convince him that he—that should introduce doubt in his mind about 

that? And what that means to me is, we’ve got to think about that, 

and that’s what—exactly what the next Nuclear Posture Review— 

and we shouldn’t necessarily foreclose any option until we understand what we think we need. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Payne—and before we get into it, I would 

just say: Carrying through on a thorough effective modernization 

would be a modest step in that direction, would it not, Dr. Roberts? 

Dr. ROBERTS. More than modest, I think. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Payne? 

Dr. PAYNE. I just want to add that I agree with Brad’s point— 

I think we all do—that we don’t want to mimic what the Russians 

are doing for the sake of mimicking the Russians. I don’t know that 

there’s any value in that at all. The question is, what do we need 

to do to shut down the Russian strategy? Because that we do need 

to do, and we all agree that we need to shut down this Russian 

strategy. And so, the question isn’t mimicking the Russians; it’s, Is 

there a gap that we can fill that will contribute to shutting down 

the Russian strategy? You know, I don’t know that something new 

is necessary to do that, if we define ‘‘new’’ the way Dr. Harvey 

rightly, I think, defined it. I don’t know that something new is necessary for that. At the same time, I don’t think we should come in 

and, a priori, say we’re not going to do anything new. I mean, we 

should be able to take a good look, and try and understand, What 

is it that the Russians are doing? What’s their strategy based on? 

And what does it take to fill whatever gap they see, when we understand what that gap is? And we’re just at the nursery slopes of 

doing that, frankly. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator King? 

Senator KING. I would argue, taking off from that point, is that 

the development of the new standoff cruise missile isn’t new. It’s 

simply a making the—that arm of the triad effective, based upon 

current realities. You all would agree? 

[All three witnesses nodded in agreement.] 

Senator KING. Okay. 

Again, change the subject a bit. It appears that the Russians violated the INF Treaty. Is the INF Treaty still in our best interests? 

Should we move on beyond it? Should we take their—should—how 

do we respond? And do we respond possibly by simply saying we’re 

no longer going to abide by it, either? 

Mr. MILLER. I think that this—we’re right back into, ‘‘We don’t 

want to mimic what the Russians are doing.’’ The Treaty is of value 

if the Russians—if the Russians abide by it. They’ve broken the 

41 

Treaty. We need to work to try to get them back into compliance 

with it. But, on the assumption that they don’t, then we ought not 

maintain the fiction that the Treaty, in fact, is governing both 

sides, that it’s a—they’ve made it a dead letter. That said, given 

that introducing new groundbased weapons into NATO is always 

a neuralgic issue, has been from the very beginning of the alliance, 

I would not try to match what the Russians are doing with a similar kind of weapon system. I’d try to use our intelligence and our 

brains to figure out a new way of offsetting that capability, should 

we decide that’s necessary for deterrence. And my own inclination 

would be to go back to some sort of a submarine-launched cruise 

missile. 

Senator KING. Dr. Roberts? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Recalling my case, in my opening statement, about 

the importance of Asia to this discussion, if we had the opportunity 

to produce intermediate-range, conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, this would be a useful response to China’s anti-access area 

denial strategies, and a—an important tool in the assurance of our 

allies, and also avoiding a potential difficulty among our allies as 

South Korea pursues theater-range ballistic conventionally-armed 

missiles of its own, thus inciting some Japanese interest in the 

same. 

So, if the INF Treaty were to no longer be binding on the United 

States, there might be certain advantages to derive for our interests in the Asian security environment. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very 

valuable hearing. I appreciate you. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’re lucky to have such a wise panel. 

Senator Donnelly, anything further? 

Senator DONNELLY. No. Their wisdom has exceeded my ability to 

absorb it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. That is a ditto here. 

Thank you all for your comments. And I think we’ve all gotten 

a sense of—we need to get this right. We don’t need to blunder in 

short-term thinking and make some errors that might have ripple 

effects that we don’t foresee today. 

Thank you all. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ