[Cite as State v. Reed, 2024-Ohio-972.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff- Appellee, :

No. 112506

v. :

JOHN JORDAN, III, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 14, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-21-664617-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Kristin Karkutt, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant, John Jordan, III, appeals his convictions for 

murder and having weapons while under disability. Because the trial court properly 

denied Jordan’s motion to dismiss the jury panel, did not err in admitting body-
camera footage, and where Jordan’s convictions were not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, we affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS

Procedural History

On October 12, 2021, Chanika Clark was shot to death outside her home 

in East Cleveland, Ohio. On October 29, 2021, Jordan was indicted for two counts 

of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and 2903.02(B), two counts of felonious 

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 2903.11(A)(2), and one count of having

weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The murder and 

felonious assault charges included one- and three-year firearm specifications, repeat 

violent offender specifications, and notices of prior conviction. 

Prior to the start of trial on February 1, 2023, Jordan executed a jury 

waiver for the having weapons while under disability charge as well as the repeat 

violent offender specifications and notices of prior conviction. On February 7, 2023, 

the jury found Jordan guilty of the murder and felonious assault charges with the 

firearm specifications. On that same day, the trial court found Jordan guilty of the 

repeat violent offender specifications and notices of prior convictions.

On February 14, 2023, the trial court merged the convictions for 

murder and felonious assault into one count of murder. It then sentenced Jordan 

to a term of imprisonment of three years on the firearm specifications to be served 

prior to a term of imprisonment of 15 years to life on the murder count. It imposed 

a sentence of 36 months on the having-weapons-while-under-disability count. The 
trial court then imposed a term of imprisonment of 10 years on the repeat violent 

offender specification and ordered all sentences to be run consecutively for an 

aggregate term of 34 years to life. 

Summary of Relevant Facts

On October 12, 2021, Clark lived in East Cleveland with her four 

children, aged 5 to 16 years old. On the day of her death, Clark, Jordan, and the 

children were carving pumpkins. When the carving was done, Clark and Jordan had 

an argument over Clark’s phone. J.C., Clark’s 16-year-old son, testified that the 

argument started inside and that they moved outside the house, continuing the 

argument. J.C. testified that he heard car windows being smashed outside. Later, 

J.C. heard a popping noise, which he thought sounded like a gunshot. J.C. saw 

Jordan pull out of the driveway; he then went to find his mother. He didn’t find her 

in the house and when he went outside, he found her on the side of their home shot 

and bleeding. 

N.H., Clark’s 14-year-old daughter, testified that after they carved 

pumpkins, she and the younger children were in her room playing Nintendo. N.H. 

said Clark and Jordan were arguing inside and then left. She said she and the other 

children heard a gunshot. She was concerned with how close it sounded and tried to 

get the children to the attic for safety. While she was moving the children from her 

room, Jordan came up the stairs and told N.H. that the gunshot was from around 

the corner and not to worry about it. Jordan asked if they wanted pizza, and they 
told him yes. Jordan left, and the children went back into N.H.’s room. They later 

heard J.C. screaming outside that Clark had been shot.

East Cleveland Police Department Sgt. Anthony Holmes testified that 

when he arrived at the scene of the shooting, he saw two adults and some children 

on the porch. He was directed toward Clark’s body. He saw a bloody path in the 

grass leading to the body. Sgt. Holmes testified that J.C. was visibly upset at that 

time and was screaming and yelling. The state introduced exhibit No. 34, which was 

a copy of the body-camera footage taken by Sgt. Holmes documenting his arrival at 

the house. In playing exhibit No. 34 to the jury, the state only played the first 45 

seconds of audio recorded on the footage, which included J.C. telling Sgt. Holmes 

who shot Clark and what kind of vehicle he left the scene in. 

Clark’s autopsy revealed that she died from a gunshot wound to the 

back of her head and noted multiple abrasions and scratches on Clark’s buttocks; 

injuries that could have occurred if her body had been dragged. On October 21, 

2021, the vehicle driven by Jordan was found in Warrensville Heights, Ohio. 

Jordan’s identification and a holster for a handgun were found in the vehicle. 

Jordan was found and arrested later that day. He had changed his appearance by 

cutting off his dreadlocks in the nine days following the murder. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT

The Motion to Dismiss the Jury Panel Was Properly Denied

Jordan’s first assignment of error reads:

1

The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the jury panel as it was not 

a jury of the defendant’s peers.

When the prospective jurors were brought to the courtroom for voir 

dire, Jordan’s counsel objected to the composition of the 30-member venire because 

it did not contain any African-American men. Jordan’s counsel offered no other 

argument or evidence in support of his motion. Jordan now argues that he was 

denied due process of law and the right to a trial by jury when his request to dismiss 

the jury venire was denied. The state argues that the motion to dismiss the venire 

was properly denied because Jordan did not make a prima facie case that the 

composition of the jury pool violated his constitutional rights. 

In State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 340, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), the 

Ohio Supreme Court adopted the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court 

in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1979),

[T]hat in order to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth 

Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must 

demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’

group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in 

venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in 

relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that 

the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in 

the jury-selection process.” Id. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668, 58 L.Ed. 2d at 

1 Although we initially address Jordan’s first assignment of error, we address the 

remaining assignments of error presented by Jordan out of order. 
587. Accord State v. Fulton (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 

1195, paragraph two of the syllabus.

Jordan, at the time of his objection, did not put forth evidence that 

African-American men are unfairly represented in venires in Cuyahoga County. As 

such, he did not meet the second prong of the Duren test. On appeal, Jordan argues 

that African-American men are excluded from jury service in Ohio due to a 

disproportionate number being incarcerated in Ohio’s prisons. However, Jordan 

presented no argument that African-American men in Cuyahoga County are either 

unfairly represented on venires or that they are systematically excluded from jury 

service; instead, like the appellant in Jones, Jordan “merely alleges that AfricanAmericans were not adequately represented on his particular venire and jury.”

Jones at 340. 

The first assignment of error is overruled. 

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Evidence

Jordan’s third assignment of error reads:

The trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit 34.

Jordan argues that exhibit No. 34, the body-camera footage of East 

Cleveland Police Department Sergeant Anthony Holmes’s arrival at the scene of the 

murder, should not have been admitted because it contained hearsay. Jordan does 

not complain of any specific statements made by any particular person in his brief 

to this court, but argues in general that the exhibit contained statements from the 

children at the scene. 
The state argues that both J.C. and N.H. testified at trial and Jordan 

had the ability to cross-examine them as to any statement made on the body-camera 

footage. Further, the state argues that the statements played to the jury were 

admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2) as excited utterances and were admissible as 

present sense impressions pursuant to Evid.R. 803(1). We address only the state’s 

argument that the statements on the body-camera footage were excited utterances 

in resolving the third assignment of error.

The decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Hughes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109563, 2021-Ohio-2764, ¶ 39. 

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is generally prohibited unless such testimony is 

subject to an exception. Evid. R. 802. An excited utterance is a statement “relating 

to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 

excitement caused by the event or condition.” Evid.R. 803(2). 

In State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106571, 2018-Ohio-5172, 

this court detailed the four prerequisites for admitting a statement pursuant to 

Evid.R. 803(2) as being

(1) an event startling enough to produce a nervous excitement in the 

declarant, (2) the statement must have been made while still under 

the stress of excitement caused by the event, (3) the statement must 

relate to the startling event, and (4) the declarant must have 

personally observed the startling event.

Id. at ¶ 38, citing State v. Brown, 112 Ohio App.3d 583, 601, 679 N.E.2d 361 (12th 

Dist.1996).
In this case, the children saw their mother laying on the ground, 

having been shot in the head. Further, when Sgt. Holmes arrived, he described the 

scene as being “like an all sensory alert, like everything was on high, we had a lot of 

screaming, a lot of yelling.” As to J.C., he described J.C. in particular as “being very, 

very upset and irate.” In determining whether the statements qualify as excited 

utterances, the record reflects that the statements recorded on the body camera were 

made after a startling event, made while under the stress caused by that event, and 

related to the event that the children observed.

2 As such, we cannot say that the 

trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 45 seconds of audio contained in 

state’s exhibit No. 34. 

The third assignment of error is overruled. 

Jordan’s Convictions Are Not Against the Manifest Weight of the 

Evidence

Jordan’s second assignment of error reads:

The guilty verdict cannot be upheld because the evidence and 

testimony presented at trial did not establish appellant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.

Jordan argues that the guilty verdicts were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence because there was no DNA evidence submitted at trial, the 

murder weapon was not recovered, and there was no physical evidence linking him 

2 Because Jordan has not specified the content of the statements he sought to suppress, 

we presume the statements related to Clark’s murder.
to the white truck seen in the area of the murder. The state argues that Jordan was 

properly convicted by sufficient and convincing evidence produced at trial. 

A manifest weight challenge to a conviction asserts that the state has 

not met its burden of persuasion in obtaining the conviction. State v. Thompkins, 

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A manifest weight challenge raises 

factual issues and we review the challenge as follows:

The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and 

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The 

discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in 

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction.

Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st 

Dist.1983).

At trial, any fact, including the perpetrator’s identity, may be proven 

by either direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 104233, 2017-Ohio-288, ¶ 28, citing State v. Tate, 140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-

Ohio-3667, 19 N.E.2d 888, ¶ 15. “[T]here is no distinction in the particular weight 

or way of evaluating the evidence, whether it is direct or circumstantial.” State v. 

Vickers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97365, 2013-Ohio-1337, ¶ 20, citing State v. 

Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97557, 2012-Ohio-3454. “Circumstantial and 

direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value.” Id. Because of this, 

the state is not required to present DNA or fingerprint evidence to meet its burden 
of persuasion in a criminal case. State v. Mendez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108527, 

2020-Ohio-3031, ¶ 49 (“The state is not required to present DNA or

fingerprint evidence to meet its burden of persuasion for a burglary charge.”).

Chanika Clark was killed by a single gunshot to the back of her head. 

Her body was found at the side of her house. J.C. testified that his mother and father 

were arguing, that they smashed windows, and that after he heard a gunshot, he saw 

Jordan leaving. After Jordan left, J.C. looked for his mother and found her lying on 

the ground. N.H. testified that she heard a gunshot and tried to round up the 

children to go to the attic for safety. After the gunshot, N.H. said Jordan came up 

the stairs and said the gunshot happened around the corner and that it was no big 

deal. He asked about pizza and then left. Surveillance video showed the Tahoe back 

up from the drive of Clark’s house and leave the area. Jordan’s vehicle was 

eventually located, and Jordan’s identification and a holster for a handgun were 

found within it. After the murder, Jordan cut his hair, changing his appearance.

In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury or trial court 

lost its way in convicting Jordan. Although there was no DNA evidence entered into 

evidence and the murder weapon was not recovered, the evidence presented by the 

state was sufficient to meet its burden of persuasion that Jordan committed the 

crimes of which he was convicted.

The second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION

The trial court properly denied Jordan’s motion to dismiss the jury 

venire where he did not provide evidence that African-American men are unfairly 

represented in venires in Cuyahoga County or systematically excluded from jury 

service. The trial court did not err by admitting body-camera footage that included 

statements made by Clark’s children because those statements were admissible as 

excited utterances under Evid.R. 803(2). Finally, Jordan’s convictions were not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence presented by the 

state at trial was sufficient to meet its burden of persuasion that Jordan committed 

the crimes of which he was convicted and the jury did not lose its way.

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, J., and

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR