A

JournalofInternationalSecurityCooperationManagement

Annual,Vol.4

2015
The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management 

This inaugural hard copy edition of The DISAM Journal of 

International Security Cooperation Management will be published 

annually, highlighting past articles from the online DISAM Journal

(www.disamjournal.org) and incorporating new articles exclusive 

to this publication. This journal is not an official publication of the 

Department of Defense (DOD); in the event of a conflict between 

any information published herein and official policy guidance, the 

current official regulation, directive, or other instruction should 

be followed. Unless otherwise stated, the views expressed herein 

are those of the contributing authors or the DISAM editorial staff, 

and are not necessarily those of DOD, other government agencies, 

departments, or any of their organizational elements. Material 

may be reprinted if credit is given to The DISAM Journal and to 

the author, except for copyright material, which requires special 

reprint authority. Readers are encouraged to submit articles and 

items that may be of interest to the security cooperation community. Articles are normally between 1500 and 

5000 words and should be prepared according to The Chicago Manual of Style. Images should be submitted 

in JPEG or TIFF format at a minimum resolution of 200 pixels per inch, or 300 pixels per inch or larger for 

cover use consideration. JPEG or TIFF images inserted into Microsoft Word documents should also be sent 

as separate files. In the interest of clarity and brevity, DISAM reserves the right to make minor editorial 

changes to articles submitted for publication.

Please send all submission materials intended for The DISAM Journal, along with any necessary clearance and 

approval, to DISAM/DR via e-mail (disam.journal@us.af.mil). You may also mail information to DISAM/

DR using the address listed below. It is DOD policy that all information prepared by DOD employees be 

reviewed for clearance by appropriate security review in public affairs offices. The DISAM Journal release 

form may be accessed from the DISAM website: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/. This form should 

be completed by the appropriate public affairs official and forwarded with your submission.

All submissions and or changes are preferred in electronic format using Microsoft 

Word. Requests for changes to The DISAM Journal distribution list should be directed to 

disam.journal@us.af.mil or mailed to DISAM/DR, 2475 K Street, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 

45433-7641, DSN: 713-3311; Commercial: (937) 713-3311. 

Visit the online DISAM Journal for regular updates: www.disamjournal.org

Editor

Mr. Gregory W. Sutton

Managing Editor

Ms. Victoria E. Ebert

Art and Graphics

Mr. Danny L. Palmer
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 i

The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management

Welcome to the 4th DISAM Annual Journal of International Security Cooperation Management. 

We circulate this annual hardcopy publication as a supplement to our Online Journal, which can 

be accessed at www.disamjournal.org. We sincerely hope the Online Journal is of benefit to you in 

your daily activities and welcome any feedback you may have for improvement of it or this annual 

edition at: dsca.wright-patt.disam.list.disam-journal@mail.mil. If you do not already subscribe 

to the Online Journal, we recommend that you do – to stay abreast of more current SC-related 

activities. DISAM does its best to post articles in a very timely manner, and we welcome article 

submissions from all sources within the Community and Enterprise. 

The highlight article that we do our best to have in time for each annual publication is the 

fiscal year recap of the current/upcoming security assistance and security cooperation legislation 

and policy. That is contained in this edition for FY16. I want to commend Dr. Thomas (“Tom”) 

Williams for his work on this article. He took over that responsibility from Mr. Ken Martin who 

retired this past year – who researched and authored the article for many years.

It’s easy to see that there is much more in addition to the traditional authorization and 

appropriation legislation which we consolidate for you here. We live in a much more complex SC 

environment as each year evolves. Planning guidance and planning activity – integrating a Total 

Program Approach (TPA) in support of overarching country programs, ties together a variety of SC 

programs, vice the more traditional Total Package Approach that we more closely associate with 

Foreign Military Sales. The focus is on building partner capabilities –the most important task of 

our Community. I see that as very obvious looking at each article in this edition on its own, and 

especially taking them collectively. 

I won’t attempt to highlight every article here, but as with each annual edition, DISAM attempts 

to cover various issues facing our community and what a number of organizations are doing to 

effectively confront them. Also, and most particularly, we have a broad cross-section of thought 

provoking articles in the “Perspectives” section – with great odds that something is included that is 

of prime interest to every reader. 

With the circulation that our annual receives, I can’t fail to mention DSCA’s Vision 2020 

Strategic Plan updated this past October. You can find it and those updates on the DSCA website 

at http://www.dsca.mil/strategic-plan-vision-2020/latest-updates. In conjunction with Vision 2020, 

DISAM is also in the midst of a Strategic Review – looking at processes and practices to better 

posture the institute to better educate the SC Enterprise to meet future challenges.

Please let us know if you found this edition particularly helpful to you or to your organization, 

and provide any recommendations for future editions by contacting gregory.w.sutton.civ@mail.mil. 

 DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS

 Commandant
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 ii
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 iii

Table of Contents

Legislation and Policy

Recap of FY 2016 Security Assistance/Cooperation Legislation ........................................................ 1

By Dr. Thomas N. Williams, Security Cooperation Planning, Programs, and Legislation 

Function Manager/Associate Professor, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Security Cooperation Strategic and Operational Guidance:

Translating Strategy to Engagement.................................................................................................. 11

By Dr. Daniel A. Gilewitch, Associate Professor, US Army Command and 

General Staff College

Force of the Future Looks to Maintain US Advantages .................................................................... 29

By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

DOD Extends Technological, Operational Edge Into the Future....................................................... 33

By Cheryl Pellerin, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

Sole Source Acquisitions for Foreign Military Sales Customers....................................................... 35

By Mark H. Alexander, Air Force Materiel Command and 

William D. Cavanaugh, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Security Cooperation Community

Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps

Commander, United States Southern Command ......................................................................... 39

Senate Armed Services Committee Opening Statement by 

General Phil Breedlove, Commander, US European Command ................................................. 63

Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander, US Central Command Before 

the House Appropriations Committee—Defense Committee on the Posture 

of US Central Command ............................................................................................................. 67

Harris Says North Korea is PACOM’s Biggest Worry, Gives Report on Asia Rebalance................. 79

By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

NORTHCOM Commander Discusses Importance of Missions ........................................................ 81

By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

Carter Discusses Military Rebalance to Asia-Pacific......................................................................... 83

By Jim Garamone, DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

Security Enterprise Recalls Successful Fiscal Year........................................................................... 85

By Adrianne Elliot, USASAC Public Affairs
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 iv

Perspectives 

Holistic Integration of Mil-to-Mil Engagement Doing Better with Less .......................................... 89

By Colonel Dave Bennett, USA, US Army Security Assistance Command

Energy Security Requires More Than New Pipelines: Section 2282 Funds and 

Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection in the South Caucasus ..................................................... 95

By Wayne J. Dahl, CPT, USA, Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO–Eurasia)

The Whole of Government Approach Demands Interagency Coordination.................................... 111

By Ira C. Queen, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

Social Media, Public Opinion, and Security Cooperation in Saudi Arabia .................................... 115

By Joshua I. Cummins, Middle East, Central and South Asia Research Assistant

Lockheed Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The Russian Intervention and the Internal Dynamics of Syria ....................................................... 127

By Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Studies Institute

Mitigating Ethical Failure in Security Cooperation ........................................................................ 131

By Dr. Carlos Braziel, Joshua I. Cummins, Nicole Tom, Defense Institute of Security

Assistance Management, William D. Cavanaugh, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

Office of the General Counsel

FMS Training

What SCOs Need to Know About EUM.......................................................................................... 139

By Jim Toomey, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

US Army Africa Assists with Democratic Republic of the Congo’s National

Logistics School............................................................................................................................... 141

By Major Noreen Mallory, U.S. Army Africa G-4 Logistics

SATMO, AMEDD Troops Train Armenian Medics During Historic Mission ................................ 143

By Adriane Elliot and Richard Bumgardner, USASAC Public Affairs

First A-29 Afghan Pilots Graduate: Ready for Combat................................................................... 147

By Senior Airman Ceaira Tinsley, 23d Wing Public Affairs

Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity .................................................. 149

Mission/Who We Are/What We Do/How We Do It, NETSAFA Website
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 1

Recap of FY 2016 Security 

Assistance/Cooperation Legislation

By Dr. Thomas N. Williams Jr.

Security Cooperation Planning, Programs, and 

Legislation Function Manager/Associate Professor

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Following is a single document providing commentary and summary on security cooperation/assistance 

programs for the security cooperation community pertaining to the FY 2016 National Defense 

Authorization Act, Associated Appropriation Acts, and a Misc. 2015 Act

Continuing Resolutions:

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-

53, 30 September 2015.

•	 Until other legislation was enacted, extended 

FY 2015 authorities and appropriations into 

FY 2016, through 11 December 2015

•	 This Act started out as H.R.719.IH “TSA 

Office of Inspection Accountability Act of

2015.” The continuing resolution language 

for all 12 appropriations were inserted in 

order to meet the looming FY 2016 deadline, 

and can be found starting in Section 101 of 

the Act. 

Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, 

P.L. 114-96, 11 December 2015.

•	 Until other legislation was enacted, extended 

FY 2015 authorities and appropriations into 

FY 2016, through 16 December 2015

Making Further Continuing Appropriations for 

fiscal year 2016, and for other purposes, P.L. 

114-100, 16 December 2015.

•	 Until other legislation was enacted, extended 

FY 2015 authorities and appropriations into 

FY 2016, through 22 December 2015

National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA):

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2016 (short title), P.L. 114-92, 25 November 

2015

•	 Seven New Security Cooperation Programs 

Authorized for FY 2016:

o Section 1207, titled “Authority to Provide 

Support to National Military Forces of 

Allied Countries for Counterterrorism 

Operations in Africa”

§	Purpose: “In General – The 

Secretary of Defense is authorized 

in coordination with the Secretary 

of State, to provide, on a 

nonreimbursable basis, logistic 

support, supplies, and services to the 

national military forces of an allied 

country conducting counterterrorism 

operations in Africa” P.L. 114-92 

Section 1207(a).

§	Amount: “The aggregate amount 

of logistic support, supplies, and 

services provided under subsection 

(a) in any fiscal year may not exceed

$100,000,000.” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1207(c)(2).
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 2

in coordination with the Secretary of 

State, to provide appropriate security 

assistance and intelligence support, 

including training, equipment, 

and logistics support, supplies 

and services to military and other 

security forces of the Government 

of Ukraine... [only $50,000,000 

of which, is available for lethal 

assistance]“ P.L. 114-92 Section 

1250(a).

§	Expiration: “Assistance may not be 

provided under the authority in this 

section after December 31, 2017” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1250(f).

o Section 1251, titled “Training for Eastern 

European National Military Forces in the 

Course of Multilateral Exercises”

§	Purpose: “The Secretary of Defense 

may provide the training specified

in subsection (b), and pay the 

incremental expenses incurred by 

a country as the direct result of 

participation in such training, for the 

national military forces provided for 

under subsection (c).” P.L. 114-92 

Section 1251(a).

§	Eligible Countries: “Countries that 

are a signatory to the Partnership 

for Peace Framework Documents, 

but not a member of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization.” P.L. 

114-92 Section 1251(c)(1)(A). – 

And – “Countries that became a 

member of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization after January 1, 1999.” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(c)(1)(B).

§	Definition of Incremental Expenses:

“...rations, fuel, training ammunition, 

and transportation. Such term does 

not include pay, allowances, and 

other normal costs of a country’s 

personnel.” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1251(g). 

§	Amount: “ANNUAL FUNDING 

– Of the amounts specified in

§	Expiration: “The authority provided 

by this section may not be exercised 

after September 30, 2018.” P.L. 114-

92, Section 1207(f).

o Section 1226, titled “Support to 

the Government of Jordan and the 

Government of Lebanon for Border 

Security Operations”

§	Purpose: “In General. – The Secretary 

of Defense with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State is authorized to 

provide support on a reimbursement 

basis to the Government of Jordan 

and the Government of Lebanon for 

purposes of supporting and enhancing 

efforts of the armed forces of Jordan 

and the armed forces of Lebanon 

to increase security and sustain 

increased security along the border 

of Jordan and the border of Lebanon 

with Syria and Iraq, as applicable.” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1226(a)(1).

§	Amount: “LIMITATION ON 

AMOUNT. – The total amount of 

support provided under the authority 

of subsection (a) may not exceed 

$150,000,000 for any country 

specified in subsection (a) in any

fiscal year.” P.L. 114-92 Section

1226(b)(1).

§	Expiration: “No support may be 

provided under the authority of 

subsection (a) after December 21, 

2018.” P.L. 114-92 Section 1226(f).

o Section 1250, titled “Ukraine Security 

Assistance Initiative”

§	Purpose: “...support of national-level 

security forces of Partnership for 

Peace nations or the government of 

Ukraine that the Secretary of Defense 

determines to be appropriate to assist 

in preserving their sovereignty and 

territorial integrity against Russian 

aggression.” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1250(b)(2)(B).

§	Amount: “...$300,000,000 shall be 

available to the Secretary of Defense, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 3

o Section 1279, titled “United States-Israel 

Anti-Tunnel Cooperation”

§	Purpose: “The Secretary of Defense, 

upon request of the Ministry of 

Defense of Israel and in consultation 

with the Secretary of State and the 

Director of National Intelligence, 

is authorized to carry out research, 

development, test, and evaluation, on 

a joint basis with Israel, to establish 

anti-tunnel capabilities to detect, 

map, and neutralize underground 

tunnels that threaten the United 

States or Israel.” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1279(a)(1)

§	Amount: “The amount of support 

provided under this subsection in any 

year may not exceed $25,000,000. 

[Israel must provide an equal amount 

of support]” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1279(b)(4).

§	Expiration: “The authority in this 

section to carry out activities described 

in subsection (a), and to provide 

support described in subsection (b), 

shall expire on December 31, 2018” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1279(f).

o Section 1533, titled “Availability of Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Fund for Training of Foreign Security 

Forces to Defeat Improvised Explosive 

Devices”

§	Purpose: For use “in locations in 

which the Department is conducting 

a named operation” P.L. 114-92 

Section 1533(c)(1) – OR – “in 

geographic areas in which the 

Secretary of Defense has determined 

that a foreign security force is facing 

a significant threat from improvised

explosive devices” P.L. 114-92 

Section 1533(c)(2).

§	Amount: “Of the amounts authorized 

to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016

for the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Fund, or a successor 

fund, up to $30,000,000 may be 

paragraph (2) for a fiscal year, up to

a total of $28,000,000 may be used 

to pay incremental expenses under 

subsection (a) in that fiscal year.”

P.L. 114-92 Section 1251(d)(1).

§	Expiration: “The authority under this 

section shall terminate on September 

30, 2017. Any activity under this 

section initiated before that date 

may be completed, but only using 

funds available for fiscal years 2016

through 2017.” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1251(h).

o Section 1263, titled “South China Sea 

Initiative”

§	Purpose: “The Secretary of Defense 

is authorized with the concurrence of 

the Secretary of State, for the purpose 

of increasing maritime security 

and maritime domain awareness of 

foreign countries along the South 

China Sea” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1263(a)(1).

§	Assistance Authorized: “...

equipment, supplies, training, and 

small-scale military construction.” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(c)(1).

§	Eligible Countries [assistance and 

training]: “Indonesia, Malaysia, The 

Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(b)(1)-(5).

§	Eligible Countries [incremental 

expenses for training]: “Brunei, 

Singapore, and Taiwan.” P.L. 114-92 

Section 1263(e)(2)(A)-(C).

§	Amount: “IN GENERAL – Of 

the amounts authorized to be 

appropriated for fiscal year 2016

for the Department of Defense, 

$50,000,000 may be available for the 

provision of assistance and training 

under subsection (a).” P.L. 114-92 

Section 1263(f)(1).

§	Expiration: “Assistance and training 

may not be provided under this 

section after September 30, 2020.” 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1263(h). 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 4

o Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery 

Capabilities (NCARC) Assistance

§	Along with assigning the primary 

programmatic and policy oversight 

to The Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict; the program was

extended through FY 2018, P.L. 114-

92 Section 1271(a)

§	The ceiling for DoD O&M funds 

available to support NCARC for 

any fiscal year was raised from

$20,000,00 to $25,000,000 - P.L. 

114-94 Section 1271 (b)(3).

o No-Cost Transfer of Defense Articles 

to Military and Security Forces of 

Afghanistan

§	The authority for this program was 

extended a year to December 31, 

2016, P.L. 114-92 Section 1215(a).

o “1233” Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

§	The authority for this program was 

extended through FY 2016, P.L. 

114-92 Section 1212(a), and funding 

levels were set at $1,160,000,000 

- P.L. 114-92, Section 1212(b)(1). 

Additionally, for portions of this 

funding to be available to Pakistan 

the Secretary of Defense must certify, 

that along with other requirements, 

that Pakistan is taking demonstrable 

steps in restricting the movements 

of militants such as the Haqqani 

Network along the Afghan-Pakistan 

border, P.L. 114-92 Section 1212(e)

(1)-(3). 

o “1234” Logistics Support for Coalition 

Forces Supporting Certain U.S. Military 

Ops.

§	Program “1234” was given a one year 

extension till December 31, 2016 - 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1201.

o “1033” DoD Assistance for C/N 

Activities by Certain Countries

§	The authority for “1033” was 

extended through FY 2017, P.L. 

114-92 Section 1012(a). Kenya 

available to the Secretary of Defense 

to provide training to foreign security 

forces to defeat improvised explosive 

devices...” P.L. 114-92 Section 

1533(a)(1).

§	Expiration: “The authority to use 

funds described in subsection (a) in 

accordance with this section shall 

expire on September 30, 2018.” P.L. 

114-92 Section 1533(e). 

•	 19 Existing Security Cooperation Programs

had the Following Significant Changes for

FY 2016:

o Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 

(ASFF)

§	Total ASFF funds authorized for FY 

2016 is $3,652,257,000 - P.L. 114-92 

Section 4302. 

o Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)

§	Total ITEF funds authorized for FY 

2016 is $715,000,000 - P.L. 114-92 

Section 4302.

o Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund 

(CTPF)

§	Total CTPF funds authorized for FY 

2016 is $750,000,000 - P.L. 114-92 

Section 4502.

o Building Capacity of Foreign Security 

Forces (2282)

§	2282 FY 2015 funding level 

authorization has been extended 

through FY 2016, P.L. 114-92 Section 

1206.

o Syrian Train and Equip Fund (STEF)

§	Total STEF funds authorized for FY 

2016 is $406,450,000 - P.L. 114-92 

Section 4302. 

o Support of Special Operations to Combat 

Terrorism

§	Along with some changes to response 

and report times the amount of DoD 

O&M for Special Operations under 

this authority was increased from 

$75,000,000 to $85,000,000 - P.L. 

114-94 Section 1274(a).
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 5

§	Funds will be provided based upon 

one-for-one cash match made by 

Israel for the respective system 

or another matching amount that 

otherwise meets best efforts, P.L. 

114-92 Section 1679(b)(1)(B).

o Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP)

§	CERP was reauthorized for another 

year, P.L. 114-92 Section 1211(a), 

and the total amount of Army O&M 

funds allowed for FY 2016 was set 

at $5,000,000 - P.L. 114-92 Section 

1211(d)(3).

o “1204” Authority to Conduct Activities 

to Enhance the Capability of Foreign 

Countries to Respond to Incidents 

Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

§	Authority for program “1204” 

has been extended to no later than 

September 30, 2019, P.L. 114-94 

Section 1273. 

o Non-Reciprocal Exchange of Defense 

Personnel

§	Authority for this program was 

extended until December 31, 2021, 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1204.

o Department of Defense State Partnership 

Program (SPP)

§	The authority for the SPP has been 

extended to December 31, 2021, P.L. 

114-94 Section 1205(i).

•	 Four Unique Security Cooperation Areas of

Emphasis for 2016:

o The 2016 NDAA in comparison to 

those of the last few years has a heavier 

emphasis on evaluating and assessing the 

management and effectiveness of DoD 

security cooperation programs. Three 

requirements of note are:

§	Section 1202, titled “Strategic 

Framework For Department of 

Defense Security Cooperation” 

Requires, “A methodology for 

assessing the effectiveness of 

Department of Defense security 

cooperation programs in making 

and Tanzania was added to list of 

eligible countries bringing the total 

number of countries eligible for such 

assistance up to 41 - P.L. 114-92 

Section 1012(b).

o “1021” Unified Counter-Drug and

Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia

§	Program “1021” authority was 

extended through FY2017, P.L. 114-

92 Section 1011. 

o Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

Program

§	Funding was made available for 

fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018,

P.L. 114-92 Section 1301(b) and 

$358,496,000 was authorized to be 

appropriated for FY 2016, P.L. 114-

92 Section 1302.

o Iron Dome Short-Range Rocket Defense 

System

§	$41,400,000 was authorized to be 

appropriated to the Government 

of Israel to procure radars for Iron 

Dome short- rocket defense system, 

P.L. 114-92 Section 1678(a), with the 

goal of maximizing the opportunities 

for the coproduction of such radars 

by industry in the United States, P.L. 

114-92 Section 1678(b)(1).

o Israeli Cooperative Missile Defense 

Program Codevelopment and Coproduction

§	Not more than $150,000,000 may be 

provided to the Government of Israel 

to procure the David’s Sling Weapon 

System, including coproduction of 

component parts by industry in the 

United States, P.L. 114-92 Section 

1679(a)(1). 

§	Not more than $15,000,000 may 

be provided to the Government of 

Israel for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 

Interceptor Program, including the 

coproduction of component parts by 

industry in the United States, P.L. 

114-92 Section 1679(a)(2). 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 6

for Support of Groups in Yemen, Syria 

& Iraq.

§	Yemen: “No amounts authorized to 

be appropriated for fiscal year 2016

for the Department of Defense by this 

Act may be used to provide security 

assistance to an entity in Yemen 

that is controlled by members of the 

Houthi movement” [under certain 

conditions a Secretary of Defense 

national security wavier is possible], 

P.L. 114-92, Section 1209(a). 

§	Syria: In matters related to supporting 

vetted Syrian opposition the Secretary 

of Defense will submit a description 

(90 days after the FY16 NDAA was 

signed) of the support needed to for 

the vetted Syrian opposition and how 

this support will not support “The 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 

the Jabhat Al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda, 

the Korasan Group, or any other 

violent extremist organization.” P.L. 

114-92, Section 1225(a)(3)(A)(i) & 

“The Syrian Arab Army or any group 

or organization supporting President 

Bashir Assad.” P.L. 114-92, Section 

1225(a)(3)(A)(ii). 

§	Iraq: When providing assistance 

to groups such as Government of 

Iraq forces, Kurdish, tribal, or other 

local security organizations that are 

opposing ISIS; such assistance will

be restricted for groups where there 

credible information pointing to 

gross human rights violations and/

or the information showing that said 

group is associated and/or receiving 

support from the government of Iran. 

P.L. 114-92, Section 1223.

o The 3rd unique area of emphasis in the 

NDAA is Excess DoD Property. Three 

key requirements are:

§	Improvements to the DoD excess 

property disposal program;

specifically the Sectary of Defense

must submit a plan to congress 

progress toward achieving the 

primary objectives, priorities, and 

desired end-states identified under

subparagraph (B), including an 

identification of key benchmarks for

such progress.” P.L. 114-92, Section 

1202(a)(2)(1)(D).

§	Section 1203, titled “Department 

of Defense State Partnership 

Program” Requires, “Assessment 

of establishment of Fund – Not 

later than 180 days after the date 

of the enactment of this Act, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy and the Under Sectary of 

Defense (Comptroller) shall jointly 

submit to the congressional defense 

committees a report setting forth a 

joint assessment of the feasibility and 

advisability of establishing a central 

fund to manage funds for programs 

and activities under the Department 

of Defense State Partnership 

Program under section 1205 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2014, as amended by 

this section.” P.L. 114-92, Section 

1203(f)(1).

§	Section 1205, titled “Monitoring 

and Evaluation of Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid Programs of the Department 

of Defense” Requires, “In General 

– Of the amounts authorized to be 

appropriated by this Act for Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic 

Aid, the Secretary of Defense is 

authorized to use up to 5 percent of 

such amounts to conduct monitoring 

and evaluation of programs that are 

funded using such amounts during 

fiscal year 2016.” P.L. 114-92,

Section 1205(a).

o The 2nd unique area of emphasis for 

Security Cooperation programs in the 

FY 2016 NDAA are special Restrictions 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 7

including through such steps as 

providing appropriate equipment, 

modifying facilities, and ensuring 

literacy and gender awareness 

training for recruits.” P.L 114-92, 

Section 1531(c)(C).

§	“In General – Of the funds available 

to the Department of Defense for the 

Afghan Security Forces Fund for 

fiscal year 2016, it is the goal that

$25,000,000, but in no event less 

than $10,000,000 shall be used [for 

the above mentioned items]” P.L. 

114-92, Section 1531(c)(D)(i)

Appropriations Legislation:

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 

114-113, 18 December 2015

•	 25 Security Cooperation/Assistance

Programs funding amounts and significant

legislative changes are identified below: 

o Economic Support Fund (ESF)

§	$4,319M in combined amounts [State 

budget & Overseas Contingency 

Operations account] identified for

ESF, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, 

Title III & VIII.

o Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, 

Demining and Related Programs 

(NADR)

§	$885M in combined amounts (DoS 

& OCO) identified for NADR, P.L.

114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & 

VIII.

o International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE)

§	$1,266M in combined amounts (DoS 

& OCO) identified for INCLE, P.L.

114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & 

VIII.

o Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

§	$600M in combined amounts (DoS 

& OCO) identified for PKO, P.L.

114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & 

VIII.

addressing procedures pertaining to 

the disposal of serviceable items so 

that such items are not destroyed but 

provided as eligible excess property 

for utilization, transfer, or donation 

to various qualified recipients. P.L.

114-92, Section 344.

§	10 U.S.C. Section 2576a was amended 

by adding a requirement to create a 

website providing information on 

available excess property for transfer 

to Federal and State Agencies. P.L. 

114-92, Section 1052.

§	10 U.S.C. Section 2576a was further 

amended by adding the use of donated 

personal property for border security 

activities to the already approved 

counterterrorism and counter-drug 

activities. P.L. 114-92 Section 1052. 

o The 4th unique area of emphasis is 

the security of, the resources for, and 

recruitment/retention of Afghan women 

in the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Some key requirements:

§	 “An assessment of the security of 

Afghan women and girls, including 

information regarding efforts to 

increase the recruitment and retention 

of women in the Afghan National 

Security Forces” P.L.114-92, Section 

1531(c)(1)(A).

§	“...increase the number of female 

security officers specifically trained

to address cases of gender-based 

violence, including ensuring the 

Afghan National Police’s Family 

Response Units have the necessary 

resources and are available to women 

across Afghanistan...” P.L. 114-92, 

Section1531(c)(1)(B)(ii).

§	“...the development and 

implementation of a plan to increase 

the number of female members of 

the Afghanistan National Army and 

the Afghanistan National Police and 

to promote their equal treatment, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 8

in the FY 2016 NDAA but still 

includes support for lethal weapons 

of a defensive nature], P.L. 114-113, 

DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 9014.

§	 Prohibits the use of these funds 

for the procurement or transfer of 

man-portable air defense systems, 

P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, 

Section 9016.

o “1233” Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

§	Further affirmed that portions of this

fund will not be made available to 

Pakistan unless demonstrable steps 

are made showing that Pakistan is 

cooperating with the United States 

in counterterrorism efforts (against 

the Haqqani Network in particular);

dismantling improvised explosive 

device networks; preventing the

proliferation of nuclear-related 

material; protecting judicial

independence; issuing visas in a

timely manner for United States 

visitors; and, providing humanitarian

organizations access to detainees/

internally displaced persons, P.L. 

114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, 

Section 9017 (a).

§	Granted the Secretary of Defense 

the ability, in coordination with 

the Secretary of State, to waive the 

restrictions of Section 9017 (a) on a 

case-by-case basis by certifying in 

writing to the congressional defense 

committees that it is in the national 

security interest to do so; such a

report may be classified, P.L. 114-

113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, Section 

9017 (b).

o Assistance to the Government of Jordan 

for Border Security Operations

§	“Up to $600M of the funds 

appropriated by this Act, from the 

CTPF, may be used to provide 

assistance to the Government of 

Jordan to support the armed forces of 

o Foreign Military Financing Program 

(FMFP)

§	$6,025M in combined amounts (DoS 

& OCO) identified for FMFP, P.L.

114-113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV & 

VIII.

§	$3.1M earmarked for Israel, P.L. 114-

113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV. 

§	$1.3MearmarkedforEgypt;however,

15% of this earmark is withheld until 

effective steps are made to improve 

various democratic and human rights 

issues, P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. 

K, Title VIII, Section 7041(3)(A).

o International Military Education and 

Training (IMET)

§	$108M identified for IMET, P.L. 114-

113, S/FOAA Div. K, Title IV

o Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 

(ASFF)

§	$3,652M identified for ASFF, P.L.

114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX.

§	$400M Rescinded for ASFF, P.L. 

114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, 

Section 9021.

§	Effective amount is $3,252M; $400M

less than what was identified in the

FY 2016 NDAA. 

o Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)

§	$715M identified for ITEF, P.L. 114-

113, DoD Div. C, Title IX.

o Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund 

(CTPF)

§	$1,100M identified for CTPF [this is

more $350M than what wasidentified

in the FY 2016 NDAA], P.L. 114-

113, DoD Div. C, Title IX.

§	$600M may be used to provide 

assistance to the government of 

Jordan to support the armed forces of 

Jordan and to enhance security along 

its borders, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. 

C, Title IX, Section 9012.

o Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 

(USAI)

§	$250M identified for USAI [this is

$50M less than what was identified
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 9

o Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI)

§	Up to $15M of Navy O&M funds are 

available for the Pacific Command

to execute Security Cooperation 

activities, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, 

Title VIII, Section 8082.

o Special Defense Acquisition Fund 

(SDAF)

§	The SDAF that allows the U.S. 

government to purchase high demand 

military articles in anticipation of 

future FMS sales was increased 

from $100M to $900M; which will

remain available for obligation until 

September 30, 2018 P.L. 114-113, 

S/FOAA Div K, Title VII, Section 

7072. 

o Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

Account

§	The CTR account had a rescission 

of $15M, P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, 

Title VIII, Section 8042.

o Countering Foreign Fighters and Violent 

Extremist Organizations

§	Funds appropriated under Title III & 

IV of the FY 2016 S/FOAA [Bilateral 

Economic Assistance & International 

Security Assistance funds] will be 

used to “counter the flow of foreign

fighters to countries in which violent

extremists or violent extremist 

organizations operate” P.L. 114-113, 

S/FOAA Div K, Title VII, Section 

7073(a)(1). 

o Logistical Support to Coalition Forces in 

Afghanistan and to Counter ISIL

§	DoD O&M funds “may be used, 

notwithstanding any other provision 

of law, to provided supplies, services, 

transportation, including airlift and 

sealift, and other logistical support 

to coalition forces supporting 

military and stability operations 

in Afghanistan and to counter the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” 

P.L. 114-113, DoD Div C., Title IX, 

Section 9006.

Jordan and to enhance security along 

its borders.” P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. 

C, Title 9012.

o “1004” Additional Support for CounterDrug Activities and Activities to Counter 

Transnational Organized Crime

§	$1,428M in combined amounts (DoD 

& OCO) identified for program

“1004” P.L. 114-113, DoD Div C, 

Title VI & IX.

o Israeli Cooperative Programs

§	$487M provided for various 

cooperative Israeli programs such as 

the Iron Dome, Short Range Ballistic 

Missile Defense [including David’s 

Sling procurement], & Upper-tier 

Missile Defense [including Arrow 

3 coproduction] P.L. 114-113, DoD 

Div C, Title VIII, Section 8071.

o Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and 

Civic Aid (OHDACA)

§	$103M for OHDACA, P.L. 114-113, 

DoD Div. C, Title II.

o International Disaster Assistance (IDA)

§	$2,794M in combined amounts (DoS 

& OCO), P.L. 114-113, S/FOAA Div. 

J, Title II & VIII. 

o Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP)

§	$5M in Army O&M funds for CERP, 

P.L. 114-113, DoD Div. C, Title IX, 

Section 9005.

o Defense Health Program

§	“not less than $8M shall be available 

for HIV prevention educational 

activities undertaken in connection 

with United States military training, 

exercises, and humanitarian 

assistance activities conducted 

primarily in Africa nations” P.L. 114-

113, DoD Div. C, Title VI. 

o Combatant Commander Initiative Fund 

(CCIF)

§	Up to $15M in DoD O&M P.L. 114-

113, DoD Div. C, Title II.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 10

o Iraq Loan Authority

§	“During fiscal year 2016, direct loans

under section 23 of the Arms Export 

Control Act may be made available 

for Iraq, gross obligations for the 

principal amounts of which shall not 

exceed $2,700,000,000: Provided,...

that such loans shall be repaid in not 

more than 12 years, including a grace 

period of up to 1 year on repayment 

of principal.” P.L. 114-113, Other 

Matters Div. O, Title XI, Section 

1101(a).

Other Legislation:

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, P.L. 114-74, 2 

November 2015

•	 This Act set the FY 2016 amount for security

at $548,091,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 Section 

101(a) and set the FY 2017 amount for 

security at $551,068,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 

Section 101(a). 

•	 The Overseas Contingency Operations

(OCO) account for FY 2016 was set at 

$14,895,000,000 - P.L. 114-74 Section 

101(d)(1)(A) and the OCO account for FY 

2017 was set at $14,895,000,000 - P.L. 114-

74 Section 101(d)(1)(B).

•	 Extended the accumulation of public debt till

March 16, 2017, P.L. 114-74 Section 901. 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 11

Security Cooperation Strategic and 

Operational Guidance: Translating 

Strategy to Engagement

By Dr. Daniel A. Gilewitch

Associate Professor

US Army Command and General Staff College

Revised 9 MAR 2015

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

On a hot, dusty morning, Major Nick Thomas 

was thankful to enter the air conditioned comfort 

of the headquarters building. He was excited 

about his new assignment as a desk officer at the 

Theater Army, responsible for five countries in 

the AOR. As he sat down with a hot cup of coffee, 

the Deputy G-5 walked in and said “Nick, you 

need to quickly get up to speed in this new job.

I want you to start by doing a top-down review 

of the country plans for all your countries. By 

that, I mean that I want you to review the most 

recent national strategic and operational level 

guidance as a first step. Once you understand 

that context, back brief me on what you learned 

and we will then take a close look at the individual 

country plans themselves.” As the Deputy G-5 

left his office, Major Thomas scratched his head 

and sighed, “I wish I had taken that security 

cooperation elective at CGSOC last year....”

For those unfamiliar with the world of 

security cooperation, there exists a dizzying array 

of national security and joint strategy documents 

that guide security cooperation planning and 

execution. To someone who does not deal with 

them on a regular basis, their purpose and the 

relationship between them can be difficult to 

understand. The linkages between documents are 

not well publicized as their purpose occasionally 

shifts over time; the rampant use of abbreviations 

is confusing. Regardless, security cooperation 

practitioners must understand the flow of 

strategic guidance through the operational level 

in order to effectively execute their jobs, and to 

better understand to what ends their efforts serve 

the Nation. Theater Campaign Plans and Country 

Plans are at the heart of security cooperation 

planning and execution. It is crucial that they are 

informed by strategic and operational guidance.

This paper reviews selected US strategic 

and operational documents that guide security 

cooperation planning and activities. The goal 

is to explain the purpose of each document; to 

discuss what roles the document serves in the 

context of security cooperation; and to explain 

how they relate to and complement each other. 

This research provides a primer for understanding 

the promulgation of strategy from the National 

Security Strategy to the country plan as it exists 

in early 2015. It should help both the security 

cooperation workforce and other actors involved 

in the field enhance their general understanding 

of which documents should be considered in 

security cooperation planning and execution.

Note that this research specifically avoids the 

budget process and budget related documents.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 12

publishing cycle. Strategy reports themselves 

are simply snapshots in time that characterize 

current policy in a manner that can be widely 

disseminated. Because national level strategies 

are based on American values, attitudes, and 

beliefs, the ends (national objectives) reflected 

in these strategies rarely change quickly. Ways 

(policies) and means (resources) change often.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) 

Figure 1)

The National Security Strategy is derived 

from the National Security Act of 1947, as 

amended (most significantly by the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986). These legislative requirements 

state that the NSS is to be published each year in 

A Caveat: Reports Are Not Strategies

It is important to understand that strategic 

documents referred to in this paper are written 

reports of the strategies and not the strategies 

themselves. For example, the national defense 

strategy is not embodied completely in the 

National Defense Strategy document – the 

strategy is an evolving concept that can and often 

does change because of changes or anticipation 

of changes in the global environment. A 

foreign revolution or the outbreak of war can 

change US defense strategy overnight (e.g. 

Cuba, 1959; Iran, 1979; or Libya, 2011). Both 

major and minor changes to US national level 

strategy are communicated in reports, press 

releases, speeches, interviews or other strategic 

communications that cannot wait for the next 

Figure 1 - Key national strategic direction and guidance documents. The President issues the 

National Security Strategy to define national strategic security outcomes and provide strategic 

direction.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 13

DOD Strategic Documents

DOD is responsible for national defense.

As such, it must take strategic direction from 

the current administration and translate it into 

priority defense missions and strategic goals for 

the DOD. The primary documents the DOD uses 

to convey this information are the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR), the National Defense 

Strategy (NDS), and the National Military 

Strategy (NMS).

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 

The QDR and the NDS are interlinked. Title 

X of the US Code requires the Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) to deliver a QDR to Congress 

“every four years, during a year following a year 

evenly divisible by four” (10 USC 118). To 

date, there have been five QDRs with the last 

published in March 2014. The QDR is a topdown, recurring, comprehensive examination of 

DOD strategy, including force structure, force 

modernization, infrastructure, and budget plans 

for the next 20 years (10 USC 118a). The SecDef 

produces the QDR after close consultation with 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). 

Their intent is to cyclically re-balance DOD 

strategies, capabilities, and forces to address 

current conflicts and future threats (QDR, 2012; 

QDR, 2014).

The NDS informs and complements the QDR 

and is the DOD’s capstone strategy document.

It is unclassified and signed by the SecDef. It 

is linked to the NSS and informs the National 

Military Strategy. It provides a framework 

for other DOD strategic guidance, specifically 

for campaign and contingency planning, and 

intelligence and force development. The NDS 

addresses how the U.S. armed forces will fight 

and win the nation’s wars and how they will 

work with partner nations to shape opportunities 

in order to prevent conflict. Normally, and by 

law, the NDS is included in the QDR.

both classified and unclassified forms, and that 

the president is to submit it to Congress with the 

budget for the next fiscal year (50 USC 404a and 

c). In years when the administration changes, 

two NSS reports are due, with the incoming 

President responsible to produce the document 

within 150 days after taking office (50 USC 

404a). Ironically, despite the law, US presidents 

have only periodically fulfilled this obligation.

President Reagan published two NSS reports in 

his eight years in office; President George H. W. 

Bush, three; President Clinton, seven; President 

George W. Bush, two; and so far, President 

Obama has published two reports, with that last 

dated February 2015.

The NSS document defines national strategic 

security outcomes and provides strategic direction 

for all agencies involved in national security. It 

is purposefully general in content; discussing 

US global interests, goals, and objectives 

vital to national security as well as addressing 

foreign policy, worldwide commitments and 

the adequacy of US capabilities to carry out the 

strategy. The NSS is based on enduring American 

values as expressed by the current administration 

and as such, ends articulated in the NSS 

generally do not change dramatically from one 

administration to another. However, significant 

changes can occur in ways to achieve national 

strategic ends. In the 2002 NSS for example, 

President Bush stated that “the United States 

will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising 

our inherent right of self-defense” (NSS, 2006), 

which some people viewed as unilateralism 

(Krauthammer, 2008). In contrast, President 

Obama has embraced a strategy of “pursuing 

comprehensive engagement” (NSS, 2010) with 

other nations, or multilateralism. In the context 

of security cooperation, the NSS defines the 

specific national level strategic outcomes that 

must be achieved and general ways to achieve 

them. Simply put, the NSS provides national 

level end states and policies to which security 

cooperation activities must contribute.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 14

by Secretary Carter in 2016, the last year of the 

Obama administration.

The National Military Strategy Report 

(NMS)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS) issues this unclassified document every 

two years (even numbered years), providing his 

strategic guidance and vision to all US Armed 

Forces. The NMS articulates military objectives 

related to the current strategic environment 

and aligns ways, means and risk with strategic 

ends articulated in the NSS. It explains how 

the military will accomplish defense objectives 

established in the QDR and looks two to eight 

years into the future. It is legislatively mandated 

by Title 10 USC 153 as amended by the National 

Defense Authorization Act, but the last report 

was actually published in 2010.

In the realm of security cooperation, the 

CJCS uses the NMS to communicate his 

understanding of the capabilities, adequacy and 

interoperability of regional allies and friendly 

nations to support US Armed forces in combat 

or other operations for extended period of time. 

It also conveys his advice with regard to the 

security environment and the necessary military 

actions to protect vital US interests. The NMS 

therefore, serves as a guide directly from the 

CJCS for Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to 

plan security cooperation activities.

The Chairman’s Strategic Direction for 

the Joint Force

Similar to the 2012 Strategic Guidance 

Document that adjusted QDR and NDS guidance, 

this document serves as the CJCS‘s adjustment to 

the NMS outside the required publication cycle.

Released in early February 2012 shortly after 

the Strategic Guidance Document, the document 

incorporates changes directed by higher level 

strategy and explains the Chairman’s policies 

Initially in the 1997 and 2001 QDR reports, 

the NDS was included as a section. However in 

2005, Secretary Rumsfeld published a separate 

NDS document and the 2006 QDR omitted a 

defense strategy section (but included a section 

titles “Operationalizing the Strategy”). Secretary 

Gates also released a separate NDS document 

in 2008. Note that the release dates of these 

documents are off-cycle with the QDR. Both 

the QDR report and the NDS document were 

published every four years, but they were offset 

by two years; a QDR was published in 2006, the 

NDS Report in 2008, the next QDR was released 

in 2010 (actual release date was February 2011). 

This publication offset was purposeful. Great 

changes can take place in the world in the space 

of four years, and it is logical to have a midcourse correction or update published in the 

interim. The separate NDS report served as an 

off cycle adjustment for the QDR.

The January 2012 Strategic 

Guidance Document

Unlike the QDR, a separate NDS document 

is not legislatively mandated. In the 2010 QDR, 

Secretary Gates once again added a section 

addressing the NDS. The Obama administration 

adjusted that strategy significantly when it 

published another off-cycle adjustment two years 

later in 2012. Although this document was titled 

“Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 

21st Century Defense”, it seems to have served 

the same purpose as a separately published 

NDS. The President signed the forward to this 

document, and the SecDef signed and released 

it. It is an off cycle adjustment to the QDR and 

communicates a shift in strategic policy with a 

“rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific Region” and a 

rededication to the Middle East. Two years later, 

Secretary Hagel once again communicated an 

adjustment to the National Defense Strategy by 

including a defense strategy section in the 2014 

QDR. It will be interesting to see if another offcycle adjustment to the NDS will be published 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 15

UCP is assessed and modified based on the NSS, 

NDS, and NMS, as well as the current operating 

environment and command guidance from the 

President and senior DOD civilian and military 

leadership. The last UCP was issued on 8 April, 

2011 (UCP, 2011) (Figure 2).

Intermediate DOD Strategic Level 

Documents (Figure 3)

The Geographic Combatant Commander’s 

(GCC) primary steady state planning document 

is the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), which I 

discuss in detail later in this paper. However, the 

SecDef and CJCS provide additional definitive 

guidance beyond national level strategy 

documents through intermediary documents to 

direct and guide CCDRs as they develop the TCP 

and other plans.

and priorities for the joint force. This document 

is not required by law and appears to be one of 

the current chairman’s methods to communicate 

guidance off cycle. CJSC Dempsey released 

another direction document in January 2014.

Unified Command Plan (UCP)

The UCP is a classified document signed by 

the President and prepared by the CJCS. The 

UCP is required by Title X of the US Code to 

be reviewed and updated every two years, at 

a minimum. The document provides basic 

guidance to the unified combatant commanders, 

stating their missions, responsibilities, and force 

structure, and delineates the general geographical 

area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic 

combatant commanders. The UCP also specifies 

functional responsibilities for functional 

combatant commanders (JP 1-02, 2014). The 

Figure 2. Areas of Responsibility in the 2011 Unified Command Plan. The current UCP (issued 8 April, 2011) 

included a shift in arctic AOR boundaries, disestablishment of USJFCOM, expansion of USSTRATCOM’s responsibility 

to include Global Missile Defense, and giving USTRANSCOM responsibility for synchronizing global distribution 

operations (UCP, 2011; Feickert, 2013).

Singapore

Hong Kong

(China S.A.R.)

Macau

Okinawa (Japan)

Soloman Islands

Guam (U.S.)

East Timor

Hawaii (USA)

Fiji

New Caledonia

(France)

Djibouti

Sri Lanka

Luxembourg

Cyprus

Malta

Monaco

Montenegro

United States

Alaska (USA)

Canada

Mexico

Greenland

(Denmark)

Cuba

The

Bahamas

Belize

Guatemala Honduras

Nicaragua El Salvador

Costa

Rica Pamama

Jamaica Dominican

Republic

Haiti Puerto

Rico

Colombia

Venezuela

Ecuador

Peru Brazil

Bolivia

Guyana

Suriname French

Guiana

Argentina

Chile Paraguay

Uraguay

Ireland

France

United

Kingdom

Germany Belgium

Netherlands

Denmark

Norway

Sweden

Poland

Czech

Republic

Austria Switzerland Hungary

Slovakia

Romania

Finland

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Russia

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova

Bulgaria

Slovenia

Croatia

Bosnia- Herzegovinia Serbia

Albania

Macedonia

Greece

Italy

Spain

Portugal

Russia

Iceland

Armenia

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Turkey

Syria

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan

Turkmenistan

Iraq Iran Afganistan

Pakistan

Tajikistan

Kyrgyzstan

China

Mongolia

India

Nepal Bhutan

Bangladesh

Myanmar (Burma) Laos

Thailand

Cambodia

Vietnam

Malaysia

Malaysia

Brunei

Indonesia Borneo

Taiwan

Philippines

Indonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia

Papua

New Guinea

Australia

New

Zealand

N. Korea

S. Korea

Japan

Saudi Arabia

Yemen

Oman

U.A.E.

Bahrain

Quatar

Kuwait

Jordan

Lebanon

Israel

Egypt

Libya

Tunisia

Algeria

Morocco

Mauritania

Western

Sahara

Mali

Senagal

GuineaBissau

The Gambia

Guinea

Sierra

Leone

Liberia

Cote

D’Ivore Ghana

Burkina

Faso

Togo

Benin

Nigeria

Niger

Chad

Cameroon Central African Republic

Sudan

Eq.

Guinea

Gabon Congo

Angola

Democratic Republic

of Congo

Uganda

Rwanda

Burundi

Tanzania

Kenya

Ethiopia

Eritrea

Somalia

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Namibia Botswana

Zimbabwe

Mozambique Malawi

South Africa Lesotho

Swaziland

Madagascar

South Sudan
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 16

example, was limited to 100 published copies 

that were tightly controlled, and subsequent 

GEFs are available only on classified networks.

The GEF directs planning for near-term (two 

year) operational activities and is developed 

concurrently with the JSCP and with input from 

the State Department. Its intent is to provide 

strategic context to link strategy to operations.

The GEF presents global posture and force 

management priorities, security cooperation 

guidance, presidential guidance for contingency 

planning, and incorporates the SecDef’s strategic 

priorities and policy aims (JP 5-0, 2011). It is a 

vehicle for the SecDef to translate higher level 

national security objectives and strategy into 

DOD priorities and planning direction for the 

CCDRs and joint planning staffs.

The centerpiece of the GEF is a requirement 

for CCDRs to develop campaign plans that 

integrate and synchronize ‘steady-state’ or Phase 

0 activities to achieve objectives specified in 

the GEF. The GEF provides theater strategic 

The GEF and JSCP are companion 

documents, developed concurrently on a two 

year cycle, to provide strategic guidance to 

theater level joint planners. The GEF builds 

upon strategic direction in the NSS, QDR and 

NMS by articulating the strategic objectives that 

Combatant

Commanders (CCDRs) are expected to 

attain (focusing 5-10 years in the future).1 The 

GEF provides CCDRs with policy guidance for 

planning. Meanwhile, the CJCS issues the JSCP 

document that actually tasks the CCDRs and 

Service Chiefs to prepare operation, contingency, 

and theater campaign plans (3D Planning Group, 

2012; OSD, 2012). In other words, the JSCP 

provides plan guidance. One of the major roles 

of a CCDR is to translate strategic guidance 

into operational level plans and activities. The 

GEF and JSCP are essential documents that 

accomplish that task.

Like the JSCP, the GEF is classified and 

has limited distribution. The 2010 GEF, for 

Figure 3. Key DOD strategic direction and guidance documents. The JSCP, GEF and GFMIG provide 

specific strategic guidance for theater level planning and activities
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 17

and contingency planning guidance for CCDRs.

The JSCP expands GEF guidance to include 

global defense posture, security cooperation, and 

other steady-state activities. Covering the same 

two year planning period as the GEF, the JSCP 

delivers an apportionment construct for use in 

the Global Force Management

Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) that I 

will discuss next. In this regard, it articulates the 

GCC’s force requirements to accomplish tasks 

assigned to them.

Global Force Management

Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)

The GFMIG is a classified document, signed 

by the SecDef, and is produced and updated 

biennially. Assignment and apportionment 

tables within the GFMIG are updated annually.

This document integrates force assignment, 

apportionment, and allocation globally using the 

objectives for GCCs, and strategic objectives 

for functional combatant commanders. It also 

provides strategic assumptions, prioritized 

contingency planning scenarios, and global 

posture and global force management guidance 

(US Army War College, 2010). The GEF 

emphasizes steady-state or Phase 0 activities, 

which are largely security cooperation actions.

Perhaps the most critical guidance in the GEF 

regarding security cooperation activities is its 

list of global core partners, critical partners, key 

supporting partners, and actors of concern for 

each objective (Figure 4).

The JSCP, signed by the CJCS, translates 

strategic policy from the GEF into guidance for 

CCDRs and service chiefs so they may prepare 

operation, contingency, and theater campaign 

plans (3D Planning Group, 2011). The CJCS 

uses the JSCP to translate strategic policy 

objectives from the GEF into specific campaign 

Figure 4. GEF objectives and partners. The GEF provides prioritized theater objectives for each AOR and 

lists which actors influence or must be influenced to achieve them. This provides planners with sufficient 

guidance to allocate limited security cooperation resources in the TCP.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 18

stakeholders (OSD, 2012). By definition, a 

campaign plan is the translation of national 

strategy into operational concepts (JP 1-02, 2014).

Unlike a traditional campaign plan however, of 

the TCP’s main purpose is to provide guidance to 

coordinate security cooperation and other Phase 

0, or steady state activities across an AOR (OSD, 

2012). It helps achieve a GCC’s theater strategy 

by coherently and comprehensively integrating 

directed steady-state activities and contingency 

operations and activities (JP 5-0, 2011). The TCP 

takes direction and guidance from all the national 

strategic level documents as well as the JSCP, 

GEF, and GFMIG and incorporates the GCC’s 

planning priorities. The TCP identifies theater 

objectives and lines of effort to accomplish the 

regional and functional end states specifically 

delineated in the GEF. It is designed to achieve 

strategic effect (OSD, 2012).

Typically, the TCP will contain higher 

level directives and guidance (ends), ways the 

CCMD intends to achieve its objectives at the 

apportionment construct from the JSCP (Figure 

5). That is to say, the JSCP assigns tasks to the 

GCCs based largely on strategic policy guidance 

in the GEF; the GCCs make their plans, then 

request forces to accomplish the tasks. The 

GFMIG communicates which forces (both 

active and reserve) will be available to GCCs to 

meet the missions and responsibilities required 

in the JSCP.4 Those forces will be assigned, 

apportioned, or allocated. Therefore, in the 

context of security cooperation, the GFMIG 

provides guidance allowing a GCC to obtain 

forces to support his security cooperation plans 

as well as any other activities.

The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) 

(Figure 6)

The TCP communicates a GCC’s theater 

strategy (a broad statement of a commander’s 

long-term vision for the AOR (JP 5-0, 2011)), 

and it must therefore be understood by a broad 

audience that includes the DOD leadership, 

subordinate military organizations, and external 

Figure 5. Providing forces. It is important to understand the lexicon of assignment, allocation, 

attachment, and apportionment and who is responsible for each in order to understand how 

forces are supplied for security cooperation or other Phase 0 tasks (JP 5-0, Chapter I, para 14).
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 19

largely security cooperation activities, often a 

security cooperation annex is redundant and left 

out. Regional Annexes may also be included to 

better organize issues dealing with culturally or 

geographically similar regions within the AOR, 

but every TCP includes Country Plans, also 

known as Country Cooperation Plans (Kloecker, 

2014), Country Security Cooperation Plans 

(CJCSM 3130.01A, 2014), or simply ‘country 

plans’.

The Country Plan (CP)

As assigned by the UCP, each GCC has 

responsibility for an AOR that encompasses 

numerous countries: the USPACOM AOR 

includes 36 countries; USEUCOM 51; 

USAFRICOM 54; USSOUTHCOM 31; 

USCENTCOM 20, and USNORTHCOM 4 (refer 

to Figure 2). It is logical to assume that a CP is 

published for each country that the US engages 

with in security cooperation activities. The CP is 

published as part of the TCP, usually as an annex.

theater level, what resources are required to do 

so (means), why those resources are critical, and 

what risks would be incurred if resources are 

not available (OSD, 2012). However, CCMDs 

generally do not control the majority of ‘means’, 

or resources, applied in AORs other than forces 

assigned to the CCMD (such as the Service 

Component Commands). Supporting agencies 

provide the much of the security cooperation 

and other resources that are used in executing 

TCPs. The GCC’s TCP therefore, provides a 

framework to guide these activities and justify 

resource allocation (OSD, 2012).

TCPs deal with steady state activities 

(primarily security cooperation, but also other 

theater shaping actions) and must address 

posture planning. All TCPs have annexes 

addressing theater posture planning, and 

numerous contingency plans (which are branch 

plans to the TCP). Some GCCs add a separate 

security cooperation annex, but since the TCP 

itself deals with Phase 0 activities that are 

Figure 6. The Theater Campaign Plan and supporting plans. The TCP is the GCC’s steady 

state plan and contains regional annexes, including Country Plans. Each Service Component 

establishes their own plans to support the TCP, and those plans reflect institutional initiatives 

that must be considered by joint planners.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 20

Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), Army 

Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM), and 

the Army Campaign Plan (Chipchase, 2012).

The TAP and its subsections provide the 

strategic framework for The Army Campaign 

Support Plan. This plan provides a host of 

institutional initiatives that support and greatly 

affect ASCC Campaign Support Plans as well 

as CPs and TCPs. An example of an Army 

institutional initiative that supports TCPs is the 

establishment of Regionally Aligned Forces 

(RAFs) that are intended to ease the Request For 

Forces (RFF) cycle and more rapidly provide 

trained and culturally aware soldiers to an AOR 

to execute security cooperation missions.

Army institutional initiatives as well as those 

by the other Service Components have influence 

on planning and execution of the GCC’s TCP and 

nested CPs. But other agencies exist within the 

US Government that rightfully have tremendous 

influence on security cooperation planning and 

execution, and their guidance must also be 

considered.

Department of State (DoS) Guidance

DOD does not develop a TCP or CP in 

isolation. Indeed, in the best Clausewitzian 

tradition, it can be argued that the CP is simply an 

extension of diplomacy, which is clearly under 

the authority of the DoS. As such, CP planners 

must consider DoS/USAID requirements and 

input. This is not always easy because, in part, 

there is a clear cultural difference between DOD 

and DoS/USAID. Cultural differences between 

these organizations stem from a variety of things 

including resource and personnel disparities.

DOD for example, has a much larger budget, 

and a much larger workforce than DoS. DOD 

planning timelines are relatively short term in 

focus, while the DoS/USAID planning horizon is 

usually years out. Finally, the DOD plans using 

a regional focus, while DoS/USAID planning is 

country focused. Of course, the mission sets for 

DOD and DoS differ greatly as well.

While it is ultimately the responsibility of the 

GCC, it is typically written by a joint staff officer 

working in the J5 shop. This officer must work 

closely with the Security Cooperation Office in 

each country, as well as the Ambassador, other 

members of the Embassy Country Team, and 

the Service component commands that provide 

resources to the GCC. The content of country 

plans varies across GCCs, but they all share 

the same purpose, which is to establish country 

objectives that support the TCP and associated 

subordinate regional plans (DA PAM 11-31, 

2013).

Service Component Campaign Plans

While a GCC has the responsibility to 

conduct security cooperation activities in his 

AOR, he often does not have the authority over 

forces and resources required to execute them.

Resourcing security cooperation and other plans 

falls to the Service Component Commands. In 

the case of the Army, doctrine clearly states that 

all security cooperation in an AOR will be “by, 

with or through the Theater Army” (FM 3-22, 

2012). Indeed, the GEF directs services to write 

their own campaign support plans that focus on 

service activities to achieve CCDR campaign 

objectives in security cooperation (DA Pam 11-

31, 2012). These are included as annexes to the 

GCC’s TCP.

Service Campaign Support Plans are guided 

by Service Plans and are designed to assist the 

Service Component Commands executing their 

responsibilities in support of the GCC. They 

aggregate and validate requirements globally 

(across all AORs) and allocate service resources 

as appropriate (FM 3-22, 2013). For example, The 

Army Plan (TAP) is a service plan. The Army’s 

senior leadership publishes the TAP annually to 

explain their intent for how the Army will fulfill 

its Title 10 obligations in support of defense 

and national strategies. It is divided into four 

synchronized and integrated sections titled Army 

Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), Army 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 21

2010). The central theme of the document, 

“leading through civilian power,” refers to 

directing and coordinating the resources of all 

America›s civilian agencies to prevent and resolve 

conflicts, to help countries lift themselves out of 

poverty into prosperous, stable, and democratic 

states, and to build global coalitions to address 

global problems.

Although the DoS QDDR serves some of 

the same purposes as the DOD QDR, it is not 

mandated by law. It does require DoS and 

USAID to transform their planning philosophy to 

be more objective-based. As a result of guidance 

in the QDDR, significant changes to planning 

documents are occurring at the DoS bureau and 

country level and these efforts are being followed 

up by our current SecState, John Kerry. In April, 

2014, Secretary Kerry announced and described 

the launch of the second QDDR effort that builds 

upon the first, but a specific publication date has 

not yet been announced (Kerry et al, 2014).

The Department of State/US Agency 

for International Development Joint 

Strategic Plan (JSP)

Comparable in scope to the DOD NDS, the JSP 

identifies the SecState’s direction and priorities 

for both DoS and USAID. It defines the primary 

aims of US foreign policy and development 

assistance as well as strategic priorities. Based 

on direction from the NSS, QDDR, and other 

national-level guidance and strategies as well 

as coordination with other interagency actors, 

the JSP incorporates the SecState’s vision and it 

articulates key priorities, strategies for achieving 

those priorities, and criteria for measuring 

results. The JSP also guides the DoS/USAID 

budget process (3D Planning Process, 2012).

Joint Regional Strategy (JRS), the 

Functional Bureau Strategy (FBS) 

(Figure 8)

Prompted by the QDDR, these two new 

documents represent a major change in how DoS 

This cultural difference is specifically 

reflected in planning philosophy. In general, 

DOD planning is objectives-based. The focus 

of the planning effort is on objectives followed 

by the identification and allocation of resources 

to achieve the objectives. DoS planning on the 

other hand, is resource-based. The focus of the 

planning effort starts with identifying resources 

and then allocating available resources to achieve 

objectives (3D Planning Group, 2012). This is a 

significant difference. Secretary Clinton had made 

a tremendous effort to transform DoS/USAID in 

many areas, including the way these agencies 

approach planning. The 2010 Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) 

introduced a planning philosophy change and it 

was further clarified in the 3D Planning Guide 

(2012). 3D refers to Diplomacy, Development 

and Defense. The 3D concept is intended to 

improve collaboration and synchronization in 

all of these realms in an effort to achieve unity 

of purpose and unity of effort among the DOD, 

DoS and USAID at each level (country, region, 

global/functional). The Secretary of State’s 

(SecState’s) goal is the better understanding of 

the products and processes each agency uses in 

planning so as to develop better collaboration

(3D Planning Group, 2012). Supporting this 

effort is the SecState’s initiative to replace 

Bureau and Country Level planning documents 

with more objective-based strategic plans. The 

foundation of all these initiatives is found in the 

DoS/USAID QDDR that will be discussed next.

The Department of State/US Agency for 

International Development Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR) (Figure 7)

Secretary Clinton established the QDDR in 

2010 to answer the question “How can we do 

better?” This foundational document articulates 

a blueprint for elevating American civilian power 

to advance national interests and to be a better 

partner to the DOD and other agencies (QDDR, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 22

Now, strategic objectives and policy drive the 

strategy, and the resource request is in support.

AORs, Bureaus, and Regions....

I want to mention an interesting and 

important planning consideration regarding DoS, 

DOD and USAID at this point because of the 

additional complexity it adds to the interagency 

security cooperation planning process.

Somewhat analogous to the DOD GCC’s Area 

of Responsibility (AOR), DoS has divided the 

world geographically into Bureaus. However, 

the boundaries of the DoS Bureaus do not align 

with DOD AORs. Therefore, the JRS for each 

bureau does not align directly with the GCC’s 

TCP, thus adding another layer of coordination 

for planning that must be accomplished.

Similarly, USAID has also divided the world 

into geographic regions, and these regions do 

not line up perfectly with either the DOD AORs, 

or the DoS Bureaus, again adding another 

layer of complexity with which a planner must 

and USAID view strategy, and the changes they 

direct were phased in across all bureaus before 

January 2015. The JRS provides guidance to 

prioritize diplomatic engagement and resources 

and respond to unanticipated events within each 

regional Bureau. The FBS establishes direction 

and priorities for each functional bureau. Both 

documents are complimentary to each other and 

collectively, they replace the Bureau Strategic 

and Resource Plan (BSRP). Unlike the BSRP, 

which was an annual document that combined 

strategy with resourcing and did not include 

USAID, the JRS and FBS are true joint3

publications published once every three years 

with an intent to focus planning on strategic 

objectives rather than available resources.

Bureau Chiefs are expected to adjust the content 

of the document within the three year cycle as the 

operating environment changes. In a clear break 

from previous philosophy, a separate Bureau 

Resource Request (BRR) now accompanies the 

JRS. Formerly, the BSRP served primarily as 

a resource document with strategic justification.

Figure 7. Key DoS/USAID Strategic Documents. Like DoD, DoS/USAID uses the NSS to provide direction for 

their security related activities. Also like DoD, DoS/USAID has established a top-down cyclical review of their 

strategy, missions and goals. These agencies have also established a Strategic Plan similar in purpose to the NDS 

to guide foreign policy and development.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 23

justice, and development strategy, if warranted.

It is integrated because it requires a whole-ofgovernment planning effort with involvement 

by mission personnel from DoS, USAID, DOD 

and other government agencies that operate 

within the mission (Clinton, 2011). The ICS 

is supported by the Mission Resource Request 

(MRR), which, similar to the BRR, is a funding 

document designed to access funds in support of 

the strategy.

The ICS is the COM’s strategic plan and 

it therefore has a great effect on security 

cooperation planning. Virtually no work by the 

US Government occurs in a country without the 

Ambassador’s consent. Therefore, military-tomilitary engagements, training, Foreign Military 

Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 

for example, should not be included in the CP 

without support of the COM.

contend. Finally, it should also be understood 

that DoS has established functional bureaus 

(e.g. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement, Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization, Bureau of Political-Military 

Affairs, etc.) somewhat akin to the DOD 

Functional Commands (e.g. TRANSCOM, 

USSOCOM, etc.). These Functional Bureaus 

have, like the DOD Functional Commands, their 

own strategic plans.

Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)

The ICS is another new document prompted 

by the QDDR, this time at the Diplomatic 

Mission level. It replaces the Mission Strategic 

Resource Plan (MSRP) that was authored by the 

Chief of Mission (COM) every year in each of 

the countries having diplomatic relations with 

the USA. Like the JRS and FBS, the new ICS is 

a three year document, but it is country specific 

and contains mission goals and diplomatic 

strategy for each mission, as well as the security, 

Figure 8. DoS/USAID Operational level documents. The QDDR mandated a significant 

change in planning philosophy for DoS/AID. As a result, the BSRP and MSRP were replaced 

with three year strategic plans (published annually) at both the Bureau and Mission levels 

(Clinton, 2011).
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 24

must take into account many other influences 

in order to be effective. Not only should plans 

reflect guidance from DOD, DoS, and other 

US agencies, but they also must consider the 

desires of partner nations, a point that cannot 

be overemphasized (particularly for the CP).

Partner nations are sovereign and have their own 

strategies, capabilities and perceived threats that 

may or may not coincide with US perspectives.

The influence the US may have on another 

country is inherently limited, and planners must 

understand the culture, motivation and strategy 

that a partner nation will follow. There exists 

only one area in which security cooperation 

activities can take place and be effective. That is 

where the partner nation, DoS/USAID and DOD 

interests overlap. TCP and CP planners must 

understand this overlap and use it effectively in 

order to produce coherent and successful plans.

Conclusion (Figure 10)

The TCP and CPs are where all the direction 

and guidance discussed in this paper must come 

together in viable plans. In order to develop 

a realistic and useful concept, planners must 

USAID Country Development 

Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 

A CDCS is a five-year strategy document 

(although it may be shorter for countries in 

transition) that focuses on USAID-implemented 

assistance and related USG non-assistance 

tools (CDCS, 2012). The USAID Mission 

Chief develops the plan for each country where 

the USAID operates, and this plan must be 

considered as integral to security cooperation 

planning and execution. A great deal of synergy 

could be gained by a CP that complements 

USAID efforts. The CDCS is often found as an 

annex to the COM’s ICS.

The Country Plan, Revisited (Figure 9)

From the discussion presented so far, it is 

clear that a myriad of guidance documents from 

the national level to the country level exists and 

influences both the TCP and CP. Planners must 

be aware of this guidance and incorporate it in the 

development of individual plans. In particular, 

planners must understand that, despite these 

plans being GCC planning documents, planners 

Figure 9. The Country Plan. The CP should be influenced by strategic and operational guidance from DoD, DoS, 

and other Interagency actors. In particular, CP planners must understand the desires of partner nations in order to be 

effective. The only area in which successful security cooperation activities can take place is where interests coincide.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 25

from the national level to security cooperation 

engagement that takes place at the tactical level.

No TCP or CP can be effective if it works at 

cross purpose with higher level guidance, input 

from DoS/USAID and other Interagencies, or the 

partner nation.

__________________________________________

About the Author

Dr. Daniel A. Gilewitch is an Associate 

Professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency 

and Multinational Operations at the US Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. He is the course author 

for the Security Cooperation Electives taught at 

the college. Dr. Gilewitch retired from the Army 

after twenty-nine years as an Armor Officer, 

having served as the Combat Arms Programs 

understand and consider guidance from the 

national and operational levels, the interagency, 

DoS/USAID, and the wants and needs of actors 

outside of the USG including the partner nation.

In other words, both the TCP and CP have to be 

well integrated and flexible planning documents.

The purpose of this paper is to review selected 

US strategic and operational level documents 

that guide security cooperation planning and 

activities and explain how they relate to and 

complement each other in order to ultimately 

provide effective security cooperation. The 

intent is to assist planners in understanding what 

key guidance documents they should review 

as they plan. As important as these documents 

are, successful planners must understand that 

the strategies these documents communicate are 

constantly changing and being refined. Planners 

must know where to look and what to review in 

order to gain insight into the translation of strategy 

Figure 10. Translating Strategy to Engagement. A TCP and CP planner must be cognizant of, 

and must incorporate guidance from multiple sources. This illustration shows a select few of the 

critical strategy documents from DoD and DoS/USAID that were discussed in this paper and 

that must be considered in order to develop a successful security cooperation engagement plan 

at the country level.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 26

Security Cooperation Planner’s Course, 7-11 

MAY 2012, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Clinton, Hillary, 2011, DoS/USAID Cable, 

Subject: Introducing New Strategic Planning 

and Budgeting Process, DoS ALDAC, 17 

DEC 2011.

DoD, 2012, Department of Defense, The 

Quadrennial Defense Review, http://www.

defense.gov/qdr/. Retrieved 24 May, 2012.

FM 2-22, 2012, Army Support to Security 

Cooperation.

JP 1-02, 2010, Department of Defense Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms, 8 NOV 

2010 as amended through 15 APR 2012.

Krauthammer, Charles, 2008 “Charlie Gibson’s 

Gaffe,”The Washington Post. http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2008/09/12/AR2008091202457.html. 

(September 13, 2008). Retrieved 19 JUNE 

2012.

NSS, 2006, The White House. The National 

Security Strategy of the United States of 

America. Washington, The White House, 

2006. p. 49.

NSS, 2010, The White House. The National 

Security Strategy of the United States of 

America. Washington, The White House, 

2010. p. 49.

OSD, 2012, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s 

Handbook, Washington, p. 39.

QDDR, 2010, Department of State, Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review: 

Leading Through Civilian Power, 

Washington, p. 219.

Officer at OMC Cairo, Egypt and as the MOI 

Security Cooperation Officer for MNSTC-I, 

Iraq. He holds a master’s degree in Cultural 

Geography from the University of Kansas and a 

Ph.D. in physical geography from Arizona State 

University.

______________________________________

Endnotes

1. Strategic end states in the GEF cannot often 

be achieved in the two-year publication cycle. 

Therefore, while the document itself focuses 

on two-year planning period, strategic end 

states articulated in the GEF have a longer 

time line.

2. Emergent requirements are time sensitive and 

are not captured in the GFMIG publication 

cycle. These requirements are handled by 

off-cycle adjudication of the Global Force 

Management Board and published in the 

Global Force Management Allocation Plan 

(included as a subsection of the GFMIG), 

which is updated annually or as needed.

3. Unlike the DoD definition of joint, the word 

‘joint’ is used here as DoS and USAID uses 

it to mean both DoS and USAID.

______________________________________

Bibliography

162d BDE Website, 2012, BDE Mission, http://

www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/Transition_team/

Bde_mission.html. Retrieved 14 June, 2012.

3D Planning Group, 2011, US Department of State, 

US Agency for International Development, 

and US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3D Planning 

Guide;Diplomacy, Development, Defense, 

Pre-Decisional Working Draft, 15 September 

2011, p. 63.

Chipchase, Karen, 2012, Security Cooperation 

Resourcing, slide presentation at the Army 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 27

Sweeney, Patrick C., 2011, A Primer for : Guidance 

for Employment of the Force, (GEF), Joint 

Strategic Capbilities Plan (JSCP), the 

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) 

System, and Global Force Management 

(GFM), The United States Naval War College, 

Joint Military Operations Department, NWC 

2061B, p.20.

USAID, 2012, United States Agency for 

International Development, CDCS 

Guidance, Version 3, pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_

docs/PDACS300.pdf. Retrieved 13 June, 

2012.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 28
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 29

Force of the Future Looks to 

Maintain US Advantages

By Jim Garamone

DoD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18, 2015 — 

“Permeability” is a word that will be heard a lot 

in relation to Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s 

new Force of the Future program. Brad Carson, 

one of the architects of the program and the 

acting undersecretary of defense for personnel 

and readiness, spoke about the concept and the 

program during a recent interview.

DoD officials are looking for permeability 

between the private and public sector, between 

the active-duty force and the reserve components 

and between military and civilian life.

US Military is Superb

The baseline for the Force of the Future is 

today’s military: it is superb, Carson said. In 

the past 14 years, DOD has fought two wars, 

maintained alliances around the globe and 

responded to humanitarian disasters in Japan, 

Indonesia, Pakistan, Haiti, Liberia and the United 

States.

While, technology and systems play a part 

in American military dominance, it is the people 

of the department that are the real advantage. 

“There is no guarantee that will continue in the 

future,” Carson said. The Force of the Future 

is designed to ensure DOD maintains its most 

precious resource: its people, he said.

The program covers a number of different 

initiatives to ensure the military remains attractive 

to those who wish to serve. This runs from 

putting in place a blended military retirement 

system to attracting the best and brightest civilian 

employees. It also seeks to incorporate the best 

practices from the private sector.

Defense Digital Service

Carson called one of the initiatives, 

the Defense Digital Service, potentially 

transformative. The department will bring in 

technology entrepreneurs for a few months or 

years to share their product development or 

project management skills.

“I envision that Defense Digital Services will 

be mostly made up of tech people who come in 

from the outside for a very short time,” he said. 

“It’s quite possible that defense employees will 

work alongside them, but the core of the DDS 

will be tech workers, tech entrepreneurs -- 

skilled IT professionals working at America’s 

leading companies.” The key is small groups 

working discrete problems, he said, noting tech 

companies today use “agile development” as 

their mantra, employing small teams that get 

products designed and in use quickly.

Effecting Change

“The only way change ever happens is 

when small groups are committed to it,” the 

undersecretary said. “In Silicon Valley they say 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 30

Another initiative is the entrepreneur-inresidence program. This is a pilot program that 

will embed entrepreneurs inside DOD to examine 

some chronic problems within the department, 

Carson said. “I expect they will be working at 

the intersection of defense policy and business,” 

he said. “I really envision it that we bring people 

in who are very creative, who are extraordinarily 

energetic. And we say, ‘We’re setting you loose. 

Go find interesting projects you think you might 

add value to.’ We want people who are divergent 

thinkers, who can energize the building.”

The Force of the Future will expand the career 

intermission program. This program allows 

personnel to take sabbaticals from the military to 

raise a family, get a new degree or explore other 

career opportunities. “I don’t envision there will 

ever be a world where a large portion of the force 

will take a sabbatical, but I do think you will see 

some of the most important people who will rise 

over time to the senior leadership of the services 

will take sabbaticals,” he said.

Participants would transfer to the individual 

ready reserve and wouldn’t count against activeduty end strength. They would still be covered 

under TRICARE, and they would shift year 

group so promotion potential is not thwarted, he 

said. Carson added that he would like to see the 

services experiment with eliminating the “pay 

back” obligation under the program.

Shifting Between Active-Duty, 

Reserve Service

The Force of the Future also wants to make 

it easier for the services and service members 

to shift back and forth seamlessly between 

the active-duty force [AC] and the reserve 

components [RC] and vice versa. “Right now, 

it’s a very hard thing to do,” he said. “We’d like 

to make it a world where any service can say, 

‘Hey, there are people in the RC that we need to 

bring them back into the AC.’”

any group that can eat more than two pizzas at a 

time is too large to get anything done.”

The world-shattering products that Americans 

use in daily life began with a few men and women 

working on them. “Then the power of the idea, 

the beauty of the product sells itself,” he said. 

“And that’s what we envision here. There are 

great products that we can get DDS to work on. 

The power of the skills they bring in will help 

change the culture and have a direct impact on 

some of the knottiest problems that we have.”

Almost everything the department does now 

is embedded with information technology, from 

digitizing and sharing health records to forming 

databases for documenting sexual assault.

How these teams approach problems will rub 

off on DOD employees, Carson said. “There are 

alternative ways to think about problems, there 

are alternative ways to go about procurement. 

They will bring in the best practices that they see 

every day [and] that they take for granted at their 

companies,” he said.

An example is at Google and Facebook. On 

their first day, new employees are expected to 

write code and apply it to products. In DOD, that 

might not happen for a year. “They are doing 

things in smaller batches, iteratively, if it fails 

they recalibrate,” he said. “It’s just a different 

way to do business -- a better way to do business, 

I think.”

Coming Initiatives

The blended military retirement system kicks 

in Jan. 1, 2018. Those on duty before then will 

continue to be covered by the current retirement 

system.

“I think the force will find this to be a great 

benefit to them and it’s a change all for the better,” 

Carson said. “While those currently serving 

will not be affected by the current retirement 

changes, ... if you served less than 12 years, you 

will have the opportunity to change over into the 

blended retirement system, [but] no one will be 

compelled to do so.”
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 31

The department wants a two-way street 

between the private sector and the department. 

“It’s not a world where you have to come to DOD 

and spend the next 40 years -- if you want to do 

that you can,” Carson said. “But you can come in 

for a year or two and make a big impact, and then 

go back to the private sector. And then maybe 

come back again in five or 10 years. That’s the 

kind of permeability that benefits both the private 

sector and DOD.”
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 32
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 33

DoD Extends Technological, 

Operational Edge Into the Future

By Cheryl Pellerin

DoD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, December 14, 2015 — 

The Defense Department’s civilian and military 

leadership is pursuing a significant and enduring 

effort to extend its military, technological and 

operational edge well into the future, Deputy 

Defense Secretary Bob Work said today.

In a speech at the Center for a New American 

Security’s National Security Forum, Work 

noted that this push into the future is driven by 

a pressing need to modify the defense program 

to meet evolving threats in the national security 

environment.

The effort includes new approaches to 

evaluating and offsetting the conventional 

strengths of potential adversaries, a commitment 

to U.S. allies and friends, and a drive to innovate.

The Only Great Power

During the period between 1999 and 2014, 

Work said, the United States was the world’s only 

great power and the sole military superpower.

“This gave us enormous freedom of action, 

but the circumstance is changing” he said, “The 

unipolar world is starting to fade and we have 

a more multipolar world in which U.S. global 

leadership is likely to be increasingly challenged.”

For the United States, Work added, “the most 

stressing [challenge] is the reemergence of great 

power competition.”

For the purposes of building a defense 

program focused on the capabilities of 

potential adversaries, the deputy secretary said 

he uses international relations theorist John 

Mearsheimer’s definition of a great power -- a 

state having sufficient military assets to put up 

a serious fight in an all-out conventional war 

against the dominant power, and possessing a 

nuclear deterrent that could survive a first strike 

against it.

On Their Way

By that narrow definition, Work said, “[and] 

from a defense program perspective, if Russia 

and China are not yet great powers, they’re well 

on their way.

“We’ve been trying for 25 years to include 

Russia within the European community and we 

want to partner with it on a wide variety of global 

issues,” Work said, adding that the United States 

still seeks both outcomes.

But Russia, he explained, is modernizing its 

nuclear and conventional forces, sharpening its 

warfighting doctrine aimed at NATO, rattling its 

nuclear saber, seeking to undermine NATO and 

intimidate the Baltic States, and trying to rewrite 

the international rule book.

As a result, the department is adapting its 

operational posture, contingency plans and 

programs to deter further aggression, the deputy 

secretary said.

The Bottom Line

“China, a rising power with impressive latent 

military technological capabilities, probably 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 34

pursuing a combination of superior technological 

capabilities and innovative operational and 

organizational constructs that offset the strengths 

of its potential adversaries, Work noted.

In the 1950s, the first offset strategy sought 

to blunt Soviet numerical and geographical 

advantage along the inner German border by 

introducing, demonstrating and developing the 

operational and organizational constructs to use 

battlefield nuclear weapons, he said.

After the Soviets achieved strategic nuclear 

parity in the 1970s, the second offset strategy 

included precision-guided munitions with nearzero miss.

Today, the department is pursuing a third 

offset strategy that includes the following five 

kinds of technological advances:

1. Learning Systems

2. Human-machine collaboration

3. Human-machine combat teaming

4. Assisted human operations

5. Network-enabled, cyber-hardened

 weapons

Deterrent Posture

Work said the first priority in trying to build 

a strong deterrent posture is “to try to achieve 

a technological overmatch against potential 

adversaries.”

The department needs new technological 

capabilities to try to achieve the technological 

overmatch important to an offset strategy, 

the deputy secretary said, but “you need new 

organizational and operational constructs to make 

them real and to gain operational advantage.”

Such capabilities also must be demonstrated, 

Work added, so an adversary can see that any 

attempt to achieve operational success in the 

warfighting campaign is likely to fail, even if 

they were to achieve an initial advantage in time 

and space.

embodies a more enduring strategic challenge as 

its ambitions and objectives expand in Asia, [the] 

Western Pacific, littoral Africa, Latin America 

and elsewhere,” Work said.

China’s words have been about peaceful rise 

and about defense, he added, but its actions will 

be the true test of its commitment to peace and 

stability in the current international order.

The department continues to pursue militaryto-military cooperation and a wide range of 

confidence-building measures with China “to 

make sure we never come to blows, but ... we 

can’t overlook the competitive aspects of our 

relationship, especially in the realm of military 

capabilities. And that’s the bottom line,” Work 

said.

A Focus on Capabilities

DoD focuses on the capabilities of potential 

challengers, and Russia and China present the 

United States and its allies and partners with 

unique and increasingly stressing military 

capabilities and operational challenges, the 

deputy secretary said.

The department understands the importance 

of engaging with potential competitors but it 

does so cognizant of its central purpose “to 

reassure our allies and partners ... and to protect 

U.S. forces and our allies from direct attack,” he 

added, “and, should deterrence fail, make sure 

that we are able to roll back any aggression that 

occurs.”

The best way to prevent great-power 

competition from becoming great-power conflict, 

the deputy secretary said, is for the United States 

to maintain a safe, reliable and secure nuclear 

arsenal for so long as those weapons exist, 

coupled with strong conventional deterrent 

capabilities.

Offset Strategies

The United States has historically 

strengthened its conventional deterrence by 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 35

Sole Source Acquisitions for Foreign 

Military Sales Customers

By Mark H. Alexander, Air Force Material Command

and William D. Cavanaugh, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

An open and competitive market has long 

been a characteristic of the western economy 

established on the shores of North America by 

the first colonists and carried forward when 

the 13 colonies established themselves as the 

United States of America. This competitive 

system between producers of goods and services 

leads to better goods and services at the lowest 

possible costs for the consumers. The United 

States Government (USG) (and the various subcomponents) is a consumer of goods and services 

and like all consumers seeks the best goods 

and services at the best price possible. For the 

purposes of federal acquisitions, the requirement 

for full and open competition is encapsulated in 

a public law known popularly as the Competition 

in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA).1

 

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is 

one of the many acquisition programs conducted 

by the USG in furtherance of its national security 

goals. This program allows the USG to purchase 

defense supplies and services for eligible foreign 

governments or International Organizations. 

This article discusses the rules governing the 

competition requirements of CICA as it applies 

to FMS purchases, as well as the guidance 

and process for supporting a sole source FMS 

acquisition under the International Agreement 

exception to CICA. 

Background and Law

CICA requires federal agencies to obtain 

full and open competition when conducting 

acquisitions for supplies and services.2 CICA 

is based on the public policy that full and 

open competition drives down cost, improves 

performance, and decreases schedule.3 Any 

contract entered into without full and open 

competition is considered noncompetitive. 

However, noncompetitive contracts are in 

compliance with CICA when circumstances 

permitting other than full and open competition 

exists. CICA recognizes seven such 

circumstances, including: (1) only one responsible 

source for goods or services; (2) unusual and 

compelling urgency; (3) maintenance of the 

industrial base; (4) requirements of international 

agreements; (5) statutory authorization or 

acquisition of brand-name items for resale; (6) 

national security; and (7) contracts necessary in 

the public interest. In most cases, the use of noncompetitive procedures via a CICA exception 

requires a written Justification and Approval 

(J&A) which documents the basis for using the 

CICA exception to competition.4

 If the use of 

any of the CICA exceptions cannot be supported, 

then the procurement must comply with the full 

and open competition requirements of CICA. As 

stated above, one exception to the requirement 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 36

The President of the United States may 

enter into contracts for the procurement defense 

articles, services and training to eligible foreign 

governments or International Organizations.9

Implicit within the provisions of the AECA is 

an acquisition preference for US origin defense 

articles, services and training.10 It follows 

from that legal construct that the acquisition of 

defense articles, services and training will be 

in accordance with US laws, regulations and 

procedures.11 If the source of supply is a new 

procurement, the military department (MILDEP) 

assigned is authorized to enter into a subsequent 

contractual arrangement with US industry in 

order to provide the articles, services or training 

requested. 

CICA contains an express exemption from the 

requirement to obtain full and open competition 

if written direction from the FMS customer 

directs the acquisition from a specific source.12

Use of this exception to competition is generally 

referenced in CICA and implementing guidance 

as the International Agreement exception. The 

common reasons an eligible foreign government 

or International Organization cites to forgo full 

and open competition are established long term 

relations with US industry, compatibility with 

existing national defense articles, services and 

training, or a urgent and compelling need for 

defense articles, services and training.

Under the International Agreement exception 

to CICA, the terms of an international agreement 

or a treaty between the United States and a foreign 

government or International Organization, or 

the written directions of a foreign government 

reimbursing the agency for the cost of the 

procurement of the property or services for such 

government, have the effect of requiring the use 

of noncompetitive procedures. A J&A is not 

required in the case of a procurement permitted by 

the International Agreement exception to CICA 

if the head of the contracting activity prepares a 

document in connection with such procurement 

that describes the terms of an agreement, treaty, 

for a written J&A is when the procurement fits 

within the International Agreement exception 

to CICA. Before discussing how this exception 

works, let’s discuss the background of foreign 

military sales. 

The FMS program is a non-appropriated 

program through which eligible foreign 

governments or International Organizations 

purchase defense articles, services, and training 

from the USG, consistent with USG national 

security and foreign policy objectives and 

restraints. The primary statutory authorities 

supporting FMS programs are the Foreign 

Assistance Act (FAA), as amended, and the Arms 

Export Control Act (AECA), as amended.5

 The 

FMS program begins when an eligible foreign 

government or International Organization 

submits a Letter of Request (LOR) describing its 

“valid military requirements” for defense articles, 

services and training.6 If the foreign government 

or International Organization wishes to designate 

a source to supply the defense articles, services 

and training, that source designation is typically 

embedded within the contents of the LOR, but 

such designation can be submitted separately. 

The LOR is evaluated and if accepted, the USG, 

through the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency, creates a government-to-government 

agreement, or government-to-International 

Organization agreement.7 The agreement is 

documented in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance 

(LOA) between the USG and the foreign 

government or International Organization. 

The purchasing government or International 

Organization is responsible for paying all costs 

associated with a sale. Under FMS authority, 

military articles and services, including training, 

may be provided from DOD stocks or from new 

procurement.8 The LOA must be signed by a 

duly authorized individual of the eligible foreign 

government or International Organization before 

the assigned US military department can initiate 

the acquisition process.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 37

International Organization must clearly state its 

intent to have such defense articles, services or 

training acquired from a specific source. In the 

absence of such statement, a purchasing agency 

(the assigned MILDEP) cannot make this “specific 

source” determination itself in order to use the 

International Agreement exception to CICA. 

If the FMS customer does not direct a specific 

source, the purchasing agency must comply with 

the competitive procedures of CICA, or meet 

one of the other CICA exceptions, which must 

be supported by a J&A. In other words, without 

the FMS customer directing a specific source 

for the acquisition, the International Agreement 

exception to CICA is unavailable. Also, while the 

FMS customer can submit a separate request for 

a directed source (with reference to the relevant 

agreement, treaty, or other written direction), 

such direction cannot be based on some less 

formal, unwritten “understanding” between the 

USG and an FMS customer. 

Conclusion 

The clear language of the statutory 

and regulatory guidance governing federal 

procurements states that an international 

agreement, treaty, or other written direction 

of a foreign government or International 

Organization, which directs the procurement 

of a defense item or service from a particular 

source, has the effect of requiring the use of other 

than competitive procedures. In such a case, 

documentation other than a J&A can be used to 

justify the use of the International Agreement 

exception to CICA. However, if there is no 

international agreement, treaty, or other written 

direction of a foreign government directing a 

particular source for a defense supply or service, 

the purchasing organization must comply with 

the competitive procedures of CICA, or support 

the use of another exception to CICA, which 

must be documented by a written J&A. 

or written direction that has the effect of requiring 

the use of other than competitive procedures.13 

Discussion

Unfortunately, there are examples of FMS 

acquisitions which fail to follow these unequivocal 

legal and procedural requirements, possibly due 

to not understanding how a valid FMS sole source 

designation and the CICA exception guidance 

work together. As a starting point, it is important 

for anyone involved in a potential sole-source 

FMS acquisition to read the law, regulations, 

and guidance in this area together in order to 

fully understand the requirements and correctly 

implement an FMS sole source acquisition. In 

using the International Agreement exception 

to CICA, the Federal Acquisition Regulations 

(FAR) state that the product being obtained 

must be “from a particular firm as specified in 

official written direction.”14 The Department 

of Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) also 

states that an FMS customer may request that 

a defense article or service be obtained “from a 

particular contractor.”15 The Security Assistance 

Management Manual (SAMM) addresses this 

issue as well when it notes that acquisitions 

for FMS purchases must be in accordance 

with Department of Defense regulations and 

procedures, and that the purchasing government 

may submit a request that the defense item or 

service be purchased from “a specific source.”16

In such circumstances, the use of other than 

competitive procedures for the acquisition under 

the International Agreement exception to CICA 

must be documented, but it does not require a 

written J&A.17 

There are several important points to be noted 

when reviewing the above guidance regarding 

sole source FMS acquisitions. First, there must 

be an International Agreement, treaty, or other 

written direction of a foreign government. 

When a foreign government or International 

Organization submits a “valid requirement” 

for defense articles, the foreign government or 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 38

Contracting Act Needed. NSIAD-87-145, 

Published; Aug. 26, 1987; Publicly Released; 

Oct. 1, 1987

4. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304; FAR 6.303-1; 

DFARS 206.304

5. 22 U.S.C. Sections 2151, et. seq. and 22 

U.S.C. Sections 2751, et. seq., respectively. 

There are other statutory authorities 

governing the “sales of defense articles 

and services,” primarily under recent Title 

10 legislation, however those laws and 

authorities are beyond the scope of this 

article

6. Security Assistance Management Manual 

(SAMM), Chapter 5, paragraph C5.1.1

7. Evaluation Criteria, SAMM, Chapter 5, 

Table C5.T3

8. 22 U.C.S. Section 2761 and 22 U.S.C. 

Section 2762, respectively. For the purposes 

of this article the focus will be on sales of 

defense articles, services and training from 

new procurements

9. 22 U.S.C. Section 2762

10. See also, SAMM, Chapter 4, paragraph 

C4.3.4

11. Department of Defense FAR Supplement 

(DFARS), Subparts 201.104 and 

225.7301(b)

12. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304(c)(4)

13. 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(4); FAR 6.302-4; DFARS 

206.302-4

14. FAR 6302-4(b)(1)

15. FARS 225.73.09(a)

16. SAMM C6.3.1, C6.3.4, C6.3.4.5

17. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304(f)(2)(E); DFARS 

206.302-4(c)

About the Authors

Mark H. Alexander is an Attorney-Advisor at 

the Headquarters Air Force Material Command 

legal office. He provides advice and support to 

AFMC leadership and subordinate legal offices, 

and also serves on the AFMC Multi-functional 

team in support of the command’s enterprisewide strategic services contracts. He also writes 

and teaches extensively on government source 

selections. Mr. Alexander is a graduate of Air 

War College, holds a Juris Doctorate degree from 

Washburn University School of Law, was the 

recipient of the United States Air Force Reginald 

C. Harmon Award, and is also a Colonel in the 

Air Force Reserves.

William D. Cavanaugh is a Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency Deputy General Counsel 

based at Wright-Patterson AFB. He provides 

advice and support to DSCA leadership, 

the Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management and the DSCA Case Writing 

Division. Mr. Cavanaugh holds a Juris Doctorate 

degree from the University of Dayton School of 

Law, is a graduate of Air War College and the 

recipient of the United States Air Force James 

O. Wrightson Award and the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency Director’s Award.

The opinions and conclusions expressed in 

this article are solely those of the authors and 

do not reflect the opinion of any department or 

agency of the US Government, and should not 

be taken as legal advice or as an exhaustive 

treatment of the subject.

______________________________________

Endnotes

1. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304

2. 10 U.S.C. Section 2304(a); FAR 6.302; 

DFARS 206.302

3. GAO Report – Procurement: Better 

Compliance With the Competition in 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 39

Posture Statement of 

General John F. Kelly

United States Marine Corps

Commander

United States Southern Command

Before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee

12 March 2015

Introduction

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

and distinguished Members of the Committee: I 

appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss US Southern Command’s efforts 

in Central America, South America, and the 

Caribbean. As I finish my third and likely final 

year in command, I continue to be impressed by 

the courage and sacrifice displayed by so many 

countries in this part of the world. Our friends 

across the region are committed to winning 

back their streets, indeed their countries, from 

criminal gangs and drug traffickers, and doing 

so while protecting human rights. They are ready 

and willing to partner with the United States, 

and they are eager for expanded cooperation and 

increased learning and training opportunities with 

the US military. But they are frustrated by what 

they perceive as the low prioritization of Latin 

America on our national security and foreign 

policy agendas, which is especially puzzling 

given the shared challenge of transnational 

organized crime.

The drug trade—which is exacerbated by US 

drug consumption—has wrought devastating 

consequences in many of our partner nations, 

degrading their civilian police and justice systems, 

corrupting their institutions, and contributing to 

a breakdown in citizen safety. The tentacles of 

global networks involved in narcotics and arms 

trafficking, human smuggling, illicit finance, and 

other types of illegal activity reach across Latin 

America and the Caribbean and into the United 

States, yet we continue to underestimate the threat 

of transnational organized crime at significant 

and direct risk to our national security and that 

of our partner nations. Unless confronted by an 

immediate, visible, or uncomfortable crisis, our 

nation’s tendency is to take the security of the 

Western Hemisphere for granted. I believe this 

is a mistake.

Last year, almost half a million migrants1

from Central America and Mexico—including 

over 50,000 unaccompanied children (UAC) 

and families—were apprehended on our border, 

many fleeing violence, poverty, and the spreading 

influence of criminal networks and gangs.

Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson 

testified that the “UAC migration serves as a 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 40

taken painful steps to implement a mandated 

20% reduction in our headquarters budget and 

personnel, and we have thus far managed to 

avoid a reduction in force while still protecting 

our ability to conduct our most important 

missions. Nevertheless, as the lowest priority 

Geographic Combatant Command, ‘doing less 

with less’ has a disproportionate effect on our 

operations, exercises, and engagement activities. 

Mr. Chairman, Members, the truth is we are 

managing to keep the pilot light of US military 

engagement on in the region—but just barely. 

This presents more than just risks to our national 

interests; US Southern Command has accepted 

risk for so long in this region that we now face 

a near-total lack of awareness of threats and the 

readiness to respond, should those threats reach 

crisis levels.

Security Environment

Transnational Organized Crime. The 

spread of criminal organizations continues to 

tear at the social, economic, and security fabric of 

our Central American neighbors. Powerful and 

well-resourced, these groups traffic in drugs—

including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, counterfeit 

pharmaceuticals, and methamphetamine—small 

arms and explosives, precursor chemicals, illegally 

mined gold, counterfeit goods, people, and other 

contraband. They engage in money laundering, 

bribery, intimidation, and assassinations. They 

threaten the very underpinnings of democracy 

warning sign that the serious and longstanding 

challenges in Central America are worsening.”2 

In my opinion, the relative ease with which 

human smugglers moved tens of thousands of 

people to our nation’s doorstep also serves as 

another warning sign: these smuggling routes 

are a potential vulnerability to our homeland. 

As I stated last year, terrorist organizations could 

seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to 

move operatives with intent to cause grave harm 

to our citizens or even bring weapons of mass 

destruction into the United States. Mr. Chairman, 

Members, addressing the root causes of insecurity 

and instability is not just in the region’s interests, 

but ours as well, which is why I support President 

Obama’s commitment to increase assistance to 

Central America.

These and other challenges underscore the 

enduring importance of US Southern Command’s 

mission to protect our southern approaches. We 

do not and cannot do this mission alone. Our 

strong partnerships with the US interagency—

especially with the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), the US Coast Guard, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 

Departments of Treasury and State—are integral 

to our efforts to ensure the forward defense of 

the US homeland. We are also fortunate to have 

strong, capable partners like Colombia, Chile, 

Brazil, El Salvador, and Panama, regional leaders 

and outstanding contributors to hemispheric 

and international security. Given our limited 

intelligence assets, interagency relationships and 

bilateral cooperation are critical to identifying 

and monitoring threats to US national security 

and regional stability.

Finally, while I thank the Congress for 

mitigating some of our asset shortfalls in 2015, 

the specter of sequestration still hovers over 

everything we do. Its potential return in FY16 

would jeopardize our progress; undermine 

our credibility and the region’s trust in our 

commitments and present renewed hardships for 

our civilian and military workforce. I have already 

Spotlight: Heroin Trafficking

 According to the National Survey on Drug Use 

and Health, there was a 37% increase in 

heroin initiates in the United States between 

2008-2012.

 In 2012, 51% of all heroin analyzed by the DEA 

originated in South America, 45% in Mexico, 

and 4% from Southwest Asia.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 41

deeply concerned that smuggling networks are a 

vulnerability that terrorists could seek to exploit.

I am also troubled by the financial and 

operational overlap between criminal and terrorist 

networks in the region. Although the extent of 

criminal-terrorist cooperation is unclear, what is 

clear is that terrorists and militant organizations 

easily tap into the international illicit marketplace 

to underwrite their activities and obtain arms and 

funding to conduct operations.4 It’s easy to see 

why: illicit trafficking is estimated to be a $650 

billion industry—larger than the GDP of all but 

20 countries in the world—and less than 1 percent 

of global illicit financial flows is currently being 

seized or frozen.5 The terrorist group Lebanese 

Hezbollah—which has long viewed the region 

as a potential attack venue against Israeli or 

other Western targets—has supporters and 

sympathizers in Lebanese diaspora communities 

in Latin America, some of whom are involved in 

lucrative illicit activities like money laundering 

and trafficking in counterfeit goods and drugs. 

These clan-based criminal networks exploit 

corruption and lax law enforcement in places 

like the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Paraguay, 

and Argentina and the Colon Free Trade Zone 

in Panama and generate revenue, an unknown 

amount of which is transferred to Lebanese 

Hezbollah. Unfortunately, our limited intelligence 

capabilities make it difficult to fully assess the 

amount of terrorist financing generated in Latin 

America, or understand the scope of possible 

criminal-terrorist collaboration.

Iranian Influence and Islamic Extremist 

Organizations. Over the last 15 years Iran has 

periodically sought closer ties with regional 

governments, albeit with mixed results. 

itself: citizen safety, rule of law, and economic 

prosperity. And they pose a direct threat to the 

stability of our partners and an insidious risk to 

the security of our nation.

While there is growing recognition of the 

danger posed by transnational organized crime, 

it is often eclipsed by other concerns. Frankly, 

Mr. Chairman, I believe we are overlooking a 

significant security threat. Despite the heroic 

efforts of our law enforcement colleagues, 

criminal organizations are constantly adapting 

their methods for trafficking across our borders. 

While there is not yet any indication that the 

criminal networks involved in human and drug 

trafficking are interested in supporting the 

efforts of terrorist groups, these networks could 

unwittingly, or even wittingly, facilitate the 

movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of 

mass destruction toward our borders, potentially 

undetected and almost completely unrestricted. 

In addition to thousands of Central Americans 

fleeing poverty and violence, foreign nationals 

from countries like Somalia, Bangladesh, 

Lebanon, and Pakistan are using the region’s 

human smuggling networks to enter the United 

States.3 While many are merely seeking 

economic opportunity or fleeing war, a small 

subset could potentially be seeking to do us harm. 

Last year, ISIS adherents posted discussions on 

social media calling for the infiltration of the 

US southern border. Thankfully, we have not 

yet seen evidence of this occurring, but I am 

Spotlight: Economic Citizenship Programs

 Regional economic citizenship programs 

provide a quick path for foreign nationals to 

acquire citizenship.

 Of concern, these “cash for passport” programs 

could be exploited by criminals, terrorists, or 

other nefarious actors to obtain freedom of 

movement, facilitate entry into the U.S., or 

launder illicitly gained funds.

Spotlight: Narco-Terrorist Profits

Colombian defense officials estimate the narcoterrorist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) earn an excess of $3.5 billion in proceeds 

from illegal mining and extortion.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 42

pivoted to the Western Hemisphere. It views 

good relations with the region as useful for two 

reasons: to gain access to natural resources and 

to increase its global influence. China continues 

to increase its cooperation with regional 

organizations such as the Community of Latin 

American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and 

the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and 

leverages its position in BRICS8 to advance its 

interests regionally. Of note, Beijing recently 

hosted a two-day China-CELAC Forum to 

discuss opportunities for increasing bilateral 

partnerships. Although cultural differences 

often preclude close cooperation, Chinese 

engagement with regional militaries is gradually 

expanding, especially with Cuba and Venezuela. 

This outreach, while not a threat to US interests 

at this time, does underscore the importance of 

continued engagement by the US military to 

maintain our valued security partnerships.

Increased Russian Presence. In contrast, 

Russian activities in the region are more 

concerning. Periodically since 2008, Russia has 

pursued an increased presence in Latin America 

through propaganda, military arms and equipment 

sales, counterdrug agreements, and trade. Under 

President Putin, however, we have seen a clear 

return to Cold War-tactics. As part of its global 

strategy, Russia is using power projection in an 

attempt to erode US leadership and challenge 

US influence in the Western Hemisphere. Last 

year and again this year, a Russian intelligence 

ship docked in Havana multiple times while 

conducting operations in the Gulf of Mexico and 

along the east coast of the United States. Russia 

has courted Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to 

gain access to air bases and ports for resupply 

of Russian naval assets and strategic bombers 

operating in the Western Hemisphere. Russian 

media also announced Russia would begin 

sending long-range strategic bombers to patrol 

the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, in an effort 

to “monitor foreign powers’ military activities 

and maritime communications.”9 While these 

actions do not pose an immediate threat, Russia’s 

Iranian legislators visited Cuba, Ecuador, and 

Nicaragua to advocate for increased economic 

and diplomatic cooperation. Iran’s outreach 

is predicated on circumventing sanctions and 

countering US influence. Additionally, Iran 

has established more than 80 ‘cultural centers’ 

in a region with an extremely small Muslim 

population. The purported purpose of these 

centers is to improve Iran’s image, promote Shi’a 

Islam, and increase Iran’s political influence in 

the region. As the foremost state sponsor of 

terrorism, Iran’s involvement in the region and 

these cultural centers is a matter for concern, 

and its diplomatic, economic, and political 

engagement is closely monitored.

Sunni extremists, while small in number, 

are actively involved in the radicalization of 

converts and other Muslims in the region and 

also provide financial and logistical support to 

designated terrorist organizations within and 

outside Latin America. Partner nation officials 

throughout the region have expressed concern 

over the increasing number of suspected Islamic 

extremists from the hemisphere who are traveling 

to Syria to participate in jihad. Some take part in 

military and weapons training before departing; 

last year 19 Trinidadian Muslims were detained 

in Venezuela for conducting training with highpowered weapons. When these foreign fighters 

return, they will possess operational experience, 

ties to global extremists, and possible intent to 

harm Western interests—and they will reside 

in a region rife with smuggling routes that lead 

directly and easily into the United States.

Chinese Outreach. As in other regions 

around the world, China has growing influence 

in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 

2005, it has provided financing to the region in 

excess of $100 billion.6 Chinese investment is 

concentrated in commodities, manufacturing, 

telecommunications, and construction sectors, 

including a $40 billion investment in a 

Nicaraguan ‘alternative’ to the Panama Canal 

by a Chinese company.7 In my view, just as 

we have ‘pivoted’ to the Pacific, China has 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 43

and large segments of the population say the 

country is on the wrong track. Additionally, 

falling oil prices and deteriorating economic 

conditions could lead the Venezuelan government 

to cut social welfare programs and its foreign 

oil subsidy program, PetroCaribe. Further 

cuts to social welfare programs and continued 

shortages—which seem unavoidable—could 

likely lead to increased tensions and violent 

protests, encouraging President Maduro and his 

party to engage in additional repressive measures 

against protestors and the opposition. Cuts to 

PetroCaribe deliveries to its member nations 

could trigger regional economic downturns, 

which could elevate the risk of increased 

migration, especially in the Caribbean.

Command Priorities

The US military plays an important role in 

addressing these and other challenges to our 

hemisphere’s security and stability. Despite 

significant resource constraints, US Southern 

Command remains postured to contribute to a 

whole-of-government approach to advancing 

US interests in the region. This important work 

is carried out by our command’s most valuable 

assets: our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, 

Coast Guardsmen, and civilian employees. 

Last year was an active one for US Southern 

Command, and I am proud of our contributions to 

the security of Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Looking to the year ahead, we hope to build on 

our past achievements and deepen our security 

activities in the hemisphere are concerning and 

underscore the importance of remaining engaged 

with our partners.

Regional Challenges and Opportunities 

for US Influence. The United States also faces 

challenges from regional bodies like CELAC, 

which deliberately exclude the United States and 

seek to limit our role in the hemisphere. Other 

regional organizations such as the Central America 

Integration System (SICA), however, offer the 

United States opportunity for engagement. Just 

this past year, we hosted SICA leaders and asked 

the Colombian Minister of Defense to share his 

perspective on Colombia’s success and lessons 

learned over the past decades. Additionally, 

ALBA10 nations like Venezuela, Ecuador, and 

Bolivia restrict defense ties with the United States 

and have sought in some cases to eliminate the 

US military presence from their countries. As 

one example, in 2014 the Ecuadorian government 

directed that the US Embassy close its security 

cooperation office, further restricting defense 

cooperation between our countries. Despite 

such complex and evolving regional dynamics 

and within our current resource constraints, 

US Southern Command is ready and willing to 

partner with all regional militaries on issues like 

respect for human rights, disaster response, and 

illicit trafficking.

Implications of Venezuelan Instability. 

Mr. Chairman, Members, our efforts to enhance 

regional stability are directly connected to our 

ability to engage. Since 2003, the Venezuelan 

government has reduced its traditionally close 

military and defense ties with the United States, 

and in the course of the past ten years we have 

witnessed a dramatic decline in the country’s 

democratic institutions. Venezuela now faces 

significant economic, social, and political 

instability due to rampant violent crime and 

poverty, runaway inflation, serious shortages of 

food, medicine, and electricity. Human rights 

abuses by security forces and the government’s 

continued mismanagement of the country are 

contributing to an environment of uncertainty, 

Implications of Venezuelan 

Instability. Mr. Chairman, Members, our 

efforts to enhance regional stability are directly 

connected to our ability to engage. Since 2003, 

the Venezuelan government has reduced its 

traditionally close military and defense ties with the United States, and in the course of the past 

ten years we have witnessed a dramatic decline in the country’s democratic institutions. 

Venezuela now faces significant economic, social, and political instability due to rampant violent 

crime and poverty, runaway inflation, serious shortages of food, medicine, and electricity. 

Human rights abuses by security forces and the government’s continued mismanagement of the 

country are contributing to an environment of uncertainty, and large segments of the population 

say the country is on the wrong track. Additionally, falling oil prices and deteriorating economic 

conditions could lead the Venezuelan government to cut social welfare programs and its foreign 

oil subsidy program, PetroCaribe. Further cuts to social welfare programs and continued 

shortages—which seem unavoidable—could likely lead to increased tensions and violent 

protests, encouraging President Maduro and his party to engage in additional repressive 

measures against protestors and the opposition. Cuts to PetroCaribe deliveries to its member 

nations could trigger regional economic downturns, which could elevate the risk of increased 

migration, especially in the Caribbean.

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The DISAM Annual, December 2015 44

Finally, it is important to note that the strategic 

importance of US Naval Station Guantanamo 

Bay is independent of the presence of the Joint 

Task Force. Its airfield and port facilities are 

indispensable to the Departments of Defense, 

Homeland Security, and State’s operational and 

contingency plans. The Naval Station plays a 

crucial role in the interception and repatriation 

of migrants and serves as a critical distribution 

and staging area for humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief operations. As the only permanent 

US military base in Latin America and the 

Caribbean, its location provides persistent US 

presence and immediate access to the region, as 

well as supporting a layered defense to secure the 

air and maritime approaches to the United States.

Countering Transnational Organized 

Crime. Our efforts to counter transnational 

organized crime focus on two complementary 

missions: defending the southern approaches of 

the United States and supporting partner nation 

efforts, in coordination with our US interagency 

partners, to stem the flow of illicit trafficking. 

In both missions, we rely heavily on support 

from the DHS, especially the US Coast Guard. 

Secretary Jeh Johnson and the heroic men and 

women at DHS deserve enormous recognition 

working cooperatively across the interagency 

to help us safeguard our nation’s southern 

approaches. Secretary Johnson and I both share 

the conviction that homeland defense does not 

begin at the ‘one yard line’ of our Southwest 

border, but instead extends forward, throughout 

the hemisphere, to keep threats far from our 

nation’s shores. Along with DHS, we work with 

the FBI, DEA, and the Departments of State and 

the Treasury to do exactly that.

While these partnerships are superb at 

the tactical level, I am frustrated by the lack 

of a comprehensive US government effort to 

counter the TOC threat. Nearly four years after 

the release of the President’s National Strategy 

to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 

interagency CTOC activities in the region—

especially in Central America—remain poorly 

partnerships, as we continue safeguarding the 

southern approaches to the United States.

Detention Operations. As we begin 

the thirteenth year of detention operations at 

Guantanamo, we continue to provide dignified, 

humane, and lawful care and treatment of 

detainees. In fact, the only people not treated 

humanely or having their human rights protected 

are the guards, especially our female and minority 

ones, who find themselves in a challenging 

environment where they regularly confront 

verbal and physical abuse and ‘splashings’ by 

many detainees. Mr. Chairman, Members, 

our guard and medical force is doing a superb 

job, and our nation should be extremely proud 

of these young military professionals. They 

execute a difficult, no-fail mission with honor, 

integrity, and the utmost professionalism, all 

within a pressure cooker of unrelenting public 

scrutiny and fabricated accusations of inhumane 

treatment and abuse. It is worth reiterating 

that everything they do—including supporting 

ongoing transfers, enteral feeding, military 

commissions, and periodic review boards—is 

done entirely at the direction of our military 

chain of command, in execution of US national 

policy. Like all our men and women in uniform, 

these young Service members are second to 

none, and I thank the Congress for sharing that 

sentiment and for its continued support to our 

troops stationed at Guantanamo.

We also greatly appreciate congressional 

support to construct a new dining facility and 

medical clinic at Naval Station Guantanamo, 

which will address the health and safety concerns 

posed by the current facilities. As our service 

members perform our directed detention mission 

in an honorable and professional manner, 

the facilities in which they reside have long 

exceeded their useful life. Each year we struggle 

to maintain, repair, or replace obsolete or substandard facilities. It is difficult and expensive 

to mitigate life, health, and safety issues in an 

incremental, piecemeal manner. Our troops 

deserve better.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 45

fraction of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) assets we need, our 

ongoing Operation MARTILLO continues to 

yield tactical successes thanks to increased 

contributions by our partner nations and our 

continued coordination with DEA. The Coast 

Guard Commandant shares my view that 

transnational organized crime poses a significant 

threat to our hemisphere, and he has committed 

a 50% increase in cutters equipped with ability 

to land a helicopter, plus a commensurate plusup in maritime patrol aircraft hours. While 

the Commandant is doing everything he can 

to support us, the Coast Guard faces its own 

limitations, and this increase only translates to an 

additional two to three cutters, far below the 16 

flight-deck equipped vessels required to conduct 

our detection and monitoring mission. This 

support, however, comes at a critical juncture 

for the counterdrug mission, as the US Navy 

decommissions its frigates and deploys its new 

Littoral Combat Ships to the Pacific. I would like 

to go on record here today before the Congress 

in strong support of the Coast Guard and DHS’ 

efforts to recapitalize their fleet of cutters, some 

of which are in their fifth decade of service. The 

Coast Guard and US Southern Command need 

these replacement cutters as soon as possible 

to continue the important work of securing our 

southern approaches.

Additionally, I believe we have a window 

of opportunity in Central America to capitalize 

on the region’s growing political will to combat 

criminal networks. Last year the presidents of 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador developed 

a coordinated plan to address their countries’ 

coordinated and minimally funded. Fortunately, 

there is growing recognition that the magnitude, 

scope, and complexity of this threat demand an 

integrated counternetwork approach. I thank 

the Congress for recognizing this threat and 

expanding section 1004 authorities to include 

CTOC operations, and I fully support efforts to 

improve interagency coordination on this critical 

national security issue.

I am hopeful that the new Strategy for US 

Engagement in Central America will broaden our 

approach to achieving lasting security in Central 

America and help reinvigorate our partnerships 

with the sub-region. As I have often said, we 

cannot shoot our way out of the CTOC challenge. 

It will truly take a whole-of-government 

effort, because Central America’s prosperity, 

governance, and security are intrinsically 

connected. Economic growth is only sustainable 

in an environment where democratic values and 

institutions flourish, citizens feel secure in their 

communities, impunity is reduced, and civil 

society and the media can play their rightful 

roles. President Obama requested $1 billion in 

the FY2016 budget for the Department of State 

and USAID to implement the new Strategy. As 

Vice President Biden rightly points out, the cost 

of investing now to address Central America’s 

challenges is modest compared with the costs of 

letting festering violence, poverty, and insecurity 

become full-blown crises.11 I fully support the 

President’s efforts to prioritize Central America 

at this crucial time, and urge Congress to support 

the President’s budget request.

In another positive development, we are 

seeing significant improvements in regional 

cooperation. Although we receive a tiny 

Spotlight: Counter Threat Finance

In collaboration with the Department of the Treasury, 

U.S. Southern Command maps illicit networks, 

conducts all-source intelligence analysis and 

production, and works with U.S. and regional 

partners to support targeted financial measures and 

U.S. law enforcement efforts.

Spotlight: Operation MARTILLO

Orchestrated by the Joint Interagency Task Force 

South, and coordinated with our interagency 

partners, MARTILLO has resulted in the disruption of 

over 400 metric tons of cocaine over the past four 

years, denying drug traffickers $8 billion in potential 

revenue.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 46

charges against high-level officials involved in 

corruption; and is making efforts to swiftly arrest 

those security forces implicated in human rights 

abuse. At the request of the Honduran president, 

the United Nations will open an office of the UN 

High Commission on Human Rights. Of note, 

human rights groups have acknowledged to me 

that Honduras is making real progress in this 

area.

This is a historical first step, and it simply 

would not have happened without our superb 

Ambassador to Tegucigalpa, Ambassador Jim 

Nealon, who provided help and advice not 

only to the Government of Honduras, but to 

the entire US interagency. This is reflective of 

the close and continuous working relationship 

all Combatant Commanders have with their 

respective ambassadors throughout their Area of 

Operations. It is a team effort, and as a team 

we are hobbled in our interaction with foreign 

governments when there is no US Ambassador 

in the seat, and frankly, the individual foreign 

partners take offense and are confused regarding 

US interests in their country and the region. I 

know there are many reasons why there are often 

long gaps in coverage, but the fact is the lack 

of an ambassador handicaps the advancement of 

US interests. This time last year, we did not have 

Ambassadors in Colombia, Peru, and Argentina. 

I am grateful for Congressional action to remedy 

the lack of Embassy leadership in these countries, 

and I am hopeful that Ambassador-Designate 

Mr. Stafford Fitzgerald Haney will be confirmed 

as Ambassador for Costa Rica without delay.

Finally, I would like to close this section by 

sharing a few examples of how our counterdrug 

efforts, conducted in coordination with DEA, are 

contributing to the region’s overall security. In 

Guatemala, we provided infrastructure support 

and over $17 million in equipment and training 

to the country’s two interagency task forces along 

Guatemala’s northern and southern borders. In 

concert with US Northern Command, we also 

work with Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize to 

support Mexico’s Southern Border Strategy. 

endemic challenges. These leaders recognize the 

magnitude of the tasks ahead and are prepared to 

address them, but they need our support. They 

are frustrated, however by conditions on US 

security assistance—some of which are not even 

related to military-to-military engagements— 

and our cumbersome Foreign Military Sales 

procurement processes, which delay or even 

hinder cooperation efforts. Unfortunately, these 

conditions are often placed on governments that 

most need our help, providing an opening for 

other actors to successfully conduct outreach 

to the region. Unlike the United States, some 

countries place no emphasis on promoting 

human rights, anti-corruption measures, fair 

labor practices, and environmental protection as 

part of their offers of security assistance.

Our president has recognized the importance 

of supporting our Central American partners, 

making the region one of his top foreign policy 

priorities. We are now seeing real progress being 

made by the three ‘Northern Triangle’ countries. 

While there are many good examples, the 

situation is especially encouraging in Honduras, 

where the government is working hard to 

combat the drug trade, re-establish governance 

in remote areas, and take meaningful action to 

protect human rights. In cooperation with the 

US Department of Justice, and for the first time 

in the country’s history, the Government of 

Honduras extradited seven Honduran nationals 

wanted to face drug trafficking charges in the 

United States. The Honduran government also 

deserves recognition for the establishment of a 

special investigative unit to combat impunity 

in Bajo Aguán and to improve citizen security. 

According to government figures, the 2014 

homicide rate dropped to 66.4 per 100,000, a 

nearly 25% reduction in only two years. Although 

some groups expressed concerns over the use of 

the Honduran military in a domestic security 

role, the government of Honduras has developed 

a comprehensive strategy to phase out the use 

of its Military Police of Public Order (PMOP); 

has increasingly investigated and brought 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 47

of terrorist organizations to justice. These, and 

other counterterrorism cooperation efforts, 

ensure our partners are able to mitigate terrorist 

threats before they can destabilize a country or 

reach the US homeland.

Building Partner Nation Capacity. Our 

engagement—through our humanitarian and 

civic assistance programs, defense institution 

building efforts like the Defense Institution 

Reform Initiative, and the US Southern 

Command-sponsored Human Rights Initiative—

helps partner nations strengthen governance and 

development, professionalize their militaries 

and security forces, and increase their ability 

to conduct peacekeeping, stability, and disaster 

relief operations. Our military components are 

at the forefront of these engagement efforts and 

perform superb work in strengthening our security 

partnerships. While we engage on a variety of 

different issues, I would like to highlight a few 

of our capacity-building efforts that are making 

a significant difference in the region.12

Support to Colombia. Colombia is a terrific 

example of how sustained US support can help 

a partner nation gain control of their security 

situation, strengthen government institutions, 

eradicate corruption, and bolster their economy. 

Colombia’s turnaround is nothing short of 

phenomenal, and it stands shoulder-to-shoulder 

with the United States as together we work to 

improve regional stability. Mr. Chairman, 

Members, as you know, the United States 

has a special relationship with only a handful 

In Honduras, we helped create a ‘maritime 

shield’ to deflect drug trafficking off the 

country’s northeastern coast and are supporting 

the Honduran government’s citizen security 

efforts. In the Caribbean, we are prioritizing 

infrastructure projects designed to improve 

regional interdiction capabilities; last year we 

completed construction on new training facilities 

in the Dominican Republic and an operations 

center for the Regional Security System. To 

enhance our partners’ efforts to counter increased 

drug trafficking in the Caribbean, we provide 

counterdrug training and support the Technical 

Assistance Field Teams, comprised of Coast 

Guard and DOD personnel who provide mentoring 

and technical assistance to 13 Caribbean nations. 

This support encourages our partners to be more 

self-reliant in the maintenance and upkeep of 

their assets, making them more dependable 

and capable allies in the CTOC fight. Further 

south, we are supporting the Peruvian military’s 

increasingly successful efforts to improve their 

maritime interdiction capability, strengthen their 

collaboration with Colombia, and combat the 

scourge of narcoterrorism that has plagued their 

country for decades.

Counterterrorism. In 2014, we continued 

our work with the interagency, US Embassy 

Country Teams, and our partner nations to 

counter Islamic extremism, recruitment, and 

radicalization efforts that support terrorism 

activities. Working closely with the interagency 

and partner nations, we also began monitoring 

the possible return of foreign fighter extremists 

participating in jihad in Syria. Over the past 

year our Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

conducted multiple engagements such as subject 

matter expert and intelligence exchanges, 

counterterrorism-focused exercises, and key 

leader engagements in countries throughout the 

region. Our Department of Defense Rewards 

Program yielded successes and offers a model 

for a low-cost, small footprint approach to 

counterterrorism. In 2014, this program enabled 

partner nation authorities to bring 33 members 

Spotlight: USS AMERICA Visits the Americas

 In 2014, the USS AMERICA, the Navy’s newest 

class of amphibious assault ships, conducted a 10-

week transit of South America while en route to her 

homeport.

 USS AMERICA embarked Expeditionary Strike 

Group THREE (ESG 3) and a Special Purpose 

Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), which 

conducted numerous engagement activities during 

port calls in Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.

 This transit offered a clear example of U.S. NavyMarine Corps integration and set the standard for 

future new ship transits in the region.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 48

options to provide verification, advice, and 

monitoring of these efforts.

Exercise Program. Bilateral and multilateral 

exercises with partner nations improve staff 

planning and operations, promote interoperability, 

and support national security objectives. While 

the technical skills our partners learn during 

these exercises are important, the personal 

relationships that are made are invaluable, 

binding participating countries together as equal 

partners and true friends. In 2014, our four 

operational exercises included INTEGRATED 

ADVANCE, which exercises our response to 

various regional contingencies, and FUSED 

RESPONSE, designed to improve the training, 

readiness, and capability of Belizean, Brazilian, 

Canadian, and US special operations forces. We 

also held four multilateral exercises, including 

TRADEWINDS, which aims to improve the 

capability of Caribbean nations to counter 

transnational organized crime and respond to a 

natural disaster; PANAMAX, which focuses on 

the defense of the Panama Canal by a 17-nation 

multinational force; and FUERZAS ALIADAS 

HUMANITARIAS, which brings together 

11 partner nations and regional humanitarian 

organizations to improve coordination on disaster 

response.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. As 

a complement to our multinational exercises, 

our humanitarian and civic assistance program 

help demonstrates the United States’ enduring 

commitment to the citizens of Latin America. 

There are no better symbols of this commitment 

than our humanitarian exercises and the USNS 

COMFORT, which returns to the region to 

conduct humanitarian missions in 11 countries 

as part of CONTINUING PROMISE 2015.

Our humanitarian mission also helps 

strengthen governance and partner nation 

response capacities. In coordination with the 

US Agency for International Development 

(USAID), in 2014 we funded the construction 

of 172 humanitarian projects in the region, 

building disaster relief warehouses, emergency 

of countries throughout the world. These 

relationships are with countries that we rely on 

to act as regional stabilizers, countries that we 

look to for international leadership, countries 

that we consider our strongest friends and most 

steadfast allies. Colombia unquestionably plays 

that role in Latin America. Through the USColombia Action Plan on Regional Security, 

Colombia provides vital assistance to its Central 

American and Mexican counterparts in the fight 

against criminal networks. I want to note that 

every aspect of US collaboration under this Plan, 

including activities conducted by US Southern 

Command, is facilitated through US security 

assistance and governed by the same US laws 

and regulations—especially those requiring the 

human rights vetting of units—governing my 

own personnel.

I fully support the government of Colombia’s 

efforts to ensure that justice and accountability 

are integral parts of the peace process. We must 

sustain US support throughout this process and 

during the post-conflict phase as our closest 

partner works to end a decades-long insurgency. 

As I have told my Colombian colleagues, the last 

50 years were easy compared to what the next 

five hold in store. Our goal is to ensure Colombia 

can sustain US-funded programs, and to that end 

we work with the Defense Institution Reform 

Initiative to improve the Colombian Ministry of 

National Defense’s strategic planning capabilities. 

As testament to the enduring strength of our 

relationship, Colombia wants to partner with the 

United States for planning and implementation 

of their Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

Reintegration (DDR) process. We are exploring 

Spotlight: USS AMERICA Visits the Americas

 U.S. Southern Command and the Joint IED 

Defeat Organization work with the Colombian 

military to counter IED threats.

 Though it remains the #3 country in the world for 

IED incidents, Colombian casualties from IEDs 

were down 20% in 2014.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 49

our President’s goal of a stable, prosperous, and 

secure Central America.

Promoting Respect for Human Rights. 

Mr. Chairman, Members, human rights are 

fundamental to our capacity-building efforts in 

the region. During my time as Commander of 

US Southern Command, I have aggressively 

worked to promote genuine and concrete respect 

for human rights throughout Latin America. One 

of my greatest tools in this mission is actually 

something pretty simple, and doesn’t cost the 

taxpayer one penny: open and frank dialogue 

with both our closest partners and our fiercest 

critics. Every conversation I have—whether 

with a president, with a minister, with a chief of 

defense or his subordinates, with US or regional 

media outlets, or human rights representatives 

from Washington to Montevideo—begins and 

ends with a straightforward discussion on human 

rights.

I am proud to state that I incorporate 

meetings and engagements specifically focused 

on human rights into nearly every one of my 

numerous trips to the region. I do this because I 

have long recognized the vital role human rights 

organizations play in supporting democracy 

and open societies, strengthening the rule of 

law, and ensuring that government officials are 

accountable to their citizens. As I have said 

before, the US military doesn’t just talk about 

human rights, we do human rights. We teach 

it. We enforce it. We live it. The protection of 

human rights is embedded in our doctrine, our 

training, and our education, and above all, in our 

moral code. It is the source of our great strength 

as a military power, and it is also our best defense 

against losing legitimacy in the hearts and minds 

of the people we have taken an oath to protect.

Mr. Chairman, I believe without question 

that improvement in human rights most often 

comes when countries have the opportunity to 

work directly with Americans. Human rights 

improvements in this region have largely 

come as a direct result of close and continuous 

dialogue and engagement by the United States 

operations centers, and emergency shelters. 

This infrastructure helps increase partner nation 

capacity to respond to a regional disaster, 

often without US assistance. Last year, the 

Government of Haiti successfully responded 

to flooding in Nord using emergency response 

facilities constructed under this program. This 

is a major step and a sign of continued progress 

in Haiti; in the past, such an event would have 

required US or outside assistance.

Public-Private Cooperation. US Southern 

Command remains at the forefront of publicprivate cooperation, a force multiplier in our 

exercises, operations, and engagement activities. 

In 2014, our collaboration with non-governmental 

and private sector entities yielded over $10 

million in service and gifts-in-kind—such as 

school furniture and medical equipment—to 

partner nations in conjunction with our annual 

exercises. Early this year we held a forum 

that brought together US and partner nation 

government officials and private sector leaders 

to brainstorm ways to improve security and 

economic investment in El Salvador, Guatemala, 

and Honduras. The forum featured lessons 

learned from Colombia and Mexico on the 

importance of security to economic development 

and identifying near-term activities to improve 

the security situation and, by extension, the 

investment climate in these three countries. To 

quote Paul Brinkley, who wrote one of the most 

impressive books I have read on the subject, the 

greatest element of our national power is our 

“private-sector economic dynamism.”13 I am 

hopeful American businesses will help advance 

Spotlight: 2014 Beyond the Horizons and New 

Horizons Exercises

 Working alongside partner nation personnel, U.S. 

military forces provided free medical and dental 

services to more than 42,000 patients in the 

Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Belize.

 U.S. forces also constructed 16 new classrooms, a 

hospital addition, and two healthcare clinics in 

remotely located communities.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 50

Planning for Contingencies. Finally, 

planning and preparing for crisis and 

contingency response are essential elements of 

US Southern Command’s mission. Contingency 

planning and preparation, including exercises 

like PANAMAX, FUSED RESPONSE, and 

INTEGRATED ADVANCE, prepares our 

organization to respond to various scenarios such 

as an attack on critical infrastructure, Caribbean 

mass migration, humanitarian crises, natural 

disasters, or the evacuation of US citizens in the 

region. We work closely with the Office of US 

Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) 

and other interagency and regional partners to 

monitor events like the increase in Haitian and 

Cuban migrant flows, the potential spread of 

infectious diseases like Ebola, and the devastating 

drought in Central America, all of which could 

trigger a crisis event. While we stand ready to 

support US government response efforts should 

the need arise, mandated budget and workforce 

reductions limit our ability to rapidly respond to 

any significant contingency without substantial 

headquarters augmentation.

Critical Needs and Concerns

Budget Cuts. US Southern Command is 

grappling with the cumulative effect of the various 

budget cuts enacted over the past few years. 

Force allocation cuts by the Services— including 

troops, ships, planes, Coast Guard cutters, and ISR 

platforms—are having the greatest impact on our 

operations, exercises, and security cooperation 

activities. I fully expect reductions to affect all 

aspects of our operations and engagements with 

our partner nations, including capacity-building 

activities, multinational exercises, information 

government. Additionally, because of partner 

nation interaction with brave and dedicated US 

law enforcement personnel like the FBI, Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE), the US Coast 

Guard and particularly DEA, we have seen a 

concrete and I believe long-term positive effect 

on the professionalism of law enforcement 

institutions in the region. It is what our partners 

learn in our military and law enforcement 

training, by the example we show and the 

attitudes they absorb from us—when they attend 

our courses, exercises, and in senior officer 

conferences and seminars, but most powerfully 

by simply working shoulder-to-shoulder with 

young American professionals that do human 

rights, do their duties entirely without thought of 

corruption, who do not preach while they wave 

their fingers in the faces of their counterparts, but 

treat them like equal partners in activities that 

are in the national security interests of both their 

nations—that are, together, making a difference.

For our part, US Southern Command’s 

commitment to promoting respect for human 

rights can be seen in many activities we carry 

out with our partners in the region, and I am 

proud to lead the only Combatant Command 

with a dedicated Human Rights Office. This 

office also has a long history of providing 

support and expertise to our partner nation 

militaries in strengthening their human rights 

programs and improving their human rights 

performance. In 2014, US Southern Command 

sponsored a series of civil-military dialogues in 

Guatemala and Honduras, two countries facing 

a ruthless onslaught of transnational criminal 

activity. These dialogues brought together 

influential human rights NGOs and key military 

leaders to discuss shared concerns, including the 

deployment of military forces in citizen safety 

missions. I thank the Congress for recognizing 

the enduring value of this mission, and we deeply 

appreciate the flexibility to soon provide human 

rights training to units that might not have been 

previously eligible to receive it.

Spotlight: 2014 Human Rights Officers Workshop

The 2014 Workshop brought together military, 

government, and civil society representatives from 14 

countries in the hemisphere to discuss the duty of 

military and security forces in protecting human 

rights.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 51

lenges we face in the region and the importance 

of adequately sourcing our missions. I continue 

to be concerned, however, by the long-term consequences of our limited awareness and lack of 

insight into security challenges in the region. The 

longer these shortfalls persist, the more difficult 

it is to track and monitor potential threats to our 

nation’s security, including the growing influence 

of extra-regional actors, the overlap between 

criminal and terrorist networks, and signs of potential regional instability. While we recognize 

that global defense priorities must be adequately 

sourced, limited tactical ISR allocation and national technical focus is impairing virtually every 

one of our assigned missions and exposing the 

southern approaches to the United States to significant risk. Sequestration will compound this 

challenge; when it comes to sourcing, we are already the lowest priority Geographic Combatant 

Command, and sequestration will likely eviscerate our already limited ISR capacity.

To mitigate some of these shortfalls, we 

have successfully employed non-traditional 

assets in support of our Title 10 detection 

and monitoring obligations. The Air Force’s 

JSTARS is especially important, providing a 

detailed maritime surveillance capability that 

is unsurpassed and increasing the efficiency of 

wide area surveillance and long-range maritime 

patrol aircraft. A single JSTARS sortie can cover 

the same search area as 10 maritime patrol 

aircraft sorties. The use of these types of assets is 

a ‘win-win’ for US Southern Command and the 

Services; we receive much-needed assets while 

the Services receive pre-deployment training 

opportunities in a ‘target-rich’ environment.

Military Construction. In support of our 

nationally-directed contingency response 

mission, we are also seeking $28 million 

in funding to construct basic horizontal 

infrastructure that would be needed to operate 

migrant camps at Guantanamo in the event of a 

maritime mass migration. These projects would 

include the shaping of terrain and installation 

of drainage and utilities infrastructure. Without 

operations, interagency support, and our ability 

to respond to crises or contingencies.

We are already feeling the impact at our 

headquarters, where we have implemented a 

13% reduction in civilian billets and an 11% 

reduction in military ones. As an economy of 

force Combatant Command, these cuts have a 

disproportionate effect on our daily operations. 

During last year’s capstone exercise PANAMAX, 

it became clear that resource constraints and 

manpower reductions are compromising our 

training and readiness. Fortunately, these 

limitations were revealed in an exercise scenario 

and not during a real-world contingency, and 

we are taking steps to mitigate some of these 

shortfalls. To that end, we are instituting a 

Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and 

have realigned personnel to support our most 

critical missions. We are also improving our 

business practices to gain greater efficiencies in 

our management of mission requirements and 

application of resources. I want to stress, however, 

that if sequestration returns in FY16, our ability 

to support national security objectives, including 

conducting many of our essential missions, will 

be significantly undermined.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Shortfalls. We deeply appreciate 

Congressional assistance to mitigating some of 

our chronic ISR shortfalls. Thanks to the support 

of Congress, we have increased maritime patrol 

capacity in support of counterdrug operations 

in the region. We are also thankful to the Congress for recognizing the urgency of the chalSpotlight: Partnering to Promote Ebola Preparedness

 In coordination with the Pan American Health 

Organizations, the Department of Health and 

Human Services, and the Defense Institute for 

Medical Operations, U.S. Southern Command is 

providing Ebola preparedness assessments, 

training, and equipment for partner nations.

 We are also working with Ministries of Defense in 

the region to develop protocols for peacekeepers 

deploying to Ebola-affected regions in West Africa.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 52

Conclusion

I would like to conclude my testimony with 

a note of warning and a sign of hope. Two 

decades ago, US policy makers and the defense 

and intelligence communities failed to anticipate 

the collapse of the Soviet Union or the rise of 

international terrorism. Today, another challenge 

is in plain sight: transnational organized crime 

threatens not only our own security, but the 

stability and prosperity of our Latin American 

neighbors. As the Congress knows, the United 

States and our partners worked hard to ensure 

the Western Hemisphere is a beacon of freedom, 

democracy, and peace. In the face of the corrosive 

spread of criminal networks and other threats, we 

must work even harder to ensure it remains that 

way.

The good news is we know how to win this 

fight. Colombia taught us that the key to defeating 

insurgents is the same as defeating criminal 

networks: a strong, accountable government 

that protects its citizens, upholds the rule of law, 

and expands economic opportunity for all. It 

taught us that countering illicit trafficking and 

countering terrorism often go hand in hand. It 

taught us that US interagency cooperation, 

coupled with a committed partner, can help 

bring a country back from the brink—and for 

a fraction of the cost of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. And above all, Colombia taught us 

that sustained engagement by the United States 

can make a real and lasting difference. We have 

learned these lessons. Now is the time to apply 

them to the region as a whole. Thank you, and I 

look forward to your questions.

this funding, we will not be able to quickly 

house the required number of migrants without 

compromising United Nations’ standards and 

placing severe constraints on current operations 

at the Naval Station. I look forward to working 

with the Congress to find a solution to these and 

other requirements.

Quality of Life and Military Housing. Mr. 

Chairman, the men and women assigned to US 

Southern Command are at a huge financial and 

benefits disadvantage, working and living in 

one of the most expensive cities in the world 

and receiving little in the way of adequate 

compensation. Access to commissary and PX 

facilities are an integral part of the benefits 

package guaranteed by law, yet we lack both at 

our installation. Our assigned personnel receive 

minimal Cost of Living Allowances for South 

Florida, even though non-housing expenditures 

like car insurance are high.14 This is particularly 

hard on our junior enlisted personnel. An E-3 

receives a mere $29 for a monthly Cost of Living 

Allowance, while an E-9 receives $44; neither 

amount covers monthly tolls on South Florida’s 

roads.

Given current housing allowances, many 

of our families cannot afford to live near the 

Command, and government housing acquired 

through domestic leasing is both expensive and 

extremely competitive. The housing situation 

will become even more challenging for our 

officer-grade personnel, who will see, on average, 

approximately 9% reduction in their BAH. I 

would like to go on record and note that I have 

serious concerns over the validity of the process 

used to calculate BAH for our assigned troops. 

A permanent military housing solution in Doral 

would allow us to bring our service members 

and their families into a secure and affordable 

community close to our facility. We are working 

with US Army Installation Management 

Command to find a long-term housing solution 

for our Service members and their families.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 53

10. ALBA (in its Spanish acronym) stands for 

the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our 

America.

11. Vice President Joseph Biden, “A Plan for 

Central America.” January 29, 2015.

12. A complete list of activities by our military 

components can be found in the Annex.

13. Paul Brinkley, War Front to Store Front: 

Americans Rebuilding Trust and Hope in 

Nations Under Fire. New York: 2014.

14. According to the Economic Policy Institute, 

it takes nearly three times the federal poverty 

line to cover basic living expenses in Miami.

Endnotes

1. US Customs and Border Patrol, FY 14 

Border Security Report. According to the 

CBP, 239,229 migrants from the Northern 

Tier countries of Guatemala, Honduras, 

and El Salvador were apprehended in 2014, 

representing a 68% increase compared to 

FY13. 229,178 migrants from Mexico were 

apprehended, a 14% decrease.

2. Testimony of Roberta Jacobson, Assistant 

Secretary of State, Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, Before the Subcommittee 

on Western Hemisphere Affairs, United 

States House of Representatives, November 

18, 2014.

3. Texas Department of Public Safety, 2013 

Threat Assessment.

4. According to the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, twenty-two of the fifty-nine 

Department of State designated Foreign 

Terrorist Organizations are linked to the 

global drug trade.

5. United Nations Office of Drugs and 

Crime. Estimating Illicit Financial Flows 

Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other 

Transnational Crimes. Geneva, 2011.

6. Amos Irwin and Kevin Gallagher. Chinese 

Finance to Latin America Tops $100 Billion 

Since 2005. Inter-American Dialogue, April 

2, 2014.

7. R. Evan Ellis. The Rise of China in the 

Americas. Security and Defense Studies 

Review. Volume 16, 2014.

8. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 

Africa.

9. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, 

November 12, 2014.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 54

Development Exchanges in Brazil, Colombia, 

Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, 

improving the ability of these countries to 

conduct inter-organizational coordination 

during humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 

operations, and to counter transnational criminal 

organizations. These exchanges provide a forum 

for bilateral executive-level information.

• Humanitarian Assistance Program 

(HAP): HAP conducts activities to build partner 

nation capacity in providing essential services 

to its civilian population including: responding 

to disaster and other crises; reinforcing security; 

and sustaining stability in a host nation or 

region. ARSOUTH, USSOUTHCOM’s HAP 

construction program manager, completed 19 

projects in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama 

and Peru, and initiated the planning for nine 

new construction projects in Belize, Guatemala, 

Honduras, El Salvador, and Peru.

• Global Peace Operations Initiative 

(GPOI): GPOI is a US government-funded 

security assistance program to enhance 

international capacity to effectively conduct 

United Nations and regional peace support 

operations. ARSOUTH, as USSOUTHCOM’s 

GPOI construction program manager, completed 

four projects in Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, 

with four ongoing construction projects in El 

Salvador and Guatemala.

• Reintegration: ARSOUTH executed a 

Reintegration operation for the surviving crew 

members of aircraft BAT 02 following their crash 

in Colombia, a Post Isolation Support Activity 

in support of the FBI for an American Citizen 

held hostage by the FARC in Colombia, and for 

a repatriated POW from Afghanistan.

• Conference of the American Armies 

(CAA): The Conference of American Armies 

(20 member nations, 5 observer nations and two 

International Military Organizations) strengthens 

relationships and improves interoperability in 

peacekeeping and disaster relief operations 

through the creation and implementation of 

practical initiatives approved by the commanders 

Annex: 

2014 Component Accomplishments

US Army South (ARSOUTH) Headquarters: 

San Antonio, Texas

• Security Cooperation: ARSOUTH 

conducted 174 security cooperation events 

with 18 countries in US Southern Command’s 

(USSOUTHCOM’s) area of responsibility. 

These events included: Army-to-Army Staff 

Talks with key countries, Foreign Liaison 

Officers assigned to ARSOUTH, Conference 

of American Armies activities, professional 

development exchanges on multiple topics, Army 

commander and distinguished visitor program, 

and Joint/Combined/Multinational Exercises and 

Operations. These events represent engagements 

aimed at building partner nation capabilities with 

other militaries in the region.

• Countering Transnational Organized 

Crime (CTOC): ARSOUTH conducted 

numerous CTOC training sessions with the 

El Salvador Army Intelligence Battalion, the 

two new Guatemalan Interagency Task Forces 

(IATF), and two Honduran Brigades associated 

with border security. These efforts have greatly 

improved the individual country’s capability to 

disrupt TOC operations and has set the stage for 

the next training phase in FY15.

• Intelligence Security Cooperation: In 

addition to the El Salvador effort, the ARSOUTH 

Intelligence Team conducted engagement 

activities enabling military intelligence capacity 

building in support of countering transnational 

threats in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, 

Honduras, Chile, and Peru.

• Counter Terrorism: ARSOUTH 

conducted 20 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges 

(SMEEs) in ten countries that included over 750 

host nation soldiers. The engagements included: 

Medical, Search and Rescue, Logistics, Force 

Protection, and Communications.

• Civil Military Relations: ARSOUTH 

conducted Civil Military Relations Professional 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 55

forces assistance during a simulated national 

disaster.

US Naval Forces Southern Command 

(COMUSNAVSO) Headquarters: 

Mayport, Florida

• US Naval Forces Southern Command/ 

US FOURTH Fleet (USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT) 

employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime 

security operations in order to maintain access, 

enhance interoperability, and build enduring 

partnerships that foster regional security in the 

USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

• “AMERICA visits The Americas” 

2014: USS AMERICA, lead ship of a new class 

of amphibious ships for the US Navy, completed 

an historic transit of the USSOUTHCOM 

AOR. AMERICA conducted Theater Security 

Cooperation (TSC) events and completed basic 

maritime operations while circumnavigating 

South America. “AMERICA Visits the Americas” 

served as our best Key Leader Engagement (KLE) 

opportunity in years, as AMERICA conducted 

TSC port visits to Cartagena, Colombia; Rio de 

Janeiro, Brazil; Valparaiso, Chile; and Callao, 

Peru. AMERICA also flew out distinguished 

visitors from Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 

and El Salvador to visit the US Navy’s newest 

ship while she sailed in the vicinity of those three 

Partner Nations.

• Southern Partnership Station 

(SPS): SPS is a series of Navy/Marine Corps 

engagements focused on TSC, specifically 

Building Partner Capacity (BPC), through 

Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) with 

partner nation militaries and civilian security 

forces. SPS engagements include Community 

Relations Projects that focus on our partnerships, 

shared interests, and shared values. 2014 SPS 

Deployments:

• SPS Joint High Speed Vessel 2014 (SPS 

JHSV 14): USNS SPEARHEAD, lead ship of a 

new class of ships for the US Navy, built partner 

capacity while conducting TSC engagements 

of the member Armies. ARSOUTH delegations 

represented the US Army Chief of Staff at 

the Transfer Ceremony to Colombia, a 1st 

Communications Exercise and a Specialized 

Conference on IEDs in Colombia, a Geospatial 

Terrain data base Ad-Hoc Committee in Peru, 

and a Disaster Relief Field Training Exercise in 

Argentina.

• Beyond the Horizon (BTH): The 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Field Training 

Exercise, BTH Dominican Republic (APRJUN 14), consisted of five engineer projects, 

two general medical and one dental exercises 

(MEDRETEs and DENTRETE), treating over 

12,917 patients. 1,468 US troops participated in 

the exercise and the Dominican military provided 

107 personnel. BTH Guatemala (MAR-JUL 

14) consisted of five engineer projects, and 

three general MEDRETEs, treating over 21,000 

residents. 1,242 US troops participated and 

the Guatemalan military provided over 120 

personnel.

• Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 

(FAHUM): The Humanitarian Assistance and 

Disaster Relief Command Post Exercise was 

hosted by El Salvador to build Partner Nation 

capacity to respond to a major disaster and 

strengthen military/security force collaboration 

and cooperation in the region. Participants 

included 300 from El Salvador, 66 US and 33 

from other Partner Nations.

• PANAMAX 2014: This year’s Joint/

Combined operational exercise focused on 

the defense of the Panama Canal designated 

ARSOUTH as HQ, Multi-National Forces-South 

with a total of 380 participants (65 participants 

coming from 17 Partner Nations). ARSOUTH 

also hosted the CFLCC with Brazil as the lead 

country which included 91 participants with 61 

of them coming from 12 partner nations (PNs). 

In addition, ARSOUTH participated in a bilateral 

exercise with the Government of Panama called 

PANAMAX – Alpha. Forty US personnel 

worked with the Panamanians coordinating US 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 56

more than 300 military and civilian personnel 

from 15 Partner Nations (including the US), all 

based at USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT Headquarters 

in Mayport. Now in its 12th year, PANAMAX is 

designed to train US and partner nation personnel 

in the execution of stability operations under the 

auspices of United Nations’ Security Council 

resolutions; provide interoperability training 

for the participating multinational staffs; and 

build participating nation capability to plan and 

execute complex multinational operations.

• UNITAS 2014: UNITAS, Latin for 

“Unity”, is the longest-running multinational 

maritime exercise in the world. Peru hosted 

the 55th iteration, featuring 14 Partner Nations 

(including the US), 20 ships, patrol boats, two 

submarines, seven helicopters, four maritime 

patrol aircraft, 10 fixed-wing tactical aircraft, and 

several thousand Sailors. The two-week exercise 

consisted of a multi-threat, multi-day scenario 

where participants operated as a multinational 

force working under a United Nations Security 

Council Resolution.

• SIFOREX 2014: “Silent Forces 

Exercise,” or SIFOREX, is a biennial exercise 

hosted by Peru that focuses on Anti-Submarine 

Warfare proficiency against diesel submarines. 

US participation included USS INGRAHAM, 

P-8 Poseidon and P-3 Orion Aircraft, and 

Commander Destroyer Squadron 40 Staff. For 

the first time, Naval Forces from Brazil and 

Colombia joined Peru and the US for SIFOREX. 

12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern) 

Headquarters: Davis-Monthan AFB, 

Tucson, Arizona

• Security Cooperation: Air Forces 

Southern (AFSOUTH) led 41 security cooperation 

events in 11 USSOUTHCOM Partner Nations. 

Engagements focused on communications, 

aircraft operations and maintenance, ISR, air 

patrol operations, NVG, aerial port, maintenance, 

space, cyber, mishap investigation, command and 

control, space capabilities, close air support, legal, 

through the use of Adaptive Force Packages 

(AFPs) ashore in Belize, Guatemala, Colombia, 

and Honduras. At sea, SPEARHEAD conducted 

Detection and Monitoring (D&M) Operations at 

sea in support of Operation MARTILLO. The 

success of the Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, 

NCIS Agents, and Civilian Mariners making up 

the SPEARHEAD Team set a firm foundation 

for future JHSV and AFP deployments to the 

USSOUTHCOM AOR. Detailed planning is in 

progress for SPS JHSV-15.

• SPS Oceanographic 2014 (SPS 

OCEANO 14): In support of USSOUTHCOM’s 

priority Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and 

Bathymetric requirements, there were multiple 

engagements with Partner Nation counterparts. 

With the support of the Naval Oceanographic 

Office, survey ship USNS PATHFINDER 

conducted hydrographic surveys in the Western 

Caribbean, shore-based Fleet Survey Teams 

conducted hydrographic surveys in coastal waters 

of Peru and Honduras, and a Light Detection 

and Ranging aircraft and crew conducted 

hydrographic surveys in the coastal waters 

of Honduras. All SPS OCEANO surveys are 

conducted with the assistance of Partner Nation 

personnel and equipment, and the hydrographic 

survey and environmental assessment data is 

shared to enable safe and effective maritime 

navigation.

• Operation MARTILLO: Seven 

frigates, JHSV USNS SPEARHEAD, four fixedwing Maritime Patrol aircraft and two Scientific 

Development Squadron ONE detachments 

deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, 

conducting D&M Operations under the tactical 

control of Joint Interagency Task Force South, 

targeting illicit trafficking routes in the waters off 

Central America.

• PANAMAX 2014: Colombia served 

as Combined Forces Maritime Component 

Commander (CFMCC) for the annual 

PANAMAX Exercise, which exercises defense 

of the approaches to the Panama Canal. The 

Colombian Navy led a multinational staff of 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 57

• Airlift Missions: AFSOUTH executed 80 

theater airlift missions, moving more than 3,900 

passengers and 280 tons of cargo throughout 

USSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility.

• Medical Deployments: AFSOUTH 

International Health Specialists had 25 global 

health engagements with partner nations, 

including aerospace physiology programs in 

safety, human factors, and hypobaric chambers; 

also focusing on standards for aeromedical 

evacuation/patient movement/critical care air 

transport teams. The AFSOUTH Command 

Surgeon’s directorate hosted nine priority nations 

for an Aerospace Medicine Symposium.

Marine Corps Forces South 

(MARFORSOUTH) Headquarters: Doral, 

Florida

• Theater Security Cooperation: In 

2014, MARFORSOUTH completed over 88 

Security Cooperation events in 27 countries. 

This resulted in over 750 Partner Nation 

Marine Corps and Defense Force personnel 

trained. While continuing to foster long-term 

relationships based on mutual respect and 

common values, MARFORSOUTH conducted 

a variety of key leader engagements throughout 

the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility that 

reinforced our commitment to partner nation 

leadership. To meet shared security objectives 

in combatting transnational organized crime, 

MARFORSOUTH delivered tailor-made 

training to our partners by establishing persistent 

presence security cooperation teams in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Honduras. This was often 

hand-in-hand with our Colombian Marine Corps 

partners through the US/Colombia Action Plan.

• Special purpose Marine Air/Ground 

Task Force – South (SPMAGTF-S):

Demonstrating the strength of the US Navy 

and Marine Corps Team, MARFORSOUTH 

embarked a SPMAGTF aboard the USS 

AMERICA during its transit through the 

USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This 

public affairs, flight medicine capabilities, and 

a Contingency Airfield Pavements Evaluation. 

The 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron 

completed 17 air adviser events to Peru, 

Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, Chile, and El 

Salvador, training 241 partner nation military 

members.

• Legal: The AFSOUTH Staff Judge 

Advocate promoted Law of Armed Conflict 

adherence and Human Rights Law in 12 legal 

engagement activities with Colombia, Honduras, 

El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Brazil, Chile, 

Ecuador, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic.

• NEW HORIZONS 2014 (Belize): 

AFSOUTH trained 444 US military personnel 

in joint/combined/interagency environments, 

in addition to 8 Canadian medical personnel, 

25 Belize Defense Force (BDF) engineers, 

and over 40 BDF personnel. Personnel built 

five classrooms, which will accommodate 390 

additional students, and one hospital addition. 

US and Canadian medical personnel treated over 

19,000 patients during five medical, surgical, & 

dental events. SMEEs covered maternal & child 

health, public health, and biomedical equipment 

topics. Veterinarian services provided 500+ 

animal vaccinations.

• ISR Missions: AFSOUTH provided 

command and control for ISR missions in support 

of USSOUTHCOM priorities. AFSOUTH 

executed 897 ISR missions and 5,004 flight 

hours, resulting in over 27,841 images and 

nearly 13,497 minutes of video. This information 

assisted in numerous drug trafficking seizures 

in the SOUTHCOM AOR by the United States 

and its Partner nations in FY14. AFSOUTH 

is assisting critical partner nations in CD/CNT 

efforts and is currently working to enable Air 

Force operational and ISR capability in both 

Guatemala and Honduras. AFSOUTH continues 

to assist both Colombia and Peru in maintaining 

the strategic initiative against illegally-armed 

combatants who previously threatened the very 

existence of those nations.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 58

task force executed a simulated humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief operation, successfully 

demonstrating interoperability and security 

cooperation while focusing on amphibious staff 

planning, training and equipping for future peace 

support operations and humanitarian assistance 

missions.

• Security Augmentation Force (SAF):

The SAF is MARFORSOUTH’s designated 

company of Marines that reinforces Diplomatic 

Missions in the AOR, as required. In close 

coordination with Department of State, the SAF 

is postured in CONUS should an Ambassador 

decide that the local guard force is unwilling, 

unable, or insufficient to provide security to his 

mission. While there are currently no high threat 

posts in the AOR, the potential for a natural 

disaster or popular unrest are likely for many 

Embassy locations. MARFORSOUTH deploys 

its Marine Liaison Element to visit each Embassy, 

solidifies plans of action with the Country Team, 

and captures relevant information that will enable 

SAF in rapidly responding to crisis.

Special Operations Command South 

(SOCSOUTH) Headquarters: 

Homestead, Florida

• Building Partner Capacity: In 2014, 

SOCSOUTH maintained small elements in 

Belize, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 

El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Guyana, 

Panama, and Peru working with key units to 

improve ground and maritime interdiction, 

civil affairs, Military Information Support 

Operations (MISO), and intelligence capacities. 

SOCSOUTH used episodic engagements – 

including 36 Joint Combined Exchange Training 

(JCET) events– with multiple Central American, 

South American, and Caribbean partners to 

develop US forces’ skills and expand partner 

nation capacity. In Honduras, SOCSOUTH 

teams and Colombian counterparts helped train 

over 200 Honduran National Police officers for 

the new Tigres special response unit as part of 

transit featured MV-22 Ospreys that conducted 

basic maritime operations at sea and supported 

strategic-level diplomatic engagements in 

Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, Trinidad and 

Tobago, Uruguay and El Salvador. Marines, 

alongside the

US Navy, partnered with other Nation’s 

Sailors and Marines in a variety of theater security 

cooperation events that included passage-atsea exercises, SMEEs, tours for partner nation 

military and civilian personnel, community 

relations projects, and sporting events.

• SPS-JHSV 14 – Marine Detachment 

(MARDET): In support of US Naval Forces 

Southern Command/US Fourth Fleet’s SPSJHSV, MARFORSOUTH deployed 45 Marines 

and Sailors to Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras to 

provide training in small-unit tactics, and support 

with engineering, civil affairs, and information 

operations activities. The MARDET enhanced 

the SPS-JHSV mission by building partner 

capacity in riverine infantry integration for 100 

partner nation forces, conducting 14 humanitarian 

assistance and military construction projects and 

175 civil-military engagements, and promoting a 

nation-wide civilian reporting system in Belize.

• TRADEWINDS Phase II Ground: The 

Dominican Republic hosted this JCS-directed 

exercise for over 250 participants, spanning 15 

countries. In partnership with the Dominican 

Republic Marine Corps and the Canadian 

Army, US Marines provided logistics, casualty 

evacuation and medical support while leading 

classroom instruction and field training. Exercise 

participants collaborated on countering illicit 

traffic activity, humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief, small arms weapons handling, basic 

infantry skills, civil affairs, human rights and law 

enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures.

• Partnership of the Americas (POA): 

MARFORSOUTH, in conjunction with 

USNAVSO and regional (PNs), conducted a 

multinational exercise incorporating amphibious 

ships from Mexico and Chile and eight other 

partner nation naval infantries. A combined 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 59

US, Colombia, and other nations collaborated 

with over 700 participants from 18 Western 

Hemisphere and NATO countries

• FUERZAS COMANDO 2014: 

FUERZAS COMANDO is a USSOUTHCOMsponsored, SOCSOUTH-executed multinational 

exercise encompassing a Special Operations 

skills competition and a Senior Leader Seminar 

designed to foster relations and improve 

cooperation throughout the theater. The 2014 

edition of FUERZAS COMANDO was held 

at Fort Tolemaida, Colombia with 17 Partner 

Nations participating. Colombia placed first 

overall, the US placed second, and third place 

went to El Salvador.

• FUSED RESPONSE 2014: SOCSOUTH 

executes an annual CJCS-directed exercise to validate 

time sensitive crisis action planning, as well as training, 

readiness, interoperability and capability of Special 

Operations Forces in support of regional crises and 

contingencies. FUSED RESPONSE 2014 was a Joint 

and Combined exercise held in Belize in conjunction 

with the Belize Defence Force and featured guest 

observers from Brazil and Canada to foster stronger 

relationships and greater interoperability with these 

fellow Western Hemisphere nations. Involving 

SOCSOUTH staff and personnel from each of its 

components, the exercise focused on improving the 

capabilities of the participant forces and increasing 

their capacity to confront common threats such as 

illicit traffic, organized crime, and terrorism.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

• Safe and Humane Custody and Control: 

JTF-GTMO conducted safe, humane, legal, and 

transparent custody and control of detainees, 

including those convicted by military commission. 

Detainees maintained family contact via mail, 

telephone calls and, in areas which support this 

service, videophone conferences coordinated by the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 

High quality care, to include routine and urgent 

medical care, was provided to detainees on a 24-hour 

expanded US support to Honduran authorities 

as they confront sources of insecurity in urban 

and remote rural areas. In the Andean Ridge, 

SOCSOUTH continued to partner with Colombia 

and Peru to confront narco-terrorist insurgencies 

whose illicit trafficking operations extend 

throughout the hemisphere.

• Civil Affairs: In 2014, 14 civil affairs 

teams and civil-military support elements engaged 

nine partner nations to reduce the vulnerability 

of key populations influenced by transnational 

organized crime or violent extremism. The teams 

assisted with counter- recruitment programs 

and, in many cases, supported partner nations in 

building civil affairs capacities.

• Military Information Support 

Operations: SOCSOUTH maintained military 

information support teams in six key partner 

nations supporting Colombia’s Demobilization 

and Counter- Recruitment Programs, Guatemalan 

Interagency Task Forces, Panamanian security 

services’ outreach programs in the Darien 

border region, the DOD Rewards Program, US 

Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons efforts, 

and expanded active tip lines to under-governed 

spaces. These activities supported a broad 

range of efforts against transnational organized 

criminal and violent extremist organizations.

• Intelligence Analytical Support to 

US Country Teams: SOCSOUTH provides 

intelligence and counter-threat financing support 

to US Country Teams focusing on terrorism, 

human smuggling networks, and transnational 

organized crime. In Belize, the Dominican 

Republic, and Honduras, SOCSOUTH helped 

develop host nation capabilities and country 

team support through a number of subject 

matter exchanges, and mentored them in 

institutionalizing intelligence pipelines.

• Building Intellectual Capital: 

SOCSOUTH, in conjunction with the Colombian 

Joint Staff College, conducted five CounterTerrorism Fellowship Program-funded seminars 

in Bogota, Colombia during 2014. Approximately 

70 subject-matter expert presenters from the 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 60

Joint Interagency Task Force South 

(JIATF-S) 

Key West, Florida

• In FY 2014, Joint Interagency Task Force 

South contributed to the disruption of 158 metric 

tons of cocaine worth nearly $3.2 billion wholesale. 

This represents 76 percent of the estimated cocaine 

flow directed towards the US market. JIATF-S 

executed an integrated defense forward strategy that 

complimented the ongoing efforts at the US Southwest 

Border. JIATF-S exercised tactical control (TACON) 

of US and allied ships and Maritime Patrol Aircraft, 

along with the Forces Surveillance Support Center’s 

re-locatable over-the- horizon radar (ROTHR) to 

detect, monitor and support interdiction of illicit 

traffic.

• Operation (OP) MARTILLO led to the 

majority of JIATF-S interdictions. Begun in January, 

2012, OP MARTILLO has resulted in the disruption 

of 400 metric tons of cocaine, and the seizure of $14.4 

million in bulk cash and 325 vessels and aircraft. 

This multi- national operation is intended to deny the 

Central American littoral routes to illicit traffickers. 

Approaching its third anniversary, OP MARTILLO is 

achieving its desired effects of decreased trafficking 

in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific littorals. 

This has driven increased activity in the Eastern 

Pacific non-littoral route, which, as a result of longer 

distances, provides additional time for US, allied 

and Partner Nation forces to respond once an illicit 

trafficking event is detected.

• Operational Results and Impact: The 

bilateral Air Bridge Denial Program with Colombia 

contributed to a significant reduction in illicit air 

traffic. JIATF-S documented a 68 percent decrease 

in illicit air tracks from South America to Central 

America (primarily Honduras) and detected only two 

flights into Haiti. In the maritime domain, JIATF-S 

assessed reductions of 73 percent and 42 percent, 

respectively, in activity along the Western Caribbean 

littoral and non-littoral trafficking vectors. JIATF-S 

also documented a significant decrease in trafficking 

via “go fast” boats using the littoral routes, which is 

consistent with the intent of OP MARTILLO. Eastern 

basis. General surgical care, dental care, preventative 

medicine, optometry and mental health services were 

provided, or arranged, as was targeted specialty care 

on a recurring basis.

• Legal and Transparent Operations: 

Assessments of detention conditions by the ICRC 

continued with four visits in 2014. The ICRC 

verifies compliance with international standards 

associated with law of war detention (as specified 

in the Geneva Conventions and other international 

conventions) and provides confidential advice for 

suggested improvements to the United States via 

the Joint Task Force Commander and US Southern 

Command. Additionally, detainees are granted 

access to legal representation, and received more than 

847 Military Commissions and 273 Habeas attorney 

visits in fiscal year 2014. Committed to transparency, 

JTF-GTMO hosted 100 media representatives from 

73 domestic and international news organizations and 

answered hundreds of media queries during the past 

year. Similarly, JTF-GTMO also hosted numerous 

Distinguished Visitor visits, including US Senators, 

Representatives, Service Chiefs and senior DOD, 

DHS, DOJ and DoS policy makers.

• Military Commissions: Support for 

the Military Commissions process is a priority 

of JTF- GTMO. These proceedings are open to 

observation by the media, victim family members, 

non-governmental organizations and other visitors. 

In fiscal year 2014, JTF-GTMO supported 14 days 

of hearings which addressed pre-trial motions in the 

case of US v. Mohammad, et al., the five individuals 

accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001 

attacks on the US (referred to in the press as “the 

9/11 Five”) and 16 days of hearings to address pretrial motions in the case of US v. Al Nashiri, the 

alleged USS COLE bomber. Additionally, the Court 

arraigned and conducted two days of hearings to 

address pre-trial motions in the case of US v. Al Iraqi, 

an alleged Al Qaeda commander charged with law of 

war offenses.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 61

USSOUTHCOM AOR. Stationed at the Honduran 

Soto Cano Air Base, JTF-Bravo manages the 

only strategic, all-weather day/night C-5 Galaxycapable airfield in Central America. The JTF, in 

cooperation with our partner nations, executes 

operations and enables multilateral exercises 

in support of the USSOUTHCOM priorities of 

countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and 

building partner capacity (BPC) to promote regional 

cooperation and security in Central America. JTFBravo supports the USSOUTHCOM Commander’s 

objectives in Honduras by executing assigned tasks 

within OPERATION ESCUDO UNIDO.

• CTOC Operations: At the request of 

the Government of Belize, JTF-Bravo provided 

aerial reconnaissance and air movement support 

for Belizean Defense Forces during two separate 

operations to eradicate 110,000 marijuana plants, 

2000 lbs of processed marijuana and 35 lbs of seeds; 

destroying over 56 million dollars of profits. JTFBravo also participated in detection and monitoring 

operations off the Northeastern coast of Honduras to 

develop and train Fuerzas Especial Naval (FEN) boat 

crews, familiarizing them with communication and 

reporting fundamentals, illicit drug trafficking tactics, 

and vessel interception techniques. Finally, JTFBravo supported the Honduran Army’s destruction of 

10 illicit airfields in the Gracias a Dios Department 

by transporting almost 400 troops and 8,500 pounds 

of demolitions to damage airfields used by drug 

trafficking organizations.

• HA/DR Response Operations: At the 

request of the President of Honduras, and directed 

by USSOUTHCOM, JTF-Bravo delivered over 

37,000 lbs of immediate lifesaving rations to isolated 

locations in GaD, which were devastated by severe 

flooding and heavy winds associated with Tropical 

Storm Hanna. JTF-Bravo executed 10 medical 

readiness training exercises, four mobile surgical 

team exercises, and weekly medical training missions 

in local municipalities to improve expeditionary 

readiness and simultaneously provide medical care 

to CENTAM countries. Over the past year, the JTF 

treated 15,886 medical patients, 2,407 dental patients, 

Pacific trafficking showed similar trends, with a 48% 

decrease in the littorals and a 38% increase in the 

non-littorals, including a recent increase in the use of 

routes south of the Galapagos.

• Operation UNIFIED RESOLVE, the 

counter illicit trafficking operation supporting 

Puerto Rico, has improved interoperability between 

JIATF-S, Coast Guard District 7, Coast Guard Sector 

San Juan, and the Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) Office of Air and Marine’s Caribbean Air 

and Marine Branch in Counter-Illicit Trafficking 

operations. Real-time information sharing improved 

OP UNIFIED RESOLVE effectiveness against 

movements of cocaine to Puerto Rico from the primary 

Hispaniola vector. This collaborative effort enhanced 

the effective sharing of resources in today’s austere 

operating environment and resulted in interdiction 

of 15,342 kg of cocaine destined for Puerto Rico in 

FY14.

• Role of Partner Nations: Fifty six percent 

of JIATF-S disruptions happened as a result of Latin 

American partner nation participation. Additionally, 

75 of the 204 (37 percent) illicit trafficking events 

disrupted by JIATF-S were a direct result of the 

participation of our international allies. The maritime 

contributions by the U.K., France, the Netherlands, 

and Canada continued to be significant and will be 

critical to future operations as US Navy resources 

continue to be limited.

• Counter-Transnational Organized Crime/

Counter Network Operations: While focused on 

its primary mission of detection and monitoring of 

illicit traffic, JIATFS established counter network 

and counter threat finance analysis cells to assist 

law enforcement agencies in dismantling the 

Transnational Criminal Organizations responsible 

for the production and shipment of narcotics and for 

undermining the stability and security of the region.

Joint Task Force-Bravo Soto Cano Air Base, 

Honduras

• Joint Task Force-Bravo Summary: Joint 

Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) is a forward- based, 

expeditionary joint task force operating in the 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 62

and 779 surgical patients. JTF-Bravo routinely 

integrates its SOUTHCOM Situational Assessment 

Team (S-SAT) with regional partners to participate 

in natural disaster exercises. The JTF deployed its 

small response package to El Salvador as a part of 

Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 2014 (FA-HUM 14), 

validating tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

response to natural disasters in the region.

• BPC and Supporting Partner Nations: JTFBravo conducted numerous BPC and PN supporting 

events. This included: deploying a Downed Aircraft 

Recovery Team (DART) to Guatemala to assist in 

recovering the wreckage from a helicopter crash on 

20 August 2014; providing subject matter expertise 

leading to revision of the Guatemalan aviation 

safety and standards program; and facilitating 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

Government of Honduras (GoH) repatriation of 

85 Honduran families from the US to locations 

throughout Honduras, by providing limited airfield 

support to DHS contracted aircraft. Additionally, 

JTF-Bravo firefighters conducted expertise exchanges 

with fire departments from Central America. The 

exchanges reinforced firefighting tactics, techniques, 

and procedures, enhancing the partner nation’s 

ability to respond and control fire emergencies. The 

JTF also hosted 54 firefighters from the El Salvador 

Port Authority at Soto Cano Air Base to conduct 

annual firefighting certification. Finally, JTFBravo coordinated and hosted a Pediatric Disaster 

Management Course at Soto Cano Airbase, as well 

as the first ever Advanced Trauma Life Support 

course in Honduras. Both courses certified Honduran 

instructors in the respective specialty areas and 

helped improve Honduran medical capacity.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 63

Senate Armed Services Committee 

Opening Statement by 

General Phil Breedlove, Commander

US European Command

By EUCOM Media Operation Division

United States European Command

Stuttgart, Germany, April 30, 2015

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

distinguished Members of the Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. It is an honor to be here representing 

the dedicated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, 

civilians and families of the US European 

Command. Thank you for all you do to support 

them, as they serve the nation.

Compared to just one year ago, Europe faces 

a very different, and much more challenging 

security environment. One with significant, 

lasting implications for US national security 

interests.

Our top concern is a revanchist Russia.

Russia is blatantly challenging the rules 

and principles that have been the bedrock of 

European security for decades. The challenge is 

global, not regional, and enduring, not temporary.

Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal 

occupation of Crimea, and in its continued 

operations in eastern Ukraine.

In Ukraine, Russia has supplied their proxies 

with heavy weapons, training and mentoring, 

command and control, artillery fire support, and 

tactical-and operational-level air defense, Russia 

has transferred many pieces of military equipment 

into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel 

carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military 

vehicles.

What we have seen over the course of the 

fight, was that when the Russian proxy offensive 

ran into trouble, Russian forces intervened 

directly to “right the course.”

Today on the ground, the situation is volatile 

and fragile. Russian forces used the opportunities 

provided by the recent lull in fighting to reset and 

reposition, while protecting their gains. Many of 

their actions are consistent with preparations for 

another offensive.

The hope remains that both parties will fully 

implement an effective ceasefire as an important 

step toward an acceptable political resolution of 

the conflict, one that respects the internationally 

recognized border.

I am often asked, “Should the United States 

and others provide weapons to Ukraine?” What 

we see is a Russia that is aggressively applying 

all elements of national power—diplomatic, 

informational, and economic, as well as military.

So my view is it would not make sense to 

unnecessarily take any of our own tools off the 

table.

But the crisis in Ukraine is about more than 

just Ukraine. Russian activities are destabilizing 

neighboring states, and the region as a whole, and 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 64

enablers such as intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance.

At the same time, our own US efforts in 

Europe remain essential. Our leadership is 

perhaps more important now than at any time in 

recent history.

Since Russian troops illegally occupied 

Crimea last year, US forces, under the banner 

of Operation Atlantic Resolve, have continued 

to take concerted steps to assure Allies of our 

commitment to their security and to Article V of 

the North Atlantic Treaty—the common defense 

cornerstone of transatlantic security.

EUCOM air, land, maritime and special 

operations forces have maintained presence 

in all three of our NATO allies in the Baltics; 

Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as in 

the Black Sea, providing an array of capabilities 

including airborne, armor, mobile infantry, light 

fighter, strike-fighter, advanced air, and maritime 

presence in addition to training, advising, and 

exercising with host nation forces.

You have made most of this persistent presence 

possible through your support for the European 

Reassurance Initiative, or “ERI.” The assurance 

measures it supports enable the Alliance to 

remain strong and cohesive in this new security 

environment. In facing both of these serious 

challenges—to Europe’s east and to its south - 

EUCOM is working closely with many others, 

our sister COCOMs, NATO partners as well 

as Allies, and other international organizations 

including the European Union. There is plenty 

of work to go around, and our collaboration, and 

our unity, are essential. EUCOM is also drawing 

heavily on great new efforts underway in the 

Department of Defense—not least the Defense 

Innovation Initiative, which applies cutting edge 

approaches to some of the toughest challenges in 

our theater, like anti-access area denial.

The strong threat posed by Russia, and the 

growing challenge to the south, lead me to three 

areas where EUCOM could particularly use your 

help:

Russia’s illegal actions are pushing instability 

closer to the boundaries of NATO.

We cannot be fully certain what Russia 

will do next, and we cannot fully grasp Putin’s 

intent. What we can do is learn from his actions. 

And what we see suggests growing Russian 

capabilities, significant military modernization, 

and ambitious strategic intent.

We also know that Putin responds to strength, 

and seeks opportunities in weakness. We must 

strengthen our deterrence in order to manage his 

opportunistic confidence.

At the same time, Europe also faces the 

challenge of a surge in violent extremism.

European nations are rightly worried about 

foreign fighters returning home to Europe from 

the fight in Syria and Iraq, with new skills and 

malign intent. Attacks like those in France, 

Belgium, and Denmark are only likely to become 

more frequent.

Foreign fighters are part of a much broader 

pattern of insecurity to Europe’s south, with 

roots in the Middle East and North Africa.

Transit routes are shared by violent extremists, 

organized criminal networks, and migrant 

populations fleeing difficult conditions in Libya 

and other under-governed places. The spread 

of instability into Europe, and the transnational 

terrorism we all face could have a direct bearing 

on the national security of the US homeland.

EUCOM is working with European nations 

bilaterally and supporting NATO Alliance 

initiatives, to meet and counter this new and 

more complex security environment.

Based on the decisions made at the NATO 

Wales Summit last year, the Alliance is 

adapting in order to improve its readiness and 

responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or 

RAP, is well underway. Our Allies are stepping 

up, making significant contributions that give 

them a real stake in the outcome. The United 

States will have a key and sustained role to play 

in supporting and enabling these changes—

especially in critical areas that are hardest for 

our Allies to provide, like lift, sustainment, and 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 65

high-power analytical support, and appropriate 

intelligence-sharing with Allies and partners.

The same holds true for effectively waging 

counter-terrorism and counter-ISIL operations 

in and through the European theater. A small 

investment in this capability could lead to a 

large return in our understanding of the complex 

challenges we face.

Third, and finally, sufficient future resourcing.

In the near term, EUCOM’s particular request 

is for your support for European Reassurance 

Initiative for Fiscal Year 2016. Your support 

for ERI in 2015 demonstrated commitment to 

our Allies, increased our ability to shape the 

European Theater, and allowed EUCOM to 

build and sustain the capacity of our Allies and 

partners.

The request for ERI funding in FY16 builds 

on this initiative. Key components include: 

maintaining air superiority presence, participating 

in NATO exercises, supporting the rotational 

presences of an Armored Brigade Combat 

Team, repositioning equipment, funding Global 

Response Force exercises, fostering SOCEUR 

engagement with partners, and increasing Guard 

and Reserve participation across the theater.

We understand that these reassurance 

measures come at a cost, and in the current budget 

environment, additional cost means making 

tough choices. As a result of previous budget 

constraints, EUCOM has already assumed greater 

risk to our mission. Specifically, our deployment 

timelines are longer, our preparations are less 

robust, and our fundamental ability to deter and 

defeat in a timely and effective manner is less 

sure than it was a decade ago.

As Secretary Carter testified recently, further 

reductions would damage our national security, 

and have a direct and lasting impact on our ability 

to protect and defend the nation in and from 

the European Theater. Meanwhile, the security 

challenges in and around Europe are growing 

sharper and more complicated.

First - sufficient persistent forward presence.

Our forward presence in Europe is the 

bedrock of our ability to assure Allies, to deter 

real and potential adversaries, and to be postured 

to act in a timely manner should deterrence fail.

It was our permanent presence in Europe that 

gave EUCOM the ability to respond immediately 

after Russian troops illegally occupied Crimea. 

Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in 

Germany deployed to the Baltic States and 

Poland within 96 hours of receiving their mission. 

And our F-15s from Lakenheath, England began 

flying missions out of Poland within 18 hours of 

mission receipt.

That same permanent presence ensures 

that EUCOM can play a full array of essential 

supporting roles for other Combatant 

Commands—from neighboring AFRICOM and 

CENTCOM, to STRATCOM and TRANSCOM.

Rotational presence is not a substitute 

for permanent forward presence in building 

relationships or signaling our commitment. A 

fully funded rotational presence can play an 

important role in helping meet the requirements 

in our theater—but only if it is heel-to-toe and 

properly resourced.

Second—sufficient intelligence support.

Since the end of the Cold War, our nation’s 

community of Russian area experts has shrunk 

considerably, and intelligence assets of all kinds 

have been shifted to the wars we’ve been fighting 

or to understanding potential future threats.

Russian military operations over the past 

year, in Ukraine and in the region more broadly, 

have underscored that there are critical gaps 

in our collection and analysis. Some Russian 

military exercises have caught us by surprise, 

and our textured feel for Russian involvement 

on the ground in Ukraine has been quite limited.

Earlier indications and warning—and the 

ability to better understand Moscow’s thinking 

and intent—are absolutely critical for avoiding 

future surprise and miscalculation, for deterring 

effectively, and for preparing to respond if 

required. Getting this right requires more ISR, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 66

Your support for EUCOM’s mission, and 

your tireless efforts to chart a long-term path 

toward resourcing a strong national defense, are 

critical steps to ensuring the enduring ability of 

EUCOM, and DOD, to protect and defend this 

great nation.

From the dedicated men and women serving 

in the European Theater, thank you for your 

time and attention, and I look forward to your 

questions.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 67

Statement of 

General Lloyd J. Austin III, 

Commander, US Central Command 

Before the House Appropriations 

Committee—Defense Committee on 

the Posture of US Central Command

5 Mar 2015

Introduction

We are in the midst of one of the most 

tumultuous periods in history. There is growing 

unrest throughout much of the world, while a 

vast array of malevolent actors seek to capitalize 

on the increasing instability to promote their own 

interests. This trend is especially pronounced in 

the Central Region, where state and non-state 

actors are in conflict, and the resulting turmoil 

impacts the affected countries and also directly 

affects the global economy and the security of 

the United States. In light of this, the US must 

continue to exert strong leadership and act 

vigorously to protect our core national interests 

in this strategically important region. An effective 

‘whole of government’ approach is essential. At 

US Central Command (USCENTCOM), our aim 

is to see a positive transformation of the region 

over time, achieved by, with, and through our 

regional partners. Despite the challenges that 

exist in our area of responsibility (AOR), we do 

see progress being made in some areas, along 

with many opportunities. We are confident that 

our actions in pursuit of these opportunities 

will continue to produce positive results in the 

coming days. 

Looking ahead, our partners will need to 

assume a larger share of the burden for providing 

improved stability in the region. Given the stakes 

involved, we must keep on assisting them in their 

efforts. At the same time, we have to find additional 

methods for dealing with the convergence of 

compound threats under increasing budget and 

resource constraints. We must be judicious in 

our decision-making. Particularly during this 

volatile period, we cannot afford restrictions 

or reductions that would degrade our military 

posture and put our core national interests at 

greater risk. Simply stated, if we hope to achieve 

improved security which provides for greater 

stability and prosperity around the globe, then the 

Central Region must remain a foremost priority. 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 68

Recent actions by the Huthis and also 

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula coupled 

with the resignation of President Hadi and the 

subsequent upheaval in the government are 

cause for significant and growing concern. If the 

situation continues to erode, and it remains on 

a negative trajectory now, Yemen could fracture 

and we could end up losing a key partner in our 

counter- terrorism (CT) fight and cede additional 

ungoverned space for our adversaries to operate 

out of. Meanwhile, we are also watching with 

interest what occurs in Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan, 

and other parts of the region. 

Without a doubt these are challenging times. 

There is a great deal at stake for the US and our 

partner nations. At USCENTCOM, we remain 

confident that we have the right strategy in 

place to safeguard our interests, to effectively 

address challenges and pursue opportunities, and 

ultimately to accomplish our mission on behalf 

of the Nation. That said, we depend upon the 

authorities and funding provided by Congress to 

execute our strategy and to do what is required 

to defend our core national interests at home 

and around the globe. Without question, our 

ability to do so and our overall readiness are 

put at grave risk by the continued reductions 

made to the defense budget, and specifically as 

a result of the Budget Control Act. We are in the 

midst of a tumultuous and unpredictable period. 

We are constantly responding to unforeseen 

contingencies and facing multiple threats from 

a wide range of actors that include nation states 

and transnational extremist groups. We cannot 

afford to constrict our ability to do so effectively 

by maintaining across-the-board spending cuts 

that severely limit our flexibility and authority 

to apply critical defense resources based on 

demand and the current security environment. If 

Sequestration goes back into effect in FY 2016, 

we will be increasingly vulnerable to external 

threats. 

A Retrospective Look

This past year has been especially busy for 

USCENTCOM. In Afghanistan, we completed 

our transition from combat operations to our 

train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counterterrorism (CT) missions. The Afghans are now in 

the lead for all security operations. They continue 

to demonstrate significant capability and a strong 

desire to build upon the progress achieved over 

the past 13+ years. In recent months, we also 

saw significant advancements made on the 

political front as a new unity government was 

established. President Ashraf Ghani and CEO 

Abdullah Abdullah have indicated a strong desire 

to work closely with USG leadership in pursuit 

of shared objectives. While much work remains 

to be done in Afghanistan, I am optimistic that 

developments will continue to trend in the right 

direction. At the same time, we are focused on 

the situation in Iraq and Syria. We responded 

quickly and effectively to the rapid expansion of 

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 

the early summer of 2014. We continue to take 

the necessary measures to counter this barbaric 

enemy which operates out of ungoverned and 

under-governed spaces in both countries. We 

are currently executing our regional campaign 

plan to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, 

and we are doing so with the support of a broad 

Coalition consisting of 62 other countries and 

organizations. However, as was clearly stated 

at the outset, this will take time and we must 

maintain strategic patience. 

We also continue to closely monitor Iran’s 

actions. Our diplomats are working diligently to 

negotiate an acceptable agreement with respect 

to Iran’s nuclear program, and we hope that they 

will be successful. But, regardless of the outcome 

of the P5+1 discussions, our relationship with 

Iran will remain a challenging one, as we are 

very concerned by their unhelpful behavior in a 

number of areas. We also are paying especially 

close attention to the situation in Yemen. 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 69

The principal currents include the growing ethnosectarian divide; the struggle between moderates 

and extremists, particularly Islamist-based 

extremists; rejection of corruption and oppressive 

governments; and, the “youth bulge,” which 

reflects the many young, educated, unemployed 

or under-employed and disenfranchised 

individuals in the region who are ripe for 

recruitment by extremist groups. To be effective, 

our approach in dealing with the challenges that 

exist in the region must address these complex 

root causes. In particular, the governments and 

people of the region must bridge the growing 

ethno- sectarian divide, elevate the voice of 

moderates, rid governments of corruption, guard 

against ungoverned and under-governed spaces, 

and make sure that young people have better 

opportunities and are able to contribute to society 

in meaningful ways. 

Of course, change will not occur overnight. 

It will take time to adjust peoples’ mindsets and 

to counter deeply-engrained prejudices. But, it 

must be done by the governments and people in 

the region. Only they can bring about enduring, 

positive change, with our engagement and 

support. Indeed, we do have a critical role to 

play in this important endeavor and we must take 

action where necessary to counter exigent threats. 

We are helping our partners to build additional 

capacity and also foster stronger military-tomilitary relationships. The goal is to enable them 

to assume a greater share of the responsibility 

and do what is required to bring about improved 

stability in the region. 

There are a number of challenges present in 

the Central Region that require our engagement 

to mitigate the potential negative effects. These 

include ongoing operations in Afghanistan, 

our activities in Iraq and Syria in support of 

Operation Inherent Resolve, and our efforts in a 

host of other locations in USCENTCOM’s AOR. 

Ultimately, our goal in all cases is to move things 

in the direction of greater stability and to ensure 

assured access and freedom of movement, 

recognizing that a secure, stable, and prosperous 

USCENTCOM’s Mission

USCENTCOM’s mission statement is: 

“With national and international partners, 

USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among 

nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats 

state and non-state aggression, and supports 

development and, when necessary, reconstruction 

in order to establish the conditions for regional 

security, stability and prosperity.” 

Strategic Environment. The Central Region 

is an area rich in history, culture, and tradition. It 

is one of the most strategically important regions, 

holding well over half of the world’s proven oil 

reserves and plentiful natural gas deposits, which 

are crucial to the global energy market. 

The US and our partners have core national 

interests in this part of the world; interests 

that include the free flow of resources through 

key shipping lanes; the prevention of the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 

and, the defense of our homeland against the 

very real and persistent threat of terrorism and 

extremism. Unfortunately, it also is an area that 

is plagued by violence and instability, political 

discord, economic stagnation, resource shortages 

(e.g., water), ethnic and religious tensions, 

and wide expanses of ungoverned or undergoverned space. Alone or in combination, these 

provocative factors often make for a volatile 

environment that puts our interests and those of 

our partners at risk. Indeed, when things go badly 

in the Central Region, it has a clear and sizeable 

impact on the affected countries and other parts 

of the globe. For this reason it is an area of the 

world that merits our continued focus. 

Of note, more so than in the past, individuals 

and groups today are coalescing around ethnic 

and sectarian issues, rather than national identity. 

This is fracturing institutions (e.g., governments, 

militaries) along sectarian lines and creating 

factional rifts within populations. This growing 

strain, coupled with other “underlying currents,” 

fuels much of the tension and conflict that is 

present today across the USCENTCOM AOR. 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 70

government teams, to support crisis response; 

optimize military resources.

Develop and execute security cooperation 

programs, improving bilateral and multi-lateral 

partnerships, building partnered “capacities,” 

and improving information sharing, security, and 

stability.

Critical Focus Areas. While we remain 

focused on the broad range of challenges present 

today in the Central Region, there are particular 

areas that merit a sizeable portion of our attention 

and resources. These areas are strategically 

important because of the potential impact on our 

core national interests and those of our partners. 

Below are descriptions of the current critical 

focus areas, along with a listing of some of the 

key opportunities that we are actively pursuing in 

an effort to improve stability in USCENTCOM’s 

AOR. 

Protection of Nation States. Historically, 

nation states have been the dominant players 

globally. However, in recent years we have 

witnessed the emergence of transnational 

extremist groups that desire and, in some cases, 

demonstrate the ability to operate as major players 

with unfavorable intentions. In many ways they 

are attempting to behave like nation states and, 

in so doing, they threaten the structures, rules, 

norms, and values that define the sovereignty of 

our nation-state based international system. 

These transnational violent extremist 

organizations (VEO) are ideologically opposed 

to and target the nation states of the Central 

Region. They conduct attacks and terrorize 

local populaces in an effort to gain power and 

influence. This, in turn, weakens the nation states 

and generates increased instability. This is of 

obvious concern to us, given that nation states are 

typically anchors for stability across the globe, 

with some exceptions (e.g., Iran, Syria). Thus, the 

US has a vested interest in buttressing our partner 

nations in the Central Region when necessary as 

part of a larger ‘whole of government’ effort to 

build regional stability through effective security 

assistance and support for inclusive governance. 

Central Region is in the best interest of the United 

States and our partners and allies. 

USCENTCOM Priorities

Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will remain 

ready, engaged and vigilant—effectively 

integrated with other instruments of power; 

strengthening relationships with partners; and 

supporting bilateral and multilateral collective 

defense relationships to counter adversaries, 

improve security, support enduring stability, and 

secure our core interests in the Central Region. 

In support of this vision, the command remains 

focused on a wide range of issues, activities, and 

operations, including our priority efforts: 

Degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL in order 

to prevent the further spread of sectarian-fueled 

radical extremism, and to mitigate the continuing 

Iraq-Syria crisis.

Continue support to Afghanistan, in 

partnership with NATO, as a regionally integrated, 

secure, stable and developing country.

Defeat Al Qaeda, deny violent extremists 

safe havens and freedom of movement, and limit 

the reach of terrorists.

Counter malign Iranian influence, while 

reducing and mitigating against the negative 

impacts of surrogates and proxies.

Support a whole of government approach to 

developments in Yemen, preventing Yemen from 

becoming an ungoverned space for AQ/VEOs; 

retain CT capacity in the region.

Maintain credible general and specific 

deterrent capability and capacity to counter Iran.

Prevent, and if required, counter the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 

disrupt their development and prevent their use.

Protect lines of communication, ensure free 

use of the shared spaces (including the cyber 

commons), and secure unimpeded global access 

for legal commerce.

Shape, support, and maintain ready, flexible 

regional Coalitions and partners, as well as 

cross-CCMD and interagency US whole-of-
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 71

environment using unconventional warfare and 

traditional terrorist tactics; 2) seize and hold 

territory; and 3) influence, shape, and define 

the conflict using sophisticated information 

operations. Importantly, although significantly 

degraded in recent months, ISIL still possesses 

the resources and organizational structure to pose 

a credible threat to the Government of Iraq (GoI). 

The erosion of Iraqi and regional stability caused 

by ISIL places extreme political and economic 

strain on Jordan, Lebanon, under-governed 

border areas, and, by extension, the broader Gulf 

and Levant sub- regions. 

That said, ISIL is not a monolith; rather it is 

a symptom of the larger problems that continue 

to threaten the Central Region. In particular, 

the growing divide between ethno-sectarian 

groups and between religious moderates and 

radical Islamists, have created ideal conditions 

for a group like ISIL to take root. Over a period 

of years the previous government alienated 

important segments of its society, notably the 

Sunni and Kurdish populations, which resulted 

in growing disenfranchisement among these 

groups. ISIL capitalized on this opportunity and 

launched a successful blitz into Iraq absent much 

resistance and with support from local Sunnis 

who viewed ISIL as a means for bringing about 

a change in their government. The Sunnis simply 

refused to fight; and, in so doing, they facilitated 

ISIL’s offensive. The remaining Iraqi security 

forces were largely incapable of mounting a 

credible defense against ISIL. After we departed 

Iraq in 2011, the leadership of the country made 

a series of poor decisions. Among them was the 

decision to stop training the security forces, to 

stop maintaining their equipment, and to assign 

leaders based on sectarian loyalty rather than 

competence, merit, and experience. As a result, 

the security forces’ skills atrophied and the 

condition of their vehicles and weapon systems 

deteriorated. This precipitated a number of 

defeats early on in ISIL’s push towards Baghdad. 

This past September, President Obama 

announced to the American people that the 

As directed, we intervene to counter external 

threats, such as al Qaeda and ISIL. While our 

primary purpose for doing so is to protect US 

interests, we also take action to allow time 

and space for the nation states in the region to 

build sufficient capacity to protect their own 

sovereignty. And, we support them through our 

planned regional engagements, our training and 

exercise programs, and foreign military sales 

(FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) 

programs; all of which are designed to further 

enhance our partners nations’ military capacity. 

One of the key opportunities that exist amidst 

the challenges posed by transnational VEOs is to 

persuade our partners in the region of the urgent 

need to build their military capacity so that they 

are better able to defend their own sovereign 

territory against such threats. Our regional 

partners are very concerned about the threat 

posed by ISIL and other VEOs. More importantly, 

many in the region recognize that if they do not 

do something to address the root causes of the 

growing instability, they can all but guarantee 

continued political upheaval and anarchy. Again, 

transformational change can only be achieved by 

the governments and people of the region. 

They must decide that the instability caused 

by the “underlying currents” merits greater 

action on their part, and they must do more to 

address the root causes of many of the problems 

that exist in their region. We can and will support 

them; but, they must lead the effort. 

Iraq-Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve).

We remain highly focused on the crisis in Iraq 

and in Syria. Since launching its major offensive 

from eastern Syria into Iraq in early June, ISIL, 

which is commonly referred to by our partners 

in the region as “DA’ESH,” has largely erased 

the internationally recognized boundary between 

Iraq and Syria and has sought to establish a proto 

state in the deserts of eastern Syria and western 

Iraq. ISIL’s goal is to spur regional instability in 

order to establish an Islamic Caliphate. To achieve 

this end, ISIL has employed three primary lines 

of effort: 1) instill fear and shape the operational 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 72

leverage their information operations to amplify 

the significance of these attacks. However, 

they are unable to achieve decisive effects. The 

effort in Iraq continues to represent our main 

focus. The actions that we are taking now in 

Syria against ISIL are shaping the conditions 

in Iraq. Specifically, our precision air strikes 

are disrupting ISIL’s command and control, 

attriting its forces and leadership, slowing the 

flow of reinforcements from Syria into Iraq, and 

interrupting the resourcing of their operations. 

The more than 2,600 total air strikes conducted 

in Iraq and Syria over the past several months 

have been extremely effective. 

Of course, the United States is not doing 

this alone. Our efforts are intended to enable the 

broader, ‘whole of government’ approach that is 

currently underway among various departments 

and agencies in the US government. Equally 

important are the contributions being made by 

our Coalition partners. Indeed, the Coalition 

represents the strength and cohesion of our 

campaign. In particular, the active and public 

involvement of five Arab-led nations, specifically 

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, 

Bahrain, and Qatar, has greatly enhanced the 

fight and sends a clear message to ISIL and other 

VEOs that their actions will not be tolerated. 

Ultimately, the intent of our regional 

campaign is not simply to destroy ISIL, 

although that is a primary objective. Even more 

importantly, we want to do what we can to help 

change the conditions inside of Iraq and Syria 

so that what we see happening there now, does 

not happen again in the future. The key to doing 

so is enabling indigenous forces to defend their 

own borders and provide for the security of their 

sovereign territory. This is the goal of our advise 

and assist and build partner capacity efforts 

currently underway in Iraq, and soon in Syria. 

We are also working with the Government of 

Iraq (GoI) to train Sunni tribal elements. Equally 

important, we are providing, in coordination with 

the GoI, support for the Kurds who continue to 

play a significant role in the fight against ISIL. 

United States, with the support of a broad 

Coalition, would take action to degrade and 

ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive 

and sustained counter-terrorism strategy. We are 

currently in the early stages of our counter-ISIL 

campaign, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). 

Our military campaign plan is comprised of five 

key elements. They will be achieved in a logical 

progression; although many of the efforts will 

occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. 

First, we must counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria. 

Our intent is to employ a Coalition effort in 

Iraq to halt the advance of ISIL and to enable 

the Iraqis to regain their territory and reestablish 

control over their border. Once we’ve halted 

ISIL’s advance in Iraq, which we have done, we 

said that we would need to contain ISIL, and we 

are doing so with the assistance of our Coalition 

partners, including Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. 

We are working with them to ensure they have 

the capacity to secure their sovereign borders. 

We also said that we would need to enable the 

moderate Syrian opposition forces through our 

train and equip efforts. Our goal is to develop 

a reliable partner that can assist in countering 

ISIL on the ground inside of Syria. Eventually 

we want to eliminate ungoverned spaces out 

of which ISIL and other terrorist groups have 

been operating by enabling the indigenous 

security forces to defend their own sovereign 

territories. Once we do all of these things, we 

will have defeated ISIL through a combination of 

sustained pressure, a systematic dismantling of 

ISIL’s capabilities, and by effectively expanding 

our regional partners’ CT capacities. 

Our military campaign is having the desired 

effects. Iraqi security forces, to include Iraqi Army 

and Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) forces, 

Kurdish Peshmerga, and tribal elements, with 

the support of US and Coalition air operations, 

have halted ISIL’s advance in Iraq. The enemy 

is now in a “defensive crouch,” and is unable to 

conduct major operations and seize additional 

territory. We can expect that ISIL will continue 

to conduct ineffective counter-attacks and 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 73

keep the levels of violence comparatively low 

across the country. 

It is also worth noting that the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) consistently ranks as 

the country’s most respected institution. This 

popularity largely reflects the improved quality 

of life that many Afghans are experiencing now 

as the country becomes increasingly safer and 

more stable. In recent years, life expectancy 

rates for Afghans have improved and the infant 

mortality rate has declined. Opportunities for 

Afghan women also have expanded; women now 

represent one- quarter of the labor force and 28% 

of the National Parliament. And, education and 

literacy levels have increased. In 2001, 900,000 

Afghans were enrolled in primary and secondary 

schools. Today, there are more than 8.0 million 

students enrolled in school; and, 39% of them are 

females. Unemployment or underemployment 

has also decreased from 50% to 35%. By 

almost all metrics, progress in Afghanistan 

has been significant over the past 13+ years. 

Numerous polls conducted in 2014 indicate 

that the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan (GIRoA) enjoys tremendous 

popular support. Polling reports have shown that 

more than 80% of Afghans believe their lives are 

improving. This is positive news; however, there 

is still much work to be done and the Afghans 

will need to continue to build upon the progress 

achieved thus far. They recognize this and clearly 

demonstrate their intent to do the right things 

going forward. 

The Afghans have the capability to provide 

for the security of their people and they 

demonstrate this on a daily basis. However, they 

do still need some help with sustainment; and, 

that includes resupply operations, particularly 

to remote or mountainous areas. They need 

help with fixed- wing and rotary-wing aviation; 

and also with intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance support. Additionally, due to the 

delay in government formation, some key leaders 

who will see the Afghans through the upcoming 

fighting seasons have only recently assumed 

All that said, the effects of our military efforts 

will be short-lived if the Iraqis do not effectively 

address their political problems. The crisis in 

Iraq will not be solved through military means 

alone. The Iraqis have a new government and 

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has vowed to be 

more inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds and 

other minority groups. We are encouraged by the 

early steps he has taken to reach out to the Sunnis 

and Kurds and we are urging him to follow 

through on pledges made in the near-term. This 

is not a minor issue, as the government cannot 

succeed long-term without that support. National 

reconciliation is absolutely critical to the success 

of the counter-ISIL campaign. 

A key opportunity that exists amidst the 

challenges posed by ISIL is to create conditions 

that reduce ungoverned spaces and allow for 

inclusion, security, and good governance in 

both Iraq and Syria. We pursue this opportunity, 

in part, by training, advising, and assisting the 

Iraqi Security Forces, helping them to re-build 

their capacity, and restructuring them to ensure 

greater inclusiveness. With your support, we have 

also have established a program to train, equip 

and sustain elements of the Syrian moderate 

opposition. We anticipate that these forces will 

make important contributions toward degrading 

and defeating ISIL, and they also will help to 

guard against ungoverned spaces, protect local 

populations, and help to create the conditions for 

a negotiated political settlement to the conflict 

in Syria that leads to more responsible and 

responsive governance. 

Afghanistan (Operation Freedom’s 

Sentinel). The engagement in Afghanistan 

remains a top priority. We conducted a successful 

transition from combat to stability operations, 

and we continue to help the Afghans to build 

and mature a capable and sustainable Afghan 

National Security Force (ANSF). Today, the 

ANSF consists of approximately 326,000 

Afghans. They, not us, are in the lead for all 

security operations and they are managing to 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 74

possibilities for reconciliation. President Ghani, 

CEO Abdullah, and their new government have 

indicated their strong desire to work with us and 

to continue to strengthen our partnership in the 

coming days. Looking ahead, our intent is to 

maintain a close relationship with the Afghan 

government and military as we work together to 

preserve improved security and stability in the 

region. At the same time, while the size of our 

footprint will decrease in the coming years, our 

continued presence in Afghanistan will allow us 

to maintain much-needed pressure on al Qaeda 

and other extremist groups. 

Countering Terrorism and Violent 

Extremist Organizations (VEO). As I travel 

around the region, I routinely hear from senior 

military leaders that they do not necessarily fear 

groups like ISIL’s military prowess so much as 

they fear the groups’ ideologies. These groups 

clearly demonstrate their ability to inspire 

extremist behavior and to recruit individuals in 

support of their causes. 

In recent years, VEOs have increasingly 

exploited ungoverned or under-governed spaces 

in USCENTCOM’s AOR. The extremists’ use 

of these areas threatens regional security, as 

well as US core national interests. They are 

able to plan and launch attacks, undermine local 

governments, and exercise malign influence 

from these spaces. At the same time, VEOs and 

other militant proxies continue to exploit security 

vacuums in countries experiencing political 

transitions and unrest, namely Iraq and Syria, 

Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon. Chronic instability, 

disenfranchised populations, and weak regional 

governments provide new footholds for a resilient 

and expanding global jihadist movement and 

an ideal environment for Iran and its allies to 

aggressively undermine US regional goals. 

Of note, ISIL’s rise as a competitor to al Qaeda 

(AQ) has significantly impacted the jihadist 

landscape. The two groups are now competing 

for recruits, resources, and publicity. This will 

likely result in increased terrorist attacks in 

their new positions. We will need to work closely 

with them to enable their success and aid them 

in building additional needed military capacity. 

We cannot afford for Afghanistan to once again 

become a safe haven for extremist groups. 

Increased instability and diminished security 

would not only affect Afghanistan, but also the 

Central Asia region as a whole. 

Of course, enduring stability in Afghanistan 

will not be achieved through military means 

alone. There must be a credible, reliable, and 

responsive government in place. Fortunately, 

after a challenging election, Afghanistan has 

begun to move forward politically under the 

National Unity Government led by President 

Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah. 

Both leaders share similar priorities and beliefs, 

and they have signaled a strong desire to see 

the government succeed. They also are actively 

countering corruption, which represents a 

principal inhibitor of GIRoA success. Theirs is 

not an easy undertaking; however, I do believe 

that they can be effective together. 

There is challenging work ahead for the 

government and people of Afghanistan. However, 

as I look at the country, I remain cautiously 

optimistic that developments will continue to 

trend in the right direction. We have been in 

Afghanistan for more than 13 years, representing 

the longest period of continuous conflict fought 

by our Nation’s all-volunteer force. Together 

with our Afghan and Coalition partners, we 

have invested many lives and other precious 

resources with the goal of improving stability in 

that country, and we want to do all that we can to 

preserve those hard-earned gains. 

Amidst the challenges posed by the current 

situation in Afghanistan is the opportunity to 

foster a strong relationship between the United 

States and Afghanistan and with other partner 

nations in the Central and South Asia (CASA) 

sub-region. In particular, this would contribute 

to improved Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, 

which would allow for increased counterterrorism cooperation in the region, along with 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 75

must sustain our active measures to address this 

growing threat. 

An important opportunity that exists in the 

Central Region is to limit the overall reach and 

effectiveness of VEOs, while also reducing the 

amount of ungoverned or under-governed space 

in which these groups typically operate. To do 

so, many of our partners acknowledge the need 

to counter radical extremists’ ideologies, in part 

by helping to amplify the voice of moderates in 

the region. They also recognize the need to limit 

access to ungoverned and under-governed spaces; 

thereby diminishing the reach and effectiveness 

of violent extremists operating in the region. 

By setting the right conditions and helping to 

promote the efforts of moderate and influential 

regional leaders, we may achieve significant and 

lasting improvements. And, these improvements 

are likely to have pervasive positive effects on 

the global security environment. 

Iran. Iran represents the most significant 

threat to the Central Region. Our diplomats have 

been hard at work, trying to reach an agreement 

with Iran with respect to its nuclear program. 

The most recent extension allows for continued 

negotiations through 1 July 2015. While we 

remain hopeful that the two sides will eventually 

reach an acceptable deal, it is presently unclear 

how things will play out. We have to be prepared 

for what comes next. We will be prepared. 

In the meantime, we remain very concerned 

about Iran’s behavior in other areas. Iran continues 

to pursue policies that threaten US strategic 

interests and goals throughout the Middle East. 

In addition to its nuclear program, Iran has a 

significant cyber capability, as well as the largest 

and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the 

Middle East. With ranges up to ~ 2,000 km, Iran 

is able to strike targets throughout the region with 

increasing precision using creatively adapted 

foreign technologies to improve its missile 

arsenal. It also has increased its anti-access areadenial air defense capabilities. Iran is improving 

its counter-maritime capabilities (e.g., mines, 

small boats, cruise missiles, submarines), which 

the near-term as ISIL, AQ, and other elements 

attempt to out-do one another. 

Meanwhile, the AQ movement is becoming 

more diffuse and decentralized as compared to 

pre- 9/11. The risk of affiliates and allies operating 

in more areas and increasingly collaborating and 

coordinating with one another as a transnational 

loosely-confederated ‘syndicate’ is cause for 

concern. The AQ ideology remains persuasive, 

attracting and radicalizing susceptible individuals 

in the region. Thus, it is critical that we maintain 

our vigilance in countering the group and its 

narrative. 

We must also continue to look for ways to 

effectively counter ISIL. As noted earlier, ISIL 

seeks to broaden its reach beyond Iraq and Syria, 

and will try to leverage regional instability to 

revive a caliphate stretching from Europe to 

North Africa to South Asia. ISIL has already 

received pledges of allegiance from smaller 

jihadist groups in Yemen, Egypt, Libya and 

Algeria, and they have inspired lone-wolf attacks 

in Algeria and the West. 

Other extremist groups have leveraged Syria’s 

security vacuum, including the AQ-affiliated 

Al Nusrah Front (ANF). As the civil war in 

Syria continues, ANF will threaten neighboring 

states, particularly Israel and Lebanon, where 

the group has launched anti-Hezbollah attacks. 

The ongoing Syrian conflict has also created a 

safe haven for the Khorasan Group, a network 

of veteran AQ operatives, providing them with 

territory to plot and train for attacks against the 

West and the US homeland. 

The Iraq-Syria area of operations is the 

premier destination for jihadist foreign fighters, 

with over 15,000 coming from around the globe, 

and particularly Africa, Europe, Asia, and North 

America. The majority of these fighters are 

joining ISIL’s ranks, although some have joined 

ANF and other Syrian opposition groups. As 

these conflicts carry on, returning battle-hardened 

foreign fighters will pose increasing risk to their 

home countries, including the United States. We 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 76

and Iran which were addressed in the previous 

section, “Critical Focus Areas” (see pages 8-21): 

The Gulf States – The Gulf States have proven 

to be valuable Coalition partners, engaging in 

and supporting offensive operations against ISIL 

and providing the indispensable access, basing 

and overflight privileges that are critical to the 

conduct of operations in the region. In recent 

months, we have seen some improvement in 

relations between and among the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 

and Qatar after a period of increased tensions. 

A convergence of interests, namely the need to 

counter the increasing threat posed by ISIL and 

other violent extremists groups, has afforded a 

unique opportunity to strengthen the Coalition 

and also contribute to improving stability and 

security in the broader Middle East region. In 

many ways, ISIL’s expansion in Iraq has forced the 

Gulf States to take more seriously the threat posed 

by ISIL and other violent extremist groups. As a 

result, they have begun to take a more proactive 

approach to countering extremist financing and 

foreign fighter facilitation. They must maintain 

their focus and continue to make much-needed 

progress in these areas. At the same time, we are 

strengthening our partners’ military capacity as 

part of a collective security architecture designed 

to deter and, where necessary, counter Iranian 

hegemonic ambitions. Going forward, we will 

play a key role in making sure that our partners 

remain united on common interests and security 

challenges. 

In late January of this year, the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia (KSA) saw a smooth transition of 

power, as King Salman bin Abdulaziz ascended 

to the throne after the death of his brother, King 

Abdullah. King Salman comes to power during 

a very challenging period. The threat from ISIL, 

particularly along Saudi’s northern border, and 

from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

and the Huthis in the south, has led KSA to 

take a more proactive role in safeguarding the 

Kingdom’s interests in the region. In particular, 

KSA’s prominent role in the campaign against 

serve to threaten the flow of global commerce in 

the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps most concerning, 

Iran routinely engages in malign activity through 

the Iranian Threat Network (ITN) consisting 

of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards CorpsQods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security, and its surrogates, businesses, and 

logistics support. Iran also engages in malign 

activity through support to proxy actors such as 

Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas which threatens 

the sovereignty and security of Israel. 

During the past year, the ITN primarily 

focused on Sunni groups in the Iraq and 

Syria-based conflict (including the moderate 

opposition in Syria) by bolstering the Syrian and 

Iraqi governments and overseeing engagements 

involving its own militant forces. Iran also 

maintains the ability to expand the scope of its 

activities. This is troubling as Iranian malign 

influence is enflaming sectarian tensions that 

are all too often exploited by violent extremist 

elements in the region. Needless to say, our 

relationship with Iran remains a challenging 

one. We will continue to pay close attention to 

their actions, and we will remain steadfast with 

our regional partners and do what we can to 

help improve their capacity to counter Iran and 

mitigate the effects of their malign activity. 

One of the key opportunities that exist with 

respect to Iran is the prospect of an acceptable 

agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program. If 

the P5+1 are able to reach a long-term resolution, 

that would represent a step in the right direction 

and may present an unprecedented opportunity 

for positive change in the Central Region. 

A Regional Perspective

In many ways our military-to-military 

relationships continue to represent the cornerstone 

of America’s partnerships with the nation states 

in the USCENTCOM AOR. Below are synopses 

of the status of those relationships, along with 

the current state of affairs in each of the 20 

countries, minus Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 77

them typically measured in their support for 

Gulf Arab regional initiatives. Overall, Kuwait 

continues to provide critical support to the US 

and partner nations while managing these internal 

political challenges. 

Our military-to-military relationship with 

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continues 

along its historically positive trajectory. UAE’s 

growing concerns regarding the spread of 

extremist ideologies and the threat that they pose 

to UAE’s internal security and regional stability 

prompted the Emirates to take an active role in 

the counter-ISIL campaign. They continue to 

demonstrate their value as a strategic partner 

by proactively addressing some of the region’s 

toughest problems. Their military capability is 

arguably the best among the GCC states. UAE’s 

is also the most expeditionary military, deploying 

forces in support of operations in Afghanistan 

and Syria. In addition to their participation in the 

ongoing air operations in Syria, UAE also has 

offered to send forces and personnel to support 

the military advise and assist mission and one 

of the four training sites in Iraq. Of note, the 

Emirates have a much broader definition of 

extremism and they want to expand the counterISIL military campaign to include a wide range of 

groups they perceive as extremist, from Islamist 

political groups to Salafi jihadist groups. Going 

forward, we will look to further strengthen our 

security cooperation partnership with UAE 

through continued engagement and through our 

FMS program. 

Qatar remains one of our most stalwart 

partners in the Gulf, hosting three of our 

forward headquarters (USCENTCOM, US Air 

Forces Central Command, Special Operations 

Command Central) and facilities and providing 

us with unimpeded access to the region. The 

Qataris were among the first to offer a site for the 

Syria Train & Equip program, along with a place 

to host the now-established Combined Joint 

Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) headquarters. 

Qatar also continues to play an active role in the 

counter-ISIL campaign. Unlike KSA, Bahrain, 

ISIL, to include its participation in air operations 

in Syria and in support of the Syria Train & 

Equip program, has paved the way for other 

Arab nations to join the Coalition efforts to 

counter ISIL. Recognizing the need for enhanced 

maritime security in the Gulf, the Saudis assumed 

command of the Gulf Maritime Security Task 

Force for the first time this year. Their leadership 

is critically important in demonstrating the 

cohesion of the Combined Maritime Forces 

generally and the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) nations in particular. Of note, the Saudis 

have taken a lead role in reconciling the Gulf 

States. Looking ahead, our continued support 

of advanced Saudi defense competencies and 

further improvements in US-Saudi military 

interoperability are expected to yield positive 

impacts, which will in turn contribute to greater 

stability in the region and beyond. 

Kuwait remains a long-time partner and 

strong and reliable ally in the region, providing 

critical support for US and Coalition troops, 

vehicles, and equipment deployed in support 

of Operation Inherent Resolve. In addition to 

providing a permissive environment for our 

deployed forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, 

Kuwait plays a significant role in the retrograde of 

equipment from Afghanistan. They also continue 

to provide critical basing and access for US 

forces and capabilities needed to address future 

contingencies. The Kuwaitis are committed to 

advancing regional cooperative defense efforts 

as evidenced by their role as a key interlocutor 

between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain 

in response to recent tensions, as well as the 

extensive preparation they have done to host the 

Eagle Resolve multi-national training exercise in 

the spring of 2015. The Kuwaitis also have made 

significant progress towards reconciling the subregion’s long-standing issues with Iraq, leading 

Gulf Arab diplomatic outreach efforts with 

the Government of Iraq. The Kuwaitis remain 

committed to accommodating all segments of 

their population to preserve internal stability, 

particularly Sunnis and Shia; and, this has made 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 78

munitions for some of its aviation systems, and it 

remains firm in its support for US assets at Naval 

Support Activity Bahrain. 

Continue: http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/

commanders-posture-statement-en

and especially UAE, Qatar makes a distinction 

between Salafi jihadist and political Islamist 

groups, which creates a challenge in terms of how 

we approach countering extremist groups in the 

region. That said, the Qataris’ relationships with 

a wide range of groups, including more moderate 

elements, could present potential opportunities. 

During the past 12 months, the Qatari 

Armed Forces have concluded extensive FMS 

equipment purchases and submitted additional 

requests. All told, 2014 saw the Qataris allocate 

billions of dollars to arm their forces with cutting 

edge American weaponry. This show of renewed 

and expanding cooperation with the US defense 

industry clearly reflects the Qataris’ drive for 

greater military interoperability with the United 

States. Future collaboration with Qatar may see 

the genesis of a partner force that reflects the 

United States in organization, arms, and training. 

We have a long history of cooperation with 

Bahrain, to include hosting the headquarters 

of the United States Fifth Fleet and Combined 

Maritime Forces in Manama. Amidst boycotting 

by opposition members, the Bahraini government 

held elections in November and December 

of 2014, which resulted in additional Shia 

representation. However, there is still significant 

distrust between the Shia majority and Sunniled government. The government perceives 

a direct threat from Shia opposition groups, 

which it believes are deliberately de-stabilizing 

the country by attacking the security forces and 

undermining the economy. The government 

believes these same Shia opposition groups are 

influenced and supported by Iran, and that Iran 

intends to eventually overthrow or supplant it 

with a Shia government. 

Bahrain has been a strong member of the 

Coalition to counter-ISIL, participating in the 

initial air strikes into Syria in September of 2014. 

However, the historically strong relationship 

between the United States and Bahrain is showing 

significant strain as the US FMS-hold carries into 

its third full year. Despite this political challenge, 

Bahrain continues to pursue the re-supply of 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 79

Harris Says North Korea is 

PACOM’s Biggest Worry, Gives 

Report on Asia Rebalance

By Jim Garamone

DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON October 10, 2015 — North 

Korea and its unpredictable leader are US Pacific 

Command’s biggest worries, Navy Admiral 

Harry Harris Jr. told the Military Reporters and 

Editors Association here yesterday. Harris, who 

has commanded US Pacific Command since 

May, gave reporters and editors an update on the 

progress of the military rebalance to the Pacific.

Harris stopped in Washington on his way 

to the Australia-United States Ministerial in 

Boston. “The greatest threat that I face on a 

day-to-day basis is the threat from North Korea, 

because you have an unpredictable leaders who 

is in complete command of his country and his 

military,” Harris said. Kim Jong Un is “on a quest 

for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver 

them intercontinentally,” he said, adding that Un 

“poses a very real threat to the 28,000 Americans 

in South Korea, the nation of South Korea, Japan 

and on and on.”

“At some point in the future, as he develops 

his capability, North Korea will present a very 

real threat to Hawaii and the rest of the United 

States,” Harris continued. “Now, I have to be 

ready from a position of strength to deal with 

North Korea and we are ready to deal ... any 

time that Kim Jong Un decides to act.”

PACOM Area of Responsibility

US Pacific Command has responsibility for 

US military operations on more than 52 percent 

of the Earth’s surface. “It’s the oldest and largest 

of the geographic combatant commands and 

responsible for all US military forces from 

Hollywood to Bollywood and from polar bears 

to penguins,” Harris said.

In the command’s area are the three largest 

world economies. Seven of the world’s 10 largest 

standing armies are in the region, as are five of 

the seven nations that have nuclear arms. “Most 

projections place seven out of every 10 people on 

Earth within the Indo-Asian region by the middle 

of this century,” Harris said.

All these projections and facts prove that the 

region “matters,” the Admiral said. The region 

fuels growth in the United States and around 

the world. This is the impetus behind the US 

government push to pay more attention to the 

area, he said. “Even though the world gets a vote 

-- like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

and Syria -- we continue to make real progress 

on the rebalance and advancing our interests in 

the Indo-Asia Pacific,” he said.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 80

interests of the United States that we continue 

to embrace and enhance our relationships with 

everyone in the region including China,” Harris 

said. “While I’ve been known to be critical of 

China’s provocative military activities these past 

two years ... I will also acknowledge when China 

has been helpful, such as China’s counter piracy 

efforts off the Horn of Africa and the search for 

the Malaysian airliner off the coast of Australia.”

The Admiral will meet with Chinese military 

leaders next month and he will “maximize” 

these areas of cooperation and agreement, while 

trying to work through areas where the United 

States and China disagree, he said. Harris is 

prepared to continue the conversation with 

Chinese leaders. “Obviously one of the topics of 

on-going discussions is my continuing concern 

with what I call China’s ‘sand castles in the sea’ 

in disputed waters of the South China Sea,” 

he said. “Militarization by any claimant in the 

area makes it harder to resolve disagreements 

diplomatically.”

Harris will not discuss future operations in his 

area of responsibility, but he referred reporters 

to his testimony before the Senate earlier this 

year. “To reaffirm our ironclad commitment 

to international law, I think we must exercise 

freedom of navigation operations throughout the 

region and throughout the globe,” he said.

He also said he told a regional chiefs of 

defense meeting -- which included China -- at his 

headquarters in Hawaii two weeks ago that the 

United States “will continue to fly and sail and 

operate anywhere—anywhere that international 

law allows.”

President Barack Obama announced the 

rebalance more than four years ago as a wholeof-government approach. Security matters are 

just one aspect of the program that also includes 

diplomacy, economic integration and political 

understandings.

Peace is a Collaborative Process

“The presence of our joint military forces in 

key locations throughout the region, underpins 

the rules-based, international order, and provides 

opportunity to engage with other countries 

while being positioned to respond to crises,” the 

Admiral said.

US forces are key to maintaining peace and 

prosperity in the region, he said, but it now entails 

a more coordinated and cooperative process. US 

forces do not impose peace; they work with other 

nations militaries to increase their capabilities 

and capacity. US forces constantly exercise 

with nations of the region and their presence 

strengthens the ties not only with the United 

States, but among neighbors.

Harris particularly cited cooperation with 

two treaty allies -- South Korea and Japan. 

US engagement with these countries “is the 

foundation for peace and security in the region,” 

he said. “Not only do we share common values 

and common concerns, but we face a common 

threat in North Korea.” Provocation by North 

Korea is one reason why Harris welcomes 

Japan’s decision to play a greater role in regional 

security. He said he will do all he can to look 

for ways for South Korea, Japan and the United 

States to collaborate.

Building the Relationship with China

Harris reiterated that US involvement in 

the region is not aimed at containing China. 

The rebalance is about US recognition of the 

increased importance of the region to Main 

Street USA. Simply put, security in the region 

has means prosperity, he said. “It’s in the best 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 81

NORTHCOM Commander Discusses 

Importance of Missions

By Jim Garamone

DOD News Features, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON October 8, 2015 — Navy 

Admiral Bill Gortney said he has a mission set 

that ranges “from tracking Santa to thermonuclear 

war.” Gortney commands both US Northern 

Command and the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command. Both commands are based in 

Colorado Springs, Colorado, and are responsible 

for defending the continent from attack. And 

while NORAD radars look for enemy missiles 

and aircraft, they also “track” Santa Claus for 

children around the world each year.

But while there are whimsical moments, the 

missions Gortney commands are deadly serious. 

The Admiral spoke at the Commanders Series at 

the nonprofit Atlantic Council “think tank” here 

yesterday. Gortney said sequestration represents 

the most dangerous threat to his commands. “I 

firmly believe that,” he said.

This is, he said, because NORTHCOM and 

NORAD don’t own forces. Most of the forces 

for the commands come from the services and 

are paid and maintained by the services, the 

Admiral said. Under sequester, the services’ 

cuts come mostly come from operations and 

maintenance accounts, precisely the money 

needed to provide combatant commands with 

the trained and equipped service members they 

need. Sequestration also affects the civilian 

agencies that NORTHCOM supports -- law 

enforcement, customs, and the Coast Guard.

Threats from State Actors

Gortney told his interlocutor -- New York 

Times journalist Eric Schmitt -- that his commands 

agree with the intelligence community’s 

assessment that North Korea has the ability and 

technology to put nuclear weapons “on rockets 

that can range the homeland.” 

His question is when or why would North 

Korean leader Kim Jong Un use nuclear weapons. 

“No one really understands the Great Leader,” 

Gortney said with his tongue firmly planted in 

cheek. “I look longingly for the predictability of 

the Great Leader’s father.” His father -- Kim Jong 

Il -- was only marginally more predictable. “But 

we’re ready for him,” Gortney said. “We’re 

ready 24-hours-a-day if he’s dumb enough to 

shoot something at us.”

In the Admiral’s aerospace defense mission, 

the big threats are Russian long-range aviation 

and cruise missiles from submarines and surface 

platforms. “It’s a bit of a challenge for us because 

for 57 years, NORAD has been in a defensive 

crouch, where Soviet and Russian aviation would 

have to come into our battlespace and we would 

deal with them there,” he said.

But Russia has qualitatively a much better 

military than the quantitative military the Soviet 

Union had, the Admiral said. “They have a much 

different doctrine, and you are seeing that much 

better quality military and doctrine being played 

out as a whole of government approach in Ukraine 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 82

who are “just in receive mode” cannot be traced, 

he said.

ISIL motivates citizens to attack fellow 

citizens. He surmised that was the case in 

Chattanooga, Tennessee, over the summer when 

a radicalized young man attacked a Navy and 

Marine Corps recruiting station killing five 

service members. Chatter on the network since 

caused Gortney to raise the force protection 

condition at installations around the country.ISIL 

is successful at radicalizing these people due to 

their narrative and the perception that they are 

trying to bring about the Caliphate. “It is a war of 

the words,” he said. “The fact is we have not yet 

been able to counter that narrative. That someone 

actually believes that’s a better way of life than 

the one that they have in the United States or 

Canada or Australia, really confounds me.”

Countering the narrative must be done at 

the grass-roots level, the Admiral said. Parents, 

friends, clergy, schools, governmental and 

nongovernmental assets must be used to defeat 

the hateful ideology, he said.

and now Syria,” he said. The quality is playing 

out in threats to the United States as well. “They 

have read our play book and they are fielding 

cruise missiles that are very accurate at very long 

ranges, to the point where they [don’t have to] 

leave Russian airspace and launch conventional 

or nuclear warheads at targets and critical 

infrastructure in Canada, the Pacific Northwest,” 

Gortney said. “[This is a] very difficult mission 

set for us, as it forces us to catch arrows instead 

of going to where we can shoot the archers.”

Ballistic Missile Defense

As NORTHCOM’s commander, Gortney 

has responsibility for ballistic missile defense. 

He said his command is prepared to deal with 

anything that might come out of North Korea. 

“In 2017, we’ll have 44 missiles in the ground, 

mostly in Alaska,” he said. “The problem is we’re 

on the wrong side of the cost curve. We postured 

to shoot down not very expensive rockets with 

expensive rockets.”

The bullet hitting a bullet scenario is very 

expensive, Gortney said. The United States 

needs technology and capabilities that operate at 

different parts of the cycle – to stop an enemy 

from launching, or to get weapons in the boost 

phase rather than relying on the bullet-on-bullet 

end game, he said.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The most dangerous threat to the homeland 

is thermonuclear war, the Admiral said. It is 

something that must be prepared for, but it is 

unlikely, he said. The most likely outside threat 

to the homeland is the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant. “The danger comes from their 

very sophisticated social media campaign that 

seeks to radicalize young people in the West,” 

he said. Gortney said those people who try to 

contact the group for advice on how to launch 

an attack give law enforcement an opportunity 

to detect them and may be dealt with. But those 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 83

Carter Discusses Military Rebalance 

to Asia-Pacific

By Jim Garamone

DOD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, November 6, 2015 — 

The Asia-Pacific will be the economic driver 

for the world in the years to come, and that is 

why rebalancing the US military to the region 

makes such sense, Defense Secretary Ash Carter 

said today at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in 

Hawaii.

“It is the single part of the world that will be 

most consequential for the future,” Carter told 

the joint service audience inside a hangar.

Carter said Asia is growing and becoming 

more prosperous because of the sacrifices 

American service members made to preserve 

the peace. “For 70 years now ... the singlemost important factor that has kept the peace 

and stability in the Asia-Pacific region ... is the 

pivotal role of American military power,” he 

said. “What the rebalance means is we intend to 

do that going forward.”

Historic Role

Carter told service members that they are the 

heart of the rebalance and that they are playing a 

role in history.

Service members asked Carter about China 

and its growing role in the region. The secretary 

said it was natural that China would seek to play 

as large a security role as it does an economic one. 

But China is not the only country in the region 

that is playing a larger part in security affairs.

“Japan is increasing its defense role out here, 

so is India,” he said. “Many, many countries 

are asking us to work with them because they 

want to be part of this regional architecture that 

keeps the peace. And we welcome all of them, to 

include China.”

The US policy is not one of division or 

exclusion, the secretary said. “Our policy is one 

of inclusion,” he said.

Employ Diplomacy to Solve Issues

Carter called on all countries claiming land 

in the South China Sea to solve their problems 

diplomatically. “For our part,” he said, “the 

United States will continue to fly, sail and operate 

anywhere international law permits [from the] 

South China Sea to the Arctic.”

There are many challenges in the region, the 

secretary said. He said the United States will 

continue to watch China, but American leaders 

are also concerned about North Korea and Russia. 

He also mentioned the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant, saying the United States must defeat 

that “evil movement.”

Carter also told service members there is 

progress on the budget front, noting he is pleased 

with the two-year budget agreement.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 84
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 85

Security Enterprise Recalls 

Successful Fiscal Year

By Adrianne Elliot

USASAC Public Affairs

The US Army Security Assistance 

Command closed fiscal 2015 with $20.5 

billion in new business, making it yet another 

successful year in foreign military sales.

The command, which develops and 

manages the Army’s security assistance 

programs and FMS, is managing more than 

5,247 FMS cases valued at $171.9 billion in 

144 countries.

USASAC is divided into regionally 

aligned Combatant Commands that cover 

every continent in the world providing the 

potential sale of equipment, spare parts, 

maintenance, training and simulation, technical 

documentation and facilities. The COCOMs 

consist of:

CENTCOM, with $15.3 billion in new 

business and 1,915 active cases totaling $126 

billion. There are 17 countries in the CENTCOM 

region. Over the last year, CENTCOM has 

been consistent with spikes due to high dollars 

sales, including aircraft, armor and air defense 

materiel. CENTCOM has averaged $6.5B in 

sales each of the last five years. UH-60M Black 

Hawk helicopters were a big seller in 2015 as 

well as Apache and Patriot PAC-3 missiles. 

USASAC accelerated provisions of arms 

and ammunition to counter the Islamic State and 

the Levant offensive in Iraq. Beginning on Jan. 

6, 2014, in response to Prime Minister Maliki’s 

request to Vice President Biden for assistance, 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

USASAC, and the Life Cycle Management 

Commands worked tirelessly to successfully 

fulfill the prime minister’s request for expedited 

support. That support continued through 2015 

through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund where the 

US government has committed $1.3 billion in 

aid to support counter-terrorism operations and 

helping build partner capacity. 

AFRICOM, with $1.6 billion in new business 

and 568 active cases totaling $2.4 billion. There 

are 32 countries in AFRICOM, whose primary 

tools for implementing US strategy are posture, 

Photo by Michelle Miller

USASAC closed out the fiscal year with $20.5 billion in new foreign 

military sales and is managing more than 5,247 FMS cases valued at 

$171.9 billion in 144 countries. Divided into regionally aligned 

Combatant Commands, USASAC operations cover every continent 

in the world, giving it its nickname, the “Army’s Face to the World.”
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 86

PACOM, with $1.3 billion in new business 

and 927 active cases totaling $23.5 billion. There 

are 22 countries in PACOM.

FMS case highlights include the Indian Air 

Force purchase of AH-64E Longbow Apache 

helicopters, a hybrid case valued at $932 million. 

The AH 64E helicopters will improve India’s 

capability to strengthen its homeland defense 

and deter regional threats. It also increases 

India’s defensive capability to counter groundarmored threats and modernize its armed forces. 

PACOM also contributed to various countries 

for United Nations’ Missions and Peace Keeping 

Operations by supplying defense articles such 

as Up Armored Humvees, Night Vision Devices 

and generators. Values in excess of $4 million 

from the Global Peace Operations Initiative 

funds were provided for these efforts.

SOUTHCOM, with $193 million in new 

business and 320 active cases totaling $2.5 

billion. There are 29 cases in the SOUTHCOM 

region. 

The Mexico Secretariat De La 

Defensa Nacional (SEDENA) purchase 

of UH-60M Black Hawks and High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicles. Even though SEDENA’s case 

for UH-60M, valued at $584 million, 

was implemented in FY14, it carried 

significantly impacts for FY15 which 

involved support from many agencies 

within the Army Security Assistance 

Enterprise to accelerate the delivery 

schedule and support countries request 

to expedite deliveries of UH-60M 

between October and December 2015, 

to support ongoing Mexican Army 

and Air Force operations. SEDENA 

purchase of Humvees valued at $271 

million have deliveries ongoing which 

contribute to the Mexican military’s 

goal of updating its capabilities, while 

presence, programs, exercises, engagements and 

operations. 

In North and West Africa, the US is addressing 

growing threats from Al-Qaida affiliates and 

adherents, a growing Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant presence, and Boko Haram. FMS sales to 

Africa significantly increased and the two largest 

FMS cases ever for Africa were implemented 

this year, including M1A1 tanks with a value of 

$971.5 million to Morocco and UH-60M Black 

Hawk aircraft to Tunisia with a value of $405 

million. 

EUCOM, with $1.4 billion in new business 

and 1,410 active cases totaling $15.2 billion. 

There are 41 countries in EUCOM. 

Top FMS cases include Turkey’s $2.9B for 

Patriot missile firing units, GEM-T missiles 

and PAC-3 missiles, followed by the United 

Kingdom’s AH-64E aircraft purchase at $2.4 

billion and CH-47D aircraft to the Netherlands 

for a total of $797 million.

Photo by Michelle Miller

Nearly 13 years to the day that two 18th century cannons were placed at Security 

Assistance Command’s headquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, the cannons were reunited with 

the USASAC headquarters building as part of the command’s 50th anniversary 

celebration at Redstone Arsenal July 21. The 3.2-caliber smooth bore projectile cannons 

are of Spanish origin. One was cast in 1792 at Seville, Spain, and the other was cast a 

year later in Manila, Philippines, then part of Spain’s empire. They were employed to 

protect the harbor at Manila as part of the Spanish Water Battery along the Esplanade. 

The United States took possession of the weapons in 1901 as part of the Distribution of 

Guns stemming from the Spanish-American War of 1898.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 87

Bragg, North Carolina; and Riyadh, Saudi 

Arabia and in various geographic locations 

throughout the globe in support of its 

worldwide mission.

Fiscal 2015 was another banner year 

for USASAC, and the command will 

continue to build partner capacity, support 

engagement strategies of combatant 

commanders and strengthen US global 

partnerships in support of America’s 

national strategy.

significantly increasing its capability to provide 

in-country troop mobility and security.

Fiscal 2015 also marked leadership changes 

for USASAC. Command Sgt. Maj. Rodger 

Mansker relinquished command and welcomed 

Command Sgt. Maj. Dana S. Mason Jr., the 

organization’s second command sergeant major. 

USASAC also welcomed its new chief of staff, 

Col. Phillip Chambers, following Col. Lawrence 

Fuller, who retired after 30 years of service. 

Chambers came to Redstone Arsenal from Saudi 

Arabia, where he served as the deputy for the 

Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian 

National Guard in Riyadh. OPM-SANG a 

subordinate command of USASAC, welcomed 

its new deputy, Col. David Matthew Fee, and 

Sgt. Maj. Michael James Mingle.

USASAC celebrated its 50th anniversary July 

19 with ceremonies at its current Redstone Arsenal 

headquarters and its original headquarters in New 

Cumberland, Pennsylvania. Serving the nation 

for more than a half-century USASAC remains 

“The Army’s Face to the World,” employing 

more than 860 personnel at Redstone Arsenal; 

New Cumberland; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort 

Photo by Michelle Miller

USASAC Command Sgt. Maj. Dana S. Mason Jr., left, and Commander Maj. Gen. Mark 

McDonald participate in the organization’s 50th anniversary celebration at Redstone Arsenal. 

During the ceremony, from a videotaped message to the USASAC workforce, Army Materiel 

Command’s Commander Gen. Dennis L. Via said, “Your organization is ‘The Army’s Face to 

the World’ by providing cutting-edge equipment and training to help our allies strengthen their 

defensive capabilities, deter aggression, achieve regional stability and promote democratic 

values. USASAC has helped shape the operational environment around the world more than any 

other Army organization.”
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 88
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 89

Holistic Integration of Mil-to-Mil 

Engagement Doing Better with Less

By Colonel Dave Bennett, USA

US Army Security Assistance Command

The following article was originally published in the Army FAO Journal of International Affairs. You can subscribe 

to the FAO Journal or search for other articles of interest in their archives at: http://www.faoa.org/FAO-JournalArchives]

Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) strive to 

epitomize the “soldier-diplomat” qualities of the 

FAO ethos. At the same time, most Army FAOs 

have internalized certain habits picked up during 

their command and staff time in operational 

units. These habits are typical of the Type A, 

combat arms officer, characterized by working 

longer, harder, and striving to accomplish more 

in a short amount of time:“If soldiers in my unit 

march 10 miles with a 40-pound ruck, then as 

leader I should march further and carry more 

weight to show my dedication. Or maybe my 

unit should execute more marches than our sister 

units so that we can distinguish ourselves.”

“If my predecessor came in at 0700 and 

worked until 1930 while producing so many 

products per week, I should come in even earlier 

and depart later than she did, and produce more 

products, to show our office’s improvement.”

Such an attitude is admirable for a midlevel leader, but might not necessarily be the 

right approach for a FAO down range. In a 

profession dominated by type-A personalities 

and incentivized by the short-term Officer 

Evaluation Report (OER), suggesting that “less 

is better” is considered anathema to the driven 

Army officer. But the FAO should consider all 

courses of action, and when it comes to Militaryto-Military (MTM) events, less usually is better.

In a seminal scene from the movie “Jerry 

Maguire,” the title character has a late-night 

epiphany, and writes, “Suddenly it was all clear.

The answer was fewer clients, less money, caring 

for them, caring for ourselves.”

Within days this honesty, clarity, and a 

resulting new mission statement earn him a 

down-sizing at the hands of his less-than-amused 

management.

Acknowledging that we live in a cynical 

world, I intend to show that exactly such an 

approach can be a smarter way of doing business 

for the Foreign Area Officer (FAO). This paper 

will show how doing less, but doing it in a 

smarter, more integrated way that favors longterm results, is a better course of action for 

Military-To-Military (MTM) events.

MTM events are exchanges paid for by 

Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) through the 

post-Soviet Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

They are usually information exchanges 

designed to familiarize our new Partner Nations 

(PNs) with US military tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. PN militaries can decide whether 

they would like to pursue a new capability based 

on US materiel, training, and best practices. If 

a PN shows interest in a capability presented 

during an MTM exchange, the PN can pursue the 

capability through other Security Cooperation 

(SC) tools. These tools include training or 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 90

Despite these drawbacks, the culture 

among my ARCENT desk officers was one 

in which MTM event growth was a source of 

pride. It was one of the few ways that shortterm “progress” could be demonstrated on the 

annual OER. Since coordinating and executing 

quality MTM events was hard, generating more 

such events must be a good thing, desk officers 

reasoned. Not surprisingly, the number of 

ARCENT-sponsored events with our Central 

Asian countries consistently grew each year.

They increased to a point that our branch was 

having difficulty ensuring quality execution. A 

manageable number of events was roughly one 

per month; three every two months, at most.

But in some cases, our events grew to three 

or four times that number—clear evidence of 

quantifiable accomplishment, from an OER 

bullet point of view. While this approach seemed 

to serve desk officers well in the short term, it did 

not contribute to optimal engagement with our 

PNs in the long term.

I left that job having learned a lot, but frustrated 

at my inability to change our office’s cultural 

mindset. As luck would have it, I became Chief 

of the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) 

in one of ARCENT’s Central Asian countries a 

couple years later. By now MTM events for 

the country, including not just ARCENT’s, but 

those of all sponsoring proponents, had grown to 

nearly 150 per year. Army officers were clearly 

not the only Type-A personalities susceptible to 

“more is better” thinking. Our office was now 

expected to help plan, coordinate, facilitate travel 

for, execute, and analyze the effects of roughly 

three events every work week!

Our Ministry of Defense (MOD) counterparts 

in the department responsible for international 

cooperation quietly suffered under “event 

fatigue,” wary of disappointing their American 

counterparts. They were clearly overwhelmed 

with US MTM events, though they never would 

admit it. From their perspective, we were just 

one PN of many for whose events their office 

was responsible. Yet as happens in most Central 

matériel acquisition that a PN can purchase 

under Foreign Military Sales (FMS), or receive 

under grant through Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF), as well as training and education it can 

receive under International Military Education 

and Training (IMET) programs. Joint exercises 

can also be selected to ensure the PN is adequately 

trained on the new capability and solidify the 

relationship between the PN and the US

A few years ago, my position at US Army 

Central’s (ARCENT’s) Civil and International 

Military Affairs, Central and South Asia branch, 

allowed me to get a close-up view of how MTM 

events are planned and executed. Our branch 

officers sponsored, planned and executed scores 

of exchanges with our Central Asian PNs each 

year. Interestingly, these MTM events tended to 

grow in number each year, but justification for 

this growth was debatable. Our PNs were not 

necessarily gaining any new capabilities, and as 

the number of MTM events increased, several 

shortcomings with the program became clear.

For example, WIF-funded MTM events are 

forbidden by law to provide training. Ironically, 

PNs tend to value any ancillary training they can 

get out of an MTM event above all else, which 

lends itself to a legalistic conflict of intent. MTM 

event funding also tends to be stove-piped in 

terms of planning and budgeting. MTM program 

event planners tend to regard their own events 

as projects unto themselves, rather than one tool 

in a kit bag that includes much more robust and 

appropriate SC tools for acquiring a significant 

new capability. At our higher headquarters’ 

MTM planning conferences, other SC tools 

typically were not mentioned at all, opening 

the door for a disjointed approach in which SC 

tools did not nest together or apply to common 

objectives. The greatest irony is that MTM 

events tend to be planned and executed in a 

vacuum, and yet, on their own, MTM events 

cannot lead to any lasting or meaningful PN 

capability. Their role is to serve as an opening 

conversation-starter for other SC tools that are 

actually designed to deliver a capability.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 91

“Well, each year a squad of our experts 

visits their mountain battalion for an information 

exchange.”

“Okay, and what capability is that leading 

to?”

“Well, our (US) guys share information 

with them about the latest mountaineering 

techniques.”

“Right, but what new capability is that leading 

to? Are they going to establish a schoolhouse?

Would they like our help developing a curriculum? 

Are they going to buy any of our equipment or 

incorporate any of our training techniques? What 

is the desired end state?”

“I’m not sure about all that, but I do know 

that these events are important.”

“Are they? Why?”

“Our proponent has executed these events for 

years, which fosters a good relationship.”

“So let’s see...a squad of our guys meets with 

a squad of their same guys each year; we have no 

desired end state, goals or objectives other than 

‘improve mountaineering,’ our PN has no plans 

to open any IMET or FMS cases that will lead to 

a MAMM objective, and both sides are content 

with this?”

“Correct.”

Armed with this information, we next 

met with our counterparts at MOD for a frank 

discussion about the MTM program of events.

We explained that MTM exchanges were not 

supposed to be an end unto themselves, but rather 

an introduction to set the stage for meaningful 

capacity development via other tools. The 

outcome of these familiarization events was 

supposed to lead to much more than just personal 

and institutional relationships among the visiting 

units. Both sides needed to agree on a MAMM 

objective; a goal that actually improved their 

military’s capacity in a specific, mutually 

beneficial way; a goal that could be measured 

objectively; a goal that was more significant and 

meaningful than simply “let’s improve.” The 

mil-to-mil event itself was supposed to be the 

opening salvo in this line of effort; a precursor 

Asian militaries, our hosts had sensed how 

important these ballooning events seemed to 

their American counterparts, so their natural 

politeness made them reluctant to say anything 

negative on the matter. Fortunately for them, 

they were not alone in their frustration. From 

our point of view too, it was virtually impossible 

to facilitate all of these events to ensure quality 

execution, much less satisfactory movement 

along a program’s Line of Effort (LOE) towards 

a desired end state.

Rather than blindly execute all these events, 

or even increase their numbers, our office decided 

we should conduct a thorough analysis of all the 

events on the calendar to determine their status.

What were the LOEs, goals, objectives and end 

states of each program? Was PN interest strong 

enough that our counterparts had designated an 

officer point of contact for each LOE? Was a 

new capability that did not exist before part of 

the plan? Were the stated objectives of the LOE 

more specific than just “improve ‘X’?”

A former colleague and Regional Affairs 

Specialist (RAS = Air Force FAO), Col Michael 

McCarthy, used to point out that strategic objectives 

must be mutual, and that FAOs need to work to 

find the strategic “sweet spot” that ensures PN 

buy-in for a line of effort. After reading through 

dozens of event descriptions whose objectives 

proclaimed “improve the capabilities of unit X,” 

I decided Col McCarthy’s explanation of what 

made an objective worthwhile warranted further 

expansion. Ideally, objectives should not only be 

mutual, but also achievable, measurable, and, 

most elusive of all, meaningful. Event objectives 

that were Mutual, Achievable, Measurable and 

Meaningful, or “MAMM,” were very hard to find 

in our MTM plan. Our office’s Locally Employed 

Staff (LES) admitted that the events they had 

been conducting for years amounted to iterative, 

“self-licking ice cream cones.” Conversations 

on each program followed a familiar pattern:

“What’s the background with these 

mountaineering events?”
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 92

• We ended up with a much closer and 

more meaningful mil-to-mil relationship 

that would actually lead to a meaningful 

new capability 

The new objectives we established with our 

hosts were truly MAMM, and if an objective or 

nested event proved deficient in any MAMM 

area, we agreed not to pursue it.

The number of lines of effort may have 

decreased, but the surviving LOEs were much 

more compelling and of higher quality. By 

shedding programs that both sides sensed were 

not leading anywhere meaningful, we freed 

ourselves to focus qualitatively on programs that 

did. Instead of twenty LOEs out of synch and 

with no link to FMF or IMET, we wound up with 

six to ten LOEs that we could carefully integrate 

with FMF, IMET, and other SC tools. Each 

LOE represented the entire kit bag of a Security 

Assistance Officer’s arsenal. Consequently, 

the new LOEs received higher-level attention, 

dedicated POCs, and the event quality improved 

greatly.

The best news was that, unlike in the movie, 

no pink slips were waiting in our office the 

following week. Communicating up, down and 

sideways from the outset was critical. We had to 

convince not only our Defense Attaché’s Office, 

but also our headquarters at Central Command 

and all the event-sponsoring proponents to ensure 

we were on the same page. Each had to agree 

or at least acknowledge the new direction for 

MTM events, even if it meant their offices might 

make fewer trips to Central Asia. Fortunately, 

our immediate boss, the Senior Defense Official/

Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), was completely 

on board. He not only had vast experience as 

a former OMC Chief and possessed plenty of 

common sense, but he had come to the same 

conclusions about MTM TTPs on his own.

Moreover, he had watched one of his capacitybuilding programs take nearly a decade to come 

to fruition, only culminating years after he had 

left. Therefore, he knew the value of establishing 

meaningful objectives, integrating SC tools to 

to other programs that should not be repeated 

blindly for years on end.

Our PN colleagues were initially shocked that 

we were having this discussion, but did not take 

long to warm to the news that it would be okay 

to reduce the number of events we had agreed to 

execute. They even admitted that many lines of 

effort were not MAMM for them at all; their side 

had only agreed to continue the program because 

they sensed our desire to continue conducting the 

exchanges. For example, several LOEs addressed 

fundamental ways the US conducts basic military 

functions, such as Logistics, Military Police, 

Personnel, and Public Affairs. These events had 

already occurred for several years, but had never 

progressed beyond the “information exchange” 

level. Some honest broker talk was in order.

“So, I see that over the last four years, we 

have presented many exchanges addressing 

how we conduct Logistics, Military Police, etc.

What do you think? Would you like our help 

developing a new capability in any of these areas 

based on what you’ve seen?”

“Frankly...we are not empowered to change 

our Soviet-established approach to these 

functions...at least not at this time. The exchanges 

were interesting, but as far as a desire to change 

how we conduct such processes...those decisions 

are still years away.”

“Then would it be okay if we put these events 

on hold for now?”

“Yes, absolutely!”

By carefully re-examining not just individual 

events, but their underlying purposes, we 

achieved several beneficial results.

• We decreased the number of events 

significantly, making both ourselves and 

our PN counterparts happy by curing 

much of the event fatigue.

• We shifted the now-lighter load on our 

LES from event management to program 

analysis 

• We saved the US taxpayers hundreds of 

thousands of dollars annually 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 93

deployment to Baghdad, Iraq; Chief, Central 

and South Asia (CASA) Branch, 3rd Army/US 

Army Central (ARCENT); The Joint Staff J-5 

Country Desk Officer for Bulgaria, Hungary, 

Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey; a deployment to 

Afghanistan as the deputy in the Communication 

Fusion Cell, Strategic Communications 

Directorate, International Security and Assistance 

Force (ISAF) HQs; Chief, Office of Military 

Cooperation, US Embassy Astana, Kazakhstan; 

and New START Treaty Inspection Team Chief 

at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Since 

July 2013 he has been the Director, EUCOM, 

AFRICOM, and Canada Regional Operations 

at US Army Security Assistance Command at 

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

achieve them, and understood that the process 

took time. With his advocacy, many event 

proponents even began to adopt a more holistic 

approach to their mi-to-mil exchange programs 

on their own, leading to more coordinated and 

meaningful capacity development with other 

countries in our area of responsibility.

The jury is still out on how much benefit 

there is to having fewer, more focused MAMM 

objectives and better nested and integrated 

events, but the prognosis is promising. Our 

PN colleagues felt so good about our new bilateral direction, they agreed to apply their own 

national funds towards several new lines of 

effort. This was a huge coup, since it was the 

first time any Central Asian country had ever 

volunteered to self-fund Security Cooperation 

with the US. This mutual ownership led to an 

immediately visible increase in pride over our 

new bilateral relationship, as both sides pointed to 

a Strategic Partnership rather than the hackneyed 

transactional relationship dominated by “what 

can you give us?”

In our case, it really did turn out that the right 

answer was fewer events, less money being spent, 

in order to cooperate with our partners better, 

while still taking care of our own objectives. 

Given the current environment of shrinking 

SC resources, this “less is better” model might 

warrant consideration in other assistance areas 

as well.

______________________________________

About the Author

Colonel Dave Bennett grew up in Moses 

Lake, WA and is a 1988 West Point graduate. He 

is an Air Defense Artillery officer and Eurasian 

FAO. He holds a Master’s Degree in Slavic 

Linguistics from the University of Washington, 

and served as a Russian instructor at West Point. 

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th

2001, Dave deployed to the Kyrgyz Republic, 

where he served as US Embassy Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan’s first permanent Security Assistance 

Officer. His assignments have included a 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 94
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 95

Energy Security Requires More Than 

New Pipelines: Section 2282 Funds 

and Critical Energy Infrastructure 

Protection in the South Caucasus

By Wayne J. Dahl, CPT, US Army

Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO—Eurasia)

Energy security has become a key watchword 

in defining the contemporary security landscape—

especially in Europe. Several energy disputes 

with Russia in the last decade serve as poignant 

examples of European energy insecurity. The 

2006 Russia-Ukraine gas disagreement halted 

the delivery of 100 million cubic meters of gas to 

Europe; in 2007, the Russia-Belarus energy clash 

direly affected Germany’s economy; and Ukraine 

siphoned gas from its pipeline to Europe in an 

attempt to leverage European households against 

Russia during a row with Gazprom over gas 

prices in 2009.1 Consequently, energy security 

concerns permeate current defense analysis 

as European leaders seek methods to increase 

energy security vis-a-vis Russia. Pipeline 

construction in the southern energy corridor—

traversing the South Caucasus—provides one of 

the greatest opportunities to enhance European 

energy security; however, future energy projects 

will likely never be realized if transit states 

do not demonstrate the ability to protect new 

pipeline infrastructure against attack. Thus, the 

U.S. Government (USG) should seek to bolster 

Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) 

capabilities in the region with available security 

assistance programs. This article will analyze 

the strategic significance of the southern energy 

corridor and CEIP capabilities in the South 

Caucasus and Turkey in order to highlight CEIP 

best practices and provide recommendations for 

CEIP improvement and U.S. security assistance 

programs that can be utilized to bolster CEIP 

and encourage continued western investment 

and political support for energy projects in the 

region. 

Strategic Context

An undiversified energy supply is the most 

significant cause of energy insecurity in Europe. 

The European Union (EU) currently imports 

50% of its energy and over 40% of EU gas 

imports come from Russia. As EU hydrocarbon 

imports increase to over 85% by 2035, the EU 

will remain the world’s largest energy importer; 

Russia will likely supply most of this increases 

gas demand.2 Dependence on Russian energy 

in Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is 

absolute as these nations receive 100% of their 

natural gas from Russia. Bulgaria, Slovakia, 

and Hungary purchase over 80% of their energy 

from Russia, while Poland, Austria, and Slovenia 

are dependent on Russia for over 50% of their 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 96

gas.3 This level of dependence is disconcerting 

because the Kremlin has a history of linking gas 

prices to political subservience.

Moscow has used gas disruptions and 

price disputes or threatened to impose these 

sanctions over forty times since the collapse 

of the Soviet Union—reflecting the Kremlin’s 

willingness to use its hydrocarbon assets for 

political blackmail.4 Some analysts argue that 

Russia’s energy dominance was a key factor 

in EU inaction during the 2008 conflict in 

Georgia.5 Additionally, as EU dependence on 

hydrocarbon imports grows, leaders believe they 

may fall victim to energy blackmail or Russian 

intervention in EU energy markets.6 This 

concern is not unwarranted, especially in light of 

Gazprom’s recent warning to the EU concerning 

possible gas disruptions. On September, 

24, 2014, Russian Energy Minister, 

Aleksandr Novak, affirmed during an 

interview with the German newspaper 

Handelsblatt that the Russia would halt 

EU gas deliveries if it supported Ukraine 

with natural gas exports.7 Currently, 

58% of all Russian natural gas exports 

to Europe flow through Ukraine; and 

Ukrainian pipelines are currently at risk 

from fighting in eastern Ukraine, terrorist 

attacks, and energy blackmail.8 Thus, 

seeking alternative energy producers and 

transport routes is the EU’s best means 

to temper Russian energy influence. 

Why the Southern Energy 

Corridor Matters

The Southern Energy Corridor—the pipeline 

systems from Azerbaijan through Georgia 

into Turkey—holds great potential to deliver 

Azeri and Caspian energy resources directly 

to Europe. Currently, the Southern Energy 

Corridor is comprised of two pipeline systems—

the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline 

and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas 

pipeline (see Figure 1). The BTC pipeline is 

1776 KM—making it the longest oil pipeline in 

the world. It transports a daily supply of one 

million barrels—1.2 percent of the world’s oil 

production—from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 

Turkmenistan to Turkey and European markets.9

The BTE pipeline is 691KM and its 2014 daily 

average throughput was 18.3 million cubic 

meters.10 Although these pipelines traverse 

rugged terrain and are located near zones of 

conflict, pipelines remain the most efficient and 

cost effective means to transport hydrocarbons 

from the Caspian to Europe. Pipeline transport 

is less expensive than sea and rail hydrocarbon 

shipments and pipelines are more reliable. 

Consequently, 95% of oil shipments through the 

region are transported via the BTC pipeline.11

The Southern Energy Corridor will continue 

to increase in significance to Europe because 

the South Caucasus region is the closest viable 

alternative market to Russian natural gas. The 

proximity of hydrocarbons in this region is 

important because the EU relies on pipelines 

to import natural gas. The Southern Energy 

Corridor also holds the possibility of delivering 

hydrocarbons from Turkmenistan, Iran, and 

Iraq—enabling the Caspian region to “compete 

with Russia in terms of energy supply to world 

Figure 112

Selected Pipelines:

 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (oil)

 Baku-Supsa (oil)

 Baku-Erzurum (gas)

 Baku-Novorossiisk (gas)

 Nabucco (proposed gas)

 South Stream (proposed gas)

TURKEY

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

ARMENIA

GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN

Az.

SYRIA

TURKMEN

-ISTAN

IRAN

IRAQ

Novorossiisk

Beregovaya

Erzurum

B l a c k S e a

To Europe

To Europe

C a s p i a n

S e a

Ceyhan

Suspa Tbilisi

Baku

NargornoKarabakh
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 97

markets.”13 This actuality has galvanized EU 

support for developing an energy bulwark 

against Russia via new pipeline projects through 

the South Caucasus. In a May 2015 interview, 

the head of the EU Delegation to Azerbaijan, 

Malena Mard, affirmed the EU’s need to 

diversify energy suppliers and its support for the 

Southern Gas Corridor over competing Russian 

gas projects—like Turkish Stream.14 Therefore, 

the EU is working to promote alternate supply 

routes to Europe through the South Caucasus—

such as the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline 

project (TANAP) from Azerbaijan through 

Turkey to Southeastern Europe and the TransAdriatic Pipeline (TAP) from Azerbaijan to 

Turkey and onward to Greece and Italy (see 

Figure 2). Azeri gas is expected to directly reach 

European markets before 2020. Yet, developing 

pipeline projects in the South Caucasus requires 

financial backing and the sustained political will 

of western states.15

Incidentally, the United States is one of the 

strongest monetary and political supporters 

of developing the Southern Energy Corridor. 

U.S. energy strategy in the region focuses on 

diminishing Russia’s coercive influence on 

Central and Eastern European NATO Allies. 

In 2013, the U.S. State Department declared, 

“The BTC pipeline is a major success for the 

U.S. goal of enhancing and diversifying global 

energy supplies.”17 Additionally, U.S. diplomacy 

was central to the completion of the BTE gas 

pipeline, which is an essential energy source for 

the proposed TANAP and TAP projects.18 In May 

2015, the U.S. Special Envoy for Energy Affairs, 

Amos Hochestein, visited Greece to stress the 

importance of diversifying energy providers 

to Europe and rejecting Russian proposals to 

develop gas pipelines to Greece—via the Turkish 

Stream. During this visit, Hochstein affirmed 

that the TANAP and TAP projects “fulfill the 

trifecta of what is energy security: new source, 

new supply, and new route.”19

Despite the recent show of support for the 

TANAP and TAP pipelines, these projects remain 

politically complex because Gazprom has been 

working to develop competing projects and the 

Kremlin has been lobbying individual nations, 

such as Greece and Bulgaria, to pull their support 

from EU energy projects. The EU has successfully 

blocked the development of 

the South Stream pipeline 

through Southeastern Europe; 

however, Russia has 

answered this setback by 

proposing the Turkish 

Stream pipeline—which 

crosses the Black Sea 

into Turkey and connects 

into the Nabucco West 

pipeline to Europe and the 

TAP system to Greece. 

Gazprom’s decision to 

develop the costly and 

technically difficult Turkish 

Stream pipeline is as much 

political as it is economic.

Likewise, for Tbilisi 

and Baku, the political 

implications of the BTC and 

Figure 216

Austria Hungary

Romania Russia

Planned gas pipeline projects

Ukraine

Bulgaria

Slovenia

Serbia

Greece

Italy

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Turkey

Source: Companies, World Energy Atlas

Staff, C. Inton, 12/02/2015

B l a c k S e a

M e d i t e r r a n e a n

S e a

Existing

To be built

Nabucco West

Trans Adriatic

Trans Anatolian

Blue Stream

South Stream

(cancelled)

South Caucasus Expansion

Southern Corridor

Proposed Gazprom pipeline

Total capacity: 63 bln m3 a year

Length: 1,090 km
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 98

BTE pipelines and future energy projects are as 

significant as the economic implications of these 

projects. Dr. Euguen Kogan, defense expert and 

research associate at Kadir Has University, asserts 

that Georgia and Azerbaijan “will continue using 

energy and the accompanying pipeline projects 

in order to protect their sovereignty from large 

neighbors, especially Russia.”20 The BTE and 

BTC pipelines have already empowered Baku to 

drift from Moscow’s sphere of privileged interest 

towards the west.21 Additionally, the BTC and 

BTE projects can foster stronger relationships 

between Azerbaijan and Turkey despite Russia’s 

efforts to stymie this development. Alexandros 

Petersen, geopolitical energy specialist, agrees that 

the energy ties, long term economic investment 

in the region, and geopolitical importance of the 

Southern Energy Corridor locks Baku, Tbilisi, 

and Ankara “into a process of Western integration 

that has the potential to affect their political and 

foreign policy orientations.”22 Despite political 

benefits to the west, security concerns 

limit infrastructure investment in the 

region because western investment in 

the TANAP and TAP projects hinges on 

the perception of regional stability and 

security of these pipelines.

Role of CEIP

CEIP is truly a transnational security 

concern because it requires the effort 

of many nations—not only the nation 

where the infrastructure is located. Yet, 

CEIP is an often overlooked factor of 

Energy Security (ENSEC) that warrants 

examination in the South Caucasus and 

Turkey. Hasan Alsancak, Director of 

Energy Security at BP p.l.c, affirms, 

“Despite its critical and integral role in 

the sector, energy infrastructure security 

is often neglected in policy circles 

and academic studies.”23 Conversely, 

the Alliance is concerned with the 

vulnerability of energy networks in Europe 

and infrastructure located beyond its territory. 

The Southern Energy Corridor is important to 

NATO because upstream infrastructure—not 

located on Allied territory—is traditionally more 

vulnerable to terrorist attacks and disruption; 

and non-state actors are the greatest global threat 

CEIP.24 Approximately 70% of the 9,930 energy 

infrastructure attacks committed from 1980 

through 2011 were perpetrated by non-state actors 

using explosives (see Figure 3); 80% of these 

attacks were correlated with ongoing regional 

conflicts.25 Consequently, the United States and 

NATO should focus CEIP efforts in regions with 

ongoing conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, 

South Ossetia, or Eastern Ukraine. NATO Allies 

may also be susceptible to infrastructure attacks 

as part of a prelude to hybrid warfare. Therefore, 

the NATO ENSEC Center of Excellence (COE) 

affirms that contributing to the protection of 

critical energy infrastructure is one of NATO’s 

crucial roles in the realm of energy security. 

Figure 326

Assault (471)

Sabatage (180)

Unknown (354)

Bombing (6918)

Hijacking (170)

Assassination (110)

Looting/Theft (107)

Siege Events & Hostages (35)

Armed Attack (2)

Cyber Attack (1)

Vandalism (1)

Hostage Taking/

Kidnapping (253)
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 99

CEIP must be a significant consideration in 

developing the South Energy Corridor. If an 

attack is executed on existing pipelines, then 

investor confidence will be shaken. Lack of 

investor confidence threatens investment in the 

nascent TANAP and TAP projects. In the event 

of a pipeline attack, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 

Turkey would also lose critical revenue from the 

sale and transport of hydrocarbons. In addition 

to the economic consequences that transit 

states face, downstream economic interests 

are impacted by pipeline disruptions as well—

further eroding investor confidence in energy 

transit states. As a result of the attack on the 

BTC pipeline prior to the 2008 Georgia War, the 

pipeline was shut down for ten days at a loss of 

$300,000/day downstream.27 BP also shut down 

the Baku-Supsa pipeline that leads to the Black 

Sea because Russian ships blockaded the port 

terminal during the 2008 war. Additionally, BP 

chose to shut off the BTE pipeline during the 

2008 war. Consequently, the only operational 

pipeline in Azerbaijan was transporting oil to 

Russia.28

Protecting energy infrastructure is important 

to governments in the South Caucasus because 

it provides a means of defending national 

sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia. Ariel Cohen, 

a leading expert with the U.S. Institute for 

the Analysis of Global Security, asserts that 

“controlling strategic energy corridors from the 

Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and beyond” was 

a key impetus for the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. 

This conflict not only allowed Russia to maintain 

physical control of key transit pipelines from 

Central Asia, but ensured that the west viewed 

the Caucasian region as too unstable a market 

to continue energy infrastructure investment to 

bypass Russia.29 Jeffrey Mankoff, former adviser 

on U.S.-Russia relations at the U.S. Department 

of State, affirms that Russia’s military action 

“has only reinforced Russian dominance in the 

energy sphere, raising the stakes for countries in 

the region that would seek to escape its grip.”30

As a result, the original Nabucco pipeline project 

lost investor backing and western political 

support. The Nabucco consortium nearly folded 

and significantly curtailed its new pipeline to 

Southeastern Europe. Currently, the TANAP 

system will nearly follow the proposed route of 

the original Nabucco pipeline and tie into the 

Nabucco West system. This South Caucasian 

and Turkish endeavor to develop independent 

energy routes vis-a-vis Russia will impact the 

future trajectory of the region. If the South 

Caucasus, especially Georgia, fail to escape from 

Russian dominance, the “result would mean the 

consolidation of Russian geo-strategic supremacy 

of the Caucasus and, with it, a complete Russian 

monopoly over trans-Eurasian energy and 

trade flows.”31 The BTE and BTC pipelines 

have already strengthened Baku’s and Tbilisi’s 

positions against Moscow’s coercive influence, 

but the ability to protect future energy projects is 

critical to maintaining investor confidence until 

these projects come online.

CEIP in the Southern Energy Corridor

Illegal tapping, vandalism, cyberattacks, 

and terrorism are four significant threats to 

regional energy infrastructure; however, the 

greatest security concern is pipeline routes, 

which run in close proximity to conflict zones 

in each country: the Nagorno-Karabakh line 

of conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, 

South Ossetia in Georgia, and Kurdish regions 

in Turkey.32 This concern is poignant in light 

of the July 2015 southward expansion of South 

Ossetia’s border, which absorbed portions of 

the Baku-Supsa Pipeline.33 Each country is 

responsible for pipeline security on its territory, 

and each government is financially liable to 

energy companies for losses incurred due to 

attacks. Thus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 

have all implemented CEIP programs; however, 

each country utilizes different tools to protect its 

energy infrastructure.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 100

engagement through the MCEIP working group 

has continued to maintain momentum. 

As a transit country, the government of 

Georgia believes that it is the most vulnerable to 

diversionary attacks in the region. Additionally, 

the Georgian government strives to maintain a 

robust pipeline security program to avoid blame 

from Azerbaijan or Turkey in the event of an 

infrastructure attack. Tbilisi’s legal responsibility 

and financial liability led to the creation of 

the Strategic Pipeline Protection Department 

(SPPD). Like the SSPS in Baku, the SPPD is 

a “specialist government agency,” within the 

Georgian MOIA, which partners with BP to 

provide security to energy pipelines. BP trains, 

equips, and partially finances this 700 member 

organization.34 Although there are currently no 

U.S.-Georgian security cooperation programs in 

the CEIP arena, BP’s role in training the SPPD 

and SSPS cannot be overstated.

BP has provided critical security and 

policing training courses including: command 

and control, tactical surveillance and search 

operations, winter operations, remote area rescue 

training, use of fire arms, map reading, first aid, 

and human rights awareness. In Georgia, BP 

has trained the SPPD in the proper use of force 

and use of lethal and nonlethal weapons.35 In 

addition to training, BP’s approach to pipeline 

security significantly bolsters the effectiveness 

of regional infrastructure protection. In 

Azerbaijan and Georgia, BP has enacted a multilayered “holistic” security program. At the first 

layer, BP employs community liaison officers 

to engage the local populace and enfranchise 

their support in providing intelligence and 

protecting the pipelines. The second layer is the 

use of local security to execute horse-mounted 

patrols along the pipeline route; the final layer 

is the use of hardened infrastructure, physical 

obstacles, and technological systems to prevent 

and monitor attacks on the pipeline network.36 

Despite BP’s successful training and protection 

programs in Azerbaijan and Georgia, BP does 

not have a formal relationship with the Turkish 

In order to protect the Azeri portion of 

the BTC/BTE pipelines, the Government 

of Azerbaijan established the State Special 

Protection Service (SSPS), which is a specialized 

agency in Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Internal 

Affairs (MOIA) that provides 24-hour monitoring 

and patrolling of pipeline infrastructure with BP 

training and support. The SSPS protects pipeline 

infrastructure while BP is responsible for security 

of the pipeline terminal at Sangachal. In addition 

to Baku’s partnership with BP, the Department of 

State has employed the Anti-terrorism Assistance 

Program to increase Azerbaijan’s infrastructure 

protection capabilities. Using this fund, the 

Regional Security Office has trained with the 

SSPS approximately 2-3 times per year (20 

people per class) and focused on airport security, 

pipeline security, and major event coordination. 

The classes have been taught by contractors, 

often former police chiefs or security personnel. 

However, the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan no 

longer has funding to continue this training 

program. Despite this cancelation of this 

program, Washington and Baku still cooperate 

in the CEIP sphere.

Perhaps the most successful USG CEIP 

coordination in the region has been Azerbaijan’s 

Maritime Critical Energy Infrastructure 

Protection Working Group (MCEIPWG), which 

began in 2013. This working group meets three 

to four times per year and provides a forum for 

myriad Azerbaijani government agencies and 

industry representatives that are responsible 

for CEIP in the Caspian Sea to discuss security 

concerns and work towards coordinating efforts 

in this arena. The working group still remains 

an essential vehicle for interagency coordination 

in Baku. Currently, the participants of the 

MCEIPWG are working towards drafting a 

joint action plan to further delineate roles, 

responsibilities and coordination mechanisms 

during crisis response in the Caspian. While U.S. 

Department of Energy initiatives have lost steam 

in the region, Department of Defense (DoD) 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 101

Recommendations for CEIP 

Improvement

Information sharing is often one of the 

greatest shortfalls concerning CEIP because 

governments do not want to admit their 

vulnerabilities and capability shortfalls—even 

within NATO. However, there is room for 

optimism in the South Caucasus. Baku, Tbilisi 

and Ankara identify weakness and threats 

through joint CEIP exercises. Since 2006, 

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have conducted 

an annual trilateral exercise called “Eternity.” 

“Eternity” is a computer-based staff exercise that 

rehearses coordination and command and control 

procedures following disruptions to critical 

energy infrastructure. Although the MOIA plays 

the lead role concerning infrastructure attacks 

or disaster response, military officials from 

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have attended 

the exercise since 2011. In 2014, 48 service 

members from these countries participated in 

“Eternity.” The key goals of the exercise are to 

increase strategic cooperation regarding CEIP of 

pipelines with the eventual goal of establishing a 

multinational brigade to protect pipelines in the 

South Caucasus.43 Developing a multinational 

CEIP working group, based on the model of 

Baku’s MCEIPWG, could serve as an initial 

step in creating this multinational CEIP brigade. 

Additionally, the CEIP working group would 

provide an information sharing forum for Turkey 

to participate as it does have the BP relationship 

for information exchange that Azerbaijan and 

Georgia share.

To build CEIP interoperability and possibly 

a multinational CEIP brigade, the governments 

in the Southern Energy Corridor should strive to 

transition “Eternity” from a computer-based staff 

exercise to an infrastructure protection exercise 

with forces from participating civilian and 

military agencies. A large-scale infrastructure 

protection exercise will more effectively stress the 

communication infrastructure between civil and 

military units and will test the interoperability of 

government as BOTAS, Turkey’s state owned 

energy company, is responsible for the pipeline 

sections in Turkey. Additionally, the Turkish 

government has not expressed interest in signing 

a security agreement with industry; Ankara 

also has not established a specialized civilian 

organization to protect its infrastructure and 

utilizes Gendarmerie forces.37 Consequently, the 

level of infrastructure security within Azerbaijan 

and Georgia far exceed that of Turkey.38

The Turkish government must improve 

its CEIP measures. Energy infrastructure in 

Turkey has been attacked over fifty times since 

1980.39 After the BTC pipeline came online in 

2006, this network has been attacked nine times; 

every incident occurred in Turkey.40 One of 

the most well-known BTC pipeline explosions 

transpired on August, 5, 2008—merely days 

before the 2008 Georgia War began. Ankara’s 

official explanation was a Kurdistan Workers’ 

Party (PKK) attack on the pipeline—as the 

PKK claimed responsibility for this incident. 

However, U.S. intelligence officials believe the 

explosion was the result of software planted into 

the pipeline system, which deactivated safety 

protocols and increased pipeline pressure until it 

caused an explosion. These intelligence analysts 

also assert that Russia likely committed the cyberattack and sabotage.41 This incident presents 

the possibility that the Russian government 

targeted the Southern Energy Corridor with 

cyber capabilities in advance of military action 

against Georgia. Still, the PKK remains the 

greatest threat to regional energy infrastructure 

as this group has attacked pipelines in Turkey 

on numerous occasions for political purposes as 

well.42 Consequently, Turkey’s BOTAS should 

follow BP’s model for community outreach 

and partnership with state agencies responsible 

for infrastructure protection. Despite the poor 

security situation in Turkey, opportunities for 

CEIP cooperation and improvement exist in the 

region. 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 102

from Section 1205, NDAA, FY2015, P.L. 113-

291—was authorized on December 19, 2014. 

This authorization replaces and codifies Section 

1206 Funds, “General Train and Equip” (NDAA 

FY06), with several distinctions. First, Section 

2282 is a permanent authorization and does 

not need to be renewed by Congress annually. 

Second, the focus of the Section 2282 shifts 

from supporting partner nation deployments 

to Afghanistan (Section 1206) to building the 

capacity of a country’s national military forces 

and national-level security forces to conduct 

counterterrorism (CT) operations. Third, U.S. 

forces are no longer required to be a participant in 

the activities or programs that are being funded. 

Section 2282 Funds may be used to provide 

equipment, supplies, training, defense services 

and small-scale military construction. To utilize 

these funds with non-MoD organizations, CT 

must be the focus of the operation or functional 

responsibility of the unit. Although Section 

2282 is a Title 10 authorization, the U.S. DoD 

is not the most effective entity to execute CEIP 

cooperation in the region.

The area for greatest cooperation likely lies 

between other USG entities, such as the Embassy 

RSO, FBI, or Export Control and Related Border 

Security (EXBS) and partner nation MOIAs. 

CEIP and CT capabilities, preparation, training, 

and prevention overlap significantly. Thus, 

CT training in the region can bolster national 

CEIP capabilities. The FBI office in Tbilisi is 

in a unique position to effectively facilitate CT 

training and capability development in Georgia 

because the FBI office has already developed 

relationships and access with the Georgian 

MIOA. Additionally, FBI representatives at 

the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi have expressed 

interest in training with the MOIA to bolster 

CT capabilities; however, the FBI has no funds 

allocated for training or partner nation capabilities 

development. 

The SPPD and Georgia MOIA effectively 

react to the aftermath of an infrastructure attack 

and effectively provide physical security to 

these agencies, as well as their standing operating 

procedures, while separated by time and distance 

and working through the friction of cooperating 

during a crisis situation.

In light of Russian resurgence, the United 

States should seek to deepen cooperation in 

all possible sectors, including energy security. 

Energy projects have enabled Baku and Tbilisi to 

strengthen their foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow; 

however, Michael Cecire, associate scholar at the 

Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia 

cautions, “What is clear is that the days of taking 

Georgia’s pro-Western consensus for granted are 

quickly coming to a close. Russian influence 

is resurgent across its periphery, from Eastern 

Europe to the Caucasus to Central Asia, and 

Georgia remains a long-coveted prize.”44 In 

addition to existing security assistance programs, 

Washington should examine opportunities 

to cooperate in the realm of CEIP in order to 

bolster this capability against possible Russian 

sanctioned attacks and as a demonstration of 

support to the region. 

In the past, the USG has officially expressed 

interest in developing ENSEC capabilities in 

Georgia—to include CEIP. The 2009 U.S.-

Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership 

outlines bilateral ENSEC goals, which include 

“increasing the physical security of energy 

transit through Georgia to European markets.”45

In 2013, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel 

stated that energy security is an important aspect 

of U.S. cooperation with Georgia. Yet, there are 

no security assistance or cooperation programs 

in the realm of energy security between the 

USG and Country of Georgia.46 Currently, the 

MCEIPW conferences in Baku are the only CEIP 

cooperation in the region. A recent change in 

Title 10 Security Cooperation Funding could 

invigorate U.S. cooperation in this field.

Section 2282 Funds, “Building Capacity 

of Foreign Security Forces,” provide the best 

method to bolster U.S. CEIP cooperation in the 

South Caucasus and Turkey. The official authority 

that governs 2282 Funds—10 U.S. Code 2282 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 103

the physical security training BP already conducts 

with the SSPS and SPPD.

In Turkey, Section 2282 Funds should be used 

to train the Turkish Gendarmerie to bolster CEIP 

capabilities and enhance overall CT capabilities 

of this unit. The initial training should focus on 

basic CEIP programs that BP has provided to the 

SSPS and SPPD: command and control, tactical 

surveillance and search operations, winter 

operations, remote area rescue training, use of 

fire arms, map reading, first aid, and human 

rights awareness. The RSO office in Ankara 

could be an effective USG entity to coordinate 

this training and identify potential trainers in the 

United States with law enforcement or security 

backgrounds. Additionally, 2282 Funds could 

be used to conduct CT investigation and cyber 

investigation training through the FBI or EXBS 

sections in Ankara. 

Conclusion

Protecting the Southern Energy Corridor is 

paramount to U.S. and NATO interests because 

these pipelines serve as the primary conduit to 

the closest alternative source to Russian energy 

resources—namely Caspian hydrocarbons. 

Moreover, if Baku, Tbilisi, and Ankara cannot 

display the ability and political will to effectively 

protect the nascent TANAP and TAP projects, 

then western investment and political support 

for these projects will likely dry up—similar 

to the original Nabucco project that fell victim 

to western divestment. Consequently, the 

USG should seek to bolster CEIP capabilities 

in the region with available security assistance 

programs. Yet, there are areas for optimism in 

the South Caucasus. 

The Turkish government and Turkish energy 

companies should base their relationship and 

security policies on the BP model, which has 

effectively trained and equipped BP’s MOIA 

partners in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, 

NATO Allies should seek to develop successful 

relationships with industry based on the BP 

Georgian pipeline networks, but the criminal 

investigation of terrorist attacks and prevention 

of these attacks is lacking. Thus, developing 

Georgia’s criminal investigation techniques 

would be a beneficial initial step. Few 

personnel within the MOIA actually conduct 

CT investigations; Georgia’s cyber investigation 

capabilities are nascent as well. Cyber 

capabilities in the South Caucasus are important 

in light of the possible Russian cyber-attack on 

the BTC pipeline in 2008. Section 2282 Funds 

could be used to provide cyber investigation 

equipment, biometric equipment for criminal CT 

investigations, forensics training, and training in 

detecting and investigating terrorism financing 

and money laundering. Currently, the Georgian 

MOIA lacks the capacity to track terrorism 

financing in order to prevent future terrorist 

attacks or limit organized criminal activity. 

Therefore, the goal of U.S.-Georgian cooperation 

in relation to CEIP should be building the MOIA 

CT capacity through training and equipping the 

MOIA agencies responsible for tracking and 

investigating terrorist networks and activities 

in the region. Additionally, the FBI office in 

Tbilisi can utilize experts from outside the FBI 

to conduct training in investigation techniques in 

the fields of CT, cyber, financial crimes, counter 

narcotics investigation, and forensics to showcase 

how the USG relies on interagency collaboration 

to effectively counter terrorist threats. 

Section 2282 Funds could also be used to train 

the SSPS or MOIA in Azerbaijan. The RSO office 

in Baku has a historical training relationship with 

the SSPS; however, there is currently no funding 

for the RSO to continue this training program. 

The Regional Security Office in Baku affirms 

that the SSPS requires training in conducting 

investigations, adhering to rules of evidence, 

and increasing cyber capabilities to track money 

laundering and illicit networks. Thus, the FBI 

or RSO offices utilizing Section 2282 Funds can 

significantly enhance CT capabilities in Georgia 

and Azerbaijan—particularly in the field of 

investigation and prevention—to complement 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 104

regional CEIP working group—similar to Baku’s 

MCEIPWG model—would be an effective 

first step to establishing an interoperable, 

multinational CEIP brigade that can tie into the 

“Eternity” exercise. Thus, utilizing the NATO 

ENSEC COE to expand the “Eternity” exercise 

warrants further investigations.

Developing new pipeline routes through 

the Southern Energy Corridor is significant 

to the future of European energy security, 

but these projects may never reach fruition 

without western support and CEIP partnership. 

Sustained partnership and support will increase 

transnational cooperation in the South Caucasus, 

enable Europe to affectively diversify energy 

suppliers and pipeline routes, and empower 

Tbilisi and Baku to continue to drift westward 

from Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interest” 

during an era of Russian resurgence. 

______________________________________

Endnotes

1. Bendik Solum Whist, Nord Stream: Not Just 

a Pipeline, FNI Report 15 (Fridtjof Nanses 

Institut, 2008), 14, accessed March 15, 2015, 

http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf.FNI-R1508.pdf; 

Marcin Kaczmarski, “Domestic Sources of 

Russia’s China Policy,” Problems of PostSoviet Communism 59, no. 2 (April 2012), 7; 

Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ed., Energy Security 

Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference 

Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Library of 

Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 

2009), ix.

2. Council of the European Union, European 

Security Strategy, (Brussels: December 

2003), 2-3, accessed March 15, 2015, 

http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/

cmsUpload/78367.pdf; Arne Schroer, 

“European Energy Security: A New Pattern 

of External Stability and Internal Risks,” 

American Institute for Contemporary 

German Studies, accessed March 14, 2015, 

http://www.aicgs.org/publication/europeanmodel. While NATO can partner with the SPPD, 

the SSPS, and Turkish Gendarmerie, the goal 

of U.S.-Georgian CEIP cooperation should be 

building the MOIA CT capacity through training 

and equipping MOIA agencies responsible for 

tracking and investigating terrorist networks 

and activities in the region. In Azerbaijan, the 

USG can utilize the training relationship that 

already exists between the RSO and SSPS to 

resume training CT capabilities as well. In 

Turkey, training with the Gendarmerie must 

focus on basic CEIP capabilities in addition to 

CT investigation programs. The USG should 

utilize Section 2282 Funds through non-DoD 

entities, such as the RSO, FBI or EXBS, to 

provide cyber investigation equipment, biometric 

equipment for criminal CT investigations, 

forensics training, and training in detecting and 

investigating terrorism financing and money 

laundering. Section 2282 Funds are a significant 

boon to “whole of government” CT development 

with partner nations because agencies that 

currently do not have budgets for training, such 

as the FBI or RSO offices, can now work with 

their partner nation counterparts to bolster CT 

capabilities. Moreover, 2282 Funds can be 

utilized to train and equip most organizations, 

not only MoD units, with a CT portfolio. While 

each respective Office of Defense Cooperation 

(ODC) and country team must utilize the 2282 

Funds independently, NATO can bolster CEIP in 

Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey simultaneously. 

The governments in the South Caucasus 

and Turkey could partner with the NATO 

ENSEC COE in order to increase utility of 

the “Eternity” exercise and expand this key 

leader exercise to include units from the MOIA 

and MoD. These enhancements will likely 

increase the interoperability of MOIA and 

MoD units in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 

in the field of CEIP. Expanding the “Eternity” 

exercise could also help these nations establish 

a multinational brigade to protect pipelines in 

the South Caucasus—one of the stated goals of 

the “Eternity” exercise. Moreover, creating a 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 105

6. Laura Solanko and Pekka Sutela, “Too Much 

or Too Little Russian Gas to Europe?,” 

Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, 

no. 1 (2009): 59, accessed March 14, 2015, 

http://bellwether.metapress.com/content/ 

2u32132761116518/fulltext.pdf.

7. “Russia’s Gazprom Warns of Gas 

Supply Disruption to Europe,” 

Reuters, September 27, 2014, accessed 

March 5, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/

article/2014/09/27/ukraine-crisis-gazpromidUKL6N0RS0H520140927; “Re-Export of 

Russian Gas Unacceptable - Energy Minister,” 

RT, September 26, 2014, accessed March 6, 

2015, http://rt.com/business/190888-russiagas-europe-export. 

8. Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 

Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe: An Overview 

of Existing and Planned Infrastructures

(Paris: IFRI, 2011), 70. 

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in Critical Infrastructure Protection, ed. 

Matthew Edwards (Amsterdam: IOS Press 

Inc., 2014), 56.

10. BP, “The South Caucasus Pipeline,” accessed 

March 8, 2015, www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/

operationsprojects/pipelines/SCP.html. 

11. Business Executives For National Security, 

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Georgia, July 11-20, 2014, 7.

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August 14, 2008, accessed March 13, 2015, 

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Tremendous Competitor to Russian Gas in 

Europe – Ariel Cohen,” Trend News, May 7, 

2015, accessed May 15, 2015, http://en.trend.

az/azerbaijan/business/2392264.html. 

energy-security-a-new-pattern-of-externalstability-and-internal-risks/; International 

Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 

2012”, 68, accessed March 12, 2015, http://

www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/

publication/WEO2012_free.pdf; Robert D. 

Kaplan and Eugene Chausovsky, “Pipelines 

of Empire,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 

September 03, 2014, accessed March 13, 

2015, https://www.stratfor.com/sample/

weekly/pipelines-empire. 

3. Real Instituto Elcano, “The EU and Natural 

Gas from Central Asia: Is Nabucco the Best 

Option?,” 1, accessed March 14, 2015, http://

www.realinstituotelcano.org/wps/portal/

rielcano_eng/content?WCM_GLO BAL_

CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/

asia-pacific/ari102-2009.

 

4. Alexander Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an 

Instrument of Russian State Power,” Letort 

Paper, Strategic Studies Institute-U.S. 

Army War College, October 2011, 127; 

Ariel Cohen, “Russia: The Flawed Energy 

Superpower,” in Energy Security Challenges 

for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook, 

ed., Gal Luft and Anne Korin (Washington, 

D.C.: Library of Congress Cataloging-inPublication Data, 2009), 94.

5. Robert L. Larsson, Nord Stream, Sweden and 

Baltic Sea Security (Stockholm: Swedish 

Defense Research Agency, 2007), 7, 

accessed March 15, 2015, http://www2.foi.

se/rapp/foir2251.pdf; Richard J. Anderson, 

“Europe’s Dependence on Russian Natural 

Gas: Perspectives and Recommendations for 

a Long-Term Strategy,” George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies, 

Occasional Paper series, No. 19, (September 

2008), 41-2; International Energy Agency, 

“World Energy Outlook 2009,” 7, accessed 

March 14, 2015, http://wordenergyoutlook.

org/docs/weo2009/WEO2009_es_english.

pdf.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 106

Strategy for Strategic and International 

Studies, No. 17 (2014), 14.

21. Jeffrey Mankoff, “Eurasian Energy Security,” 

Council Special Report (Council on 

Foreign Relations), no. 43 (February 2009), 

accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.cfr.

org/europerussia/eurasian-energy-security/

p18418, 23.

22. Alexandros Petersen, “Integrating Azerbaijan, 

Georgia, and Turkey with the West: The 

Case of the East-West Transport Corridor,” 

CSIS commentary, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, (September 2007), 15. 

23. “Protecting Pipelines - BTC as a Case Study,” 

55.

24. Iohan Dessard, “Energy Security in South 

Caucasus: Effective Cooperation in the 

Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure,” 

Energy Security: Operational Highlights, 

No. 4 (2013), 8-10.

25. Jennifer Giroux, “Energy Infrastructure 

Attack Database,” Presentation to the 

Energy Future and Security Seminar, Tbilisi: 

June 26, 2014; Brigita Kupstaityte, “Setting 

Databases—Another Way to Prevent 

Attacks Against the Energy Infrastructure?,” 

Operational Highlights, No. 4, (2013), 17.

26. Jennifer Giroux, Peter Burgherr, and 

Laura Melkunaite, “Research Notes on 

the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database 

(EIAD),” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, No 6. 

(2013), accessed May 9, 2015, http://www.

terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/

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27. Dessard, “Energy Security in the South 

Caucasus,” 12; Kupstaityte, “Setting 

Databases,” 15; Protecting Pipelines - BTC 

as a Case Study,” 55.

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EU than Turkish Stream – Malena Mard,” 

APA, May 13, 2015, accessed May 25, 

2015, http://en.apa.az/xeber_southern_gas_

corridor_is_more_priority_f_227015.html. 

 

15. Kaplan, “Pipelines of Empire;” “EU Expects 

First Gas to come from Azerbaijan in 2020,” 

Bloomberg Business, April 9, 2015, Accessed 

May 5, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.

com/research/markets/new/artilce.

asp?docKey=600-201504090946KRTRIB_

BUSNEWS-23618_18206-1. 

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Stream for Southern Gas Corridor: Russia’s 

New Gas Strategy,” Energy Corridors 

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2015, https://energycorridors.wordpress.

com/2015/04/14/repercussions-of-turkishstream-for-southern-gas-corridor-russiasnew-gas-strategy/

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As Georgia’s Energy Security Needs Rise 

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an Instrument of Russian State Power,” 127.

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from Moscow and Washington,” Georgian 
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37. Kogan, “Trilateral Military and Energy 

Security Co-operation,” 6; Petersen, 

“Integrating Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 

with the West,” 10.

38. Kogan, “Trilateral Military and Energy 

Security Co-operation,” 8; Petersen, 

“Integrating Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 

with the West,” 10.

39. Jennifer Giroux, Peter Burgherr, and 

Laura Melkunaite, “Research Notes on 

the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database 

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(2013), accessed May 9, 2015, http://www.

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article/view/315/html. 

40. Kogan, “Trilateral Military and Energy 

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41. “U.S. Intelligence: Russia Sabotaged 

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accessed March 8, 2015, www.eurasianet.

org/node/71291. 

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pipelines,” Oilprice.com, October 14, 2012, 

accessed March 8, 2015, http://oilprice.com/

Energy/Crude-Oil/Yet-Another-Attack-onTurkish-Pipelines.html. 

43. Kogan, “Trilateral Military and Energy 

Security Co-operation,” 9-10; “International 

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Online, September 2014, accessed March 

8, 2015, http://www.messenger.com.ge/

issues/3209_september_25_2014/3209_4.

html; MAJ Colin Thompson, Bilateral 

Affairs Officer—ODC Tbilisi, interview by 

Wayne J. Dahl, November 28, 2014. 

44. Cecire, “The Kremlin Pulls on Georgia.”

45. Petersen, “Integrating Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

and Turkey with the West,” 15.

28. “The Dangers of the Safe Route,” 

(Economist). 

29. Cohen, “Russia: The Flawed Energy 

Superpower,” 92.

30. Mankoff, “Eurasian Energy Security,” 7.

31. Michael Cecire, “The Kremlin Pulls on 

Georgia, It’s Time for the West to Stop Taking 

Tbilisi for Granted,” Foreign Policy, March 

9, 2015, accessed March 10, 2015, https://

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32. “Protecting Pipelines - BTC as a Case Study,” 

56.

 

33. “Breakway Republic of South Ossetia Claims 

More of Georgia’s Territory,” (The Moscow 

Times), July 13, 2015, accessed July 14, 2015, 

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article/breakway-republic-of-south-ossetiaclaims-more-of-georgias-territory/525487.

html. 

34. Kogan, “Trilateral Military and Energy 

Security Co-operation,” 5-6 & 11; BP, “BP 

in Georgia: Sustainability Report 2013,” 

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document/1339/2165342/1/BP%20in%20

Georgia%20Sustainability%20Report%20

2013.pdf, 36.

35. Dessard, “Energy Security in the South 

Caucasus,” 12; Petersen, “Integrating 

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey with the 

West,” 8; BP, “BP in Georgia,” 14; Kogan, 

“Trilateral Military and Energy Security Cooperation,” 5; “Protecting Pipelines - BTC as 

a Case Study,” 57.

36. Dessard, “Energy Security in the South 

Caucasus,” 10; Kogan, “Trilateral Military 

and Energy Security Co-Operation,” 8.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 108

BP. “The South Caucasus Pipeline.” Accessed 

March 8, 2015. www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/

operationsprojects/pipelines/SCP.html. 

Business Executives for National Security. BENS 

Advisory Visit to Azerbaijan and Georgia.

July 11-20, 2014. 

Cecire, Michael. “The Kremlin Pulls on Georgia, 

It’s time for the west to stop taking Tbilisi 

for Granted.” Foreign Policy. March 9, 

2015. Accessed March 10, 2015. https://

foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/09/the-kremlinpulls-on-georgia/. 

Cohen, Ariel. “Russia: The flawed Energy 

Superpower.” in Energy Security Challenges 

for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook.

Ed., Gal Luft and Anne Korin (Washington, 

D.C.: Library of Congress Cataloging-inPublication Data, 2009). 

Council of the European Union. European 

Security Strategy. Brussels: December 2003. 

Accessed March 15, 2015. http://consilium.

europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 

Daily, John. “Yet another Attack on Turkish 

pipelines.” Oilprice.com. October 14, 2012. 

Accessed March 8, 2015, http://oilprice.com/

Energy/Crude-Oil/Yet-Another-Attack-onTurkish-Pipelines.html. 

Dessard, Iohan. “Energy Security in the South 

Caucasus: Effective Cooperation in the 

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Energy Security: Operation Highlights, no. 

4 (2013). 

Economist. “Algeria’s Hostage Crisis: A Murky 

Mess.” (March 18, 2015). Accessed March 

15, 2015. http://www.economist.com/blogs/

pomegranate/2013/01/algerias-hostagecrisis.

[46] Ibid.

______________________________________

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com/2015/04/14/repercussions-of-turkishstream-for-southern-gas-corridor-russiasnew-gas-strategy/.

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of Existing and Planned Infrastructures. 

Paris: IFRI, 2011. 
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Real Instituto Elcano. “The EU and Natural 

Gas from Central Asia: Is Nabucco the Best 

Option?” Accessed March 14, 2015. http://

www.realinstituotelcano.org/wps/portal/

rielcano_eng/content?WCM_GLO BAL_

CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/

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Reuters. “Russia’s Gazprom Warns of 

Gas Supply Disruption to Europe.” 

(Reuters, September 27, 2014). Accessed 

March 5, 2015. http://uk.reuters.com/

article/2014/09/27/ukraine-crisis-gazpromidUKL6N0RS0H520140927. 

RT. “Re-export of Russian gas unacceptable - 

Energy Minister.” (RT, September 26, 2014). 

Accessed March 6, 2015. http://rt.com/

business/190888-russia-gas-europe-export. 

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New Pattern of External Stability and Internal 

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http://www.aicgs.org/publication/europeanenergy-security-a-new-pattern-of-externalstability-and-internal-risks/. 

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Too Little Russian Gas to Europe?” Eurasian 

Geography and Economics 50, no. 1 (2009). 

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fulltext.pdf. 

“U.S. Intelligence: Russia Sabotaged BTC 

Pipeline Ahead of 2008 Georgia War.” 

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Accessed March 8, 2015. www.eurasianet.

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foir2251.pdf. 

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2014). Accessed March 8, 2015. http://

www.messenger.com.ge/issues/3209_

september_25_2014/3209_4.html. 

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Inc., 2014.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 111

The Whole of Government Approach 

Demands Interagency Coordination

By Ira C. Queen

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Recently the Brent Scowcroft Center on 

International Security at the Atlantic Council 

conducted an analysis of the Geographic 

Combatant Commands. The Task Force that 

undertook this endeavor was a mixture of retired 

senior military officers, diplomats and academics; 

all of which had experience working at or with 

various Geographic Combatant Commands. As 

part of their process, they met with and interviewed 

many former Geographic Combatant Command 

Commanders, Ambassadors, and National 

Security Advisors. The result of their study was 

a document entitled “All Elements of National 

Power Moving Toward a New Interagency 

Balance for US Global Engagement”.

The reason they undertook this study was to 

make recommendations that would help improve 

interagency coordination, at the Geographic 

Combatant Command level, in order to improve 

foreign and defense policy execution with our 

allies and partners. Having seen firsthand how 

disjointed some attempts to implement foreign 

and defense policy were implemented, I am 

very glad a group of senior leaders undertook 

this study, and I hope our government will 

do something to implement a process that 

will improve interagency coordination and 

coordination between our allies and partners. 

However, this would be no small undertaking.

Having worked at a Geographic Combatant 

Command, at an Embassy, and for the 

Department of State, I have experienced how 

difficult interagency coordination can be as well 

as how difficult it is to find out what different 

countries and organizations are doing with a 

‘recipient’ country. Not only are most of the US 

organizations internally stove-piped, most of 

the interagency is stove-piped from the rest of 

the government. Furthermore, most countries 

will not tell you what they are doing with a 

‘recipient’ country and the ‘recipient’ country 

will not tell you what they are receiving or from 

whom; they want to receive all the resources they 

can. This leads to a lot of redundancy and waste 

of resources; thus, the topics brought out in their 

study need to be taken seriously, so that we, as a 

nation, can try to find ways to implement a better 

system that allows us to coordinate activities 

with ‘recipient’ nations.

While working in the J5 at European 

Command and as the Chief of the Office of 

Defense Cooperation in Bucharest, I witnessed 

time-after-time how the different Component 

Commands and organizations failed to 

coordinate the training of their personnel in 

or with a host nation as well as a myriad of 

other military-to-military contact events. Wellmeaning officers and NCOs worked tirelessly 

with different host nations to arrange needed 

training or military-to-military contact events 

without knowing other officers and NCOs 

from another US military organization were 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 112

While I paint a bleak picture, there is hope 

on the horizon. Recently, steps have been taken 

to start improving the interagency coordination, 

but there is still a long way to go.

Impressed with the way the Department 

of Defense went through the process of the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, how it provided 

a strategic plan that forced hard decisions about 

priorities, and made sure those priorities were 

reflected in the budget, in 2010 the Department 

of State and US Agency for International 

Development issued the first Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). 

This was a way to start directing and coordinating 

the resources of all of America’s agencies at the 

different embassies so that they could advance 

our national interests and better partner with the 

US military.

While still not fully implemented, the QDDR 

calls for the development of Joint Regional 

Strategies (JRSs) – three-year documents jointly 

developed by the Department of State and USAID 

regional bureaus, which identify US foreign policy 

and development priorities for a given region. 

It also calls for Integrated Country Strategies 

(ICSs) – three-year documents developed by 

an embassy’s Country Team, which identify US 

foreign policy and development priorities for 

that specific country. Although the JRS and ICS 

do not focus on military matters, the Security 

Cooperation Office (SCO) at each embassy 

does have input into the ICS; in fact, it is their 

responsibility to make sure the DOD equities are 

included in the ICS. The JRSs and ICSs are very 

similar in nature to the Geographic Combatant 

Command Theater Security Cooperation Plans 

and Country Campaign Plans, except they 

include all agencies that have activities in the 

region/country. Also, just as the different US 

Military Functional Combatant Commands 

have worldwide plans, the different functional 

bureaus inside of the Department of State have 

Functional Bureau Strategies. As mentioned, this 

process is not yet fully implemented, but all of 

the ICSs should be completed soon.

planning similar or even repetitive events with 

the host nation; a lot of times, these activities 

were not even coordinated with the US military 

personnel at the Embassy in country. This was 

not intentional but caused by a lack of training 

and understanding. Unfortunately, too many of 

our officers and NCOs are assigned duties of 

this nature without receiving the proper training. 

Too many times in my career, I have learned of 

training, humanitarian assistance, or military-tomilitary contact events being cancelled at the last 

minute, after months of planning, because they 

did need not meet the goals or objectives outlined 

in the Geographic Combatant Command Country 

Plan for that country. Most countries gladly and 

willingly want to work with the US military, but 

assume that we all know each other and that we 

are coordinating amongst ourselves; why would 

they need to de-conflict our activities with them?

Unfortunately, this lack of synchronization is 

not limited to the US military. While working for 

the Department of State, I was constantly running 

into other agencies that were involved in activities 

similar to mine, with a ‘recipient’ country. Not 

all the time, but enough times to really frustrate 

me, I would try to find out what the other agency/

organization was planning with the ‘recipient’ 

country but the other agency/organization was 

reluctant to share that information. It was as if 

they were afraid that by us working together 

their funding would get cut and they would be 

out of job. At the time, these different agencies/

organizations were all involved in Counter 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Programs but were all conducting their activities 

independently with the ‘recipient’ nations, not 

coordinating their activities. These agencies/

organizations were from across the executive 

branch and for whatever reason, just did not 

think it important to coordinate their activities 

with each other--even though they were all 

operating out of the same embassy. Since there 

was so little coordination at the embassy level, 

you can imagine how much coordination was 

taking place at the regional level.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 113

• Drug Enforcement Administration 

• Customs and Border Protection 

• US Agency for International

Development 

• Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

• Department of Justice 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation 

These ‘Interagency Directorates’ embody a 

‘whole of government’ approach. Their staffs 

can reach out to entities within and outside of 

the US Government, including academia, think 

tanks, non-governmental organizations, private 

businesses and international organizations. In 

addition, more and more military officers and 

NCOs are being assigned to work alongside 

interagency partners within the National Capitol 

Region. While we have already made some 

organizational changes, the biggest issue still 

seems to be in making sure personnel are properly 

trained and educated and that a ‘cultural’ change 

takes place within the interagency.

Luckily, the US is not the only country to 

realize the ‘whole of government’ approach is 

the only way to move forward. Many countries 

have taken this approach: the British call theirs 

the ‘Cross-Whitehall Approach’. The first 

Cross-Whitehall Conflict and Stabilization 

Lessons Event took place on 9 November 

2010. This event brought together personnel 

from across the Whitehall conflict lessons 

community and included representatives from 

their interdepartmental agency known as the 

Stabilization Unit (Foreign and Commonwealth 

Office, Department for International 

Development and Ministry of Defense) as well 

as other government departments. Also, there are 

several studies out on how some of our allies have 

moved forward, with varying degrees of success, 

all of which could serve as lessons learned as 

we move even further toward improving out 

interagency coordination.

I would also like to point out that USAID has 

a document entitled “USAID Policy Framework 

2011-2015” that provides their staff and partners 

worldwide with information on their core 

development priorities, and from this document, 

for some countries, USAID develops a Country 

Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). 

The development priorities for a ‘recipient’ 

country are to be included in the ICS along with 

the goals, objectives, strategies and policies for 

every agency/organization at the Embassy.

Having personally experienced disjointed 

and uncoordinated actions, I am very glad that 

one of the things that is emphasized in training 

at DISAM is that all personnel involved in any 

type of Security Cooperation need to read not 

only the Theater Campaign Plan and Country 

Campaign Plan for the region and countries 

they are working with, but also read all of the 

Department of State, USAID and other agency/

organization documents mentioned above. In 

fact, the personnel working at the Embassy 

Security Cooperation Office are supposed to be 

heavily involved in helping to write the ICS and 

the Mission Resource Request (MRR).

Another example of forward movement 

is the ‘Interagency Directorates’ at all of the 

Geographic Combatant Commands and US 

Special Operations Command. While the names, 

staffing levels, and exact composition of each 

‘Interagency Directorate’ are different, they all 

have the same function: to bring in a wide range 

of perspectives from the many different agencies 

and organizations outside of the Defense 

Department. They are all staffed by military 

members, DOD civilians, and agency partners 

from throughout the federal government, so 

they can better execute operations. A few of the 

organizations and agencies that are represented 

in these directorates are as follows:

• Department of State 

• Department of Treasury 

• Department of Energy 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 114

and agencies, but they also want to make sure 

we are effectively measuring how well these 

investments are being implemented.

As you can see, there are some steps already 

being taken toward improving interagency 

coordination, but as the Brent Scowcroft Center 

on International Security at the Atlantic Council 

points out, there is still a long way to go. They 

provide a lot of valuable information and propose 

several things we could do to move forward, but, in 

my opinion, none more important than changing 

our interagency culture. Until we implement 

serious efforts to change the interagency culture, 

we are not going to see the effects we desire. In 

order to achieve this cultural change, we need to 

increase personnel exchanges between different 

agencies and enact reforms and/or legislation 

such as those that helped create our military 

joint structure. Also, we need to establish some 

type of training mechanism that will allow us to 

“strengthen Security Sector Assistance workforce 

skills and knowledge of, and capacity for, the full 

range of Security Sector Assistance activities 

in the United States Government”. (SSA PPD 

Implementation Guidance). Thus, we need to 

enhance training and education programs, which 

promote interagency cooperation and support for 

Security Sector Assistance requirements.

______________________________________

About the Author

Ira C. Queen is a retired Army Special Forces 

and Foreign Area Officer and is currently an 

Instructor at the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management, as well as the 

Course Manager for the Security Cooperation 

Management-Action Officer (SCM-AO) Course.

Mr. Queen has served as an International 

Political Military Affairs Officer in the EUCOM 

J5, as the Chief of the Office of Defense 

Cooperation in Bucharest, and as a Foreign 

Affairs Officer for the Department of State. In 

addition Mr. Queen has served on several Joint 

Combined Interagency Task Forces.

Finally, there is even more good news. In 

April 2013, President Obama signed Presidential 

Policy Directive-23 (PPD-23); US Security 

Sector Assistance Policy. This policy was crafted 

with the aim of improving the ability of the US 

to help allies and partner nations build their own 

security capacity. PPD-23 outlines the fact that 

the US must pursue a new approach to enable 

partner nations to provide security for their own 

people. PPD-23 outlines the goals for Security 

Sector Assistance, but more importantly, it 

provides guidelines for all government agencies 

to ‘plan, synchronize, and implement security 

sector assistance through a deliberate and 

inclusive whole-of-government process that 

ensures alignment of activities and resources with 

our national security priorities.’(PPD-23 fact 

sheet). These guidelines emphasize consistency, 

transparency, synchronization and coordination 

across all US government organizations. It 

emphasizes the regional and functional strategies 

as well as the country strategies mentioned 

earlier. While PPD-23 has not yet been fully 

implemented, steps have been taken to start 

synchronization and coordination across all US 

Government organizations.

The Department of State, in coordination 

with other agencies involved in Security Sector 

Assistance, has developed a plan to implement 

the strategic planning process described in PPD23. This plan includes how the Department of 

State will incorporate interagency assessments, 

planning, and evaluations into existing and 

projected interagency planning processes, and 

outline how key interagency stakeholders will 

participate and coordinate in each stage of the 

process. In fact, in March 2014, the Department 

of State and Department of Defense provided 

a joint update to Congress on Security Sector 

Assistance (SSA) PPD Implementation.

Through the course of the briefings, it came out 

that overall, Congress is supportive of Security 

Sector Assistance investments, but they want to 

make sure that program dollars are being applied 

in a synchronized manner across departments 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 115

Social Media, Public Opinion, and 

Security Cooperation in Saudi 

Arabia

By Joshua I. Cummins

Middle East, Central and South Asia Research Assistant

Lockheed Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“In just 10 years, I have seen young people 

become very brave, and I wonder what will 

happen in the next five years. I think a lot will 

happen.” -Waleed Abu Alkhair, Saudi civil rights 

lawyer and activist (Time Magazine, 2012)

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been 

experiencing a variety of cultural and social 

changes over the past decade. There has been a 

small relaxation in some religious laws, a push 

for more rights for women, and even an increase 

in popularity of the United States. A recent study 

of public opinion in the Middle East over the last 

10 years highlighted an interesting case in Saudi 

Arabia. While Saudi public opinion of the US 

was in 2003 among the lowest of the study, it 

ranked among the highest in 2012 (Cummins, 

2012). This poses the questions of what has 

caused these changes in culture and attitudes 

in Saudi Arabia that have not occurred in other 

Middle Eastern or Arab countries and how these 

changes affect US Security Cooperation and 

overall relations with the United States.

Is it the wide use of social media by the 

youth population in Saudi Arabia that has 

caused these changes? Currently, Saudi Arabia 

is experiencing a youth bulge with nearly 70 

percent of the population being 30 years old or 

younger. (Holmes, 2012) Is it a result of the Arab 

Spring movement which has spread throughout 

the Middle East since December 2010? Or 

could the change be linked to the King Abdullah 

Scholarship Program (KASP), which has sent a 

record number of Saudi students to the United 

States for their education?

This article analyzes the different types of 

social change occurring in Saudi Arabia over the 

last decade including the relaxation of religious 

laws, the increase in rights for women, and the 

improving public perception of the United States. 

This article then examines the role of social media 

and the KASP on the youth population in Saudi 

Arabia and determines how this change affects 

US-Saudi relations. Research was performed 

in Saudi Arabia by conducting interviews with 

Department of State personnel at the US embassy 

in Riyadh and with Security Cooperation 

personnel at Eskan Village in Riyadh. Research 

was also conducted in the United States by 

interviewing and performing survey research on 

Saudi Arabian students currently studying in the 

US.

Cultural and Social Change in 

Saudi Arabia

One of the most delicate aspects of change 

in Saudi Arabia is the relaxation of religious 

laws, which are overseen by the Commission 

for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention 

of Vice, Saudi Arabia’s religious police, which 

are also known as the mutaween. The mutaween 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 116

government in a tough situation as it attempts 

to balance between public disapproval of the 

mutaween and a backlash from the conservative 

religious leaders.

Similarly to religious laws, women’s rights 

were a delicate area of reform for King Abdullah 

after he ascended the throne in 2005. Under 

King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia has opened its 

first co-educational university, clamped down 

on domestic violence, and appointed the first 

female cabinet member (Ambah, 2005). Women 

have also been granted the right to vote on the 

Shura Council, which is the national body that 

advises the government and helps with writing 

laws (Holmes, 2012). More Saudi women are 

graduating college than men and are being 

encouraged to enter the workforce. Mixedgender workplaces are also becoming more 

common, which is something that would have 

been unheard of 10 or 20 years ago (Butters, 

2009). In what became known as the “lingerie 

movement,” King Abdullah enacted a law in 

2011 that stated that women were to replace men 

in all lingerie shops. This also became the first 

time that it was legal for women to work in retail 

stores. Katherine Zoepf (2013) writes, “After the 

King’s decree on lingerie shops, in June, 2011, 

the Ministry of Labor ordered shops specializing 

in cosmetics, abayas, and wedding dresses, along 

with the women’s sections of department stores, 

to begin shifting to all-female Saudi sales staffs 

as well. The process was called ‘feminization.’” 

However, women’s rights activists are dissatisfied 

with the slow pace of reforms. Women are still 

prohibited from studying, traveling, working, 

or even receiving medical treatment unless they 

receive permission from their male guardian 

(Human Rights Watch, 2013). Saudi Arabia is 

the only country in the world where women are 

unable to drive (Zoepf, 2013). In December 2014, 

two women were arrested at the Saudi-UAE 

border when Ms. Al-Hathloul attempted to defy 

the law by driving into Saudi Arabia (Batrawy, 

2014). The two women were held for over two 

months and transferred to a terrorism court before 

enforce the separation of men and women, strict 

dress codes, the observance of daily prayers, and 

other aspects of Sharia law (Al-Sharif, 2014). 

The mutaween are known for their oppressive 

restrictions on Saudi citizens, especially women. 

In 2002, 15 girls burned to death after the 

mutaween obstructed efforts to let the girls leave 

a burning building because they were dressed 

inappropriately (BBC, 2002). In 2007, nearly a 

dozen mutaween entered a 28-year-old man’s 

home and beat him to death after they suspected he 

might be in possession of alcohol (Human Rights 

Watch, 2007). The mutaween have also tried to 

restrict internet use, and in 2004 attempted to ban 

camera phones. However, this was unsuccessful 

as Saudi Arabia is currently third highest in the 

world in smart phone usage (Al-Sharif, 2014). 

The slow process of reining in the mutaween 

began when King Abdullah took the throne in 

2005. By 2012, he had appointed the moderate 

Sheikh Abdulatif al-Sheikh to be head of the 

mutaween (Said, 2014). Al-Sheikh has reformed 

the mutaween by restricting private funding, 

outlawing the confiscation of phones and personal 

items, and impeding the ability of the mutaween 

to chase or physically harm citizens (Hilleary, 

2013). He also is in the process of relaxing the 

religious laws that require businesses to close for 

nearly 45 minutes during prayer time. Instead, 

business owners will be allowed to pray inside 

their business in lieu of walking to the nearest 

mosque (Said, 2014). However, these reforms 

have not stopped the mutaween from enforcing 

their harsh interpretation of Islam. In 2013, two 

brothers ages 22 and 24, died after their car was 

forced off a bridge in Riyadh by the mutaween 

because the boys were playing loud music from 

their vehicle (Al-Sharif, 2014). In 2014, a British 

man and his wife were beaten by the mutaween 

outside a mall in Riyadh after they withdrew 

money from a female-only ATM (Elwazer, 2014). 

However, both of these events were caught on 

camera by cell phones and quickly went viral, 

which has led to a public outcry and lawsuits 

against the mutaween. This leaves the Saudi 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 117

the study (4 percent approval in 2003 and 2004), 

the study showed some of the highest approval 

levels in 2012 (62 percent approval). (See 

Figure 1 below for the year-by-year numbers) 

Bivariate analysis was performed on US foreign 

policy indicators and survey data from several 

Middle Eastern countries including Egypt, 

Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi 

Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. 

(See Figure 2 below for the regional year-byyear numbers) Of the countries, Saudi Arabia 

had the lowest approval numbers in 2002, 2004, 

and 2005. However, this changed when Saudi 

Arabia had the second highest approval in 2007 

and 2010. Saudi Arabia was second to Lebanon, 

which has a significant Christian population that 

tends to hold much more favorable views of the 

United States. Saudi Arabia also witnessed the 

highest approval numbers of the study in 2009, 

2011, and 2012.

finally being released (Mackey, 2014). Women 

also remain restricted form certain jobs, must 

wear the long black abaya and a headscarf, and in 

more conservative areas women are required to 

wear the niqab, which reveals nothing but their 

eyes (Zoepf, 2013). As with religious reforms, 

King Abdullah remained wary of a backlash 

from religious conservatives who continue to 

take a hard stance against allowing more rights 

for women in Saudi Arabia.

Public Opinion in Saudi Arabia

Another change that is occurring in Saudi 

Arabia is public opinion of the United States. A 

recent study observed public opinion of the United 

States in five Middle Eastern countries over a 10-

year period while analyzing US foreign policy 

and found an interesting case in Saudi Arabia 

(Cummins, 2012). While public approval of the 

US was among the lowest in the early years of 

Figure 1 - Saudi Arabia's Public Approval

of the U.S. From 2002-2012

Source: The year-by-year numbers are aggregate means of available Zogby, Pew, and Gallup 

polling data and represent the percentage of those that indicated favorable views of the United 

States.

0	
  

10	
  

20	
  

30	
  

40	
  

50	
  

60	
  

70	
  

Public	
  Approval	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  	
  

in	
  Saudi	
  Arabia	
  	
  
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 118

opponents to Syrian president, Bashar Assad, and 

has criticized the US for its reluctance to engage 

the Syrian dictator. The Saudi government even 

went so far as to boycott its seat on the United 

Nations Security Council in opposition to the 

US-Russia deal to remove Assad’s chemical 

weapons in 2013 (Worth, 2013). To compound 

this tenuous relationship, Saudi Arabia was even 

more disconcerted when it learned that the US 

was decreasing its economic sanctions on Iran in 

light of a possible nuclear deal in 2014 (Gause, 

2014). Although this resentment might not trickle 

down to the public population in Saudi Arabia, it 

certainly does not appear that US foreign policy 

has improved public views of the US in Saudi 

Arabia since 2011. So if not foreign policy, then 

what has led to these changes in culture and 

public opinion? Some scholars point to wide 

uses of social media and the KASP, which has 

led to thousands of students studying in the 

United States

The Role of Social Media

Another aspect of Saudi culture that has 

changed dramatically in the last decade – and 

that might also be contributing to more change – 

When analyzing the survey data, the obvious 

question became, “Does US foreign policy affect 

public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia?” The 

study concluded that in 2003 and 2004, the US 

military intervention in Iraq played a large role 

in increasing anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia 

(Cummins, 2012). Both of those years, Saudi 

public support for the US was at 4 percent, its 

lowest of the 10-year study. Therefore, one might 

conclude that foreign policy has played a role in 

the recent increase in positive views of the United 

States in Saudi Arabia. This was most likely 

the case in 2009 with the election of President 

Obama after his famous Cairo speech, which led 

to increases in public approval of the US across 

the Middle East. However, US foreign policy 

in the Middle East has been counter to Saudi 

interests over the past few years. This started 

when the US called for Egyptian president, 

Hosni Mubarak, to step down in February 

2011. This move shocked and frightened the 

Saudi government, which was closely allied 

to Mubarak and saw him as a stabilizing force 

in the region (Zogby, 2014). Furthermore, the 

Saudi Arabian government criticized the US for 

being slow to act when it came to the civil war in 

Syria. The Saudis have been one of the biggest 

Figure 2: Regional Public Approval of the

U.S. Data From 2002-2012

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

EGYPT 15 13 4 14 22 15 12 33 15 5 14

JORDAN 27 6 10 27 10 20 17 22 19 10 18

LEBANON 34 29 20 37 28 47 32 38 36 23 34

MOROCCO 30 6 11 34 7 15 26 36 13 12 13

PAKISTAN 10 13 21 23 27 16 19 13 17 11 12

SAUDI	
  ARABIA 14 4 4 9 12 40 13 41 24 30 62

TURKEY 35 15 30 23 12 9 12 14 17 10 15

UAE 11 9 14 28 34 N/A 22 36 22 12 28

Source: The year-by-year numbers are aggregate means of available Zogby, Pew, and Gallup 

polling data. The numbers represent the percentage of the public population that indicated 

favorable views of the United States. For comparison reason, Saudi Arabia’s approval 

percentages are highlighted. N/A represents years in which there was no available polling data in 

that county.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 119

media to express their outrage. It even forced 

the head of the mutaween, Sheikh Abdulatif alSheikh, to issue a public apology and denounce 

the actions taken by his religious police (AlSharif, 2014). Women also used social media 

to protest the ban against driving. In all, about 

60 women participated in the protest, and many 

uploaded videos of themselves driving on social 

media sites such as YouTube (The Guardian, 

2013). When one woman was arrested after 

she posted her video, Saudis quickly went to 

her defense on Twitter and Facebook, posting 

more than 30,000 comments within a day of the 

arrest (MacFarquhar, 2011). It remains illegal 

for any Saudi to go out on the street and gather 

several people in a group, but now Saudis can 

immediately share their ideas with thousands of 

people on the internet through social media.

The King Abdullah Scholarship Program

A contributing factor to this cultural change 

could be the rapidly increasing number of Saudi 

students who are studying in the United States. 

Over the past 10 years the number of Saudi 

is the use of social media. Websites like Twitter, 

YouTube, and Facebook are extremely popular 

in Saudi Arabia and remain very accessible 

through computers and smart phones. Jacob 

Templin (2012) from Time Magazine writes, 

“Saudis are some of the most active social-media 

users in the Arab world. According to a recent 

study by the Dubai School of Government, Saudi 

Arabia has more Twitter users than any other 

nation in the region, with around 400,000. They 

also have around 4 million people on Facebook, 

second only to Egypt.” This gives young Saudis 

an avenue for dissent against their government 

(Holmes, 2012). This is the same dissent that 

built up in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria 

and eventually led to mass protests, coups, and 

civil wars. Any sort of public demonstrations 

or protests remain strictly prohibited in Saudi 

Arabia, but social media gives young Saudis a 

way to peacefully vent their frustrations. Social 

media has played a key role in public issues such 

as the criticism of the mutaween and women’s 

rights. After the mutaween forced a car with 

two brothers off the road, killing both of them 

in 2013, thousands of Saudis took to social 

Figure 3: Number of Saudi Arabian Students Studying

in the U.S. from 2002-2014

Source: These year by year numbers were compiled by the Institute for International Education 

in their yearly publication, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: Saudi Arabia.” The yearly figures reflect the 

number of Saudi Arabian students who traveled to the United States in that year on a KASP 

student visa. 

0	
  

10,000	
  

20,000	
  

30,000	
  

40,000	
  

50,000	
  

60,000	
  

2002	
   2004	
   2006	
   2008	
   2010	
   2012	
   2014	
  

Saudi	
  Arabia	
  Student	
  Totals	
  	
  
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 120

public opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia before 

and after 2007.

Figure 4 displays the possible causal 

relationship between the KASP and public 

opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia. As is shown, 

both numbers are significantly higher after 2007 

when an influx of Saudi students begins to flood 

the United States. This theory has also been 

practiced by the US military for decades. The 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) program has worked to bring military 

personnel from around the world to the US for 

training and education. Miles (2011) writes, 

“IMET is a State Department security-assistance 

program, managed by the Defense Department’s 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 

to provide professional military training and 

education to US allies.” This has allowed the 

US to build strategic partnerships with personnel 

from partner nations who are rising stars in 

their respective militaries and who often come 

into leadership positions in the future. Through 

the IMET program, they are exposed to the 

American way of life and ideals, democratic 

values, respect, individual and human rights, 

and belief in the rule of law (Miles, 2011). This 

creates much more positive views of the US 

military and the US in general, which go a long 

students in the United States has increased by 

nearly 500 percent (Institute for International 

Education, 2014). In 2003, only 3,521 Saudi 

students traveled to the US to study abroad, 

but in 2014 there were 53,919 who came to the 

US for their studies. (See Figure 3 for the yearby-year numbers.) This is a dramatic increase 

that could be having effects on Saudi society. 

Is it possible those students who travel to the 

US for their education return to Saudi Arabia 

with improved views of the US? Saudi students 

who travel to the US for their education make 

American friends, wear American clothes, and 

shop at American malls, which could explain the 

influx of American brands and stores appearing 

throughout the country. Taylor and Albasri (2014) 

write, “KASP is clearly impacting Saudi Arabia. 

The alumni are bringing their experiences from 

the United States back to Saudi Arabia and trying 

to recreate them. The impact that the exposure 

of American culture has on these students will 

have an impact on the future of Saudi Arabia.” 

(p. 117). The KASP could also lead to improved 

public opinion of Saudi Arabia in the United 

States as many American students befriend their 

Saudi classmates (Knickmeyer, 2012). Figure 

4 below displays the comparison between the 

number of Saudi students entering the US and 

Figure 4: Potential Impact of KASP on 

Public Opinion percentages

Mean from 

2002-2006

Mean from 

2007-2014

Public Opinion of the U.S. 8.60% 33.14%

Saudi students in the U.S. 3,951.60 25,194.75

Source: The public opinion numbers were averages of the available Zogby, Pew, and Gallup 

survey results for the years listed. The Saudi student numbers were averages from the Institute 

for International education’s yearly publication, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: Saudi Arabia” for the 

years listed.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 121

views of the US (somewhat unfavorable and 

very unfavorable), while 51 percent indicated 

“somewhat positive” views, 33 percent indicated 

“very positive” views, and 9 percent indicated 

“no opinion.” Another interesting finding was 

the difference in gender. The aggregate mean for 

male respondents’ views of the US after studying 

in the US was 3.97 while the aggregate mean 

for female respondents’ views of the US after 

studying in the US was 4.33. The comparison 

of means between males and females before and 

after studying in the US is displayed below in 

Figure 5. When asked to report their views of 

the US after studying in the US, 42 percent of 

females indicated “very favorable”; 50 percent 

of females indicated “somewhat favorable”; and 

8 percent of females indicated “no opinion.” 

When asked to report their views of the US 

after studying in the US, 27 percent of males 

indicated “very favorable”; 54 percent of males 

indicated “somewhat favorable”; 9 percent of 

males indicated “no opinion”; 5 percent of males 

indicated “somewhat unfavorable,” and 5 percent 

of males indicated “very unfavorable.”

Overall, students reported higher approvals 

of the US after leaving Saudi Arabia to live in the 

US. While the differences between views before 

coming to the US and views after coming to the 

US are not colossal, they do show a positive 

change. It is also interesting that Saudi women 

reported higher approval levels than Saudi men. 

way in building important relationships. Is it 

possible that the KASP is doing for the civilian 

population what the IMET program has done for 

the military population?

Discussion of Survey Results of Saudi 

Students Studying in the USA

To test this theory, research was conducted 

at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio to 

gauge the views of Saudi Arabian students living 

in the United States. Wright State ranks fifth in 

the United States in Saudi student enrollment 

(Taylor and Albasri, 2014). Anonymous Likert 

scale surveys were dispersed to fifty-five Saudi 

Arabian students, asking them to self-report on 

their views of the United States prior to and after 

leaving Saudi Arabia for the US. The survey also 

asked students to report their gender, age, and 

indicate how long they have lived in the US. It 

included a comment section to allow students 

to explain why their views of the US changed. 

The Likert scale surveys were coded from 1 to 

5, with 1 indicating “very unfavorable” views 

of the US and 5 indicating “very favorable” 

views of the US. The aggregate mean for Saudi 

students’ views of the US increased from 3.76 

(before coming to the US) to 4.05 (after coming 

to the US). After studying in the US, only 7 

percent of Saudi students indicated negative 

Figure 5: Comparison of

Saudi Arabia Student Perceptions

Saudi Arabia Student Views of the U.S.

Males Females

Before 3.67 4.08

After 3.97 4.33

Difference 0.3 0.25

Source: These numbers were derived from the independent anonymous survey research 

performed at Wright State University.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 122

Cooperation organizations in Saudi Arabia: 

the United States Military Training Mission 

(USMTM) was established in 1953 and works 

primarily with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and 

the Saudi Armed Forces under the authority of 

USCENTCOM (Blanchard, 2010). The Office of 

Program Management – Saudi Arabia National 

Guard (OPM-SANG) was established in 1973 

and bilaterally trains, operates, and supplies 

the Saudi Arabian National Guard under the 

administration of the United States Army 

Security Assistance Command (USASAC). The 

Office of the Program Management – Ministry of 

Interior – Facilities Security Forces (OPM-MOIFSF) was created in 2008 to ensure infrastructure 

protection including border security, civil 

defense, and coast guard operations and is 

administered by the Department of State and the 

US military (Blanchard, 2010).

Although the social changes and public 

opinion in Saudi Arabia might not directly 

affect the US-Saudi relationship, it could still 

play an important role. Blanchard argues that 

Saudi Arabia’s domestic political situation 

with regard to issues such as human rights, 

religious freedom, and cultural change might 

be more important to the US-Saudi relationship 

than ever before (Blanchard, 2014). Cummins 

and Braziel (2014) also draw the connection 

between public opinion of the United States in 

the Middle East and Security Cooperation. When 

public opinion of the United States is positive, 

Security Cooperation Officers (SCO) have more 

access to their counterparts and can more easily 

develop strong relationships. Conversely, when 

anti-Americanism is high it can lead to “delays 

in decision-making, a lack of access, or even put 

the SCOs life in danger.” (Cummins and Braziel, 

2014) Therefore, positive increases in public 

opinion of the US in Saudi Arabia will only help 

to strengthen the US-Saudi relationship.

This could be attributed to the vast difference in 

women’s rights between the US and Saudi Arabia. 

When given the chance to write comments on 

why their opinion of the US might have changed, 

many students cited the difference in laws, food, 

and fashion as causing positive changes. Many 

wrote that they were surprised by the amount of 

taxes in the US, and others wrote that they were 

surprised by how friendly people are in the US. 

When asked why his opinion of the US changed, 

one male simply responded by writing “girls and 

freedom.”

The US-Saudi Relationship

How does this change occurring in Saudi 

Arabia affect its relationship with the United 

States? The simple answer is that it most likely 

does not affect the relationship. Before some of 

these cultural changes and when views of the US 

were very poor, the United States’ relationship 

with the Saudi government remained strong. 

Since the 1940s, the US has seen Saudi Arabia as 

a strategic partner in the Middle East. Its vast oil 

reserves and strategic location in the Middle East 

made Saudi Arabia a strong ally against Soviet 

influence during the Cold War and a staunch 

ally in the War on Terror since September 11, 

2001 (Cordesman, 2010). This is reflected in the 

Security Cooperation partnership between the 

United States and Saudi Arabia. Since 1950, the 

United States has been Saudi Arabia’s leading 

defense supplier with Saudi Arabia’s accounting 

for nearly 20 percent of global US Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) deliveries amounting to 

$62.7 billion US dollars (Blanchard, 2010). 

Since 2010, the Obama Administration has 

notified Congress of over $86 billion in 

proposed arms sales with Saudi Arabia, which 

include fighter aircraft, helicopters, armored 

vehicles, missile defense systems, and related 

equipment and services (DSCA: Major Arms 

Sales, 2014). Saudi Arabia has a robust and 

complicated Security Cooperation partnership 

with the US. There are three separate Security 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 123

citizens are studying in US colleges, and many 

are making American friends and returning to 

their country with positive views of the United 

States.

The opinions and recommendations expressed 

in this article are solely those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the views of Lockheed 

Martin Corporation.

______________________________________

About the Author

Joshua Cummins is the CENTCOM – Middle 

East/Central Asia research assistant at DISAM. 

He received a Master’s degree in International 

and Comparative Politics from Wright State 

University in 2012. He completed his Master’s 

thesis on Middle Eastern public opinion, and 

his other research interests include Middle East 

politics, US foreign policy, and Middle Eastern 

history.

______________________________________

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Conclusion

King Abdullah passed away at the age of 90 

on January 23, 2015. His death came at a delicate 

time for Saudi Arabia as the kingdom is dealing 

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The DISAM Annual, December 2015 126
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 127

The Russian Intervention and the 

Internal Dynamics of Syria

By Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Strategic Studies Institute

The views expressed in this Strategic Insights piece 

are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 

the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. This article is cleared for public release; 

distribution is unlimited. 

The Syrian civil war began in March 2011 

and has claimed nearly 250,000 lives so far. 

After over 4 years of internal fighting, the 

Kremlin has decided to expand its role in this 

conflict by moving combat aircraft and some 

ground troops to Syria to support the Bashar 

al-Assad government. These actions seem like 

a clear prelude to a direct Russian combat role, 

although the scope of such an effort is not yet 

clear. It has started with a limited number of air 

strikes against the opposition forces fighting 

Assad. Additionally, Russia is providing the 

Syrian army with new weapons supplies which 

that army seems to be absorbing very quickly. 

The United States has expressed concern about 

the deployment and is facing the question of how 

seriously it seeks to oppose increased Russian 

involvement in this war, and what, if anything, 

to do about it.

Some strategic context is necessary when 

addressing this problem. The Russians have 

intervened in the Syrian civil war to bolster the 

Assad regime at a time when things are going 

badly for that government. Since March 2015, 

various Islamist opposition groups have scored 

a series of combat victories. Assad is being 

battered in the north, east, and central part of 

the country. The Islamic State’s (IS) capture of 

Palmyra/Tadmor in May gives the organization 

an important strategic foothold about 130 miles 

northeast of Damascus. Assad, in an unusual 

display of frankness, stated in June that his military 

had become less capable because it had been 

weakened by desertions and defections.1 This is 

a serious problem for him since he leads a regime 

dominated by his Alawite minority sect, which is 

only 12 percent of the population at most. Some 

majority Sunni Muslims, as well as non-Alawite 

minorities such as the Christians and Druzes, 

favor the regime over the Islamist opposition, but 

there is still a tremendously limited manpower 

pool from which Assad is able to replenish the 

ranks of his military. On several occasions, the 

regime managed to avoid significant military 

defeat only through the actions of the Lebanese 

Shi’ite militia, Hezbollah, which has deployed 

around 10,000 militiamen in Syria to support 

Assad, with around 3,000 operating at any one 

time.2

In establishing its own policy, the United 

States is confounded by a lack of potential Syrian 

allies for influencing the situation. Currently, 

Syria’s dominant internal players are the Assad 

regime, IS, the Nusra Front (which is aligned with 

al-Qaeda), and other jihadists and Islamists. Some 

militant Islamist groups fighting the government 

are not considered jihadists because they are not 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 128

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that 

supporting the Syrian regime is indispensable to 

defeating IS.6 His colleague, Russian First Deputy 

Director of Federal Security Sergei Smirnov, has 

stated that about 2,400 Russian nationals are 

fighting with IS, and these individuals eventually 

may pose a terrorism threat to Russia.7 Some 

Russian concerns appear to overlap with U.S. 

interests, with the greatest differences being over 

the future role of Assad. The United States is also 

unhappy to see an expansion of Russian influence 

in Syria, but this is a double-edged sword for 

Moscow. Saudi Arabia and most of the other 

Gulf Arab monarchies fervently detest Assad 

and will consider Russian efforts to support him 

to be a direct confrontation against their foreign 

policy priorities. Relations between Russia and 

the Gulf could remain poisoned for decades over 

this decision.

The Russian intervention in Syria therefore is 

not necessarily a major setback for U.S. policy, 

but it can evolve into one. Thus, Washington 

needs to be certain that the Russians understand 

the type of actions that the United States would 

consider especially provocative and damaging 

to bilateral relations. In this regard, Russian 

aircraft would have no business bombing 

Kurdish forces, which are fighting IS in areas 

long abandoned by the Assad regime. Moscow 

also needs scrupulously to avoid bombing the 

organizations they themselves have identified 

as “healthy” and thereby important to a political 

solution. Moreover, neither the United States nor 

the Israelis like the idea of Russian aircraft and 

a strong air defense network so close to Israel. 

Russia has already agreed to coordinate its 

military actions with Israel, and it needs to pay 

strong attention to this obligation.8

The United States has only a limited 

capability to pressure the Russians to withdraw 

from Syria, but even if this were possible, it 

may not be the right move. Assad is a vicious 

dictator, but his one redeeming characteristic is 

that the IS jihadists are worse. If the regime were 

to collapse, the war would continue between 

clear advocates of international terrorism and do 

not proclaim the revolution in Syria as an early 

step in a more far-reaching global program. 

They also do not have massive numbers of 

foreign fighters in their ranks, unlike the jihadist 

organizations. One of the largest and most 

important of these groups is Ahrar al-Sham (Free 

Men of Syria).3 Its leader, Hashim al-Shaikh, 

has acknowledged close battlefield coordination 

with the Nusra Front, but has indicated that he 

would like Nusra to distance itself from al-Qaeda 

central. This statement is vaguely positive, but 

not nearly enough reassurance to require even 

a second look at Ahrar al-Sham as a potential 

ally. Consequently, Washington lacks powerful 

potential allies in the northern part of Syria, 

beyond the Kurdish rebels whose strength is 

mostly confined to their own region. Things are 

slightly better in the south where there are a few 

important nonideological/nonjihadi groups, some 

of whom have members trained in Jordan with the 

assistance of the United States.4 Unfortunately, 

jihadist groups operate in the south as well. The 

nonideological groups are important, but they 

are nowhere near as significant to Syria’s future 

as IS, Nusra, and the other extremists. Moreover, 

the nonideological groups are not clearly proWestern or pro-democracy, and it is not clear 

if they will forcefully resist the jihadist agenda 

over time.

Washington currently supports a political 

solution to the war in Syria which does not 

involve jihadists or Assad but could allow some 

of the dictator’s former associates to participate 

in a future government. The Russians clearly 

support Assad, but they have stated that they are 

willing to work with Syria’s “healthy” opposition 

to find a political solution.5 These statements may 

be propaganda or, more promisingly, Moscow 

may be indicating some realism about the 

impossibility of turning the clock back to a pre2011 concept of the Syrian state. The Russians 

have also stated that their military actions are to 

be targeted directly against IS and other jihadists, 

whom they view as a serious threat. Russian 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 129

Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, 

Middle Eastern chemical weapons and ballistic 

missile proliferation, terrorism, and commando 

operations. He is also the author of Global 

Security Watch--Jordan (Praeger 2010). From 

1994-2012, Dr. Terrill participated in the Middle 

East Regional Security Track 2 talks, which were 

then part of the Middle East Peace Process. He 

has also served as a member of the military and 

security working group of the Baker/Hamilton 

Iraq Study Group throughout its existence in 

2006. Dr. Terrill holds a B.A. from California 

State Polytechnic University and an M.A. from 

the University of California, Riverside, both 

in Political Science. He also holds a Ph.D. in 

International Relations from Claremont Graduate 

University, Claremont, CA.

______________________________________

Endnotes

1. Dion Nissenbaum and Philip Shishkin, “World 

News: Russian Buildup in Syria Worried 

U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 

2015, p. A-10.

2. I have previously considered the role of 

Hezbollah in the Syria civil war in some depth. 

Please see W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s Strategy 

for Saving Asad,” Middle East Journal, Spring 

2015, especially pp. 232-235.

3. “Ahrar al Sham playing bigger role in war,” 

Daily Star, September 23, 20145.

4. New Approach in Southern Syria, Brussels, 

Belgium: International Crisis Group, 

September 2, 2015, pp. 2-6, 23-24.

5. Agence France Presse, “Putin pledges to keep 

up military support for Assad,” Daily Star, 

September 15, 2015.

6. Ishaan Tharoor, “Why Russia is in Syria,” The 

Washington Post, September 11, 2015.

7. “Moscow says about 2,400 Russians Fighting 

with ISIS,” Daily Star, September 18, 2015.

8. Reuters, “Israel, Russia to coordinate military 

action on Syria,” Jordan Times, September 

21, 2015.

competing Syrian factions, with IS threatening 

to emerge as the dominant player in ever larger 

parts of the country. IS crimes already include 

mass executions of prisoners and civilians, 

drowning prisoners in cages, beheading Western 

hostages, destroying, and pillaging antiquities on 

what the United Nations Educational, Scientific 

and Cultural Organization calls an “industrial 

scale”—executing children, burning prisoners 

alive, establishing a sexual slavery system based 

on the oppression of non-Muslim women, and 

attempting to eradicate various non-Muslim 

minorities. If Russian actions prevent the Assad 

government from collapsing at this time, that may 

be a tragedy. But an IS takeover of most of the 

country would be a bigger tragedy. Under these 

horrific circumstances, the best course for the 

United States may be to try to build on common 

ground with the Russians and unrelentingly push 

for a political solution that marginalizes and 

defeats the jihadists, but also gets rid of the worst 

aspects of the Assad dictatorship (including 

Assad himself). Such a result is probably years, 

if not decades, away, but no other solution seems 

possible, so it may be time for a pragmatic 

reaction to the Russian intervention.

______________________________________

About the Author

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill joined the Strategic 

Studies Institute in October 2001, and is SSI’s 

Middle East specialist. Prior to his appointment, 

he served as a Middle East nonproliferation 

analyst for the International Assessments 

Division of the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also 

served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War 

College on assignment from LLNL. He is a former 

faculty member at Old Dominion University in 

Norfolk, VA, and has taught adjunct at a variety 

of other colleges and universities. He is a retired 

U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel and 

Foreign Area Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill 

has published in numerous academic journals 

on topics including nuclear proliferation, the 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 130
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 131

Mitigating Ethical Failure in 

Security Cooperation

By Dr. Carlos Braziel, Joshua I. Cummins, Nicole Tom

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

William D. Cavanaugh

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the General Counsel

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Introduction

The Department of Defense (DOD) has 

been harmed by numerous ethical failures in 

the recent past. Although these issues can been 

attributed to a small percentage of those serving 

in the military, failure to correct them early and 

effectively could further erode the moral fabric 

of the force charged with the duty of protecting 

the United States from external aggression.

All DOD employees including members of the 

Security Cooperation (SC) workforce, and those 

employed by the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) are expected to take their 

ethical responsibilities seriously. As will be 

stated elsewhere in this article, given the nature 

of their work, members of the SC workforce, 

such as Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs), 

may find their adherence to ethical principles 

tested in a variety of occasions. This article will 

attempt to remind SCOs of their commitment to 

ethical behavior by exploring the various ethical 

rules, laws, and regulations pertinent to security 

cooperation.

Discussion

Competence and character are not mutually 

exclusive.... They are woven together—they 

must be” (Chuck Hagel, 2014 as cited in Burns, 

2014).

Over the last several years, DOD has 

faced great scrutiny for the recent number of 

publicized ethical failures in its ranks. Some 

of the ethical failures that have caught the eye 

of the media run the gambit from junior to midlevel military members cheating on exams all 

the way to senior military leaders falsifying 

records and abusing power. In August 2013, 

the Washington Post ran a story about a US 

Army three-star general who, as Whitlock 

(2013) points out, improperly received gifts 

from a South Korean citizen during his tenure as 

commander. The story detailed how the general 

illegally accepted gold-plated Montblanc pens, 

an expensive leather briefcase, and “failed to 

report a $3,000 cash gift to a member of his 

family from” an “unnamed South Korean 

benefactor” (Whitlock, 2013). Several months 

later, NBC News ran a story about three US 

Navy officials accused of accepting gifts of 

luxury travel, cash, concert tickets and even 

prostitutes “from a foreign defense contractor 

in exchange for classified and internal Navy 

information” (Bratu, 2013).

In the words of Grassgold and Eich (2014), 

the examples highlighted above, “and other 

forms of egregious personal behavior, have led 

to several top military officials being relieved 

of their commands.” The previous examples 

also have many high-ranking executive branch 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 132

expected to maintain professional relationships, 

uphold the public trust, and put the SC mission 

before personal gain by adhering to ethical 

principles, regulations and laws.

The vast majority of members in the SC 

community have the highest commitment to 

ethical standards. However, when a member 

of the community fails to comply with these 

standards, his or her conduct can call into 

question the integrity of the work done, not just 

by that member, but also by the SC community 

as a whole.

Gifts

A common issue that will arise when SCOs 

are working abroad is the ethical question of 

accepting gifts. The act of gift giving can be 

essential to developing business relationships in 

some cultures across the globe. From time to 

time, SCOs are occasionally offered gifts from 

vendors and foreign governments. It is, however, 

important to note that in some circumstances, 

an act that is well-intentioned could be 

misconceived as an attempt to either bribe or 

influence SCOs. The DOD preferred method for 

handling gifts is for federal employees to simply 

refuse them in order to avoid the appearance 

of impropriety (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

2003). However, this can be a complicated issue 

when a SCO is presented a gift by a foreign 

government - whereby the act of refusing it can 

potentially damage the relationship between the 

US and the partner nation. Congress recognizes 

the importance of gift giving in diplomacy and 

has consented to federal employees accepting 

gifts from foreign governments to avoid 

embarrassing the US government (United 

States Code, Title 5, 2006). In order to avoid the 

appearance of impropriety, while balancing the 

need for relationship development with the host 

nation counterparts, it is imperative that SCOs 

understand the following common exceptions 

for accepting gifts from prohibited sources:

officials, including the current Secretary of 

Defense, Chuck Hagel, perplexed and concerned 

about the nature and scope of these ethical lapses 

in the military. Sources who have previously 

worked closely with high ranking officials in the 

military point out that “a culture has developed 

in which some believe they are above the law” 

(Nye, 2012). Conversely, some experts say 

these violations should only be attributed to a 

very small percentage of the military population 

(Tilghman, 2014).

However, other experts believe this may be 

more of an institutional problem, which lies in 

“poor training, toxic command climates, flawed 

personnel policies and deeper cultural issues....” 

(Tilghman, 2014). Hagel’s concerns prompted 

the appointment of Navy Rear Admiral Margaret 

“Peg” Klein to serve as the ethical czar for the 

Department of Defense. As ethics czar, Klein 

will coordinate “the actions of the Joint Staff, the 

combatant commands and the military service, 

she will work directly with the service secretaries 

and chiefs on the Defense Department’s focus on 

ethics, character and competence in all activities at 

every level of command with an uncompromising 

culture of accountability” Garamone, 2014, para. 

3). In addition to Klein’s appointment, the Joint 

Chiefs reviewed numerous ethical violations of 

senior military leaders and are implementing 

aggressive measures to avert future instances 

of critical judgment lapses. In the words of A. 

E. Major (2014), “their preliminary findings 

included that ‘we need to... reinforce that [ethics] 

training more frequently in an officer’s career’” 

(p. 58).

More important than ever, the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the 

DOD agency responsible for managing the SC 

workforce, must be vigilant in protecting itself 

when interacting with US industry and partner 

nations. The men and women who serve in the 

SC community are often required to cultivate 

relationships with a variety of organizations 

and individuals in order to support US foreign 

policy. In the execution of their duties, SCOs are 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 133

Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 

Branch (Exceptions), 2014]; Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, 2003; United States Code, Title 5, 

2006; US DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 

2012). This rule applies when accepting gifts 

from the host nation government or the SCO’s 

military counterparts. Essentially, this rule states 

that SCOs may accept gifts that do not exceed 

the fair market value in the US of $375. This 

rule applies to multiple gifts given on the same 

occasion, including gifts to the SCO’s spouse 

or family members. Gifts exceeding $375 must 

be returned to the donor, retained for use within 

the DOD component, or forwarded to GSA for a 

utilization decision or disposal. The SCO may 

also decide to purchase the gift for their Fair 

Market Value (US DOD Standards of Conduct 

Office, 2012). For example, if a SCO receives a 

sword from the host nation valued at $450, the 

SCO cannot decide to purchase the sword for 

the difference between $375 and the fair market 

value. Instead, the SCO must purchase the 

sword for the entire Fair Market Value of $450. 

The SCO will work with their ethics officer in 

each case and write a check to the US Treasury 

if they choose to keep a gift valued at more than 

$375.

Per Diem Rule

Next, we have the Per Diem Rule, which is 

also referred to as Rule 5 CFR § 2635.204. In 

basic terms, this particular rule points out that 

SCOs assigned to duty in the host nation or on 

official travel may accept gifts from local host 

nation business representatives based on the 

following criteria:

1. The market value of the total cost for 

the gifts (e.g. food, refreshments, and 

entertainment) in the host nation does 

not exceed the US per diem rate for the 

local area. 

2. Non-US citizens or members of the host 

nation government are attending the 

event. 

• $20/$50 Rule: 5 CFR § 2635.204(a) 

• $375 Rule: 5 CFR § 2635.204(l); DOD 

1005.13; 5 USC 7342 

• Per Diem Rule: 5 CFR § 2635.204(i) 

$20/$50 Rule

According to the US DOD Standards of 

Conduct Office (2012), the most applicable rule 

for SCOs accepting gifts is 5 CFR § 2635.204(a), 

otherwise known as the “20/50 rule.” The 20/50 

rule states:

An employee may accept unsolicited gifts having 

an aggregate market value of $20 or less per 

source per occasion, provided that the aggregate 

market value of individual gifts received from any 

one person under the authority of this paragraph 

shall not exceed $50 in a calendar year (US 

DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012). 

This rule applies when receiving gifts 

from sources defined as “prohibited,” that is a 

source seeking official action, with whom the 

SCO is doing business, or with whom the US 

government is doing business (Standards of 

Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 

Branch (Exceptions), 2014). This rule states 

that SCOs may accept unsolicited gifts valued 

at $20 or less, “provided that the total value of 

gifts under this provision from any one person or 

organization does not exceed $50 in a calendar 

year” (United States DOD Standards of Conduct 

Office, 2012). The SCO cannot settle the 

surplus value over $20 to receive the award or 

present. In order to accept the gift, it must be 

valued at $20 or less, or the SCO must purchase 

the gift for the entire amount [Standards of 

Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 

Branch (Exceptions), 2014]. 

$375 Rule (Fair Market Value in US Dollars) 

[Foreign Government]

Another important rule that SCOs should 

be aware of is the $375 rule [Standards of 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 134

(Exceptions), 2014]. An example that would be 

most appropriate in this case is that where an 

aerospace company “that is a prohibited source 

sponsors an industry wide, two-day seminar for 

which it charges a fee of $400 and anticipates 

attendance of approximately 400 people” 

(Authenticated US Government Information – 

GPO, 2013, p. 581). As the Authenticated US 

Government Information - GPO (2013, p. 581) 

further points out, “an Air Force contractor pays 

$2,000 to the association so that the association 

can extend free invitations to five.....officials 

designated by the contractor” including a 

SCO. The SCO, in this case, “may not accept the 

gifts of free attendance....because the contractor 

specified the invitees and bore the cost of their 

attendance” (Authenticated US Government 

Information – GPO, 2013, p. 581). In this 

example, “the gift of free attendance is considered 

to be provided by the company and not by the 

sponsoring association” (Authenticated US 

Government Information – GPO, 2013, p. 

581). As the Authenticated US Government 

Information - GPO further points out, “had the 

contractor paid $2,000 to the association in order 

that the association might invite any five Federal 

employees,” a SCO “to whom the sponsoring 

association extended one of the five invitations 

could attend if his participation were determined 

to be in the interest of” the US government. The 

SCO “could not in any case accept an invitation 

directly from the non-sponsor contractor because 

the market value of the gift exceeds $375” 

(Authenticated US Government Information – 

GPO, 2013, p. 581).

Official Travel and Resources

SCOs must also be cognizant of the ethical 

issues involved with traveling. SCOs can take 

travel offerings from foreign governments for 

travel taking place (in its entirety) outside of the 

US if acceptance is in line with the interests of the 

US government (US DOD Standards of Conduct 

Office, 2012). Certain rules also apply to the use 

of first or premium class travel. SCOs are only 

3. Attendance is part of SCO’s official duty 

to gather/share information and promote 

US industry. 

4. The local business vendor or someone 

other than the host nation government 

is funding the food, refreshments or 

entertainment for the event. 

For example, a representative for a US 

defense contractor is invited to attend a dinner 

with a local host nation business representative 

seeking to form a partnership with the US 

company. As part of his/her official duties, the 

SCO may accompany the US defense contractor 

to the dinner just as long as to the market value of 

both the food and entertainment does not exceed 

the per diem rate for that foreign locations. As 

a precaution, SCOs should forward all pertinent 

information (i.e. location, cost, participates, 

entertainment) to their Ethics Counselor for a 

legal determination before agreeing to attend the 

dinner or meeting.

Other Exceptions

SCOs are permitted to accept modest food 

and refreshments such as coffee, donuts, and 

light snacks as a form of hospitality to expedite 

meetings. For meals made available pursuant 

to an agreement between the US Government 

and an organization or foreign government, 

the value should be deducted from the daily 

per diem rate (US DOD Standards of Conduct 

Office, 2012). For events with greater than 

100 attendees, SCOs are permitted to officially 

accept free attendance when participating as a 

speaker or when the gift of attendance was not 

given by the event sponsor [Standards of Ethical 

Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch 

(Exceptions), 2014].

SCOs may also personally accept free 

attendance if they are not speaking at the event, 

if it is attended in a personal capacity, the 

leave is authorized, and they are not spending 

appropriated funds [Standards of Ethical 

Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 135

(Personal and Business Relationships), 2014; 

Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of 

the Executive Branch (Disqualification While 

Seeking Employment), 2014). While seeking 

employment, a SCO must participate in full 

disclosure by notifying his or her supervisor or 

ethics counselor. SCOs should also be aware 

of the representational prohibitions that may 

apply. After leaving government service, SCOs 

should never act for other entities or represent 

them to the US government with regard to specific 

issues they personally handled while on active 

duty (United States Code, Title 18, 2006). The 

following section outlines the restrictions SCOs 

may face when seeking employment after 

government service.

Lifetime Ban

Although SCOs rarely fall in this category, 

they may face a lifetime restriction in representing 

an entity in front of a federal agency in which they 

have participated personally and substantially in 

contracting matters while in the performance 

of their official duties (United States Code, 

Title 18, 2006). Thus, the lifetime ban includes 

matters in which the SCO approved contract 

statement of works; prepared and developed 

solicitations; evaluated contract bids, negotiating 

contract prices; participating in source selection 

or approving contract awards. An example 

of an individual that would fit this category is 

former SCO who was also a contracting officer 

responsible for preparing a statement of work for 

a contract associated with a particular foreign 

military sales case. Since the SCO participated 

“personally” and “substantially” in this matter, 

the SCO’s knowledge and influence can provide 

an unfair advantage if they represent a US defense 

contractor in front of the US government for this 

particular contract. However, this lifetime ban 

does not prohibit former SCOs from working 

for a different division defense contractor that or 

“behind-the-scenes” without violating any US 

disclosure laws.

permitted to partake in premium class air travel 

for specified, limited circumstances. SCOs 

may only accept premium class air travel if it is 

obtained as an accommodation upgrade through 

redemption or frequent traveler benefits, if it 

is the only accommodation available, or if the 

mission requires it and it is approved by the 

designated premium travel approving authority 

for the SCO.

For example, a SCO may be expected 

to partake in premium class air travel if he or 

she is accompanying a minister of a foreign 

government on official travel. Authorization 

of premium class air travel should be made in 

advance of the actual travel; however, if this 

is not possible then written approval must be 

obtained from the appropriate authority. When 

traveling for official duty, SCOs should use 

US air carriers whenever possible, but SCOs 

may use foreign air carriers when air travel 

is provided under a bilateral or multilateral 

agreement. SCOs are encouraged to exercise 

prudence when participating in foreign travel 

for official purposes. Any additional expenses 

outside of the scope of official duty or official 

travel are the SCO’s financial responsibility and 

are not chargeable to the US government (US 

DOD Standards of Conduct Office, 2012).

Post Government Employment

Another issue SCOs must be conscious of, 

which falls under rule 5 CFR § 2635.502(e) 

and 5 CFR § 2635.604(a), is the issue of post 

government employment. SCOs may wish 

to seek employment after retiring from a US 

government position, but they must be aware of 

the rules that apply.

A SCO begins seeking employment when he 

or she directly or indirectly engages a prospective 

employer in employment negotiations, through 

unsolicited communication about possible 

employment, or by responding to unsolicited 

communication about possible employment in a 

way other than a rejection (Standards of Ethical 

Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 136

government or with private companies. SCOs 

should also avoid the appearance of impropriety 

and should notify their supervisor and ethics 

counselor of approved personal relationships 

with prohibited sources and themselves, family 

members, or close friends (US DOD Standards 

of Conduct Office, 2012).

Conclusion

There are numerous resources available to 

help SCOs with understanding the vast majorities 

of ethical rules, policies, and laws. First, the 

DOD “Standards of Conduct Office” website, 

which has been cited in the references section 

of this text, provides a repository of ethics 

policies, training programs and guidelines for 

implementing regulations for Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and DOD agencies.

Second, the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management (DISAM) has 

developed an online learning guide to assist the 

SC community in understanding the various 

ethical rules and regulation when dealing with 

international partners and vendors. The DISAM 

“Ethics for SCOs” online learning guide 

cannot cover every ethical situation SCOs may 

experience during their assignments; however, it 

provides a solid foundation to help them through 

an issue and make an ethically sound decision 

that places the interest of the US Government in 

the forefront.

Lastly, the Ethics Counselor at the Security 

Cooperation Office or at the CCMD is always 

a good resource for advice. Ethics Counselors 

are trained to provide counseling to SCOs and 

provide written determinations and personal 

briefings to all incoming and departing SCOs.

Ethical lapses by any member of our 

community will never be tolerated. As a 

SCO, you are expected to maintain the highest 

standards of ethics and integrity in both your 

professional and personal conduct. Even the 

perception of impropriety can derail a career 

and, more importantly, cause the loss of our 

credibility with the public. Remember, as long 

Two-Year Ban

For two years, after leaving government 

service, SCOs should not act for another entity 

or represent the entity to the US government 

with regard to specific issues or matters that 

were pending under their official responsibility 

during their one year period prior to leaving 

federal service (United States Code, Title 18, 

2006). For example, a SCO that was appointed 

as a contracting officer representative (COR) for 

a particular contract of a foreign military sales 

case would fall in this category[1]. Since the 

responsibility for monitoring the US contractor’s 

performance was a part of the SCO’s official 

duty as a COR, he or she is prohibited from 

representing the U.S contractor in front of the 

US government for at least two years.

One-Year Ban

For one year after leaving a senior SCO 

position (0-7 & above), SCOs may not act for 

any other entity, with the view of influencing, 

before the agency they worked for in the past, 

any official undertaking (United States Code, 

Title 18, 2006). Due to their senior rank, their 

mere presence while representing the US defense 

contractor in front of the US government could 

result in an inappropriate influence on existing 

government employees. Therefore, a one-year 

cooling off period is required.

Conflicts of Interest

Other issues that may arise are conflicts of 

interest. This, in basic terms, occurs when a 

SCO personally (and markedly) engages in an 

official capacity in an undertaking, which has a 

direct or predictable impact on a SCO’s personal, 

and/or family’s financial interests (Code of 

Federal Regulations (5 CFR 2635.402(b)

(i), 201)). SCOs may not accept or demand 

compensation for performance of official duties 

and must remain impartial during performance 

of official duties with either the host nation 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 137

______________________________________

References

Authenticated US Government Information 

– GPO. (2013). Office of Government Ethics.

Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/

CFR-2012-title5-vol3/pdf/CFR-2012-title5-

vol3-part2635.pdf

as you include ethics and integrity in the center 

of your everyday actions, you will protect the 

credibility of relationships with our international 

partners and uphold the public trust.

______________________________________

About the Authors

Dr. Carlos Braziel is an assistant professor 

and the CENTCOM-Middle East/Central 

Asia Seminar Director at DISAM. He is also 

a retired US Air Force officer who has served 

in a variety of operations and positions in the 

Middle East as an Air Force civil engineer and 

a US defense contractor. He holds a doctoral 

degree in organizational leadership from Indiana 

Wesleyan University.

Mr. William Cavanaugh is the Deputy General 

Counsel for the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency. He also served as an acquisition 

attorney for the US Air Force. He holds a doctor 

of law degree from the University Of Dayton 

School Of Law.

Mr. Joshua Cummins works for Lockheed 

Martin as the CENTCOM-Middle East/Central 

Asia Seminar research assistant at DISAM. 

He received a Master’s in International and 

Comparative Politics from Wright State 

University in 2012. He completed his Master’s 

thesis on Middle Eastern public opinion, and his 

other research interests include Middle Eastern 

politics, US foreign policy, and Middle Eastern 

history.

Ms. Nicole Tom is a former CENTCOM-Middle 

East/Central Asia Seminar research assistant 

at DISAM. She is currently an international 

business major and a member of the Air Force 

Reserve Officer Training Corps program at 

the University of California, Los Angeles.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 138
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 139

What SCOs Need to Know 

About EUM

By Jim Toomey

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Recently, I attended a tri-geographic combatant 

command (GCCMD) end-use monitoring (EUM) 

conference in Garmisch, Germany. Aside from 

enjoying the summer rains and beer, I was able 

to come away with almost sixteen pages of notes 

derived not only from the formal presentations but 

also from informal conversations with security 

cooperation organization (SCO) folks present.

In this simple and hopefully concise article, I 

hope to share some of the insights I learned there 

as well as reinforce some of the fundamentals 

that all SCO personnel should know about EUM.

First and foremost, as Chuck Handal, 

the Deputy for EUM at the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA), emphasized at the 

beginning of the training, there is really only one 

official source of EUM policy in DOD: that single 

source is Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance 

Management Manual (DCSA Manual 5105.38-

M). Chapter 8 is useful for SCOs because, 

in addition to citing general responsibilities, 

program goals, legal requirements, etc., it also 

provides more practical information on how 

to request both programmed and out-of-cycle 

funding for enhanced EUM (EEUM) duties, 

explains compliance assessment visit (CAV) 

inspection criteria, and describes the procedures 

foreign partners must follow to request third 

party transfers and demilitarize US equipment.

Second, the training in Garmisch helped to 

clarify certain aspects of end-use monitoring 

that SCOs are often a bit fuzzy on. For example, 

although US-sourced night vision devices (NVDs) 

are generally considered to be articles that require 

enhanced (or more stringent) monitoring, older 

generations of NVDs, produced in 1990 or earlier 

that do not provide thermal imaging capabilities, 

are not subject to EEUM; similarly, any NVDs 

that are mounted on a defense platform (i.e., 

integrated into a vehicle), are also not subject 

to EEUM. In addition, although SCOs are 

expected to account for and ensure the physical 

security of most EEUM items, which are defined 

in Table C8.T4 of the SAMM, communications 

security (COMSEC) equipment is the primary 

responsibility of the National Security Agency 

(NSA). Moreover, DOD’s EUM responsibilities 

are not limited to just those items transferred via 

the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process; our 

Golden Sentry program also mandates that SCOs 

provide monitoring and verification on any and 

all other items furnished by DOD, regardless of 

the means or channel, and SCOs may also be 

called upon to assist the Department of State and 

Department of Commerce with their separate 

EUM programs.

Third, discussions at the conference with 

individual SCO reps showed that some EUM 

managers, even after DISAM training, still 

didn’t fully understand the differences between 

routine and enhanced EUM. Routine end-use 

monitoring applies to all articles and information/

technology transferred by DOD to foreign 

parties that is not subject to EEUM. Although 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 140

DSCA’s Directorate for Security Assistance 

is also available for information, advice, and 

guidance on everything from CAV schedules 

to expense codes for EEUM funding requests 

(see John Oswald at john.a.oswald2.civ@mail.

mil). For general SCIP-related issues, there’s 

the SCIP Help Desk at dsca.sciphelp@mail.mil.

And, depending on the issue, other agencies or 

individuals, such as State Department’s Office 

of Regional Security and Arms Transfer (PM/

RSAT), the Defense Technology Security 

Administration (DTSA), and your COCOM 

EUM program manager, are always available to 

support the SCO. 

______________________________________

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) James Toomey 

is an associate professor at the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). 

During his military career, he served as a SubSaharan African (48J) Foreign Area Officer 

(FAO) for the Army for nearly fourteen years, 

with tours of duty at five U.S. embassies overseas, 

including service as a Defense Attaché in Haiti 

and Liberia, as the Chief, Central Africa Branch 

at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), as the 

first Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation 

for South Sudan, and as the first Senior Defense 

Official/Defense Attaché in Djibouti. He holds 

four degrees related to international business/

political affairs, including master’s degrees from 

Columbus State University and the University of 

Florida, where he also obtained a certificate in 

African studies.

this technically means that everything down to 

lab equipment and tents should be periodically 

inspected, routine checks should be focused 

on certain major systems, such as tanks, other 

ground vehicles, aircraft, warships, crew-served 

weapons, firearms, and those platform-mounted 

NVDs I mentioned earlier. Routine monitoring 

is more informal than EEUM, requiring 

quarterly verification of just a few routine items 

in a partner’s inventory by basic sight checks, 

reporting by other US Government (USG) 

personnel, or even open source reports, such 

as pictures of equipment that show up in local 

newspapers. By contrast, enhanced monitoring 

requires 100 percent inventories of items within 

90 days of delivery plus regular inspections 

(at least annually) of all EEUM items, and the 

inspections are normally done exclusively by 

US citizens using more thorough procedures, 

such as serial number checks and inventories 

of all sub-components accompanying an item 

or system. Last but not least, since EEUM may 

require looking at millions of items spread out 

throughout a large foreign country, these duties 

can be funded or supported by DSCA using SA 

Admin or T-20 funds; on the other hand, routine 

checks are conducted at no cost to the USG, and 

are expected to be performed in the course of 

other SCO duties.

Finally, the training also revealed new 

requirements on the horizon for SCOs. As a 

quick example, routine EUM in the past could be 

documented via hard copy reports kept on file at 

the SCO; however, there is a looming change to 

the SAMM that will very soon require all routine 

checks to be annotated in electronic reports via 

the Security Cooperation Information Portal 

(SCIP).

So as not to put my readers to sleep, I’ll 

end my sermon on EUM here, but not before 

mentioning that further assistance is available to 

you if you need help. DISAM, of course, offers 

a plethora of in-residence and online courses that 

can provide initial or refresher training on EUM.
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 141

US Army Africa Assists with 

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 

National Logistics School

By Major Noreen Mallory, USA

US Army Africa G-4 Logistics

VICENZA, Italy -- Recently, the Democratic 

Republic of Congo National Logistics School 

graduated its fourth class since 1983. US Army 

Africa and several international organizations 

were involved in the curriculum and instruction 

at the school in Kinshasa, DRC.

More than 600 graduates from all corners of 

the DRC and branches of the military including 

Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior 

security forces participated in the six month 

program of instruction.

The DRC Logistics School Initiative started 

with a shared vision between the leadership of the 

DRC, US Department of State and the European 

Union. The combined effort for this institutional 

build began in November 2014. According to 

Don Brown, a senior contractor, the DRC, US 

State Department, EU partner nations, US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command and US Army 

Africa teams worked to design an institution that 

would form the foundation for a new generation 

of DRC logistical leaders and increase the DRC’s 

Land Forces readiness posture.

The DRC identified and consolidated 

talented individuals from all branches of the 

military to support the pilot program. EU 

participants contributed to the infrastructure, 

providing the facilities, building and furniture. 

The US Department of State and its contracting 

representative the Crisis Response Company 

worked with the commandant and cadre of 

the logistics school to develop the program of 

instruction and the course curriculum.

USARAF’s Directorate 

of Logistics acted as the lead 

integrator, providing the 

overall concept, planning, 

coordination, oversight and 

subject matter expertise 

focusing on designing a 

sustainable institution. 

Support for the school came 

from several organization 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 142

instruction, teaching techniques and developing 

enduring academic institutional policies.

After six months of intensive classroom and 

hands-on training, students held a graduation 

ceremony attended by representatives of the 

DRC’s National Congress and director of Military 

Operations, USARAF, the US Department of 

State, European Union and numerous senior 

military leaders. The 

event culminated 

with 612 graduates 

conducting a pass and 

review.

The DRC 

intends to conduct 

two iterations of the 

logistics school per 

year for the next 

several years in order 

to build continuity within its forces. The next 

iteration of the logistics school will start July 

2015, where the DRC cadre, US Department of 

State, international 

partners and the 

USARAF ILAT 

will continue 

their collective 

efforts to develop 

a sustainable and 

enduring logistics 

institution.

including the Army Logistics University, the 

Army’s Regionally Aligned Force, 3rd Brigade 

1st Infantry Brigade from Fort Bliss, Texas. The 

RAF provided a six person Institutional Logistics 

Assistance Team known as an ILAT.

The ILAT worked with the DRC National 

Logistics School to assist cadre, instructors and 

commandant with every facet of the schools 

development, management and execution. 

Sgt. 1st Class Antonio Flores provided 

n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d 

officer guidance at 

the tactical level with 

the school’s cadre and 

students. ILAT members 

also assisted DRC cadre 

by providing subject 

matter experts in food 

service, transportation, 

a m m u n i t i o n , 

maintenance, armament 

repair, fuel supply 

operations and supply management. Flores 

stressed the ‘train as you fight’ approach to 

training, constantly reminding Congolese soldiers 

“What you learn here are the foundations of your 

skills. Learn it, remember it and master it.” 

Congolese cadre provided instruction 

through classroom lectures, hands-on and 

practical exercises dedicated to expanding 

student’s abilities to conduct various sustainment 

operations in austere environments. The ILAT 

also assisted with the refinement of course 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 143

SATMO, AMEDD Troops Train 

Armenian Medics During Historic 

Mission

By Adriane Elliot and Richard Bumgardner

USASAC Public Affairs

Capt. Chris Hudson (left), Mobile Training Team Leader from the US Army Security Assistance Training Management 

Organization, along with US Ambassador Richard M. Mills, Jr. (center) and the Armenian Minister of Defense Seyran 

Ohanyan (right), observe Armenian medics as they demonstrate combat lifesaving techniques before the official 

graduation ceremony for 12 Armenian Army medics. These 12 medics completed the US Army’s 68W, Health Care 

Specialist, and then a modified Army Basic Instructor Course, which certifies them as the first instructors for the newly 

formed Armenian Combat Medic School in Yerevan, a first of its kind for the Armenian Armed Forces. (Photo by 

Master Sgt. Efrem Dicochea, AMEDDCS)
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 144

“The overall goal was to establish a combat 

medic school within the Armenian military,” said 

Capt. Chris Hudson, the MTT officer in charge. 

“We taught the entire 68Whiskey Advanced 

Individual Training (AIT) course-Day One 

through graduation-to the Armenian medics.”

Hudson said AMEDD instructors provided 

Armenian soldiers the same level of training 

US troops receive to become qualified health 

care specialists. The Armenian students, who are 

expected to stand up their military’s first combat 

medic school in January, learned to administer 

US Soldiers made history this summer by 

bringing the Army’s Health Care Specialist 

School and Army Basic Instructor Course 

(ABIC) to the Armenian Armed Forces.

Mobile Training Teams (MMTs) from the US 

Army Security Assistance Training Management 

Organization (SATMO) at Fort Bragg, NC, and 

the Army Medical Department Center & School 

(AMEDD) out of Fort Sam Houston, TX, 

deployed to Yerevan, Armenian’s capital, June 2 

to Sept 2.

FC Victor Miranda, from the 232d Medical Battalion at Fort Sam Houston, trains Armenian students on the Sked Basic 

Rescue System. Miranda and four other medic instructors traveled to Armenia to provide US Army’s 68W, Health Care 

Specialist, training to 12 Armenian medics. After medic training these newly qualified Armenian medics completed a 

modified Army Basic Instructor Course which certified them as the initial instructors for the newly formed Armenian 

Combat Medic School in Yerevan, a first of its kind for the Armenian Armed Forces. (Photo by Capt. Chris Hudson, 

SATMO)
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 145

person would receive quality care right on point 

of injury.”

Hudson, an Engagement Branch team leader 

with SATMO, accompanied both training teams 

to Armenia. Having conducted five previous MTT 

deployments, Hudson provided the transitional 

expertise and continuity.

Phase Three of the training, slated for 2016, 

will deploy US observer/controllers to evaluate 

the first class of Armenian medics at their new 

school.

“These troops will probably be a part of 

NATO peacekeeping forces and in order to 

deploy units for NATO missions, they must train 

to NATO standards, so they’ll have a corps of 

medics that are NATO qualified,” said Hudson.

The benefit to the US Army is an increased 

interoperability that is the trademark of security 

assistance operations. For SATMO, deploying 

MTTs like this showcase their motto: “Training 

the World, one Soldier at a Time.”

SATMO is a subordinate organization to 

the US Army Security Assistance Command 

(USASAC), headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, 

AL.

emergency medical treatment to battlefield 

casualties; prepare patients for evacuation to next 

level of care, manage equipment and supplies for 

patient care; and many other skills that has made 

the US military a leader in saving lives on the 

battlefield.

“This enables the 12 Armenian instructors 

to develop their own program of instruction for 

medic training that will best suit their needs in 

the future and will be a great force multiplier for 

generations to come,” said Master Sgt. Efrem 

Dicochea, AMEDD’s Advanced Training Branch 

Chief instructor who served as the MTT NCOIC.

Helping a partner nation build a program 

as complex as a combat medic school from 

the ground up meant teaching in phases. After 

AMEDD successfully completed Phase One of 

the training, a four-man SATMO MTT arrived 

to teach Phase Two-the modified ABIC. Upon 

completion of ABIC, students become qualified 

Army instructors.

According to Hudson, being an expert 

combat medic is one thing; being an instructor 

and teaching others how to be a medic is a 

different story.

“It was the train-the-trainer methodology,” 

said Hudson. “The Armenians will now be 

trainers and subject matter experts, able to 

establish their school and have the capacity to 

train 50-60 medics at a time.”

ABIC Instructor Sgt. 1st Class Romeo Santos 

said he benefitted greatly from the experience, 

learning as much from the students as he 

instructed.

“We’ve definitely made lasting friendships 

with the students,” said Santos. “They gave us 

their time and patience, and the cultural gap 

really didn’t exist after the first day.”

Fellow ABIC instructor Sgt. 1st Class Johnny 

Gonzales agreed, and said everyone benefits on 

the battlefield from shared knowledge.

“It’s the continuity of care,” said Gonzales. 

“Whoever gets injured, or whatever medic comes 

upon them-either Armenian or US Soldier-that 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 146
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 147

First A-29 Afghan Pilots Graduate: 

Ready for Combat

By Senior Airman Ceaira Tinsley

23d Wing Public Affairs

MOODY AIR FORCE BASE, GA. -- A 

new era for the Afghan Air Force began today 

with the first graduation of eight A-29 Super 

Tucano pilots. 

The 81st Fighter Squadron graduated the 

first class of combat-ready attack pilots, Dec. 18, 

here.

“The extraordinary dedication of these pilots 

and the sacrifices these graduates have made 

will help establish a secure, stable and unified 

country,” said US Air Force Col. John Nichols, 

14th Flying Training Wing commander. “They 

are enabling the future of Afghanistan, a future 

that will be decided by the Afghans themselves.”

Even though the 81st FS was reactivated 

in January 2015, the students began their 

classroom training in February 

and launched their first A-29 

training sorties in March.

“I stood on this stage 

11 months ago to reactivate 

this perilous squadron,” said 

Nichols. “We had three planes, 

a handful of motivated Airmen 

and no students. Now less than 

a year later, we are graduating 

our first class.”

According to Nichols, 

this graduation is the first step 

in fulfilling the requirement 

from the International Security 

Assistance Force to conduct 

training outside of Afghanistan.

These pilots are the first of 30 who will 

be trained by the 81st FS over the next three 

years. “We are here this morning to graduate 

eight Afghan patriots who will execute a vitally 

important mission,” Nichols added. “That 

mission, simply stated, is to help build the future 

of Afghanistan. This graduation marks the first 

step in this monumental undertaking.”

After about 337 training days, the pilots 

are ready just in time as the Afghan Air Force’s 

current light air support aircraft, the Mi-35 attack 

helicopter, reaches the end of its service life in 

January 2016.

“I’m just so proud of the Afghan pilots and 

even prouder of the instructors who were able to 
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 148

make them fighter pilots in less than a year,” said 

US Air Force Maj. Gen. James Hecker, 19th Air 

Force commander. “Pilot training takes two to 

three years, depending on which aircraft they are 

going to but they had to push it up because they 

need to get over there and get in the fight.”

“When they get back there, we know that 

there is an ongoing fight that is mainly US led, 

as far as in the air,” Hecker added. “Now they 

are going to be up in the air with us helping their 

Afghan soldiers who are on the ground.”

Although the graduation marks the end 

of the Afghan students’ training journey, the 

mission will continue through advisory support 

in Afghanistan.

“Today does not mark the end, but the 

beginning of our continued friendship between 

the 81st Fighter Squadron and the 355th Fighter 

Squadron,” said Lt. Col. Jeffrey Hogan, 81st FS 

commander. “Please know that we are shoulderto-shoulder with you and we look forward to many 

years of working together. Soon we will be flying 

together over the skies of your homeland. Shortly 

thereafter, you will be in combat defending your 

nation but most importantly, you will defend that 

soldier or commando on the ground.”

As the ceremony came to a close, Nichols 

left the graduates with a few parting words.

“To those charged with securing the skies over 

Afghanistan, I congratulate you.” said Nichols. 

“You have honored your country through your 

selfless actions, you have honored your families 

through your perseverance and the future of both 

will be better because of your dedication.

“You will now have a powerful vote in the 

governance of your country through the air arm 

of Afghanistan’s defense forces,” Nichols added. 

“We all want to improve the world for our family, 

our children, and our grandchildren ... it is clear 

to me that you are no different.”
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 149

Naval Education and Training 

Security Assistance Field Activity

Mission/Who We Are/What We Do/How We Do It

[Courtesy NETSAFA Website]

NETSAFA is the US Navy’s agent for 

international education and training. NETSAFA 

coordinates training support to international 

governments and international organizations.

As a field activity of the Naval Education and 

Training Command (NETC), NETSAFA serves 

as a focal point for all security assistance training 

program issues, coordination and advice within 

the US Navy.

NETSAFA is an integral part of Navy 

International Programs Office (Navy IPO); 

therefore, NETSAFA works with and through 

the Navy IPO chain of command. NETSAFA 

is committed to providing world class customer 

training support first and foremost and willwork 

to assure the best training support for our 

international partners through Navy, other 

government institution and organizations, and 

private industry providers.

HOW TO REQUEST NAVY TRAINING

1. Initial country program requests for Navy 

training should be presented at the annual Security 

Cooperation Education and Training Working 

Groups (SCETWG) sponsored by the Unified 

Commands. This allows advance planning and 

maximum flexibility to accommodate country 

requests.

2. The Navy will make every effort to 

accommodate country requirements as long as 

space is available in the course requested.

3. Requests for out of cycle training and 

changes to training programs should be addressed 

to the appropriate NETSAFA Country Program 

Manager. Messages, phone calls, fax, and email

are acceptable. These requests should include 

course title, location, MASL number, grade of 

student to attend, and funding/programming 

information.

4. Host Nations can view and search on-line 

for all services training available using the I-SAN 

web. An I-SAN web account for the Host Nation 

may be obtained by the Security Cooperation 

Officer (SCO). Additionally, this catalog is 

available online at the NETSAFA website at 

https://www.netsafa.navy.mil.

5. For training not found in this catalog, 

contact the appropriate NETSAFA Country 

Program Manager to discuss potential solutions 

to meet requested training.

Country/Region Managers – 850-452-xxxx 

(See Ext. below)

DSN: 459-XXXX - Fax: (850) 452-2953

PACOM 8832

CENTCOM 8846

SOUTHCOM 8846

NORTHCOM 8846

AFRICOM 8816

EUCOM 8816
The DISAM Annual, December 2015 150