CIVIL-MILITARY CHANGE IN CHINA:

ELITES, INSTITUTES, AND IDEAS

AFTER THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS

Edited by

Andrew Scobell

Larry Wortzel

September 2004
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-165-2
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword

Ambassador James R. Lilley............................................................................ v

1. Introduction

Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel................................................................. 1

2. Party-Army Relations Since the 16th Party Congress: 

The Battle of the “Two Centers”? 

James C. Mulvenon ....................................................................................... 11

3. Hu Jintao as China’s Emerging National Security Leader

Murray Scot Tanner ..................................................................................... 49

4. China’s Ruling Elite: The Politburo and Central Committee

 Joseph Fewsmith ............................................................................................ 77

5. Premier Wen and Vice President Zeng: The “Two Centers” 

of China’s “Fourth Generation” 

John Tkacik .................................................................................................... 95

6. The 16th Party Congress and Leadership Changes in the PLA

Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Dean Cheng, and Ken Gause........................... 179

7. PLA Leadership in China’s Military Regions

Elizabeth Hague........................................................................................... 219

8. Predicting PLA Leader Promotions

Kenneth W. Allen and John F. Corbett, Jr................................................... 257

9. Agents of Infl uence: Assessing the Role of Chinese Foreign 

Policy Research Organizations after the 16th Party Congress

Evan Medeiros............................................................................................. 279

10. Demystifying Sha Shou Jian: China’s “Assassin’s Mace” Concept 

Jason Bruzdzinski ........................................................................................ 309

11. The Future of PLA Modernization: Bumps and Boosters 

Ellis Joffe...................................................................................................... 365

12. About the Contributors............................................................................ 373 

v

FOREWORD

In November 2002, the Chinese Communist Party held its 16th Congress 

and formally initiated a sweeping turnover of senior leaders in both the 

Party and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The meeting heralded 

not merely a new set of personalities in positions of political and military 

power, but also the emergence of a new generation of leaders. Who are 

these individuals, and what does their rise mean for the future of China 

and its military?

The group of China specialists who have written this book have applied 

their research talents, intelligence, and hands-on experience to clarify and 

explain the most important issues of the day in China. China obviously 

matters to the United States because of its size, its spectacular patterns of 

growth, its profound problems linked to rapid growth, and its military 

intentions. 

These specialists have avoided the diseases of bias, demagoguery, 

predispositions, and showmanship, which infect so many of the analyses 

of China. Rather, they have examined the facts and the trends to explain 

the divisions and cohesions in the Chinese leadership and their potential 

signifi cance to the United States and the rest of the world. 

These annual conferences have a long continuity stretching back to the 

early 1990s. Hence, there is a common database for the books produced 

each year. The writers revisit major problems in China’s development, 

particularly in the military sphere. They also examine how Chinese 

policies have evolved over the years, and how important the United 

States has been in infl uencing China’s strategy. What, for instance, will 

the emerging leadership with its factious differences do about Taiwan and 

North Korea? 

The conference took place at the Carlisle Barracks in September 19-

21, 2003, and was sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, the 

Heritage Foundation and the Army War College. The exchanges were 

frank, the atmosphere was fi lled with camaraderie and tension. There 

were challenges, I understand, but there was no group-think. The depth of 

knowledge was astounding. I commend this book to all interested in China 

and to anyone who thinks about our future and China’s role therein.

Ambassador James R. Lilley

Senior Fellow

American Enterprise Institute

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Andrew Scobell

Larry Wortzel

For more than a decade considerable attention has focused 

on the subject of leadership transition in the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC). Who would succeed Deng Xiaoping (1904–97) and 

the other geriatric elites of the so-called “Long March Generation”? 

According to conventional wisdom, the reins of power in the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were 

being transferred from poorly educated revolutionaries and guerilla 

fi ghters to technocratic bureaucrats and military professionals.1

Since 2002, the PRC has experienced a “sweeping” turnover of Party, 

state, and military elites.2 This volume examines in some detail the 

key personalities of the new crop of Chinese leaders both in and 

out of uniform—the so-called “Fourth Generation.” Moreover, 

contributors analyze civil-military interactions in the wake of the 

CCP’s 16th Party Congress held in November 2002 and the 10th 

National People’s Congress (NPC) held in March 2003, and examine 

key trends in strategic thought and the role of national security 

research institutes.

The 16th Party Congress, 10th NPC, and subsequent personnel 

appointments brought about and revealed signifi cant changes in 

both the civil and military leadership of the PLA. Former President 

Jiang Zemin relinquished all of the Party and State offi ces, except 

for the critical position of chief of the Party’s Central Military 

Commission (CMC). The retention of this post by Jiang, mirroring 

earlier actions by Deng Xiaoping, has effectively denied the new 

General Party Secretary and President, Hu Jintao, effective control 

of the military, which in turn, has fostered uncertainty within China 

over the depth of his control of the Party and the PLA.

According to James Mulvenon, in his contribution to this volume, 

the PLA is caught in the middle of a power struggle between CMC 

Chair Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao, his CMC deputy. 

Offi cial Chinese military newspapers have called the two leaders the 
2

“two centers” (of power in the Party and Army). Mulvenon believes 

that the longer this situation persists, particularly if there are “tugs 

of war over policy,” the more potential damage to the stability of 

the civil-military arrangement in China, the greater the chance of 

internal instabilities, and the less capacity in China to control any 

escalation of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Mulvenon argues that Hu 

must further consolidate his power in order to restore coherence to 

the civilian side of civil-military relations. Strong political control of 

the PLA, in Mulvenon’s view, is important to preserve stability in 

the Western Pacifi c. Although still a Party army, the PLA is currently 

moving toward becoming a more modern national army. However, 

the deadlock between Jiang and Hu impedes military modernization 

in such areas as budget and equipment procurement, in addition to 

confusing the chain-of-command. As long as the PLA perceives 

itself to be caught in a struggle between the “two centers,” the PLA 

will have diffi culty in pushing for measures it needs to modernize 

through the CCP bureaucracy.

Parallel to Jiang Zemin and President Hu’s competition for 

control of the military, and perhaps more important for the future 

of the PLA, is a second competition―that is between the “two 

centers” of China’s “Fourth Generation.” Premier Wen Jiabao, Hu’s 

top political ally, and Vice President Zeng Qinghong, one of Jiang’s 

top allies, are the two secondary fi gures now vying for preeminence 

in China’s political structure. In the chapter on the “two centers” 

of China’s “Fourth Generation,” John Tkacik argues that the way 

Hu and Jiang manage their relationship with the PLA will greatly 

depend on the talents of their respective number two men: Premier 

Wen and Vice President Zeng. For their part, senior uniformed PLA 

leaders are uncomfortable with being caught between the “two 

centers.” This uneasiness is evidenced by a number of quotes from 

senior PLA offi cers in the Liberation Army Daily. Both Major General 

Gu Huisheng, deputy director of the political department in the 

Nanjing region and Major General Ai Husheng, commander of the 

39th Mechanized Group Army in the Shenyang region after listening 

to a speech given by Jiang Zemin, complained that “many centers 

means no center, which will lead to no achievement.” These critical 

words came from two respected generals and are an example of 

the uneasiness of the PLA. Still, despite the tug of war for primacy,
3

Tkacik argues, it is unlikely that the PLA’s infl uence over debates of 

national policy can be marginalized. It is likely that China’s national 

priorities will remain military modernization and “increasing the 

comprehensive strength of the nation.” 

The 16th Party Congress also set into motion some signifi cant 

changes in the Chinese PLA high command. The new group is 

younger, better educated, and more professional in comparison to 

past PLA leadership. Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Dean Cheng, and 

Ken Gause point out in their contribution that these new leaders 

will bear the responsibility of guiding and facilitating the PLA’s 

adaptation to new challenges and a rapidly changing international 

security environment. 

The changes in China’s military high command included the 

replacement of the director of each of the four general departments of 

the PLA―the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Political 

Department (GPD), the General Logistics Department (GLD), and 

the General Equipment Department (GED). Liang Guanglie replaced 

Fu Quanyou as director of the GSD; General Xu Caihou replaced Yu 

Yongbo as director of the GPD. The current director of the GLD is 

Liao Xilong, who replaced Wang Ke, and Li Jinai currently holds the 

directorate of the GED that was formerly held by Cao Gangchuan. 

Their chapter provides an in-depth look at who these military 

leaders are, their similarities to previous CMC leaders in their 

belief in the implementation of Jiang’s long term vision for the 

PLA, their differences from previous CMC leaders with respect to 

age, education, and training, and their career experiences that will 

shape the way they meet the challenges that lie ahead. These three 

authors agree that amidst rapid change in the international security 

environment, the most striking aspect of the CMC leadership 

transition is the lack of surprises. This leads them to conclude that 

the new leadership was chosen to implement the long-term vision for 

PRC reform and modernization as defi ned by Jiang and the outgoing 

military leadership. This is a strong indicator that the course of the 

PLA over the coming years is continuity. 

At the end of Hu Jintao’s fi rst year as General Secretary, 

Murray Scot Tanner looks at how well Hu has asserted himself 

as a policy leader in national security affairs, how effective he has 

been in obtaining a leading role in this area, and to what extent he 
4

has articulated his own view of China’s national security. Tanner 

believes that Hu has moved with caution on most signifi cant policy 

issues, but, as demonstrated in the response to SARS, Hu is able to 

respond to crises with some boldness and can marshal political forces 

to overturn an existing policy consensus. Hu’s greatest vulnerability, 

according to the author, is that his desire to paint himself as a proreform populist could backfi re. Hu may be promising more than 

he really intends to, or can, deliver, which may engender greater 

internal dissent or unrest.

It is notable that military leadership within the CMC has passed 

to a new generation of generals who are more practical about 

military matters and less political. Perhaps the best way to describe 

China’s new military leaders is as “Techno-Nationalists.”3 Formal 

institutional authority based on appointed position in the PLA 

hierarchy is slowly replacing the great personal infl uence historically 

wielded by the top levels of the Party, such as Jiang Zemin. 

Nonetheless, predicting who will be the PLA’s future leaders, and 

how they will act, is still more of an art than a science, as Kenneth 

Allen and John Corbett, Jr., observe in their chapter. This is because 

the CCP’s leaders still use many other factors outside of the formal 

bureaucratic structure when promoting PLA leaders. Allen and 

Corbett say that such factors as the guanxi system of interpersonal 

relationships that provide mentoring, patronage, and sponsorship, 

CCP Congress and NPC membership, education requirements, 

experience gained from foreign travel, place of birth, and political 

reliability all affect appointments. Nevertheless, the newly 

appointed generals of the CMC are younger, more experienced, 

better educated, and less involved in day-to-day national politics 

than their predecessors. They are quite capable of continuing the 

PLA along the path of military modernization established by their 

immediate predecessors. Yet, it is an open question as to whether 

they are capable of dealing with rapid changes in the international 

arena and national security threats facing China. 

The characteristics of the PLA military leaders in the seven 

military region (MR) headquarters are also signifi cant and worth 

studying. As Elizabeth Hague explains in her chapter, MRs 

are particularly important because they are where the PLA’s 

modernization program is implemented at the operational level. In 
5

many cases, mid- and senior-level promotions at this level refl ect the 

operational priorities of the PLA. They refl ect success in achieving the 

specifi c mission objectives of that military region. Hague examines 

how PLA leaders in an MR refl ect PLA objectives and MR priorities. 

The selection of these leaders can be traced to the backgrounds of 

a few military leaders who have advanced from the MRs to the 

national level. A careful examination of senior leader backgrounds 

shows that MR leaders have a keen interest in and promote issues 

related to the PLA’s modernization priorities―information warfare, 

mechanization, amphibious operations, mobile operations, realistic 

training, and equipment integration. Hague believes that it is diffi cult 

to point to an emphasis on any specifi c priority as one that the PLA 

is looking for in a future national-level leader. However, Hague 

fi nds that collectively the selection of new military leaders refl ects 

the spectrum of PLA priorities, even in cases where a newly chosen 

leader offers continuity as major goals, instead of new techniques or 

ideas in a specifi c mission area. 

In contrast, many of the new provincial Party secretaries selected 

at the 16th Party Congress were promoted “up through the ranks” 

through provincial levels. They often started their careers as local 

Party functionaries. Many of these newly appointed secretaries 

had their higher education interrupted by the Cultural Revolution, 

and their isolationism from being “sent down” often narrows their 

worldview. Thus, local and provincial politics in China are likely to 

be more conservative, and resistant to change. 

Joseph Fewsmith, after researching the composition of China’s 

ruling elite, agrees with Elizabeth Hague that the provincial 

Party secretaries are generally a conservative group. Fewsmith, 

therefore, dismisses the view that an increasingly well-educated and 

technocratic elite is governing China and cautions against expecting 

rapid political change. This conservatism, in Fewsmith’s view, will 

slow political change in China and hence also affect the speed of 

PLA modernization and its tendency to perhaps distance itself from 

the provincial leadership, general public, and even industry. While it 

may be true that the Chinese political system is evolving, the process 

is not universal, as illustrated by the conservatism of the provincial 

Party secretaries.
6

Nonetheless, China’s military continues to modernize. New 

concepts, currents, and debates in Chinese military thinking are 

common.4 An example of this is the concept of obtaining a “silver 

bullet” technology to make the PLA more powerful. The term 

shashoujian (assassin’s mace) now has currency. In classical Chinese 

military thought, “assassin’s mace” is used to indicate a secret 

weapon or method used by a person or group to triumph over a 

stronger adversary. Demystifying shashoujian is both the topic and 

title of the chapter by Jason Bruzdzinski. 

Whether this concept is the PLA’s way of defeating a superior 

military force or a reference to a specifi c weapon or program within 

the Chinese military is not clear. In tactical and operational-level PLA 

literature, “assassin’s mace” seems to refer to unconventional tactics, 

asymmetrical warfare, and even “miracle weapons” that could be 

used to negate the combat and technological advantages of a stronger 

adversary. However, several pronouncements by high-level PLA 

and Party leaders suggest that concrete “assassin’s mace” weapons 

development programs exist. Although such weapons might give 

China a tactical advantage on the battlefi eld, Bruzdzinski is troubled 

by the possibility that Chinese leaders would be more willing to risk 

military action due to their belief that specifi c advanced weapons 

would give them a sudden victory. What worries Bruzdzinski is 

the notion that China’s leadership could decide to order a PLA 

equipped with a few such advanced weapons into what would 

almost certainly be a disastrous confl ict with the United States. He 

argues that not enough is known about the concept and possible 

weapons being developed to support it. Bruzdzinski says questions 

regarding the PLA’s approach to such “silver bullet” weapons and 

their impact on the PLA need serious attention and further study by 

academic and governmental PLA watchers. 

While the PLA continues to modernize, there are a number 

of factors that infl uence the pace at which this happens. The fi rst 

is China’s perception of the military threats it faces. As long as 

Sino-U.S. tensions about Taiwan continue, China’s military will 

have a strong incentive to pursue its military modernization and a 

tangible scenario for which to train. A second infl uence comes from 

the Chinese economy. The money for PLA modernization requires 
7

continued economic growth. Were this growth to drop from its 

current pace, so too would the money available to the PLA. Another 

factor that affects the pace of modernization is that Chinese leaders 

after Deng Xiaoping have emphasized concentrating on economic 

development in lieu of military modernization. 

China’s national security research institutes also infl uence the 

pace of modernization.5 Evan Medeiros examines this topic in his 

chapter, arguing that in recent years, China has become much more 

internationally engaged in regional and multilateral organizations. 

This is a result of a worldview less infl uenced by history and 

ideology, China’s classic insecurity, an “entitlement mentality,” 

and pedantic moralism. In exploring the impact that Chinese think 

tanks have on policymaking, Medeiros fi nds that the quality of the 

research on international issues is improving, the research agendas 

are expanding, more analytical tools are used, and new ideas are 

being generated at Chinese think tanks. However, Medeiros cautions 

that there is no one think tank analyst or journal that indicates 

defi nitively the future direction of Chinese foreign policy. 

The fi nal chapter, a perceptive summation by Ellis Joffe, 

examines the future of PLA modernization efforts and what could 

affect its pace. Joffe believes that the achievements over the last two 

decades by Chinese leaders in transforming their armed forces from 

a backward, Maoist army into a more modern army are impressive. 

However, the Chinese are still a long way from achieving their 

fundamental objectives in dealing with the external world. According 

to Joffe, Beijing’s external objectives are to deter, or defeat, U.S. 

intervention in a war with Taiwan, effectively challenge the U.S. 

military presence in the Pacifi c and to obtain the military power 

necessary for recognition as a great power in the long run. Although 

these external objectives will ensure that the PLA will continue 

its modernization program in the coming decades, the PLA, itself 

cannot set the pace, scope, nor content of military modernization. 

Joffe believes that external factors and economic realities, the civilmilitary relationship, and policy issues will infl uence the pace of 

modernization. Due to challenges in each of these areas, Joffe argues 

that the Chinese army is changing, but slowly―certainly not by 

“leaps and bounds.” 
8

Political maneuvering within the civilian leadership as well as 

PLA-CCP differences over the aim of military modernization also 

affect the pace of military modernization, even retarding that pace. 

The PLA does not currently have a unifi ed chain of command: No 

one person is in charge of both the party and the army. This has 

increased tensions both within the CCP and between the civilian 

and military members of the CMC, and hampers communication 

between the two establishments. Under these circumstances, 

modernization will be a paced process, responding to domestic 

imperatives and hampered by domestic limitations. That said, the 

PLA remains a latent challenge in Asia that could be triggered by 

external factors such as pressure on sovereignty issues or a crisis in 

the Taiwan Strait. 

The civilian and military leadership changes analyzed in this 

volume will have a signifi cant impact on China’s future. The impact 

will be felt in a number of ways including how individuals and 

groups interact with each other to formulate and implement policy 

on a wide range of issues. In contrast to earlier generations, the 

leaders of the PLA and the leaders of the CCP in the fi rst generation 

of the 21st century are clearly differentiated and completely distinct 

from one another. We can discern tantalizing but incomplete hints 

about future dynamics from the way these elites handled episodes 

in 2003: the SARS crisis and the PLA Navy submarine disaster. It is 

unclear, however, how much we can generalize from these incidents 

because they took place during the twilight of Jiang Zemin. 

Until Jiang’s inevitable passage from the political scene, it will 

be diffi cult to extrapolate from such episodes. Moreover, it remains 

to be seen precisely how these new leaders in and out of uniform 

will view issues of national security and the challenges of military 

modernization. Will the emphasis be more on change or continuity 

with previous generations? What does seem likely is that strategic 

concepts and expert analysis are destined to play even more 

prominent roles in the future as this new generation of leaders seeks 

to make sense of an increasingly complex and uncertain world and 

China’s role in it.
9

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. See, for example, Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party 

Technocrats in Socialist China, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 

Press, 1991; Cheng Li Press, 1991; Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation , China’s Leaders: The New Generation, Lanham, MD: Rowman 

and Littlefi eld, 2001; James C. Mulvenon and Littlefi eld, 2001; James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese , Professionalization of the Senior Chinese 

Offi cer Corps: Trends and Implications, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997; David 

Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, Prospects, Berkeley 

and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002, chapter 2.

2. H. Lyman Miller, “The 10th National People’s Congress and China’s 

Leadership Transition,” China Leadership Monitor ,” China Leadership Monitor ,” China Leadership Monitor China Leadership Monitor, 7, Summer 2003, available at , 7, Summer 2003, available at 

www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org.

3. This is the term Andrew Scobell coined at an unclassifi ed seminar on 

China’s leadership transition held at the Central Intelligence Agency on November 

20, 2002―less than a week after the conclusion of the 16th Party Congress. He 

resurrected the term “techno-nationalist” at the September 2003 PLA conference 

at the U.S. Army War College to describe the new generation of PLA leaders. Of 

course, the twin themes of technology and nationalism have a glorious tradition 

in China’s post-1949 military. See, for example, Evan Feigenbaum, China’s , China’s 

Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition From the Nuclear to the 

Information Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.

4. See, for example, the range of Chinese strategic thinking outlined in 

Michael Pillsbury’s books: Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 1998; and China Debates the Future Security 

Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000.

5. For a thorough recent survey of these think tanks, see the collection of 

articles edited by Scot Tanner that appeared in The China Quarterly, No. 171, 

September 2002.

11

CHAPTER 2

PARTY-ARMY RELATIONS SINCE THE 16th PARTY CONGRESS

THE BATTLE OF THE “TWO CENTERS”?

James C. Mulvenon

INTRODUCTION

The 12 months between the 16th Party Congress in October 

2002 and the party plenum in November 2003 provide a fascinating 

snapshot of party-army relations in China. Jiang Zemin’s retention 

of the Central Military Commission in China (CMC) chairmanship at 

the 16th Party Congress, which most observers expect him to retain 

for 2-3 years, has set off a classic successor struggle with Hu Jintao, 

who is seeking to consolidate his own position with the military. 

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fi nds itself in the middle of 

this muddle, looking for support for military modernization and 

concerned about clarity in the chain of command, especially during 

crisis. This chapter charts some of the most important episodes of 

this fl uid party-army dynamic since October 2002, including the 

16th Party Congress itself and the 2003 National People’s Congress 

(NPC), as well as the party-army implications of the recent severe 

acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic and the Ming #361 

submarine accident in late spring 2003. The current evidence suggests 

that Hu is consolidating his power more quickly than expected, 

though Jiang did not step down at the plenum in November 2003. 

As a result, the civil side of the civil-military arrangement is still 

frustratingly opaque, foreshadowing possible problems in both 

domestic and international realms, particularly an external crisis 

like a dispute in the Taiwan Strait.

CHINESE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL 

FRAMEWORK1

Currently, the best term to describe the civil-military arrangement, 

more accurately known as “party-military relations,” in China 
12

is Ellis Joffe’s notion of “conditional compliance.”2 The Chinese 

military is compliant with civilian wishes in two critical areas. First, 

it actively supports the legitimacy of the single-party rule of the 

Chinese Communist Party with the full political and coercive weight 

of the military institution itself. Second, the PLA has accepted a 

more circumscribed role within the Chinese system, largely 

staying out of the management of nonmilitary policymaking areas, 

such as the economy, and focusing on professional development 

instead of factional confl ict. In areas of corporate identity, such as 

military modernization or defense planning, the military seems to 

retain virtual autonomy, unfettered by civilian control. In areas of 

corporate interest, such as Sino-U.S. relations, Sino-Japan relations, 

Sino-Taiwan relations, South China Sea issues, and arms control, 

the military seeks to infl uence the process. In other nondefense, 

nonsecurity areas, the PLA appears to have ceded or lost the ability 

to infl uence policy.

The reasons for this compliance are complicated. Viewed 

in terms of the last 70-plus years, the major continuity is party 

domination of the military, manifested in the lack of a historical 

legacy of praetorianism or coup d’etats by the PLA. In the past, this 

relative quiescence could be explained largely in terms of personal 

and institutional variables. On the one hand, the Chinese military 

for decades was subordinated in a system dominated by powerful, 

paramount leaders with personal connections to the senior military 

leadership. To enforce that subordination, the military was 

penetrated from top to bottom by a political work system intent 

on maintaining the military’s loyalty to the party. In recent years, 

however, there has been signifi cant change in both of these areas. As 

Joffe has pointed out, the current leadership does not enjoy the same 

type of relationship with the PLA as Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, 

giving the military a degree of leverage over the civilian leadership 

that it did not have with previous leaders. As a result, military 

legitimation of the leadership requires a complicated mix of formal 

institutional authority, patronage, and bureaucratic bargaining over 

resources and infl uence.3 As Swaine writes, 

Senior party leaders undoubtedly play a complex and nuanced game in 

their policy interactions with the military leadership, seeking to retain 
13

the initiative and maintain overall fl exibility by alternately placating, 

resisting, or diluting military views and pressures through a complex 

mixture of personal persuasion, balancing of bureaucratic interests, and 

direct control over formal organs and policy channels.4

From 1989 to 2002, Jiang Zemin spent a substantial amount of 

time cultivating a relationship with the PLA and catering to its 

interests. He regularly paid his respects to military elders, visited 

units, extolled military heroes, supported budget and procurement 

increases, honored PLA traditions, and listened to their concerns 

about issues related to internal and external affairs. Nonetheless, 

Jiang remained critically dependent on the political support of the 

military during his tenure.

At the same time, however, two important trends―the 

professionalization of the offi cer corps and an unprecedented 

generational shift that has led to an effective separation of military 

and civilian elites―have constrained the extent to which the PLA can 

exploit this leverage.5 The latter variable is particularly important. 

China has witnessed a tectonic generational transformation of the 

civilian and military leaderships from a symbiotic revolutionary 

guerrilla generation to a technocratic pairing of bifurcated military 

and civilian elites. The deaths of the revolutionary military generation 

and changes in the political setting, especially the passing of Deng 

Xiaoping and the ascension of a collective leadership under Jiang 

Zemin, meant that the current generation of military leaders did 

not possess the same level of political capital as their predecessors, 

and therefore were less able to act as power brokers within the 

system. As a result, the institutional and individual opportunities 

and capacities for the military to intervene in the policy process 

have been reduced, and thereby strengthened civilian control of 

critical realms. Moreover, the military’s intervention in politics in 

general, and the policy process in particular, has both narrowed 

and deepened, depending on the particular issue or individuals 

involved. The relative weakness of the collective civilian leadership 

means that bureaucratic wrangling is still required on key policy 

and resource distribution issues, but this bargaining should not be 

described as occurring between “equal” parties. Thus, it could be 

argued that the PLA’s conditional compliance is as much a function 
14

of the transitional trends in the Chinese system writ large as it is a 

result of the changing dynamic between the paramount leader and 

the military. Together, the interaction of these two structural changes 

produces the dynamic that we see in party-military relations.

The remainder of this chapter uses this framework to analyze 

civil-military relations from the 16th Party Congress in the fall of 

2002 to the present day. 

THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS: JIANG CONTROLS THE GUN?

Introduction.

For western observers of the PLA, the 16th Party Congress 

offered a curious mixture of the past, the present and the future. 

Jiang Zemin’s long-rumored and ultimately successful bid to 

retain chairmanship of the CMC brought back memories of partyarmy relations in the late 1980s before Tiananmen. At the same 

time, the new crop of PLA leaders elevated to the CMC represent 

the present and future PLA, possessing high levels of experience, 

training, education, and thus professionalism. This section explores 

the implications of Jiang’s gambit, and analyzes the retirements of 

senior PLA leaders and the biographies of their replacements.

Jiang Sticks Around.

If imitation is the highest form of fl attery, then Jiang Zemin has 

given Deng Xiaoping’s boots a real tongue-shine. Recall that in 1987, 

confi dent of his preeminence in the system, Deng at the 13th Party 

Congress retired from all formal positions save one, chairmanship of 

the Central Military Commission. His logic at the time was clear. The 

PLA was still subordinate to party control, but Deng believed that his 

continued personal control of the military was crucially important. 

Deng retained his position for 2 years, relinquishing his party 

CMC chairmanship at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th Central 

Committee in November 1989 and his state CMC chairmanship at 

the Third Session of the Seventh NPC in March 1990. 

Leaks from Beijing suggest that Jiang will retain his CMC 

chairmanship for at least 2 years, and possibly 3.6 The semi-offi cial 
15

explanation for his move was offered by an article in the PRC-owned 

mouthpiece newspaper Wen Wei Po, asserting that “Jiang Zemin’s 

continuing to serve as chairman of the Central Military Commission 

is conducive to stabilizing the morale of the armed forces and the 

smooth transition from the old to the new generation.”7 Susan 

Lawrence of the Wall Street Journal asserts that Jiang will now be able 

to “lend his support to China’s moderate policies towards the U.S. 

and Taiwan,” as well as ensure the implementation of the reforms at 

the heart of his “Three Represents” concept (see below).8 Willy WoLap Lam from CNN takes a different, more pessimistic tack, asserting 

that the Politburo supported Jiang’s retention of the position because 

of “uncertainties in the Taiwan Strait,” particularly “unstable SinoU.S. relations and Washington’s increasing support for the Taiwan 

military.”9 Either way, Jiang’s post-Congress coverage in the PRC 

media confi rms his continued preeminence. On the November 15 

evening news, Jiang was announced fi rst, and dominated the postcongress media attention at the expense of a virtually-invisible Hu 

Jintao.

While the pattern looks familiar, the results and the long-term 

implications for the political system could be quite different. While 

Deng was initiating and overseeing the gradual implementation of 

radical new norms, particularly age-based retirement, to improve 

the health of the system, Jiang’s move appears to be institutional 

retrogression driven by unattractive personal ambition. The 

scrambled party hierarchy, where the general secretary of the 

Party and the ranking cadre of the Politburo Standing Committee 

is nonetheless subordinate to a non-Standing Committee member 

as vice-chair of the CMC, throws a spanner into the evolving 

mechanisms of inner-party democracy, unless rumors are true that 

Jiang has also wangled a replica of Deng’s special arrangement to 

attend Standing Committee meetings as an ex offi cio member or at 

least receive minutes of the meetings.10

Jiang and the Three Represents. At the close of the 16th Party 

Congress, a 14th Amendment was added to the Chinese state 

constitution, enshrining Jiang’s “expositions” (lunshu) on the “Three 

Represents” (san ge daibiao). While Jiang’s name does not explicitly 

appear in the key sentence11 (“The Communist Party of China takes 
16

Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, 

and the important thinking of the ‘Three Represents as its guide to 

action”12), this adoption of the “Three Represents” as a set of formal 

guidelines is the culmination of a long and controversial process 

begun in the late 1990s at the behest of Jiang and developed by party 

theoreticians at the Central Party School and elsewhere. 

The Chinese PLA has been one of the strongest institutional 

proponents of the “Three Represents,” and the post-Congress 

lauding of the concept by the newly elected members of the CMC 

did not disappoint. Personal praise and loyalty to Jiang were in 

abundance in the military press, and the absence of references to Hu 

Jintao or the downplaying of his role were striking. On November 

17, 2002, this split was highlighted by the Jiefangjun Bao “round-up 

report,” which fi rst pledged “absolute” loyalty to Jiang by name 

as chair of the CMC and then merely identifi ed Hu Jintao as the 

leader (not “core”) of the new Central Committee.13 The article 

went on to mention Jiang by name twice more, thanking him for his 

“great inspiration and encouragement” and pledging to live up to 

his “expectations.” The new heads of the four general departments 

(Chief of the General Staff General Liang Guanglie, Director of the 

General Political Department General Xu Caihou, Director of the 

General Logistics Department General Liao Xilong, and Director of 

the General Armaments Department Li Jinai) made their loyalty clear, 

each pledging publicly on the day after the close of the Congress to 

“resolutely heed the commands of the party central authorities and 

Chairman Jiang.”14 Other similar meetings had an identical tone, 

often effusively praising Jiang (most notably the Party committee 

of the Second Artillery15) and the “Three Represents,” with only 

cursory mention of Hu Jintao.16 The lack of reference in these 

meetings to General-Secretary Hu, who serves as vice-chairman of 

the CMC, was taken by some observers to mean that party control 

over the PLA has been split by Jiang’s retention of his CMC position. 

If so, the 16th Congress was a stunning victory for Jiang Zemin. It is 

also possible that the effusive praise was an elaborate goodbye gift 

to Jiang, masking a desire to get rid of him. As shall be explored later 

in the chapter, reality will only be revealed through actions or lack 

of actions, not words.
17

So Long, Farewell.

The 16th Congress was marked by the orderly retirement of all 

members of the CMC over the age of 70, including Generals Zhang 

Wannian (74), Chi Haotian (73), Fu Quanyou (72), Yu Yongbo (71), 

Wang Ke (71), and Wang Ruilin (73). Because of the age limit of 70 

for Politburo members, Generals Fu, Yu, or the two Wangs could 

not replace Generals Zhang and Chi as vice-chairs of the CMC. 

Some Hong Kong sources speculated that the retirement of so 

many “relatively young” PLA offi cers sets the stage for a round of 

PLA elder politics reminiscent of the 1980s, and this outcome may 

perversely have been furthered by Jiang’s retention of the CMC 

chairmanship.

Of the pre-Congress CMC, only three offi cers―Generals Cao 

Gangchuan (67), Guo Boxiong (59), and Xu Caihou (59)―retained 

membership, with Cao and Guo both rising to CMC Vice-Chair 

and Xu promoted to director of the General Political Department. 

Following the pattern of the last two sets of Vice-Chairs, General 

Guo, whom one Hong Kong newspaper describes as a “noted 

military strategist” and “trusted aide of [outgoing GSD Director] 

General Fu Quanyou,” is now the “chief warfi ghter” of the PLA 

in the tradition of past CMC vice-chairs Zhang Zhen and Zhang 

Wannian, though continued rumors about his ongoing battles with 

stomach cancer may elevate the importance of the new director of 

the General Staff Department, General Liang Guanglie.17 General 

Cao is the “chief military politician” in the tradition of Admiral Liu 

Huaqing and General Chi Haotian, and, as discussed below, was 

therefore the obvious choice for Defense Minister.

Say Hello to the FNGs (Filial New Guys).

Forty-three PLA offi cers, including 26 new names, are members 

of the 16th Central Committee, comprising 22 percent of the overall 

body. Of these, three new offi cers were added to the CMC: Generals 

Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong, and Li Jinai. All are incumbent Central 

Committee members and “fourth generation” cadres, and are 

therefore contemporaries of Hu Jintao. Indeed, the average age of the 
18

incoming CMC has dropped from 68 at the 15th Congress to 63 for 

the 16th Congress, though the average age of the new CMC is 61, if 

one does not factor in its 76-year-old chairman, Jiang Zemin. The fact 

that the oldest military CMC member is now only 67 reinforces the 

“qishang baxia” [“above 7, below 8”] principle that was implemented 

on the civilian side.18

Looking at their backgrounds, the career offi cers on the 

CMC share many things in common, in particular professional 

backgrounds and outlook. First, at least three of the offi cers have 

combat experience. Generals Guo Boxiong, Liang Guanglie, and 

Liao Xilong all saw action in the 1979 war with Vietnam, and Liang 

and Liao were regimental commanders on the front lines. Second, 

all have received senior professional military education. Generals 

Guo Boxiong, Liang Guanglie, and Liao Xilong graduated from 

programs at the PLA Military Academy, Xu Caihou and Li Jinai 

graduated from the prestigious but since-disbanded Harbin Military 

Engineering Academy, and Cao Gangchuan studied at the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Military Engineering School of 

the Artillery Corps. In addition, Liao Xilong even studied as a parttime student in a post-graduate program of social and economic 

development and management in Beijing University’s Sociology 

Department, which is a manifestation of the PLA’s renewed 

emphasis on “comprehensive” education. 

Third, all of the offi cers have served in sensitive regions relevant 

to either Beijing’s interest in counterterrorism or confl ict with Taiwan. 

General Guo was 47th Army commander under Fu Quanyou during 

anti-separatist operations in Xinjiang between 1990-92. When martial 

law was declared in the Tibetan capital Lhasa in March 1989 during 

Hu Jintao’s tenure as provincial fi rst secretary, Liao was one of the 

commanders on the scene. General Liang commanded a unit in the 

1989 Tiananmen crackdown. As for Taiwan, Generals Guo, Liang, 

and Liao have all served at one time or another as commander or 

deputy commander of military exercises directed against Taiwan. In 

1994, Liao commanded the ground and air forces in taking over the 

“simulated Taiwan Qingquangang airfi eld” that was built in Gansu. 

Guo directed the PLA’s Taiwan exercise in 2000. Liang, Liao, and Li 

have served in coastal regional commands in either the Nanjing or 

Jinan Military Region (MR) since 1996, where they gained experience 
19

with joint operations. General Liang even oversaw the writing of a 

book entitled Sea Crossings and Landing Operations when he was 

commander of the Nanjing Military Region, and Cao Gangchuan 

and Li Jinai are very familiar with missiles and missile operations. 

All in all, this CMC is fi lled with men trained for modern war.

Not So Fast, General Xiong.

The new defense minister was not formally appointed until the 

NPC in March 2003 (see later section), but Chi Haotian’s retirement 

assures that his term has ended. General Xiong Guangkai’s failure to 

be elected to the full Central Committee resolutely ended speculation 

about his possible appointment. Xiong was merely elected to be 

an alternate Central Committee member, placing 148th out of 158 

alternates. In retrospect, his audacious bragging about his chances to 

delegations of visiting foreigners should have been a huge red fl ag, 

despite his reported closeness to Jiang Zemin and unrivaled position 

in the intelligence apparatus as the interpreter of foreign affairs. 

His well-documented lack of respect among uniformed warfi ghters 

likely sealed his fate.

Assessment.

Post-Congress rhetoric in the PLA media about Jiang Zemin, 

however, raised troubling concerns about the state of party-army 

relations in China, particularly the re-personalization of army loyalty. 

This, combined with the PLA’s less than desultory cooperation with 

the civilian apparatus during the EP-3A crisis,19 strongly suggested 

that the system was becoming dangerously dysfunctional. This 

is not to say, however, that the PLA was abandoning conditional 

compliance in favor of greater political intervention. Instead, Jiang’s 

retention of the chairmanship of the CMC raised serious questions 

about the chain of command, particularly in a crisis over Taiwan, 

where escalation control is made more diffi cult by the triangular 

dynamic between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing.
20

THE 2003 NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS: 

GRUMBLING DOGFACES

The NPC meetings, particularly the publicized PLA delegate 

discussion sessions, are a consistently useful barometer of the state 

of party-army relations. This section examines the makeup of the 

delegation, outlines the issues highlighted in PLA leaders’ speeches 

and delegates’ comments, and analyzes the announced defense 

budget. Special attention is paid to an article in Liberation Army Daily

by Wang Wenjie, particularly a cryptic comment made by a PLA 

delegate about the problems posed by “two centers,” which some 

analysts took as a criticism of the divided leadership of Hu Jintao 

and Jiang Zemin.

PLA Leaders’ Speeches.

The PLA delegation to the fi rst session of the 10th NPC, which 

consisted of 268 deputies, was led by CMC Vice Chair Guo Boxiong 

(the PLA’s chief warfi ghter), with fellow Vice Chair Cao Gangchuan 

and General Political Department Director Xu Caihou as deputy 

heads.20 Leadership speeches at the NPC are important indicators 

of the priorities of different sectors of the military in the coming 

year. Guo’s speech at the opening delegation session touched on 

the centrality of the theory of the “three represents” to the future 

development of China, the importance of generational change in 

the leadership, and the military’s commitment to creating a “welloff society” (xiaokang shehui). Guo’s second speech, following the 

First Plenary Session of the NPC, also identifi ed four principles for 

implementation, suggesting that the PLA is focused on loyalty to the 

party and modernization rather than ideology.21 First, the military 

must apply the theory of the “three represents,” which does not have 

direct military relevance but instead should be seen as a statement 

of party orthodoxy. Second, and more substantively signifi cant, the 

PLA must “take modernization as the central task and strengthen 

our sense of mission, of responsibility, and of urgency in building 

modernized armed forces.” “Ideological” work comes in third, but 

Guo warns that personnel must assess the “appropriateness” and 
21

“timeliness” of political activities, suggesting that political work 

must not get in the way of modernization. Finally, Guo leaves no 

doubt that professional concerns must trump all others, asserting 

that “combat strength” must be the “yardstick” and that “enhancing 

combat strength” must be the “starting and base point in all work.” 

At a group discussion later in the week, Guo also delivered the 

predicted warning to Taiwan, calling the situation “complicated” 

and refusing to renounce the use of force.22

General Cao Gangchuan augmented these remarks by 

emphasizing innovation and high technology, though he made a 

point of lauding “Chairman Jiang Zemin’s thinking on national 

defenses and armed forces building” without identifying any specifi c 

aspect of Jiang’s military insights.23 A later speech credited Jiang 

with “great foresight” that led to “eye-catching great successes,” and 

joined Guo Boxiong in calling on PLA personnel to “obey the orders 

of the party Central Committee, the CMC, and Chairman Jiang in all 

their actions” without ever mentioning Hu Jintao by name.24 Chief 

of the General Staff Liang Guanglie highlighted the need to develop 

“weaponry and command methods that meet the requirements of 

information warfare” and to “deepen . . . preparations for military 

struggle.”25 Director of the General Logistics Department (GLD) 

Liao Xilong repeated the recent mantra about building capabilities 

to “win battles,” and called for “optimization” of the PLA’s structure 

(usually a code word for reductions of personnel and headquarters) 

and acceleration of the “socialization of logistics support” (a code 

phrase for outsourcing to nonmilitary providers).26 Director of the 

General Equipment Department Li Jinai reemphasized the slogan of 

“manufacturing a generation of weapons, developing a generation 

of weapons, and researching in advance a generation of weapons,” 

calling for greatest attention to the last set of challenges.27

PLA Delegates’ Proposals and Complaints.

Early reports from the NPC offered glimpses of the delegates 

themselves. Of 268 deputies, offi cial media reported that the share 

of delegates with university educations was up from 32 percent to 

64.2 percent, and the share of delegates with professional school 

educations was up to 37.7 percent.28 Chen Yan, director of the Political 
22

Department of the South China Sea Fleet speedboat detachment, has 

a doctorate in national defense economics, while 30-year-old Li Jun, 

who runs computer networks in the Guangzhou Military Region, 

has a master’s degree in signals and information processing with 

four science and technology progress awards to her credit.29

Statements by PLA delegates at the NPC were equally diverse, 

touching on a wide variety of topics. A summary of PLA themes 

from the NPC included (1) implementing the “three represents,” (2) 

acting according to the “fi ve phrases” (Jiang Zemin’s slogan for the 

military), (3) “fi ghting to win,” (4) “guarding against degeneration,” 

(5) “keeping pace with the times,” (6) developing “fewer but 

better troops with Chinese characteristics,” and (7) safeguarding 

“national security and unifi cation” while building a “well-off 

society.”30 Echoing a line repeated since the intense international 

relations debate in summer 1999 following the Belgrade embassy 

bombing, delegates also stressed the continuing primacy of “peace, 

development, and multipolarity” as themes of the age, but warned 

of “new situations,” “uncertainties,” and “turbulence.”31 Senior 

Colonel Yao Yunzhu of the Academy of Military Sciences offered 

a Chinese proverb to support this position, invoking the adage that 

“a strong wind blowing in the tower heralds an impending storm 

in the mountains.”32 One delegate challenged the PLA to succeed in 

the “dual tasks of mechanization and informationization,”33 while 

another called for the acceleration of national defense and military 

modernization according to “the principle of coordinating national 

defense construction with economic construction.”34 Many echoed 

the offi cial party line about “developing the west,” with a focus on 

Xinjiang,35 while representatives of the personnel system called for 

greater emphasis on the recruitment of university students into the 

ranks.36 Equipment and technology advocates demanded that the 

“national defense S&T [science and technology] industry . . . serve 

both military and civilian purposes,”37 while one bold thinker called 

upon the PLA to “conduct exercises with live ammunition.”38

As part of their offi cial duties, PLA delegates to the NPC also 

submitted 23 proposals to the NPC, dealing with a national defense 

tax, information security for national defense, the protection of 

servicemen’s civil rights, the management of frontier defense, 

amendments to Article 369 of Criminal Law, property management, 

and free compulsory education.39
23

The Defense Budget.

Minister of Finance Xiang Huaicheng announced on March 6 

that defense spending would rise 9.6 percent to 185.3 billion yuan.40

Offi cial reasons for the increase included addressing “changes in 

the international situation, safeguarding China’s national security, 

sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and raising the combat 

effectiveness of the armed forces in fi ghting wars using high 

technology.”41 Yet a 9.6 percent increase represented a signifi cant 

drop-off in the rate of growth of the PLA budget, which had 

averaged well above 10 percent per year since the late 1980s. The 

2003 increase also was well below the projected programming of 

the 10th fi ve-year plan, which appeared to be averaging between 15 

and 20 percent after infl ation. One offi cial source offered a reason 

for the smaller-than-normal increase, arguing that slower overall 

economic growth required caps on central budget spending.42 Yet 

a hint of another reason can be found in the fact that only Englishlanguage offi cial sources, such as China Daily, highlighted the drop 

in the rate of increase as the “lowest in 14 years,”43 while Chineselanguage sources simply stated the numbers without editorial 

comment. What is going on here? While the offi cial budget numbers 

were already widely viewed as incomplete, it is entirely possible 

that the Chinese government, weary of the annual public relations 

debacle in the Western media over double-digit increases in the 

defense budget, decided to hide a greater share of the increase in 

other accounts. Using this logic, 9.6 percent was a reasonable mean 

between previous high-profi le increases of nearly 18 percent and 

smaller increases, such as 5 percent, that would have been politically 

embarrassing to the important military constituency.

Nonetheless, numerous PLA offi cers publicly called the 

increase insuffi cient and argued for greater resources. PLA Air 

Force Lieutenant General Liu Cangzi allegedly told South China 

Morning Post Morning Post that defense spending should be increased “many, that defense spending should be increased “many, 

many times,”44 while his colleague Lieutenant General Zeng Jianguo 

told the same paper that the budget should be raised “even more 

in certain respects.”45 Even more shocking were the comments of 

Major General Ding Jiye, head of the General Logistics Department 
24

Finance Department, who told the state-run Xinhua News Agency 

that the current level of defense spending was “barely enough to 

keep things moving.”46 One PLA delegate asserted that the level of 

military modernization was only “on par” with the capabilities of 

major countries in the 1970s and was “incompatible” with China’s 

“comprehensive national strength” 20 years after reform.47 To 

correct these defi ciencies, delegates called on the leadership to “raise 

the welfare and remuneration of military offi cers and men, improve 

the living conditions of military offi cers on active duty, increase 

allowances for offi cers and men on active duty, and narrow the gap 

between military personnel on active duty and other civil servants in 

terms of welfare and wages.”48

The Mystery of the “Two Centers.”

Early reports from PLA delegates offered generic lauding of 

the “successful transition of the party leadership at the 16th Party 

Congress.”49 Yet a fascinatingly cryptic March 11 article in Liberation 

Army Daily written by Wang Wenjie, deputy director for reporting 

under the paper’s editor-in-chief according to the Directory of Military 

Personalities, could be interpreted as an indirect but shockingly 

heterodox attack on divided civilian leadership in the CMC, as 

described in a previous section. The Liberation Army Daily article 

begins with a series of axioms of leadership followed by a rhetorical 

question:

It is better to have a good general than 10,000 troops, and it is better to 

have a good policy than a good general. A person good at running an 

army cannot do without good generals, much less do without a good 

policy. What is the good policy for guiding the direction of the armed 

forces construction and the future development of the military?50

On their face, these comments seem deductively reasonable, 

and the question appears to be a standard Socratic way of initiating 

an argument. At the same time, the logical sequence could be 

interpreted to mean that bad policy at the top (i.e., from the civilians) 

can undermine even a professional military with good generals. A 

series of unanswered questions a few paragraphs later strongly 

suggests that something indeed is wrong at the policy level:
25

Should the military choose to bypass or confront deep-level 

contradictions and problems encountered in the course of reform and 

development? Should the military try to avoid or confront “bottleneck 

problems” which produce constraining effects on our military’s 

organizational structure, functioning mechanisms, and policy systems? 

Note the emphasis on forces outside the military that are 

constraining structure and process. At this point, the article abruptly 

switches from a general, institutional focus to a tone that suggests 

a personal attack is afoot, without giving a hint as to who might be 

the target: “Should one emphasize the overall situation or fuss over 

small things when there is a confl ict between the individual interest 

and the national interest?” The article does not immediately identify 

whose “individual interest” is trumping the national interest. 

Instead, the bombshell is dropped by two delegates named Gu 

Huisheng and Ai Husheng, who complain:

Having one center is called “loyalty,” while having two centers will 

result in “problems.” Having multiple centers is the same as having 

no center, and having no center results in having no success in any 

area. Implementing the “Three Represents” will be an empty slogan 

and word in the absence of undiluted devotion, total concentration, 

enthusiasm for producing achievements and for pursuing exploration 

and advancement, and unyielding and unwavering convictions.51

This appears to be a clear attack on the divided leadership situation 

of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, whereby Hu is general secretary of 

the party and state president but nonetheless subordinate to Jiang 

(who is not even a member of the Central Committee) on the CMC, 

thus creating “two centers” of power. An article in Asia Times about 

the essay highlights the clever wordplay behind the attack, which 

should be literally translated as “one zhong and one xin together 

make one ‘loyalty,’ but piecing two zhongs together to one xin gives 

one chuan, a problem.” The key characters are zhong (center) and xin

(heart). As separate characters in a compound they mean “center” 

(zhongxin), while the same two characters stacked on top of one 

another make the character for “loyalty,” or zhong. In other words, 

one “center” means “loyalty.” The character for “string together,” or 
26

chuan, consists of two “center,” or zhong, characters stacked on top 

of each other, while the character for “problem” is composed of a 

chuan on top (two “centers”) and a xin. So if you “string together two 

centers,” it becomes a “problem.”52

The article then goes on to outline the destabilizing consequences 

of selfi sh interests: “Correct guidance will make large numbers of 

people be of one mind and produce cohesion; incorrect guidance 

will inevitably result in people wanting different things and produce 

centrifugal effects.”53 As a corrective to this outcome, the author cites 

the ancients: “Li Bu of the Song Dynasty said in the Book of Refl ections: 

‘Self-sacrifi ce produces support; tolerance wins people over; and 

taking the lead establishes leadership.’ This statement addresses 

the power of example and the charismatic power of personality. 

‘When the dragon head moves, the dragon tail swings’.”54 Just to 

make the point further, the author points out the hypocrisy of the 

main proponent of intraparty reform via the three represents, Jiang 

Zemin, acting as an obstacle to intraparty reform, and exhorts him to 

practice what he preaches:

Leading cadres are organizers of efforts to implement the “Three 

Represents,” and should personally practice the “Three Represents.” 

Leading cadres now should fi rmly remember the “two musts,” and work 

hard to do a good job of serving as the “fi ve models.” It is necessary to 

dare to take the lead, to reach the level of ideological advancement 

characterized by not being vainglorious . . .55

In other words, Jiang should think less of his own ambitions and 

desires, and subordinate himself to the good of the future of the 

party. 

All in all, the article presents a seemingly scathing attack on 

Jiang and the political outcome of the 16th Party Congress. Even 

more surprisingly, the article was still on the web site of Liberation 

Army Daily as of this writing in early December 2003.56 The author 

certainly is too prominent within the newspaper’s leadership and 

the General Political Department for this article to be ignored. How 

can we explain this hidden heterodoxy in the heart of the PLA 

propaganda apparatus, which was the most vociferous exponent of 

the “three represents” and of fealty to Chairman Jiang only 6 months 
27

earlier? Such open splits and use of the media for attacks in the past 

have suggested much deeper disputes within the system, so they 

lead this author to conclude that dissension within the ranks over 

Jiang’s retention of the chairmanship of the CMC is deep and real.

Assessment.

To sum up, the NPC revealed a PLA focused on its professional 

missions but also displayed potentially widening fi ssures in the 

superstructure of the conditional compliance arrangement. While the 

16th Party Congress ushered in a new set of younger, more capable 

military leaders, the lines of authority and priorities among their 

civilian masters were much less clear. The “two centers” argument 

strongly suggested discomfort with the “split” leadership of Hu and 

Jiang over the army, which, like most military organizations, seeks 

clarity on issues related to chain of command and future planning 

and procuring capacities. Until this leadership situation is settled, 

the PLA can legitimately question whether civilian commitments 

for resources refl ect consensus or factional jockeying, which in turn 

reduces the PLA’s incentives to remain apolitical.

THE PLA AND THE SARS CRISIS: HEAR NO EVIL, 

SEE NO EVIL

SARS emerged in China in November 2002. The story of civilian 

obfuscation, coverup, confession, and mobilization is well-known,57

but the parallel events within the military, particularly in Beijing, 

require further exploration. This section will analyze the initial PLA 

coverup of SARS cases in Beijing, the saga of whistleblower Dr. 

Jiang Yanyong, PLA contributions to the fi ght against SARS, the 

PLA’s continued stonewalling and opacity even after Hu Jintao’s 

promulgation of the transparency policy, and the implications of 

SARS for the ongoing power struggle between Hu Jintao and Jiang 

Zemin.

The PLA Coverup in Beijing.

According to a Western journalist, SARS in fact fi rst appeared in 
28

Beijing in the elite PLA #301 Hospital, spreading quickly to PLA #302 

and #309 Hospitals, “though no one in the military reported these 

numbers to civilian authorities in the city.”58 Later offi cial Chinese 

media confi rmed that the fi rst nonlocal resident SARS patient 

arrived at PLA #302 Hospital on March 7.59 An article by a Western 

journalist, quoting a direct participant in the meeting, asserted that 

Premier Wen Jiabao told the Chinese Center for Disease Control 

on April 7 that the military was not reporting cases of SARS to the 

Beijing municipality government or the central government.60 The 

chief of the CDC, Li Liming, reportedly told the Premier: “if we had 

controlled the military hospitals at the beginning, we never would 

have had this epidemic in Beijing.”61 This lack of communication 

was facilitated and exacerbated by Chinese bureaucratic politics, 

which separates military and civilian organs into opaque stovepipes 

that can only horizontally share information at the highest levels. 

In similar ways, PLA hospitals also resisted intrusive inspections 

by the World Health Organization as well. According to a Western 

newspaper, doctors at PLA #309 on April 15 moved 40 SARS patients 

to the Zihuachun Hotel on the hospital’s grounds to prevent visiting 

World Health Organization (WHO) teams from fi nding them.62

Dr. Jiang Yanyong, Whistleblower.

But the PLA cover-up was not to last, and the revelation of 

unknown PLA cases was one of the most important impetuses for 

the civilian leadership to admit its previous obfuscation and begin 

cooperating more fully with the WHO. On April 4, Jiang Yanyong, 

72, former director of PLA #301 Hospital during the 1989 massacre 

in Tiananmen, revealed in an email to China Central Television and 

Hong Kong-based Phoenix Television that the #309 Hospital had 

60 cases of SARS, with six deaths. His revelation occurred on the 

same day that Health Minister and former military doctor Zhang 

Wenkang told a news conference that Beijing had 12 cases and three 

deaths. Neither media outlet broadcast the content of Dr. Jiang’s 

email, but it was leaked to Time, which placed the information on its 

web site on April 9. Later, Jiang Yanyong told Time that three PLA 

hospitals in Beijing had at least 120 SARS patients, six of which by 

April 9 had died.63 This contradicted the Health Ministry’s tally of 22 
29

cases in Beijing, with four dead.

Partially as a result of Dr. Jiang’s whistleblowing, the Chinese 

leadership on April 18 reversed course and ordered offi cials to stop 

covering up the extent of the SARS outbreak.64 After a Politburo 

meeting that “demanded the accurate, timely, and honest reporting 

of the SARS situation,” Hu Jintao announced the mobilization of 

a nationwide anti-SARS campaign, “relying on science, effective 

prevention, and increased coordination.”65 On April 20, Vice 

Minister of Health Gao Qiang released a revised number of 346 

SARS cases in Beijing, more than 10 times the number previously 

acknowledged by the Ministry.66 On the same day, Health Minister 

Zhang and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong were both sacked. Zhang’s 

removal was linked to his earlier false statements and the desire of 

the leadership to improve the Chinese government’s credibility and 

international reputation, while Meng’s dismissal appears to refl ect 

the purely political calculation of balancing the loss of an offi cial 

from the Jiang camp (Zhang) with one from the Hu camp (Meng). 

PLA Contributions to the Fight Against SARS.

Most SARS-related activity in the military was focused on 

propaganda, mobilization, and security. On the propaganda side, 

the media was fi lled with laudatory stories about the military’s 

scientifi c and medical role in combating SARS, as well as grandiose 

treatises on “national spirit”67 and advice on how to use the theory 

of the “Three Represents” to improve military sanitation work 

(insert your own joke here).68 Military researchers from the Microbe 

Epidemic Institute of the Military Medical Academy of Sciences 

“identifi ed the pathogen and developed a technique for quickly 

testing” the disease.69 The researchers also cooperated with the 

Beijing Genomics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to 

complete genome sequencing of the coronavirus. Medical staff were 

sent to rural areas to augment limited rural medical infrastructure.70

The General Staff Department’s Chemical Defense Command and 

Engineering College in Beijing was honored for its contributions 

to the fi ght against SARS, specifi cally the school’s development of 

disinfectants and cooperation in sterilization campaigns in the city.71
30

Among the many identifi ed “heroes” in the PLA was Jiang Suchun, 

74, an infectious disease expert at PLA #302, a special hospital for 

people with infectious diseases. Jiang became infected soon after 

he began treating patients, and then used himself as a guinea pig 

by injecting blood serum from SARS patients who had recovered, 

getting well after 23 days.72

In terms of mobilization, Guangzhou Military Region’s response 

to the new SARS policy was likely typical across of the PLA’s regional 

commands.73 Guangzhou set up a SARS leading group at the MR 

level, “plus an epidemic monitoring and managing group, technical 

guidance group, and clinic treatment group.”74 Units at or above the 

regiment level formed their own leading groups for preventing and 

controlling the disease, as well as special groups for dealing with 

emergencies.75 All hospitals affi liated with the MR established special 

clinic teams for treating SARS patients. On the information side, MR 

political and health units cooperated to disseminate knowledge 

about preventing SARS, publishing and distributing pamphlets to 

the rank and fi le, organizing mobile exhibitions, and setting up a 

24-hour hotline. Finally, all personnel movements were “strictly 

controlled” under a policy called “closed management,” involving 

the rescinding of all leave and relatively complete isolation from the 

general population and even their dependents.76

The most important, or at least the most public, PLA contribution 

to the fi ght against SARS, however, involved the rapid construction 

and manning of the new SARS hospital in Xiaotangshan, a suburb 

of Beijing. On the approval of the General Departments “Circular 

on Transferring Emergency Personnel in Support of the Beijing 

Municipality Dedicated Hospital for Atypical Pneumonia” by CMC 

Chair Jiang Zemin on April 27, a total of 1,200 medical specialists 

(respiratory disease, contagious disease, and epidemic control) 

were transferred from major military units to Beijing’s designated 

SARS patient reception hospitals.77 By April 28, 333 military medical 

staff from the Beijing, Shenyang, and Jinan Military Regions (MR), 

as well as personnel from the #175 and #180 Hospitals in Nanjing 

MR, Changzheng Hospital under the No. 2 PLA Medical University, 

and No. 3 PLA Medical University, had arrived at the new SARS 

hospital, with the remainder expected to arrive by May 5.78 The 

hospital accepted its fi rst patients on May 1, treating them with 90 

million yuan worth of medical equipment.79
31

Continued Stonewalling and Opacity?

Despite these public efforts, however, there is some evidence that 

the military continued to be less than candid about the extent of the 

outbreak among the armed forces. While describing its multifarious 

efforts to combat the disease, Guangzhou Military Region also 

reported as of April 28 that no SARS cases had been discovered 

among its personnel, which stretched credulity to say the least.80

In light of the deceptions among military hospitals in Beijing, the 

Ministry of Health in late April issued a circular on SARS data, 

and General Logistics Department Director Liao Xilong ordered all 

medical units to comply.81 Yet the WHO in mid-May, according to a 

Washington Post Washington Post article, criticized the military for continuing to limit article, criticized the military for continuing to limit 

information on SARS within its ranks.82 Soldiers accounted for an 

estimated 8 percent of cases in China, but the PLA had heretofore 

released only scant information.83 One member of the WHO expert 

team in Beijing, Keiji Fukuda, complained that “A lot of the key 

details about those cases . . . [are] not being shared with the civilian 

authorities. These numbers don’t tell us anything.” General Logistics 

Department Director Liao Xilong further obfuscated the situation by 

declaring on May 14 that the PLA was “safe” from SARS, arguing 

there were no cases of SARS in the ranks.84 In perhaps the most 

counterproductive move of all, Hong Kong media reported that the 

PLA was censuring the “honest doctor,” Dr. Jiang Yanyong of PLA 

#301 Hospital, surveilling his movements and banning his contact 

with foreign and domestic media without prior approval from 

the #301 Hospital Propaganda Department. An internal circular 

reportedly even criticized Jiang for providing the original information 

about the additional Beijing cases to foreign media while serving as 

a military doctor.85 It was not until June, when Beijing Weekly placed 

him on its cover, that any offi cial media in China acknowledged his 

contribution. 

Jiang, Hu, and SARS.

The SARS crisis revealed continuing strains in both the partyarmy dynamic and the leadership struggle between Jiang Zemin and 
32

Hu Jintao. While they were guilty at a minimum of sins of omission 

and perhaps commission at the beginning of the crisis, Hu Jintao and 

Wen Jiabao took leading roles in pushing the transparency policy 

once the extent of the disease in PLA hospitals in Beijing became 

known in mid-April, appearing constantly on state media.86 One 

Western journalist asserts that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao “used the 

crisis to challenge the authority of parts of China’s government, the 

military and the capital’s administration, ultimately challenging 

the authority of their predecessor, former President Jiang Zemin.”87

The same article asserted that Hu Jintao, using his authority as vicechair of the CMC, “persuaded the army to release statistics of SARS 

patients in its hospitals.”88

For his part, Jiang Zemin and his allies remained silent on the 

epidemic until April 26, 2003, when Jiang told the visiting Indian 

Defense Minister George Fernandes at a meeting in Shanghai that 

China had “scored notable achievements in containing the disease.”89

His appearance in Shanghai reportedly left many Chinese with the 

impression that Jiang had fl ed the capital to escape the disease, and 

his statement, which directly contradicted the new openness and 

transparency of Hu and Wen’s public statements, seemed to be out 

of touch or naïve. In the following weeks, Chinese sources cited in 

Western media reports strongly suggested that Jiang was opposed 

to Hu’s transparency policy, and sought to use the military media 

apparatus to undermine the efforts.90 At the same time, Hu began 

to make aggressive plays for an independent power base in the 

military, chairing a Politburo meeting on military reorganization 

that was reportedly not attended by Jiang.91

Public statements by senior civilian and military offi cials also 

hinted at the possible schism between Hu and Jiang. In a tour of the 

SARS hospital on April 28, General Logistics Department Director 

Liao Xilong tried to balance the situation by ordering the PLA to 

carry out the “instructions set forth by General Secretary Hu Jintao 

and CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin.”92 This equitable profession of 

loyalty was strikingly different than the language used by senior 

military leaders during and after the 16th Party Congress, when 

Jiang’s name was prominently mentioned at the expense of Hu.93

By contrast, CMC Vice-Chair Guo Boxiong used the opportunity 

of a SARS inspection meeting to fl atter Jiang Zemin, mentioning 
33

only Jiang by name and referring to “the party Central Committee” 

instead of mentioning Hu. Moreover, Guo found time to laud the 

“important thinking of the ‘Three Represents’.”94 Likewise, Liu Qi, 

the Beijing Party Secretary and Politburo member who escaped 

punishment for the obfuscation of SARS cases in Beijing because 

of his close ties to Jiang Zemin, gushed over the latter’s wisdom in 

deploying PLA personnel to aid in the battle against SARS.95

By June, when the disease appeared to be coming under control, 

Jiang Zemin took a belatedly active role, perhaps concluding that his 

previous reticence and nonchalance on SARS had undermined his 

standing. On June 6, Hu and Jiang appeared together at a meeting 

with delegates to a military personnel training seminar, and Jiang 

used the event to praise the PLA for its achievements in fi ghting 

SARS.96 On June 22, Jiang signed a circular praising the PLA personnel 

who had served at the Xiaotangshan SARS hospital for “making 

great achievements in protecting people’s health and safety.”97 The 

circular closed with a Jiang-friendly mantra, calling upon the PLA to 

“follow the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee and 

the CMC, hold high the banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory, earnestly 

study the important thinking of the ‘Three Represents,’ implement 

the general requirements of the ‘fi ve sentences,’ and work hard to 

promote the development of our army’s modernization by leaps 

and bounds.”98 Again, differences could also be seen in the speeches 

of other offi cials attending the event. Liu Qi continued his paean to 

Jiang, linking the victory over SARS to correct implementation of the 

Three Represents and mentioning only Jiang by name, while GLD 

Director Liao Xilong took the opposite tack, calling for the masses to 

“unite around the party Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao 

as the general secretary” and advocating Hu’s signature policy of 

“building a well-off society [xiaokang shehui].”99 The disparities 

in these statements, so different from the uniformity of the pre16th Party Congress environment and the ceaseless lauding of the 

leadership “with Jiang Zemin at the core,” highlights the continuing 

jockeying among the elites and the ongoing lack of clarity in the 

leadership.

MING 361 ACCIDENT

Amidst the SARS crisis, the PLA’s Ming-class submarine #361 
34

was lost with 70 hands aboard. This section analyzes the public 

record about the causes of the accident, the competition between 

Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to control the media campaign related to 

the tragedy, and the sensitive political debate over accountability.

What Happened.

In late April or early May 2003, diesel-powered, Ming-class 

submarine Number 361 experienced a “mechanical malfunction” 

during an exercise in the waters of the Yellow Sea between Korea 

and Shandong Province, killing all 70 crew members.100 According to 

Wen Hui Bao, which is often used by Beijing as a channel for unoffi cial 

messages, the crippled, half-submerged boat was discovered by 

fi sherman, who reported their fi ndings to authorities.101 Upon 

opening the hatch, all 70 personnel were found to have suffocated 

at their stations.102 The submarine was towed from the accident 

site, east of the Neichangshan Islands, to its home port base at 

Qingdao.103 The Wen Hui Bao article offered three possible reasons for 

the accident, speculating that (1) “a steersman mistakenly opened a 

discharge valve instead of an air inlet valve,” or (2) “sea water mixed 

the submarine’s batteries to produce a toxic gas,” or (3) “a spark 

caused a big explosion” on board the boat. Western experts discount 

explanation #1 because the compartmentation of the submarine 

could have prevented the outcome, and argue that #3 can be ruled 

out because the submarine did not sink. A later article in the same 

newspaper claimed that an intake valve had failed to open during 

snorkeling with the diesel engines, which consumed the oxygen 

within the boat and causing acute suffocation of the crew within 

2 minutes.104 The lack of oxygen lowered the barometric pressure 

within the submarine, making it impossible to open the hatch covers 

from inside and preventing any escape by the crew.

Battling Condolences.

The Ming #361 accident provides revealing insights into the 

current party-military leadership dynamic between Jiang Zemin and 

Hu Jintao. Jiang appears from the outset to have sought to dominate 

the media coverage of the event and thereby project his authority 
35

as head of the CMC. The original Xinhua report of the accident 

specifi cally mentions that “Jiang Zemin, chairman of the CMC, 

sent condolence messages dated May 2, to the family members of 

the dead Navy offi cers and seamen,” with no mention of GeneralSecretary Hu. Later sources revealed the text of the message: “The 

offi cers and sailors of 361 remembered their sacred duty entrusted 

to them by the Party and the People. They died on duty, sacrifi ced 

themselves for the country, and they are great losses to the People’s 

Navy.”

One Hong Kong newspaper with a reputation for neutrality 

on China issues, citing sources in Beijing, also portrayed Jiang as 

the most important leader in the crisis. On May 4, Dongfang Ribao

reported that Jiang had “personally made the fi nal decision to quickly 

release the news” as well as ordering “senior offi cers in the military 

to go personally to the scene to direct rescue work and properly cope 

with the aftermath of the accident.”105 The newspaper opined that 

these moves were undertaken to “improve the international image” 

of China after the SARS debacle, were evidence of learning from the 

Russian Kursk experience, showed decisiveness on the part of Jiang, 

and highlighted an improved crisis management system, the latter of 

which was one of Jiang’s stated reasons for retaining his leadership 

position.

By contrast, Hu Jintao’s condolences to the families were not 

issued until May 3. In his message, he declared the accident as a great 

loss to the Navy of the PLA and extolled the patriotism and bravery 

of the sailors aboard. He also added that “people should turn their 

mourning into a source of strength by learning from the accident 

to advance the country’s national defense capacity and speed the 

PLA’s modernization drive.”106 This latter statement has been widely 

interpreted as Hu’s attempt to turn the accident into an opportunity 

for reform, much as he has used SARS to force transparency on 

the government side. Moreover, Hu, unlike Jiang, called for an 

investigation of the accident, arguing that it was important to learn 

the lessons of the accident. Articles through May and June continued 

to remind readers of Jiang and Hu’s condolences,107 with some 

explicitly citing the different dates, as if to emphasis the point that 

Jiang’s regrets were more important and more timely.108
36

Comrades Are Seeing It for Themselves.

On the night of May 5, state-run television showed both Jiang 

and Hu, in their capacities as chairman and vice-chairman of the 

CMC, meeting with family members of the dead sailors at the 

Lushun Naval Base in Dalian, sending the message that both men 

were involved in the investigation.109 One Hong Kong newspaper 

reported that this was the fi rst time Jiang and Hu had appeared 

together since the SARS outbreak.110 Xinhua again reported Jiang 

in the lead, expressing “profound grief on the deaths of the offi cers 

and men and kind sympathy and solicitude for their families.” His 

comments focused on emotional and ideological issues, referring to 

the dead as martyrs and calling on the party to take care of the men’s 

dependents.111 In Hu’s comments, by contrast, the emotional rhetoric 

was followed by discussions of both military and nonmilitary policy 

issues, once again exhorting them to “turn grief into strength” and 

calling for “victory in the struggle to prevent and control” SARS, 

promotion of the “modernization of national defense and armed 

forces,” and current developmental line of “building a well-off 

society in an all-around way.”112 The broadcast also showed the 

two men inside the crippled vessel and standing alongside the boat. 

According to the Washington Post’s John Pomfret, these latter images 

were unusual, as “Chinese leaders rarely if ever have appeared 

publicly at the scenes of disasters, especially those involving the 

military.” Later reports asserted that the two leaders “entered each 

cabin, carefully examined each combat position, and inquired into 

relevant details.”113

These accounts suggest that the civilian leadership structure did 

not apparently play a large role in the investigation. Given that the 

accident involved a military unit, the CMC was a natural choice to 

take the lead, though it was also a bureaucracy in which Hu Jintao 

is subordinate to Jiang Zemin. When Jiang and Hu visited Lushun 

Naval Base in Dalian, offi cial media used their CMC titles and 

ranked them accordingly. Similarly, the memorial service on May 20 

in Dalian was attended by the entire CMC, and the eulogy was given 

by General Guo Boxiong, the vice-chair of the CMC and the “chief 

warfi ghter.” Interestingly, his brief comments echoed Hu Jintao’s 
37

earlier statements, urging “mourners to turn their grief towards 

building a powerful navy, and further revolutionizing, modernizing, 

and regularizing the armed forces.”114

Somebody Will Pay For This! 

Multiple sources report that the Ming #361 accident also quickly 

led to calls for accountability, suggesting that Hu Jintao’s strategy had 

succeeded.115 One PRC-owned news outlet in Hong Kong reported 

that CMC Vice-Chairman Guo Boxiong led a 30-member CMC 

work team to uncover the lessons from the Ming #361 accident.116

By June, the Central Committee and the CMC dismissed four senior 

navy leaders, including Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng, Political 

Commissar Yang Huaiqing, North Sea Fleet Commander Ding 

Yiping, and North Sea Fleet Political Commissar Chen Xianfeng.117 

The offi cers were not only criticized for fostering an environment 

in which such an accident could happen, but also for the failure of 

the Navy to discover the accident in a timely manner.118 On June 

13, Xinhua reported that eight other “relevant personnel” were 

disciplined with either administrative dismissal or demotion.119 The 

forcible retirement of Shi Yunsheng for “improper command and 

action”120 was reminiscent of the removal of Health Minister Zhang 

Wenkang and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong for their mishandling 

of SARS, and was likely meant to send a signal that military leaders 

will assume responsibility for mistakes on their watch, whether 

they were directly responsible or not. A June 14 article in the PRCowned Hong Kong daily Ta Kung Pao, citing an unnamed “expert,” 

expounded on this theme at length:

. . . the Navy personnel reshuffl e refl ects the modern leadership mentality 

of the central leadership in running the army strictly and according to 

law, adding that the only way to win the hearts of servicemen and the 

people is to be strict and fair on matters of merits and demerits, right and 

wrong, responsibility, and rewards and punishments . . . the resolute 

measures taken by the central authorities refl ect that the Chinese 

government has steadily increased its transparency, acted strictly in 

accordance with the system of taking responsibility for accidents . . . This 

is in keeping with the international practice of offering to resign to show 

that one takes full blame, a practice that will win the support of people 

of all walks of life in the whole country.121
38

Moreover, it is signifi cant that the offi cial Xinhua announcement 

of the demotions began with the statement, “With the approval of 

the Central Committee of the CCP, the CMC recently issued an order 

. . .,” possibly confi rming Hu Jintao’s role in ensuring accountability 

and reform in the PLA. Perhaps realizing that Hu had stolen a march 

on him, Jiang in late June reportedly gave a speech on the Ming #361 

accident in which he emphasized similar themes of reform and 

military development.122

CONCLUSION: A FINAL ASSESSMENT

By the end of 2003, Hu Jintao’s successful capturing of political 

momentum in the SARS and Ming #361 crises, his media dominance 

during the recent Shenzhou-5 manned space launch, as well as his 

surprise assumption of leadership of three of the key “leading 

groups” (foreign policy, cross-strait relations, and the economy) 

has led some outside observers to conclude that he has solidifi ed 

his power more rapidly than expected.123 Nonetheless, Jiang did 

not step down at the plenum in November 2003, leaving the chain 

of command in a muddle even if Hu does appear ascendant. The 

longer this situation persists, the more potential damage to the 

stability of the civil-military arrangement at the heart of conditional 

compliance. The real test, unfortunately, will be a crisis, and the 

most dangerous crisis would involve Taiwan and the United States, 

given continuing Chinese diffi culties in institutionalizing crisis 

management mechanisms and the inherent challenges of escalation 

control in a triangular dispute. In such a situation, there will be 

precious little time for slow, collective decisionmaking of the sort 

displayed in the EP-3A crisis, much less the additional diffi culty of 

coordinating policy with individuals like Jiang who are completely 

outside the formal party structure. For the sake of stability in the 

Western Pacifi c, one hopes that Hu accelerates his consolidation 

of power, restoring coherence to the civilian side of civil-military 

relations.
39

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. For a fuller explication of this framework, see my chapter “Conditional 

Compliance,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining 

Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

2. Comments made by Ellis Joffe at the CAPS/RAND PLA conference, 

Washington, DC, 8-11 July 1999.

3. Ellis Joffe, “The Military and China’s New Politics: Trends and CounterTrends,” in James Mulvenon and Richard Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army 

in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

4. Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security 

Policymaking, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996.

5. James Mulvenon, The Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Offi cer Corps: 

Trends and Implications, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997; Micheal D. Swaine, The 

Military and the Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.

6. Susan V. Lawrence, “Jiang Will Retain His Post as Chinese Military Head: 

President Shows He Will Remain a Force Well After Stepping Down,” Wall Street 

Journal, November 28, 2002.

7. “Jiang Zemin’s Control of Military is Conducive to Smooth Transition,” Wen 

wei po, November 16, 2002, p. A4.

8. Lawrence, “Jiang Will Retain His Post.”

9. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Taiwan Issues Keep Jiang in Army Role,” CNN.com, 

November 22, 2002.

10. Lawrence, “Jiang Will Retain His Post.”

11. Later in the Constitution, Jiang’s names does appear during an explication 

of the “Three Represents”: 

Since the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Party Central Committee 

and in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, 

the Chinese communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief 

representative, have acquired a deeper understanding of what socialism 

is, how to build it and what kind of a party to build and how to build it, 

accumulated new valuable experience in running the Party and state and 

formed the important thinking of the “Three Represents.” The important 

thinking of the “Three Represents” is a continuation and development of 
40

Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory; 

it refl ects new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising 

from the changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves 

as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and improving 

Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development 

of socialism in China; and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the 

Communist Party of China. It is a guiding ideology that the Party must 

uphold for a long time to come. Persistent implementation of the ‘Three 

Represents’ is the foundation for building our party, the cornerstone for 

its governance, and the source of its strength. 

See “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, November 18, 

2002.

12. “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, November 

18, 2002.

13. Wan Yuan, Hu Chengshan, Wu Xudong, Jiang Boyou, Xu Yingyun, Guo 

Kai, Gong Xiling, Wang Mingjin, Cao Xiaoming, Shi Zhaodong, Xu Feng, Liu 

Tianhui, Zhu Peilun, Liang Xiliang, Lang Longxi, Zhou Xupeng, Zhang Hong, 

Fang Junzhong, Fang Lufeng, Guo Weihu, Zhu Guangzheng, Zhao Heng, Quan 

Zhixue, Yu Hongtao, Hou Xiaoqin, Deng Hongtao, and Lei Ziyuan, “Vast Numbers 

of Offi cers and Men of All Armed Forces and Armed Police Corps Resolutely 

Support New CPC Central Committee and Central Military Commission,” 

Jiefangjun bao, November 17, 2002, p. 1.

14. Jiefangjun bao, November 20, 2002.

15. Qian Xiaohu, Xia Hongqing, Han Guoxian, Xu Feng, Guo Kai, Shen Jinke, 

Bao Guojun, Li Xucheng, Liao Weiwen, Liu Guoshun, Xu Qingyun, and Yang 

Hong: “Units Throughout the Military and Armed Police Force Conscientiously 

Convey and Implement the Guiding Spirit of the 16th National Congress of the 

Communist Party of China,” Jiefangjun bao, November 20, 2002.

16. For a sample, see “Major Army Units Conscientiously Study the Spirit 

of the 16th CPC National Congress, Vow to Realize Leapfrog Development in 

Military Modernization,” Xinhua, November 20, 2002; “Offi cers and Men of the 

People’s Liberation Army and the Armed Police Forces Pledge to Deeply Study 

and Implement the 16th CPC National Congress Guidelines, Create A New 

Situation in Building A Modernized Defense and Army,” Xinhua, November 16, 

2002; and “PLA, Armed Police Offi cers, Men Profoundly Study Spirit of 16th CPC 

National Congress, Vow To Provide Crucial Guarantee for Defense of National 

Security, Reunifi cation, Comprehensive Building of Well-Off Society,” Jiefangjun 

bao, November 14, 2002, p. 1.
41

17. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, “PLA Faces Upgrade After New Top Brass 

Installed,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2002, p. 2.

18. Cadres aged 67 and below can be promoted to the Politburo and Politburo 

Standing Committee, while those 68 and older are too old to be considered for 

membership. For the Central Committee, candidates who are 57 or below are 

considered young enough, while those 58 and above are too old to be inducted 

into the body. One key principle is that appointees need to be able to serve two full 

5-year terms.

19. See my contribution to the inaugural issue of China Leadership Monitor, 

entitled “Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis,” which 

can be found at http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20011/20011JM1.html.

20. Ding Haiming, “PLA Delegation to First Session of the 10th National 

People’s Congress Formed; Guo Boxiong Is Head of the Delegation, Cao 

Gangchuan and Xu Caihou Are Deputy Heads,” Jiefangjun bao, March 4, 2003, p. 1.

21. General Xu’s speech at the same meeting reinforced this impression, 

focusing mainly on the “party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces” 

without any specifi c reference to what the party currently believed in.

22. Gao Aisu, “Deputy Guo Boxiong Stressed: Inspire Enthusiasm, Innovatively 

Deal with Concrete Matters Relating to Work, Work Hard to Create New Situation 

for Army Building,” Jiefangjun bao, March 7, 2003, p. 1.

23. Zhang Tao, Huang Guozhu, and Cao Zhi, “PLA Deputies Pledge to 

Quicken National Defense and Military Modernization in Line with Principle 

of Developing National Defense Building and Economic Construction in 

Coordination,” Xinhua News Agency, March 6, 2003. 

24. Cao’s remarks can be found in Du Xianzhou, “Deputy Cao Gangchuan 

Stresses: Accelerate Advancement of National Defense and Army Modernization 

Building with Important Thinking of ‘Three Represents’ as Guide,” Jiefangjun bao, 

March 7, 2003, p. 1. Guo’s comment about obeying orders was offered in Gao Aisu, 

“Deputy Guo Boxiong Stressed: Inspire Enthusiasm.” 

25. Zhang Tao, Huang Guozhu, and Cao Zhi, “PLA Deputies Pledge to 

Quicken.”

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. “Education Background of Army NPC Deputies Up,” Xinhua News 

Agency, March 3, 2003.
42

29. Ibid.

30. Zhou Ben, “The PLA Delegation of NPC Deputies Pledges to Guide Itself 

with the Important Thinking of the ‘Three Represents’ and Strive to Bring About 

Leapfrog Development in the Modernization of the Army,” Jiefangjun bao, March 

6, 2003, p. 1.

31. Zhang Tao, Huang Guozhu, Cao Zhi, and Bai Ruixue, “National Wealth 

and Powerful Military: Forming Mechanism to Achieve Synchronized Growth―

Military NPC Deputies on Coordinated Development of National Defense 

Construction and Economic Construction,” Xinhua News Agency, March 9, 2003.

32. Cao Zhi, Xu Zhuangzhi, and Sun Yanxin, “PLA Deputies to the NPC Say 

Military Security Is Still Most Important to National Security,” Xinhua News 

Agency, March 12, 2003.

33. “PLA Delegation: Push Forward Modernization of the PLA,” Jiefangjun 

bao, March 6, 2003.

34. Zhang Tao, Huang Guozhu, and Cao Zhi, “PLA Deputies Pledge to 

Quicken.”

35. Li Guoli and Liu Xin, “The Armed Forces Will Plunge into the Large-Scale 

Development of the Western Region with a More Active Posture,” Xinhua News 

Agency, March 6, 2003.

36. Sun Yanxin and Liu Xin, “Representatives from the Military: Joining the 

Military and Contributing Your Education Will Provide Great Opportunities,” 

Xinhua News Agency, March 7, 2003.

37. Zhang Tao, Huang Guozhu, Cao Zhi, and Bai Ruixue, “National Wealth 

and Powerful Military.”

38. “Good Tidings Fill Us with Joy, Tasks of Seeking Development Are 

Heavy―Report on Military NPC Deputies and CPPCC Members Discussing State 

Affairs,” Jiefangjun bao, March 9, 2003, p. 4.

39. “Army Deputies Submit 23 Proposals,” Jiefangjun bao, March 12, 2003.

40. “Xiang Huaicheng at NPC: PRC Plans 9.6 Percent Increase in 2003 Defense 

Spending,” Xinhua News Agency, March 6, 2003.

41. Ibid.

42. Allen T. Chung and Fong Tak-ho, “Defense Outlay Sees Smallest Rise in 14 

Years,” South China Morning Post, March 7, 2003.
43

43. Xing Zhigang, “Military Budget Rise Lowest in 14 Years,” China Daily, 

March 7, 2003.

44. Allen T. Chung and Fong Tak-ho, “Defense Outlay.”

45. Ibid.

46. “Major General Ding Jiye Says Defense Spending Much Lower Than 

World Average,” Xinhua News Agency (English), March 8, 2003.

47. Cao Zhi, “Proper Investment into National Defense Is Needed for Building 

Well-Off Society in All-Around Way,” Xinhua News Agency, March 6, 2003.

48. Ibid.

49. “PLA Delegation: Push Forward.” 

50. Wang Wenjie, “Advance Development by Leaps and Bounds in Our 

Military Modernization under Guidance of ‘Three Represents’―Report on Effort 

by the Military’s Deputies to NPC to Study President Jiang’s Important Speech at 

the Military’s Delegation,” Jiefangjun bao, March 11, 2003, p. 5. 

51. Asia Times reports that “Major-General Gu is the vice chief of the political 

department of Nanjing Military Region, while Ai is now with the Information 

Technology Warfare Unit, but is far better remembered as the colonel who led 

the fi rst regiment to occupy Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, and got rid of 

demonstrating students with bloodshed.” See Xu Yufang, “Chinese Military Blasts 

Confusion at the Top,” Asia Times, March 12, 2003.

52. The author would like to thank Chinese guru Cliff Edmonds for explaining 

the intricacies of this wordplay.

53. Wang Wenjie, “Advance Development by Leaps and Bounds.”

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. See http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/03/11/20030311001061_

TodayNews.html.

57. For an excellent account, see John Pomfret, “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu 

An Opening; President Responded to Pressure Inside and Outside Country on 

SARS,” Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A01.
44

58. John Pomfret, “China’s Crisis Has A Political Edge; Leaders Use SARS to 

Challenge Recalcitrant Parts of Government,” Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. 

A33.

59. Jiang Wanliu and Liu Mingxue, “Hero in Special Battlefi eld―On the Spot 

Report on Efforts of Professor Jiang Suchun of Hospital 302 in Combating Aytpical 

Pneumonia,” Jiefangjun bao, April 25 2003, p. 1.

60. John Pomfret, “China’s Crisis,” p. A33.

61. Ibid.

62. John Pomfret, “Beijing Told Doctors to Hide SARS Victims,” Washington 

Post, April 19, 2003, p. A10.

63. Taken from www.time.com. See also John Pomfret, “Doctor Says Health 

Ministry Lied About Disease; Chinese Military Physician Accuses Beijing of 

Hiding Extent of Outbreak to Promote Tourism,” Washington Post, April 9, 2003, p. 

A26.

64. John Pomfret, “China Orders End to SARS Coverup; Offi cials Begin 

Belated Campaign Against Disease,” Washington Post, April 18, p. A08.

65. “Hu Warns Of Hard Battle With SARS,” China Daily, April 18, 2003, p. 1.

66. John Pomfret, “China’s Crisis,” p. A33.

67. The most egregious example of the latter, which could only have been 

written by a committee, is Yang Chunchang, Wang Xinsheng, and He Gengxing, 

“Carrying Forward the National Spirit and Conquering the Disaster of Atypical 

Pneumonia,” Jiefangjun bao, May 14, 2003, p. 7.

68. Shi Rui, “Properly Weave the Sanitary Epidemic Prevention Net,” 

Jiefangjun bao, May 14, 2003, p. 2.

69. Du Xiaojing, “Salute to Brave Scientifi c-Technical Personnel Who Are 

Engaged in Fighting SARS,” Jiefangjun bao, April 24, 2003, p. 1.

70. Xu Jingzhang, “Jiang Zemin Approves Army Medics Setting Up Beijing 

SARS Hospital,” Xinhua, April 28, 2003.

71. “Army College Honored for Its Contribution to SARS Fight,” Jiefangjun 

bao, April 28, 2003.

72. “Efforts of PLA Medical Specialist to Combat Atypical Pneumonia,” 

Jiefangjun bao, April 25, 2003, p. 1.
45

73. “Army Sends Teams to Inspect SARS Prevention Work,” Jiefangjun bao, 

May 9, 2003.

74. Li Shiyuan and Li Jian, “Guangzhou Military Region Takes Measures 

Against SARS,” Xinhua, April 28, 2003.

75. Ibid.

76. Hsiao Han, “Beijing Military Camps Practice Closed Management,” Wen 

wei po, May 9, 2003.

77. Xu Jinzhang, Bao Ruixue, and Xu Zhuangzhi, “Designated Hospital for 

Atypical Pneumonia Patients Completes Preparations for Admitting First Group 

of Patients on 30 April,” Xinhua, April 29, 2003.

78. “Jiang Zemin Approves Transfer of Military Doctors, Nurses To Fight 

SARS,” Xinhua, April 28, 2003; and “Broad Masses of PLA Medical Personnel Vow 

to Support Beijing in Fight Against Atypical Pneumonia,” Jiefangjun bao, April 30, 

2003, p. 1.

79. Tang Xiaodong and Xu Jinzhang, “New Beijing Hospital Begins to Admit 

SARS Patients; CMC Member Liao Inspects,” Xinhua, May 1, 2003.

80. Li Shiyuan and Li Jian, “Guangzhou Military Region Takes Measures 

Against SARS,” Xinhua, April 28, 2003.

81. Jiang Wanliu, “Liao Xilong Notes People’s Army Must Be At the Front Line 

Against SARS,” Jiefangjun bao, April 29, 2003, p. 3.

82. John Pomfret, “China Orders Offi cials to Give Full SARS Data,” Washington 

Post, May 13, 2003.

83. Erik Eckholm, “China Issues Strict Rules on Reporting of Disease,” New 

York Times, May 14, 2003.

84. “Director of General Logistics Department Liao Xilong Says China’s 

Armed Forces Are Safe,” Zhongguo xinwen she, May 14, 2003.

85. “Military Doctor Who Exposes Epidemic Said to Be Placed Under 

Surveillance,” Tungfang jihpao, May 15, 2003, p. A13.

86. John Pomfret, “China Feels Side-Effects From SARS; Political Fallout 

Follows Coverup,” Washington Post, May 1, 2003.

87. John Pomfret, “China’s Crisis,” p. A33.
46

88. Ibid.

89. “CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin Meets Indian Defense Minister, Briefs on 

SARS,” Xinhua, April 26, 2003.

90. John Pomfret, “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu An Opening,” p. A01.

91. John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Solidifi es Power.”

92. Jiang Wanliu, “Liao Xilong Notes People’s Army Must Be At the Front Line 

Against SARS,” Jiefangjun bao, April 29, 2003, p.3.

93. For greater elaboration of this thesis, see my contribution to China Leadership 

Monitor 5 at http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20031/jm.pdf.

94. Cao Zhi, “Guo Boxiong Inspects Army’s Anti-‘Atypical Pneumonia’ Work, 

Stresses Work on Anti-‘Atypical Pneumonia’ and on Army Building to Ensure 

Completion of All Tasks,” Xinhua, May 11, 2003.

95. Huang Wei, “Liu Qi On 30 April Inspects Construction Site of Xiaotangshan 

Hospital, Expresses Gratitude to Medics from People’s Army,” Xinhua, April 30, 

2003.

96. Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao Meet Military Delegates; Jiang Praises PLA AntiSARS Efforts,” Xinhua, June 6, 2003.

97. “Jiang Zemin Signs Circular Praising Troops in SARS Fight at Xiaotangshan 

Hospital,” Xinhua, June 22, 2003.

98. “Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin Signed a General 

Order To Commend All Offi cers and Men of Xiaotangshan Hospital,” Xinhua, 

June 22, 2003.

99. Xu Zhuangzhi, “The People in the Capital Hold a Commendation and 

Farewell Meeting to Thank the People’s Own Army for Triumphing Over SARS,” 

Xinhua, June 22, 2003.

100. “70 Sailors Killed in Submarine Disaster,” Xinhua, May 2, 2003; Among 

the Western reports of the accident, see John Pomfret, “Chinese Submarine 

Accident Kills 70; Report Offers Few Clues to What Caused Overcrowded Vessel 

to ‘Malfunction’,” Washington Post, May 2, 2003, p. A19; and John Pomfret, “Some 

Details of Sub Accident Disclosed; In Unusual Reports, Chinese Papers Say Crew 

Members Found Dead at Posts,” Washington Post, May 6, 2003, p. A24.

101. “Experts Guess 70 Offi cers and Men Died Due to Lack of Oxygen; Call for 

Acceleration of Military Modernization,” Wen hui bao, May 4, 2003, p. A5.
47

102. Observers quickly noted that the Ming-class has a standard complement 

of 55-59 sailors. Speculation centered on the question of whether the additional 

personnel were related to the accident, either signifying that the boat was engaged 

in more risky experimental training or was overmanned. A possibly authorized 

leak in Wen Wei Po on May 7 specifi cally addressed this issue, asserting that the 

complement of 70, including a professor from the Qingdao Submarine Academy, 

was “within its carrying capacity” for a “routine training mission.” See Han 

Hsiao, “The Submarine That Had the Fatal Accident Was Not Overmanned and 

Overloaded,” Wen wei po, May 7, 2003. An article in the same newspaper the next 

day provided further elaboration, revealing that 13 cadets from the Qingdao 

Submarine Academy had been aboard. See “Cause of Submarine Accident Has 

Been Found,” Wen wei po, May 8, 2003, p. A12. 

103. “70 Sailors Killed in Submarine Disaster,” Xinhua, May 2, 2003.

104. “Cause of Submarine Accident Has Been Found,” Wen wei po, May 8, 

2003, p. A12.

105. “Jiang Makes Final Decision to Announce Submarine Accident―Indicates 

Ability to Deal with Crises Has Improved Sharply and Responses From All Sides 

Are Favorable,” Dongfang ribao, May 4, 2003, p. A12.

106. “PRC President Hu Jintao Conveys Condolences to Families of Dead 

Submariners,” Xinhua, May 3, 2003.

107. For example, see “Two Senior PLA Navy Commanders Demoted After 

Submarine Accident,” Xinhua, June 13, 2003.

108. For example, see “CMC Attends Funeral Service Held for Submarine 

Accident Victims,” Xinhua, May 20, 2003.

109. Wang Wenjie and Chen Wanjun, “Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Other CMC 

Leaders Meet Representatives of Families of Martyred Offi cers and Men of No. 

361 Submarine, Board the Ship to Conduct Investigation and Study Personally,” 

Xinhua Domestic Service, May 5, 2003.

110. Fong Tak-ho, “HK-Based ‘PLA Expert’: Engine Failure Explains 

Submarine Accident,” South China Morning Post, May 6, 2003.

111. Wang Wenjie and Chen Wanjun, “Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Other CMC 

Leaders Meet Representatives of Families of Martyred Offi cers and Men of No. 

361 Submarine, Board the Ship to Conduct Investigation and Study Personally,” 

Xinhua Domestic Service, May 5, 2003.

112. Ibid.
48

113. Ibid.

114. “CMC Attends Funeral Service Held for Submarine Accident Victims,” 

Xinhua, May 20, 2003.

115. “High-Level Military Possibly to Be Punished,” Xiangkang shangbao, May 

4, 2003, p. B1.

116. “Upheaval in Navy as Commanders, Political Commissars Replaced,” 

Wen wei po, June 13, 2003.

117. Ibid.

118. Jie Fang, “PRC Prudent to Instill Accountability in Military,” Hsiang kang 

shang pao, June 16, 2003, p. A2.

119. “Reasons Causing Submarine Accident Found, Relevant Offi cers 

Removed from Post,” Xinhua, June 13, 2003.

120. Ray Cheung, “Top Brass Sacked Over Sub Disaster,” South China Morning 

Post, June 14, 2003.

121. Liu Ying, “North Sea Fleet Commander and Political Commissar Get 

Demoted in Punishment,” Ta kung pao, June 14, 2003.

122. Ma Ling and Li Ming, “Jiang Zemin Diligently Studying Military Affairs,” 

Ming pao, June 28, 2003.

123. For example, see John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Solidifi es Power.”
49

CHAPTER 3

HU JINTAO AS CHINA’S EMERGING 

NATIONAL SECURITY LEADER

Murray Scot Tanner

INTRODUCTION

The end of Hu Jintao’s fi rst year as general secretary marks an 

appropriate time to begin assessing what Chinese national security 

policy under Hu Jintao will look like. The purpose of this chapter is 

to assess Hu’s emergence as a “national security leader.” I will use 

the term “national security” not in the narrower U.S. conception, but 

conceived rather broadly, as the Chinese themselves do when they 

use the term “guojia anquan” to include Hu’s leadership not only 

in foreign and military affairs, but also in internal security. More 

specifi cally, this chapter focuses on several interrelated questions: 

How well has Hu Jintao done in asserting himself as a policy leader 

in national security affairs? How effective has he been in obtaining a 

leading role in security-related policymaking―by gaining leadership 

over the key organizations involved in security policymaking, or by 

expanding the security-policy role of those organizations that he does 

lead, or by attempting to use policy issues to strengthen his infl uence 

in sectors where his organizational infl uence still lags? Finally, to 

what extent has Hu attempted, and succeeded, in articulating his 

own distinctive vision of China’s national security? 

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO HU JINTAO’S NATIONAL 

SECURITY POWER BASE

Two major institutional issues shape the political context within 

which Hu Jintao has come to power and help defi ne the powerful 

challenges he faces as he tries to become a national security leader. 

The fi rst of these concerns the structure of the leadership succession 

struggle, while the second concerns the evolving pattern of civilmilitary relations in China. Both present Hu with formidable 

challenges.
50

As I have argued elsewhere, Hu Jintao came to power under 

conditions of the “successor’s dilemma”―a rational dilemma 

of power building that bedevils all designated successors in all 

authoritarian systems. The root of the “successor’s dilemma” lies in 

an assumption about the power of the top leader in authoritarian 

systems; that this power is not―and cannot―be fully institutionalized 

independent of the individual who holds it. Otherwise, these would 

be “constitutional” rather than “authoritarian” systems. Thus, the 

personal power relations among the current leader, the designated 

successor, and the other top leaders in the system become crucial. 

Since Hu began his rise to power while his predecessor was still alive, 

as long as Jiang Zemin retains a major share of informal political 

power, Hu must struggle to keep Jiang’s trust and support for fear 

that Jiang will feel threatened by Hu’s rise and turn on him. But even 

if Hu succeeds in winning Jiang’s support, Hu must work to secure 

his power for after Jiang is gone by simultaneously building his own 

sources of power that are ultimately independent of Jiang. In doing 

so, however, Hu must be careful not to make his predecessor feel 

threatened―something that even heavyweight political operators 

like Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang failed to 

do. 

As successor, Hu can attempt to build his independent power 

in many ways, most of which are not mutually exclusive. Most 

obviously, Hu can pursue the traditional “circular theory” of a 

Leninist general secretary’s powerbase by striving to promote 

his personal supporters and clients to the Politburo, the Central 

Military Commission (CMC), the Central Committee, and the other 

bodies that, in turn, help defi ne a general secretary’s power. Second, 

and relatedly, since power in the Chinese system is certainly not 

entirely uninstitutionalized, Hu Jintao can seek the leadership of 

key organs of power for himself and his allies, or conversely try to 

expand the infl uence of the organs which he and his followers do 

command. Third, Hu can attempt to take advantage of the political 

issues and crises that arise in the system to assert his leadership and 

try to demonstrate to his colleagues that he is “indispensable” as 

a leader. Fourth, and relatedly, since Hu Jintao accedes to power 

in a reforming Leninist system where the very nature of power is 
51

undergoing gradual change, Hu can try to create new sources of 

power that can persuade or compel his colleagues to embrace or at 

least accept his leadership. In other reforming Leninist systems, the 

most obvious―and most perilous―paths to creating new sources 

of power have been through direct appeals to mass support, either 

through informal populist appeals or through formal efforts to build 

a plebiscitary or proto-democratic power base for the executive. But 

since this last involves guessing both the direction and timing of 

truly historic change, it requires remarkable political timing (and 

no small amount of luck!). Thus, for every Boris Yeltsin or Eduard 

Shevardnadze who successfully timed their leap from a Leninist 

power base to an electoral one, the ground is strewn with dozens of 

political corpses of those who―like Zhao Ziyang―made their mass 

appeals too early and were crushed by the remaining power of the 

old system―or those who―like Mikhail Gorbachev―waited too long 

to transform their base of power from Leninism to electoralism and 

found themselves rudely shut out of the new sources of power.

But the superfi cial smoothness of Hu Jintao’s accession to offi cial 

power at the 16th Party Congress and the subsequent National 

People’s Congress (NPC) session has sparked a debate among our 

best analysts of the Chinese leadership that raises the question 

of whether the classic “successor’s dilemma” has been rendered 

obsolete by the gradual institutionalization of leadership politics. In 

their widely read study, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, Andrew 

Nathan and Bruce Gilley argue that the accession of Hu Jintao and the 

new Politiburo Standing Committee marks the culmination of a 10-

year leadership selection, winnowing, and succession process begun 

by Deng Xiaoping that gradually gathered so much institutional 

momentum that Jiang Zemin―even if he had wanted to―was unable 

to stop it, notwithstanding the fact that Deng has been dead since 

1997.1 To be fair to Nathan and Gilley, they do not speak in terms of 

the “successor’s dilemma” I have discussed. But the implication of 

their work is clear: Chinese leadership succession politics are now 

suffi ciently institutionalized that even a powerful ex-leader like 

Jiang Zemin lacks the informal infl uence to threaten his successor 

after the successor holds the reins of formal institutional power―and 

what informal power Jiang still holds will atrophy rapidly now that 
52

he is no longer General Secretary or President. Thus, one half of the 

danger the successor faces in his “dilemma” appears to be gone.

But Joseph Fewsmith and many other analysts are having none 

of this characterization of institutionalization and the Hu succession. 

These analysts may be willing to concede that Jiang was either 

unwilling or unable to block Hu’s path to the General Secretary’s 

position. But Jiang has succeeded in surrounding Hu with a Politburo 

overwhelmingly stacked with Jiang’s clients, and almost devoid of 

leaders who primarily owe their careers to Hu. Despite forecasts to 

the contrary by those who see the system as more institutionalized, 

Jiang has thus far clung to the chairmanship of the CMC. So effective 

has Jiang been in caging Hu that Fewsmith labels the 16th Congress 

“the succession that didn’t happen.”2

Hu Jintao’s second institutional challenge derives from 

longstanding changes in China’s civil-military relations. The erosion 

of what David Shambaugh has labelled the old “interlocking 

directorate” among Party and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

leaders has, in one sense, facilitated Hu Jintao’s rise, but will also 

cause Hu problems as he tries to assert his leadership over the PLA 

in the years to come. On the one hand, all reporting to date suggests 

that, in contrast to all of his predecessors as the Chinese Communist 

Party’s (CCP) top leader, the PLA played virtually no role as 

“kingmaker” in Hu’s selection and promotion. The other side of this 

equation is that Hu Jintao, like Jiang himself, has no experience as a 

military leader, and therefore lacks the sort of ready-made support 

base that earlier CCP leaders could count on.

While there is some disagreement among analysts about the 

allegiances of a few members of the new Politburo and CMC, I am 

more impressed by the evidence that Hu Jintao took over leadership 

bodies far more dominated by Jiang’s followers than his own. But 

for the narrower purposes of this chapter, the key point is that the 

identifi able network of Hu Jintao’s associates who were promoted 

are concentrated in Party and government sectors that are not related 

to national security (e.g., propaganda, united front work, provincial 

leadership). 

Virtually all of the new civilian security leaders owe their 

careers far more to Jiang and other leaders than to Hu. Luo Gan, 
53

who has replaced Wei Jianxing as the Political Bureau’s Standing 

Committee (PBSC) member in charge of political-legal (zhengfa) 

affairs, has historically been associated with Li Peng. New Politburo 

member and Minister of Public Security Zhou Wenkang emerged 

from China’s northeastern petroleum sector, and at fi rst blush, 

Zong Hairen’s claim that he owes his rise fi rst to the patronage 

of Yu Qiuli and later of Zeng Qinghong and Jiang seems to fi t the 

available career data. Minister of State Security Xu Yongyue was 

also promoted under Jiang, not Hu, and according to some Hong 

Kong and Taiwan press sources, owes his career more to the fact that 

his father was a personal secretary to Chen Geng, one of the mythic 

founding members of the Chinese Communist intelligence services.

Hu’s infl uence within the PLA remains plagued by “unknowns” 

and is diffi cult to assess. Based on previously available information, 

I have argued elsewhere that it was diffi cult to identify even one 

top-ranking PLA offi cer who probably owes his career more to 

Hu than to Jiang. Recently, moreover, Jiang was reportedly able 

to reassert the residual power over military personnel that some 

forecast would wane by promoting ally Jia Ting’an within the CMC. 

But there is still much we do not know about Hu’s military support 

network, for example, which offi cers Hu Jintao worked most closely 

with when he chaired the politically sensitive drive to get the PLA 

out of business. Moreover, the network of senior offi cers with whom 

he enjoys good relations may be a bit better than I (and others) 

originally assessed. One of the key “unknowns” here seems to be the 

state of Hu’s relationship with former Chief of General Staff (COGS) 

Fu Quanyou. The ties between the two men go back at least a decade 

and a half, to when Fu commanded the Chengdu Military Region 

(MR) and Hu was Tibetan Party Secretary during the diffi cult days of 

the suppression of the 1989 Tibetan uprising. Among Fu’s numerous 

subordinates who received senior promotions last year, many 

reportedly served in Tibet during the suppression, including CMC 

Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong and General Logistics Department 

Chief Liao Xilong. Thus, if Hu enjoys Fu Quanyou’s active support, 

he may after all have the beginnings of a ready-made PLA infl uence 

network. But assuming an alliance from past leadership ties is risky. 

And it has also been reported that that Fu Quanyou was one of the 
54

senior military leaders who suggested that Jiang Zemin should 

continue in his current post.3 Thus the relationship between Hu and 

Fu, about which we know little, must still rank very high on our 

leadership politics research agenda.

Hu’s lack of an impressive personnel base coming out of 

the Congress has shaped and limited his strategic options for 

establishing himself as a national security leader. His approach to 

the internationally-oriented aspects of national security have been 

far more cautious than his policies on domestic security-related 

issues. As this chapter will argue, Hu has worked with care to 

expand the national security impact of those decisionmaking bodies 

where he is strongest, in particular laying down markers that the 

Politburo could become a greater actor in military issues. Relatedly, 

Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao have also tried to manipulate key issues 

to strengthen his authority among the leadership. There has been a 

strong populist fl avor to this strategy (the severe acute respiratory 

syndrome (SARS) crisis and the crackdown on law enforcement 

abuses, both discussed below, are the clearest examples). 

Despite widespread press rumors of backstage disagreements 

between Hu and Jiang, however, the available evidence suggests 

Hu has tried to maintain a solid relationship with Jiang―remaining 

publicly deferential and respectful (though far less obsequious 

than in recent years). Jiang, for his part, has mostly reciprocated by 

assuming a lower profi le. But this does not mean Hu has refrained 

entirely from policy disagreements with Jiang and Jiang’s allies. 

Hu has not picked many issue battles in his fi rst year, and he has 

picked them very carefully for maximum political effect. As I will 

try to demonstrate below, on most foreign policy, military affairs, 

and internal security issues, Hu has remained scrupulously “on 

message” during his fi rst year, and embraced policy lines wellestablished by his colleagues in recent years. There have been a few 

noteworthy exceptions―regarding SARS and the Korean issue, for 

example―and Hu apparently fl irted with a more institutionalist 

response to China’s growing crisis of internal stability, though he 

was ultimately forced to back down for the time being. 

For the most part, however, Hu’s strategy has been to embrace 

existing policy lines while taking over leadership of several key 

policymaking bodies,4 and cautiously reasserting the role of his 
55

Politburo in military affairs―raising for some the spectre of “two 

centers” in military leadership. Hu has also emphasized and 

insisted upon the use of formal rather than informal avenues of 

power, apparently trying to dilute Jiang’s remaining infl uence by 

decreasing the number of arenas in which he can exercise it. The most 

prominent example was Hu’s reported decision to end the annual 

leadership summer confab in Beidaihe―historically one of the key 

venues through which retired elders exercised great infl uence over 

key leadership personnel and policy decisions.5

Also, while such things are virtually impossible to measure 

reliably, Hu seems to have used his command of political issues to 

strengthen his personal popularity among the broader Party elite 

and general citizenry. To his advantage, Hu seems to have enjoyed 

greater popularity within the broader Party elite than within his 

own Politburo. Since the mid-1980s, one useful measure of such 

support has been the vote totals leaders received for state positions 

at the quinquennial National People’s Congress (NPC) session. Hu 

received a notably higher vote for President at the NPC session than 

Jiang Zemin did for reelection to the State Military Commission 

chairmanship, and indeed, some delegates even wrote in Hu’s name 

for the latter post. Hu’s putative rival, Zeng Qinghong, received 

something of an electoral raspberry from the assembled NPC 

delegates.

Hu effectively built on that popular base with a series of 

seemingly low-risk efforts to portray himself as a clean leader close 

to the people. Most prominent―and most bold―was of course his 

highly public engagement of the SARS crisis, including potentially 

risky visits with Wen Jiabao to supervise anti-SARS operations 

“at the front.” Hu also gave major addresses on surefi re populist 

themes―pledging to strengthen “rule by law” and calling for an end 

to corruption and a return to plain living by Party offi cials. While 

these speeches were all notably short on specifi c policy proposals, 

they helped buttress Hu’s image.6

I will argue at the end of this chapter, however, that some of 

Hu’s efforts to strengthen his mass support by portraying himself as 

a responsive, populist, clean government reformer are riskier than 

they might fi rst appear. As a national security leader who has not 

yet come to grips with how he wants to respond to growing protest 
56

and unrest in Chinese society, Hu must be cautious not to create 

unrealistic images of himself and expectations among disgruntled 

groups in Chinese society.

RELATIONS WITH JIANG

Except for the SARS case (see below), Hu’s desire to maintain 

strong positive relations with Jiang has caused him to show his 

predecessor deference, but hardly obsequiousness. An excellent 

example was Hu’s July 1 speech on the Party, which affi rmed 

Jiang’s contributions, but can hardly be described as effusive 

personal praise. Hu began by lauding the theory of “The Three 

Representations” as “one of the three great theoretical products of 

the Chinese Communist Party” in its historical effort to integrate 

communist theory with Chinese reality―placing Jiang’s pet theory 

in the pantheon alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping 

Theory.7 But in crediting Jiang and his contributions by name, Hu 

described him merely as “the main representative, along with 

contemporary Chinese Communists” in building this theoretical 

decision. Likewise in his March 11 major speech on Taiwan, Hu 

gave extensive credit for strong leadership to the third generation 

leadership with Jiang as core―again crediting him as leader, but 

within a collective context.

EMERGING FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS

Less Victimhood.

Refl ecting a broader trend that predates his presidency, Hu 

Jintao has largely resisted portraying China as a victim on the world 

stage.8 For some, this may represent something of a surprise. Before 

his accession, Hu’s most famous foray into foreign policy was his 

speech giving China’s offi cial response to the U.S.’s bombing of 

the Belgrade embassy.9 More than one analyst, drawing upon this 

speech, anticipated a prickly nationalism to Chinese foreign policy 

under Hu. Since his election to General Secretary last November, Hu 

has not even mentioned the Belgrade bombing once in public.10
57

Taiwan.

Hu Jintao’s fi rst year in offi ce, particularly the latter months, 

was of course marked by gradually increasing tension in crossstraits relations, which tested the entire leadership’s willingness to 

maintain its low-key patient approach. In his early meetings with 

senior U.S. offi cials from President Bush, Secretary Powell, and 

Senator Frist to former President Carter, Hu has reportedly been 

restrained, meticulously “on message,” and even formulaic about 

Taiwan―typically noting China’s “appreciation” of U.S. repeated 

assurances that it will adhere to the one-China policy, abide by 

the three joint communiqués, and oppose Taiwan independence. 

Hu invariably asks each to avoid sending the wrong signals to 

independence advocates, and play a constructive role in peaceful 

reunifi cation.11

Hu’s real coming out party on Taiwan was his March 11 speech 

to the Taiwan delegation at the NPC.12 The very fact that Hu got 

to deliver the speech is probably more important than its content. 

Beijing offi cials had already signaled that there would be continuity 

in Taiwan policy after Jiang stepped down,13 and Hu’s remarks 

reaffi rmed recent policy statements. Hu’s speech was offi cially 

billed as “important” by a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce. 

Coupled with Hu’s meeting with President Bush and the lack of any 

public statements on Taiwan by Jiang since his 16th Congress report, 

the speech clearly marked Hu as the authoritative face of Chinese 

foreign policy, especially Taiwan policy.14

Hu’s speech hit all the major points, calling for steadfastly 

upholding the basic principles of peaceful reunifi cation, “one 

country two systems” as well as Jiang’s 8-point proposal. Hu put 

great stress on economic and cultural exchanges and personal visits, 

and vigorously promoting the direct three links across the straits. He 

held out to the Taiwan people an offer of strengthening protections 

for them and their investments on the mainland.15 Hu repeatedly 

invoked the importance of reunifi cation through peaceful means, 

and generally characterized the cross-straits situation as positive 

and progressive. Hu gave no indication of desperation or a belief 

that time is on the side of independence.

Hu’s speech was largely upbeat and assured. His remarks 
58

greatly elaborated on Jiang’s much briefer comments on Taiwan 

at the 16th Party Congress, and he refl ected the general confi dence 

of those remarks.16 Hu characterized the current situation as one 

in which the number of Taiwanese who support reunifi cation is 

expanding―a “win-win” situation for both sides. Hu also expressed 

a fi rm belief that with their efforts, the Taiwan situation could be 

resolved at an early date. Hu’s speech was strong on carrots, with 

little or no reference to sticks. With no sign of desperation, Hu 

stated a strong belief that time was on the side of reunifi cation. 

Certainly Hu was addressing multiple audiences―trying at one 

time to talk past or disarm independence sympathizers, strengthen 

the hand of Taiwanese who are more receptive to a deal, reassure 

U.S. authorities about China’s intentions, and provide little public 

intellectual justifi cation for People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders 

who might argue that more forceful tactics to pressure Taiwan are 

necessary or justifi ed at present.17

Hu’s disciplined quality of staying on message and refusing 

to rise to the bait of provocative statements coming out of Taiwan 

makes it virtually impossible to discern any personal impact he may 

have on the shaping of Taiwan policy. Still, despite offi cial assertions 

that Taiwan policy would not change under Hu, at least some Taiwan 

analysts claim to see signs that Hu may handle Taiwan issues with 

greater deftness and fl exibility, particularly after he has established 

his power. According to Andrew Yang of the Chinese Council of 

Advanced Policy Studies (CCAPS), after China initially embarrassed 

itself by petulantly opposing World Health Organization (WHO) 

observer status for Taiwan during the SARS crisis, Chinese offi cials 

changed their behavior at the Kuala Lumpur conference. They were 

“quite low-profi le in . . . its approach to Taiwan’s representatives . . . 

[and] did not emphasize that Taiwan is part of China . . . [and were] 

. . . very approachable in terms of communication with the Taipei 

representative.”18 Yang reportedly sees Hu’s infl uence in this change 

of style.

Sino-U.S. Relations.

Some analysts also hypothesize an emerging security debate 

between Jiang and Hu over how to deal with the United States, with 
59

advisors to Hu arguing that China has put too much emphasis on 

maintaining good relations with the United States, even to the point 

of paralyzing itself in dealing with Third World countries or the 

Iraq war.19 These authors contend that Hu Jintao is concerned about 

appearing weak, and may move to be a bit tougher on the United 

States than Jiang Zemin has been. As part of this line, these analysts 

expect Hu to push for an even stronger relationship with Russia 

and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries as a 

counterbalance to the United States, particularly in Central Asia.

Whatever Hu may be thinking privately, his public remarks on 

Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russia relations have not validated this view. 

During his trip to Russia, Hu’s comments on the U.S. war on Iraq, 

though critical, were indirect and low-key. Hu rarely mentioned 

the United States publicly by name, and insisted that the war 

cannot change the emerging multipolar global architecture.20

Hu’s remarks on relations with Russia were similarly generic and 

mainstream, seeming to betray no special urgency about deepening 

the relationship.21

North Korea.

Hu’s most surprising―and apparently personal―foreign policy 

departure has been his activism on the Korean issue, in which he 

has shown strong personal engagement as an intermediary between 

the United States and North Korea,22 as well as a willingness to use 

China’s economic leverage to pressure North Korea. Symbolizing 

a major evolution in China’s policy, Hu has resisted becoming 

paralyzed by the prospect of a North Korean rebuff to its efforts, or 

by the very real prospect of an even greater refugee problem on the 

border of China’s depressed and unstable Northeast.

Publicly, Hu has shown China’s strong interest in the 

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and perhaps a slightly 

more equivocal commitment to the security of the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).23 In his May Interfax interview, 

for example, he noted that China and Russia are “friendly neighbors 

of the Korean peninsula” (emphasis added) with no particular 

reaffi rmation of the DPRK per se. He noted much more clearly that 

China stands “for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and 
60

we are against either side . . . developing or possessing nuclear weapons,” 

while stating much less defi nitively China’s belief that “the concerns 

of the DPRK for its own security must receive proper consideration.”24

While we cannot say what role Hu may have played in some 

of China’s stronger actions, such as the reported 3-day cutoff of oil 

to the DPRK or the recent substitution of regular PLA for People’s 

Action Party (PAP) forces on China’s Korean border, Hu’s personal 

initiatives have apparently been very important in arranging talks 

with the DPRK. On July 12, 2003, Hu dispatched Dai Bingguo to 

deliver a letter to Kim, urging the necessity of talks. The exact 

contents of the letter have not been released. But according to an 

article by Zong Hairen, Hu personally made three promises to 

Kim: that “China is willing to help resolve this crisis, mediate, and 

facilitate negotiation with the greatest sincerity; China is willing to 

offer the DPRK greater economic aid than in previous years (without 

mentioning specifi c numbers); and China will resolutely persuade the 

United States to make a promise of nonaggression against the DPRK, 

in exchange for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”25

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

As with Taiwan affairs and Korea, Hu’s approach to military 

issues provides an example of his strategy of embracing wellaccepted policies while trying to establish his authoritative position 

as a national security leader. In May Hu hosted a policy study session 

for the Politburo on military modernization and gave the opening 

speech. According to Nanfang Zhoumo, Hu’s speech emphasized 

the need for “developing by leaps and bounds . . . national defense 

and military modernization on the basis of the development of the 

national economy and science and technological progress.”26 Hu was 

followed by presentations from military researchers Qian Haihao and 

Fu Liqun. The seminar reportedly stressed two particular aspects of 

the new transformation in military affairs. First, with the end of the 

cold war and bipolarity, the prospect for the outbreak of world war 

has greatly diminished, but smaller scale wars persist, sometimes on 

the rise, sometimes on the decline. So the military system designed 

to deal with a large war must be readjusted to fi t the new situation 

of numerous smaller wars. The second is the rise of advanced new 
61

technologies, with information technology as the core, which dictate 

the need for readjustments in construction, size, and structure 

of the armed forces.27 Hu’s comments are in keeping with a long 

series of recent authoritative CCP and Defense documents calling 

for increased coordination of military and nonmilitary science and 

technology to accelerate defense modernization. This development, 

however, is to be conditioned by and promoted on the basis of the 

China’s continued overall economic development.

The South China Morning Post South China Morning Post characterized the meeting and characterized the meeting and 

Hu’s speech as an effort to encroach on Jiang’s territory, even 

though several analysts agree that Hu’s speech did not contradict 

Jiang’s military policy.28 Whether one characterizes it as cautious 

encroachment, creating “two centers,” or a completely defensible 

assertion of prerogatives by the Party’s top body, Hu was clearly 

asserting cautiously his authority as Party chief to involve himself in 

military policy. At a minimum, by arranging a small dose of military 

education for the Politburo, Hu seemed to serve notice that under 

his leadership the Politburo would not merely be an “agenda taker” 

on military issues.

Nor was this Hu’s only effort to involve himself in military 

issues during the year. Later Hu effectively used the SARS crisis to 

press the military for greater transparency about the cases in their 

hospitals. The South China Morning Post South China Morning Post article also charges that it article also charges that it 

was Hu who promoted publication of information on the accident 

aboard a Chinese Ming-class submarine in which all souls aboard 

were lost. This last allegation cannot be confi rmed, however, and 

must be treated with some skepticism.29

EMERGING INTERNAL SECURITY VIEWS: HOW TO 

HANDLE RISING UNREST

Hu Jintao comes to power as China’s internal security specialists 

are engaged in a major debate over how to handle social unrest, 

sparked by the terrifi c increase in mass protests since the early 

1990s. In their efforts to better understand the roots of rising 

protest, many senior police offi cials and analysts have increasingly 

discarded the conspiracy-based explanations of unrest that were 

offi cially imposed after Tiananmen. In their place, most offi cial 
62

analyses are now debating competing explanations of unrest and 

the implications that these competing explanations have for the 

best way of handling unrest. In particular, debate has centered on 

how much China should rely on coercion, economic buyoffs, or 

more fundamental political concessions in dealing with protestors. 

Many are attracted to theories explaining unrest almost solely 

as the result of shifting economic interest and suggesting that if 

China can keep a lid on long enough, it can eventually “outgrow” 

the problem. But growing numbers of analysts contend that such 

economic theories are inadequate, and rising unrest refl ects either 

a permanent shift toward a more assertive mass political culture, or 

is the result of fundamental failures in China’s political and legal 

institutions to rein-in corruption and abuses by cadres. These latter 

two explanations suggest that much bolder and more far-reaching 

political and institutional reforms will be necessary if China is to 

successfully handle unrest.30

As Hu establishes himself in offi ce, his emerging understanding 

of the origins of, and optimal strategies for, dealing with unrest 

will likely have a major impact on how the leadership responds 

to unrest―in particular, whether or not China considers more 

fundamental reforms in political institutions. If Hu’s views become 

at odds with Jiang and other senior leaders, it could also be a major 

source of leadership disagreement. 

Jiang Zemin on Handling Unrest.

Jiang Zemin’s thinking on the origins of unrest (“contradictions 

among the people” and “mass incidents”) and the proper 

strategies for handling it seems to be a mixture of rather traditional 

conspiratorialism, mixed with a strong streak of economism, and 

simple moral appeals to errant local cadres. Innumerable times he 

has reminded listeners that “in the course of reform, opening up, 

and the development of the socialist market economy, contradictions 

among the people are obviously increasing.” These tensions are 

exacerbated by abuses, mishandling, and corruption by local cadres. 

But Jiang also frequently reminds Party and security offi cials to be 

vigilant against a wide array of unspecifi ed “enemy forces” (didui 

shili) who lie poised to take advantage of these tensions (and turn 

them into “antagonistic contradictions”).
63

Absent from Jiang’s thinking about unrest seems to be any 

deeper institutional or cultural analysis. He typically has called 

on local cadres to mend their ways, become closer to the people, 

and take concrete steps to ease popular anger. But despite voicing 

these criticisms for a decades, Jiang usually seems to stop just short 

of drawing the (seemingly obvious) policy conclusion that without 

signifi cant political institutional reforms, China cannot establish 

a self-sustaining system to impose accountability on the Party 

cadres who are angering the people. Nor can it establish adequate 

institutional channels for aggrieved citizens to voice their complaints 

peacefully. As a matter of strategy, Jiang seems to believe that 

through a mixture of strong selective repression of dissident protest 

leaders and periodic high profi le crackdowns on selected corrupt 

offi cials, the CCP can muddle through―keeping unrest manageable 

until China reaches a high-enough level of economic growth to cure 

what he believes is the true root cause of most unrest. Indeed Jiang’s 

mostly economist views seem to describe the post-Tiananmen 

mainstream analysis of unrest.

Hu Jintao: New Departures?

To date Hu Jintao’s offi cial pronouncements primarily show an 

embrace of this mainstream viewpoint, tinged with a few intriguing 

hints of bolder thinking about how China should confront its 

growing problem of unrest. But many have looked to Hu rather 

expectantly for bolder ideas, and a number of unconfi rmable Hong 

Kong sources report a much wider gap separates Hu and Jiang on 

these issues.

Few CCP leaders come to power with more direct experience 

in dealing with unrest, and Hu’s pre-2002 record is littered with 

interesting and contradictory hints about his thinking on the 

problem. The pivotal incident, of course, came in 1989 when Hu 

was the front-line leader in suppressing the Tibetan uprising. 

Unfortunately, Western experts still know virtually nothing about 

Hu’s personal role in the decisionmaking process leading up to 

the suppression. The scant available public evidence shows no 

hesitation on the young Party secretary’s part in leading martial law 

locally. Hu gave a number of fi rm, decisive speeches supporting the 
64

repressive actions at the time,31 and I have encountered no evidence 

published since then to suggest that Hu regretted or felt forced to 

take these actions. 

Nevertheless, it is diffi cult to infer Hu’s contemporary attitudes 

toward suppressing protest from 1989 Tibet―Hu is now general 

secretary, not China’s most junior provincial secretary, and Chinese 

leaders have, in any case, long been quicker to use force against 

protests in minority regions than in the Han heartland. More recent 

press reports, based on conversations with Hu’s advisors and his 

responses to the protests after the Belgrade embassy bombing, 

suggest Hu will be more willing to tolerate social unrest and protest 

as a “safety valve,” or attempt to turn such unrest to the CCP’s 

benefi t.32

In recent years, Hu has often invoked Deng Xiaoping’s 

conservative dictum that “Stability is of overriding importance. 

Without a stable environment we can accomplish nothing, and may 

even lose what we have gained. This is a major principle for running 

the country, which overrules many minor principles.”33

While quoting Deng, however, Hu has also suggested a 

tantalizing willingness to consider more sophisticated approaches 

toward social control and stability. He has argued that the leadership 

needed to “keep a cool head . . . and enhance its political fl air and acuity 

in handling contradictions among the people . . . particularly ones that 

emerge as a result of economic development.”34

Hu’s July 1 Speech.

As a step forward in Hu’s development as a national security 

leader, Hu’s heavily anticipated July 1 speech on the state of the party 

provided the ideal opportunity for Hu to explicate the intellectual 

roots and justifi cation of his own internal security strategy and how 

he will handle “contradictions among the people.” The annual July 

1 “state of the Party” speech represents the ideal venue for laying 

out an explanation of the growing sources of tension and unrest 

in Chinese society―tracing their roots to the spin-offs of economic 

growth, cultural change, institutional failure, enemy instigation, or 

so on. Such an interpretation would logically be followed by the 
65

general secretary’s vision of the Party’s proper role in dealing with 

social tension, plus a series of specifi c policies for managing confl ict, 

deterring or containing unrest, and reaffi rming the Party’s leading 

place in society.

In the weeks running up to Hu’s July 1 speech, it was widely 

reported that Hu would take advantage of his faster-than-expected 

consolidation of power to put forward a major institutional critique 

of Party-society relations, and fl oat a number of trial proposals for 

intra-Party and constitutional reforms. So many different Beijingbased correspondents reported these rumors that one strongly 

suspects they were more than just smoke.35 Some cite an article 

in Qiushi as setting the stage by arguing that the collapse of the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demonstrated that the failure 

to reform the political system was as much of a dead end as the 

failure to reform and develop the economy. Among the reforms Hu 

was rumored to be considering were expanding experiments with 

competitive elections for some Party posts, revising the constitution 

to give greater protection to private property, loosening control 

over mass media to encourage their active supervision of politicians 

(including authorizing greater foreign investment), strengthening 

the autonomy of the democratic parties (for example, by no longer 

having CCP members serve on their leadership bodies), and 

perhaps considering means to permit dissidents self-exiled after 

1989 to return home to live and work without punishment.36 In 

Party journals such as Qiushi and mass press outlets such as Ta Kung 

Pao, the institutional reform proposals of several Party intellectuals 

received the kind of prominent attention that typically precedes the 

embrace of these ideas by senior leaders.

In the end, however, Hu’s speech provided no hint of his future 

internal security strategy. Several Hong Kong sources contend that 

allies of Jiang forced Hu to beat a strategic retreat. Other Chinese 

analysts argued that Hu Jintao’s overall vision was to increase state 

effi ciency rather than promote a more fundamental democratization.37

Whatever the explanation, Hu’s speech was not only devoid of 

specifi c reform proposals, but even of language hinting that the 

Party urgently needed signifi cant institutional reforms to save its 

hold on power.38 Rather, Hu delivered a rather general gloss on 
66

the alleged virtues of the Three Represents ideal. The speech took 

virtually no note of the growing tensions, confl icting interests, or 

unrest in the society the CCP rules. Nor did he try to provide any 

explanation for social tensions and unrest, except to make a vague 

suggestion that he subscribes to Beijing’s current mainstream theory 

that contradictions in economic growth are the major sources of 

social unrest. Among the Party’s three major tasks, for example, was 

to “properly understand and handle the main social contradictions 

created by the people’s growing material and cultural needs and 

backward social production.” 

Nor did Hu annunciate any vision of how the Party could 

contain, suppress, cope with, or manage unrest to help preserve its 

leading position. The speech was also shorn of any of the rumored 

institutional or legal reforms to revive the CCP as a ruling Party, 

or provide better avenues to allow citizens to voice complaints and 

peacefully defuse tensions and unrest.39 Hu only noted very generally 

that one key aspect of the Three Representations was properly 

handling the relationship between reform, development, and stability, and 

building a socialist country ruled by both law and ethical conduct. 

In the end, although Hu called for building a stronger Party of 

members better able to govern well, resist corruption, and “rally and 

lead the people,” he offered no credible analysis of how the CCP can 

confront its problems, overcome growing social tensions, and reach 

this goal.

Although Hu has failed since becoming general secretary to 

annunciate a more general vision of or approach to unrest, his 

response to specifi c cases of unrest suggests more fl exibility (some 

might even say indecisiveness) in responding to protests. The BBC, 

citing Chinese press reports, indicated in January that Hu personally 

intervened to try to end the large student demonstrations in Hefei, 

Anhui. Hu reportedly ordered that local offi cials accede to a key 

student demand that a truck driver who ran down a student be 

severely punished. Hu’s handling of this incident does not yet 

indicate any particularly clear set of views about the origins of 

unrest, but it shows a willingness to order concessions in the face 

of demonstrations. This may encourage demonstrators like the 

students to perceive Hu as a potential benefactor. At the same time, 
67

it risks creating dangerous incentives by encouraging citizens to 

believe that protests get results.40

Hu also gave ambivalent signals on protest in his response 

to the controversy over the Hong Kong government’s proposed 

National Security Bill. After the unexpectedly massive protests 

forced Tung Chee-hwa’s government to reconsider the bill, Hu and 

Wen Jiabao initially responded with a fairly tough line. In their July 

19 meeting with Tung, Hu politely but forcefully reminded Tung of 

the importance of “maintaining social stability.” Hu also pointed out 

that “for the Hong Kong SAR to draw up itself law for safeguarding 

national security and unity is the inevitable demand of implementing 

the Basic Law, and is also the responsibility that Hong Kong must 

undertake as a SAR of the People’s Republic of China.”41

But despite this seeming unwillingness to back down in the face 

of protest, Hu apparently acquiesced shortly thereafter when Tung 

decided to table the draft law for the foreseeable future. While it is 

very diffi cult to extrapolate Hong Kong experiences to the mainland, 

in this case at least, Hu and the rest of the leadership seemed willing 

to compromise in the face of popular protest.

As an internal security leader, Hu has also tried quietly to step 

up pressure for ongoing efforts to rein-in law enforcement abuses 

that undermine the government’s legitimacy and fan unrest. One 

focus has been increased pressure for police professionalization. 

Zhou Yongkang, in a major speech to public security offi cials, 

revealed that Hu Jintao and unspecifi ed other Central leaders had 

issued a series of directives designed to rectify police work and 

limit abuses. In his speech, Zhou suggested that these moves were 

motivated by a series of recent high-profi le incidents of police 

malfeasance and brutality. Although he did not specify these cases, 

they very likely included the widely publicized death in March of 

a 27 year-old student, Sun Zhigang, who was detained for failure 

to show adequate identifi cation and was subsequently beaten to 

death by one of his cell-mates.42 Another widely publicized case 

was that of the 3 year-old daughter of Li Guifang, a Chengdu 

heroin addict. Li was arrested by Chengdu police, but despite her 

persistent pleas, she was not permitted by police to return to take 

care of her daughter, nor did the police send anyone to look after 
68

the child, who subsequently starved to death and was discovered by 

neighbors. Beijing soon responded to these tragedies with a reform 

of the regulations for police handling of migrant workers. To put 

his personal stamp on the changes, in September Hu Jintao made 

a personal inspection tour of local police stations in Jiangxi, during 

which police press reports indicate he quizzed street-level police on 

the new regulations and their meaning for the rights of citizens.

HANDLING THE SARS CRISIS

On the face of it, Hu’s boldest leadership departure of the year was 

only tangentially related to national security issues―specifi cally his 

relationship to the military, and the prospects for social instability.43

This was, of course, his early-mid April effort with Wen Jiabao to 

force the government and military to take the SARS epidemic more 

seriously, and release the kind of accurate information necessary for 

China to cooperate effectively with the WHO and the international 

community in reining-in the disease. Hu appears to have responded 

to international pressure, in particular business concerns, criticism 

from the WHO and other international organizations, as well as the 

prospect of a potentially destabilizing social panic and economic 

downturn caused by the government’s inevitable loss of control over 

information about the epidemic.44 All of these forces underscored 

dramatically the increasing impact of new technologies―in this 

case, text-messaging in particular―on the government’s capacity to 

control information and keep issues off the political agenda. They 

also demonstrated Hu’s willingness, at least sometimes, to take bold 

action in response to such pressures.

Hu reportedly began pushing for greater reporting of 

information on the disease as early as late February, when he 

overrode Guangdong CCP Secretary Zhang Dejiang and sided with 

Governor Huang Huahua in permitting provincial media to report 

more detailed information on the spread of the virus. It is not clear 

that Hu by this date had already decided to push for a widespread 

opening up of information, and it seems that he hesitated and 

attempted to rein-in the reporting in mid-March, when the Politburo 

reportedly directed the Propaganda Department to order China’s 

media not to report WHO warnings about the virus. But it seems 
69

clear that by early April―particularly after Dr. Jiang Yanyong 

publicly criticized Health Minister Zhang Wenkang’s prevarications 

that China was safe and that SARS had been placed under effective 

control―Hu saw the game beginning to slip away, and became more 

strongly committed to changing the Politburo’s handling of SARS. 

This clearly placed Hu at loggerheads with several offi cials allied 

with Jiang Zemin who opposed more open admissions about the 

virus. Soon thereafter, Wen Jiabao on April 7 and Hu Jintao on April 

11, criticized the army and the Party for lying about the scale of the 

epidemic and urged more honest reporting, greater openness, and 

stronger cooperation with international health authorities. They then 

fi red the Health Minister and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong. Some 

sources report that Jiang took the fi ring of Zhang―reportedly his 

former personal physician―badly, and made efforts to rehabilitate 

Zhang’s reputation.45

The move demonstrated that despite his well-deserved reputation 

for caution, Hu is capable of bold action in a crisis, even at some risk 

to his relationship with Jiang.46 Jiang and his allies, moreover, obliged 

Hu by sticking to dangerously stale “deny everything” tactics in 

their initial response to SARS, even long after popular alarm had 

reached high levels. In the end, the move redounded to Hu’s benefi t 

politically, and proved to be the turning point in China’s handling 

of the epidemic as well as international perceptions of China’s 

willingness to admit the scope of the problem. China’s subsequent 

success in controlling SARS made Hu and Wen’s actions look even 

wiser in hindsight.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: HU JINTAO AS NATIONAL 

SECURITY LEADER IN YEAR ONE

Coming to power with a weak personnel base in nearly all 

sectors of China’s national security system, Hu Jintao apparently 

has moved with expected caution on most―but by no means all―

signifi cant security policy issues. In foreign and military affairs in 

particular, Hu has focused on securing for himself as many of the 

key authoritative positions as possible, trying to supplant Jiang as 

the authoritative public voice of Chinese foreign policy on key issues 

such as Taiwan and Korea, while subtly reasserting the role of the 
70

Politburo (vs. the CMC) as a venue for discussing military affairs. On 

substantive issues, however, Hu remains solidly on-message and in 

the mainstream, and has given observers little evidence from which 

to infer his personal vision of national security policy (his personal 

activism on Korea is the main exception here). 

Hu came to offi ce with far more experience in internal security, 

based on his days in Guizhou and Tibet, and his record suggested 

both that he was willing to use repression, but also that he might 

consider bolder, more sophisticated strategies for internal security 

than Jiang. In the end, however, in his July 1 speech he missed his 

major opportunity of the year for annunciating a personal vision of 

internal security policy―perhaps because of opposition among Jiang 

supporters within the leadership. Instead, his handling of specifi c 

cases―Hefei, Hong Kong―suggests a leader who is still reactive and 

a bit ambivalent when faced with mass protest.

The SARS case, however, raises interesting questions about 

Hu, and suggests a little about his crisis decisionmaking style. It is 

unclear how deeply committed Hu really is to greater transparency 

in government, in particular a truly free fl ow of policy-related 

information. Some of his public statements in this regard are clearly 

designed to create a powerfully reformist image.47 Hu has indeed 

pushed to have Chinese authorities release more information, 

but still at the government’s discretion. On Hu and Wen’s watch, 

Chinese police arrested large numbers of citizens for “spreading 

rumors” about SARS via cell-phones and there is no sign that Hu and 

Wen have criticized these arrests, ordered these persons released, 

or directed that the Implementing Regulations of the State Secrets 

Law that make such actions a crime be revised or repealed. So for 

now it appears that Hu and Wen’s preference is not necessarily for 

a much freer fl ow of information. It is possible they prefer a regime 

of greater information and transparency, but one in which the 

government is able to get out ahead of information fl ows rather than 

being manipulated by them and placed in a passive position. 

This case merits closer scrutiny as we consider how Hu might 

respond to future crises. The case also makes clear that, despite his 

well-deserved reputation for caution, Hu is able to respond to crises 

with some boldness and marshal his forces to overturn past policy 

consensus. In the SARS case, Hu’s relative boldness was rewarded 
71

handsomely―Hu seems to have won increased popular support, 

and soon after the policy shift, China began to see greater success in 

its handling of the disease. Perhaps more importantly, by the sheer 

popularity of their demarche, Hu and Wen were able to compel 

the more recalcitrant members of the Politburo―most of whom 

did not owe their promotions to them―to embrace their position. 

The impressive payoffs from this early test may encourage him to 

respond in similar fashion in future crises.48

But Hu’s efforts to portray himself as a leader who is more in 

favor of public discussion, reform, openness, transparency, and 

accountability is also potentially very risky. In particular, it risks 

sending many disgruntled citizens in Chinese society a possibly 

mistaken message―that Hu Jintao is signifi cantly more liberal than 

Jiang Zemin―an assertion for which we have very little hard evidence 

as yet. Such a public perception risks creating false perceptions of a 

reformer/conservative split in the leadership and unrealistic public 

hopes that might encourage greater dissent or unrest. Moreover, 

Hu’s apparent willingness to respond to protests with concessions 

certainly risks creating incentives for more protests. These could 

place Hu Jintao in a dangerous situation (the overly effusive, 

populist, and reformist wording used by some offi cial media outlets 

in describing Hu is, in this respect, risky and perhaps even unwise). 

If Hu is attempting to paint an image of himself as more populist 

and pro-reform than he is in order to broaden his popular base of 

support (perhaps as compensation for his weak personnel base in 

the top leadership), he needs to proceed with greater caution, lest he 

seem to promise more than he really intends to deliver.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, New 

York, New York Review Books, 2002. See especially chapter 2, pp. 36-73.

2. Joseph Fewsmith, “The Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession 

that Didn’t Happen,” The China Quarterly, No. 173, pp. 1-16.

3. For an article that stresses the large number of Fu allies in the new leadership, 

see Oliver Chou, “PLA’s Old Guard Makes Sure the New Faces Fit,” South China 

Morning Post, internet version, December 2, 2002.
72

4. According to various press sources, by mid-year Hu was reportedly the 

secretary of the Central Leading Groups for Foreign Affairs, National Security, 

and Taiwan Affairs. Like other Party leaders before him, he has not chosen to chair 

the Leading Groups on Political-Legal Affairs (Luo Gan does). I have no sources 

on the current chair of the Leading Group for the Protection of State Secrets.

5. See, for example, “Beijing Bids Farewell to Beidaihe,” Japan Times, July 29, 

2003.

6. A May 23, 2003, Xinhuanet report claims that Hu Jintao has ended the 

practise of giving leaders big airport sendoffs when they go overseas, beginning 

with his fi rst foreign trip to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, to make the 

leadership appear more professional and less distant and regal.

7. The text of the speech was published by Xinhua, July 1, 2003, BBC translation, 

accessed on Lexis-Nexis.

8. On this trend, see Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, “China’s New 

Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, November 2003.

9. “Mr. Hu, 59, is the enforcer who was the top offi cial in Tibet when China 

imposed martial law in 1989 to quell unrest. He is the nationalist who supported 

anti-American protesters after a United States bomb destroyed the Chinese 

Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999.” Joseph Kahn, “Mystery Man At the Helm: Hu 

Jintao,” New York Times, November 15, 2002, p. A-1.

10. Based on a Lexis-Nexis world news search by the author.

11. See, for example, Xinhua’s April 21, 2003, report on Hu’s meetings with 

Senator Frist. 

Hu Jintao said: The nature of the Taiwan issue is an issue of sovereignty 

which involves the question of China’s reunifi cation or separation. The 

Chinese government’s position on the Taiwan issue has been consistent 

and clear. We appreciate the U.S. side’s reaffi rmation on several 

occasions of adherence to the one-China policy, of abiding by the three 

Sino-US joint communiqués, and of opposing “Taiwan independence.” 

It is hoped that the U.S. side will keep its commitments, not send wrong 

signals to the “Taiwan independence” forces, and play a constructive 

role in China’s peaceful reunifi cation. It is also hoped that friends in the 

U.S. Congress and senators will exert a positive impact to this end.

12. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.

13. See the statement by Taiwan Affairs Offi ce spokesman Zhang Mingqing, 

AFP, November 27, 2002. Also, at a January 2003 Hong Kong symposium 
73

commemorating the eighth anniversary of Jiang’s “eight point proposal,” Hong 

Kong Special Administrative Region (H.K. S.A.R.) Taiwan Offi ce Director General 

Xing Kuishan reaffi rmed the continuity and stability of the policy.

14. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.

15. Ibid. Hu announced “four viewpoints on work toward Taiwan in the new 

situation,” though it was unclear what was “new” about the situation, especially 

given that he has endorsed the success of policies in the past. The four viewpoints 

were (1) always uphold the one China principle; (2) vigorously promote crossstrait economic and cultural exchanges; (3) thoroughly implement a policy of 

placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan; and (4) uniting compatriots on both 

sides of the straits in joint effort for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. 

16. Jiang actually said little about Taiwan at the Congress. 

Fresh progress has been made in the great cause of national reunifi cation. 

The Chinese Government has resumed the exercise of sovereignty 

over Macao. The principle of “one country, two systems” has been 

implemented, and the basic laws of Hong Kong and Macao special 

administrative regions have been carried out to the letter. Hong Kong 

and Macao enjoy social and economic stability. Personnel, economic 

and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Straits have kept increasing. 

The fi ght against “Taiwan independence” and other attempts to split the 

country has been going on in depth.

He went on to say:

Here, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, I wish to express our 

heartfelt thanks to the people of all our ethnic groups, the democratic 

parties, people’s organizations and patriots from all walks of life, to 

our compatriots in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the 

Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan as well as overseas 

Chinese, and to our foreign friends who care about and support China’s 

modernization drive.

“Full text of Jiang Zemin’s report at 16th Party congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 

2002, accessed on Lexis-Nexis.

17. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.

18. South China Morning Post web site, June 19, 2003.

19. Leslie Fong, The Straits Times, May 24, 2003.
74

20. Interview with Interfax, May 22, 2003.

21. Ibid.

22. In their February meeting, Hu tried to reassure Secretary Powell that China 

was working through private channels to deal with the North Korean government 

and urged the United States to hold direct dialogues with the North as soon as 

possible. Washington Post, February 25, 2003, p. A-19; New York Times, February 25, 

2003.

23. Interview with Interfax May 22, 2003.

24. Ibid.

25. Zong Hairen: “Hu Jintao Writes to Kim Chong-il To Open Door to SixParty Talks,” Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, BBC translation accessed on Lexis-Nexis.

26. Wu Chenguang, “China Pushes forward Military Transformation,” 

Nanfang Zhoumo, internet version, June 12, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (FBIS) translation. 

27. Ibid.

28. South China Morning Post, online edition, May 26, 2003; also Nanfang 

Zhoumo, June 12, 2003.

29. South China Morning Post, online edition, May 26, 2003.

30. I have analyzed this debate in a forthcoming chapter in a book on law and 

society in China, edited by Kevin O’Brien, Stanley Lubman, and Neil J. Diamant 

(Stanford University Press).

31. Hu’s comments at the time are nicely summarized in Richard Daniel Ewing, 

“Hu Jintao, the Making of a Chinese General Secretary,” The China Quarterly, No. 

173, March 2003, pp. 22-25.

32. Susan Lawrence, “Primed for Power” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 

22, 2001.

33. Xinhua, March 6, 1997.

34. Ibid.

35. Note, for example, the unusual publicity given by the PRC-owned HK 

daily, Ta Kung Pao, to an August forum in Jilin on intra-Party democracy featuring 

several Party academics. 
75

36. For a sample of these rumored reforms, see John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader 

Solidifi es Power,” The Washington Post, June 28, 2003, p. A18; Luo Bing, “Hu Jintao 

Promises ‘Reforms in Four Fields’,” Zhengming, June 1, 2003, pp. 11-13.

37. John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Solidifi es Power,” The Washington Post, 

June 28, 2003, p. A18.

38. This lack of even a strong statement on the need for reform is striking. 

Willy Lam, writing on the eve of the speech, reported that Hu had dropped his 

reform proposals, but would at least say that “there is no way out for the Party 

save political reform.” “China’s Conservative Backlash,” CNN.com, June 24, 2003.

39. On p. 6, however, Hu discusses at some length the need to build a Party 

that serves the interests of the people, and rules the country for the people― the people―that this is 

an essence of the Three Representations. But the speech says nothing about the 

desirability of involving the people more in their own government―an omission 

that may undermine the justifi cation for any such institutional reforms for the time 

being.

40. BBC.co.uk, January 9, 2003. This report notes the PRC-owned Wen Wei Po as 

one source.

41. Xinhua Domestic Service, July 19, 2003, FBIS translation.

42. Yao Ye, “Child’s Death Turns Up Heat on China’s Police,” Asiatimes online, 

June 28, 2003.

43. John Pomfret, “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu an Opening,” Washington Post, 

May 13, 2003, p. A-1.

44. Ibid.

45. Jonathan Ansfi eld of Reuters reports that in late May when Hu Jintao was 

overseas, Jiang lunched with Zhang in Beijing, and Zhang’s former deputy, Vice 

Minister Gao Qiang, made a public statement defending Zhang, which he was 

forced to retract under intense media criticism. “Hu, Jiang Intrigue Clouds China’s 

Reform Outlook,” Reuters, June 29, 2003.

46. Rupert Wingfi eld-Hayes, “Hu Jintao and the Handling of the SARS 

Epidemic,” BBC.co.uk.

47. Note, for example, the widely quoted statement, attributed to Hu and Li 

Changchun, that the press must be “closer to life, closer to reality, and closer to the 

people,” and must honour the people’s “right to know” (zhiqingquan). Willy WoLap Lam, “China’s Conservative Backlash,” CNN.com, June 24, 2003.
76

48. The case, of course, still leaves open the question of just what types of 

issues and problems make Hu seize the initiative and what types of policy actions 

he might consider in a crisis.
77

CHAPTER 4

CHINA’S RULING ELITE:

THE POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Joseph Fewsmith

The 16th National Party Congress met in Beijing on November 

8-14, 2002, to select a Central Committee consisting of 198 full 

members and 158 alternate members (very close in size to the 193 

full members and 151 alternate members named to the 15th Central 

Committee in 1997). When the fi rst Plenary Session of the new 

Central Committee met on November 15, it named 24 people to 

be full members of the Politburo and one person to be an alternate 

member of the Politburo. It also named seven people to the party’s 

Secretariat, the body that assists the Politburo in its day-to-day work 

by overseeing propaganda and the general fl ow of documents that 

implement policy decisions; and it appointed eight people to the 

Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA). The Politburo, in turn, named nine people 

to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), which makes up the 

heart of China’s political system. Collectively, these people can be 

considered China’s ruling elite.1 Who are they, and what does their 

composition tell us about contemporary Chinese politics?

The focus of this chapter is on the 198 full members of the 

Central Committee; it is doubtful that alternate members of the 

Central Committee can be considered a part of the ruling elite, or 

even the ruling elite in waiting. Of the 151 alternate members of the 

15th Central Committee, only 30 (19.9 percent) were elevated to full 

membership in the 16th Central Committee. Interestingly, the one 

place in which being named an alternate member of the Central 

Committee is suggestive of future advancement is among the 

provincial cadres―22 of the 30 alternate members of the 15th Central 

Committee who were promoted to full membership were provincial 

cadres. That is just over one-third the number of provincial cadres 

named to full membership in the 16th Central Committee (65). In 

contrast, only 3 (12.5 percent) of the 24 military personnel who were 
78

alternate members of the 15th Central Committee were advanced 

to full membership in the 16th Central Committee. There were 40 

alternate members of the 15th Central Committee who continued on 

as alternate members of the 16th Central Committee, but judging by 

age (most were born in the early 1940s), few are likely to be named 

full members of the 17th Central Committee. Fully 53.6 percent of 

the alternate members (81 people) of the 15th Central Committee 

were retired from membership at the 16th Party Congress.

We do know that there was a lot of fresh blood injected into the 

16th Central Committee. Of the 198 full members, 112 were new, 

a turnover rate of 56 percent, just about the same as 5 years ago 

when the turnover rate was 57 percent. Since 30 were elevated from 

alternate membership in the 15th Central Committee, that means 81 

were promoted without prior experience in the Central Committee. 

The number of provincial representatives (65) was very close to the 

number in the 15th Central Committee (61), and the number of State 

Council seats was up somewhat from 5 years ago (60 compared to 

51). The number of national minorities (15) was about the same as 

last time (14). The number of women decreased from seven to fi ve 

(2.5 percent).

Military representation was nearly equal to 5 years ago. Whereas 

there were 42 PLA representatives (22 percent) on the 15th Central 

Committee, there were 45 (23 percent) on the 16th Central Committee. 

At least in formal terms, the makeup of the Central Committee 

appears increasingly institutionalized. That is to say, people 

occupying certain positions in the central government, military, and 

provinces are routinely appointed to the Central Commission―but 

that observation does not answer the crucial question of who gets 

appointed to those positions.2

There were a few surprises in the selection of the 16th Central 

Committee. Hua Guofeng (born in 1921) was fi nally retired, despite 

Deng Xiaoping’s apparent promise that he would have a life-time 

appointment. Two members of the new Central Committee were 

born in 1937, though they should have retired if the retirement age 

of 65 was strictly adhered to. One was Li Guixian, the former head 

of the People’s Bank of China, and the other was Xu Kuangdi, who 

was unceremoniously dismissed as mayor of Shanghai in May 2002 

(and appointed head of the Chinese Academy of Engineering).
79

Some limitations of the data should be acknowledged at the 

outset. Even a year after the convening of the 16th Party Congress, 

Xinhua News Agency has still not published standard biographical 

information on the full (or alternate) members of the Central 

Committee (though most are available from the Xinhua website). 

Apart from knowing in greater detail the career paths of the members 

of the Central Committee, one would ideally like to know about the 

pool of people these people were picked from. After all, focusing on 

the biographies of those that were picked tells us something about 

the makeup of China’s political elite, but it does not say anything 

about those not selected. If one wants to make more defi nitive selected. If one wants to make more definitive 

statements about institutionalization, we will need much greater 

biographical information. Alas, this chapter can only “select on the 

dependent variable,” as the social science literature would put it.3

Other chapters in this volume deal with the top civilian and 

military leadership, so this chapter will look at the demographic and 

career paths of the ruling elite more broadly. Overall, the Central 

Committee draws its membership from four broad constituencies: 

Central Party cadres, the State Council system, the provincial elite, 

and the military. This chapter will look at each of these constituencies 

in turn.

THE CENTRAL PARTY CADRES

The Politburo.

The Politburo and its Standing Committee stand at the apex of 

the political system. The only member of the Politburo of the 15th 

Central Committee to retain a seat on the new standing committee 

was Hu Jintao, who was named as General Secretary of the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP), as expected. The retirement of the other six 

members of the standing committee was largely anticipated, though 

Li Ruihuan was only 68 at the time of the congress and by past 

precedence could have anticipated another term on the PBSC. One 

explanation for his retirement was that he had already served over 

two full terms (Li was elevated to the Politburo after the Tiananmen 

debacle), though his notoriously bad relationship with Jiang Zemin 
80

appears to be the reason the “two term” rule was invoked (such term 

limits had not been in evidence in the past). 

Rumors in the summer of 2002 had raised the possibility that 

Jiang Zemin might stay on the PBSC and continue to serve as general 

secretary. Such rumors were probably always intended as leverage 

in inner-party negotiations; if so, they worked. The PBSC has never 

exceeded seven members in size during the reform era, but the First 

Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee named nine members 

to it. At least fi ve, and perhaps six, of the nine members had close 

personal relations with Jiang Zemin, thus ensuring him infl uence 

over party affairs.

Of the other 15 full members of the 15th Central Committee 

Politburo, seven moved up to the PBSC of the 16th Central Committee 

(Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Luo Gan, Wen Jiabao, 

Wu Bangguo, and Wu Guanzheng). Of the other eight originally 

appointed in 1997, one (Xie Fei) had died and the other seven all 

retired―including Li Tieying, the then 66 year-old son of Party elder 

Li Weihan. Again, one could invoke the “two term” rule to explain 

Li’s retirement, though it is more likely that Li’s clashes with Jiang 

Zemin over ideological issues (particularly the admission of private 

entrepreneurs into the Party) account for his early departure.

How institutionalized was this transfer of power? The retirement 

of all those 70 or older suggests an incremental institutionalization 

of binding norms. But the increased size of the PBSC, the apparent 

stacking of it with Jiang’s protégés, the early retirement of two 

Politburo members, and the leap frogging of Zeng Qinghong from 

alternate status on the Politburo to Standing Committee status 

(as well as being named head of the Secretariat) point both to the 

arbitrariness left in the process as well as the success Jiang had at 

the 15th Party Congress in getting so many of his followers onto the 

Politburo.

Much has been made of the number of provincial leaders who 

made it onto the Politburo.4 Ten of the 24 people named to the 

Politburo were serving as provincial leaders when they were named, 

and 20 have experience as provincial leaders. It appears at fi rst 

glance that provincial infl uence is growing at the expense of central 

authority. There are, however, several reasons to be skeptical of this 

thesis. First, throughout the reform era, certain seats on the Politburo 
81

have been reserved for leaders of important provincial-level areas, 

most notably Beijing and Shanghai. Other Politburo seats have been 

given to the leaders of Sichuan, Henan, Tianjin, and Guangdong, 

though not all at the same time. So it is normal to have four or fi ve 

sitting provincial leaders serving concurrently on the Politburo. This 

local representation perhaps injects consideration of local reality into 

central discussions but it also, and more importantly, ensures central 

control over the localities. Second, a distinction must be made 

between offi cials whose careers have been primarily at the center 

but have been “sent down” for tempering (a trend that has increased 

in recent years) and those whose careers have been primarily in the 

provinces. Thus, Hu Jintao, He Guoqiang (head of the Organization 

Department), and Zhou Yongkang (named Minister of Public 

Security shortly after the Congress) have served primarily as central 

offi cials who have gained local experience before being brought back 

to the center. Third, a considerable portion of those with provincial 

administrative experience who were named to the Politburo appear 

to have been brought in as supporters of Jiang Zemin, and refl ect 

Jiang’s career path, particularly his time in Shanghai. Such leaders 

include Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Li 

Changchun, Chen Liangyu, Liu Qi, and maybe Zhang Dejiang. 

The promotion of such fi gures refl ects less provincial infl uence 

than it does the personal infl uence of Jiang Zemin. Fourth, several 

provincial leaders named to the Politburo quickly exchanged their 

provincial portfolios for posts at the center, where they will no 

doubt look out for the center’s interests. Such leaders include Wu 

Bangguo, who became head of the National People’s Congress 

(NPC); Jia Qinglin, who was named head of the Chinese People’s 

Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Huang Ju, who became 

a vice premier; Li Changchun, who took over the ideology portfolio; 

He Guoqiang, who became head of the Organization Department; 

Hui Liangyu, who became a vice premier; Liu Yunshan, who 

became head of the Propaganda Department; and Zhou Yongkang, 

who became minister of public security. When such changes are 

taken into account, only six of the 24 full members of the Politburo 

“represent” provincial interests. While provincial experience may 

become a more important criterion for promotion to the highest 

levels, it is evident that the interests of the center still prevail.
82

Other Central Party Cadres. 

Other than the 25 full and alternate members of the Politburo, 

there are 27 members of the 16th Central Committee who oversee 

important Party organs, two less than the number in the 15th Central 

Committee. Even a cursory look at the functions of these Central 

Party cadres suggests the functions that the Party feels are most 

critical to its political control: Organization, propaganda, security, 

and united front work of various sorts. Thus, although Politburo 

members direct the departments of organization and propaganda 

as well as the Ministry of Public Security, other full members of the 

Central Committee include two deputy heads of the Organization 

Department (Huang Qingyi and Li Tielin), the editor-in chief of 

People’s Daily (Wang Chen), the head of the Xinhua News Agency 

(Tian Congming), the head of the State Press and Publication 

Administration (Shi Zongyuan), the director of the Central Offi ce 

for Overseas Propaganda (Zhao Qizheng), the Minister of State 

Security (Xu Yongyue), and a vice minister of public security (Liu 

Jing). Wang Huning, the newly promoted head of the Central 

Policy Research Offi ce, was also named to the Central Committee, 

while the former head, Teng Wensheng, remained on the Central 

Committee and took over as director of the Central Party Literature 

Research Center (which overseas such things as the compilation of 

the collected works of senior leaders). 

Foreign affairs (although primarily under the State Council―see 

below) is also another area of Party concern. Liu Huaqiu, head of the 

Party’s General Offi ce for Foreign Affairs, is one of these central Party 

cadres, as are Dai Bingguo (head of the International Liaison Offi ce), 

Gao Siren (director of the Liaison Offi ce of the Central Government 

in Hong Kong), and Bai Zhizhen (director of the Liaison Offi ce of the 

Central Government in Macao). United front work is represented 

by Liu Yandong (director of the United Front Work Department), 

Zhang Junjiu (fi rst secretary of the All-China Federation of Trade 

Unions), Zheng Wantong (secretary general of the CPPCC), and Bai 

Lichen (Vice Chairman of the CPPCC). One might note in passing 

that sports are also important to the CCP; Yuan Weimin, Executive 

President of the 29th Olympic Games Organizing Committee (under 
83

the overall direction of Politburo member and Beijing CCP secretary 

Liu Qi) made the Central Committee.

This group is a generally well educated group. The diplomats―

Dai Bingguo and Liu Huaqiu―are both graduates of the Foreign 

Affairs College in Beijing. Lu Yongxiang, the President of the 

Chinese Academy of Sciences, obtained a Ph.D. degree from 

Aachen Industrial University in East Germany in 1981 and taught 

at Zhejiang University through the 1980s. Wang Huning attended 

Fudan University as a “worker, peasant, soldier” student during the 

Cultural Revolution, but was able to overcome this to become dean 

of the School of International Relations at Fudan. Zhao Qizheng 

graduated from Chinese University of Science and Technology in 

Anhui in 1963, but his career then went in decidedly untechnical 

directions (e.g., heading the Organization Department in Shanghai). 

Liu Jing, the vice minister of public security, graduated from Beijing 

Polytechnical University, but did so only in 1968, presumably after 

his college education had been disrupted for 2 years.

Others are less well educated, at least in a formal sense. Shi 

Zongyuan, the Director of Press and Publication Administration, 

spent most of his career in the propaganda and party school 

apparatus of Gansu and Jilin provinces. Bai Lichen, a member of 

the Hui minority, graduated from Shenyang Agricultural College, 

but then rose through organization and personnel work to be vice 

governor of Liaoning and Chairman of the Ningxia Autonomous 

Region before being named to the CPPCC.

At least two members of this group―Liao Hui (director of the 

Hong Kong and Macao Offi ce) and Zhang Junjiu (First Secretary of 

the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)―have extensive 

military backgrounds. Liao graduated from the Military Engineering 

Institute of the PLA, and Zhang spent most of his career in the 

ordnance industry.

The State Council System.

Of the 198 people named full members of the Central Committee, 

45 had posts in the State Council system at the time of being named. 

Because the State Council system is responsible for overseeing the 

administration of the country, including the economy, one would 
84

expect to see the highest concentration of technocrats here. Of 

course, not all posts in the State Council system require technical 

expertise. The Foreign Ministry requires professionalism, but 

not technical profi ciency. The Ministry of Supervision, the State 

Nationalities Commission, the Ministry of Culture, and similar posts 

similarly require competence and experience, but not a technical 

background. Altogether, 23 of the 45 postings of those named to the 

Central Committee seem to require, or at least would benefi t from, 

technical expertise (these include the People’s Bank of China, the 

Auditor General, Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of 

Environmental Protection, and so forth). Nevertheless, only about 

half of these posts―12―are fi lled by people who could be considered 

real technocrats (as opposed to those who might have had technical 

training but have long since gone onto other fi elds of endeavor). At 

least one of these, Xiang Huaicheng, has since given up his portfolio 

as minister of fi nance to become mayor of Tianjin, a position that 

certainly requires administrative ability but not technical expertise.

Overall, this is a very well educated group. Six attended 

Qinghua University; three, Beijing University; and others attended 

the Tongji, Fudan, and Nanjing Universities. Central leaders tend 

to be somewhat older than provincial leaders (see below), so most 

who attended college were able to graduate prior to the start of the 

Cultural Revolution. Still, 11 of the 45 people had their educations 

curtailed in some way by the Cultural Revolution, including three 

who graduated in the 1970s and must have attended college as 

“worker, peasant, army” students (one of whom, Zhou Xiaochuan, 

then attended Qinghua University after the Cultural Revolution). 

Three of these cadres have no college background; one (Du Qinglin) 

appears not to have attended college but nevertheless attained an 

M.A. degree in law through correspondence. Others appears to 

have followed less than rigorous academic paths. For instance, Tian 

Fengshan, who was arrested on corruption charges shortly after the 

16th Party Congress, attended the PLA’s Second Artillery Technical 

College. Similarly, Li Dezhu, of Korean nationality, attended 

Yanbian University before taking up a career in nationalities work; 

and Mou Xinsheng, the director of the General Administration of 

Customs, attended Northwest China Institute of Politics and Law to 

prepare himself for a career in public security.
85

Of these 45 people, 6 have spent their careers primarily in the 

provinces, coming to Beijing in recent years to take up central 

administrative posts. It is not apparent from their offi cial biographies 

why these people were able to make the jump from what appeared 

to be successful, but limited, provincial careers to high-level central 

administrative positions. For instance, Jin Renqing, the director 

of the State Taxation Administration, attended the prestigious 

Central Institute of Finance and Banking (as did Dai Xianglong, Jia 

Chunwang, and Li Jinhua), but then spent 23 years in Yunnan, rising 

to vice governor before being promoted to vice minister of fi nance 

in 1991. Tian Fengshan spent his whole career in Heilongjiang, 

rising to be governor (1995-2000), before coming to Beijing (and was 

subsequently arrested for corruption). Wang Zhongfu graduated 

from the Changsha Institute of Railway Construction and then 

served 20 years in Hunan before becoming vice-mayor of Shenzhen 

and then coming to Beijing as director of the State Administration of 

Industry and Commerce. What accounts for the sudden promotion of 

such people, when others in similar positions did not get promoted, 

is not clear.

Provincial Leadership.

For at least a decade-and-a-half, it has been apparent that China 

has been moving toward a system in which membership in the 

Central Committee would be determined by position in China’s 

political hierarchy; model workers and others selected because of 

age or personal favoritism would be eliminated in favor of “rational” 

criteria of position. In the past, it has been the general practice that all 

provincial Party secretaries and about half of provincial governors 

were selected to the Central Committee. At the 16th Party Congress, 

for the fi rst time, all provincial party secretaries and all provincial 

governors were named to the central committee. Although this 

indicates progress toward institutionalizing the allocation of seats on 

the Central Committee, it is premature to conclude that it indicates a 

growing clout of the provinces.

Looking at those who rose to positions of provincial leadership and 

thus were qualifi ed to be named to the Central Committee suggests 

that some correction is in order in our usual characterizations of the 
86

Chinese leadership. It is often agued that China’s leadership is better 

educated, technocratic, and increasingly institutionalized. I would 

suggest that a close look at the career paths of China’s provincial 

leadership suggest that there are very different career paths, which 

may suggest a lower degree of institutionalization than sometimes 

depicted; that the leadership is, on the whole, not as well educated 

as often thought, and that despite technical education, most have not 

followed what might be considered a technocratic path.

Education.

Those who lead China’s provinces are generally in their late 

50s (provincial Party secretaries averaged 58 years old in 2002; 

provincial governors, 56 years old), and so were born in the mid1940s. The oldest was Wu Guanzheng, born in 1938, who was 

also named to the Politburo and as head of the Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission (CDIC), thus removing him from the ranks 

of provincial leaders. The youngest was Li Keqiang (governor of 

Henan at the time of the congress, and since elevated to Henan Party 

secretary), who was born in 1955. (Subsequently, Zhao Leji, born in 

1957, was named Party secretary of Qinghai, becoming the youngest 

provincial leader.) Of the 31 provincial party secretaries, only 8 were 

able to fi nish college before the Cultural Revolution.5 Three others 

were young enough to attend college after the Cultural Revolution, 

and the education of these three appears to be much superior to that of 

their elders.6 Of the other 20 provincial party secretaries, 4 appear to 

have no college education,7 and 1 (Zhang Dejiang, Guangdong Party 

Secretary) has the dubious distinction of having studied economics 

at Kim Il-sung Comprehensive University. The other 16 are credited 

with having gone to college, but in each case their higher education 

was disrupted to one degree or another by the Cultural Revolution. 

Moreover, some of these colleges must have been somewhat limited 

in their focus. For instance, Zhang Lichang, Tianjin party secretary, 

is credited with gaining a college degree by correspondence with 

Beijing Economic University. One wonders what sort of an education 

Wang Taihua, Anhui Party Secretary, received at Jiangxi Teachers 

College: he graduated in 1968, 2 years after the Cultural Revolution 
87

disrupted higher education. Wang Xiaofeng, Hainan Party Secretary, 

received a college education at Beijing Mining Institute, graduating 

in 1969. Even Xi Jinping, Xi Zhongxun’s son who studied at Qinghua 

University, received his education 1975-1979 as a “worker, peasant, 

PLA” student (gongnongbing xuesheng). It was probably a decent 

education, but not as good as he would have received prior to, much 

less after, the Cultural Revolution.

Governors, being on average 2 years younger than provincial 

party secretaries, were even more affected by the Cultural Revolution. 

Only six governors made it through college before the onslaught 

of the Cultural Revolution.8 Only two (Bo Xilai and Lu Hao) have 

completed college since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Three 

(Han Yuqun, Han Zheng, and Lu Zhangong) show no evidence 

of college, and eight had their college careers interrupted by the 

Cultural Revolution.9 Many others followed less orthodox patterns 

of achieving higher education. Six attained college degrees from the 

Central Party School.10 Jia Zhibang, governor of Shaanxi received a 

college education through correspondence with Chinese People’s 

University. Xiang Bapingcuo, named to the Central Committee at 

the 16th Party Congress and then elevated to be chairman of Tibet, 

has 2 years of tertiary education at the Chinese Nationalities Institute 

in Beijing.

In short, 19 of the 63 provincial leaders named to the Central 

Committee have a 4-year college education. Others may have 

patched together something resembling a college career in the 

course of their careers, but it is diffi cult to say that they are “college 

educated” in the normal sense of that term. Many, including those 

with degrees from the Central Party School, appear to have been sent 

for further education as they rose in party ranks and were picked as 

potential future leaders. This may be a smart group, but their formal 

education is limited.

Career Patterns.

If the provincial political elite turns out to be less well-educated 

than Xinhua statistics of the number “college educated” (daxue 

xueli―a vague term), then that seems to be a function of their career 

patterns. Looking at the career pattern of provincial party secretaries 
88

and governors, they seem to fall logically into fairly distinct groups: 

Those who have worked their way up from the bottom, those who 

have received a college education (even if interrupted by the Cultural 

Revolution) and have subsequently advanced quickly, a few who 

have worked in the military or military industry, a few who have 

“parachuted” in from the center, and those whose careers can only 

be described as “blessed,” usually because of their parents’ political 

standing. On balance, however, provincial political leadership is 

dominated by those who have spent long periods of time at the grass 

roots; roughly half of the 63 provincial leaders selected for Central 

Committee membership fi ts into this category. Even if some of these 

people received technical educations while young, they quickly 

followed political paths and can hardly be considered “technocrats.” 

They are politicos.

A couple of examples will illustrate this point. Meng Jiangzhu, 

who was appointed Jiangxi Party secretary in April 2001, is a case 

in point. Meng joined the CCP in 1968 (which, at the age of 21 was a 

fairly early date), and then spent almost the next 20 years in various 

capacities at the Qianwei farm in suburban Shanghai. It was not until 

1986 that he was promoted to Party secretary of Chuansha county 

(also in Shanghai). And it was only in 1991 that his career began to 

take off when he became secretary of the rural work committee in 

the Shanghai Municipal government. The following year, he became 

deputy secretary-general of the Shanghai municipal government, 

and the following year (1993) he was named vice mayor of Shanghai 

and head of the Economic Reform Commission. Obviously he had 

caught someone’s eye.

Similarly, Zhang Lichang, Party secretary of Tianjin Municipality, 

spent a long time at the grass roots. Zhang graduated from the 

Tianjin Matellurgical Industry School in 1958, and then spent the 

next 22 years in various capacities in the seamless steel industry 

in Tianjin. It was not until 1980, when he was named as deputy 

director general of the National Metallurgical Industry Bureau in 

Tianjin, that his career began to take off. Yet it was only 2 years later 

when he was named an alternate to the 12th Central Committee, and 

only 3 years later when he became deputy general director of the 

Municipal Economic Commission in Tianjin. In 1985 he was named 

vice mayor.
89

Those with a greater pretense to a college education generally 

moved along faster, and their jobs tended to be more urban. For 

instance, Li Jianguo, Shaanxi party secretary, graduated from 

Shandong University in 1970. He then worked in a number of 

positions, perhaps simultaneously (his biography is not clear) 

including the Culture and Education Bureau of Ninghe County 

in Shandong, the propaganda department of the county, then to 

the propaganda department of the Agricultural Committee of 

Tianjin, and, most important, as a worker in the general offi ce of 

the municipal government. He had not yet joined the Communist 

Party, though he did so the following year (1971). In other words, Li 

was already working in key organizations in the Tianjin municipal 

government only a year after graduation, whereas Zhang Lichang, 

rising in the same municipality, spent 22 years reaching roughly the 

same level.

Although few provincial leaders―with the notable exception 

of Song Defu, Party secretary of Fujian―have had military careers, 

quite a few have experience in military industries. Examples of such 

cadres would include Bai Keming, who studied missile engineering 

at the Military Engineering Institute of the PLA; Chen Liangyu, who 

studied at the PLA Institute of Logistics Engineering and served 2 

years in the military upon graduation; and Yu Zhengsheng, who 

studied missile engineering at the Harbin Institute of Military 

Engineering along with Bai Keming. In addition, quite a number of 

provincial leaders studied at technical institutes, where the study 

may have been oriented toward military needs (e.g., Cao Bochun, 

who studied at the Zhuzhou School of Aeronautics Industry and 

then worked as Deputy chief of No. 331 Factory, which made aircraft 

engines). Thus, although one generally thinks of the provincial 

leadership as civilian, there is some overlap with the military. The 

gap between civilian and military cultures may not be as large as 

sometimes supposed.

Finally, there is a small group who have led charmed careers 

due to their fathers’ infl uence. Some of these had careers stall in the 

Cultural Revolution, but others were largely able to avoid that fate. 

For instance, Hong Hu, Hong Xuezhi’s son who is currently governor 

of Jilin, worked at the Liming Chemical Industry Factory in Qinghai 

during the Cultural Revolution, but once that cataclysm was over, 
90

he was able to move back to Beijing, taking up responsible positions 

as head of the Comprehensive Planning Division of the Ministry 

of Chemical Industry, as Vice Minister of the State Commission 

for Restructuring the Economy, and as member of the CDIC. Bo 

Xilai, Bo Yibo’s son who is now Minister of Commerce, worked in a 

factory during the Cultural Revolution, but was able to enter Beijing 

University in 1977 (where he studied history). His fi rst real job was 

as a staff member at the Research Offi ce of the Secretariat, followed 

by a stint as a staff member of the General Offi ce of the Central 

Committee. In short, he started by getting a fi rst hand look at policy 

and power.

The Military Leadership.

The 16th Party Congress saw 45 PLA cadres named as full 

members of the Central Committee, including three leaders of 

the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Of these 45 people, two (Cao 

Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong) serve on the Politburo, though not on 

its Standing Committee. It has become the practice in recent years for 

the PLA to be “represented” on the PBSC only by the CCP general 

secretary, although the fact that Hu Jintao is only a vice chairman of 

the Central Military Commission (CMC) while Jiang Zemin, who is 

not a member of the Central Committee, continues to head the CMC 

makes this an awkward, uninstitutionalized relationship. 

Born in 1935, Cao Gangchuan is the oldest member of the 16th 

Central Committee, and he serves as a vice chairman of the CMC 

as well as Minister of Defense (as of March 2003). He is also the 

only military leader who has studied overseas. Cao spent 1957-63 

in the Soviet Union studying at the Leningrad Advanced Artillery 

Military Engineering School. As observed elsewhere in this volume 

(see Chapter 6 by Kivlehan-Wise, Cheng, and Gause), Cao has spent 

his career as a military modernizer. From a political perspective, it 

is important to note that his big promotion came in November 1992 

when, in the wake of the purge of Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, 

Cao was made Deputy Chief of Staff under Zhang Wannian. Thus, 

Cao was very much part of the effort to bring new leadership to 

the PLA as Jiang Zemin tried to consolidate his power. Cao was 
91

promoted to lieutenant general in 1993, a decision that would have 

been made personally by Jiang, and then to general in 1998.

Guo Boxiong, the other military vice chairman of the CMC, has 

focused much of his attention on fi ghting under high technology 

conditions and indeed edited a volume that the General Staff 

Department distributed to the PLA for use. Guo, too, was promoted 

in the shake-up following the removal of the Yang brothers, albeit 

a bit later; in December 1993 he was made deputy commander of 

the critical Beijing Military Region (MR). In 1997 he took over as 

commander of the Lanzhou MR, and the following year he was 

promoted to lieutenant general.

A third PLA leader, Xu Caihou, is a member of the seven-person 

Secretariat and a member of the CMC. Although a graduate of Harbin 

Military Engineering Academy, Xu has specialized his whole career 

in political work. He started as a political cadre in the Jilin provincial 

military district in the 1970s, attended the PLA Political Academy 

(Jiefangjun zhengzhi xueyuan) 1980-82, and in November 1992 became 

an assistant to the chairman of the General Political Department. This 

was, of course, the time when Yu Yongbo replaced Yang Baibing as 

head of the General Political Department and helped Jiang Zemin 

gain control over the military. Xu is from the same county in 

Liaoning as Yu Yongbo (Xia county). In May 1993, Xu took over as 

head of People’s Liberation Army Daily, a position he held for 5 years. 

A tour as political commissar in the Jinan Military Region qualifi ed 

him to become brigadier general (in 1990) and lieutenant general (in 

1993).

The other three members of the CMC―Li Jinai, Liang Guanglie, 

and Liao Xilong―are director of the General Armament Department, 

Chief of the General Staff, and director of the General Logistics 

Department, respectively. Li is a graduate of Harbin Institute of 

Technology and has spent much of his career in the Second Artillery, 

where he did political and organization work. In the mid-1980s, 

he worked in the General Political Department (rising to become 

deputy director), before moving to the Commission on Science, 

Technology and Industry (COSTIND). Liang worked his way up 

through the ranks, attending PLA Military Affairs Academy in 1982 

and National Defense University in 1987 and 1991. In December 
92

1993, Liang became chief of staff of the Beijing MR―the same 

time Guo Boxiong became deputy commander. Liao rose through 

the ranks quickly, becoming deputy commander of the Chengdu 

Military Region in 1985 and commander in 1995.

These six military members of the CMC are better educated 

and more professional than their predecessors, but at least four of 

them advanced their careers in the wake of the removal of the Yang 

brothers. All were promoted to their current ranks in the mid-1990s 

by Jiang Zemin. Although no doubt professional soldiers, their 

career paths suggest that they were all hand picked by Jiang and 

remain an important source of Jiang’s infl uence.

Of the other 39 military members of the 16th Central Committee, 

Xinhua has published biographical information on 15 of them 

(the other 24 were neither members nor alternate members of the 

15th Central Committee). Almost all of these 15 people were born 

in the early 1940s, suggesting that this will be their last term on 

the Central Committee. One, Air Force Chief of Staff Xu Qiliang, 

was born in 1950 and thus is likely to serve another term. All are 

lieutenant generals, except for Wen Zongren, who is a brigadier 

general. Like the provincial offi cials, these are people who spent 

long years working their way up through the ranks. Only 1 of these 

15 is identifi ed as having a college education, and only 1 is identifi ed 

has having only a junior high school education. The others received 

specialized training (dazhuan), though all have gone through one 

or more military academies. All received their highest promotions 

in the mid-1990s, and so they were picked for promotion by Jiang 

Zemin.

Conclusion.

We often think of China as being governed by an increasingly 

well-educated and technocratic elite. Such generalizations may be 

true of the higher reaches of the political system (e.g., six of the 

nine members of the PBSC graduated from Qinghua University) 

and (partially) of the State Council system, but as a characterization 

of the overall political system it seems exaggerated. Indeed, as the 

examination above suggests, much of the current Central Committee 
93

is not that well-educated. Many had their educations interrupted 

by the Cultural Revolution, others attended undistinguished 

universities, and many others substituted professional education (in 

the military), correspondence school, or the Central Party School for 

a real 4-year education. This does not mean that they are not welltrained at what they do, but they are not, by and large, a meritocracy. 

Those people who received technical educations rarely used them, 

switching quickly to political tracks. Some pursued careers in the 

Communist Youth League, others in the Organization bureaus at 

different levels, others in the propaganda sector, and many (of the 

provincial cadres) as regional administrators. There are few examples 

of economic or other administrative specialists who have risen to the 

top ranks of China’s political system by plying their trades.

Most of the provincial political elites spent roughly 2 decades at 

lower administrative levels, some working in factories, others rising 

in county and the prefectural hierarchies. These are people who know 

local-level power, and appear to have been promoted because of 

their understanding of local power (and, no doubt, connections with 

higher levels). In short, they are more politicos than technocrats.

This fi nding should not be surprising. Jiang Zemin had a decade 

to promote those he felt were loyal to him and administratively 

competent. At local levels, those who have succeeded are adept 

at dealing with social and political diffi culties―and at cultivating 

relations. In the military one sees a combination of long service at 

lower levels, professional military education, and―at the highest 

levels―political loyalty to Jiang.

This fi nding should caution us against expecting rapid political 

change in China. Jiang had 10 years to build his network, and the 

16th Party Congress only represented the beginning of a process 

of generational succession. Although Hu Jintao has succeeded to 

political power, the process of political transition is by no means 

over. This hybrid political system is likely to surprise us over the 

coming years, either moving quickly or suffering from immobilism, 

depending on the situation. Those people who made their way to 

the top at the 16th Party Congress are no doubt willing to tackle 

problems of economic development and perhaps address some 

popular complaints. But overall, this looks like a fairly conservative 

group of people in political terms. 
94

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Joseph Fewsmith, The 16th National Party Congress: The Succession that 

Didn’t Happen,” The China Quarterly, No. 173, March 2003, pp. 1-16.

2. Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese 

Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August 2003, 

pp. 553-597.

3. Data in this chapter is drawn primarily from the Xinhua News Service 

biographies of Chinese leaders posted both on the www.xinhuanet.com and the 

People’s Daily website at www.people.com. I have also consulted the biographies on 

www.chinavitae.com. For the military leadership, Ling Haijian, Zhonggong jundui 

xin jiangxing (New stars in the CCP military), Hong Kong: Pacifi c Century Press, 

1999, has been useful. For biographies of full and alternate members of the 15th 

Central Committee, see Zhonggong di shiwu jie zhongyang weiyuanhui, zhongyang jilu 

jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu (Names of members of the 15th Central Committee 

and Discipline Inspection Committee).

4. Cheng Li, “A Landslide Victory for Provincial Leaders,” China Leadership 

Monitor, Vol. 5, Winter 2003, available at www.Chinaleadershipmonitor.com.

5. Bai Keming, Cao Bochun, Huang Zhendong, Liu Qi, Song Fatang, Wang 

Yunkun, Wen Shizhen, and Zhang Xuezhong.

6. Li Keqiang attended Beijing University; Li Yuanchao attended Fudan 

University and later received an MA degree in economic management from 

Beijing University; and Zhao Leji attended Beijing University, where he studied 

philosophy.

7. Song Defu, Su Rong, Yu Zhengsheng, and Wang Lequan.

8. Hong Hu, Huang Zhiquan, Ji Yunshi, Liu Zhenhua, Shi Xiushi, and Zhang 

Zuoji. 

9. Dai Xianglong graduated in 1967; Liang Baohua, Lu Bing, Ma Qizhi, 

Wang Hongju, Wang Jinshan, Wang Xiaofeng, and Wang Qishan, who studied 

at Northwest University 1973-1976, but is credited with having studied economic 

management at Qinghua University and fi nance at China Institute of Finance, 

albeit on a part-time basis.

10. Huang Huahua, Li Chengyu, Lu Zhangong, Luo Qingquan, Zhang 

Zhongwei, and Zhou Bohua.
95

CHAPTER 5

PREMIER WEN AND VICE PRESIDENT ZENG:

THE “TWO CENTERS” OF CHINA’S FOURTH GENERATION

John Tkacik

Those who thought China’s politics would fi nally settle down 

into something more recognizable to Westerners with the putative 

ascendance of the a pro-reformist “Fourth Generation” of leaders in 

November 2002 must be disappointed. As China moves into the 21st 

century, Chinese politics continue to be bedeviled by the traditional 

“Struggle Between Two Lines.” In the past, the two lines were 

Maoists and Rightists, or the Cultural Revolution Group and the Old 

Party, or the Gang of Four and everyone else. Now, the struggle is 

between the reformist line and the Communist Party apparatchiks’ 

line. Beijing’s leadership factions are centered on China’s outgoing 

and incoming general secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party, 

Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. 

Historically, communist China could not be governed effectively 

unless the paramount leader has full control of the Army. And 

historically, the Army has made itself subservient to the dictates 

of the Party. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now 

split between two rival, though not necessarily hostile, leadership 

factions. And both camps see the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) as the strategic pivot of their political competition. 

No sooner had the new general secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao, 

been named on November 15, than Jiang Zemin, the outgoing 

general secretary, had himself renamed to a fourth term as chairman 

of China’s all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). Jiang’s 

insistence that he remain as military commander while nominally 

relinquishing his political authority to the nine-member Standing 

Committee of Hu’s Politburo was a blunt political maneuver 

designed to buttress the Old Man’s tight but indirect grip on the 

Politburo with a tight and direct grip on the military. 

In the Politburo, fi ve, perhaps six, of the nine Standing 

Committeemen are Jiang’s hand-picked cronies. In fact, in China’s 

supreme governing body, the Politburo Standing Committee (SC), 
96

incoming Party chief Hu Jintao (the top ranked member of the 

SC) can only count on Premier Wen Jiabao, the SC’s third-ranking 

member, for consistent support. By contrast, in the previous 

Politburo, perhaps only one of Jiang’s colleagues on the seven-man 

standing committee could be counted on to vote solidly with Jiang. 

In short, the retired Jiang is much more infl uential in the current 

16th Party Congress Politburo than he ever was in the 15th Congress 

leadership. 

Can President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao break Jiang’s 

grip on power? Do they have what it takes to maneuver Jiang out 

of the Central Military Commission? Have they already tried? Are 

they succeeding? As one wag puts it, “Hu and Wen are the main 

questions of China’s politics.”1

INTRODUCTION: CHINA’S “TWO CENTERS”

At the close of the CCP’s 16th Party Congress in November 

2002, the Party/Government leadership center of power (now with 

“Comrade Hu Jintao as its General Secretary”) was left without 

control of the military for the fi rst time since Mao Zedong wrested 

power from the Party Center in 1930. Aligned against President Hu 

and Premier Wen are Jiang’s people in the Party/Government and 

Jiang himself as military commander-in-chief in the CMC.

The fi ve major fi gures of the SC Jiang camp include Wu Bangguo, 

the new chair of the National People’s Congress (NPC) (and secondranking to Hu in the party hierarchy) who was Jiang’s vice mayor 

in Shanghai during the 1980s and Jiang elevated him to Party 

chief/mayor in 1991. Fourth-ranked Politburo member, Jia Qinglin 

who chairs China’s “second legislature,” the powerless Chinese 

People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), is another Jiang 

loyalist. In 1995, Jia was chosen by Jiang to replace Beijing’s corrupt 

but powerful mayor Chen Xitong, but Jia has his own unsavory 

reputation.2

Zeng Qinghong, the fi fth ranking member of the SC and successor 

in Hu Jintao’s ceremonial position as vice president, had also been 

with Jiang continually since the 1980s and remains Jiang’s most 

trusted confi dant. Huang Ju, Jiang’s hand-picked successor to Wu 
97

Bangguo as Shanghai party boss, was as colorless and unimaginative 

an apparatchik as Shanghai had seen in decades.3 And the former 

Guangdong Party chief, Li Changchun, was Jiang’s choice to be 

premier rather than Wen Jiabao―a decision that not even Jiang 

could push through, given Li’s own shady reputation.4 The two 

others in the SC are Central Discipline Inspection Commission chair, 

Wu Guanzheng―also thought by some to be a Jiang protégé5―and 

Luo Gan, a co-factionalist of outgoing NPC Chairman and former 

Premier Li Peng, have less loyalty to Jiang, but are hardly stalwart 

supporters of the Hu/Wen reformist line. By all accounts, Luo was 

not chosen to help Hu and Wen balance Jiang Zemin’s infl uence 

on the SC, but rather to look after former Premier (and orthodox 

hardliner) Li Peng’s affairs. 

In this context, when the smoke-fi lled rooms of the 16th Party 

Congress had cleared, Jiang Zemin was in a far more powerful 

position than he was before his retirement from the Party and State 

chairmanships.6 Most of his traditional rivals and opponents in the 

top leadership (Li Ruihuan, Qiao Shi, and even the long-suffering 

Zhu Rongji, to name a few) were gone.7

In short, Jiang Zemin has not even pretended to transfer power 

to the rising and young(ish) “Fourth Generation.” Instead, he 

plans to rule through them. But just in case his protégés prove 

not to be as loyal as he might want, Jiang decided to retain his 

control of the PLA by keeping his CMC chairmanship. This was a 

certain disappointment to Hu Jintao and about-to-be Premier Wen 

Jiabao who had reportedly plotted through the summer of 2002 to 

maneuver Jiang into retirement.8 But both of those gentlemen are 

well-tempered in the twilight struggle of Beijing’s internecine power 

plays, and both are by all accounts superbly intelligent, so they must 

know their limits. 

Their stratagem in a subtle campaign to pry Jiang’s fi ngers from 

the reins of power is to to play along for the time being. Immediately 

upon being named CCP Party head on November 15, 2002, Hu Jintao 

pledged fealty to Jiang’s “Three Represents” theory and quickly 

assured the elder leader that in all “important matters” he would 

see to it that the Politburo sought Jiang’s guidance and leadership 

before a decision is reached.9 Of course, this raised the embarrassing 
98

possibility that Hu might not take power at all, but rather cede it by 

default to Jiang and his cohorts. 

Then came the fi rst clear evidence of “Two Centers.” On Saturday, 

November 17, 2002, the military’s propaganda organ, the People’s 

Liberation Army Daily (PLAD), proudly declared the loyalty of 

the “broad mass of the offi cers and ranks of the entire army” to 

the new Party Center and to the CMC with “Comrade Jiang Zemin 

as core of the collective leadership of the Third Generation.” “We 

absolutely and unwaveringly adhere to the principle of the Party 

controlling the Army, and will resolutely obey the commands of the 

Party Center and Chairman Jiang Zemin.”10 “Chairman Jiang” was 

mentioned six times in the editorial, and only once was Hu Jintao 

mentioned by name―and then only in the context of “the Party 

Center with comrade Hu Jintao as its secretary general” which will 

unswervingly hold high the banner of the “important theory of the 

Three Represents.” (The “Three Represents,” of course, are Jiang’s 

signature contribution to the ideology of Chinese communism.) By 

Monday, November 18, two Taiwan newspapers reported on the 

anomalous split loyalty.11

Fast forward to March 2003 and the eve of the NPC which―some 

observers devoutly but vainly prayed―might see CMC Chairman 

Jiang fi nally relinquish leadership of the military and turn over this 

fi nal, essential rein of power to the younger, fresher, more reformist 

Hu Jintao. But it was not to be. The NPC merely reaffi rmed Jiang as 

the chairman of the state CMC, a protocolary nicety for the already 

incumbent Party CMC chair.

What was odd, however, was the appearance in print―in the 

PLAD, no less―of a number of comments and quotable quotes from 

upper ranking PLA offi cers in the Army’s NPC delegation. 

After listening to a speech given by Jiang Zemin (reported by the 

March 4 PLAD), generals Gu Huisheng and Ai Husheng serving as 

PLA deputies to the NPC, complained that “many centers means 

no center, which will lead to no achievement.” They then explained 

the metaphysical truth behind the Chinese characters for “center” 

(zhong), “loyalty” (zhong), and “disaster” (huan). “One ‘zhong’ 

(center) and one ‘xin’ (heart) together make one loyalty, but piecing 

two ‘zhongs’ together to one ‘xin’ gives one ‘huan’, a disaster.” 

They explained that “having ‘two centers’ means no center at all.”12
99

These were not just your average PLA malcontents speaking, either. 

Major-General Gu was deputy chief of the Nanjing Military Region 

(MR) political department and General Ai ran the PLA’s Information 

Technology Warfare Unit, although he is “far better remembered 

as the colonel who led the fi rst regiment to occupy Tiananmen 

Square on June 4, 1989, and got rid of demonstrating students with 

bloodshed.”13

What makes this “struggle between two lines” different from 

those of the past, is that the PLA doesn’t seem to have the same 

reverence for their chairman, Jiang Zemin, that they had for his 

predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. As of September 

2003, as a clear dividing line emerged between the inchoate Hu 

Jintao faction and the fi rmly-established “Shanghai Faction” (or the 

“Shanghai Gang” as the Hong Kong press irreverently calls them) 

under “Chairman Jiang,” there are signs that the military leadership 

may actually prefer Hu Jintao’s competent leadership to Jiang’s. 

How Hu and Jiang manage their relationship with the PLA will 

depend greatly on the talents of their top political allies: Premier 

Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Zeng Qinghong.

WEN AND ZENG: FACTION LEADERS

This chapter contrasts these two secondary fi gures at the top of 

the two Beijing leadership factions now vying for preeminence in 

China’s political structure. Wen Jiabao is the urbane, intellectual, 

“reformist” and self-effacing premier of China who has been at the 

center of power in Beijing for nearly 15 years. Zeng Qinghong is 

the ambitious, canny, determined capo de capo of Jiang’s Shanghai 

Gang who is China’s titular vice president. Premier Wen has quietly 

built up a base of support among Beijing’s party and government 

bureaucracy over a decade-and-a-half of competent management in 

the CCP Politburo Secretariat. Vice President Zeng’s infl uence, on 

the other hand, has come with a decade of service as Chairman Jiang 

Zemin’s chief of staff in both the Party and the Army. 

Wen’s ties with the bureaucracy are bolstered by a reputation for 

scholarly and serious analysis of issues, proven leadership in crises 

and genuine consideration of all sides of a policy debate. Zeng’s ties 
100

with the party and military come from a career of recommending 

suitable promotions and appointments for Jiang loyalists during a 

period when Jiang’s leadership suffered from sniping and harassment 

from other Politburo heavyweights. But more importantly, Zeng’s 

ties with the military are the rightful legacy of a man to the revolution 

born. His father, Zeng Shan, headed the CCP’s main base area before 

the legendary “Long March,” his mother was one of only 27 female 

cadres to survive the March, two of his brothers are generals, and 

his sister, Major General Zeng Haisheng, is apparently the highestranking woman in the PLA. 

Both Premier Wen and Vice President Zeng are technocrats of a 

sort. The premier is a published geologist with the equivalent of a 

doctorate, while the vice president graduated from an aeronautical 

college with a degree in automated systems and served as a rocket 

engineer with the military in the 1960s. But they are completely 

different creatures in every other way.

Given these contrasting fi gures holding rival positions in the 

Chinese leadership, what are the implications for China’s economic 

future if either gains ascendancy―or if both manage to coexist in 

separate leadership spheres for an extended period?

Wen Jiabao: The Early Years.

As Chinese politicians go, Wen Jiabao is an attractive fi gure. He is 

fi t and trim, with a well-chiseled face; he is from humble origins, and 

by all accounts he is personable and engaging. He is also an avowed 

reformist with a feeling of dedication for China’s common people, 

a policy trait that is far less obvious in Zeng Qinghong, or indeed 

anyone in the “Shanghai” camp. Premier Wen’s policy focus since 

his promotion to vice premier in 1998 has been China’s fi nancial 

crisis―perhaps the single biggest challenge facing China’s economic 

planners in the early 21st century. But when he appeared at the 

Great Hall of the People on March 18, 2003, for his inaugural press 

conference with foreign reporters, he promised to narrow China’s 

widening income gap and make rural and urban development a 

“priority of priorities.”14 A look at Wen’s background may help to 

illuminate his policy predilections. 
101

Wen Jiabao was born in the outskirts of Japanese-occupied 

Tianjin in September 1942 to a rural school teachers’ family. His 

father, Wen Gang, was a geology instructor at a Tianjin middle 

school and his mother, Yang Xiulan, taught grammar at a Tianjin 

elementary school. Young Jiabao’s grandfather, Wen Yingshi, ran a 

rural schoolhouse at the Wen family home at No. 8 Wenjia Hutong, 

in the village of Yixingfu just north of the city. Jiabao thrived in a 

simple brick and adobe compound, taught by his grandfather during 

the days and by his parents in the evenings. Though impoverished, 

young Jiabao absorbed an appreciation for Chinese calligraphy and 

painting that has lasted his lifetime. 

Another thing that served him well in later life was his 

grandfather’s passion for Tang Dynasty poetry. Young Jiabao was 

said to have memorized half of the ancient classic 300 Tang Poems, 

roughly the equivalent of memorizing three Shakespeare plays.15 In 

addition to his innate intelligence, Jiabao’s excellent memory made 

him a star pupil. His interest in geology came at his father’s knee. 

In addition to gaining a deep appreciation for literature and science 

early in life, Wen also got his fi rst taste of war and the value of 

family. Certainly, one of the most traumatic experiences of his early 

childhood was the sacking of his village, the torching of the family 

compound and school, and the murder of his grandfather at the 

end of 1948 during the civil war.16 In January 1949, the Tianjin area 

was occupied by the PLA’s Fourth Field Army, and fi nally Jiabao’s 

granduncle, Wen Pengjiu, an aide to Zhou Enlai, turned up to help 

the family of his dead brother along the road to recovery.

Premier Wen hasn’t been shy about describing his early childhood 

to American audiences. He told an audience at Harvard University:

As you probably know, I’m the son of a schoolteacher. I spent my 

childhood mostly in the smoke and fi re of war. I was not as fortunate 

as you as a child. When Japanese aggressors drove all the people in my 

place to the Central Plaza, I had to huddle closely against my mother. 

Later on, my whole family and house were all burned up, and even the 

primary school that my grandpa built himself all went up in fl ames. In 

my work life, most of the time I worked in areas under the most harsh 

conditions in China. Therefore I know my country and my people quite 

well, and I love them so deeply.17
102

To an audience in Washington, DC, Wen confi ded:

My childhood was spent in hardships of war. Even today, I still could 

remember that. Because even a child had to face the bayonets of fascist 

aggressors, and he huddled against his mother. And I still remember how 

it felt, and I personally experienced that. And my family’s and my house 

was all burned up in the war, and even the school, the modest school 

that my grandfather built with his own hands, was all destroyed.18

With his family tutelage in literature and science, and a wartime 

child’s determination to survive, Jiabao was a precocious student. 

In 1954 he was admitted into Tianjin’s prestigious Nankai middle 

school, the alma mater of China’s revered Premier Zhou Enlai. Middle 

school must have been a glorious time for the youth. His teachers 

remember him fondly―but Wen is now Premier, so that is to be 

expected. Still, Wen has made three unannounced private trips back 

to the Nankai campus since 1990, where he called on his old teachers 

and gave encouraging talks to the startled youngsters who hadn’t 

been notifi ed of the old boy’s appearance. The dean of Nankai’s 

junior class in 1959 claims to have a clear memory of young Jinbao’s 

“focus, discipline, and fi rm-study habits,” but she also recalled Wen 

as being introverted and “frustrated if he wasn’t quickly able to ‘eat 

up’ what he read.”19

Upon graduating from Nankai and getting top marks in the 

national university exams, Wen was guaranteed acceptance to any 

of China’s most impressive schools, and certainly nearby Beijing or 

Tsinghua universities must have been attractive. But Wen chose his 

father’s profession and took a place at Beijing Institute of Geology, 

the country’s top geology school, which boasted a teaching staff with 

American and European (rather than Soviet) training. Again, Wen 

performed superbly, and on the eve of his May 1965 graduation, 

the institute’s party organization approved Wen’s membership 

in the Chinese Communist Party. Immediately, he was accepted 

as a research student in the institute’s graduate program to study 

“sectoral” geology, with a concentration on mining. The graduate 

program exposed him to scholarly journals from a broad range of 

foreign countries―mostly in English, a language in which he is said 

to have a fairly advanced reading facility.
103

An unhappy drawback of the Beijing Geology Institute was its 

centrality in the bloody Red Guard rivalries in Beijing during the 

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) which exploded on 

the scene in May 1966. As a “red and expert” student, Wen penned 

a big character poster urging the school’s party committee to “shake 

up a revolution” (nao geming) and attacking the school’s “bourgeois 

educational mindset.” But it didn’t insulate Wen from being attacked 

by his fellow students for his dubious class background. Wasn’t his 

grandfather a petit bourgeoise, after all? Perhaps so, but fortunately 

his grandfather’s elder brother, Pengjiu, had also been a roomate of 

Premier Zhou Enlai’s top aide [later foreign minister] Qiao Guanhua 

and was a senior Tianjin cadre in his own right.20 Pengjiu’s infl uence 

was not enough to save Wen’s parents from doing an obligatory 

year in the countryside for their pre-revolutionary sins of capitalism, 

but Jiabao himself suffered little. Little, that is, until 1968, the 

year of the cataclysmic July 27 Red Guard battles in Beijing, when 

screaming fanatics from the Geology Institute’s “Earth Faction” and 

the Aeronautical University’s “Heaven Faction” (all joined by cofactionalists from Tsinghua University) butchered and maimed each 

other in fi ghting that lasted the entire day. The “7-27 Incident” was 

the breaking point for Mao Zedong who fi nally ordered the PLA to 

clean out the city of students and ship them all off to the countryside 

to cool off―forever, as far as he was concerned.21 But Wen missed the 

July violence because he was already off in the western deserts.

In the Gansu Wilderness.

Up to the previous February, Wen Jiabao remained at the 

Institute, unable to continue his studies but already fi nished with 

the equivalent of a doctoral program. That month he received 

his orders to serve as a “technician” with the Gansu Provincial 

Geodynamics Unit in Jiuquan―a Gobi Desert town near “Jade Gate” 

at the distant extremity of the Great Wall of China. Shivering in the 

late winter winds on the platform at Beijing Station, he didn’t realize 

how fortunate he would be to miss the upcoming violent climax 

of political radicalism at his alma mater. As his granduncle, Wen 

Pengjiu, saw him off at the train station, the words of a Tang poem 

beclouded him: “The Spring Breezes never reach Jade Gate Pass.” 
104

Winds came with a vengeance during one of his fi rst fi eld studies 

that summer. In the wastes of Gansu, he and three fellow cadres were 

caught in a black-night rainstorm which collapsed their tents three 

times before it was over. The rains fl ooded their camp, and Wen is 

credited with saving the lives of his colleagues that night. Wen later 

came to be an expert in fl ash fl ooding, something that came in handy 

later in his life when he was put in charge of relief work for the oncein-a-century Yangtze basin deluge of 1998. 

One account says that young Wen hadn’t been in Gansu long 

before “factional struggles” sent him to a farm to do manual labor. 

Nearly two decades later, after Wen had been named deputy 

director of the Central Offi ce, “some people in Jiuquan sent a letter 

to Beijing accusing Wen of being in the “vanguard of the ‘Criticize 

Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius’ movement” in the town, and said that 

he was a “ardent critic of Deng Xiaoping,” and had “destroyed old 

cadres.” In an attempt to get to the bottom of the matter, the Central 

Organization Department sent inspectors to Jiuquan four separate 

times, and in the end gave Wen a thumbs-up.22

After a decade working as a fi eld geologist in outback Gansu, Wen 

amassed an encyclopedic knowledge of the province’s geoforms and 

used his superior analytical and literary skills to produce volumes of 

valuable and unprecedented scientifi c reporting for the Ministry of 

Geology in Beijing.

“Spring Breezes” eventually came to “Jade Gate Pass” when 

Jiabao met a young female gemologist from the 1966 class of the 

Lanzhou University geology department, Zhang Peili.23 In Beijing, 

Wen had been seeing one young woman, but she was assigned away 

from Beijing after graduation. Wen is also said to have had three coeds eyeing him while he was in Jiuquan, but Zhang Peili “took the 

most initiative,” often volunteering to do his laundry and “snagging 

his heart.”24 Zhang is considered an extrovert, nicely balancing 

Wen’s natural reticence. 

Two children (a son, Wen Yunsong, and a daughter, Wen Ruchun) 

eventually came to the couple―both of whom reportedly studied 

in the United States.25 And eventually a promotion came to Wen 

as well. In 1978, after a decade of mapping geologic outcroppings 

and tapping at rocks and crystals in the Gansu desert, Wen was 

appointed as “Member of the SC of the Party Committee of the 
105

Geomechanics Survey Team under the Gansu Provincial Geological 

Bureau and Deputy Team Chief.” His service as part of the Team’s 

party committee must have convinced higher-ups in Lanzhou 

that Wen Jiabao had what it took to be a management-level cadre, 

because in 1979 he was promoted to be a deputy section head in the 

Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau and given the academic title of 

“engineer.” In 1981 he was promoted yet again as deputy executive 

director of the provincial geology bureau.

It was also fortunate for Wen’s career that the Communist 

Party Chief in Gansu Province happened to be Song Ping, a former 

secretary to Zhou Enlai. In August of 1980, Song mulled a new 

directive from Beijing ordering the retirement of overage cadres 

and their replacement with signifi cantly younger ones. A seasoned 

veteran of Beijing’s intrigues, Song also knew that the Beijing was 

going to need a new generation of cadres to fi ll slots in the central 

party and government bureaucracy that had been decimated in the 

Cultural Revolution. He began to look around his Gansu domain for 

likely candidates. His fi rst choice was an obvious one―one young 

Hu Jintao who was a graduate of Tsinghua University (Song’s alma 

mater of sorts) and a protégé of Song’s wife, Chen Shunyao, who 

had been the University’s deputy Party chief in the early 1960s when 

Hu’s application for Communist Party membership was approved. 

There is no doubt that Mrs. Song knew and liked young Jintao.26

But Song’s other choice for promotion to Beijing was Wen 

Jiabao, although Song apparently did not know Wen personally. 

Rather, visiting Beijing Minister of Geology Sun Daguang made 

the recommendation to Party Chief Song Ping after a particularly 

successful visit to Gansu in early spring of 1982. Minister Sun had 

been impressed by the quality of reporting from Gansu and went 

out to see the province himself. He was also in the process of hacking 

away the ministry’s deadwood and was on the lookout for new 

talent. A few days with Wen Jiabao convinced him that he had found 

a good prospect. “Wen Jiabao, that’s the man I want, bring him to 

Beijing, he has the makings of a minister,” is how Sun approached 

Song Ping with the idea.27 Song then canvassed the provincial 

geology bureau with a questionnaire―“who would be best suited 

for a job in Beijing?” and the answer was pretty unanimous―“Wen 

Jiabao.”
106

According to the Yang Zhongmei biography, Song then did his 

own background check. Satisfi ed that Wen had the right stuff, he 

gave Wen’s transfer his personal seal of approval.28 And by October 

1982, just as the 12th Party Congress was ending, Wen arrived in 

Beijing to take up his post as director of mining policy and a member 

of the geology ministry’s party committee.

Wen Jiabao in Beijing. 

The scholarly and thoughtful Wen Jiabao continued to impress 

his colleagues and after a certain probation period, Minister Sun 

Daguang promoted him to vice-minister of Geology and Mineral 

Resources, deputy secretary of its “Leading Party Members 

Group,” and director of the ministry’s political department where 

Wen served for two years overseeing the ministry’s planning and 

fi nancial policies.

By this time, Song Ping had been transferred to the Party Center 

in Beijing where he took over the all-powerful State Planning 

Commission. When Wen’s boss, geology minister Sun Daguang, 

heard through the grapevine that the Party’s general secretary, 

Hu Yaobang, was looking for a bright young candidate to be 

deputy director of the CPC Central Committee’s General Offi ce, 

he immediately called Song Ping and suggested they push to get 

Vice Minister Wen into the job. Other candidates for the slot were a 

deputy party secretary in Shanghai, Wu Bangguo, and State Council 

Secretary General Wang Zhongyu. And in October 1985, after all the 

dossiers were reviewed, Wen Jiabao got the job.

It was the fi rst completely nontechnical job Wen had ever had. 

Again, Wen apparently fi t right in with Party General Secretary Hu 

Yaobang’s frenetic, avuncular, and free-wheeling style on the party 

side and Premier Zhao Ziyang’s worried, methodical, and theoretical 

reformism on the government side. In 1987, after Hu Yaobang’s fall 

from grace and Zhao’s appointment as Party Chief, Wen was put 

on Zhao’s “Political Structural Reform Small Group” and also had a 

hand in economic reform policies. Zhao also placed Wen as deputy 

director of the preparatory commission for the 13th Party Congress 

in October, and Wen is said to have ensured that Zhao’s policies 

survived the debates of that seminal meeting.
107

Zhao also rewarded Wen Jiabao with a seat on the Communist 

Party’s Central Committee and was made the only alternate member 

of the infl uential party center’s Secretariat. It is notable that at this 

time, although Hu Jintao was the Party’s youngest provincial leader, 

Wen Jiabao ranked well ahead of Hu in the party structure―and 

was a scant three months older. But China was going through a 

rough adjustment to Deng Xiaoping’s capitalistic reforms. Not only 

was infl ation nearing 40 percent at one point in 1987, but political 

relaxations had released an extravagance of new thinking among 

intellectuals. There was a clamor to re-impose the discipline of 

central planning structures to stabilize commodity pricing and a 

howl for “spiritual civilization” to counteract political forces that 

undermined the Party’s legitimacy. 

Tiananmen Boils Over.

This reactionary countercurrent was resisted by China’s young 

intelligentsia, and their frustrations erupted in mass demonstrations 

on April 17 when their patron saint, Hu Yaobang, died unexpectedly. 

The demonstrations grew and expanded and accreted all manner 

of sympathizers―students, laborers, government bureaucrats, 

even police. Housewives, shopkeepers, private entrepreneurs, taxi 

drivers, all joined in. The demonstrations moved early on to Central 

Beijing’s 98-acre Tiananmen Square and there they stayed, day and 

night, drawing masses of over a million to tell the central authorities 

they were fed up. 

By the evening of May 19, 1989, Wen Jiabao had become known 

in Party circles as General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s man in the 

Secretariat and the Central Offi ce. So it was unsurprising that 

Wen accompanied Secretary Zhao in the persistent drizzle that 

night to Tiananmen Square for a call on hunger-strikers. As Wen 

somberly held an umbrella over Zhao’s head, Zhao choked out 

a rambling apology that the students did not quite understand. 

That day, unbeknownst to the demonstrators in the Square, the 

Party Center had approved the use of force in the Square. As Zhao 

spoke, hundreds of thousands of PLA troops were mobilizing for 

deployment to Beijing.
108

On May 23, Deng Xiaoping summoned Shanghai’s party 

secretary Jiang Zemin to Beijing to inform him that he was to replace 

Zhao Ziyang as the CCP’s general secretary. Deng then ordered Jiang 

to return to Shanghai and detain NPC Chairman, Wan Li, on his 

emergency return to China from the United States. Jiang was gentle 

in his detention, placing Wan in a local hospital to help him recover 

from the stresses of the demands of the Tiananmen demonstrations. 

Of course, some believed that Wan would have mobilized the NPC 

to support Zhao Ziyang had he been able to return to Beijing, but 

fortunately, his plane was scheduled to arrive in Shanghai fi rst.29

Wen’s survival of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre is a case study 

in communist party ethics. Shortly after the June 4 disaster, Wen 

remained prominent in the media, while Zhao Ziyang became a 

nonperson. A bit tardily, on June 8, Wen wrote on behalf of the “Labor 

Committee of Central Government Agencies” to congratulate the 

Party Center for crushing the Tiananmen “turmoil” and returning 

the country to stability, and signed as the committee chief.30 On June 

12, Wen accompanied CCP Central SC Member Qiao Shi to call on 

the martial law troops and a number of People’s Armed Police (PAP) 

units which had participated in the Tiananmen operation, followed 

by a visit to wounded soldiers being cared for in Beijing’s hospitals. 

On June 19, he accompanied Premier Li Peng on calls to family 

members of PLA and PAP soldiers killed in the action.31

Despite Wen’s outward expression of support for the 

Tiananmen action, there were those in the leadership who wanted 

a thoroughgoing housecleaning of all Zhao Ziyang factionalists. Li 

Xiannian and Wang Zhen, among others, called for Wen’s removal 

explicitly, and Li Peng and the Executive Vice Premier Yao Yilin 

seconded the motion. The Hong Kong press was rife with rumors 

that the head of the young, intelligent, attractive reformist of the 

Zhao camp was on the chopping block.

I remember asking knowledgeable party cadres in Guangzhou 

about Wen Jiabao in September 1989, with the thought that if Wen 

went, reformism in China was dead. But I was universally assured 

that Wen would not only endure, he would prevail.32 I did not 

know that party leaders in Beijing had already decided to keep Wen 

Jiabao on the job. Wen’s guardian was retired Geology Minister 
109

Sun Daguang who sent a note to the Party Center declaring that he 

had nominated Wen for the Central Offi ce director’s job only after 

a rigorous review of his political background. He was certain that 

Wen was sound. Sun, a reliable “old revolutionary” sent his report 

to Party elders Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo, both of whom had also dealt 

with Wen. They, too, seconded Sun’s testament. 

Perhaps Wen’s most important post-Tiananmen support came 

from Song Ping who had just been named as one of the six top 

Party leaders in the Politburo SC. Although Song had not directly 

recommended Wen for any positions, he had signed off on all of 

them, and even he agreed that Wen Jiabao’s credentials as a reliable 

communist were impeccable. By accompanying Party General 

Secretary Zhao Ziyang to Tiananmen Square on the night of May 

19 and holding his umbrella in the drizzle, Wen was only doing his 

job. It demonstrated “loyalty to the organization,” he said, not to the 

man.33 Wen has since put the Tiananmen issue behind him, at least 

in public.34

Wen remained in the central offi ce, but had to deal with a new 

reality. Incoming Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had arrived 

in Beijing with only one assistant, Zeng Qinghong from Shanghai. 

All Jiang asked was that Zeng be placed in the CCP’s Central Offi ce 

as a deputy to Wen Jiabao. Whether this refl ected Jiang’s or Zeng’s 

appreciation of the importance of the CCP Central Offi ce in shaping 

political agendas is unknown, but it is clear that from the beginning, 

Wen expected Zeng to replace him as the policy traffi c-cop in the 

CCP’s Central Committee. Wen apparently got along splendidly 

with newcomer Zeng.35

Reform, PLA Infi ghting and the 14th Party Congress.

In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping was frustrated by the lack of 

progress on economic reforms at the hands of Premier Li Peng and 

the central planners of the CCP’s orthodox wing. Time was running 

out for Deng. He was becoming ever more frail, and the 14th Party 

Congress to be held that October would be his last chance to leave 

his imprint on Marxist thought. Forging a coalition that would pay 

obeisance to reforms and establish “Deng Theory” in the canon of 
110

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics became a desperate priority 

for him. He launched the so-called “Southern Progress” (Nanxun) 

in Guangdong to popularize his new ideology―“whatever benefi ts 

increasing the comprehensive strength (zonghe liliang) of the socialist 

state, whatever benefi ts the improvement of the people’s standard 

of living, that is socialism.” He urged the Party to reject its obsession 

with “rightist” tendencies, and instead focus on the “important 

thing, to oppose ‘leftism’.”36

Jiang’s aide Zeng Qinghong was instrumental in getting Jiang 

to buy on to this vision, and Wen Jiabao aided Zeng in this effort. 

With a bit of maneuvering, Zeng and Wen managed to put Jiang 

Zemin in Deng Xiaoping’s camp―in opposition to Li Peng and 

Li’s mentor, Chen Yun, who was Deng’s rival in the top ranks of 

China’s powerful but rapidly aging ranks of “Old Revolutionaries.” 

But more importantly, Deng had the unswerving loyalty of the 

PLA. Jiang’s chief rivals, President Yang Shangkun and his “halfbrother,” Yang Baibing, hoped to gain Deng’s acquiescence in their 

bid to supplant Deng as the paramount force in the military. In the 

Byzantine machinations of Beijing’s factional struggle, the “Yang 

Brothers” were on the verge of outfl anking Jiang Zemin’s titular role 

as CMC chair by offering Deng Xiaoping the PLA’s support of Deng’s 

reforms in marked contrast to Jiang’s evident lack of enthusiasm for 

ideological battles. 

Instead, Zeng (with Wen Jiabao’s help) convinced Jiang not only 

to support the reforms against the Old Revolutionaries but also to 

enlist the sympathies of Old Soldiers who implacably hated the 

“Yang Brothers” and their bald-faced attempt to consolidate their 

hold on PLA promotions. 

By September 1992, an impressive phalanx of old generals wrote 

an open letter to Deng Xiaoping and the CPC Central Committee 

hinting, in the words of one Hong Kong journal, that the “Yang 

Brothers” were “left one moment, and right the next,” and “feigning 

compliance with Deng Xiaoping.” The old generals had no beef 

with Deng, but their real targets were the Yangs.37 In the end, Deng 

determined that the “Yang Brothers” were a divisive force in the 

military and ordered that they be removed from authority in the 

PLA. With them gone, Jiang Zemin was the undisputed chief civilian 

leader in the CMC, and the way was open for him to exert his 
111

infl uence in the Army ranks by virtue of his prerogative in general 

rank promotions.

In the run-up to the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, Wen 

worked closely with Zeng, as well as with Song Ping (in charge of 

CCP organization work) and Song’s protégé, then-Tibetan Party 

Chief Hu Jintao, to map out the blueprint for the Congress.38 The 

Party Charter (Dang Zhang) for the 14th Congress also did something 

remarkable―it elevated “Deng Xiaoping Theory” to equal status 

with “Mao Zedong Thought.”39 At the same time, Jiang Zemin read 

the Party Work Report to explain what it meant for him to be the 

“Core of the Third Generation of Leaders.”40 The term “core” had 

little meaning in the CCP glossary until it was defi ned formally in 

Jiang’s Political Report to the 14th Congress: “the central leading 

collective of the fi rst generation, with comrade Mao Zedong as the 

core . . . [and] the central leading collective of the second generation, 

with comrade Deng Xiaoping as the core. . .”

In the process, Hu Jintao managed to snag himself a prize―a 

seat on the CCP Politburo SC, leap-frogging into the top council 

of China’s leadership at the age of 49. Wen was just as happy to be 

promoted to an alternate Politburo position and retain his seat in the 

CCP Secretariat.

Truth be known, Wen was in line for a vice premiership. Jiang 

Zemin hoped to buy Wen’s loyalty by putting him in charge of the 

State Council’s agricultural policy, but the ardent lobbying of Premier 

Li Peng turned a vice premiership over to Jiang Chunyun, a Li Peng 

partisan, and the Agricultural portfolio went to new executive Vice 

Premier Zhu Rongji. Although Zhu had been Jiang’s successor as 

Shanghai Party chief, he owed little (or nothing) to Jiang. Rather, his 

ascent to the senior vice premiership was at the insistence of Deng 

Xiaoping who had been consistently impressed by Zhu’s capable 

management of Shanghai’s reforms following Jiang’s promotion to 

the top spot in Beijing.

Premier Zhu’s Idea Man on Agricultural Policy.

But Zhu seemed to appreciate Wen Jiabao’s talents as much as 

Jiang, and Zhu named Wen to be his deputy in the Party’s newly 

created “Leading Group on Agriculture.”41 In January 1993, Zeng 
112

Qinghong formally replaced Wen Jiabao as Central Offi ce director, 

and Wen was left with little else to do but assist Vice Premier Zhu 

in agricultural policy as an alternate member of the Politburo. It was 

a daunting task. At fi rst, the vice premier focused on the plight of 

the peasant, viewing rural poverty and the growing income gap 

with the urban coastal regions as a potential source of catastrophic 

instability. Throughout 1993, Wen Jiabao penned all central-level 

directives and media commentaries on rural policy. Moreover, 

agricultural issues were a back-burner case for Jiang Zemin, and 

Wen’s task rapidly became a thankless one―one for which he 

would bear the responsibility if rural development suddenly were 

to become a crisis. Jiang was becoming adept at giving hard tasks to 

cadres outside his own faction. They were, after all, expendable.

Even so, Wen Jiabao had nothing else to do, so he took it as his 

own. Over the coming months and years, Wen successfully kept 

agricultural issues on Vice Premier Zhu’s radar screen, drafting a 

fi ve-point policy directive in May 1993 calling for reductions in the 

peasants’ growing tax burdens, opening credit channels via state 

banks, and slamming local cadres who levied arbitrary and (more 

often) capricious fees on the already poverty-stricken farmers. Vice 

Premier Zhu, who by this time had taken over the most substantive 

economic portfolios from Premier Li Peng, was impressed by Wen’s 

tenacity. Zhu himself declared that “Agriculture is the foundation 

of the nation, without the farmers there is no stability.” Wen 

accompanied the vice premier on an inspection tour of rural Hunan 

in May, and was shocked to learn of the dire straits the locals had 

landed in. At Wen’s suggestion, Vice Premier Zhu ordered the locals 

in Changde district to get development capital via the state banks 

and said “here’s my telephone number, call me when you get the 

money.” Zhu wanted to know if his orders would be followed. 

With the full backing and authority of the vice premier (though 

perhaps without his constant attention), Wen Jiabao pushed ahead 

with agricultural policy development. In June 1994, Wen penned 

a major commentary in Qiu Shi (Seek Truth), the Party’s most 

prestigious theoretical journal. The Party’s policy goals in the rural 

areas included effi cient distribution of farm inputs and produce, 

stable prices for inputs but steadily increasing prices for farm 

outputs, the development of rural industries and services, expansion 
113

of market structures, and extended land use contracts. Wen called 

for increased government investment in the agricultural sector and a 

systematic reform of the pricing structures.

In March of 1995, Wen wrote another commentary for Qiu Shi 

outlining the “Seven Major Problems In Agriculture” and discussed 

their remedies in terms of creating an exchange market for land 

use rights, vastly improved rural education, relaxing rural labor 

mobility, developing the light industrial potential of the farm 

sector, strengthening political supervision at the basic levels, and 

fi nally deepening “spiritual civilization” in the countryside with an 

emphasis on “democratic rule of law.”

By the time of the CCP’s 15th Party Congress in October 1997, 

Wen Jiabao’s stock had risen so high that he was fi nally put in 

charge of the Central Committee Secretariat, and in 1998 he was 

appointed to a vice premiership―that year, he was the only new vice 

premier. For the rest of his 5-year tenure as vice premier, Wen made 

agricultural reforms the centerpiece of his accomplishments. 

Wen Jiabao and the Floods of 1998.

In April 1998, he was also made head of the emergency fl ood 

task force, and in May he was named head of the State Council’s 

“Leading Small Group on Agricultural Poverty.”42

August 1998 saw the heaviest fl oods in recent Chinese memory. 

On August 1, the Jiayi Levee in Hubei burst its banks killing and 

injuring several thousand PLA troops assigned to engineering 

work on the structure. On August 4, the Jiangzhou levee collapsed, 

making 40,000 homeless in the rains. On August 5, the Hubei 

provincial government reported that waters from the Yangtse 

river had challenged the lip of the Xingzhou Levee two or three 

times. If the Levee were breached, it would endanger the entire 

Wuhan municipal region. According to the Yang Zhongmei book, 

the summer leadership meeting at Beidaihe on August 7 placed all 

the responsibility for fl ood emergency operations and relief on Vice 

Premier Wen Jiabao (though it seems that the Center had taken its 

sweet time about even calling a meeting to address the issue).

The vice premier fi nally arrived in Xingzhou on August 9 to take 

charge of the engineering work and ordered up 4,000 troops from the 
114

15th Airborne Army and the Guangzhou MR. For the next several 

days, state television repeatedly aired footage of the vice premier 

directing rescue efforts while, in the words of the Los Angeles Times, 

“treading through muddy waters and shouting through bullhorns 

in the rain.”43 It’s hard to see what Wen actually did, however. The 

Yang Zhongmei biography essentially had Wen ordering the PLA 

engineers not to take action that might exacerbate fl ooding in other 

areas, but not doing anything at the scene that actually helped the 

situation.44 In the months following the fl ood, however, Wen turned 

his attention to avoiding the problems that magnifi ed the disasters 

of the August 1998 fl oods and promulgating relief and insurance 

policies that would aid the victims.45

Nonetheless, Wen once again snatched success from the jaws of 

a very nasty mess. Had the Xingzhou levee disintegrated and the 

fl oodwaters inundated Wuhan, vice premier Wen would probably 

have been forced to resign. As it was, he gave every appearance of 

being a cool, intelligent, take-charge leader. 

Learning the Complexities of State Finance.

As if Wen didn’t have enough to do in 1998, he was named to the 

“CCP Central Financial Work Committee” in June to help cope with 

the growing dislocations sparked by the Asian fi nancial crisis of 

1997-98. He also held the posts of secretary general Central Financial 

and Economic Leading Group and deputy head of the State Scientifi c 

and Technical Leading Group, the highest decisionmaking body 

on China’s economic and fi nancial policies. Jiang Zemin chaired 

the task force, with Zhu Rongji and Wu Bangguo as deputies, but 

Wen was the workaday chief, backed up by China’s central bank 

(People’s Bank of China or PBOC), governor Dai Xianglong as his 

deputy, and a dozen or so other members, including the governors 

of four state-owned commercial banks, i.e., the Bank of China, China 

Agricultural Development, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 

China, and China Construction Bank―all concerned with banking 

sector reform, specifi cally the management of nongovernmental 

deposits, credits, enterprise fi nancing, current account settlements, 

foreign exchange transactions, and other activities. Over the next 5 

years, China would confront a series of highly complex adjustments 
115

in its fi nancial structures, including developing institutionalized 

fi nancial oversight and supervision, resolving the nonperforming 

loan and bad asset crisis in the state-owned commercial banks, 

marketizing interest rates, and creating a competition environment 

for the fi nancial industry.

Although Vice Premier Wen Jiabao was seen as an intelligent 

and organized man, his appointment as the primary manager of 

China’s fi nancial reforms “astonished the outside world.” Wen, 

after all, had never been involved in fi nancial policies before. But 

he had a knack for pulling teams of experts together and coming 

up with effective strategies. Together with PBOC Governor Dai, 

Bank of China Governor Wang Xuebing, Industrial and Commercial 

Bank of China Governor Liu Tinghuan, China Construction Bank 

Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, China Agricultural Bank governor He 

Xianglin, and PBOC South China chief Wang Qishan, Wen formed 

a very infl uential policy team, though it is debatable how well they 

worked together. Certainly, Zhou Xiaochuan and Wang Qishan 

were―and remain―part of Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction and are 

more infl uenced by the central planning policies of their respective 

mentors than by the reformist views shared by Wen Jiabao and 

Premier Zhu Rongji.46

Nonetheless, by working painstakingly for a consensus, Wen 

was effective in moving fi nancial reforms ahead and gaining 

general acquiescence that China’s membership in the World Trade 

Organization was essential to economic growth. Wen argued that 

acceding to Western demands for access to China’s fi nancial markets 

meant that China’s banks had to be competitive before foreign banks 

were allowed entry, and that meant that fi nancial reforms had to 

come sooner rather than later.

By December 2000, Vice Premier Wen Jiabao was considered a 

lead-pipe cinch to replace Zhu Rongji as premier. He had proven his 

talents to relieve the two biggest headaches in the Chinese economy, 

agriculture and fi nance, but he had served three CCP general 

secretaries loyally and, in the end, even Jiang Zemin was said to 

have “basically accepted” Wen.47 If so, Jiang continued to play hardto-get with Wen’s promotion to the premiership. In the Spring of 

2002, several Hong Kong and Japanese media reports suggested that 

Wen Jiabao had submitted his resignation to the Politburo after a 
116

particularly fractious session of the Central Financial Work Group 

which had been wrestling with China’s accession to the World Trade 

Organization. One account said “Jiang Zemin openly censured Wen 

Jiabao for not doing his best in his work.” But other analyses from 

Hong Kong indicate that, if Jiang really had made a scene about 

Wen’s fi nancial work, it was in the context of assuring that Zeng 

Qinghong would be guaranteed to join Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in 

“fully taking over the reins of power.”48

In January 2003, after his elevation to the Politburo SC assured 

his appointment as Premier, Wen Jiabao outlined views on the 

changes in the international economic systems and his vision for 

China’s place in them. China must make better headway in dealing 

with international fi nancial risk and competition, while at the same 

time protecting fi nancial stability and security at home. He then 

listed the fi ve priorities for fi nancial policy over the coming year: 1) 

cut bank bad debt ratios; 2) implement continued fi nancial reforms 

in a “stable” manner; 3) improve and perfect fi nancial statistics data 

collection and monitoring, raise the overall standard of fi nancial 

supervision, and perfect the institutions administering the fi nancial 

sector; 4) gradually expand the opening of fi nancial markets to 

foreign banks; and, 5) raise the standard of fi nancial services.49 Rather 

than present a comprehensive reformist outlook, it was clear that the 

new premier-designate foresaw a movement toward marketization 

of China’s fi nancial sector with “all deliberate speed.”

Wen Jiabao as Premier.

Wen was fi nally named Premier at the March 2003 NPC, elected 

with the largest vote total of any candidate―2,906 or 99.4 percent 

of the ballots, with three against and 16 abstentions, comparing 

favorably to Zhu Rongji who “only” got 97.9 percent in 1997.50 But 

despite having been in the central government for over two decades, 

including 15 years at the absolute center of power, he did not bring 

into his cabinet a coterie of like-minded reformists. In fact, the 

Jiang faction surrounded him with Shanghai Gang fi gures which 

promised to rein-in any move by the new Premier―or new President 

Hu Jintao, for that matter―to exercise real power.51 A good chunk 

of the new State Council are Jiang faction appointees, and Secretary 
117

General of the State Council Hua Jianmin is a long time Jiang loyalist 

who served as Jiang’s chief confi dential secretary in Shanghai and 

came to Beijing in 1994 to work with Zeng Qinghong.52 At least two 

of Wen’s four vice premiers are direct Jiang loyalists, senior vice 

premier Huang Ju and junior vice premier in charge of agriculture 

Hui Liangyu. Zeng Peiyan reportedly has been a Jiang aide since 

1992. Meanwhile, Vice Premier Wu Yi is a protégé of outgoing vice 

premier Li Lanqing―sympathetic with Wen’s situation, but no one 

believes she will fall on her sword for the new Premier.53 Most key 

State Council ministers are also Jiang partisans.54

It is debatable, however, how much Premier Wen’s agenda differs 

from the Jiang faction’s. “Stability is the Mission that Supercedes 

All Others” was the mantra of the more conservative wing of 

the Party, and by defi nition “stability” in China means dealing 

with unemployment in the cities and poverty in the countryside. 

Premier Wen Jiabao proposes to tackle these issues by buoying 

state enterprises as long as possible through state fi nancial support, 

and addressing the heavy fi scal burdens placed on the farmers 

by rapacious local cadres, hog-tied distribution systems, securityconstrained labor mobility, and inadequate returns on farm outputs. 

He will probably also resist efforts by U.S. and other agricultural 

trading partners to open China’ farm markets to international 

competition. 

One top farm lobbyist in Washington complained in March 2003 

that “at the end of [WTO] negotiations, China was a $2 billion market. 

We expected substantial growth, but we haven’t seen that growth 

because China hasn’t done what it’s supposed to.” U.S. exports like 

cotton, grains, and vegetable oils have had particular trouble getting 

through China’s opaque quota system and into China’s domestic 

markets. On the other hand, China is now a net exporter of cotton, 

maize corn, honey, and apples, and has become a major competitor 

in international markets with U.S. producers.55 Moreover, China is 

utilizing a number of pseudo-quarantine measures to exclude other 

U.S. farm products, particularly soybeans. Given his sympathy for 

the average Chinese peasant, Premier Wen Jiabao can be expected to 

continue a policy of stubborn resistance to agricultural imports. But 

his fi rst order of new business will be to cut taxes on farmers and his 
118

second order of business will be to vastly reduce the size of the rural 

cadre bureaucracy.56

Wen pointed out that despite Premier Zhu’s attempts to cut the 

governmental bureaucracy by 50 percent, the vast proportion of 

those offi cials stayed on in local offi ces. Altogether, there were about 

45 million bureaucrats in China, with an average of 28 peasants 

feeding “imperial grain” (i.e., grain intended for the welfare of 

the empire) to each one of them. Wen explained that “in Chinese 

history, the average has surely been less than 1 offi cial per 100 

farmers in the Two Han dynasties, the ratio was one to 945; while in 

the Tang dynasty, it was 1 to 500, and even in the early stages of the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC), the ratio was about 1 to 600, but 

that slipped to 1 to 50 by 1978.” Wen is convinced that the present 

situation is untenable, an attitude that may win him great adulation 

in the countryside from everyone but the bureaucrats and offi cials 

who run things.57

One thing that Premier Wen is highly unlikely to do is acquiesce 

to Western (especially American and Japanese) pressures to revalue 

upward China’s renminbi currency.58 On technology policy and the 

development of an advanced defense industrial infrastructure, Wen 

is likely to be supportive of the PLA’s priorities. A scientist himself, 

Wen is convinced that technological transformation holds the key 

to unlocking China’s vast production potential.59 By July 2003, 

Premier Wen had also seized on the idea that internet commerce 

was a promising way to encourage better distribution networks in 

China.60

SARS: Showdown with the PLA―and Jiang.

The outbreak of a particularly virulent strain of “atypical 

pneumonia” (fei dianxing feiyan fei dianxing feiyan) in South China, perhaps as early 

as November 1, 1992, surprised nobody. South China has been the 

human race’s perennial stewpot for new strains of infl uenza. What is 

surprising is that the Chinese government treated it as a state secret 

shortly after its recrudescence. Public health authorities in Beijing 

knew that a new killer disease―soon to be dubbed “sudden acute 

respiratory syndrome,” or “SARS” by the World Health Organization 

(WHO)―was gripping Southern China as early as January 27 when, 
119

according to the Washington Post, the Guangdong provincial health 

department received a “top secret” document from Beijing which 

outlined the extent of the contagion. Unfortunately, no one in the 

Guangdong health department had the security clearances to read 

the document, so it remained unopened until the department chief 

returned from holiday some time later.61

There has been some fi nger-pointing about what Chinese 

President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao knew and when they 

knew it―Washington Post Washington Post reporter John Pomfret says “from the reporter John Pomfret says “from the 

start, Chinese sources said, the new government of President Hu 

Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, who formally took power in March, 

approved the coverup.”62 But the sequence of events leading up to 

Pomfret’s story indicates that both the President and the Premier 

already had blown the top off the cover-up, while Jiang Zemin’s 

crony, PLA general Zhang Wenkang (China’s feckless and pompous 

minister of public health,) was still spreading lies. 

There are other indications that Hu and Wen discovered the 

PLA to be Jiang’s “Achilles’ heel” in the SARS crisis. As early as 

March, SARS patients began appearing at the PLA’s 301 Hospital 

in Beijing for treatment and were then shipped over to the 302 

Hospital, infecting scores of hospital staff on the way. Minister 

Zhang Wenkang, a former vice president of the Second Military 

Medical University in Shanghai still holding the rank of major 

general, was a typical cadre of the old school―”submit meaningless 

reports of political accomplishments, report only happy things, 

don’t report worrisome things” is the way Zhang is described by 

Yang Zhongmei.63

Yang Zhongmei also reports that the ministry of health had 

coordinated their SARS research with PLA medical hospitals as 

early as February, but declined to publicize their fi ndings because of 

objections from the military. (In April, the WHO reported that about 

8 percent of SARS victims in China were in the PLA, but the fi gure 

was certainly higher.) On March 2, the PLA had already begun its 

in-depth investigation of the SARS etiology, and by March 21 had 

discovered it emanated from a “coronavirus.” But the results of this 

research was classifi ed “top secret” (ji mi) and was never shared with 

the government to help with SARS control,64 although the military 
120

health system did report up its own chain of command―directly to 

Jiang Zemin―according to the Washington Post.

65

The Chinese leadership was acutely aware that SARS was 

beginning to spread international alarm. Surely, SARS had been 

identifi ed fi rst in South China, and the Guangdong provincial medical 

authorities were providing what statistics they had (on a low-keyed 

basis) to the WHO.66 Moreover, Hong Kong and Taiwan were both 

suffering from a fearsome spread of the disease, and Singapore was 

also hard hit. Canadian and European health authorities reported 

numerous cases and some deaths. SARS was not a mystery in 

Beijing. But President Hu and Premier Wen probably only began to 

focus on the issue in late March. Yang Zhongmei reports that there 

was a directive from the Ministry of Public Health in mid-March 

directing that operations preventing SARS should not impact the 

smooth progress of the NPC, and that SARS information must not 

be disseminated abroad.67

On April 3, the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular 

Affairs issued a formal Travel Warning to U.S. citizens advising 

that all nonessential offi cial personnel and dependents at the 

U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the Consulates General in Chengdu, 

Shanghai, Shenyang, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong SAR, were being 

evacuated “as a precautionary measure due to the Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) situation.” 

In an attempt to assuage international (and domestic) criticism 

over Beijing’s offi cial cover up of the epidemic, Minister/General 

Zhang Wenkang briefed foreign reporters on April 3; but rather than 

admit the disease was still on a rampage, he insisted the “epidemic is 

effectively under control.”68 Moreover, he declared “China is a safe 

place to work and live, including to travel.” It wasn’t safe for Pekka 

Aro, a Finnish staffer with the United Nations’s (UN) International 

Labor Organization offi ce in Beijing. He died of SARS on April 7. 

Even Chinese physicians were outraged at Minister Zhang’s effort to 

downplay the seriousness of the ongoing health crisis. Retired senior 

military surgeon Colonel Jiang Yanyong, who worked one day a 

week with patients at the 301 hospital, tried to tell China Central 

Television network about the cover-up but was ignored. 

On April 7, Premier Wen and Vice Premier Wu Yi inspected 

the national center for disease control where Minister/General 
121

Zhang gave them the same happy-faced reports he had been giving 

foreigners all along. In private, according to the Washington Post, 

the Chinese CDC workers at that meeting were encouraged that 

the scales were fi nally falling from Premier Wen’s eyes. “He talked 

about the military,” said a witness, “he said it was wrong that the 

military was not reporting cases of SARS. He said we have to start 

telling the truth to the people. He asked us how many people had 

SARS in Beijing. We couldn’t tell him.”69

Nonetheless, Premier Wen himself told the foreign press that 

same day that China had “cooperated closely” with international 

and foreign health centers to control the outbreak. This was too 

much for Colonel Jiang Yanyong. He tracked down National Public 

Radio’s correspondent in Beijing, Rob Gifford, and gave taperecorded interview saying that “This is a matter of life and death, it 

is very irresponsible what the Health Minister did.” Jiang cautioned 

“if you deliberately give fake numbers and play down the situation, 

more might die who shouldn’t die and more might be infected who 

shouldn’t be infected.”70

Still, that same day, April 9, Vice Premier Wu Yi continued to 

give assurances that SARS was not a problem in Beijing to foreign 

diplomats and senior international civil servants resident in Beijing. 

On April 12, the WHO fi nally lost patience with the PRC government 

and issued a SARS travel warning for Beijing. 

Jiang Zemin Evacuated from Beijing.

The WHO travel warning was a wake-up call to President Hu and 

Premier Wen. They immediately began to reassess the situation.71

On April 11, President Hu made an emergency visit to Guangdong 

in an attempt to publicize the gravity of the SARS epidemic―outside 

Beijing. And at about the same time, CMC Jiang Zemin decamped 

to Shanghai.72 Later in April, Jiang Zemin’s faction tried to explain 

the evacuation as a prudent step to ensure leadership continuity in 

“wartime.” 

As Beijing’s SARS crisis drags on, knowledgeable sources in Beijjng 

report that the leadership, in order to avoid a situation where the 

leadership is affected by the SARS infection, the Party Center and the 
122

State Council has in recent days launched an offi cial mobilization of the 

“Wartime Leadership Structure.” This is the fi rst time that Zhongnanhai 

has had such an emergency structure in 50 years.

Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao,and Public Health Minister Wu Yi will remain in 

Beijing as the “A Team Leadership” in work against the disease.

The “B Team,” consists of Zeng Qinghong, NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo, 

Executive Vice Premier Huang Ju, et al. “The B Team” offi cials will make 

all arrangements possible to lessen the chance that SARS infections will 

impact open governmental actions. 

The Central Offi ce of the CPC has arranged for leadership families to 

depart the crowded leadership compound at Zhongnanhai and go to 

other areas to live, or to go stay with relatives. 

News has it that Shanghainese like Jiang Zemin and Huang Ju have 

evacuated themselves to Shanghai. But this was the fi rst time since the 

founding of the nation that the wartime leadership structure has been so 

mobilized.73

Whether Hu and Wen―and the doughty female Vice Premier 

Wu Yi―were fl attered to be China’s “A Team” is unknown, but 

they quickly began to take charge. The entire Jiang Zemin faction 

had abandoned Beijing, leaving them in charge. While Hu was still 

in Guangdong, Premier Wen chaired an emergency meeting of the 

State Council on April 13. He warned that the country’s economy, 

international image, and social stability could be affected and that 

“the overall situation remains grave.”

For some reason, Beijing’s mayor must not have been clued in 

on the decision. On April 13, Beijing mayor Meng Xuenong (one 

of President Hu Jintao’s few allies in Beijing) adamantly insisted 

that “Beijing City’s atypical pneumonia epidemic situation has 

already been effectively controlled and suspect cases are currently 

decreasing . . . Six atypical pneumonia patients have to date been 

discharged from hospital after recovery, and a Canadian among 

them continues his normal work in Beijing.”74 Also on April 13, as 

if to make a liar out of the hapless mayor, WHO scientists in China 

complained bitterly that they still were not getting the cooperation 

they needed from the Chinese authorities, especially from China’s 

military hospitals in the Beijing area.75
123

On April 16, something totally separate from the SARS epidemic 

shook the PLA high command. Diesel-powered PLA Navy submarine 

No. 361 suffered an accident while on exercises in the Yellow Sea 

between the Shandong and Korean peninsulas when a “mechanical 

malfunction” killed all 70 crew members on board.76 It is likely that 

the PLA command did not brief anyone outside the military or the 

CMC on the accident at the time, although certainly President Hu 

Jintao, vice chairman of the CMC, must have been informed. 

Whether the submarine disaster was on his mind or not, the 

president and the premier may have made up their minds at that 

time to fi re Minister Zhang, but given his support from both CMC 

Chairman Jiang, as well as his putative support in the PLA, they had 

to plot their strategy carefully. On April 17, Party General Secretary 

Hu Jintao called the full Politburo together in an extraordinary 

session in Beijing. According to the Washington Post:

Hu and Wen had spent more than 10 days preparing for the 

confrontation. Hu ordered China’s offi cials to stop lying about the 

extent of the SARS epidemic sweeping the country and vowed an all-out 

war against the disease. The orders appeared on the front page of every 

Chinese newspaper the next day.77

The April 20 Storm.

In addition to the April 17 meeting recorded by the Washington Post, 

Yang Zhongmei describes an “expanded session of the Politburo” on 

April 19 that was full of “acrimony and argumentation” but which 

fi nally passed three resolutions:

1) Zhang Wenkang and Meng Xuenong would be removed 

from their Party positions (only the NPC could remove them 

from their government offi ces). And they would be replaced 

by Vice Health Minister Gao Qiang and Hainan Party chief 

Wang Qishan, respectively. Because Comrade Liu Qi had been 

remiss in his work directing the Beijing effort at combating 

SARS, his case must also be looked into.

2) As the SARS situation had become the gravest of the grave, 

Premier Wen Jiabao would be given plenipotentiary powers 

to deal with it.
124

3) The full extent of the government’s SARS information will be 

made public, and the government will cooperate fully with 

the WHO in an effort to ease the fl ow of information.

On April 20, the sackings were announced, and Vice Chairman 

of the CMC Hu Jintao, accompanied by PLA Chief of General Staff 

General Guo Boxiong, inspected the PLA Institute of Military Medical 

Sciences’ Institute for the Study of Infectious Microorganisms to 

express his deep appreciation for their work.78

The heat was building on Jiang Zemin. On April 24, he greeted 

visiting Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes in Shanghai, 

thus reminding everyone that he wasn’t in Beijing. While meeting 

with Fernandes, Jiang remarked “The Party Center and the State 

Council are responsible to the people,” pointedly neglecting any 

mention of the Army’s responsibilities.79 Neither NPC Chairman Wu 

Bangguo nor CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin had appeared in public in 

weeks. Executive Vice Premier Huang Ju, Wen Jiabao’s deputy, was 

nowhere to be seen. And Beijing’s people noticed. College students 

(naturally) were the most cynical. 

Beijing University’s web site has a “student’s internet news” 

page and on April 26, students posted a number of articles pointing 

out with considerable irony that Jiang’s Shanghai appearances were 

evidence that “Shanghai should be safer than Beijing, since our 

Military Committee Chair Jiang Zemin is in Shanghai.”80 Another 

student noted that “(Jiang) didn’t even set an example and ran away 

to seek shelter in Shanghai! (He) fears death! No wonder the Party 

Central Committee asked the nation to guarantee (the safety of) 

Shanghai with all one’s strength!”81

Other internet articles noted with gratifi cation the visits of 

“brother Bao” (Wen Jiabao) and “sister Wu” (Wu Yi) who dined 

with students in Bei-Da’s cafeteria on April 26.82

On April 28, Jiang Zemin signed an order assigning 1,200 

military medical service personnel to aid Beijing in SARS control, 

placing for the fi rst time in the SARS crisis the General Logistical 

Department’s medical services units under the unifi ed leadership of 

the National SARS Control Command Center. Within 7 days, these 

troops managed to construct a 1,000 bed SARS quarantine facility in 

Xiaotangshan on the outskirts of Beijing.83
125

SARS Aftermath: Jiang Struggles to Maintain Prestige. 

The SARS experience was an unhappy one for the PLA. The 

Army ranks certainly knew that the PLA had failed the people by 

withholding vital public health information, and the offi cers and 

commanders certainly felt vulnerable without a leadership capable 

of meshing the requirements of the military with the exigencies of 

public emergencies. The entire episode must have been adequate 

proof to the High Command that the PLA cannot function effectively 

under “Two Centers.” Had Jiang Zemin taken it upon himself to 

coordinate what the PLA knew and when they knew it with the 

civilian leadership―primarily under Premier Wen Jiabao―the PLA 

would have wound up being a positive force in Chinese life―similar 

to their infl uence in the disastrous fl oods of 1998. As it was, CMC 

Chairman Jiang was apparently asleep at the switch and became 

more disengaged when he decamped to Shanghai with his coterie of 

hangers-on.

On May 2, two weeks after the fact, Xinhua wire service fi nally 

reported the April 16 submarine disaster. “The most startling 

thing about this episode is that they issued a public report,” Rand 

Corporation China specialist Evan Medeiros told the Washington 

Post. “Maybe Jiang Zemin just judged that, in this crisis of faith and 

accountability, it would be better to get out in front of something like 

this.”84

Indeed, for the rest of May, Jiang Zemin appeared off-balance, 

while the national media extolled the capacities of President Hu 

Jintao as he prepared for his state visits to Central Asia and the G-8 

Summit in Evian les Bains, France. Indeed, for about a week prior to 

his travel to Europe and a week thereafter, Hu Jintao’s photographs 

graced the front pages, every day, of all China’s major newspapers, 

including the PLAD. Perhaps Chairman Jiang got tired of seeing 

Hu’s picture on the front page of his morning PLAD every day 

and ordered additional coverage of his “Three Represents.”85 But if 

coverage in the PLAD is any indication, Hu’s own stock seems to 

have fi rmed up among the military. 
126

ZENG QINGHONG, A CONTRASTING LEADERSHIP PROFILE

Over drinks in Beijing in early November 2003, a prominent U.S. 

journalist gave me his impression of Zeng Qinghong, whom he had 

seen once or twice playing tennis at the China World Hotel. Zeng 

is an outgoing, affable man of supreme confi dence. “There was a 

rumor going around that while Hu Jintao was preparing to leave 

the country for the Central Asia and G-8 tour, a proposal was raised 

in the Politburo SC that Vice President Zeng Qinghong should take 

over the reins of power while President Hu Jintao was out of the 

country.” The vote was two for and six against, with Zeng recusing 

himself for the obvious reasons. Rumors had it that the only two 

SC members supporting Zeng were CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin 

and executive vice premier Huang Ju―the core of the Jiang Zemin 

faction.

Whether the story is true or not is less relevant than it is as 

a parable of Zeng Qingong’s position in the Communist Party 

hierarchy. Zeng increasingly sees himself as a separate center of 

power in the Party, both as Jiang’s representative and as a principal 

actor in his own right. He does not see himself as an ideologue or a 

member of the Party’s orthodox faction. Rather, he considers himself 

a reformist, a far-thinking visionary, and a generally good old boy.

But others apparently don’t see him in quite the same light. Older 

cadres in the Party and the Army openly call him a “conspirator” and 

a power-seeker. Several years ago, for example, some unauthorized 

biographies of Zeng were fl oating around Hong Kong, and Zeng’s 

sister, PLA Major General Zeng Haisheng, found one for him to read. 

After reading it, Zeng had only one comment: “Am I that bad?” and 

he threw it back at her.86

It doesn’t seem that Zeng is as bad as all that. In 1999, an exiled 

Chinese writer in the United States named Li Jie wrote a futuristic 

fantasy about Chinese politics entitled “The Last Struggle in 

Zhongnanhai” (Zhongnanhai Zuihoude Douzheng) in which a fi gure 

named “Zheng Qingshan” was the real power behind the throne 

for a feckless Party general secretary modeled on Jiang Zemin. Li 

Jie portrayed the Zheng Qingshan fi gure as a democratic reformist 

struggling against Party ideologues. To make a long story short, a 

heroic fi gure is assassinated after forming a Democratic Chinese 
127

Federation, leaving Zheng Qingshan to take up the mantle of 

leadership and undertake the daunting and complex task of turning 

a democratic Chinese Federation into the reality of a future Chinese 

democracy.87

Li Jie admits he patterned “Zheng” on Zeng Qinghong. Li, a 

former professor at Huadong Normal University, was a supporter 

of the Tiananmen Student Movement, spent some time in a lockup, 

and had his career ruined because of it. In disgust with China, Li 

emigrated to the United States in 1998. But Li tells a story that when 

he was released from jail after serving his Tiananmen time, Zeng 

Qinghong sent for him via an intermediary. Li Jie showed up for the 

meeting but sat in sullen silence as Zeng spoke. Zeng pleaded for 

understanding about the Tiananmen suppression―it had to be done, 

the government was disintegrating. Li Jie left without responding, 

but evidently was left with a favorable impression of Zeng. While 

Li Jie didn’t know Zeng well, he felt well-disposed enough to base a 

sympathetic and heroic character in his novel on Zeng.88

Zeng Qinghong, it seems, strives to be all things to all men. He 

plays the reformist to the reformers, the nationalist to the military, 

the technocrat to the scientists, and all the while plays the Machiavelli 

to Prince Jiang Zemin.

In the tumultuous, unpredictable, and capricious world of 

Chinese politics, Zeng seems miraculously to have avoided being 

purged, struggled, or criticized or being related to anyone who 

was. He grew up in an environment of privilege (if not wealth) 

and superlative connections. He is the son of a revered Red Army 

general, the aide to a top PLA general, and the older brother to three 

other mid-ranking PLA generals―who, for some reason, didn’t 

progress quite as smoothly as their elder brother did.

His Father’s Son. 

Qinghong is the son of the late Zeng Shan, former minister of 

commerce who passed away at the age of 72 in April of 1972, just a 

few months after the purge of Lin Biao. Zeng Shan was a member 

of the Maoist faction during the Cultural Revolution, and in fact 

had been a protégé of Chairman Mao’s since the earliest days of the 
128

Jiangxi Soviet. The elder Zeng was born in 1899 in Ji’an county in 

isolated Jiangxi province, and was a well-known local butcher. He 

“joined the peasant movement in 1925” and in 1926, Zeng Shan joined 

the Chinese Communist Party.89 He was named party secretary for 

the base area in Jishui county in the winter of 1928. In June of 1929 

he was named chairman of the West Jiangxi Soviet Government. 

Within a year he was running the entire CCP operation in Jiangxi 

province under Mao Zedong,who was chairman of the CCP Front 

Party Committee and the Jiangxi-Fujian regional committee. 

After the break between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) 

Party and the Communists in 1927, intense sweeps of Shanghai by 

Chiang’s secret police in 1930 and 1931 made the city too hot for 

the Communist Party Central Committee Offi ce, which disbanded 

and migrated secretly to the party’s Jiangxi base areas. At this point, 

perhaps, Zeng Shan’s pre-revolutionary career experience came 

in handy. As the Central Offi ce cadres arrived in the base areas 

from Shanghai, Mao felt his authority eroding and in November 

1930 ordered Zeng Shan to arrest 4,400 offi cers and men of the Red 

Army who were under the command of General Peng Dehuai. The 

arrestees were dubbed the “A-B corps” (for “anti-Bolsheviks”), and 

those who weren’t killed during arrest were held in stockades in the 

hamlet of Futian. On the evening of December 7 or 8, one of Peng’s 

subcommanders launched an unsuccessful counterattack against the 

prison, and in the gun-battles that persisted for days after the “Futian 

Incident,” the hapless anti-Maoists were eliminated. For at least a 

year afterwards, Zeng was one of the Party’s three top offi cials in the 

Jiangxi Base Area―ranking after Mao himself and General Zhu De.90

According to one communist not murdered by Mao, “the Fu–T’ien 

Incident was entirely a plot on the part of Mao Tse-tung to kill off the 

southwest Kiangsi Leadership and to bring about his own personal 

counterrevolution.” Zeng Shan was the manager of “Mao’s machine 

within the Party” and served as a member of the nine-man Soviet 

Area Central Bureau chaired by Zhou Enlai.91

Zeng was Party Chairman for Jiangxi and ran the Front Party’s 

internal affairs ministry until Chiang’s Fifth Encirclement Campaign 

fi nally forced the bulk of the Communist Party’s structure onto the 

Long March. Zhou Enlai, however, ordered Zeng Shan, Marshal 
129

Chen Yi, and Qu Qiubai to remain in the base areas and organize a 

guerrilla movement. And at some point, Zeng Shan’s father, Zeng 

Caiqin, was arrested and ultimately died in a KMT prison, and two 

of Zeng’s brothers and their wives were killed by KMT forces.92 At 

some point after the Long March, Mao dispatched Zeng Shan off to 

the Soviet Union where he studied at Moscow’s Lenin Institute. It is 

possible that Zeng’s reputation as Mao’s hatchet-man had generated 

bitterness in the Party and Mao wanted to remove Zeng from the 

scene until the heat was off. In any event, Zeng returned to China 

in 1937 and was promptly sent back to the newly reconstituted East 

China Bureau in Southern Anhui where he was the director of the 

Bureau’s Organization Department.

Comrade Zeng probably met his bride-to-be before the Long 

March. Zeng’s Fujianese comrade Deng Liujin was a mere child of 

20 when she joined the Communist Party in 1931, and by 1934 Zeng 

had appointed her director of the Fujian Party Committee Women’s 

Affairs offi ce. The Elder Zeng, half Hakkannese, may have been 

attracted to Ms. Deng by her full-blooded Hakka heritage.93 She was 

attached to the Red First Front Army when the Army pulled out of 

Jiangxi to join the Long March in 1935. Several accounts have her as 

one of only 27 women to have survived the March, but by 1938 she 

was back in East China where she married Zeng Shan. Her fi rst born 

son, Qinghong, appeared unexpectedly on August 29, 1939, as she 

marched through the countryside in the South Anhui Base Area.94

Ms. Deng had no time to get back to her camp and instead sought 

out a peasant home in “Ding Family Mount” (Dingjiashan)―where 

she gave birth to “Li’l Ding” (Ding-er), her pet name for baby Zeng 

Qinghong.95

 After a month, when she had recovered suffi ciently from the birth 

at the peasant home, Comrade Deng carried her babe back to the 

South Anhui Base Area and presented him to a very happy General 

Zeng. Before long, Japanese pressure on the Base Area made it an 

unsuitable place for an infant, and in April 1940, Ms. Deng took the 

child to General Zeng’s home village in Ji’an, Jiangxi, where he lived 

with Zeng’s mother, sisters, and Zeng’s fi rst wife who had borne 

Zeng two other children. In the spring of 1941, Deng Liujin bore 

the general another son, Qinghuai, who was also sent back to the 
130

village. One story says that Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers surrounded 

the village, and brutally interrogated Zeng’s grandmother. Infant 

Qinghong escaped with some relatives and literally spent two 

nights in a nearby tree to avoid capture. At least four or fi ve of 

Zeng’s relatives had been killed by Kuomintang troops during the 

fi rst Chinese Civil War―including Zeng’s grandfather.96 Female 

Comrade Deng must have missed her toddlers terribly, because in a 

short time she pleaded with the Base Area leadership―of which her 

husband was organization chief―to let her open a nursery for cadre 

children in South Anhui, and the two children returned to live with 

their parents.97

Zeng Qinghong may already have started networking in nursery 

school. One account reveals that Qinghong’s younger brother 

Qinghuai shared a wet nurse with Chen Haosu, the infant son of the 

Chairman of the East China Bureau, General Chen Yi.98 In any event, 

several biographers of Zeng assert that Zeng’s mother cared for 

virtually all the younger children of the East China Bureau leadership 

in the years before the formation of the PRC.99 Meanwhile, Zeng Shan 

had become a fi nancier of sorts, having received orders from the 

Party Center to set up the Central China Bank which subsequently 

opened a branch in Shanghai. Among the young cadres he recruited 

for the Party’s fi nancial and banking work in East China were Fang 

Yi, Li Renju, Chen Guodong, Wang Daohan, Sun Yanfang, and Xu 

Xuehan. The Elder Zeng himself even served as a vice mayor of 

Shanghai until 1949. Chen Guodong, Wang Daohan, and Hu Lijiao, 

who all had held the top government and party posts in Shanghai in 

the 1980s, had been protégés of Zeng Shan at one time or another. 

In his fi nancial career, Zeng pere was said to have had “excellent ties 

with Chen Yun,” Deng’s major rival in the elder hierarchy during 

the 1980s and 1990s.100

Zeng’s Early Career.

When the communist bureaucracy moved to Beijing, Zeng Shan 

went with it to serve in a variety of upper-level party and state 

council jobs, eventually topping out as commerce minister. His son, 

Qinghong, continued to be with the scions of Chinese Communism’s 

leading families at Beijing’s 101 Middle School, graduating in 

1958.101
131

He evidently was not a very serious student because, even 

with his father’s prestige, his grades weren’t good enough to gain 

entry to Beijing or Tsinghua university. Instead, he entered the 

Beijing Industrial Institute, matriculated in the automated controls 

department, and entered the Communist Party in his second year. 

His biographer, Zong Hairen, notes that “at the time he was not seen 

much among his fellow students.”102

Upon graduating, probably in 1962, Zeng joined the PLA and 

was assigned to the PLA’s 743 Unit where he served for two years 

probably as a missile technician. Zeng is the oldest of fi ve children, 

three of whom are apparently still in the PLA. Qinghong’s next 

brother is Qinghuai, originally a driver for the Cultural Ministry, 

and is now a bureau chief in charge of major national artistic 

performances and competition. Next is Zeng Qingyang, initially a 

corps level cadre in the Academy of Military Sciences and now a 

major general. Third is Zeng Qingyuan, once a lieutenant colonel at 

the Air Force Command School (Kongjun Zhihui Xueyuan), and now 

a major general serving as deputy director of the Air Force logistics 

department. Then comes younger sister Zeng Haisheng, recently 

promoted from director of the PLA personnel fi les offi ce (Jiefangjun 

Dangan Guan Guanzhang) to be cadre director in the General Staff 

Department of the PLA, and is also a major general.103

In 1965 Zeng Qinghong apparently left the PLA to join the 

Seventh Ministry of Machine Building (also known as the Ministry of 

Aeronautical Industry) that had responsibility for the PLA’s rockets 

and missiles, where he continued to work with rockets in Laboratory 

Six of the Second Department in the ministry’s Second Institute. 

Zeng was at the Seventh Ministry in August 1966 at the start of 

the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and soon found himself in the 

throes of political violence. By September, the Seventh Ministry was 

split between the “915 Faction” from the ministry’s administrative 

offi ces and the “619 Faction” dominated by engineers. By January 

1968, a young missile engineer forcibly overthrew Minister Wang 

Bingzhang and the other senior cadres and paralyzed the ministry 

for nearly two years. In June 1968, a mob murdered one of China’s 

foremost missile designers, Yao Tongbin, obliging then-Premier 

Zhou Enlai to intervene to protect China’s top minds in rocketry.104
132

It would be interesting to know which faction Zeng joined, but 

whatever one it was, he paid for his sins in 1969 when he was sent off 

to Chikan Naval Base near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province, and 

thence to a production base in Hunan’s Xihu county to do a year’s 

manual labor.105

A year was enough. In 1970 Zeng returned to the Second 

Institute in the Seventh Ministry and resumed his work. He was in 

the Institute when his father, a long-time Mao loyalist, died in April 

1972 unscathed by the GPCR. At his death, Zeng Shan was “one of 

the few old cadres not to have been purged by Mao in the Cultural 

Revolution.”106 Zeng Qinghong left the Seventh Ministry in 1973 

for another technical assignment in the military’s Commission on 

Science and Technology for the National Defense (COSTIND) offi ce 

in Beijing. He apparently remained at COSTIND for 6 years until 

1979.

When one of old General Zeng’s comrades in arms from the 

Jiangxi Soviet days, General Yu Qiuli, was appointed vice premier 

and chairman of the State Planning Commission in 1979, Zeng 

Qinghong’s mother interceded. She asked the vice premier to hire 

her son away from the COSTIND Beijing offi ce to be his aide in the 

State Planning Commission. By September 1980, the transfer was 

fi nalized and Zeng Qinghong, aged 41, became Vice Premier Yu’s 

personal secretary with the title of deputy offi ce director in the State 

Energy Commission and later as chief of liaison in the Ministry of 

Petroleum’s Foreign Affairs Offi ce. Dr. Cheng Li, an astute chronicler 

of China’s leadership dynamics, notes that Vice Premier Yu was one 

of the many in China’s leadership who were proponents of having 

the “children of old leaders” move into top-tier positions (tixie lao 

shouzhangde haizi), and Yu’s sentiments probably predisposed him to 

take on Qinghong as his protégé. 

In July 1982, Deng Xiaoping, as chair of the CMC, ordered 

Vice Premier Yu back into uniform to take over the PLA’s Political 

Department, a top military slot that also included seats on the CMC 

and the Politburo’s Secretariat. Zeng Qinghong once again put on a 

uniform and followed General Yu over to the PLA High Command. 

Zeng soon fi gured out that his prospects for improvement were 

somewhat greater if he could return to the Petroleum Ministry than 
133

at PLA headquarters. After assisting General Yu to settle in, Zeng 

asked to go back to the Ministry. Yu was amenable, and that was 

that. Back at the Ministry, under Yu’s continuing patronage, Zeng 

was promoted to deputy foreign affairs chief, then to Party secretary 

of the South Yellow Sea Oil Corporation at a fairly senior cadre 

grade of bureau director (Juji).107

In the Shanghai Party Committee.

Zeng Qinghong’s rank of Bureau Director now made him eligible 

for a serious provincial-level leadership job. In late 1984 and after 

importuning his late father’s protégés at the old Central China Bank, 

Chen Guodong and Wang Daohan, respectively Party Chief and 

Mayor of Shanghai, Qinghong was appointed deputy organization 

chief in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. Within 6 months, 

he was promoted again to organization chief, just in time to welcome 

Jiang Zemin, who was appointed mayor of Shanghai that June. 

Interestingly, once Zeng gained a real leadership position―and a 

seat on the Shanghai Party’s SC―he didn’t just focus on feathering 

his own nest, but became intent on making a reputation for himself as 

a reformer. Deng Xiaoping’s motto for his new agenda to reform the 

Party was “more revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more 

professional” (geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua). Zeng 

made it his motto, and ordered sweeping new party recruitment and 

personnel requirements on age and education levels. He launched 

China’s fi rst journal for the Party organization sector, Organizational 

and Personnel Information News (Renshi Zuzhi Xinxi Bao). He ordered 

the young general editor of the paper to maintain daily contact 

with the Party Center’s Organization Department and prepare 

information reports on the latest directives from an increasingly 

reformist party and governmental leadership. Soon, Zeng had made 

a reputation for himself as Shanghai’s most dynamic reformer.108

Zeng also had a softer side―for old Maoists. When Qi Benyu was 

released from 18 years in Beijing’s Qincheng prison in 1985 and was 

sent back to Shanghai to live out his days, Zeng interceded to make 

his life easier. Qi was a radical protégé of Mme. Jiang Qing and a 

Cultural Revolution Group polemicist who penned vituperative 

attacks on Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai and had been arrested in late 
134

1968 and thrown in jail. In 1983, he was fi nally convicted in a Beijing 

court of “counterrevolutionary propaganda incitement to violence” 

and sentenced to time served plus two years.109 When the middleaged Qi fi nally wandered into Shanghai with nothing but a Beijing 

cadre stipend, Zeng Qinghong took up his cause, declared that the 

cost of living in Beijing was considerably lower than Shanghai and 

poor Mr. Qi, now at the ripe age of 54, was entitled to a cost of living 

increase. For some reason, Zeng’s pseudonymous biographer Zong 

Hairen seems to believe that Zeng’s advocacy on the part of a true 

Gang of Four criminal from the Cultural Revolution is evidence of a 

humanitarian streak, because the incident warrants nearly a full page 

in Di Si Dai and prominent mention in the Nathan-Gilley book.110 It 

could just as easily demonstrate Zeng’s continued affi nity for Maoist 

loyalties. But that may be another story.

In any event, Zeng got along famously in Shanghai with his boss, 

Party Chief Rui Xingwen, and after a year Rui promoted Zeng to be 

a deputy Party secretary for the Shanghai Party Committee (with 

oversight of organization and propaganda work), joining the more 

senior deputy Party secretaries Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju, both 

native Shanghainese. Both Rui and Zeng were outsiders, neither 

could speak the city’s distinctive dialect, and the two men tended 

to look out for each other. At the time, Zeng did not come into close 

contact with his future patron Jiang Zemin, because Zeng worked 

the Party structure and Jiang was mayor of the city’s governmental 

organs. 

Finally, in the summer of 1987, as the city prepared its delegation 

to the Reform-or-Retrenchment 13th Party Congress in Beijing, 

Jiang and Zeng began to consult closely on who would be in the 

delegation, and how to prepare Jiang to take over the Shanghai 

Party Secretary slot―and a seat on the Central Politburo.111 In the 

interregnum between 1987’s 13th Congress and 1989’s Tiananmen 

incident, Zeng oversaw Shanghai’s newspapers and media―and for 

a while was particularly fond of Shanghai’s edgy, outspoken, and 

market-oriented World Economic Journal which he saw as a useful tool 

to ingratiate the city with the Reformist Faction in Beijing headed by 

Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.112

But by the end of April 1989, after the death of the sainted 
135

(but ousted) former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang sparked 

massive demonstrations in support of drastic political reforms, the 

Party Center had split. Zeng Qinghong was in Beijing sounding out 

his contacts in the military, the party and the media, and came to 

the conclusion that the demonstrations would soon be labeled as 

“counterrevolutionary turmoil.” He sent word back to Shanghai that 

his favorite newspaper, the World Economic Herald, had to be watched. 

On April 20, Zeng and Shanghai city’s propaganda chief, Mme. 

Chen Zhili (now state councilor and education minister) met with 

the Herald’s editor-in-chief, Qin Benli, demanding that the municipal 

party have the right to clear articles calling for a reassessment of the 

“mistaken” purge of the late Hu Yaobang. Although Qin agreed to 

delete problematic portions, the April 22 issue of the Herald included 

the offending paragraphs.113 Sure enough, on April 24, Jiang Zemin 

announced to a plenary meeting of several thousand Shanghai Party 

cadres that the Herald was closed for investigation and Qin Benli had 

been removed from his position. The Herald’s transgression was to 

publish a lengthy and laudatory report on a symposium entitled 

“Comrade Hu Yaobang Still Lives in our Hearts” attended by 40 of 

Shanghai’s most noted scholars.114

Shanghai Mayor and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, working off 

Zeng’s reports from Beijing, took immediate steps to defuse growing 

demonstrations in the city and ordered that all city offi cials “support 

order.” The move drew Deng Xiaoping’s attention and convinced 

Deng that Jiang was a capable administrator. On May 21, when the 

Deng family convened a meeting in Beijing of the so-called “Eight 

Immortals,”115 Chen Yun and Li Xiannian both recommended that 

Jiang replace Zhao Ziyang as general secretary, a nomination that 

Deng fi nally confi rmed on May 27, a week before the June 4 massacre 

at Tiananmen. Zeng Qinghong’s part in Jiang’s rise was the deciding 

factor.116

Jiang Moves to Beijing.

When Jiang fi nally moved his offi ces to Beijing, the stories go, 

he only brought one Shanghai aide with him, one of the Shanghai 

Communist Party Committee’s deputy secretaries, Zeng Qinghong. 

To be perfectly honest, Jiang hadn’t a clue about how politics 
136

worked in Beijing, while Zeng had his father’s friends, his highschool buddies, and fellow cadre-kid connections to serve as his eyes 

and ears in the capital. Jiang was reluctant to take his position as the 

Communist Party’s new general secretary too seriously lest he run 

up against a phalanx of resistance. So Zeng Qinghong, a lofty man 

in the Shanghai Party structure, was taken over to the Central Offi ce 

of the CCP and introduced to his new boss, Central Offi ce Director 

Wen Jiabao. Wen himself was in a precarious position and was 

seen as part of the disgraced pre-Tiananmen Zhao Ziyang clique. 

Still, Wen Jiabao was amenable to according his new deputy senior 

protocolary rank (over another sitting deputy offi ce director), while 

keeping Zeng’s duties light enough to give him time to work with 

Jiang Zemin.117

Zeng was also given responsibility for Central Offi ce personnel 

issues, and it seems that he was quite happy with this key portfolio. 

Given that Zeng’s father was adept at party organization work, it 

is not too much of a stretch to imagine that Zeng inherited a knack 

for it. Did he talk with his father about his work? Did his mother’s 

skill at networking infl uence him? Did his father’s friends give him 

advice? Probably all of the above. Zeng’s biographer Zong Hairen 

says: 

Qinghong, who didn’t go for reading books, found himself forming a 

deep interest in the intrigues of the Ming and Qing courts, and read 

vast volumes of Ming and Qing fi les, focusing on the lessons of how 

to protect oneself, attack the enemy, how to gain the upper hand in 

complex situations, resolve contradictions, how to consolidate one’s 

power, and how to advance oneself a step higher when one’s base is 

consolidated.118

There was a problem with Jiang Zemin, however. His fi rst three 

springs in Beijing were rather passive as Premier Li Peng took the 

lead in economic policy, making “Rectifi cation and Control” (zhili 

zhengdun) the guiding catch-phrase, eclipsing Deng Xiaoping’s 

“Reform and Opening” (gaige kaifang). Nonetheless, as Deng 

Xiaoping continued his habit of wintering in Shanghai and in the 

winter/springs of 1989-90 and 1990-91, Zeng took over all advance 

work for Deng’s Shanghai vacations. From his offi ce in Beijing, 

Zeng arranged for Deng’s visit to the fl at rice paddies of Shanghai’s 
137

Pudong development zone on January 21, 1991, where he got a 

briefi ng from Shanghai’s mayor Zhu Rongji on plans to develop 

the real estate into a fi nancial and commercial base. Maintaining 

some infl uence on Shanghai’s media, Zeng arranged for the city’s 

Liberation Daily to publish a series of lengthy articles entitled “Reform 

and Opening need a new way of thinking.”119 In attempt to keep up 

the momentum of his reforms, Deng made a series of tours in the 

summer and fall of 1991 to Hubei and Jiangxi where he was quoted 

several times as vowing that “anyone who doesn’t reform must step 

down from power” (shei bu gaige, shei jiu xiatai).120

The following year, when Deng Xiaoping made his now-famous 

“Southern Progress” (Nanxun)121 of Guangdong’s special economic 

zones, Zeng saw to it that Deng’s visit concluded in Shanghai. Zeng, 

at least, seemed to sense whither the wind was blowing, even if Jiang 

was a bit timid to get involved. During the Nanxun, the key meeting 

was an informal gathering of top PLA leaders in the Zhuhai Special 

Economic Zone for an audience with Deng, including CMC vice 

chairman (and State President) Yang Shangkun, Politburo Politics 

and Law Czar (and Jiang rival) Qiao Shi, the PLA’s senior military 

commander Liu Huaqing, himself a CMC vice chairman. Also 

present were CMC Secretary General General Yank Baibing, four 

other generals from the PLA high command, and the commanders 

of the top military regions. Missing from this meeting was CMC 

chairman Jiang Zemin himself!122

The spring and summer of 1992 proved to be the turning point 

for Jiang Zemin, whom Deng Xiaoping considered weak on reform 

and more afraid of “peaceful evolution” than of China’s faltering 

economy. Zeng could see trouble brewing a mile away, and hastily 

arranged a series of meetings between Jiang and Premier Li Peng 

to convince them that Deng’s handwriting on the wall would spell 

the downfall of both if they didn’t mend their ways. Over a span of 

several months, Jiang and Li issued over 20 articles from both the 

Party Center and the State Council, urging the entire bureaucracies 

of both to study Deng’s speeches in the South and boldly implement 

“Reform and Opening.” It was a 180-degree turn for both men, 

which gave them some breathing space to prepare for the 14th Party 

Congress scheduled for October. 
138

With Jiang and Li now toeing the Reformist line, Zeng began 

working on “turning the spear point at Deng’s own supporters.”123

A quick survey of the situation led Zeng to conclude that the only 

way Jiang could survive the 14th Congress preparations would be to 

engineer the removal of Deng’s closest comrade-in-arms, President 

Yang Shangkun. But how?

“The Hundred Generals List.”

President Yang Shangkun’s infl uence in the party came from his 

service as Deng’s top aide in the Communist Party leadership in the 

1950s and 60s. His infl uence in the army came from his close ties to 

the families of revered PLA generals Liao Hansheng, Xiao Ke, and 

He Long, all of whom had suffered or been killed in the Cultural 

Revolution. With Deng’s rehabilitation in 1977 and the consolidation 

of his power from 1979 through 1982, Yang maneuvered to get the 

scions of the old generals’ families into top PLA posts. And for a 

decade thereafter, Yang Shangkun and his younger half-brother, 

Yang Baibing, began to use their infl uence to affect general offi cer 

promotions.

Then came the break Zeng Qinghong needed. In the summer of 

1992, Yang Baibing (then secretary general of the CMC) prepared a 

list of 100 general offi cer promotions that had to be rubber-stamped 

by CMC Chairman Jiang. The promotees were generally supporters 

of the Yang brothers,124 and their movement into ever higher PLA 

command positions would consolidate the Yangs’ grip on the 

military.

Normally, Jiang would have felt obliged to pass on them, but 

Zeng prevailed on him to hold up for a few days and seek counsel 

of a top general who was not a fan of the Yang faction, General Yu 

Yongbo, vice director of the PLA’s General Political Department. 

General Yu was director of the Nanjing Military Region political 

department when Jiang and Zeng were in the Shanghai Party 

leadership, and Yu was considered Jiang’s sole ally in the CMC.

When General Yu saw the 100-name promotion list, he was 

dumbstruck. CMC Secretary General Yang Baibing had drawn up 

the list and had the temerity to submit it to General Liu Huaqing 
139

(then the top ranking military offi cer) and then to CMC Chairman 

Jiang Zemin without running the names through the PLA’s political 

department for vetting. Yu told Jiang and Zeng that it was clear 

that the names were all “pro-Yang,” and the action was designed to 

“completely supplant Deng Xiaoping’s men in the central military 

organs with Yang family horse-holders.”125

Zeng Qinghong took this information to two of his “princeling” 

comrades (Yu Zhengsheng and Liu Jing) who had solid ties with 

Deng’s son, Pufang.126 These two friends arranged for Zeng Qinghong 

to meet face-to-face with Deng Pufang in the midst of a whispering 

campaign in Beijing suggesting that “Yang Shangkun seeks to replace 

Deng Xiaoping,” “Yang wants to be CMC Chairman,” and “Yang 

Baibing will launch a bloodless coup.” Whether Zeng Qinghong was 

behind this rumor mongering is conjectural, but the message Zeng 

passed to Deng Pufang was that “Jiang wasn’t disloyal to Deng, 

Jiang had been muzzled by Yang Shangkun.” Zeng insisted that 

“Jiang Zemin was wholly loyal to the Old Man.”127

Zeng then explained the problem of the 100-man promotion list, 

and warned that the Yang family’s power was growing. Zeng also 

suggested that Yang was considering the rehabilitation of disgraced 

General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. This, he said, would be a disaster 

and would be an admission that Deng Xiaoping had been wrong 

about the June 4 decision. 

Pufang then arranged a meeting for Jiang Zemin and General Yu 

Yongbo to brief his father directly about their concerns. When they 

arrived, General Liu Huaqing was sitting at Deng’s side, and the two 

men said they were ready to hear the Chairman Jiang’s concerns. At 

the end of the conversation, General Liu nodded sagely and confi rmed 

to Deng the substance of the complaints, that CMC Chairman Jiang 

had been frozen out of virtually all CMC decisionmaking, and that 

the Yang Brothers had been acting suspiciously.128

All this transpired behind President Yang Shangkun’s back, and 

he must have been getting uneasy. A few days later, Yang asked Jiang 

what had happened to the promotion list, and was startled to hear 

Jiang was “holding it up subject to Deng Xiaoping’s guidance.” 

As whispers of Yang’s troubles with the “Hundred Generals” 

promotion list spread among the leadership, former Chinese 
140

president Li Xiannian (whom Yang Shangkun had replaced when 

Li “became too old”―despite the fact that Li was only a year older 

than Yang) was seized with an acute bout of schadenfreude. Other 

elders, including Chen Yun and Peng Zhen were simply delighted 

at the Yang brothers’ predicament. They freely offered their separate 

advice to Deng that the Yang Family’s scheming “was unhelpful to 

[army] unity.” Deng’s old Third Field Army comrade and former 

defense minister Zhang Aiping urged Deng to put his foot down 

and then went directly to Jiang Zemin to offer his wholehearted 

support.129

Deng still was disinclined to forsake his loyal friend Shangkun, 

but a steady drumbeat of criticism and a heavy lobbying campaign 

from the elders obliged him to set up a “leading small group to 

prepare for the 14th Party Congress” that would include Jiang, Li 

Peng, Song Ping (a mentor to both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao), and 

Party elder Bo Yibo. 

When the backroom smoke had cleared, the Yang brothers had 

been removed from all PLA positions. And in the end, the only offi cer 

on the 100-names list to be promoted was general Xiong Guangkai―

who has ever since been a sworn follower of the Jiang camp. To call 

the dismantlement of the “Yang Family Army” a victory for Jiang 

Zemin or Li Peng, says Zong Hairen, “is to misunderstand what 

happened.” Zeng Qinghong orchestrated the effort on Jiang’s behalf, 

and “without Zeng to put together this enterprise, it would never 

have happened, and as a result the Jiang-Zeng relationship cannot 

be supplanted by any other.”130

The Chen Xitong Affair.

Jiang Zeming was acutely aware that getting through the 14th 

Party Congress unscathed and visiting confusion upon his enemies 

was Zeng’s doing (although Jiang’s victory in getting himself named 

as the successor “generational ‘core’” to Mao and Deng was probably 

Hu Jintao’s doing). But Jiang still had a number of formidable rivals 

and foes in the leadership, all vying for Deng’s blessing and all 

trying to maintain the loyalties of their own factions.

One such fi gure was Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong who had long 

used his position to ingratiate himself both to Deng and to Deng’s 
141

elder comrade and chief rival in the ideological debate, Chen Yun. 

Chen Xitong had become such a force in the capital, Zong Hairen 

says, “that Jiang Zemin’s writ didn’t run in Beijing City.”131

With the Nanxun of early 1992, as Chen Xitong quickly got on 

Deng’s good side by arranging for the old man to tour Beijing’s 

Capital Steel Factory in late spring where Deng gave a speech 

praising vice premier Zhu Rongji for “really understanding 

economics” and supporting Capital Steel chief Zhou Guanjun’s 

reformist innovations at the plant. It was only after Deng had gone 

that Mayor Chen notifi ed the Politburo (of which he was a member) 

of Deng’s speech and issued press releases under the Beijing Party 

Committee’s name. Two years later, in 1994, Chen Xitong was 

quoted as questioning Jiang’s authority well after Jiang had been 

named “Core of the Third Generation” at 1992’s 14th Party Congress. 

“The core is not bestowed,” Chen reportedly told Beijing cadres, “it 

is something you have to live up to, you have to rely on everyone to 

support you.”132

For Jiang Zemin, this was the last straw. Chen had to go, and once 

again Zeng was put on the case. He set aside his General Offi ce duties 

and began to study the problem―which turned out to be easier than 

the Yang Family affair. Chen Xitong, it turned out, was notoriously 

corrupt. Zeng began to collect reports on Chen’s behavior, as well 

as stories that Chen’s top aides, vice mayors Zhang Baifa and Wang 

Baosen, regularly took bribes. After a while, Zeng began dispatching 

agents to report on every speech Chen Xitong gave, every meeting 

he had, and every inspection tour he made.133

At last, Zeng discovered a massive corruption case in the East 

China metropolis of Wuxi whose threads led back to Beijing. Despite 

“seven degrees of separation,” the web of corruption was traced to 

the Beijing mayor’s doorstep. Big-ticket real estate deals, billion-yuan 

insider trading, and a host of other unsavory practices enmeshed 

Capital Steel’s chief Zhou Beifang―with the money coming from 

one of the world’s wealthiest men, Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing. 

Li Ka-shing seems to have been well-connected with Jiang Zeming’s 

rivals in Beijing―but had little use for Jiang, probably because Jiang 

had little infl uence over municipal affairs in the capital.

That was all well and good from Zeng Qinghong’s point of view. 

As Zeng was mulling his catch, another fi sh swam into his net. Deng 
142

Zhifang, Deng Xiaoping’s younger son, was involved in several 

shady business deals with Capital Steel and Li Ka-shing’s real estate 

empire, including a land development operation in Hong Kong 

called “Capital Steel Four Corners.”

This all began to mesh nicely with a growing scandal surrounding 

Li Ka-shing’s shakedown of McDonald’s Restaurants, which 

happened to occupy a prime bit of real estate on Wangfujing Street 

in bustling downtown Beijing. Li’s land developers lusted after the 

land for a mega-mall shopping site to be called “Oriental Plaza” and 

by liberally greasing several very infl uential palms―including some 

in the Deng Xiaoping family and no doubt Chen Xitong’s as well―

Li Ka-shing’s land developers persuaded the Beijing municipal 

government to renege on a 20-year land lease that McDonald’s 

had on the Wangfujing parcel. McDonald’s, accustomed to dealing 

with crooks worldwide, knew how to protect itself. They went to 

the press, and behind the scenes to the Chinese Communist Party’s 

corruption watchdogs and blew the whistle. By the end of 1994, 

the McDonald’s affair had become a major embarrassment for 

the Chinese government, with senior trade offi cials pleading that 

McDonald’s would be well-compensated.134

But the dice were cast―snake-eyes for Chen Xitong. The Central 

Discipline Inspection Commission’s investigation into McDonald’s 

scandal and Chen Xitong’s Capital Steel connections sealed his 

fate. Chen was detained on April 26, 1995, and the next day senior 

Poliburo member Hu Jintao announced the purge to a gathering 

of Beijing municipal offi cials. As Jiang’s biographer described the 

scene, on one side of Hu sat discipline czar Wei Jianxing, and on the 

other sat Zeng Qinghong. “If there was any doubt that Jiang was 

behind the move, it was dispelled by the prominent and unexplained 

appearance of Zeng, who was called a ‘responsible person from the 

relevant central department’.”135

No doubt the Deng family was also somewhat shaken. And 

Zeng personally reassured them that China’s new leader would take 

measures to keep their black sheep out of trouble. Zeng wrestled with 

“whether or not to arrest Zhou Beifang, and if Zhou was arrested 

would that implicate members of Deng Xiaoping’s family?” “How 

to dissect the Zhou Beifang-Deng Zhifang relationship?” These 

issues were all handled by Zeng Qinghong and not by the party 
143

investigation team. Zeng was said to have “called on Deng Pufang 

several times, and even personally interviewed Deng Zhifang.” In 

the end, Zhou Beifang was in jail, while Deng Zhifang sold all his 

shares in “Capital Steel Four Corners” for one yuan, and “the Deng 

family continued to live in peace.”136 Zeng even saw to it that the 

Deng family’s retainer, General Wang Ruilin, was put on the CMC, 

and Jiang’s ally from Fujian, Jia Qinglin, was transferred to Beijing to 

replace Chen Xitong as mayor. 

But Zeng’s real stroke of genius was to take advantage of the Chen 

Xitong purge to consolidate Jiang’s power in the provinces. Zeng 

proposed a fi ve-point program of political oversight that involved 

regularizing Central Party inspection missions to the provinces, 

permitting all provincial units to report discipline violations of 

other units at an equal level, requiring that all provincial discipline 

inspectors immediately inform the next highest level of all discipline 

complaints they receive, making discipline inspection units part of 

all personnel appointments processes, and fi nally, requiring that all 

personnel moves get the approval of the discipline inspection unit at 

the next higher level of the party bureaucracy. 

The effect was to put the entire governing cadre of all 32 provinces 

on notice that Jiang would be watching personnel appointments very 

closely―through Zeng Qinghong, and over the coming years, Zeng’s 

reform resulted in the arrests of hundreds of upper level offi cials, 

dozens of vice-governor level offi cers, and in the case of Cheng 

Kejie, a vice chairman of the NPC, his trial conviction and execution 

for his corruption when he was Party secretary of Guangxi. In the 

meantime, Zeng seemed to show due solicitude of the views of the 

Deng Xiaoping family―which, no doubt, remains eternally grateful. 

The purge of Chen Xitong demonstrated that Jiang was ready and 

willing to play hardball in the cutthroat jungle of Beijing politics, 

and Zeng Qinghong was Jiang’s strategist.137

National Security and Foreign Affairs.

There is no question that economics, agriculture, and fi nance 

were the thorniest problems facing China in the 1990s, and they were 

issues in which Zeng Qinghong had no expertise. Moreover, should 

the country suffer an economic downturn, no doubt Zeng Qinghong 
144

wanted Jiang Zemin to have a plausible deniability of responsibility. 

Instead, fault for a sputtering economy could be laid at Zhu Rongji’s 

and Wen Jiabao’s feet, and they could be sacrifi ced. 

On the other hand, Jiang consolidated his power base in the 

military. The episode with the “hundred generals” promotion list 

certainly taught Zeng Qinghong that there was considerable potential 

to leverage general offi cer promotions into infl uence with the PLA. 

Military budgets, equipment technology, procurement strategies, 

personnel downsizing, and reorganization of military units into 

effi cient fi ghting machines were all issues that had to be addressed 

by the CMC, of which Jiang was Chairman. And these were issues 

that could be addressed fairly easily by throwing money at them. 

Of course, these issues would be much more easily addressed if the 

PLA were to have a specifi c mission to focus on. 

Taiwan. By December 1990, defense against the Soviet 

hegemon had disappeared as a mission. And Zeng Qinghong no 

doubt set about coming up with a mission that could crystallize 

Jiang’s authority in the PLA. By the end of 1991, Taiwan appeared to 

be that mission. Jiang authorized the purchase of 48 Soviet-built SU27 jet fi ghters and signed options for 24 more. The sale sparked an 

American election year decision to sell 150 F-16 fi ghters to Taiwan, 

and a French commercial decision to sell 60 Mirage 2000-5 fi ghters 

to Taiwan as well. This demonstration that the Western democracies 

were still committed to supporting Taiwan in the aftermath of the 

Tiananmen crisis inclined Beijing to follow a two-pronged strategy 

of wooing Taiwan with kindliness and accelerating the purchase of 

advanced Soviet weaponry. In November 1992, China acknowledged 

the so-called “One China, different interpretations” formula (except 

that Taiwan didn’t immediately respond with an interpretation), 

and in April 1993 Taiwanese representatives met with Chinese 

counterparts in Singapore to start the so-called “Koo-Wang Talks.”

Because national security and Taiwan are central to military 

policy, Jiang and Zeng gravitated toward a strategy of seizing the 

high-ground in those areas. Early on, Jiang sought to place his 

loyalists in key foreign affairs slots, and Zeng apparently took on the 

job as Jiang’s alter-ego in Taiwan affairs, Hong Kong and national 

security strategies. 
145

Zeng may have coveted control of Taiwan Affairs because up to 

1992, Taiwan had been the province of Jiang’s nemesis, President Yang 

Shangkun. Indeed, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui considered his 

contacts with Beijing via “secret envoys” Su Chih-ch’eng and Cheng 

Shu-min to have been a direct link to Yang Shangkun via Yang’s 

envoy Yang Side.138 The contacts between Lee Teng-hui and Yang 

Shangkun were intermediated by a Hong Kong-based “Qigong 

Master” cum Zen philosopher named Nan Huaijin who had a 

considerable following among neo-Confucian elites in both Taiwan 

and the PRC. In early 1988, Master Nan claimed very high level 

interest in the Chinese communist hierarchy in establishing a direct 

channel of communications to Taiwan’s new president, and over the 

following 6 years hosted nine separate meetings between emissaries 

from the presidents of Taiwan and China. This channel facilitated the 

opening of public contacts between Taipei and Beijing via unoffi cial 

instrumentalities deputized to discuss practical ways to deal with 

notarial, immigration, criminal, and other administrative issues. 

But those talks were not authorized to discuss political differences. 

Politics, however, were the subject of the secret meetings.

As Taiwan had become dominant focus of the PLA’s mission 

after the fall of the Soviet Union, Zeng and Jiang Zemin may have 

presumed that President Yang Shangkun somehow gained leverage 

in the PLA through his infl uence on Taiwan policy. By the end of 

1992, although Yang Shangkun had lost his authority in the military 

and Master Nan had lost the honor of hosting the secret cross-Strait 

liaisons (much to Master Nan’s chagrin), Yang still managed to 

maintain his presence in Taiwan affairs by continuing the contacts 

with Lee Teng-hui via another aide, Xu Mingzhen. Throughout these 

early talks, Taiwan’s President doggedly pursued the idea of signing 

a cross-Strait nonaggression pact as the fi rst step to opening direct 

transportation links between Taiwan and China. After Jiang Zemin 

succeeded Yang Shangkun as China’s president in 1993, Jiang’s 

representative, former Shanghai mayor Wang Daohan, continued 

as the main interlocutor with Lee Teng-hui’s secret envoy, but Xu 

Mingzhen still reported to Yang and other Jiang rivals. 

In January 1994, Wang Daohan informed his Taiwan counterpart 

that “Jiang Zemin had named a new representative and hoped that 
146

Su Chih-ch’eng would meet with him.” But Wang declined to say 

just who this “new representative” was. President Lee was obliged 

to send his junior envoy, Ms. Cheng, to Beijing to learn the identity of 

the new man, and “after being lead down dark alley after dark alley, 

she fi nally came upon a room in which she met the new counterpart, 

the director of the Central Offi ce of the Chinese Communist Party, 

Zeng Qinghong.” Zeng informed her that “henceforth, the two sides 

need not use any other channel for direct liaison.”139

Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui was now confi dent that he had 

a direct line to China’s President Jiang Zemin and eagerly agreed to 

the new contact. Zeng’s fi rst meeting with Su Chih-ch’eng came on 

the not-very-auspicious date of April 4, 1994, after much haggling 

about the venue, at a discreet villa in the sleepy Zhuhai Special 

Economic Zone abutting the equally sleepy Portuguese enclave of 

Macau. Su presented Zeng with a rustic ceramic with a crystalline 

glaze crafted by one of Taiwan’s foremost artists. In return, Zeng 

presented Su with a gigantic fl ower vase that was so big that it had 

to be FedEx-ed to Taiwan a week later. Lee’s biography doesn’t 

say what else happened at that fi rst meeting, but confi rms that Lee 

agreed that his emissary could “have deeper discussions” at their 

next meeting, which took place on November 25, 1994, again in 

Zhuhai.

Again, Su Chih-ch’eng proposed a peace agreement, but Zeng 

demurred that a peace pact “is state-to-state behavior.” Su then 

explored the idea of a three-way joint-venture cross-Strait airline 

service, with Taiwan and China each holding 45 percent of the 

shares and Singapore holding a 10 percent share to avoid any 

political implications. Again, Zeng demurred. 

Then Zeng broached the idea of arranging for a “spontaneous 

meeting” (buqi er dai) between Lee Teng-hui and Jiang Zemin at 

some “third place”―which, however, could not be an international 

forum (guoji changhe). Both men agreed that this should be further 

explored, and would help stabilize the situation in the Taiwan 

Strait.

On the eve of the announcement of President Jiang’s “Eight 

Points” (Jiang Ba Dian) on Taiwan policy just before Lunar New Year 

in January 1995, word got back to Taipei that it would mark a turn 

in relations and hoped that Taiwan would respond with goodwill. 
147

The word, unfortunately, didn’t get to Lee’s aides in time, and the 

next day Taipei dismissed Jiang’s “Eight Points” as “nothing new.” 

By the end of the Lunar New Year celebrations, President Lee 

issued his own observation that “the Eight Points are worth our 

careful attention.” Within a week, Lee had prepared his “Lee’s Six 

Conditions” (Li Liu Tiao) as a concrete response to the “Eight Points” 

in hopes of reminding the PRC side “to be a bit more attentive to 

Taiwan’s sensitivities.”

In March 1995, Su Chih-ch’eng again met Zeng Qinghong faceto-face in Zhuhai where he gave Zeng a head’s-up that President 

Lee was planning visits to the Middle East and the United States, 

and hoped that the other side could countenance the trips. “This is 

something we must do, and must do successfully.” At the time, the 

PRC believed that there was no possibility that the United States 

would approve Lee’s visit―after all, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 

had already reported to the Party Center that the U.S. administration 

had turned down Lee’s request. So Zeng’s response to Su was “you 

have your own position, we have our position, so when the time 

comes, if there’s to be criticism from our side, we’ll still have to 

criticize” (dao shihou piping, hai shi yao pipingde). 

It was to be the last meeting with Zeng. On April 4, 1995, Lee 

Teng-hui completed his visit to the United Arab Emirates and 

Jordan. At the end of his visit to Amman, Lee’s motorcade drove 

out to Mount Nebo overlooking Galilee. Lee trudged to the top of 

Nebo’s ridge and looked into the ancient land of Canaan and stared 

quietly into the Promised Land. He returned to Taipei the same day, 

and told the waiting press that 

I saw the place where Moses died on Mount Moses. I know the story. 

Where did Moses and Joshua go after their departure? It is unclear. 

Later on, Joshua went to the Jordan River to develop the area and 

rebuild his homeland. We must understand two things in this segment 

of history. First, it is about the place where Moses died; this is not clearly 

mentioned in history. People say that he died on the mountain. Second, 

the mountain is a nice place. Looking down from it, we can see the Dead 

Sea; looking across, we can see the entire area occupied by the Jordan 

River plain. It is a very interesting place. I approach this matter from 

various angles, not from biblical or religious viewpoints.140
148

Zeng Qinghong was good to his word. The PRC press and the 

PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong published a number of scathing 

articles haranguing Lee for his messianic delusions, and excoriating 

his independentist proclivities. And when Lee actually did manage 

to wangle an invitation to speak at Cornell University and gain 

White House approval (announced on May 21), the Chinese reaction 

was initially confi ned to propaganda hot air. In fact, the chief of the 

PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Offi ce, Tang Shubei, arrived in 

Taipei on May 24, to do advance preparations for a scheduled visit 

of PRC negotiator Wang Daohan.

But it is doubtful that the Lee Teng-hui visit to Cornell in June 

1995 had anything to do with the interruption of the “secret envoy” 

channel with Zeng Qinghong. Zeng’s meetings with Su Chih-ch’eng 

were halted in April―apparently because their existence was leaked 

by pro-China legislator Yok Mu-ming during a session of Taiwan’s 

Legislative Yuan. When news appeared in the Taiwan press, Su 

received notifi cation from “the other side” that “hereafter, it is 

inconvenient to see each other.” Legislator Yok seemed to have had 

ties with the Yang Shangkun “Anti-Jiang Faction” in Beijing, and 

according to the Lee Teng-hui biography, the leak was inspired by 

their desire to undermine Jiang―aided and abetted by pro-China 

politicians in Taiwan who wanted to wound Lee.141

There are also rumors that Jiang himself was criticized by the PLA 

for allowing the Lee visit to Cornell to take place and for being “softhearted” on the Taiwan issue.142 Zeng apparently used the incident 

to discredit the foreign ministry bureaucracy and, in a deft move 

designed to protect foreign minister Qian Qichen from excessive 

attacks, Zeng coopted Qian into becoming a pliant member of the 

Jiang camp.143

China responded to the Taiwan president’s visit to Cornell 

University in June 1995 with a series of missile tests in the Taiwan 

Strait in late July that closed the Strait to international merchant 

shipping for nearly 2 weeks and obliged an estimated 14,000 cargo 

ships to be re-routed around Taiwan’s eastern coast. It is uncertain 

whether Zeng Qinghong had a hand in the decision to go ahead 

with the missile tests. One might expect that it would take perhaps 

two weeks from decision-time to launch for such a symbolic show 
149

of force, and if so, Zeng and Jiang Zemin were on an offi cial visit 

of Europe during the time the missile threats were being debated. 

It is possible, therefore, that the PLA hatched the idea, and ran it 

through the CMC bureaucracy with only minimal involvement from 

CMC chairman Jiang and his closest advisor. Similarly, in March 

1996, after weeks of signaling that Beijing was unhappy with the 

prospect of 4 more years for incumbent Taiwan President Lee Tenghui, the PLA launched at least three (though some news report say 

four) missile tests into the Taiwan Strait which hit waters just a few 

miles off Taiwan’s coast. Again, international maritime traffi c was 

disrupted. But, again, it is not clear that Zeng had anything to do 

with the missile tests.

Nonetheless, it seems likely that Zeng Qinghong has been 

intimately involved in all other aspects of Taiwan policy from the 

time of the “secret envoy” meetings until this day. By September 

1996, it was widely assumed that Zeng had been named to the 

“Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs.” Jiang headed the 

Group which also included Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian 

Qichen, Zeng Qinghong (as director of the CCP General Offi ce), 

Wang Zhaoguo (director of the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce under the 

State Council), Xiong Guangkai (assistant chief of the PLA General 

Staff), Jia Chunwang (Minister of State Security). When Zeng joined 

the Taiwan leading group, the Hong Kong press revealed that the 

leading group decided to “slightly readjust its policy”―primarily 

with regards to the impact of the PLA on Taiwan policy. Said one 

Hong Kong paper: after reviewing “both the positive and negative 

impact of the PLA military exercises during [Taiwan’s] presidential 

election period, a new framework has thus been established for the 

policy toward Taiwan.”

Zeng’s appearance on the Taiwan Group was not a surprise. No 

doubt Zeng identifi ed Taiwan policy as critical to the PLA’s mission 

and was determined that Jiang Zemin must maintain control of the 

Taiwan Group in order to enhance his leverage over the generals.144

At a meeting of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs in 

August of 1998, Zeng was appointed to “take charge of the routine 

work of the group,” and Wang Zhaoguo was reportedly “relieved 

from his post as the secretary general of the group” when “the Central 

Committee decided to abolish the post of the secretary general of the 
150

group.”145 The Taiwan press was certain that Zeng would take over 

the day-to-day running of Taiwan work when the Politburo name 

list for the 16th Party Congress was published.146 And, judging from 

the names of those on the Taiwan Work Group when a more or less 

authoritative list was published in December 2003, Zeng certainly 

was in a position to exert control on the group―because they were 

mostly Shanghai factionalists.147

Most analysts see Zeng’s fi ngerprints on Taiwan policy, but it 

is evident that Zeng hopes to keep his name out of it. As the grassroots movement among Taiwan’s people for ever greater “national 

identity” spreads, Taiwan policy now has the potential to turn into a 

major disaster for China. True to form, Zeng is perfectly happy with 

Hu Jintao as chairman of Taiwan affairs, and hence liable for blame 

if the policies backfi re. But Zeng wants his own people running 

Taiwan decisionmaking.148

Hong Kong. Jiang Zemin not only trusted Zeng Qinghong’s 

instincts in domestic affairs and Taiwan, but from a fairly early 

stage, Zeng seemed to have Jiang’s ear on Hong Kong’s transition. 

Hong Kong, of course, was Deng Xiaoping’s crowning foreign policy 

achievement and, until Deng’s passing in February 1997, Jiang was 

reluctant to make any obvious move to bring Hong Kong policy 

under his direct control by assigning it to Zeng. Nonetheless, as early 

as January 1994, Zeng, as director of the CCP Central Committee’s 

General Offi ce, reported to Deng that two opinion polls in major 

urban areas and cities showed that, while “99 percent of the people 

supported the Central Government’s policy on the Hong Kong 

issue,” there were still “some people who thought that the central 

government was not tough enough toward Britain” and “even 

criticized the central government for being ‘rightist’ on this issue.” 

Deng reacted defensively, and called on the PRC’s “Preliminary 

Work Committee” on Hong Kong negotiations to “quicken its work 

and . . . work in a down-to-earth manner.” Britain’s political attempts 

would not be allowed to succeed, Deng said, “because Hong Kong 

belongs to China.”149

Deng also acquiesced in Jiang’s selection of Hong Kong tycoon 

C.H. Tung as the territory’s fi rst post-British leader, a choice that 

Zeng Qinghong no doubt had a hand in. In the early 1980s, when 

Tung’s “Orient Overseas Line” ran into fi nancial troubles, the 
151

Chinese government bailed it out. Hence, Tung was beholden 

to Beijing. Tung, who spent his youth working in the Shanghai 

headquarters of his father’s extensive shipping company, could 

speak Shanghainese, had impressed Jiang as a loyal Chinese subject, 

and has since been considered a Jiang man.

After Deng’s death, Zeng ensured that all the “advance” 

planning of Jiang’s central role in the July 1, 1997, handover 

ceremonies required his personal attention. Ten days before the 

reversion, State Council Secretary-General Luo Gan and Hong Kong 

and Macao Affairs Offi ce Director Lu Ping were obliged to complete 

their consultations in Hong Kong and return to Beijing, and three 

days later, Zeng, in his capacity as director of the General Offi ce of 

the CCP Central Committee, arrived in Hong Kong to personally 

manage the details of Jiang’s visit. Zeng Qinghong informed the 

Hong Kong government that he was the senior Chinese offi cial 

responsible for the Central Party Security Bureau and proceeded 

to review Jiang’s motorcade routes, protective coverage, guest lists, 

speeches, hotel and housing for the delegation, and all information 

related to foreign participants in the festivities.150

For the next 6 years, Zeng apparently maintained considerable, 

albeit discreet, infl uence over Hong Kong policy. Zeng’s prominence 

in Hong Kong affairs became visible after the Hong Kong 

government’s attempt to push through harsh sedition laws (known 

as “Article 23” legislation) prompted a series of gigantic street 

protests beginning with a march that drew more than 500,000 people 

on July 1. Within days, the Politburo had convened an “enlarged” 

meeting to study the situation. By July 6, reports out of Hong Kong 

indicated that there was a split in the Chinese leadership over how to 

handle the situation.151 On July 14, Beijing’s offi cial English language 

newspaper China Daily slammed the demonstrations and the offi cial 

Xinhua news agency insisted that Hong Kong must go through with 

legislative consideration of the Sedition Law “as scheduled.”152

All evidence pointed to Beijing’s propaganda arms gearing up 

for major pressure on Hong Kong’s government to push through the 

legislation. The Politburo’s Propaganda Chief was Liu Yunshan―a 

protégé of Jiang Zemin’s and Zeng Qinghong’s.153 Meanwhile, James 

Tien of Hong Kong’s pro-business (and Pro-Beijing) Liberal Party, 

and a key legislative ally of the SAR’s Chief Executive C.H. Tung, 
152

made an emergency visit to Beijing on July 3 and was immediately 

seen by Liu Yandong, the head of the Chinese Communist Party 

United Front Work Department and “a known protege of President 

Hu Jintao.”154

There was no question that the CCP Center―under Hu Jintao―

found it necessary to open an alternative dialogue channel in Hong 

Kong instead of relying solely on Tung. In a move that further 

undermined C. H. Tung (presumably to the delight of the Hu JintaoWen Jiabao faction), James Tien resigned from the Hong Kong 

SAR Executive Council. Tien indicated he was getting signals from 

Beijing that the PRC government wanted a “hands-off” stance in an 

effort to assuage democratic sentiments in the Hong Kong public. 

The Chinese government, he said, had no particular interest in either 

the “content or the timing” of the Article 23 legislation.155

The information dissonance coming from Beijing alarmed Tung, 

who fl ew to Beijing on July 19 to brief the leadership on the situation 

in Hong Kong. After meetings with C. H. Tung, President Hu and 

Premier Wen issued statements of somewhat faint praise for the SAR 

chief, and Hu Jingtao even directed Tung to “once again seek the 

advice and consent of the general public” (zaici xunwen gongzhong) 

on the Article 23 legislation. Hu also warned against “foreign powers 

or other outside forces interfering in Hong Kong’s internal affairs.” 

Premier Wen Jiabao vowed to speed up “arrangements to establish 

even closer economic and trade ties between the interior and Hong 

Kong” in an effort to improve the SAR’s stagnant markets.156 But 

Wen Jiabao’s comment to the press, that he “as usual” (yiran) had full 

faith in Hong Kong, and its government “with C. H. Tung as head” 

was commented upon as a weak endorsement of the embattled SAR 

head.157

Tung also met with Jiang Zemin, and interestingly, Vice President 

Zeng Qinghong, the “infl uential ally of the former president” (as the 

Washington Post Washington Post put it) participated in that meeting, not in Tung’s put it) participated in that meeting, not in Tung’s 

session with President Hu.158 On July 22, Hong Kong’s Economic 

Daily reported that Vice President Zeng had taken over the central 

task force on Hong Kong policy from State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, 

fearing that Beijing’s handling of the territory’s affairs was being 

conducted at too low a level.159 Shortly afterwards, a “well-placed 
153

source” in Beijing confi ded to a Singapore reporter that “VicePresident Zeng Qinghong, now head of a special task force on Hong 

Kong, agreed the top priority was to stabilise the situation.”160

By September 16, Zeng had made an emergency inspection 

tour of South China to explore ways of “deepening” the economic 

interdependence of Hong Kong and neighboring Guangdong 

province. He then “summoned” Hong Kong’s beleaguered Chief 

Executive, C. H. Tung, to an audience in the East China city of 

Hangzhou where Zeng was “vacationing” and impressed on Tung 

the “importance of stability” to the situation in the former British 

Colony.161

As this paper was undergoing its fi nal proof-read, there were 

indications that Zeng had remained at the center of Beijing’s strategic 

planning for Hong Kong, but that President Hu Jintao seemed less 

agitated about local agitation for democratization. It appeared, then, 

that Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao may have adjudged that there 

was a good chance Zeng Qinghong’s hardline stance against Hong 

Kong democratization may backfi re and thus discredit Zeng and the 

Shanghai Gang.

Zeng’s Other Foreign Policy Involvement. Beginning in 1997, 

before that autumn’s 15th Party Congress, Zeng had already begun 

to maneuver his way into foreign policy. His modus operandi was 

Machiavellian. Basically, Zeng made the foreign ministry look 

incompetent, and then, rather than punish the fools, he would appear 

to intercede in their defense. But he also used foreign ministry gaffes 

to justify the reinvention of the “Central Foreign Affairs Leading 

Group” as a national security council directly under Jiang Zemin 

(with, of course, Zeng maintaining control of the agenda on Jiang’s 

behalf). Through 1997, Zeng accompanied Jiang on his groundbreaking visits to Russia and the United States and was described 

as Jiang’s “special assistant” with protocolary rank higher than the 

foreign minister. I recall that during Jiang’s October 1997 trip to the 

United States, Jiang made a special point of introducing Zeng to 

President William Clinton in such a way as to lead the American 

side to assume that Zeng was an especially important infl uence on 

Jiang’s thinking. Zeng also made his own trips abroad in 1997 and 

1998, covering countries in Europe, North America, and Asia―all 
154

greeted with raised-eyebrows from China-watchers who interpreted 

them as evidence of Zeng’s special interest in foreign policy.162

One example of Zeng’s tactics came during President Clinton’s 

visit to China in June-July 1998. Unbeknownst to either Beijing’s 

foreign ministry or the American president’s advance team, Zeng 

secretly ordered China Central Television to prepare live televised 

coverage for Clinton’s two scheduled speeches. But the foreign 

ministry was ordered to refuse the Clinton advance team’s requests 

for TV time. On both occasions, it was Zeng’s own CCP General 

Offi ce offi cial who approved the television broadcasts of Clinton’s 

speeches―and then only on the eve of the events. The effect was to 

make Jiang look reasonable and moderate to the Clinton people, 

while humiliating the foreign ministry.163

Zeng’s most remarkable foreign policy maneuver came in 

November 1998 surrounding Jiang Zemin’s state visit to Japan. 

China’s new foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan, a Japan hand, had 

somehow been led to believe that the Japanese government would 

make two historical concessions: that Japan would issue a written 

apology for invading China in World War II, and that Japan would 

explicitly commit to President Clinton’s so-called “Three No’s” on 

the issue of Taiwan. Even before President Jiang embarked on his 

travels to Tokyo, Zeng was “already very much aware” that Japan 

had no intention of budging on these points. Yet, Zeng kept Beijing’s 

foreign ministry in the dark, and apparently allowed Minister Tang 

to brief Jiang that the concessions were achievable. At the conclusion 

of Jiang’s Japan visit, most observers counted it an utter fi asco and 

seemed to lay blame for the poor coordination on Minister Tang.164

Which is probably what Zeng Qinghong intended. Wounded by 

the debacle, Tang the Japan-hand was no doubt grateful that Jiang 

(and Zeng) kept him on the team. Within two years, Zeng was seen 

exercising his infl uence on diplomatic personnel and training, and 

was generally considered to have established his primacy over the 

foreign affairs bureaucracy.165

Another way Zeng seems to have gained infl uence in foreign 

affairs after 1997 was to serve as the advance man for Jiang Zemin 

on important visits abroad. In March 2001, for example, Zeng spent 

two days in Pyongyang conversing with North Korean leader 

Kim Jong Il as well as with the Democratic People’s Republic of 
155

Korea’s (DPRK) top military leader, Jo Myong Rok. Zeng’s mission 

apparently was focused on planning for Jiang Zemin’s September 

2001 visit to Pyongyang. But Zeng’s mission was also to encourage 

the DPRK to move toward economic reforms with offers of “China’s 

free assistance.” Kim Jong Il had been in Shanghai just two months 

prior to Zeng’s Korean visit, and the Chinese press was fi lled 

with hope that the spectacle of Shanghai’s transformation since 

Kim’s previous visits of over a decade earlier would convince the 

DPRK’s god-king that the North had to change. In consideration 

whereof, Zeng reportedly offered to increase aid supplies of Chinese 

foodstuffs, crude oil, and coking coal.166

To be sure, a key topic of Zeng’s talks was the incoming Bush 

administration’s reassessment of America’s permissive stance 

on North Korean nuclear and missile development “and also 

reconfi rmed their position on fi rmly opposing the so-called strategy 

of hegemonism, such as the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, 

pursued by the Bush administration.”167 As it happened, Jiang’s visit 

(with Zeng prominently fi guring in the entourage) took place the 

week before the September 11 terror attacks in the United States and 

repeated the same themes of Chinese aid to the DPRK and Chinese 

hopes that the North would reform its economy. 

During his two-day March visit, Zeng―at the time the 20th 

ranking member of the CCP Politburo―met fi ve or six times with 

Pyongyang’s Dear Leader Kim. Dear Leader could no doubt overlook 

Zeng’s comparatively junior Politburo standing since Jiang himself 

reportedly had described Zeng as one of China’s “core leaders” of 

the next generation together with Vice President Hu Jintao.168

That Zeng was still very much in the center of North Korean 

policy issues on the eve of his ascension into the CCP’s nine-man SC 

of the Politburo in October 2002 was evident when Zeng took over 

the infamous “Yang Bin” case. Yang was a big-time tycoon-cum-con 

man from China who has wormed (or bribed) his way into the favor 

of Kim Jong Il and with his considerable wealth had managed to 

become named “governor” of the DPRK’s Potemkin-style “special 

economic zone” on the Chinese border. Apparently, the Chinese 

had advised Kim not to have anything to do with Yang Bin, but 

were ignored. Yang was then arrested on fraud and tax evasion 

charges and eventually tossed into prison with an 18-year sentence 
156

and a $300 million dollar fi ne.169 According to the Hong Kong press, 

Zeng coordinated the Yang Bin affair with the foreign minister, the 

tax bureau, the public security ministry, the Liaoning provincial 

government, and a host of lesser offi ces.170

Given Zeng’s central role in China’s relations with North Korea, 

it was not surprising when Hong Kong analyst Willy Wo-lap Lam 

reported in March 2003 that China’s new Vice President Zeng Qing 

Hong was a member of a newly formed Leading Group on the North 

Korean Crisis headed by President Hu. As recently as August 2003, 

Zeng was freely expressing himself on the North Korean nuclear 

crisis. Zeng evinced a sympathy with North Korea’s security concerns 

that seemed co-equal with any desire he may have had about a 

nuclear-free Korean peninsula.171 Without knowing the identities of 

the others on the “North Korean Crisis” leading group, it would be 

diffi cult to judge whether Zeng’s infl uence on North Korean policy 

is greater than Hu Jintao’s, but Zeng’s grip on the foreign ministry 

bureaucracy (through Tang Jiaxuan) and the military (via Jiang’s 

CMC chairmanship) suggest that whatever infl uence he cares to 

exercise would be decisive.

Zeng’s Interest in Military Policies. 

Most of the Chinese language press in Hong Kong and Taiwan 

has speculated that Jiang has intended to move Zeng Qinghong into 

the CMC at least since 1999.172 And it has been an open secret since 

Zeng’s selection in November 2002 for a seat on the CCP Politburo 

SC that his ambitions include a seat on the CMC. Jiang Zemin 

himself counted heavily on support from the PLA to tighten his 

grip on political power, and one report from Hong Kong indicated 

that Zeng Qinghong personally huddled with outgoing PLA chief, 

General Zhang Wannian, for over an hour in October to map out 

Jiang’s continuation as chairman of the CMC.173

Shortly after Zeng’s appointment as China’s vice president, 

informed observers in Beijing opined that “Jiang Zemin has the 

major power, Hu Jintao has the position, and Zeng Qinghong holds 

real power.”174 Speculation in Beijing calculated that Jiang Zemin 

could hold on to the CMC chair as long as the world was gripped 

by a series of crises from the Iraq war to the North Korean crisis 
157

and from the Taiwan issue to unsettled relations with the United 

States, all compounded by the leadership transition, but that Jiang 

would be loath to abandon his CMC chair to Hu Jintao without some 

confi dence that his infl uence would remain strong. As such, Jiang 

could only rest easy if Zeng Qinghong were on the CMC running 

day-to-day affairs. By the end of 2003, it was clear that Jiang had no 

plans to depart the CMC anytime soon, and perhaps would even 

stay on until the 17th CCP Party Congress in 2007. If so, Zeng still 

plans to be a CMC vice chairman―despite the fact that he would be 

over 68 years old.175 Through 2003, Zeng had already given outward 

appearances of being interested in defense affairs. In September he 

conferred with visiting defense ministers from Uganda, Canada, 

and Australia, and met with the Vietnamese defense minister in 

October.176

It may also have been that Zeng sought to take advantage of his 

early career in the military missile program to enhance his reputation 

as the Politburo’s expert on space technology and policies. In March 

of 2002, Zeng accompanied Jiang Zemin to China’s space center in 

Jiuquan to observe the launch of the unmanned Shenzhou-3 space 

capsule, and in November Zeng and other Politburo and military 

fi gures apparently visited the Second Astronautical Institute to offer 

their congratulations.177 In early 2003, Zeng toured several missile 

component factories in Jiangxi, his father’s old bailiwick, and in 

Guizhou province.178

Zeng Haisheng, Sister of the Revolution.

Zeng Qinghong’s sister must certainly be one of Zeng’s primary 

conduits for inside scuttlebutt within the PLA bureaucracy. She 

has come up through the ranks, but her promotion into the PLA’s 

general personnel fi les offi ce to the offi ce of the Chief of General Staff 

seems to have coincided with her brother’s increasing prominence 

on the national scene.

General Zeng Haisheng is a close aide to General Liang Guanglie, 

chief of the PLA General Staff Department. She was also a member 

of the PLA’s 268-person delegation to the Tenth National People’s 

Congress in March 2003.179 On April 3, 2003, “Major General Zeng 

Haisheng” was identifi ed as deputy director of Chief of General Staff 
158

offi ce (Zong Can Bangongting fuzhuren) when she saw off General 

Kui Fulin at the airport as he departed on a visit to three African 

countries, and a few days later she saw off General Xiong Guangkai 

on his trip to South Africa.180 Naturally, she was at the airport when 

the delegations returned. 

A name search of the PLAD website turned up at least 20 news 

articles that included General Zeng Haisheng’s name, mostly 

blurbs about General Zeng greeting or sending-off various PLA 

delegations.181 In January 2003, General Zeng gave at least four 

military, security, and information related briefi ngs to the tenth 

session of the Beijing Municipal Political Consultative Conference.182

From September 29 to October 1, 2002, General Zeng Haisheng led 

a team of four from the PLA General Staff Department to inspect 

the city of Jinggangshan, which she called the “cradle of the 

revolution.”183 No doubt because of her paternity and her brother’s 

senior status in the Politburo, General Zeng was treated with the 

greatest of deference in Jiangxi as she traveled with several other 

military offi cers from the Jiangxi Military district, touring such 

landmarks as Mao’s old house in the Ruijin base area.

Clearly, General Zeng is in a position to know just about 

everything that is going on in the PLA, and certainly must share that 

information freely with the vice president―her brother.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE “TWO CENTERS” 

The careers of Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice President Zeng 

Qinghong are emblematic of the two very different world views of 

China’s “two centers,” the Party/Government and the PLA. Not since 

the early 1930s when Mao Zedong leveraged his control of the Red 

Army “gun” in the Jiangxi Base area to gain leadership in the Party, 

has the Army’s top leadership been seen as a competing center of 

power to the Party Center. The “Futian Incident” of 1930 established 

Mao as the preeminent leader of the Party for nearly three decades, 

and in 1959, following his humiliation at the Lushan Plenum and his 

retirement from the policy work, Mao was determined to maintain 

his control of the Army. Indeed, Mao used the Army as his powerbase to undermine and then destroy his political rivals during the 
159

Cultural Revolution, and the Army remained a separate center of 

power until the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress when 

both political and military power were again concentrated in the 

hands of one person, Deng Xiaoping. Control of the Army was 

essential to Deng’s ability to defeat the most serious challenge to the 

power of the Party since the Cultural Revolution―the Tiananmen 

Demonstrations. 

Since 1989, Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong have seen the 

PLA as a vital part of their own power base. But it remains to be 

seen whether China’s army wants to continue in the role as the 

Praetorian Guard for an unpopular leadership. Political dynamics 

in China are already undergoing profound changes, and the SARS 

fi asco may have begun a process in the Army that inclines it toward 

a leadership with proven political competence. As the sentiments 

against the “two centers” expressed by senior PLA generals during 

the NPC session in March 2003 indicate, the PLA is somewhat 

uncomfortable with the existing situation―a civilian leadership 

focused on economic (and perhaps even eventual political reforms) 

vying with Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai Gang,” which sees the PLA’s 

role as bolstering their personal infl uence. But as long as the PLA 

has its own agenda―to transform itself into a fi ghting force befi tting 

a global superpower―the PLA’s top military commanders may well 

be inclined to go with the political leadership that promotes their 

goals.

If, in the long-run, both the economic reformists and Zeng 

Qinghong’s Shanghai faction continue to see the PLA as the strategic 

center of power in China, there is little likelihood that China’s 

national priorities will shift away from military modernization and 

“increasing the comprehensive strength of the nation.” On the other 

hand, if the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership faction can successfully 

undermine Jiang Zemin’s prestige in the military―as they tried to do 

in the SARS crisis―there is a chance that the PLA’s infl uence over 

debates of national policy can be marginalized. At this juncture, the 

latter scenario seems unlikely.
160

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. I blame former State Department China Hand, Ambassador Harvey 

Feldman, with this unforgivable pun. 

2. Jia Qinglin suffers from a universally bad reputation. Reports from Agence 

France Presse, Reuters, and The Associated Press shortly after his appointment 

to China’s leadership also included commentary on his wife’s reputed links 

with massive corruption and smuggling schemes. My own recollections of his 

promotions in Fujian were that they were the result of having impressed Jiang 

Zemin with his personal loyalty to Jiang. His loyalty to Jiang is an accepted factor 

in Chinese politics. For example, see China News Digest at http://services.cnd.org/

CND-Global/CND-Global.02-10-25.html. 

3. Even the normally hagiographic Chinese leadership profi le of Wu 

that appeared in the Hong Kong PRC press was unable to list many of Wu’s 

accomplishments in Shanghai―other than attributing to Wu credit for the success 

of the Shanghai stock exchange and the development of the Pudong Zone, both 

of which seem to have been the result of Zhu Rongji’s policies, not Wu’s. See 

Tseng Hua, “Wu Bangguo Studies Treaties on Financial Affairs Intensely―brief 

biography of the Shanghai CPC Committee secretary,” Hong Kong TA KUNG 

PAO in Chinese, June 22, 1994, p. A1, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (FBIS) at FBIS-CHI-94-137.

4. Tamora Vidaillet, “‘Young’ Guangdong chief joins China powerful,” 

Reuters English News Service, November 15, 2002. 

5. See Tamora Vidaillet, “China’s Mr Integrity picked to weed out party 

graft,” Reuters English News Service, November 15, 2002. Vidaillet refers to Wu’s 

“unswerving support for Jiang,” but cites Hamilton College professor Cheng Li’s 

opinion that “Wu Guanzheng has been a rising star because he is a capable leader. 

He’s also someone the different factions can accept.” For a broader view of Wu, see 

Cheng Li, China’s Leaders, The New Generation, Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefi eld, 

2001.

6. John Pomfret, “New Guard In China Marks No Clear Path,” Washington 

Post, November 16, 2002; p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/

A61554-2002Nov15.html.

7. For a plausible discussion of the Politburo Standing Committee rivalries, see 

a collection of articles under the general title of “Si Changwei fan Jiang Lianren” 

(Four Standing Committee members oppose another term for Jiang), Hong Kong 

Kaifang magazine, September 2002, pp. 10-23. 

8. See, among others, Xu Xiangli, “Beidaihe Huiyi Wei 16 Da Yicheng Dingdiao” 

(Beidaihe Conference sets agenda for 16th Party Congress), Taipei China Times, 
161

July 9, 2002, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,354

6,110505+112002070900063,00.html; and Zhu Jianling, “Beidaihe Huiyi 16 Da Feng 

Xiang Qiu” (Beidaihe Conference and the 16th Party Congress to have far-reaching 

impact), Taipei China Times, July 19, 2002, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/

newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112002071900088,00.html. In English, see 

Charles Hutzler, “China Party Chief Could Cling To Post Leaving Less for Hu,” 

The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002,

http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1025546134720334600.djm,00.html; John Pomfret, 

“Chinese Leader Throws a Curve Jiang’s Reluctance to Retire Could Spark Power 

Struggle,” Washington Post, July 21, 2002, p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/articles/A38286-2002Jul20.html.

9. See Erik Eckholm, “China’s New Leader Promises Not to Sever Tether to 

Jiang,” The New York Times, November 21, 2002, p. A16. This is wholly plausible. 

It mirrors the loyalty oaths sworn to Deng Xiaoping by the Politburo in the 

1980’s that “on most important issues, we still need Deng Xiaoping at the helm.” 

Clearly, Jiang saw himself as Deng’s successor, and no doubt insisted on similar 

deference.

10. “Quan Jun he Wujing Budui Guangda Guan Bing Jianjue yonghu xinde 

Dang Zhongyang he Zhongyang Junwei” (The Broad Mass of Offi cers and Ranks 

of the Entire Army and Armed Police are determined to support the new Party 

Center and the New CMC), People’s Liberation Army Daily (hereafter PLAD), p. 1, 

at http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2002/11/17/20021117001004.html.

11. See Wang Zhuozhong “Dang, Jun Ge you zhongyang, Gong Jun Liangtou 

Yucheng” (Party and Army each have their own center, PRC Army must be loyal 

to two chiefs), Taipei China Times, November 18, 2003, at http://news.chinatimes.com/

Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112002111800077,00.html.

12. See “Xue ‘Sange Daibiao’ Zhen Zhua Shi Gan” (Studying the ‘Three 

Represents’ truly is acting according to reality), PLAD, March 4, 2003, at http:

//www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/03/11/20030311001061.html and http://

www.pladaily.com.cn/item/lianghui/rdzz/009.htm.

13. See Xu Yufang, “Chinese military blasts confusion at the top,” Asia Times, 

March 11, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EC12Ad01.html.

14. Ching-Ching Ni, “New Premier in China Has Gone Along to Get Along,” 

The Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2003, at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/

world/la-fg-wen18mar18,1,5650141.story?coll=la percent2Dheadlines percent2Dworld.

15. Unless otherwise noted, all other information relating to Wen’s career prior 

to his return to Beijing comes from Yang Zhongmei, Pingbu Qingyun, Zhonggong 

Xin Zongli Wen Jiabao (Striding Along with Destiny, the PRC’s New Premier Wen 
162

Jiabao), Taipei: China Times Cultural Publishers, 2003. This is a comprehensive 

and readable (but neither footnoted nor indexed) biography, which includes 

details from Wen Jiabao’s early career that appear nowhere else in open sources. 

All the events, however, seem plausible, and the narrative is consistent with other 

reporting of Wen’s career. The author was raised and educated in the PRC and 

apparently takes much of the hagiography of Chinese media leadership profi les at 

face value. 

16. Yang Zhongmei, p. 28. Yang doesn’t say which warring side burned the 

town.

17. See “Remarks of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao ‘Turning Your Eyes to China’” 

given at Harvard University on December 10, 2003, at http://www.news.harvard.edu/

gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html.

18. See Premier Wen’s speech “Working Together to Write A New Chapter 

In China-US Relations” at the website for the National Committee on US China 

Relations, https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2003/12/09-jiabao_dc.html.

19. See “Tianjin Nankai Zhongxue Chule Liangge Zongli” (Tianjin’s Nankai 

Middle School produces two Premiers), New York World Journal, March 19, 2003, 

p. 6.

20. One source says Wen Pengjiu was the PRC Consul General in Geneva 

during the 1960s. Zhang Weiguo, “Zhongnanhai Budaoweng Wen Jiabao” 

(Zhongnanhai’s ‘Bounce-back doll’ Wen Jiabao), Hong Kong Kaifang (Open 

Magazine), July 2002, p. 34. 

21. The Geology Institute was very much in the camp of the Cultural 

Revolution Group, later infamous as the “Gang of Four,” while the “Heaven 

Faction” supported Premier Zhou Enlai. See David and Nancy Dall Milton, The 

Wind Will Not Subside, Years in Revolutionary China 1964-1969, New York: Pantheon 

Books, 1976, pp. 206, 240-1.

22. Wang Haitao, “Wen Jiabao he tade Jiating” (Wen Jiabao and his family), 

Hong Kong Kaifang (Open Magazine), April 2003, pp. 29-30.

23. “Wen Jiabao Qi Shi Baoshi Jianding Zhuanjia” (Wen Jiabao’s Wife Zhang 

Peili is expert gemologist), New York World Journal, March 20, 2003. Yang 

Zhongmei says Ms. Zhang was in the 1976 class at the geology institute, but I 

assume that is a misprint because Zhang is a year older than Wen.

24. Wang Haitao, “Wen,” p. 31.

25. Yang Zhongmei, p. 24; Wang Haitao (Wen, p. 31) says that Yunsong is 

a computer prodigy, and tried to get a job in Beijing with a foreign fi rm after 
163

graduating from a U.S. school. The fi rm wouldn’t hire him, fearing repercussions 

of having a leader’s son, so Yunsong started his own fi rm in Beijing called 

UNIHUB. UNIHUB now has major contracts with Dell and Northern Telecom, 

and maintains offi ces in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Wuhan. Yunsong also 

conducts business under the alias, “Chen Song.” The March 20, 2003, issue of 

Hong Kong’s Yi Zhoukan (Next magazine) says that in 1999, Wen Yunsong formed 

a venture in Hong Kong called “Unihub Global Network,” with tycoon Li Kashing as his partner. Wen’s daughter, Ruchun, is a graduate student at the Nanjing 

International Relations Institute where she “buries her head in books,” and 

basically treats everyone with respect―“not like most children of high cadres.”

26. Cheng Li, pp. 117-118.

27. Yang Zhongmei, p. 55.

28. Ibid., p. 55.

29. This narrative is essentially taken from Ibid., pp 70-72. However, the 

Poliburo apparently did not confi rm Jiang’s appointment until May 27. See 

footnote 115.

30. Ibid., p.71. The earliest congratulatory letters to the Center came between 

June 5 and June 12. Hu Jintao’s letter of support―one of the earliest―apparently 

came on June 7. See “Tibet Supports Central Policy on Crackdown” broadcast on 

Lhasa Tibet Regional Service in Mandarin, 1330 GMT, June 9, 1989, transcribed in 

the FBIS Green Book for June 13, 1989, at FBIS, p. 57.

31. Yang Zhongmei, p. 71.

32. The author was deputy consul general at the U.S. Consulate General in 

Guangzhou from August 1989 to July 1992.

33. Yang Zhongmei, p. 74.

34. “Zeng shi Zhao Zong Shuji Deli Zhushou, Ru Jin Bi Tan Zhao Ziyang” 

(Once a powerful Zhao Ziyang Aide, Wen Jiabao now avoids discussing Zhao 

Ziyang), New York World Journal, March 19, 2003. 

35. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, 

London: Granta Books, 2002, pp. 96-97. This book is remarkable for how much of 

its prognostication about the outcome of the 2002 16th party congress was dead 

wrong―and that only serves to bolster the view that it incorporates the tendentious 

views of partisans of the Politburo’s reformist maverick, Li Ruihuan. Nonetheless, 

the raw material used by the pseudonymous “Zong Hairen” is fully plausible and 

in the end accurate, and includes details unavailable in open sources.
164

36. Yang Zhongmei covers this aspect of Deng’s new ideology succinctly at p. 78.

37. See Guan Juan, “Deng Personally Mediated Disputes Between Qin Jiwei 

and Yang Baibing,” Hong Kong Cheng Ming magazine, No. 180, October 1, 1992, pp 

19-20, translated in FBIS, pp. 27-28. This article was viewed in the U.S. intelligence 

community as the fi rst indication of a major revolt among the old soldiers and 

a harbinger of Yang’s demise. Yang Zhongmei says on page 81 that 103 senior 

general offi cers wrote the letter to Deng, warning that the “Yang Brothers” were 

violating the dictum that “the party should control the gun.”

38. For a full biographic review of Hu Jintao’s career, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., 

Joseph Fewsmith, and Maryanne Kivlehan, “Who’s Hu? Assessing China’s Heir 

Apparent, Hu Jintao,” Heritage Lecture #739 available at http://www.heritage.org/

Research/AsiaandthePacifi c/HL739.cfm#pgfId=1010175.

39. While “Deng Xiaoping Theory” was not explicitly named in the Party 

Charter, it is clear that the revisions were adopted wholly from Deng’s policies. 

The best analysis of this is contained in “Revised Party Constitution Strengthens 

Reformers’ Cause,” published in FBIS TRENDS of November 12, 1992, pp. 1-6. All 

other Congress documents, however, explicitly linked the wording of the CCP 

constitution amendments to “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” 

40. Jiang Zemin was fi rst identifi ed as the “core” of the leadership by Premier 

Li Peng in a meeting with “democratic and nonparty personages” on June 28, 1989 

(see “Li Peng Admits that Jiang Zemin is the Core of the New Leading Body,” Wen 

Wei Po, June 29, 1989, p. 1, transcribed by FBIS, p. 17). The term came from Deng 

Xiaoping’s speech to the new Politburo Standing Committee on June 16 when he 

declared “In the leadership of the third generation, there should also be a core . . . 

this leadership core is Comrade Jiang Zemin, whom we agreed to select.” The title 

stuck, and had been an offi cial part of Jiang’s leadership roles ever since. See “‘Full 

Text of Gists’ of Deng Xiaoping’s Speech to Members of the New Political Bureau 

Standing Committee” given on June 16, 1989, Tung Fang Jih Pao, Hong Kong, July 

15, 1989, p. 6, transcribed in FBIS, p. 13.

41. Nathan and Gilley, p. 97.

42. Yang Zhongmei, p. 103.

43. Ching-Ching Ni, “New Premier in China Has Gone Along to Get Along,” 

Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2003.

44. Yang Zhongmei, pp. 108-109.

45. “Special dispatch: Wen Jiabao Puts Forward Principles for Rebuilding 

Disaster Areas,” Hong Kong Ming Pao in Chinese, October 22, 1998, p. B18.
165

46. “Wen Jiabao To Head Central Financial Work Group,” Hong Kong Hsin 

Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese, March 12, 1998, p 1. Zhou is now 

Governor of the People’s Bank of China. Zhou was born in 1948 in Jiangsu. Zhou 

replaced Dai Xianglong, who was named mayor of Tianjin in an effort to remove 

Zhu Rongji’s infl uence from policies after the 10th NPC in March 2003. Zhou is a 

protégé of Jiang Zemin, Zhou’s father, Zhou Jiannan, was Jiang’s mentor at the 

Ministry of Machine-Building in the 1970s. Wang, now mayor of Beijing, is of the 

“princeling” faction, his father-in-law was the late Yao Yilin, a very conservative 

Politburo Standing Committee member and State Council vice premier under Li 

Peng. In 1998, he was a former governor of China Construction Bank recently 

transferred to Guangdong to take over South China operations for the People’s 

Bank of China. In November 2002, Wang was appointed CCP Party chief in 

Hainan, and in April 2003, Wang was named mayor of Beijing replacing Hu 

Jintao’s ally, Meng Xuenong.

47. Lu Ru-lue: “Wen Jiabao Is Almost Certain to Be the Next Premier,” Hong 

Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese, December 04, 2000, p. 

24, translated by FBIS.

48. “Process of Speculation About Wen Jiabao Offering Resignation,” Hong 

Kong Ming Pao, May 2, 2002 p. B12, translated by FBIS.

49. (citing Beijing Xinhua) “Wen Jiabao ti Jinrong Gongzuo Wu Renwu” (Wen 

Jiabao outlines fi ve points for fi nancial reforms), New York World Journal internet 

edition, January 28, 2003. 

50. Ruan Leyi et al, “Wen Jiabao Gao Piao Dang Xuan Zhonggong Zongli” 

(Wen Jiabao elected PRC Premier with top vote), China Times Internet Edition, 

March 17, 2003. Notes that Hu Jintao got 99.7 percent of the votes for MAC vice 

chairman, while Jiang Zemin’s successful bid for a second term as MAC Chairman 

received “yes” votes from 92.5 percent of the NPC delegates.

51. Wang Zhuozhong, “Wen Jiabao Neige, Caijing Renma duo Jiang Pai” (In 

Wen Jiabao Cabinet Finance Experts mostly JZM cronies), China Times Internet 

Edition, March 9, 2003, http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslistcontent/0,3546,110505+112003030900053,00.html

52. “Hua Jianmin jiang ren Guowuyuan Mishuzhang” (Hua Jianmin to be 

State Council Secretary General), New York World Journal internet edition, March 

9, 2003.

53. “Siwei Fu Zongli dou shi Zhengzhi Ju Chengyuan” (Four new Vice 

Premiers are all Politburo members), New York World Journal internet edition, 

March 20, 2003. 
166

54. Among Jiang’s factionalists are State Councillor and Public Security 

Minister Zhou Yongkang, Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan, Foreign 

Minister Tang Jiaxuan, State Councillor Chen Zhili, and Personnel Minister Zhang 

Bolin who was Zeng Qinghong’s aide in the Central Organization Department. 

See “Wen Neige Renshi, Jiang Xi reng ju Yaojin” (In Wen’s cabinet, Jiang people 

hold strategic positions), New York World Journal internet edition March 18, 2003.

55. Jeffrey Sparshott, “China to feel farm trade pressure,” The Washington Times, 

February 15, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/business/20030215-69329136.htm.

56. “Jie Zongli hou, Wen Jiabao jiang dajian Nongye shui” (After ascending 

to the Premiership, Wen Jiabao will grant huge cuts in agriculture tax), New York 

World Journal internet edition, March 11, 2003.

57. “Shang ren di ba dao, Wen Jiabao qian xiang chi ‘Huangliang 

Rongguan’” (First to get the knife after his appointment, Wen Jiabao takes aim 

at ‘supernumerary offi cials who eat imperial grain’), Taipei China Times internet 

edition, March 10, 2003, http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslistcontent/0,3546,110505+112003031000076,00.html.

58. “Wen Jiabao: Dangqian Jingji Renwu, Shouzhong Fang Tongsuo” (Wen 

Jiabao: Defl ation Fight is Biggest Economic Mission at Present), New York World 

Journal internet edition, July 18, 2003.

59. “Wen Jiabao Gua shuai, Zhiding Keji Fazhan Zhan lue” (Wen Jiabao Takes 

Command, Sets Strategy for Science and Technology Development), New York 

World Journal internet edition, June 19, 2003.

60. “Wen Jiabao Qianchang Xinxihua Lingdao Xiaozu” (Wen Jiabao takes over 

E Commerce Leading Small Group), New York World Journal internet edition, July 

6, 2003. See also “Wen Jiabao zu Kaichuang Xinxihua Xin Ju” (Wen Jiabao urges 

informationalization of new bureaus), New York World Journal internet edition, 

July 24, 2003.

61. John Pomfret, “China’s Slow Reaction to Fast-Moving Illness, Fearing Loss 

of Control, Beijing Stonewalled,” Washington Post, April 3, 2003, p. A18, at http:

//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14967-2003Apr2.html.

62. John Pomfret, “SARS Coverup Spurs A Shake-Up in Beijing,” Washington 

Post, April 21, 2003, p. A01, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/

A64440-2003Apr20.html.

63. Yang Zhongmei, p. 187.

64.Ibid., p. 196.
167

65. John Pomfret, “President Responded to Pressure Inside and 

Outside Country on SARS,” Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A01, at http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A47408-2003May12.html.

66. Boxun.com (at http://www.peacehall.com/hot/feiyan.shtml) has provided a 

running tab of SARS reporting from Guangdong since February 10. See http:

//www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2003/02/200302102341.shtml. As late as April 2, 

the Guangdong provincial government was reporting the alarming fi gures it had, 

but maintained political correctness by couching them in soothing terms. See Shen 

Gan, “Wo Sheng Feidianxing Feiyan 3 Yuefen Bingli Mingxian Xiajiang” (The 

Number of New SARS Cases in Guangdong Province Show Clear Decline During 

March), Nanfang Daily, Guangzhou, China, April 2, 2003. Text available at http:

//www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/nf/20030402/jywz/200304020033.asp.

67. Yang Zhongmei, p. 191.

68. Zeng Liming, “State Council Information Offi ce Holds Press Conference 

on Prevention and Control of Atypical Pneumonia,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, April 

3, 2003, translated by FBIS.

69. John Pomfret, “President Responded,” May 13, 2003. 

70. Rob Gifford, “China and SARS,” audio broadcast report for National Public 

Radio, April 9, 2003. Audio portion available at http://discover.npr.org/features/featur

e.jhtml?wfId=1225737. Jiang sought out several foreign reporters on April 9 and 10, 

giving each separate interviews.

71. According to John Pomfret’s May 13 report, the wake-up call came earlier. 

“Hu and Wen’s push for change began gathering momentum. On April 9 and 10 

they arranged for experts and respected nonmembers of the party to meet with 

senior government and party offi cials to discuss the crisis. The consensus from 

those meetings, according to participants, was that China should stop covering up 

its epidemic and begin working closely with WHO and other agencies to deal with 

the virus.”

72. “Jiang Zemin dao Shanghai bi SARS? Bei Da Xuesheng Bu Man” (Did JZM 

go to Shanghai to escape SARS? Beijing University Students Unhappy), New York 

World Journal internet edition, April 27, 2003.

73. “Baozhang Lingdao Ceng, Zhanshi Lingdao Tizhi Qidong” (To ensure the 

leadership levels, the wartime leadership structure is mobilized), New York World 

Journal internet edition, April 27, 2003. 

74. See Chang Fan, Chung Hsueh-ping, “Meng Xuenong: Capital’s Epidemic 

Situation Under Control,” Hong Kong Wen Wei Po internet edition, April 14, 2003, 

translated by FBIS. 
168

75. Charles Hutzler, Karen Richardson, and Todd Zaun, “Beijing Authorities 

Grant Slow Access to WHO Team, China’s Limited Response Could Hinder 

Global Effort To Control SARS Outbreak,” The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2003, 

p. A-17.

76. Erik Eckholm, “China Said to Take 2 Weeks to Disclose Sub Disaster,” The 

New York Times, May 5, 2003 at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/05/international/

asia/05CHIN.html. 

77. John Pomfret, “President Responded,” May 13, 2003.

78. Yang Zhongmei, p. 199.

79. Ibid., p. 202.

80. See http://www.pku.edu.cn/news/xiao_kan/pkunews03/news4.html.

81. See Tang Qing, “Jiang Zemin ‘fl ees to Shanghai’ Internet-ers bombard 

Jiang and his cast for being ‘ignominious’,” Association for Asian Research 

(AFAR), May 04, 2003, at http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/1337.html. I have not 

been able to locate these postings on the Beijing University site.

82. See http://www.pku.edu.cn/news/xiao_kan/news/304/04-123.htm.

83. “Jiang Zemin Qin Pijun Ji Diao Junyi Yuan Jing” (Jiang Zemin Personally 

OKs Emergency Detail of Military Doctors to aid Beijing), New York World Journal

internet edition, April 29, 2003. Also see Yang Zhongmei, P. 202.

84. John Pomfret, “Report Offers Few Clues to What Caused Overcrowded 

Vessel to ‘Malfunction’,” Washington Post, Saturday, May 3, 2003, p. A19, at http:

//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5037-2003May2.html.

85. See image fi les of the PLAD front pages at http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/

pladaily/2003/05/23/1.html through http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/06/

08/1.html. For 2 full weeks, Hu Jintao dominated the LAD to the exclusion of 

Jiang Zemin. Jiang returned on June 7, and Hu was little seen until June 19. From 

June 19 through June 28, Jiang and Hu share the front pages of the LAD more or 

less equally. Random checks for July and August seem to bear this out. I strongly 

recommend anyone with access to hard copies of the LAD to riffl e through them 

for a better idea of LAD coverage of Hu in recent days.

86. Liu Tong, “Wei Jiang Zemin Shinian Ding Qiankan” (A Decade of Deciding 

Heaven and Earth for Jiang Zemin), Hong Kong Kaifang (Open magazine), July, 

2002, p. 30. 
169

87. Wang Haitao, “Da Nei Quan Mo Gaoshou Zeng Qinghong” (The Great 

Internal Puppetmaster Zeng Qinghong), Hong Kong Kaifang (Open Magazine), 

July, 2002, p. 31.

88. Ibid.

89. Lu Fei-lang, “Zeng Qinghong: ‘the King’s Man, Zeng Qinghong’,” Chiushih Nien-tai magazine, January 1, 1998, No 1, pp 53-55, translated by FBIS. See also 

Zong Hairen, Di Si Dai (The Fourth Generation), Hong Kong Mirror Books, 2002, 

p. 332. Zong doesn’t mention Zeng Shan’s father’s pre-revolutionary career.

90. John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition: 1927-1935, Palo Alto: Stanford 

University Press, 1966, pp. 231-240. 

91. Ibid. Zeng Shan is also cited as a key Mao aide in at least two accounts of 

the Futian Incident. Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, 

Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 174-177. See also Otto Braun, A 

Comintern Agent in China 1932-1939, London, C. Hurst & Company, 1982. p. 57.

92. Cheng Li, p. 160. Li cites Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese 

Communism, and private correspondence with Dai Qing.

93. Ting Wang: “‘Sunset Group’ Strong Man Zeng Qinghong Has Great 

Potential,” Hong Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese, May 

31, 2000, p. 30, FBIS.

94. Wang Zhuozhong, “Changzheng Nyu Hongjun Zeng Qinghongzhi Mu 

Deng Liujin Bingshi Beijing” (Female Red Army Veteran of the Long March, and 

Zeng Qinghong’s Mother, Deng Liujin dies in Beijing), Taipei, China Times internet 

edition, July 24, 2003.

95. Zong Hairen, p. 263.

96. Wang Haitao. p. 32.

97. Zong Hairen, p. 263.

98. Ting Wang. It is interesting to note that Chen Yi was Mao’s chief military 

lieutenant at the Futian Incident. See Howard L. Boorman, ed., Biographical 

Dictionary of Republican China, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, p. 256. 

It is also interesting to note that Hu Jintao apparently alienated Chen Haosu when 

Hu served as Party Secretary of the Communist Youth League. See Yi Ming, “The 

Logical General Secretary Designate, Among the Seven CPC Politburo Standing 

Committee Members, Hu Jintao Ranks Fifth and Is the Youngest, At 54,” Chiu-shih 

Nien-tai (The Nineties), Hong Kong in Chinese, No. 1, January 1, 1998, pp. 50-52. 
170

99. Wang Zhuozhong.

100. “Yi Ren Zhixia, Wan Ren Zhishangde ‘Jiuqian Sui’ Zeng Qinghong” 

(Second to One, Lord of the multitudes, May Zeng Qinghong have a ‘pretty long 

life’), Secret China, July 16, 2002, at http://www.secretchina.com/news/articles/2/7/16/

21099b.html. See also Liu Fei-lang.

101. Zeng was said to have helped his former 101 Middle School classmate, Bai 

Keming, get appointed as CCP party secretary in Hainan in August 2001. Bai was 

general manager of Renmin Ribao, and was considered wholly incompetent. His 

father was Bai Jian, the former No. 1 Machine Building deputy minister, who was 

once Jiang Zemin’s superior. See Zong Hairen, “Declining Hainan: Part 2,” Hong 

Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) January 22, 2003, p. 22, translated by 

FBIS.

102. Zong, p. 264.

103. See Secret China.

104. Mark A. Stokes, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Space and 

Missile Development,” Chapter 6 of Burkitt, et al., eds, The Lessons of History: The 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 197-198.

105. Zong, pp. 264-265.

106. See Secret China, July 16, 2002.

107. Zong, p. 266. Liu Fei-lang says Zeng “politely demurred” when invited to 

“put on the uniform again.” Cheng Li says that Zeng did not rejoin the PLA at this 

point, p. 162.

108. Zong, p. 269-270. See also Nathan and Gilley, p. 85.

109. David and Nancy Milton, pp. 114-115, 183, 196, 240, 244, 311-312. For the 

conviction, see Zong, p. 334.

110. Zong, p. 268; Nathan, p. 85.

111. Zong, p. 270.

112. Liu Tong, p. 28.

113. For an account of the offi cial reaction to the World Economic Herald’s

excesses, see Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, and Perry Link, The Tiananmen Papers, 

New York: Public Affairs, 2001, pp. 91-94.
171

114. Liu Tong, p. 28.

115. Eight of the Communist Party’s top old revolutionaries were commonly 

referred to as the “Eight Immortals” (Bage Yuanlao), but no two lists of the eight is 

the same. My sense is that they included Zhou Enlai’s widow, Deng Yingchao, Bo 

Yibo, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and Yang 

Zhangkun. They all had their own offi ces and staff and corresponded on offi cial 

stationery that bore the logo “The Offi ce of . . .”

116. Liu Tong, p. 29. The PRC-owned press in Hong Kong reported in June 

1989 that “Jiang Zemin had left Shanghai and worked in Beijing for several weeks.” 

See “Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to 

Undergo a Major Reshuffl e,” Wen Wei Po, June 23, 1989, p. 1, transcribed by FBIS, 

p. 7.

117. Nathan and Gilley, pp. 96-97.

118. Zong, p. 273.

119. Liu Tong p. 29.

120. Zong, p. 275.

121. “Nanxun,” literally, “Southern Progress,” refers to the ancient imperial 

tradition of an emperor’s royal tour through his domain (“progress”). Deng’s visit 

also was dubbed the “Southern Whirlwind” (Nanxuan) because of its profound 

political impact.

122. Zong, p. 276. At the time, the offi cial PRC press was coy about reporting 

the meeting. Qiao Shi’s presence in Zhuhai as the chair of a public security and 

legal affairs conference was reported in “Qiao Shi Zai Zhuhai Zhichu Zhengzhi 

Tizhi Gaige - Zai Jingji Tequ ye xuyao xian xing yi bu” (Qiao Shi points out: 

Reform of Political Structure requires the Special Economic Zones to be one step 

ahead), Shenzhen Tequ Bao, January 29, 1992. See also “Qiao Shi dui Jingji tequ 

Zhengfa Gongzuo tichu Yaoqiu, Wei Quanguo Shuli Bangyang Tigong jingyan” 

(Qiao Shi demands that the Special Economic Zones’ Politics and Law work set a 

model that will avail the entire nation of its experience), Nanfang Ribao, January 

29, 1992. On the same page, the Nanfang Ribao also reported “Liu Huaqing kaocha 

Guangzhou Junqu shi qiangdiao Liyong Gaige Kaifang Youli tiaojian quanmian 

jiaqiang budui zhiliang jianshe” (During an inspection tour of the Guangzhou 

military region, Liu Huaqing stresses the need to utilize the benefi cial conditions 

of Reform and Opening to establish a strenthened quality among the troops). 

President Yang Shangkun’s inspection of Zhuhai was reported by Xinhua. See 

“Yang Shangkun Kaocha Zhuhai Zhongshan” (Yang Shangkun Inspects Zhuhai 

and Zhongshan), Nanfang Ribao, February 2, 1992. The Hong Kong press noted 
172

Qiao’s―though not Deng’s―meeting in Zhuhai with top CMC and PLA fi gures at 

the time; see Chu Chan-kang, “Major Military Offi cials Visit Zhuhai,” Hong Kong 

Ming Pao, transcribed by FBIS, February 10, 1992. My recollection was that at 

least one Guangdong newspaper published a photograph of the meeting. Deng’s 

January 25 meeting with Qiao and the CMC leadership (sans Jiang) was reported 

in Lin Wu, “Inside Story of Central Military Commission’s Meeting in Zhuhai’s 

Yuanlin Guest House,” Hong Kong Cheng Ming, No. 183, March 1, 1992, pp. 15-

16, 89, transcribed by FBIS on March 6, 1992. Cheng Ming said that President Yang 

Shangkun proposed to Deng that Qiao Shi “take part in the work of the Central 

Military Commission’s leading body in his capacity as a member of the Political 

Bureau’s Standing Committee, and for him to be in charge of the armed police 

force and the PLA’s secret service troops.”

123. Ibid., p. 277.

124. Including General Xiong Guangkai―who was the only general on the list 

who was fi nally promoted.

125. Zong, p. 280.

126. Ibid. Yu was mayor of Qingdao (and is now a Politburo member and CCP 

Party Secretary for Hebei), and Liu was mayor of Kunming and was later vice 

governor of Yunnan.

127. Ibid., p. 281.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., p. 282.

131. Ibid. (Shi Beijing Shi chengwei Jiang Zemin Shui Pobujin.)

132. Bruce Gilly, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China’s New Elite, Berkeley, 

University of California Press, 1998, p. 243. Gilley cites a Reuters wire service 

report of April 30, 1995.

133. Unless otherwise noted, all information on the Chen Xitong affair is from 

Zong, pp. 285-288; and Nathan and Gilley pp. 154-157.

134. Marcus W. Brauchli, “Beijing and McDonald’s Settle Location Dispute,” 

The Asian Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1994, p. J.1; Peggy Sito, “Work stopped 

on troubled McDonald’s site Li Peng steps into plaza row,” South China Morning 

Post, December 22, 1994, p. 1. See also the description of the threat in Gilley’s Tiger, 

pp. 242-245.
173

135. Gilley, Tiger, p. 245.

136. Zong, p. 286.

137. Ibid., pp. 287-289.

138. A long account of the “secret envoy” talks from 1988 to 1995 held under 

the auspices of a Hong Kong-based, Rasputin-style “Qigong Master” and Zen 

philosopher named Nan Huaijin, is related in Lee Teng-hui’s authoritative (if not 

wholly “authorized”) biography. See Zou Jingwen, Li Denghui Zhizheng Gaobai 

Shilyu (A True Account of Lee Teng-hui’s Tenure), Chengyang Chuban She, Taipei 

2001, pp. 192-214.

139. Zou Jingwen, p. 201. All other information about the “secret envoys” is 

from Zou’s book unless otherwise noted.

140. See “Li Teng-hui News Conference on Mideast Trip,” Taipei China Times, 

April 5, 1995, pp. 1-2, transcribed by FBIS.

141. Zou Jingwen, p. 204

142. Qu Tao, “Jiang Zemin Promotes Hong Hu,” Hong Kong Chengming

magazine, November 1, 1997, No. 142, pp. 41-43, translated by FBIS.

143. Ling Chen, “When Has Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin’s Ambitious Top 

Advisor, Emerged From Behind the Scenes?” Hong Kong Kai Fang magazine, No. 

145, January 3, 1999, pp. 35-38.

144. Hao Xinyi, “CPC Comprehensively Readjusts Its Policy Toward Taiwan,” 

Hong Kong Ming Pao, September 10, 1996, p. A12, transcribed by FBIS.

145. Xiao Peng, “Zeng Qinghong Joins Central Leading Group for Taiwan 

Affairs,” Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, September 7, 1998, p. A7, translated by 

FBIS.

146. Wang Zhuozhong, “Zeng Qinghong, Chen Yunlin jiang zhang dui Tai 

Gong zuo” (Zeng Qinghong, Chen Yunlin to run Taiwan Work portfolio), Taipei 

China Times, November 15, 2002.

147. See Wang Zhuozhong, “Zhonggong dui Tai Juece Xin Ban di, Yi zhiwu 

Gongneng Kaoliang” (The CCP’s new cadre of Taiwan Policymakers, Professional 

Capacities is main consideration), Taipei China Times, December 26, 2003. Author 

cites Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po as reporting that the CCP Central Taiwan Task 

Force (Zhong Yang Dui Tai Gong Zuo Xiao Zu) had been reshuffl ed and formally 

announced on December 25. The new nine-man Task Force includes one more 
174

member than the previous group. They are Hu Jintao (replacing Jiang Zemin, 

as chief), Jia Qinglin (replacing Qian Qichen as deputy), Tang Jiaxuan (state 

councilor, replacing Zeng Qinghong, as secretary general), Wang Gang (director 

of General Offi ce of the CPC Central Committee, new), Liu Yantong (Head of the 

United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, replacing Wang 

Zhaoguo), Wang Daohan (president of the Association for Relations Across the 

Taiwan Strait, remains), Chen Yunlin (Director of Taiwan Affairs Offi ce of China’s 

State Council, remains), Xu Yungyao (National Security Minister, remains), Xiong 

Guangkai (Deputy Chief of General Staff of PLA, remains). Aside from Hu Jintao 

himself, only Minister of State Security Xu Yunyao is clearly not a Jiang Zemin 

protégé, and consequently may not be inclined to seek Zeng Qinghong’s guidance. 

Zeng kept Tang Jiaxuan on the job even after the fi asco of Jiang Zemin’s Tokyo visit 

of 1998 (see below), Wang Gang is also considered a “brother and faction member 

of Zeng Qinghong” (Wang was in the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building with 

Zeng for 10 years). 

148. At the end of December 2003, the removal of a key Shanghai man from 

the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce indicated that Zeng Qinghong may be losing his grip 

on Taiwan policy. See “Zhuan Zhou Mingwei bei diaoli Guotaiban ‘Shanghai 

Bang’ Zaici Shoushang” (Zhou Mingwei transfer from the State Council Taiwan 

Offi ce said to be another blow to the ‘Shanghai Faction’”), Singapore Asia Times (in 

Chinese), December 29, 2003, at http://www4.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Forums/

BackStage/2003_12_29_8_43_39_511.html.

149. Chen Weiming, “Deng Xiaoping Requires the Preliminary Work 

Committee to Do Down-to-Earth Work,” in the Pro-PRC Hong Kong magazine, 

Ching Pao, No. 1, January 5, 1994, pp. 18-19, translated by FBIS.

150. “Jiang Zemin’s Assistant Zeng Qinghong Arrives in Hong Kong to 

Make Arrangements for Reversion,” Hong Kong Ming Pao, June 23, 1997, p. A2, 

translated by FBIS. Liu Fei-lang (cited earlier) also says that before the 15th party 

congress (1997) Zeng was “given another title, that of fi rst political commissar 

of the Central Guards Regiment” the unit that is responsible for the protective 

security of the central leadership.

151. Zheng Hanliang, “23 tiao zenma xiu? Zhongyang liang tiao luxian?” 

(How to revise Article 23? Are there Two Lines at the Center?), Taipei China Times, 

July 7, 2003.

152. The China Daily headline read “Conspiracy to Subvert,” and the editorial 

accused the democratic camp of trying to transplant “Western political systems 

to Hong Kong.” “Hong Kong Democrats Attacked in Editorial in China-Owned 

Paper,” Bloomberg wire service, July 14, 2003, at http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/

news?pid=10000080&sid=ajFWimtYe80M&refer=asia#.
175

153. Even the English language press was sensitive to Liu’s patrimony―see 

Joseph Kahn, “Analysts See Tension Among Chinas Leaders,” New York Times, 

July 1, 2003. Liu Yunshan is a rigid party ideologue on propaganda matters 

according to Charles Hutzler, “Beijing Strives to Match Changing Nation’s Pace,” 

The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2003, at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1066584

95545149000,00.html.

154. Wong Kwok Wah, “ANALYSIS: HK leader loses the mandate of 

heaven,” Singapore, Asia Times, July 9, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/

EG09Ad03.html.

155. Hamish McDonald, “Hong Kong protesters to keep up the pressure,” 

Melbourne, The Age, July 7 2003, at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/06/

1057430073927.html.

156. Chen Jingxin, “Beijing Si Jutou, Gao Zitai Yan Dong” (Four Beijing 

Heavyweights give high profi le support to Tung), New York World Journal, July 

20, 2003.

157. “Wen Jiabao Hui Dong, Xian Paiding Xinwan,” (Wen Jiabao sees C. H. 

Tung, fi rst prescribes a dose of digitalis), New York World Journal, July 21, 2003 

(citing Taipei Central News Agency).

158. Philip P. Pan, “China’s Leaders Show Support for Hong Kong’s 

Chief Executive,” The Washington Post, Sunday, July 20, 2003, p. A28, at http:

//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17238-2003Jul19.html.

159. See “Zeng Qinghong fenguan Xianggang shiwu” (Zeng Qinghong 

assigned to handle Hong Kong Affairs,” New York, World Journal, July 23, 2003. 

See also Ching Cheong, “Beijing may shelve new HK law,” Singapore, The Straits 

Times, August 15, 2003.

160. Ching Cheong, “Beijing may shelve new HK law,” Singapore, The Straits 

Times, August 15, 2003, p. 1.

161. “Zeng Qinghong fan Yue shicha, Zhaojian Dong Jianhua, liaojie Gangfu 

chehui guoan tiaoli hou zhuangkuang, qiangdiao wending dui Xianggangde 

zhongyaoxing,” (Zeng Qinghong returns from inspection of Guangdong, 

Summons C. H. Tung for an appreciation of the situation in the wake of the recall 

of National Security legislation, Stresses the importance of stability to Hong 

Kong), New York, World Journal, September 17, 2003, p. 2.

162. Ling Chen. 

163. Ibid.
176

164. Ibid. The most scathing commentary came from the Hong Kong press. 

See Wang Ziyan, “Jiang Zemin’s Visit to Japan Premature, Ill-Timed,” Hong Kong 

Hsin Pao, November 30, 1998, p. 20, which said all the visit did “was to expose 

the weakness of the Japan policy of the Chinese government” and called it “Jiang 

Zemin’s worst diplomatic failure since he assumed offi ce.”

165. Wang Ziyan (above), see also “Twelve Senior Diplomats Who Were 

Promoted Through Open Selection Have Recently Gone To Their Posts―Zeng 

Qinghong Demands Stepping Up The Reform of The Personnel System Of Cadres 

Dealing With Foreign Affairs,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, in Chinese, 1348 

GMT, March 19, 2003, translated by FBIS.

166. The reporting of Zeng’s “secret” visit was quite public, and references 

to “free assistance” were replete in the Chinese press. See Kwon Kyong-pok, 

“Background Behind CPC Organization Department Director’s Visit to DPRK,” 

Seoul Yonhap, 0108 GMT, March 20, 2001, FBIS translated text. Zhang Jinfang 

and Li Zhengyu, “Kim Chong-il, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of 

Korea and Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, Meets With 

Zeng Qinghong,” Beijing, Xinhua 1513 GMT, March 22, 2001, FBIS translated text. 

Kim Jong Il Meets CPC Leader,” Beijing Xinhua 1555 GMT, March 22, 2001, FBIS 

transcribed text. 

167. Kwon Kyong-pok: “Director Zeng Qinghong’s Visit to North Korea, 

What Did it Accomplish?,” Seoul Yonhap (Internet Version-WWW), 1517 GMT, 

March 25, 2001, FBIS translated text.

168. See Wen Yu, “Zeng Qinghong: A Potential Challenger To China’s Heir 

Apparent,” The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief China Brief Vol. 1, No. 10, November Vol. 1, No. 10, November 

21, 2001. Jiang had been making a habit of lavishing particular attention on Zeng 

in the presence of foreign leaders. In a meeting with Russian President Putin at 

the October 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai, Jiang introduced Zeng to Russian 

president Putin as “Qinghong, our director of the Organization Department 

and a member of the Secretariat.” Most analysts saw Jiang’s reference to Zeng 

simply as “Qinghong” as implying an extremely close relationship, at http:

//www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=17&issue_id=638&article_

id=4589.

169. See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference on July 15, 2003, at http:

//www.china-un.ch/eng/52865.html. 

170. “Chuli Yang Bin An, Chuan you Zeng Qinghong Fuze” (Zeng Qinghong 

said to handle Yang Bin Case), Taipei China Times, October 8, 2002 (cites Hong 

Kong’s Jingji Ribao).

171. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China looks ahead to Korea crisis,” CNN International 

(internet report), March 18, 2003, at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/
177

03/18/willy.column/n policies. See also Joseph Kahn, “Six Party Talks U.S. Set to Take 

a Hard Line in Talks on Korean Arms,” the New York Times, August 27, 2003, at 

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/27/international/asia/27KORE.html.

172. Wu Su-li, “‘Shenzhou’ Space Strategy,” Hong Kong Kai Fang magazine, 

No 156, December 5, 1999, pp. 15-16, FBIS.

173. “Kaifang Zazhi: Jiang Zemin Kao Juntou ji zhang Jun quan” (Kaifang 

Magazine says Jiang Zemin relies on Military chiefs for hold on Military power), 

New York World Journal, December 6, 2002.

174. “Zeng Qinghong mingnian keneng ren Junwei Fuzhuxi” (Zeng Qinghong 

could be named CMC Vice Chairman next year), New York World Journal, April 

3, 2003 (citing Hong Kong Kaifang [Open] magazine). See also Wang Zhuozhong, 

“Jiang Zemin Ji Zhang ‘Guofang Waijiao Liangan’ San Daquan” (Jiang Zemin 

maintains grip on authority in three priority areas, ‘Defense, Foreign Affairs, 

Cross-Strait’), Taipei China Times, February 17, 2003.

175. Ruan Leyi, “Zeng Qinghong Shiqi Da ren Junwei fuzhuxi?” (Will Zeng 

Qinghong wait for 17th CPP Congress before being CMC Vice Chairman?), Taipei 

China Times, December 15, 2003, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/

newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112003121500066,00.html.

176. See “China’s Zeng spreads wings, gains power with military post,” 

based on Reuters dispatches, Taipei China Post, November 4, 2003, at http://

www.chinapost.com.tw/p_detail.asp?id=42807&GRP=A&onNews=.

177. “Hangtian Er Yuan Jianyuan 45 zhou nian, Li Lanqing, Wu Bangguo, Zeng 

Qinghong, deng biaoshi zhuhe” (Li Lanqing, Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong and 

others offer congratulations on the 45th anniversary of the Second Astronautical 

Institute), Press Release, China National Space Administration, November 28, 

2002, at http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/brow.asp?id=1154.

178. News release, “Jiang Zemin Xianchang Guankan ‘Shenzhou”Sanhao 

Feichuan Fashe Chenggong” (Jiang Zemin observes the successful launch of the 

‘Shenzhou-3’ Spacecraft at the launch site), China National Space Administration, 

March 25, 2002, at http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/brow.asp?id=725.

179. “Zhonghua Remnin Gonghe Guo Di Shijie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao 

Dahui daibiao Mingdan (2982 ming)” (Namelist of delegates to the Tenth Session 

of the People’s Republic of China National People’s Congress [2982 names]), 

People’s Daily Information Database, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/

9667/9685/20030315/944408.html.

180. “Kui Fulin shuai Junshi Daibiaotuan Chufang Feizhou san guo” (Kui 

Fulin leads a military delegation to three African nations), Beijing People’s 
178

Liberation Army Daily, April 3, 2003, at http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/

2002/04/03/20020403001090_army.html. Fu Zong Canmozhang Xiong Guangkai 

Shangjiang Qicheng fan Nanfei Chuxi Huiyi, (Vice Chief of General Staff General 

Xiong Guangkai Embarks on trip to South Africa to attend conference), April 6, 

2003, at http://jczs.sina.com.cn/2003-04-06/119324.html.

181. Among them were: www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200304/06/

eng20030406_114633.shtml, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9685/

20030315/944408.html, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/60/20021028/852180.html, 

www.jiaodong.net/2003/2/68203.htm, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2002/10/

27/20021027001043_world.html, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2001/12/12/

20011212001112_army.html, http://mil.21dnn.com/5051/2002-10-27/186@486760.htm, 

http://www.pladaily.com.cn/big5/pladaily/2002/04/20/20020420001067_army.html, http:

//jczs.sina.com.cn/2003-04-06/119324.html, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/

2002/04/03/20020403001090_army.html.

182. See the Beijing PCC web site at http://www.beinet.net.cn/bjzx2003/overture/

index.jsp. In 1998, Zeng Haisheng was awarded a Science and Technology 

Progress Prize, Third Class, possibly for her work in computerizing the General 

Staff Records Offi ce, see http://www.chinatech.com.cn/aspx/kejiziliao/kejijiangxiang/

jinbujiang/jinbujiang202.htm.

183. See the Jiangxi Agricultural and Economic Net at http://www.jxagriec.gov.cn.
179

CHAPTER 6

THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS AND LEADERSHIP 

CHANGES IN THE PLA

Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise

Dean Cheng

Ken Gause

INTRODUCTION

The 16th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), held November 8-15, 2002, 

set into motion signifi cant changes in the Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) high command. In a single re-shuffl e, the directorship 

of each of the four general departments of the PLA was replaced, 

ushering into power a group who, most concur, are younger, 

better educated, and more professionalized than any previous PLA 

leadership. At the same time, Jiang Zemin retained the position of 

Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman although giving up 

all his other Party (and later State) positions.

This transition takes place at a critical moment in China’s 

history. China’s new military (and political) leadership is faced with 

a rapidly changing international security environment, radically 

different from those facing its predecessors. The current leadership 

must adjust to the new demands brought about by the U.S.-led 

Global War on Terrorism, even as it is responding to transnational 

issues that had previously been given less attention (everything 

from issues of emerging diseases to emerging terrorism threats). 

Moreover, it must do so in the context of latent domestic upheaval. 

China’s internal situation is undergoing tremendous change as 

well, partly as a consequence of two decades of economic reform, 

and there are a host of burgeoning social, economic, and political 

problems. 

Finally, these new leaders have come into power at an important 

phase in PLA reform and modernization. They will be charged with 

implementing many of the reforms fi rst developed before or during 

Jiang’s tenure as paramount leader of the PRC. These challenges go 
180

beyond simply the acquisition of weapons and technology and span 

the spectrum of institutional and systemic reforms that will enable 

the PLA to professionalize, modernize, and realize the aspirations 

Jiang laid out in his “Two Transformations” program of reform and 

modernization.

Who are these military leaders? Who are the key staff members 

that will support them in this effort? What experiences in their 

careers have prepared them to meet the challenges that lie ahead? 

The following paper will attempt to answer these questions.

CAREER PATHS IN CONTEXT OF PLA DEVELOPMENT 

AND REFORM

Before looking at the biographies of these new military leaders, 

it is useful to review some of the key events that have shaped the 

recent history of the PLA in order to better understand their impact 

on this new CMC. For example, one would want to know where, 

institutionally, these new leaders sat during previous periods of 

crisis or tension. This would include understanding what positions 

these leaders held during the summer of 1989 or as the crisis evolved 

during the Taiwan Straits missile tests in 1995-96. 

Other events deal more directly with the reform and 

modernization of the PLA. The new members of the Central Military 

Commission were not mere spectators to the dramatic changes 

that have taken place within the PLA over the past two decades. 

In many cases they were active participants, implementing military 

policies and responding to national crises. And, their involvement 

in these changes was deemed to be successful. These events shaped 

their careers, defi ned what were seen to be their professional 

accomplishments, and make up the experiences that they will draw 

upon when leading the People’s Liberation Army in the coming 

years.

Some key events include:

Development of the New Strategic Assessment of “Peace and 

Development.”

In 1985 Deng Xiaoping provided an assessment of the 

international security environment that has since provided a 
181

rationale for the basic direction of China’s domestic policies, foreign 

policies, and defense policies. Key to this was the belief that “peace 

and development” was the keynote of the times—that China would 

enjoy a relatively long lasting peaceful environment in which it 

could concentrate on economic development. With this assessment, 

Deng determined that what had previously been considered the 

most likely PLA contingency—fi ghting an imminent war, total 

war, and nuclear war—was no longer applicable and that the PLA 

should instead train and prepare for a more limited, locally-oriented 

war. This fundamental shift in assumptions made PLA reform and 

modernization possible. 

Quite simply, when the PRC was working under the assumption 

that total war was imminent, the PLA could only rely on the weapons 

and techniques it had on hand to defend China. With war no longer 

considered to be imminent, and with two decades of predicted 

peace in which to reform, modernize, innovate, and experiment, the 

door was now open for doctrinal adjustment based on new military 

developments. It was possible for the PLA to plan for the future as 

well as deal with the present.1 As a result the PRC leadership made 

a decision to modernize the PLA while at the same time carrying out 

a program of economic development.

The defi nition of this most likely type of confl ict for which the PLA 

was preparing to fi ght has changed several times since this fi rst 

groundbreaking change: from Local Wars to Local Wars Under 

Modern Conditions, to Local Wars Under Modern High Tech 

Conditions. Each change has brought with it some adjustment 

to PLA military doctrine. These changes in turn have had to be 

internalized by PLA leaders, passed down through the ranks, and 

utilized in training. Rising offi cers in the PLA were called upon to 

master these changes and further implement them over the course 

of their careers.

Downsizing and Force Restructuring.

Concomitant with the decision to reform and modernize the PLA 

while focusing on economic development was the conclusion that 

PLA restructuring was necessary, as well. This involved downsizing 
182

the PLA, both in terms of manpower and organizational structure. 

Thus, in 1985 the PLA was reduced by a million in personnel, and 

the number of Military Regions (MR) went from eleven to seven. 

This was followed by later force reductions of 500,000 (announced in 

1997) and 200,000 (announced in 2003).

Although a critical move necessary in order to promote 

modernization and professionalization in the PLA offi cer corps, 

implementing this decision presented a host of challenges for 

offi cers in the PLA. This was particularly true for those working 

in the headquarters of military regions and in the General Staff 

Department (GSD) and those working on personnel related issues. 

As provincial and local governments worked with appropriate 

military counterparts to provide newly demobilized soldiers with 

appropriate jobs and housing, PLA offi cers developed a more 

nuanced appreciation for the evolving relationship between the 

PLA and society. Offi cers assigned to various military regions were 

able to see how this restructuring was affecting the PLA and were 

given an opportunity to gain a deeper appreciation for the limits 

and challenges downsizing presented. They also were afforded an 

opportunity to see the potential for professionalization and reform 

such polices provided.

Operation Desert Storm.

U.S. operations during the 1991 Gulf War left a deeper 

impression on the leadership of the Chinese military than virtually 

any previous military action. Most were shocked and stunned by the 

highly televised U.S. victory; more to the point, they were surprised 

by what this victory indicated about the state of modern warfare, 

including the role of joint operations in modern warfare.

The Gulf War resulted in a PLA “study campaign” to understand 

the operational signifi cance of the event. Upon assessing the rapidly 

changing nature of modern warfare, China’s leadership apparently 

drew two important conclusions. First, it revised its conception of 

the most likely types of wars and campaigns its military would be 

called upon to prosecute. Second, it concluded that the armed forces 

of China were ill equipped to fi ght and win these new, most likely 

campaigns, which they termed “Local Wars Under Modern High 

Tech Conditions.” 
183

Two Transformations Program of Reform and Modernization.

Based upon the conclusions the PLA leadership drew from 

the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA set upon a course of thorough and 

comprehensive reform—cutting across virtually every conceivable 

facet of activity within the PLA and seeking measured leaps in the 

intellectual, professional, and conceptual outlooks of its defense 

establishment and virtually every member of its military.2

In December 1995, at an enlarged meeting of the CMC chaired 

by Jiang Zemin, China’s military leaders put forth a new policy for 

“army building” or defense modernization to guide all aspects of 

PLA reform.3 Known as the “Two Transformations,” it calls for the 

Chinese armed forces to undergo a metamorphosis, transforming:

• From an army preparing to fi ght local wars under ordinary 

conditions to an army preparing to fi ght and win Local Wars 

Under Modern High Tech Conditions.

• From an army based on quantity to an army based on quality.

Although a holistic endeavor, the true scope and breadth of these 

reforms is best understood by considering them as three separate 

vectors aimed at the same objective. 4 (See Figure 1.)

Material Vector

Doctrinal Vector

Institutional Vector

Capability to fi ght and win 

future Local Wars Under 

Modern High Tech Conditions

Figure 1. Three Vectors of PLA Reform and Modernization.
184

• Material vector—weapons, equipment, and new age systems. 

Reforms in this area are aimed at improving the weapons 

and equipment that the PLA will use to wage a campaign. 

They involve the development, procurement, acquisition, and 

fi elding of new weapons systems, technologies, command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets and architectures, and both 

combat and combat support technologies.

• Doctrinal vector—operational concepts and warfi ghting 

techniques. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving how

the PLA will fi ght. It consists of the new operational concepts: 

strategic guidelines, campaign methods, and tactics. 

• Institutional vector—systemic underpinning, organizations, 

and processes. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving the 

institutions that enable the PLA to fulfi ll its national security 

objectives. It includes reforms to the systemic underpinnings, 

organizations, and processes that support and enable the fi rst 

two vectors of reform. Examples include the personnel system, 

military education system, training regimens, force structure, 

command and control relationships, logistics structure, defense 

research and development complex, standardization processes 

(the codifi cation of regulations and standard operating 

procedures), and military legal system. 

It would be diffi cult to overstate the degree to which the PLA 

has focused on this program of reform and modernization in recent 

years. Reforms occurring along each of these vectors have been 

repeatedly emphasized in PLA discussions during the bulk of the 

past 10 years.

Progress along the material vector is comparatively easy to 

measure. Leaders engaged in these sorts of reforms include those 

engaged in weapons procurement and those participating in or 

guiding the development of new types of weapons and equipment. 

Military leaders engaged in work along the doctrinal vector 

would include those involved in the formulation, vetting, and 

implementation of new operational concepts and techniques. At 

various phases in the process, this would include researchers 

at military science research and teaching institutions such as 
185

the Academy of Military Science and China’s National Defense 

University. It would also include operators, such as leaders in 

experimental units that are charged to test and evaluate new tactics 

and operational concepts and those working in the headquarters 

departments of Military Regions who might be charged to 

incorporate these concepts in large-scale military exercises. 

Military leaders engaged in work along the institutional vector 

focus on improving the systemic underpinnings supporting PLA 

reform and modernization. Often this work supports activities 

occurring along the other two vectors of reform. Offi cers engaged 

in this work can be found both “at the center” working within the 

four general departments, and at the headquarters departments of 

military regions throughout China.

In light of all these changes, the PLA is therefore in fl ux. That 

is, it is operating in the midst of both internal evolution (covering 

institutions and doctrine, as well as equipment), as well as nationallevel changes (in terms of the ongoing process of economic reform 

and the building of a “socialist market economy”) and a global 

security environment that has seen, since at least 2001, enormous 

shifts. 

LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE CENTRAL MILITARY 

COMMISSION

It is in this context that the 16th Party Congress met in 2003. In 

the course of that Party Congress, there was an almost complete 

personnel overhaul in the composition of the CMC, the highest 

military body (see Table 1). The overall number of CMC members 

was reduced from eleven to eight and the heads of each of the 

four PLA General Departments changed. [Note: In April 2004, the 

Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po reported that the membership 

of the CMC would soon expand from eight to eleven. The three 

new members would be Vice Admiral Zhang Dingfa, commander 

of the PLA Navy, General Qiao Qingchen, commander of the PLA 

Air Force, and Lieutenant General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of 

PLA Second Artillery. If true, this change would establish a Central 

Military Commission that is remarkably “joint” in its composition. 

At the time of this writing, however, such a change has not been 

formally announced.]
186

Position Previously held by Currently held by

Chairman Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin, no change

Vice Chairman Hu Jintao Hu Jintao, no change

Vice Chairmen Zhang Wannian 

Chi Haotian Guo Boxiong Cao Gangchuan 

Director of the General Staff 

Department (GSD) Fu Quanyou Liang Guanglie

Director of the General Political 

Department (GPD) Yu Yongbo General Xu Caihou

Director of the General Logistics 

Department (GLD) Wang Ke Liao Xilong

Director of General Armament 

Department (GAD) Cao Gangchuan Li Jinai

Table 1. Changes in Make-up of the CMC 

Resulting from 16th Party Congress.

Six individuals retired. These were: 

• Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the Central Military 

Commission 

• Chi Haotian, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission 

and concurrent Minister of Defense 

• Fu Quanyou, chief of General Staff Department (GSD)5

• Yu Yongbo, director of the General Political Department (GPD)

• Wang Ke, director of the General Logistics Department (GLD)

• Wang Ruilin, deputy director of the General Political Department 

(GPD). 

Five individuals retained their membership. Chairman Jiang 

Zemin and Vice Chairman Hu Jintao each retained their original 

CMC positions. In addition to their non-CMC posts, Cao Gangchuan, 

former director of the General Armament Department (GAD) and 

Guo Boxiong, former executive deputy chief of the GSD were both 

promoted to vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission.6

Xu Caihou, former CMC member and executive deputy director 
187

of the General Political Department retained his membership and 

was appointed director of the GPD. Although this was not a change 

in military grade (CMC members that are not vice chairmen are 

all grade three), Xu Caihou was also made a member of the CCP 

Secretariat. As he was the only member of the PLA to hold such a 

position, the 16th Party Congress personnel shuffl e established Xu 

as a critical link between the Party and its military for issues of dayto-day Party affairs.

Three new individuals were added: Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong, 

and Li Jinai. In addition to being made members of the CMC, Liang 

Guanglie, former commander of the Nanjing Military Region was 

made the head of the General Staff Department; Liao Xilong, former 

commander of the Chengdu Military Region, was made director 

of the General Logistics Department; and Li Jinai, former Political 

Commissar of the General Armaments Department was made 

Director of the GAD.

MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY 

COMMISSION

The civilian leaders on the CMC have been the subject of much 

research and discussion already. This paper will focus instead on 

the new military members of the CMC and the background and 

experiences they bring to bear on the challenges the PLA will face in 

the coming decade.7 Key aspects of their background are outlined in 

table two.

CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong.

During the 16th Party Congress, Guo Boxiong was made vice 

chairman of the CMC and a member of the Politburo of the Central 

Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Prior to this, he 

held the positions of CMC member and executive deputy director of 

the General Staff Department.

Guo Boxiong was born in 1942. He joined the PLA in 1961 at 

age 19 and joined the CCP in 1963 at age 21.8 He received military 

training at the Xian Army Academy, at the PLA Military Academy, 

and at China’s National Defense University.9
188

Guo has been a member of the PLA for over 43 years. He spent 

the fi rst two decades of his career (from 1961 to 1982) with the 55th 

Division of the 19th Army, rising from enlisted soldier to chief of 

staff of the division.10 He also served as both a staff member of 

the Propaganda Group of the Political Section in one of the 55th 

Division’s regiments, as well as in the Combat Training Group of the 

headquarters of the same regiment (the 164th Regiment). 

Guo has spent the bulk of the second half of his career in 

military region headquarters positions gaining expertise in military 

operations and command issues. From 1983-1985, Guo was the 

chief of staff of the PLA’s 19th Army. In 1985, as the PLA began 

its dramatic shift from a wartime to a peacetime footing, Guo was 

deputy chief of staff of the Lanzhou MR. This was followed by a 

three year stint as commander of the 47th Group Army. In 1993, Guo 

was made deputy commander of the Beijing MR—a position he held 

during the Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1995-96. This was followed 

in 1997 by an appointment to be commander of the Lanzhou MR. 

Guo is also experienced in issues related to military training. 

During the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, for example, he served as 

the deputy head of the Combat Training Section of the 19th Group 

Army. He also has a reputation in the PLA for developing innovative 

tactics. During the Western ‘93 and ‘94 war games, he is said to have 

earned the esteem of the CMC by orchestrating exercises featuring 

live mobile rapid response operations, frontier defense bolstering, 

and border counterattack. He also is credited with introducing 

new tactics for mobilizing elite forces for air/land attacks and 

integrated mobile strikes against key targets.11 While serving as 

deputy commander of Beijing Military Region and commander 

of Lanzhou Military Region, he was credited with introducing 

“quality management initiatives” in an effort to improve combat 

effectiveness.12

After serving as commander of the Lanzhou MR for two years, 

Guo was made a member of the CMC, GSD executive deputy chief, 

and deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the PLA General 

Staff Department. In 2002, Guo was made a member of the Politburo 

as well as CMC vice chairman.
189

CMC Vice Chairman and Minister of Defense Cao Gangchuan.

Like Guo Boxiong, as a result of the 16th Party Congress, Cao 

Gangchuan was made vice chairman of the CMC and a member of 

the Politburo. During the subsequent National People’s Congress 

(NPC) in March of the following year, he was made Minister of 

Defense.

At age 68, Cao Gangchuan is the oldest military member of the 

new CMC. General Cao’s career in the PLA spans fi ve decades. He 

joined the PLA in 1954 and joined the CCP in 1956. 

Seemingly marked early on for advancement, Cao spent virtually 

the fi rst decade of his military career in training. First, he attended 

the Nanjing No. 3 Artillery Ordnance Technical School and the No.1 

Ordnance Technical School (1954-56). He next went to Dalian for 

Russian language training, and then went to the Soviet Union to train 

at the Leningrad Advanced Artillery Military Engineering School 

(a.k.a. the Soviet Army Artillery Academy), where he majored in 

missile design. He returned to the PRC in 1963. 

During his lengthy career, Cao has gained a substantial level of 

experience on issues related to equipment. Cao spent over two and a 

half decades focused on issues of ordnance and military equipment. 

He served in a variety of positions fi rst within the General Logistics 

Department and then in the Military Equipment Department of the 

GSD.13 These positions ranged from working in the Ammunition 

Division of the GLD Ordnance Department (1963) to serving as 

deputy director of the GSD Military Equipment Department (1989).

Thirty-fi ve years into his military career, Cao Gangchuan was 

made, fi rst, director of the Military Affairs offi ce in the GSD, and 

later director of the CMC Offi ce of Military Trade. In 1992, as the 

PLA began to digest the lessons it had learned from its observations 

of U.S. operations during Operation DESERT STORM, Cao was 

appointed to the position of GSD deputy chief. He was reportedly the 

fi rst person without any combat experience to hold this position.14

In many ways, General Cao has been one of the critical leaders 

in the PLA’s efforts to advance the modernization of its weapons 

and equipment. In 1996, Cao left his position in the GSD and was 

appointed minister of the Commission of Science, Technology, 
190

and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). This transfer from 

a GSD position to a position that was under the dual jurisdiction 

of the PLA and the State Council was considered unusual. Many 

concluded that this was an indication of Jiang’s renewed interest in 

reforming the national Chinese military industrial complex as part 

of his ongoing program of reform and modernization known as the 

“Two Transformations.”15

During his tenure in this position, Cao repeatedly pressed for 

modernization in the face of resource constraints. He is reported 

to have publicly argued for increases in the PLA military budget, 

particularly in the area of research and development. For example, 

in 1997, after learning that the projected budget increase was 12.7 per 

cent (6.6 per cent above infl ation) he is reported to have complained 

that the PLA had no choice but to postpone many research and 

development projects, stating, “We have to feed and clothe three 

million-odd soldiers. What’s left after that?”16

In 1998, General Cao became the fi rst director of the newly 

formed General Armament Department—a position he held until 

his promotion to vice chairman at the 16th Party Congress. As 

director of the GAD he continued his work of promoting scientifi c 

and technological innovation as a means of improving the PLA’s 

military capabilities, i.e., advancements on the material vector of 

PLA reform. 

Cao is reportedly trying to foster innovation in the PLA weapons 

development process through the introduction of such measures as 

competition.17 One can expect Cao to continue to advocate innovation 

and reform during his tenure as vice chairman, as he helps to guide 

the PLA in its ongoing program of reform and modernization.

CMC and CCP Secretariat Member Xu Caihou.

Prior to the 16th Party Congress, Xu was a CMC member and 

held the post of executive deputy director of the General Political 

Department. In addition, he held the position of secretary of the 

PLA Discipline Inspection Committee—a post that gave him a 

great deal of infl uence over promotions and other PLA personnel 

moves. At the 16th Party Congress, Xu maintained his membership 
191

in the CMC as well as his position as secretary of the PLA Discipline 

Inspection Committee, and was further promoted to director of the 

General Political Department. At the same time, Xu was also given 

membership in the CCP Secretariat.18 As the only PLA offi cer serving 

in this body, he is a critical fi gure in Chinese civil-military (or at least 

Party-Army) relations.

Xu Caihou was born in Liaoning in June 1943. He joined the 

PLA in 1963, and spent the bulk of his career in the Shenyang MR 

working on personnel and political issues. Soon after enlisting, Xu 

became a student in the Electronics Engineering Department of the 

prestigious Harbin Institute of Military Engineering. He graduated 

in 1968—just as the Cultural Revolution was reaching its height.

Immediately thereafter, he was sent to a farm controlled by 

the 39th Army. Subsequently, he was sent, as a soldier, to the Jilin 

Provincial Military District. There, he began as a deputy company 

political instructor, then became a deputy political instructor in an 

artillery regiment in the Shenyang MR. 

Xu has spent the bulk of his career in the Shenyang MR working 

on personnel and political issues. From 1972 to 1982, he was 

secretary and deputy chief in the Personnel Division of the Political 

Department of the Jilin Provincial Military District. During this time, 

he also studied at the PLA Institute of Political Sciences (October 

1980-August 1982). He rose to become chief of the Personnel Division 

of the same Political Department, then became deputy director of 

that Political Department in 1983-1984. 

For the next decade, Xu held a series of positions of increasing 

responsibility in military region and group army commands. He 

served as director of the Mass Work Section of the Shenyang MR’s 

Political Department (1984-85), director of the Political Department 

of the 16th Group Army (1985-1990), and then was promoted to 

political commissar of the 16th Group Army. 

Xu digested the PLA’s lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War 

while serving in the position of assistant to the director, and then 

deputy director, of the GPD. He remained in the GPD throughout a 

series of dramatic events for the PLA, including the purge of the Yang 

brothers and Jiang’s announcement of the “Two Transformations” 

program of reform and modernization.19 For a portion of this time he 
192

also served as director of the Liberation Army Publishing House and 

served as co-editor of Liberation Army Daily.

 20 Xu remained deputy 

director of the GPD until 1996, when he became political commissar 

for the Jinan MR. 

In 1999, Xu became a member of the CMC and executive deputy 

director of the PLA GPD. In 2000, he also gained the position of 

secretary of the Discipline Inspection Committee of the CMC, as 

well as deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the PLA GPD. 

He continued to hold all these positions in 2002 when he succeeded 

his old boss, Yu Yongbo, as CMC member and director of the GPD 

and became a member of the CCP Secretariat. 

CMC Member and Director of the General Staff Department 

Liang Guanglie.

At the 16th Party Congress, Liang Guanglie was promoted from 

commander of the Nanjing Military Region to member of the Central 

Military Committee and director of the General Staff Department.

Liang Guanglie was born in December 1940. He joined the PLA 

in 1958 and the CCP in 1959. He attended the Xinyang PLA Infantry 

School, the Military Academy in Nanjing, and the Chinese National 

Defense University and has a degree from Henan University, where 

he completed a political theory correspondence education program.

Liang worked his way up from the lowest ranks in the PLA. From 

1958-1963, Liang was in the First Army, fi rst as an enlisted soldier 

and squad leader and subsequently as commander of an engineer 

company and staff offi cer of the operations and training branch, 

Headquarters (HQ), 2nd Regiment, 1st Division of the First Army. In 

1966, he became a staff offi cer of the engineering branch. In 1970 he 

held that same position in the operations and training branch of that 

same headquarters. It was in this fi eld, operations, that he then spent 

the bulk of his military career.

From 1970 to 1979, he was in various positions in the Wuhan 

Military Command HQ, including as a staff offi cer in the Operations 

Department, deputy chief of the fi rst section of the Operations 

Department, then deputy head of the Operations Department. 

Liang gained combat experience during the Sino-Vietnam War 

of 1979. From 1979 to 1981, Liang was the deputy commander of 
193

the 58th Division of the 20th Army, before rising to command of 

the same division from 1981 to 1983. Liang was promoted to deputy 

commander of the entire 20th Army in 1983 and rose to command 

that Army in 1985, a position he held for the next fi ve years. It is 

reported that at the time Liang was serving in these positions, 

the 20th Army was a test unit for new concepts in organization. 

He is rumored to have played a hand in the formation of the fi rst 

mechanized brigades in the Chinese military and the formation of 

the PLA’s fi rst emergency response unit.21

Next, Liang became the commander of the 54th Group Army. 

According to his offi cial biography, this event occurred in 1990. 

However, as David Shambaugh has pointed out in previous work, 

one should note the existence of unverifi ed news reports in the Hong 

Kong press asserting (1) that Liang actually took up the position in 

1988 and (2) that the 54th Group Army played an unspecifi ed role in 

enforcing martial law in Beijing in 1989. 22

In 1993, he was promoted to chief of staff of the Beijing MR—

crossing career paths with Guo Boxing.23 He then became the Beijing 

MR deputy commander in 1995 and held this position during the 

PRC’s Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1995-96. In 1997, Liang rose to 

command of the Shenyang MR. 

In 1999, Liang was made both commander and deputy Party 

committee secretary of the Nanjing MR. During his tenure as 

commander of the Nanjing MR, he spent a great deal of time focusing 

on sea-crossing and landing operations of both Chinese and foreign 

armies (with a clear eye on a possible Taiwan contingency). While 

commanding the Nanjing MR, he oversaw a series of increasingly 

elaborate exercises directed at Taiwan. He has since published a 

book on the subject of landing operations. 24

His expertise in these areas mark him as the CMC’s point man 

on Taiwan. His selection as director of the General Staff Department 

clearly signals the continued importance of Taiwan to the PLA. 

However, one should note that Taiwan expertise is not Liang 

Guanglie’s only attribute, but was instead probably only one of 

several factors that played a role in his selection to this position. For 

example, although in some ways he has spent comparatively little 

time “at the center,” one should note that he has been involved with 
194

the CCP Central Committee longer than any of the current members 

of the CMC. Liang was an alternate member of both the 13th and 

14th Central Committees.25

Furthermore, Liang comes to the General Staff Department 

with signifi cant command experience drawn from a number of 

different regions. His early experiences in Wuhan, combined 

with his headquarters-level command experiences in the Beijing, 

Shenyang, and Nanjing MRs have likely exposed him to a range of 

PLA conditions, and given him a deep understanding of the on-theground realities throughout the PLA. This breadth of expertise will 

likely prove valuable as he continues to lead the PLA down its path 

of reform and modernization.

CMC Member and Director of the General Logistics Department 

Liao Xilong.

During the 16th Party Congress, General Liao Xilong was 

promoted from commander of the Chengdu MR to CMC member 

and director of the General Logistics Department. 

Rising quickly through the ranks, Liao is said to have had the 

quickest path to general of all of the current members of the CMC.26

He has attended the PLA Military Academy, China’s National 

Defense University, and has done some part-time post-graduate 

studies with the Sociology Department of Beijing University.

Liao was born in 1940. He joined the PLA in 1959 and the CCP in 

1963. He spent a little over the fi rst decade of his career in rising from 

enlisted soldier to company commander in the 49th Division of the 

Guizhou Provincial Military Command. 

In 1971, he became deputy head of the operations and training 

branch in the HQ of the 91st Regiment, 31st Division of the 11th 

Army, and then became the deputy head of the Military Affairs 

section and Operations and Training Section in the HQ of the 31st 

Division. By 1978, he had risen to be deputy commander of the same 

regiment, and in 1981, he was further promoted to commander of 

the regiment. 

Liao is a combat veteran who gained fame in the Sino-Vietnam 

War of 1979. According to Hong Kong news reports, he gained a 

reputation for command during his efforts in the Basha mountain 
195

pass and in the capture and occupation of Fengtu. He was 

commended by the CMC for his “combat effectiveness” and his 

ability to win military victories with minimal casualties and using 

few resources27

In these experiences, he had an opportunity to gain appreciation 

for the critical role logistics and support play in planning successful 

military campaigns. As important, he experienced, fi rst-hand, PLA 

weakness in this important aspect of modern warfare. 

In 1984, Liao was once again involved in combat with Vietnam, 

where he commanded the 31st Division when it captured Zheyinshan 

on April 30, 1984. In the course of this campaign, Liao again was 

praised for his effective use of forces and low casualties. As a result, 

he was reportedly handpicked for promotion by then-chairman 

of the CMC Deng Xiaoping from division commander to deputy 

army commander of the 11th Army. Six months later, Liao Xilong 

was promoted to commander of the 11th Army. At that time, Liao 

Xilong was 44 years old, the youngest army commander in the entire 

PLA.28

In 1985, he rose to become deputy commander of the Chengdu 

MR, a post he held for the next ten years—after which he was 

promoted to the post of commander of the same MR. 29 He held this 

post until the 16th Party Congress.

In his 17 years in the headquarters of the Chengdu MR, Liao saw 

the PLA face challenges and adapt to change. From this vantage 

point, he heard Deng announce that “Peace and Development” was 

the new keynote of the times, witnessed dramatic downsizing and 

force restructuring in 1985 with a 1 million-man force reduction 

(followed by a later reduction of 500,000) and a consolidation of 

Military Regions from eleven to seven. In 1989, it was troops from 

his MR that enforced marital law in Tibet. Liao saw the PLA digest 

its lessons from the 1991 Gulf War and worked to implement 

Jiang Zemin’s Two Transformation’s program of reform and 

modernization

Little is known about his opinions of the United States. However, 

it should be noted that during the period of tension that eventually 

led to the Chinese missile tests in the Taiwan Straits in 1996, Liao 

was a voice of hawkish sentiments. According to one Hong Kong 

report: 
196

When asked: “If the United States gets involved when the cross-strait 

situation becomes precarious, what changes will take place?” Liao 

responded without hesitation: “Why should we be afraid of the United 

States?” Liao said: “In the past the Japanese troops could be considered 

powerful, but they were defeated. The Kuomintang troops could also be 

considered strong, but they were no match for the Communist troops. 

The relative strength of the opposing sides cannot be judged solely 

by several planes or a specifi c weapon; the people’s will plays a more 

important role. Sensible people should understand this.”30

CMC Member and Director of the General Armament 

Department Li Jinai.

At the 16th Party Congress, General Li Jinai was made CMC 

member and director of the General Armament Department. 

Li Jinai is the nephew of the PLA’s former GSD chief Li Jing.31 

Li Jinai was born in 1942. Unlike the other members of the CMC, Li 

actually joined the CCP before joining the PLA. He joined the CCP in 

1965 and the PLA in 1967. Prior to joining the PLA, he was a student 

of missile design at the Engineering Mechanics Department of the 

Harbin Institute of Technology.

Li spent much of the early part of his career doing political work 

in Second Artillery Corps (China’s missile forces). After serving for 

a brief period as an enlisted soldier in a construction regiment, Li, 

in 1969, became a clerk and deputy platoon leader in the Second 

Artillery. From 1970 to 1977, he rose steadily, becoming a deputy 

head and deputy political commissar of the Propaganda Branch 

within his regiment. 

By 1977, Li had become head of the Youth Section and head of the 

Organization Section, in the Organization Division of the Political 

Department of the Second Artillery. After serving there for six years, 

he went on to become the deputy political commissar of the 54th 

Base, Second Artillery. For much of that time, he was also working 

at the Party Consolidation Offi ce of the PLA. In 1985, Li became head 

of the Cadres’ Department within the PLA GPD. From there, he was 

promoted to be deputy director of the GPD, a post he held for two 

years.

During the PLA’s reforms of the 8th and 9th Five Year Plans (1991-

2000), Li served as the deputy political commissar, then political 
197

commissar of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry 

for National Defense (COSTIND). In this position, he played a role 

in guiding the PLA in its efforts to move from a personnel intensive 

force to a military that relied more on technology and professional 

expertise. It was also in this position that, in 1996, he fi rst began to 

work side by side with the then new minister of COSTIND—current 

CMC vice chairman Cao Gangchuan. 

When COSTIND was reorganized in 1998, Li became the political 

commissar and deputy secretary of the Party committee of the newly 

formed General Armaments Department. There he continued to 

work with Cao—who was serving as GAD director. 

An engineer by training and a political offi cer by practice, during 

his tenure at COSTIND and at the GAD, Li took a keen interest in 

various major research projects. It has been reported that at major 

tests, both he and Cao Gangchuan would be personally involved in 

the oversight and direction of major tests.32 This has remained true 

for China’s space program. A December 2002 report from China’s 

offi cial Xinhua news service identifi es him as the commander and 

chief of China’s space program—a position he likely inherited when 

assuming the duties of director of the GAD.

Li has also gone on record calling for qualitative improvements 

in the capabilities of the PLA, including incorporating greater 

informationization and mechanization into the PLA’s equipment. 

And, according to the Hong Kong press, like his colleague Cao 

Gangchuan, he has actively petitioned the CCP to increase PLA 

budgets in an effort to enhance and implement its modernization 

program.33

In 2002, in addition to taking over directorship of the GAD, 

Li joined Cao as a second member of the CMC with an S&T 

background. This personnel move highlights the fact that technical 

innovation and reform are seen as issues of critical interest to the 

PLA. Given their shared professional history, one can expect to see 

more continuity than change in the pace or direction of the PLA’s 

approach to material vector modernization in coming years.
198

Table 2. Military CMC Members Career Paths 

at Key Moments in Time.
199

DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENTS

In addition to the individuals who hold the positions of directors, 

each of the four general departments (GSD, GPD, GLD, GAD) has a 

group of deputy directors that comprise a second tier of leadership 

over these organizations. Those who hold these positions are of 

interest for two reasons. First, in many ways, these are the individuals 

who manage the more day-to-day implementation of Chinese defense 

policy. Second, deputy directorship can be indicative of future CMC 

membership. At some point in their careers, for example, four of the 

six current military members of the CMC have served as deputy 

directors of a general department. 34

The following section identifi es the deputy directors of the 

four general departments and, where possible, lists some of their 

concurrent positions, areas of expertise, and previous posts. 

Biographical information on these individuals is not generally as 

detailed as that available for the full members of the CMC. In some 

cases, even identifying the individuals who hold these positions 

can be a challenge. Furthermore, at the time of this writing, reports 

of a December 2003 personnel reshuffl ing are still being evaluated. 

Therefore, this listing should be viewed as preliminary, possibly 

incomplete, and not necessarily refl ecting the fi nal outcomes. 

General Staff Department.

Ge Zhenfeng. Ge Zhenfeng currently serves as executive deputy 

chief in the PLA General Staff Department, a position previously 

held by current CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong. He is also a full 

member of the CCP Central Committee and is rumored to be deputy 

secretary of the General Staff Department’s Party Committee.35

Prior to assuming the position of GSD executive deputy chief, Ge 

served as commandant of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, an 

institution intimately involved with the PLA process of formulating 

and testing new doctrinal concepts. He has authored articles on the 

role of education in military reform.

Ge currently serves under GSD Director Liang Guanglie. This 

is not the fi rst time their career paths have crossed. When Liang 

Guanglie held the position of commander of the Shenyang Military 
200

Region from 1997-1999, Ge served as the military region’s chief of 

staff. There, among his other duties, he was actively involved in 

managing the Shenyang MR’s response to the 1998 fl oods.36

Wu Quanxu. Wu Quanxu currently holds the position of deputy 

chief of the General Staff Department. He is an alternate member of 

the Central Committee. Wu was promoted to GSD deputy chief in 

1995 after serving as an assistant in the same general department. He 

was promoted to the rank of general in June 2000, a date common to 

several individuals currently serving at the deputy director level in 

the four general departments. 

Wu is well traveled. During his tenure in the GSD, he has visited 

numerous countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. 

He has also helped receive delegations visiting from the U.S. and 

Canada. 

According to some Hong Kong reports, Wu has served as both 

the commander and commissar of the First Group Army—a unit 

that is known in China for its achievements in the 1984 border battle 

to recover strategic Zheyin Mountain from Vietnamese forces.37

General Wu has had a series of positions and career experiences 

of interest:

• He is currently the deputy director of the Military Encyclopedia 

Compilation Committee. 

• He served as chairman of the State Council’s fi rst ever committee 

on the accreditation of military science academic degrees. 

• He served as a member of the “21 February” security group 

responsible for overseeing security in Beijing during President 

George Bush’s 2002 visit to Beijing.

• In April 2001, he oversaw the PLA’s fi rst ever disaster response 

drill dealing with potential accidents in nuclear power stations.

Qian Shugen. Qian Shugen is currently a deputy chief of the 

General Staff Department. He is a full member of the CCP Central 

Committee. He also serves as a member of the NPC Committee for 

Overseas Chinese Affairs and the NPC People’s Liberation Army 

Election Committee.
201

Signifi cantly, much of Qian’s previous work on the GSD appears 

to revolve around mobilization issues, including PLA reserve units, 

conscription issues, and inspection tours. Qian now holds the 

position of secretary general of the National Defense Mobilization 

Committee (NDMC). This is a position of growing importance, as 

mobilization planning assumes a larger role in PLA concepts of 

future warfare. In that context, the NDMC is a critical nexus, linking 

the State, the Party, and the Army. The NDMC, which includes 

the head of the State Council, as well as the leadership of the CCP 

and the CMC, is responsible for planning (and, in event of war, 

executing) mobilization plans. It therefore has enormous purview; 

included in its brief are economic, social, and political missions, as 

well as military ones. 

Qian is also fairly well traveled. In addition to trips around Asia, 

to Europe, and Africa, he has also visited the U.S. Pacifi c Command, 

Russia, Cuba, and Iran.

Zhang Li. Zhang Li currently serves as deputy chief of the 

GSD and as deputy secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection 

Committee. He is an alternate member of the Central Committee 

and a member of the NPC Army Election Commission.

Zhang is fairly new to his position and served as assistant to the 

GSD chief until late 2000 or early 2001. He has traveled to India, 

Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Finland, and Greece.

Xiong Guangkai. Xiong Guangkai currently serves as deputy chief 

of the General Staff Department. He is also an alternate member of 

the Central Committee. Xiong is involved with many PLA foreign 

exchanges, as well as Chinese intelligence. 

Prior to the 16th Party Congress, there were rumors that Xiong 

would rise though the ranks and could possibly become the next 

PRC Minister of Defense. This did not happen. Xiong, and his post 

16th Party Congress fate, have been discussed at length in Hong 

Kong news reporting and by other U.S. scholars. 38

General Political Department.

Tang Tianbiao. Tang Tianbao currently serves as deputy director 

of the General Political Department. He has held this position 

since 1995. Prior to this time he held the position of assistant to the 
202

director. He has held full membership in both the 15th and 16th 

Central Committees. He is also an NPC delegate and member of the 

NPC Credentials Committee. Like Wu Quanxu, he was promoted to 

the rank of general in June of 2000.

Tang is also fairly well traveled. He has been on military 

delegations to Africa, South Asia, North Korea, and Latin America. 

During the 2001 EP-3 crisis, he traveled with Zhang Wannian to 

Australia and New Zealand.

Over the course of his career, Tang has worked on many of the 

institutional and systemic challenges facing the PLA as it carries out 

its process of reform. 

• He has experience with the PLA’s ongoing work in 

“regularization” and the development of military laws and 

regulations. For example, he worked under Luo Gan as a member 

of a CCP commission on political science and law. 

• He has experience with ongoing PLA efforts to streamline and 

downsize its personnel. In 1999 he served on a State Council 

working group focusing on the placement of demobilized 

military offi cers.

• He has experience with ongoing PLA efforts to reform its 

approach to professional military education. He served under 

GSD Deputy Chief Wu Quanxu as deputy chairman of the State 

Council’s fi rst ever committee on the accreditation of military 

science academic degrees.

Yuan Shoufang. Yuan Shoufang currently serves as deputy 

director of the GPD. He has been listed as an alternate member of 

both the 15th and 16th Central Committees. Born in Jilin in 1958, he 

was promoted to the rank of major general in 1988 and was made 

a full general in June 2000. Like several other General Department 

deputy directors, he fi rst served as assistant to the director of the 

GPD and was promoted to deputy director in 1996.

Among the GPD deputy directors, Yuan appears to hold the 

propaganda portfolio. He often attends and speaks at meetings for 

military newspapers and publishing houses. He also holds the post 

of Director of the Military Sports Committee and served as the head 
203

of a leading group in charge of the PLA’s participation in the PRC’s 

Ninth National Games.

Yuan Shoufang has paid special attention to developing methods 

to use technology to improve the GPD’s approach to propaganda 

work. Since 1999, he has worked with relevant departments in the 

GSD to develop an “all army “ propaganda and cultural information 

network. The purpose of this project was to make available a 

special network where offi cers could obtain detailed and current 

information directly from the General Political Department. This 

network is reported to have been in operation since 2000, and Yuan 

has been reported as being an important voice in promoting its 

use.39

Yuan has traveled within Asia, but does not appear to have had 

as many opportunities to interact with foreigners as other deputy 

directors of the GPD.

Zhang Shutian. Zhang Shutian serves as deputy director of 

the GPD. He was promoted to general in June of 2000. He has 

comparatively limited experiences abroad, although it should be 

noted that he did travel with Chi Haotian to the DPRK in October of 

2000.

Zhang Shutian currently serves as secretary of the CMC 

Discipline and Inspection Committee and as deputy secretary of the 

CCP’s Central Discipline and Inspection Committee. He is the only 

current member of the PLA appointed to this position on the Central 

Discipline and Inspection Committee. He is also currently serving as 

an NPC deputy.

General Logistics Department.

Leadership in the General Logistics Department has undergone 

some turnover in recent months. At the time of this writing, reports 

on these changes are still surfacing. This has made identifying the 

current deputy directors of this department diffi cult. The following 

list should be considered preliminary.

Wen Guangchun. Wen Guangchun is currently serving as deputy 

director of the GLD. He has held this position since 1996 when he 

was promoted from “assistant to the director” to deputy director. 

He is currently a vice chairman of the State Council’s committee 
204

regarding accreditation of military science academic degrees. He is a 

deputy of the 10th National People’s Congress.

Wen has chaired and attended several meetings focusing on 

“socializing” logistics (i.e., relying more on civil and commercial 

providers to meet military needs in such areas as housing and fuel) 

and appears to have some interest in mobilization issues. He has 

accompanied Zhang Wannnian on several inspection tours and has 

traveled to Macau and Morocco.

Sun Zhiqiang. As of December 2003, Sun Zhiqiang was serving 

as deputy director of the GLD. He is a member of the 16th Central 

Committee and a deputy to the National People’s Congress.

Sun Zhiqiang appears to be an understudied, but important, 

player in the PLA bureaucracy. Within the GLD, he appears to play 

a key role in managing the PRC defense budget. He is frequently 

quoted in news stories explaining military budgets and especially 

their increases, and appears have been occasionally tasked to explain 

military budgetary matters to the NPC. Xinhua lists him as holding 

the position of director of the GLD fi nance department in 1999.

Sun is also frequently quoted in articles discussing budgetary 

implications of PLA personnel reforms such as pay and housing 

reform. He appears to have experience in this area as well. For 

example, in 1998, he was listed as the head of the new PLA Military 

Insurance Offi ce, which was set up to provide, for the fi rst time ever, 

a mechanism to insure all members of the PLA against injury or loss 

of life. This program was approved by the State Council in 1998. 

Wang Qian. As of October 2003, Wang Qian was serving as 

deputy director of the GLD. He is also an alternate member of the 

Central Committee. He has served as deputy director of the General 

Logistics Department since April 2001

Wang has experience with health and sanitation issues. Prior to 

moving to the GLD, Wang was the commandant of the No 3 Military 

Medical University in Chongqing. Recently, he has been active in the 

PLA’s efforts to combat SARS (atypical pneumonia). In the spring of 

2003, he was appointed Deputy Head of the Beijing Joint Working 

Group for Atypical Pneumonia Prevention and Treatment. 

Zhou Youliang. As of July 2003, Zhou Youliang was deputy 

director of the GLD. He also held the concurrent post of director of 

the Capital Construction Department and was vice chairman of the 
205

Beijing Commission on Urban Planning.

Some Hong Kong news reports, as of November 2003, indicated 

that Zhou Youliang had left these positions and had taken on a 

new post as a full-time member of the NPC Standing Committee.40

Su Shuyan is said to have assumed at least a portion of Zhou’s 

responsibilities.

Su Shuyan. Su Shuyan currently holds the position of deputy 

director of the GLD.41 He is a member of the 10th National People’s 

Congress and currently holds the position of deputy director of the 

Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning.

His previous positions include: director of the GLD Vehicles and 

Vessels Department and director of the GLD Materials and POL 

Department. 

Tan Xuexin. As of late December 2003, Tan Xuexin was serving 

as deputy director of the GLD. Prior to taking up this position, Tan 

served as the long time director of the CMC General Offi ce. He is 

seen to be close to CMC chairman Jiang Zemin.

At the time of this writing, little data is available regarding Tan’s 

duties in his new position.

Wang Tailan. As of March 2003, Wang Tailan has been listed in 

Hong Kong and Taiwan news reports as a former deputy director 

of the GLD. He was last identifi ed in the Chinese press as a deputy 

director of the GLD at around this same time.

His is currently serving as an NPC deputy and a member on the 

NPC Committee for Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

General Armament Department.

As with the General Logistics Department, identifying deputy 

directors of the General Armament Department was challenging. 

The following list should be considered preliminary. Individuals are 

not listed in protocol order.

Li Andong. Li Andong currently serves as deputy director of the 

General Armament Department. He is also a member of the 16th 

CCP Central committee and is a military delegate to the 10th NPC.

Li accompanied Cao Gangchuan on his trip to the United States 

in 2003.
206

Like GSD Deputy Chief Wu Quanxu, Li is a member of the 

current PLA Military Encyclopedia Compilation Committee. 

Chu Hongyan. Chu Hongyan is currently serving as deputy 

director of the General Armament Department. He is a deputy for 

the 10th NPC. He was promoted to the position of deputy director 

in early 2002. Prior to this time he served as the GAD director for 

Comprehensive Planning.

Chu Hongyan participated in some planning meetings for 

the Chinese space program in early 2000. These meetings were 

supposed to have outlined the PRC’s space exploration goals for the 

coming decade, which were laid out in the PRC Space White Paper 

of November 2000. 

Zhang Shiming. Zhang Shiming is currently serving as deputy 

director for the GAD. He was promoted to this position in the spring 

of 2002. Prior to this time, he served as the director of the armament 

department in the Nanjing Military Region. At this time, he would 

have crossed career paths with then-Nanjing MR commander and 

current chief of the General Staff Department, Liang Guanglie.

Zhang was reported to have participated in the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization’s historic counterterrorism exercises in 

the summer of 2003.

Hu Shixiang. Hu Shixiang currently serves as deputy director of 

the GAD. He has held this position since the GAD was founded in 

1998.

He is an NPC deputy, and currently serves as deputy director 

of China’s manned space program (Xinhua lists Li Jinai, the current 

director of the GAD, as the director of this program.)

Zhu Fazhong. As of October 2003, Zhu Fazhong was deputy 

director of the GAD.42 He is an alternate member of the Central 

Committee.

Zhu was promoted to GAD deputy director in the spring of 2002 

(at the same time as current GAD deputy director Zhang Shiming). 

Prior to taking up this position, he is reported to have served as the 

director of the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.

CMC GENERAL OFFICE

In addition to examining the background of the individuals that 

comprise the new CMC and the general department deputy directors 
207

that support these leaders, it is also useful to look at the CMC as an 

institution to the extent that it is possible, given the limits of publicly 

available data. One offi ce that demands particular attention is the 

General Offi ce (GO) of the CMC.43

The General Offi ce of the CMC serves as the nexus of PartyArmy relations. The General Offi ce’s main functions are to provide 

secretarial, administrative, and personnel support for the CMC 

leadership.44 It packages and passes information to the senior leaders. 

It assists CMC leaders in digesting the material, some of which may 

refl ect debates and interpretations that were worked out at lower 

levels.45 It also facilitates and supervises personal interactions 

among the senior members of the PLA leadership, manages the 

external activities of the MND, coordinates bureaucratic interactions 

among the core PLA agencies and their subordinate systems, and 

supervises the daily operations of CMC departments. It is the 

key coordination and evaluation point for strategic research and 

assessments developed within the PLA bureaucracy.46

A critical function of the General Offi ce is to maintain routine 

communications with the CCP via the latter’s own General Offi ce.47 

This allows the party to have input into the CMC’s deliberations 

and supplements information and infl uence that comes from CMC 

membership ties to the Central Committee apparatus, namely Cao 

Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong, who sit on the Political Bureau, and 

Xu Caihou, who is a member of the Secretariat. 

The General Offi ce’s infl uence is generated through controlling 

the fl ow of information and documents, as well as the organization 

and agendas of the CMC meetings.48 It therefore has the potential 

to exert signifi cant, albeit usually indirect, infl uence on the CMC 

leadership and over many aspects of PRC military policy. 

General Offi ce Personnel.

The General Offi ce is overseen by a director and several deputy 

directors. Prior to the 16th Party Congress, the director of the GO 

was Tan Yuexin. He assumed the post in 1999, having come from 

the Second Artillery, where he headed the logistics department.49

In January 2004, he was replaced by Jia Tingan, the head of Jiang 
208

Zemin’s personal offi ce since 1994 and former deputy director of the 

General Offi ce.50

The staff of the CMC General Offi ce is rumored to have undergone 

changes in recent years. The most current available reference on 

Chinese military leadership lists the deputy directors of the CMC 

General Offi ce as follows (see Table 3).51

Member Position Appointment

Jia Tingan Director December 2003

Xu Changyou Deputy Director 1996

Sun Fengshan Deputy Director 1997

Yang Fukun Deputy Director 1997

Wang Guanzhong Deputy Director 2002

Cai Hongshuo Deputy Director 1997

Cao Yumin Deputy Director 2003

Hu Hanlin Director, Comprehensive 

Bureau

1990

Table 3. CMC General Offi ce.

General Offi ce and Elite Politics.

The General Offi ce has been a major bureaucratic focal point 

to key fi gures in the CMC leadership ever since its establishment, 

in the early 1950s.52 Its fi rst director, Xiao Xiangrong, for example, 

reportedly had links to both Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan (each of 

whom was partly responsible for CMC daily operations). 53

The strong patronage link between the secretary general and the 

GO became clear in the Deng Xiaoping era when Yang Shangkun/

Yang Baibing played a pivotal role in directing the daily operation 

of the General Offi ce. For most of this period, Major General Li 

Jijun was critical. In the 1980s, he headed the GO’s policy research 

section, which he used to put forth papers—via the patronage of 

Yang Shangkun and Zhao Ziyang (fi rst vice chairman of the CMC)—
209

advocating a new local war strategy.54 Later, Li was picked to head 

the GO, but was replaced in 1996 by Dong Liangju, whose political 

loyalties are unclear. Two years earlier, however, Jiang Zemin began 

to place his stamp on the GO with the 1994 appointment of his

personal secretary, Jia Tingan, as a deputy director.55

At the time of this writing, much remains unclear about the 

post-16th Party Congress make-up of the CMC General Offi ce. In 

December 2003 a host of changes in PLA leadership positions were 

announced. Among them, a change in the leadership of the CMC 

General Offi ce was announced. In what some might argue was an 

elite political power play, Jiang’s former secretary and then deputy 

director of the CMC General Offi ce was appointed director. Rumors 

abound of a further reaching personnel reshuffl ing within CMC 

General Offi ce, but concrete data are not yet available. Whether 

they are later determined to be seen as Jiang loyalists, politically 

neutral, or close to Hu Jintao, the individuals taking up these new 

positions of leadership will be well positioned to infl uence the day 

to day activities of the CMC and, through them, indirectly infl uence 

defense policy in the PRC. For this reason, such changes should be 

watched with interest.

CONCLUSION

As noted earlier, the CMC installed after the 16th NPC will be 

confronted with a range of issues, both within the PLA, as well as 

for the PRC as a whole. Given the personages involved, what can be 

said about their ability to successfully handle the myriad issues that 

are arising? 

On the one hand, the various members of the new CMC exhibit 

an array of skills that are likely to serve them in good stead. For 

example, given the range of reforms (material, doctrinal, and 

institutional) that the PLA is seeking to undertake, there are CMC 

members who appear to have experience in each facet. Some, such as 

Cao Gangchuan and to some extent Li Jinai, are familiar with the new 

technologies involved in the modern weapons necessary for fi ghting 

wars under “high-tech conditions.” Indeed, relative to the PLA as a 

whole, they are downright open to technological innovation. Others, 
210

such as Liang Guanglie and Liao Xilong, are military operators with 

fi rst-hand knowledge of tactics and operational concepts. Finally, 

the new CMC contains institutional reformers, seeking to manage, 

track, and improve the systemic underpinning that supports the 

PLA’s ongoing program of reform and modernization. Xu Caihou 

and to some extent Li Jinai are responsible for ensuring that these 

programs are “regularized” and continue to support the PRC and 

the Party’s larger political goals. Thus, when viewed from a larger 

perspective the new CMC’s members bring with them signifi cant 

experience in implementing systemic reforms and enhancing the 

PLA’s capability to create an army that can fi ght Local Wars Under 

Modern Conditions, and which emphasizes quality over quantity. 

Nor is that array of experiences necessarily limited to only 

the senior members of the CMC. At the deputy director level, for 

example, one fi nds a similar mix of functional experts. There are 

a number of deputy directors who come from either the military 

regions or various PLA institutions of military research and 

education. The latter includes the new GSD executive deputy chief, 

Ge Zhenfeng, and deputy director of the GLD, Wang Qian.

At the same time, however, there is also a striking degree of 

continuity within the top leadership at deputy director level. 

Chinese reports, for example, suggest that some of the deputy 

directors within the General Armaments Department were fi rst 

appointed when it was founded in 1998. More to the point, after the 

Party Congress, each of the other general departments has at least 

one current deputy director that has held this position since 1996. 

Moreover, many of these long time deputy directors obtained these 

positions after serving for a number of years in the same department 

as assistant to the deputy director. 

Although not unusual in China, when looking back at some 

of the events that took place prior to the Party congress, this 

continuity is even more striking. Given the upheavals and changes 

indicated earlier, including 9-11 and increasing domestic problems, 

it is noteworthy that the central political leadership did not in 

any signifi cant way alter the anticipated make up of its CMC. In 

particular, there is a distinct paucity of expertise within the CMC in 

the area of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Indeed, with 

the arguable exception of Liao Xilong’s experience with martial law 
211

in Tibet, the new military leadership—at both the CMC member and 

GSD deputy director level—does not appear to contain anyone with 

experience or expertise in non-traditional security threats. Although 

it would be diffi cult to make the argument that the pool of potential 

CMC members contained any candidate with this type of expertise, 

one cannot help but wonder about what sorts of efforts the current 

military leadership is making to elevate this issue within the General 

Departments. 

Instead, in selecting its new generation of military leadership, 

the PRC appears to have hewed steadfastly to its long-held goals, 

such as reform and modernization and reunifi cation with Taiwan. 

The individuals selected for these key leadership positions have 

advanced their careers by implementing a vision for modernization 

and national defense laid out by Jiang Zemin over the course of a 

decade. Change and reform, it appears, will primarily involve only 

those areas that were previously set forth. 

This apparent paradox of both welcoming and discouraging 

signifi cant change suggests several issues that need to be addressed 

in studying the CMC. 

First, there is the issue of civil-military relations within the CMC. 

With Hu Jintao now apparently in control, it remains to be seen 

whether he will have a new perspective on PLA military reform. 

Will he echo Jiang Zemin’s line of reform and modernization, or 

introduce a new guiding concept? Might he have an alternative 

interpretation of what Jiang’s views on reform and modernization 

mean? Whatever Hu’s line will be, how the CMC, comprised of 

offi cers whose careers have been shaped in part by Jiang and his

interpretation of reform, will be worth watching. 

Then, there is the question of institutional memory within the 

CMC and how that affects the larger PLA. Even if Hu does not 

provide a radically different perspective on how PLA reform should 

proceed, how the CMC itself evolves, in light of ongoing changes 

in the Chinese foreign and domestic security environment, remains 

open to analysis.

Moreover, those who hold such positions serve not only as 

institutional memory for their respective organizations, but as 

important, are often apparently themselves being groomed for top 

spots. How well such offi cers interact with other members of the 
212

larger CMC structure, and especially those who are “imported” 

from the MRs and the group armies is likely to have a major impact 

on the course of reform. 

Indeed, the case of Li Jijun, who successfully incorporated his 

own views on future warfare into ongoing reform programs for the 

PLA, raises the concomitant question of how the CMC, as well as the 

PLA as a whole, manages the entire issue of reform, beginning with 

where concepts of reform originate, through how it is shepherded 

to broader acceptance. Within that process, what role does the CMC 

play? 

As the strategic situation confronting the PRC continues to 

evolve, the CMC will have a steady stream of new issues to consider. 

At the same time, as PLA reform advances, the CMC will have to 

balance those concerns with accommodating changes and evolution 

within the military. Close observation of the CMC, in terms of its 

personnel and its reactions, will provide valuable indicators for how 

the PLA, and indeed the top Chinese leadership, ultimately respond, 

including the likely limits and boundaries of discussion. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. When assessing the need for change, the PRC leadership also made several 

judgments about the nation’s internal capacity. For example, it determined how 

many economic, societal, and political resources the PRC had the capacity to 

earmark for military purposes. These judgments in turn functioned to defi ne the 

type of military the nation developed by bounding the nation’s options with regard 

to PLA’s force structure and the type of weapons and equipment the military 

predicted it would have at its disposal. For further discussion of the signifi cance of 

“Peace and Development” see Yao Yunzhu, “The Evolution of Military Doctrine 

of the Chinese PLA from 1985-1995,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 

1995 and David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: “The Great 

Peace and Development Debate of 1999,” The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA 

2000.

2. For a more detailed discussion of this reform program, please see Kenneth 

Allen, Dean Cheng, David Finkelstein, and Maryanne Kivlehan, Institutional 

Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges, Alexandria, 

VA: The CNA Corporation, 2002.

3. Xiao Yusheng (Deputy Director of the Military History Department of the 

PLA Academy of Military Science), “Building a Strong People’s Army,” Liaowang, 

No. 31, July 29, 2002, pp. 7-9. 
213

4. For a more detailed discussion of this parsing of reform, see please see 

Allen, et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Also see 

Finkelstein’s “Thinking About the PLA’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs” in 

David M. Finkelstein and James C. Mulvenon, The PLA’s Revolution in Doctrinal 

Affairs, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Forthcoming conference volume.

5. This position also is referred to as GSD director.

6. This was a change from a grade two to a grade one position. For explanation 

of the PLA grade system, see Chapter 8 by Kenneth Allen and John Corbett.

7. The background of these new leaders has also been subject to a fair 

amount of research. In particular, see David Shamabaugh, “China’s New High 

Command,” in Stephen Flanagan and Michael Marti, eds., The People’s Liberation 

Army and China in Transition, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

2003; and James Mulvenon’s numerous contributions to the online journal, China 

Leadership Monitor, which can be found at http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org.

8. Prior to joining the PLA, he had been a factory-worker.

9. Bi Jianxiang, Reforging the Sword: New Leaders, New Roles, unpublished 

paper.

10. Although he offi cially held this position until 1982, Guo was separated 

from the 55th Division from September 1981 to July 1983, when he attended the 

PLA Military Academy.

11. Bi Jianxiang,. Reforging the Sword.

12. Ibid.

13. His positions in the GLD were from 1963-1975. His positions in the Military 

Equipment Department of the GSD were from 1975-1989.

14. There is confl icting data on this point, however. Some scholars have 

referenced unconfi rmed reports that Cao was sent to the frontlines during the 

1979 Sino-Vietnam border confl ict to coordinate artillery assets. See Shambaugh’s 

“China’s High Command,” p. 52.

15. See, for example, Kuan Cha-chia “New Personnel Changes at Senior 

Military Hierarchy; Jiang Zemin’s Call for Administering the Army With Strict 

Discipline; Major Decisions of Central Military Commission,” Hong Kong Kuang 

Chiao Ching, December 16, 1996.

16. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Jiang Zemin To Mobilize Army Support To Be Next 
214

Helsman,” Hong Kong South China Morning Post, March 5, 1997, p. 19. Other reports 

about his comments that PLA’s current defense spending is “still insuffi cient and 

is far from meeting actual needs,” can be found in Hong Kong press articles 

such as Liu Yue-ying’s “Why Finance Minister Has Become Angry--Liu Zhongli 

Analyzes Increase in Defense Spending” Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, March 3, 1997.

17. Xinhua, “Navy To Develop More High-Tech Equipment, ” 10 Jun 99.

18. The CCP Secretariat is the body responsible for running the day-to-day 

affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. It currently consists of seven members: 

Zeng Qinghong, Liu Yunshan, Zhou Yongkang, He Guoqiang, Wang Gang, Xu 

Caihou, and He Yong.

19. In 1992, in the wake of Tiananmen and a renewed commitment to the 

economic reform process (after his “southern tour”), Deng Xiaoping engaged 

in a major reshuffl ing (if not purge) of the top Chinese leadership, focused on 

President Yang Shangkun and his half-brother, General Yang Baibing (who 

was both secretary-general of the CMC and head of the GPD). The Yangs were 

reputed to be intent on blocking Jiang Zemin’s accession to the top of the Chinese 

leadership. Furthermore, both were reported to have started repoliticizing the 

PLA, with perceived loyalty to the Yangs being a factor in promotions. Indeed, in 

the wake of the fall of the Yang brothers, a signifi cant portion of the PLA’s senior 

offi cers were reportedly transferred or retired. (Lena H. Sun, “Deng Completes 

Major Army Purge,” Washington Post, February 12, 1993).

20. Tieh Yun-cheng, “Latest Developments With China’s Military Leadership,” 

Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle ], No. 364, January 16, 2003, pp. 12-15. 

Also see Shambaugh, p. 52.

21. Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Characteristics of the New Chinese Military Leadership 

Structure,” Tokyo Chian Foramu, June 1, 2003.

22. Shambaugh, “China’s New High Command,” p. 54. 

23. According to their offi cial bios, both Liang Guanglie and Guo Boxiong 

were serving in the Beijing MR headquarters from 1993 to 1997. Moreover, during 

the 1995-96 Taiwan missile tests, both were serving as deputy commanders of the 

Beijing MR.

24. Tieh Yun-cheng, “Latest Developments With China’s Military Leadership,” 

pp. 12-15.

25. According to their offi cial bios, Liang is the only CMC member who is 

listed as an alternate member of the 13th Central Committee. The only other 

current CMC member who can even claim alternate membership to the 14th 

Central Committee is Li Jinai.
215

26. Hiramatsu, “Characteristics of the New Chinese Military Leadership 

Structure.” 

27. Liu Bafu, “Liao Xilong is Rising Star in Military,” Kuang-Chiao Ching [Wide 

Angle], No. 278, November 16, 1995, pp. 64-66. 

28. Ibid.

29. In 1995, in addition to being promoted to commander of the Chengdu MR, 

he also was made deputy secretary of the Party Committee.

30. “Chengdu Military Region Is Prepared for Actual Combat; Liao Xilong 

Says: Why Should We Be Afraid of the United States?” Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, 

March 6, 1996, p. A3.

31. Lin Chieh “Jiang Zemin Forms a New Central Military Commission Aimed 

at Operations Against Taiwan,” Hong Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic 

Journal), December 5, 2002, p. 34 .

32. Yu Bencheng and Su Kuoshan , “An Account of How Jiang Zemin Shows 

Concern for the Building of Units Under the State Commission of Science, 

Technology, and Industry for National Defense,” Beijing Liaowang, No. 30, July 28, 

1997, pp. 4-6.

33. Li Tzu-ching, “The Military Presses Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji To 

Increase Military Funding” Hong Kong Cheng Ming, April 1, 1999, No. 258, pp. 19-

20. 

34. Cao Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong served as deputy directors in the GSD 

and Xu Caihou and Li Jinai served as deputy directors of the GPD.

35. Hong Kong Commercial Daily, “Reports Say Three Major Military Regions 

Will Carry Out Top-Level Adjustments,” September 16, 2003, p. B2.

36. Xinhua “200,000 Soldiers Fight Floods In Northeastern China,” August 13, 

1998.

37. Oliver Chou, “PLA’s Old Guard Makes Sure the New Faces Fit,” South 

China Morning Post, December 2, 2002.

38. For a more detailed discussion, see Shambaugh, “China’s New High 

Command,” pp. 46-47.

39. Xinhua, December 26, 1999.
216

40. “Tong Shiping Is Appointed Deputy Political Commissar of the Guangzhou 

Military Region,” Oriental Daily News, November 9, 2003.

41. Unlike Zhou Youliang, PRC news reports list him as having attended 

public Spring Festival events in early 2004.

42. Note, he has not been listed in news reports discussing public PLA Spring 

Festival related events.

43. The name of the GO of the CMC has changed several times. The original 

GO of the CMC became the Offi ce Group of the CMC and then the Offi ce Meeting 

of the CMC, and now the name is again the GO of the CMC.

44. Tai Ming Cheung, “The Infl uence of the Gun: China’s Central Military 

Commission and Its Relationship with the Military, Party, and State Decisionmaking Systems,” in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and 

Security Policy: 1978-2000, Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2001, p. 70.

45. David Shambaugh, “The Pinnacle of the Pyramid: The Central Military 

Commission,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, The People’s 

Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 

Corporation, 2002, p. 105.

46. The offi ces of the CMC have undergone several changes in the 50-

year history of the CMC. Currently, the General Offi ce is composed of several 

subordinate bureaus and offi ces, including: the Comprehensive Investigation 

and Research Bureau, the Legal Bureau, the Audit Bureau, the Military Trade 

Bureau, the Communications War Readiness Offi ce, and the Political Offi ce. The 

GO also has two fewer functional departments, the Services Department and the 

Guard Department. These offi ces were developed over time to coordinate policy 

with regard to emerging issues that did not easily fi t into the portfolios of the 

PLA general departments. A discussion of the role and function of many of these 

departments can be found in David Shambaugh, ibid.

47. Nan Li, “The Central Military Commission and Military Policy in China,” 

in Mulvenon and Yang, p. 77.

48. Tai Ming Cheung. The General Offi ce’s functions were likely expanded 

in 1992 with Yang Shangkun/Yang Baibing’s ouster and the disbanding of the 

functioning CMC Secretariat. 

49. Directory of Military Personalities, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, October 2000, p. iii.

50. Major General Tan Yuexin was appointed deputy director of the General 

Logistics Department.
217

51. Directory of PRC Military Personalities, November 2002. This chart 

represents the last known senior membership of the CMC General Offi ce. With 

the replacement of the director in January 2004, there is widespread speculation 

that many other portfolios have changed. But, as of this writing, no other changes 

have been made public

52. Nan Li’s article, cited earlier, provides a detailed analysis of the CMC’s 

history, which provided background material for parts of this section.

53. Ibid.

54. Shambaugh, “The Pinnacle of the Pyramid,” p. 105.

55. Jia is part of Jiang’s “Shanghai gang,” which originated when he was fi rst 

mayor and then party chief in Shanghai in the mid-1980s. When Deng Xiaoping 

promoted Jiang to become party general secretary after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, 

Jiang brought Zeng Qinghong (his chief-of-staff), You Xigui (his bodyguard), and 

Jia Tingan (his personal secretary) to Beijing with him. You was later appointed 

director of the Bodyguards Bureau and deputy director of the CCP General Offi ce. 

Jia served Jiang as director of the offi ce of the PRC president. You and Jia also 

have the military ranks of lieutenant general and major general, respectively. Jia’s 

infl uence within the CMC comes from his access to Jiang. It is rumored that he acts 

as Jiang’s surrogate in military matters. The nature of his role became even more 

defi ned in 2000, when he coordinated the investigation into party and military 

wrong doing related to the Yuanhua smuggling scandal. It was even rumored 

that he had been implicated in the scandal and was removed from his post, an 

allegation that was personally refuted by Jiang Zemin. See Tai Ming Cheung, op 

cit.

219

CHAPTER 7

PLA LEADERSHIP IN CHINA'S MILITARY REGIONS

Elizabeth Hague

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the characteristics of the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) military leaders in the seven military region 

(MR) headquarters. A study of leaders at the military region level 

can provide critical insight into how PLA modernization is being 

implemented at the operational level. The PLA has moved away 

from the fi eld army model described by William Whitson in the 

1970s, where fi eld army affi liation played a key role in building 

contacts for promotion. While the PLA Group Army (GA) is a new 

organizational basis for forming contacts that can enhance a PLA 

offi cer’s career, professional experience becomes an increasingly 

important factor for promotion as the PLA modernizes.1 New 

assignments can be vertical (promotions) or lateral (often offering 

fresh experience within one's current rank or grade). First, the 

chapter will begin by identifying some key characteristics of MR 

leaders, and, where possible, potential turnover in the MRs based 

on criteria such as age, time in position and grade, and promotion 

potential.2 It will focus on leaders at the deputy commander level 

and below, rather than on the commanders of the MRs. While in 

some cases promotions and assignments are based on connections, 

age, and timing of open positions, in many cases, the selection 

of key military leaders in MR headquarters refl ects operational 

priorities of the PLA or specifi c mission objectives of that military 

region. Second, the chapter will examine how, collectively, PLA 

leaders in a MR refl ect PLA and MR priorities. Finally, just as the 

provinces are training grounds for national-level civilian leaders, 

military regions are training grounds for national-level military 

leaders.3 The chapter will conclude by examining the backgrounds 

of selected military leaders who have been transferred or promoted 

from the MRs to the national level in the past two years, refl ecting 
220

PLA priorities where possible. It assumes that the collective makeup 

and characteristics of military leaders in an MR are more important 

for that MR’s missions than the promotability of a few individuals. 

In this context, promotability is not treated as a factor in itself, but 

rather as a signpost for gauging the priorities of the PLA and the MR. 

To narrow the scope, this chapter focuses on ground force leaders 

in the MRs. An additional article could be written on Air Force and 

Navy leaders.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY REGION 

PERSONNEL 

The MRs include individuals with a variety of different 

backgrounds who collectively meet the MR’s or the PLA’s needs. 

Typically, the mix includes, on the one hand, MR leaders who have 

served for many years in the MR, provide continuity or connections 

to provincial and local governments, and often serve MR political 

functions. On the other hand, it also includes leaders who have been 

promoted recently and in many cases occupy their current positions 

to gain experience prior to further promotion. The MR leaders also 

have a mix of diverse Group Army (GA) or MR experience and have 

distinct portfolios. Finally, MR personnel turnover will continue at a 

rapid pace.

1. A mix of MR leaders who provide continuity in the MR and ”fast 

burners” who are expected to move on to higher commands. MRs 

usually include at least one individual who serves the important 

function of representing continuity in the MR. This individual 

usually has been in the MR or the MR system for a number of 

years and actively contributes to the working operations of the 

MR. He serves political functions such as attending ceremonies; 

offers functional expertise; and coordinates relations between 

MR headquarters, different MR units, and local or provincial 

governments. In many cases, despite his important contributions 

at the MR level, the individual will not be further promoted 

before retirement, though he has a better chance for promotion 

if he still has two or more years left at the deputy commander 

level before mandatory retirement at 63 years old.4 Every MR 
221

also has more than one “fast burner”—a comparative newcomer 

with desirable experience, who often has been promoted at least 

once in the last two years and is a year or two younger than his 

colleagues. Due to his age and experience in operational areas 

of interest to the PLA, this individual’s promotion potential is 

often greater. He often is assigned to his current position for a 

relatively short period to gain experience before being further 

promoted.

2. Rapid Expected Turnover. The military regions will continue to 

experience a great deal of turnover because most military region 

leaders are relatively close in age (within fi ve years of each other) 

and have usually 1-3 (up to 5) years before retirement.5

3. Diverse GA and MR experience. MR headquarters include 

deputy commanders and a chief of staff who have spent their 

careers in the MR, ensuring an understanding of the MR within 

the MR headquarters. However, all MRs have fairly diverse 

representation of group armies in the headquarters and more 

than one chief of staff or deputy commander (not including the 

Navy and/or Air Force representative) from other MRs.6 Most 

MR leaders have group army backgrounds, but a few also have 

general department experience at the national level or experience 

as military district commanders. 

4. Diversity in portfolios. MRs have always included a diversity 

of portfolios, with deputy commanders at a minimum dividing 

responsibility for training and operations; political, personnel 

and troop welfare; logistics and budget; and armaments.7

• Training and Operations. In many cases, it is diffi cult to tell who 

is driving training and operations in the MR. It seems that, as 

in the past, the ranking deputy commander—the number 

one ranking deputy commander in offi cial protocol—is in 

charge of training and operations. Often this individual 

is an established military leader with strong training in a 

conventional fi eld such as infantry. However, some MRs—

such as the Beijing and Chengdu MRs—also have a more 

recently promoted deputy commander with operational 

experience in a more "cutting edge" GA—one of the GAs 

which has received priority equipment and training to carry 
222

out PLA modernization objectives—than that of the ranking 

deputy commander. It appears these deputy commanders 

(Beijing’s Gao Zhongxing and Chengdu’s Gui Quanzhi) also 

may play some role in training and operations. All MRs have 

at least one individual with cutting edge experience; it seems 

that many do not yet have the portfolio for training and 

operations. 

• Political issues. While political commissars are not the focus 

of this paper, the political commissar, deputy political 

commissars, and head of the MR political department play an 

important role in MR political, personnel, and troop welfare 

issues.

• Logistics. One deputy commander holds the logistics portfolio, 

which includes supply, transportation, ordnance, medical 

services, housing, and fi nance. He is responsible for ensuring 

the sustainability of MR forces during operations and 

developing a more effective joint logistics capability in the 

MR, in support of the PLA’s objectives to develop improved 

power projection, rapid reaction, and fl exibility.8 In addition, 

the individual in charge of logistics generally takes the 

working-level lead for the MR’s national defense mobilization 

committee, established to cope with mobilization for war. The 

chairman of the MR’s national defense mobilization committee 

is the MR commander. Multiple deputy commanders and the 

chief of staff also are involved in mobilization issues. 

• Armaments. MR-level armament departments were established 

following the 1998 creation of the national-level General 

Armament Department and oversee unit-level equipment 

management and maintenance.9 In the last couple of years, 

there has been a dramatic increase in the number of deputy 

commanders or chiefs of staff with a strong armaments 

background, as the PLA attempts to integrate new equipment 

into its training and operations. Four of the seven MRs now 

have at least one chief of staff or deputy commander with 

strong experience in weapons and technology integration. 

• Air Force. In each military region, at least one deputy 

commander also commands the military region air force. 
223

There were three new military region air force commanders 

in 2003.

• Navy. In three MRs, at least one deputy commander 

commands the fl eet associated with that military region: the 

North Sea Fleet (Jinan MR); East Sea Fleet (Nanjing MR); or 

South Sea Fleet (Guangzhou MR).

• National-level experience. Four of the seven MR headquarters 

include one or two individuals with known experience in the 

General Staff Department.10 These individuals have nationallevel experience in national defense mobilization, operations, 

and equipment integration and probably act as a link in their 

areas of expertise between the General Staff Department and 

their MR. They include Beijing MR’s Su Rongsheng, Chengdu 

MR’s Fan Xiaoguang and Lu Dengming, Nanjing MR’s Liu 

Shenyang, and Shenyang MR’s Mao Fengming. 

• Ethnic Minorities and Internal Stability. At least two MRs—

Chengdu and Lanzhou—include one deputy commander 

with a portfolio for an ethnic minority military district or 

handling internal unrest. While the People’s Armed Police 

(PAP) has taken over most responsibilities for internal unrest, 

the PLA maintains an active role in some sensitive regions. 

The Beijing Garrison commander concurrently is a deputy 

commander of the Beijing MR—the only municipal garrison 

commander who is also a MR deputy commander. The 

continued importance of the PLA’s role in ethnic and sensitive 

areas, and the strong local ties that MR leaders foster, are one 

argument for sustaining the current MR structure, in contrast 

to an argument made mostly by military academics to abolish 

the system on grounds of modernization and “jointness.”11

Military Region Leaders Representing Continuity in the MR. 

The MR headquarters include military region leaders who have 

worked in the MR system for a number of years and demonstrated 

strong ability and contributions to their military regions. Many are 

the ranking deputy commander for their region. Some retire after 
224

years of solid contributions, such as Ranking Deputy Commander 

Gong Gucheng of the Guangzhou MR, who retired in January 2004. 

Many do not rise further in the chain before retiring. 

• Chen Xitao, Ranking Deputy Commander, Beijing MR 

(BJMR). Chen has been a Beijing MR deputy commander 

since around march 1998; before that, he was a chief of staff in 

the Nanjing MR and a 31st GA commander. Chen was born in 

1943 and has a couple of years left at the deputy commander 

level.

• Chen Shijun, Ranking Deputy Commander, Chengdu MR 

(CDMR). Chen has been a Chengdu MR deputy commander 

since January 1995 and ranking deputy commander since at 

least July 2001. He is very active and visible within the MR, 

speaking at a variety of events in support of PLA and MR 

initiatives. Chen still has two or three years left at the deputy 

commander level.

• Zheng Shouzeng Zheng Shouzeng, Ranking Deputy Commander, Lanzhou , Ranking Deputy Commander, Lanzhou 

MR (LZMR). Deputy commander of the Lanzhou MR since 

1999, Zheng Shouzeng seems to have spent his whole career 

in the Lanzhou MR and currently is the deputy commander 

with the longest experience in the Lanzhou MR. He has 

the portfolio for training and operations. He wrote on 

information operations as early as 1996.12 He has conducted a 

number of exercises in the Lanzhou MR, to include a “4-level 

headquarters” long-range on-line communications exercise in 

November, 1999 as deputy commander of the military region, 

and the 1998 “WEST-EX” exercise, as 21st GA commander 

in the Lanzhou MR. Both exercises featured prominently 

in national-level newspapers.13 Zheng’s age is unknown, 

making it diffi cult to calculate how many years he has left in 

his career.14

• Dong Wanrui, Ranking Deputy Commander, Nanjing MR. 

Dong Wanrui has been Nanjing MR deputy commander 

since September 1996. Dong is in charge of national defense 

mobilization and logistics for the military region. He has 

made a strong argument that economic development should 

consider national defense needs, a potent argument in the 
225

Nanjing MR, which has experienced both strong economic 

growth and infrastructure development that would support 

a Taiwan contingency. Lt Gen Dong has an infantry 

background and was a 31st GA commander in the Nanjing 

MR. He was born in 1943 and still has a couple of years left 

before retirement.

• Ding Shouyue, Deputy Commander, GZMR. Ding replaced 

ranking Deputy Commander Gong Gucheng when Gong 

retired in January 2004; it is unclear whether Ding also is 

the ranking deputy commander. Although Ding is new to 

the GZMR, he had been a deputy commander in the Jinan 

MR since at least July 1999. He reportedly is a specialist 

in urban warfare—of probable use in Taiwan contingency 

planning—and was a 21st GA commander. He was born in 

November 1944 and still has at least four years left at the 

deputy commander level.

Expected Turnover. 

A lot of turnover is expected in the military regions in the 

next several years. This should allow younger offi cers with more 

operational experience in recent PLA modernization to enter the 

leadership ranks more quickly and will probably help with PLA 

modernization. Based on the "Law of the People's Republic of 

China for Active Duty Offi cers" and “PRC Amendment to Offi cer 

Enlistment Regulations” implemented in 2001, the following are 

mandatory retirement ages, based on position.13

Military Region Commander 65 years old

Military Region Politiical Commissar

Military Region Deputy Commander 63 years old

Military Region Chief of Staff

Military Region Headquarters Department Directors

(Political, Logistics, Armament)

Group Army Leader 55 years old

Military Region Headquarters Department Deputy Directors14
226

Li Cheng has used similar methodology to demonstrate the 

narrow band of ages within the military regions and the resulting 

expected high turnover.15 Table 1 below demonstrates that most 

leaders are expected to retire within fi ve years if they remain at their 

current level and do not get promoted. 

ABBREVIATIONS: CDR: Commander; PC: Political Commissar; DCDR: 

Deputy Commander; MRAF: Military Region Air Force; COS: Chief of 

Staff; J Log Dept: Joint Logistics Department; BJ Gar=Beijing Garrison; Pol 

Dept=Political Department; Arm Dept=Armament Department; GA=Group 

Army; Tib MD=Tibet Military District; SSF=South Sea Fleet; NSF=North Sea 

Fleet; ESF=East Sea Fleet; AF=Air Force. MRs are listed in alphabetical, rather 

than protocol, order.

Beijing MR (BJMR)

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position

CDR Zhu Qi 1942 2007 

PC Fu Tinggui 8/44 8/09 

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Chen Xitao 1943 2006

DCDR Zang Wenqing 12/40 Ready to retire

DCDR/CDR, BJ Gar Liu Fengjun 10/42 10/05

DCDR Su Rongsheng 10/42 10/05

DCDR/CDR, MRAF Li Yongjin 1941 2004

DCDR Gao Zhongxing 12/43 12/06

COS Chang Wanquan ?

Dir, Pol Dept Dong Wancai ?

Dir, J Log Dept Guo Fengqi 7/45 7/08

Dir, Arm Dept Qiu Jinkai 7/46 7/09

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 27th GA Wang Xibin ?

CDR, 38th GA Li Shaojun 1949 2004

CDR, 65th GA Feng Zhaoju 9/49 9/04

Chengdu MR (CDMR)

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position 

CDR Wang Jianmin 11/42 11/07

PC Liu Shutian 12/40 12/05

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Chen Shijun 1942 or 1943 2005 or 2006

DCDR Gui Quanzhi 1943 2006

DCDR/CDR,Tib MD Meng Jinxi 9/44 9/07

DCDR Fan Xiaoguang ?

 

Table 1: MR Leaders Probable Year of Retirement from Their 

Current Positions (January 2004).
227

DCDR/CDR, MRAF Fang Dianrong ?

COS Lu Dengming ?

Dir, Pol Dept Hu Yongzhu 7/44 7/07

Dir, J Log Dept Zeng Jianguo ?

Dir, Arm Dept Dong Guishan ?

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 13th GA Zhang Youxi 7/50 7/05

CDR, 14th GA Xia Guofu 11/51 11/06

Guangzhou MR (GZMR)

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position

CDR Liu Zhenwu 4/44 4/09

PC Yang Deqing 9/42 9/07 

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Ding Shouyue 11/44 11/07

DCDR/CDR,SSF Wu Shengli 8/45 8/08

DCDRCDR, MRAF Lu Denghua 12/41 12/04

DCDR Gao Chunxiang ? 

DCDR Ou Jingu 8/44 8/07

COS Fang Fenghui ?

Dir, Pol Dept Zhou Yuqi ?

Dir, J Log Dept Tang Xinqiu ?

Dir, Arm Dept unknown

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 41st GA Jia Xiaowei ?

CDR, 42nd GA Liu Yuejun 1954-1955 2009-2010

Jinan MR (JNMR) 

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position

CDR Chen Bingde 12/40 12/05

PC Liu Dongdong 1945 2010 

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Zhong Shengqin 1943 2006

DCDR Ye Aiqun 10/45 10/08

DCDR/CDR, NSF Zhang Zhannan ? 

DCDR/CDR, MRAF Liu Zhongxing ?

COS Li Hongcheng ?

Dir, Pol Dept Kou Xianxiang 11/44 11/07

Dir, J Log Dept Zhang Zhende ?

Dir, Arm Dept Hu Renhai ?

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 20th GA Yuan Jiaxin ?

CDR, 26th GA Feng Yujun ?

CDR, 54th GA Huang Hanbiao ?

 

 

 

Table 1: MR Leaders Probable Year of Retirement (Continued).
228

LZMR

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position

CDR Li Qianyuan 1942 2007

PC Liu Yongzhi 11/44 2009

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Zheng Shouzeng ?

DCDR Zou Gengren ?

DCDR/CDR, Qiu Yanhan 2/44 2/07

Xinjiang MD

DCDR/CDR MRAF Huang Hengmei 12/40 Ready to retire

DCDR Song Caiwen ?

COS Wang Guosheng ?

Dir, Pol Dept Kong Ying ?

Dir, J Log Dept Guo Hongchao ?

Dir, Arm Dept Long Dawei 3/45 3/08

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 21st GA Unkown

CDR, 47th GA Xu Fenlin ?

NJMR (Nanjing MR)

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position

CDR Zhu Wenquan 3/43 3/08

PC Lei Mingqiu 6/42 6/07 

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Dong Wanrui 1943 2006

DCDR Ma Diansheng (AF) 3/42 3/05 

DCDR Lin Bingyao ?

DCDR/CDR, ESF Zhao Guojun ?

DCDR/CDR, MRAF Liu Chengjun ?

COS Xu Chengyun ?

Dir, Pol Dept Sun Dafa ?

Dir, J Log Dept Zhong Minghui ?

Dir, Arm Dept Liu Shenyang ?

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 1st GA Unknown

CDR, 12th GA Qi Jianguo ?

CDR, 31st GA Zhao Keshi ?

Shenyang MR (SYMR)

Max age 65 years old Name DOB Probable Year 

of Retirement

Position

CDR Qian Guoliang 12/39 12/04 

PC Jiang Futang 10/41 10/06

Max age 63 years old

DCDR Wu Yuqian ?

Ma Diansheng (AF) 

Table 1: MR Leaders Probable Year of Retirement (Continued).
229

DCDR/CDR, MRAF Xu Qiliang 1950 2013

DCDR Liu Yahong 2/46 2/09

DCDR Mao Fengming ?

COS Li Shiming ?

Dir, Pol Dept Pan Ruiji ?

Dir, J Log Dept Hou Shusen ?

Dir, Arm Dept Xun Zhenjiang ?

Max age 55 years old

CDR, 16th GA Guan Kai ?

CDR, 23rd GA Kou Tie ?

CDR, 39thGA Ai Husheng ?

CDR, 40th GA Unknown

Table 1: MR Leaders Probable Year of Retirement (Concluded).

Assorted Backgrounds.

Most MRs include personnel from a variety of backgrounds. 

The diversity of backgrounds of personnel in the MRs enhances the 

MRs’ ability to deal with a variety of operational issues and expand 

the MRs’ contacts with offi cers outside of the MR. The Beijing 

Military Region is a good example. In the Beijing MR, only two key 

leaders with known GA affi liation share that affi liation with another 

member—Deputy Commander Zang Wenqing (expected to retire 

soon) and Logistics Department Director Guo Fengqi, who both were 

65 GA commanders in the Beijing MR. Four MRs, at least nine group 

armies, two general departments, and the Air Force are represented 

among twelve of the top military leaders (not including deputy 

political commissars). While the exact command backgrounds of 

many of these individuals is unknown, collectively their experience 

includes former service in group armies associated with infantry, 

mechanized, amphibious and armor; chief of staff experience in three 

military regions; administration and enforcement of regulations; 

army aviation; and Blue Army opposing force (OPFOR) exercises. 
230

(CDR=Commander; PC=Political Commissar; DCDR=Deputy Commander; 

COS=Chief of Staff; BJMR=Beijing MR; CDMR=Chengdu; SYMR=Shenyang 

MR; Pol Dept=Political Department; GA=Group Army; NJMR=Nanjing MR; 

LZMR=Lanzhou MR; GSD=General Staff Department)

Name and Position Current Portfolio Past Experience (most recent fi rst)

Zhu Qi 

CDR, BJMR 

Commander, Beijing MR. • COS, BJMR

• COS, CDMR

• CDR, 14th GA CDMR 

(minorities, mountain areas, 

large MR with complex 

logistics due to size and varied 

terrrain)

Fu Tinggui 

PC

Political Commissar, 

Beijing MR.

• Dir, BJMR Pol Dept 

• PC, 39th GA, SYMR 

Chen Xitao 

DCDR

Probably operations and 

training.

• COS, NJMR

• CDR, 31st GA, NJMR 

(amphibious, armor, artillery, 

and Taiwan-related exercises)

Zang Wenqing 

DCDR

Unknown but has been 

involved in mobilization 

issues.

Will retire soon.

• DCOS, BJMR 

• CDR, 63rd GA

• CDR, 65th GA

Liu Fengjun

DCDR

Commander, Beijing 

Garrison.

• COS, unknown GA, BJMR; 

Infantry background. 

• Beijing experience since at least 

1995.

Su Rongsheng

DCDR

Executive Vice Chairman, 

MR National Defense 

Mobilization Committee. 

• CDR, 24th GA 

• DDir, Dir, Military 

Affairs Department, GSD 

(administration, regulations, 

enforcement)

• Prominent princeling.

Li Yongjin

DCDR

Commander, Beijing MR 

Air Force

• CDR, BJMR AF since at least 

1997

• Previously a DCDR, probably 

in BJMR; exact background 

unknown.

Gao Zhongxing

DCDR

Military affairs portfolio; 

possible training and 

operations and probable 

civil-military issues. 

Excellent promotion 

potential.

• COS, BJMR

• CDR, 38th GA, BJMR (elite 

rapid reaction unit, mech, fi rst 

army aviation, Taiwan-related 

exercises) 

Table 2: Beijing Military Region (BJMR): 

An Assortment of Backgrounds.
231

Chang Wanquan

COS

Coordinates MR 

Headquarters training, 

logistics, equipment. 

Excellent promotion 

potential.

• COS, LZMR

• CDR, 47th GA, LZMR (OPFOR 

army/innovative exercises; 

47th GA has produced many 

generals)

Dong Wancai 

Dir, MR Pol Dept

Coordinates/oversees 

political, welfare, and 

discipline issues for MR

• Dir, Pol Dept, General 

Armament Department (GAD)

• (national-level experience)

Guo Fengqi

Dir, MR Joint 

Logistics 

Department

MR logistics; has argued 

for improved personnel, 

a joint logistics system, 

and better logistics 

management.

• CDR, 65th GA, BJMR

Qiu Jinkai

Dir, MR Armament 

Department

MR armament and 

equipment integration 

and management.

• CDR, 27th GA, BJMR (Rapid 

reaction, all brigades. Probably 

will get more equipment 

instead of downsizing. 

Possible involvement in 1989 

Beijing Tiananmen protests)

Sources: Military Databases, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

Table 2: Beijing Military Region (BJMR): 

An Assortment of Backgrounds (Concluded).

OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES IN THE PLA AND THE 

MILITARY REGIONS

The PLA’s attempts to modernize are focused on fi ghting and 

winning a local war under modern, high-tech conditions. Although 

PLA modernization has been ongoing since 1985, since the 1990s 

the PLA has identifi ed several key priorities for doing so based 

on lessons learned since the Gulf War in 1991; Operation ALLIED 

FORCE in Serbia; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan 

in 2001; and the War on Iraq in 2003. Some of the priorities for which 

the PLA military is training include: 

• combined and joint operations;

• PLA equipment upgrades and integration;

• more realistic training;

• improving command and control;

• logistics reform;

• amphibious operations;
232

• special operations and rapid deployment;

• countering precision guided munitions;

• countering electronic interference;

• information warfare (gaining information dominance);

• improving air combat operations;

• blue water navy;

• national defense mobilization.18

While the above are PLA-wide priorities, within each military 

region, training priorities refl ect the primary strategic direction and 

operational focus of the MR. For example, the Chengdu MR has 

issues with internal stability related to Tibet; the Lanzhou MR has 

issues with internal stability related to Xinjiang. These two military 

regions are the only two military regions with deputy commanders 

in their headquarters who are also the commanders of military 

districts (Tibet Military District—Chengdu MR; Xinjiang Military 

District—Lanzhou MR). Military Region priorities include:19

• Beijing MR: Beijing Garrison; capital air defense; Gobi Desert 

training; electronic warfare; demobilization of two group 

armies in January 2004.

• Chengdu MR: Minority restiveness; mountain/border/high 

altitude combat.

• Guangzhou MR: South Sea Fleet; Hong Kong/Macau/

proximity to Special Economic Zones; amphibious operations; 

equipment upgrades; fl ood fi ghting.

• Jinan MR: North Sea Fleet; different weather conditions. 

• Lanzhou MR: Minority restiveness (Like Tibet Military 

District commander, Xinjiang Military District commander 

is also MR deputy commander); “high tech” training; blue 

forces; India; cooperation with Central Asia ( two strategiclevel concerns).

• Nanjing MR: equipment integration; Taiwan contingencyrelated tactics; missiles; East Sea Fleet; air; Shanghai 

Garrison; amphibious operations; combined air-groundnaval operations; information warfare. While national 
233

defense mobilization receives attention in all MRs, Nanjing 

MR appears to place great public emphasis on this issue, 

perhaps because the Nanjing MR has benefi ted from major 

infrastructure upgrades and is an area that leaders likely fear 

could be attacked in a Taiwan contingency.

• Shenyang MR: Severe winter conditions; North Korean 

refugees; demobilization of one group army. 

Not surprisingly, collectively these are the priorities that most of 

China’s military leaders concentrate on, especially younger leaders 

equipped with better education and experience.20 I do not have space 

to address all of these issues—particularly those relating to the Air 

Force and Navy—and instead will limit my discussion to a few. 

Overall, however, as younger leaders come into important positions 

in the military regions or are promoted to national-level positions, 

they are often tasked to work on these issues or are promoted based 

on their experience or background. Because the PLA’s operational 

doctrine and plans for modernization have evolved signifi cantly 

over the last several years, some of the older leaders attempt to catch 

up with new operational developments and equipment acquisition 

through intensive training in “high technology” concepts. As 

alluded to earlier, predicted continued turnover in the next few years 

increasingly will bring in leaders with greater career experience 

implementing PLA modernization concepts from the 1990s onwards. 

Already, current MR leaders, like their Central Military Committee 

(CMC) counterparts, have more operational experience as a group 

in target areas of the PLA’s post-1990 modernization. These areas 

include amphibious operations; combined operations; national 

defense mobilization; weapons integration; mobile warfare; logistics; 

command, control, communications, computers and intelligence 

(C4I); and more realistic training, in many cases to include Taiwan 

scenarios.21

Equipment Upgrades and Integration: An Increased Emphasis 

on Experience in Armament Departments.

At least four out of seven of the MRs (Nanjing MR, Guangzhou 

MR, Lanzhou MR, and Jinan MR) have deputy commanders or chiefs 
234

of staff with known former MR Armament Department experience, 

indicating a new trend towards prioritizing having a knowledgeable 

leader with experience with equipment. This trend refl ects 1998 

changes in the PLA’s organizational structure that added equipment 

departments at the national and MR levels, as well as an increasing 

emphasis on integrating new equipment into the MR’s operations 

and training, particularly in MRs receiving a lot of new equipment. 

For example, the Guangzhou and Nanjing MRs both are receiving 

a lot of new equipment. Each has two individuals with extremely 

strong backgrounds in equipment. Guangzhou MR has two deputy 

commanders who were former Armament Department directors—

Gao Chunxiang, former Jinan MR Armament Department Director; 

and Ou Jingu, former Guangzhou MR Armament Department 

director. 

The Nanjing MR’s Chief of Staff since January 2003, Xu Chengyun, 

also is a former Armament Department director and even as chief 

of staff may continue to hold the MR headquarters’ portfolio for 

armament issues. As Armament Department director, he had been 

responsible for integrating the equipment that the Nanjing MR has 

acquired in the last several years. Some of this equipment, such as 

the Sovremenny Class destroyers and some advanced fi ghter aircraft 

from Russia, were assigned to the Nanjing MR theater but in fact 

are national-level assets. Much equipment, however, has gone to the 

Nanjing MR itself. 

Additionally, then-Armament Department Director Zhang 

Shiming was promoted to a deputy director of Beijing’s General 

Armament Department (GAD) in January 2002, providing a 

national-level link between the MR’s equipment department and the 

General Armament Department. Current Nanjing MR Armament 

Department Director Liu Shenyang provides a second national 

link. Before becoming Nanjing MR Armament Department director 

around July 2003, Liu was the director of the Armored Force Bureau, 

Armed Services Department, General Staff Department (GSD). Liu 

had rotated to the Nanjing MR’s 31st GA a year earlier, possibly to 

work with the armored forces in the 31st GA. His appointment as 

Nanjing MR Armament Department director probably indicates the 

Nanjing MR is working on its armored equipment. The links Zhang 

Shiming and Liu Shenyang provide between the Nanjing MR and the 

general department offi ces dealing with armament issues probably 
235

ensure that the national level leadership in charge of armaments are 

able to provide guidance and oversight to equipment integration in 

the Nanjing MR. 

Amphibious Operations.

Amphibious operations receive particular attention in the 

Guangzhou and Nanjing MRs across from Taiwan. The 1st, 12th, 

and 31st GAs in the Nanjing MR and the 41st and 42nd GAs in the 

Guangzhou MR likely all train for amphibious operations. Elements 

of these GAs reportedly have participated in Dongshan exercises 

across from Taiwan. 

In the Nanjing MR, Commander Zhu Wenquan is the best 

known example of an individual with a background in amphibious 

operations. Zhu probably had experience with amphibious 

operations as 1st GA commander, before becoming chief of staff 

and later commander of the Nanjing MR. He was a deputy compiler 

of a joint Nanjing MR-National Defense University publication on 

amphibious operations.22 Other current Nanjing MR members of the 

compilation committee for that publication include current 12th GA 

Commander Qi Jianguo and 31st Group Army Commander Zhao 

Keshi. Both group armies exercise for amphibious operations. In 

addition, Qi was the former commander of the 1st GA’s amphibious 

mechanized infantry division and wrote an article in the PLA 

fl agship publication, Jiefangjun Bao, “Amphibious Operation: ThreeDimensional Rushing to Seize the Beaches” in August 2002.23

Several others in the Nanjing MR headquarters can be deduced 

to have experience with amphibious operations by background: 

Dong Wanrui, Ranking Deputy Commander, Nanjing MR, and Lin 

Bingyao, Deputy Commander, Nanjing MR, were both previous 31st 

GA commanders. As current Nanjing MR armament director and 

former director of the Armored Force Bureau in the General Staff 

Department’s Armed Services Department, it is probable, though not 

certain, that Liu Shenyang has experience working on amphibious 

tanks in the Nanjing MR order of battle. The same is true of Chief of 

Staff Xu Chengyun, who was also a former Armament Department 

director and former 12th GA commander. 

In the Guangzhou MR, current 41st GA Commander Jia Xiaowei 

has the most certain interest in amphibious operations. The 41st GA is 
236

involved in amphibious training, and Jia reportedly led a “realistic” 

“sea crossing” amphibious exercise in September 2003 as a result of 

years of training. He also wrote an article in Jiefangjun Bao on shock 

amphibious landing tactics in 1996.24 Deputy Commander Ou Jingu 

likely has experience with amphibious operations as former 41st

GA commmander. Moreover, as former director of the Armament 

Department, he likely had a role in incorporating new equipment 

into the GZMR, including possible amphibious equipment. 

However, no specifi c information is available on his connection 

to amphibious operations. As commander of the 42nd GA, which 

includes the 124th Amphibious Mechanized Division, Liu Yuejun is 

certainly familiar with amphibious operations, though he does not 

appear to have direct experience commanding amphibious units. 

Before becoming 41st Group Army commander, he was the Macau 

Garrison Commander. His probable prior background is as former 

123rd Motor Infantry Division Commander, 41st GA. 

National Defense Mobilization.

25

The PLA fi rst renewed its emphasis on national defense 

mobilization efforts in 1987. These efforts accelerated in 1995, 

following the post-Tiananmen retrenchment period due to increased 

concern over the implications of rapid economic growth and an 

uncertain security environment. Since at least the Kosovo War in 

1999, the PLA has further increased its civil and air defense efforts, one 

component of which is its “three attacks, three defenses” campaign 

(three attacks are against stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed 

helicopters. The three defenses are against reconnaissance, precision 

weapons, and electronic interference).26

Every MR headquarters has a National Defense Mobilization 

Committee and dedicated MR leaders handling national defense 

mobilization issues and coordinating national- and provincial-level 

national defense mobilization. The likely mission of these committees 

is to set goals for mobilization of resources in that military region, to 

include working with military leaders in units and military districts 

and with civilian authorities to mobilize resources or civil defense 

in case of war. In peacetime, the MR National Defense Mobilization 
237

Committee organizes, directs, and coordinates provincial 

mobilization committees within a theater. During wartime, it would 

manage the war zone’s “Joint Military-Civilian Command Center.” 

Membership consists of the chairman (the MR commander); the MR 

political commissar; an executive vice chairman; and vice chairmen. 

As the concurrent MR commander, the chairman has the authority 

to garner resources within the MR. A deputy commander with 

a strong background in logistics or administrative issues is the 

executive vice chairman. Two additional deputy commanders are 

vice chairmen. Other participants or members likely include other 

deputy commanders, deputy political commissars, chiefs of staff, 

deputy chiefs of staff or directors of logistics departments, who work 

on mobilization issues at the working level, to include coordinating 

with military districts. Provincial governors and mayors of large 

municipalities may also be members of the committee. Offi cials 

in charge of national defense mobilization issues at the national 

level, the State National Defense Mobilization Committee secretary 

general and/or General Staff Department Comprehensive Offi ce 

director, often attend MR mobilization committee meetings. 

The MR-level National Defense Mobilization Committees share 

common characteristics in the types of personnel selected.

• Membership of the committees is based on position and 

portfolio, and includes: the MR commander, deputy 

commander in charge of military affairs, logistics, and lowerlevel mobilization committee members.

• At least two individuals on National Defense Mobilization 

Committees, Beijing MR Deputy Commander Su Rongsheng 

and Shenyang MR Deputy Commander Mao Fengming, have 

previously served as directors of the General Staff Department 

Military Affairs Department, giving them important insight 

into national-level regulations and personnel issues.

• Several members have had long-term experience in the 

MR in which they serve, providing them with contacts and 

experience in areas such as logistics, relations with local 

provincial authorities, and operations. They often have both 

MR headquarters experience and MR unit (for example, 
238

former MR group army commander) command experience. 

Former chiefs of staff of the MR are common members, and 

chiefs of staff, who as part of their duties coordinate issues 

between the MR headquarters and MR operational units, are 

frequently involved in mobilization-related activities. Other 

members likely include Logistics Department directors. 

• Several members or suspected members have had prior 

experience in military districts because MD commanders are 

responsible for reserve forces and mobilization preparations 

in their province.27 They thus have the experience and 

contacts with both military and civilian leaders in military 

districts, which they can draw upon as members of an MR 

Mobilization Committee.

Beijing Military Region (BJMR)

• Chairman—Zhu Qi, Commander, BJMR

• Executive Vice Chairman—Su Rongsheng, Deputy Commander, BJMR. 

Background: former director and deputy director of the General Staff 

Department’s Military Affairs Department and former Commander, 24th 

GA, BJMR. His experience and contacts in the Military Affairs Department 

likely ensures that BJMR properly implements new regulations on 

national defense mobilization.28 Su brings experience in national-level 

administration, regulation, enforcement, and personnel issues and years of 

command and headquarters experience in the BJMR. 

• Vice Chairman—Chen Xitao, Deputy Commander, BJMR. Background: 

COS, BJMR; COS, Nanjing MR; former Commander, 31st GA. Brings 

managerial skills and operational training skills to the table. Probable 

conventional ground forces/armor background.

• Vice Chairman—Zang Wenqing, Deputy Commander, BJMR (expected 

to retire soon; he was 63 in December 2003). Deputy chief of staff in 

BJMR before becoming deputy commander. Presided over a session on 

information technology and gave a speech on national defense mobilization 

at the National People’s Congress, 03/03. Brings long term understanding 

of BJMR operations, a possible understanding of information technology, 

and an understanding of national defense mobilization issues (he has been 

on the committee since May, 2001) to the table. 

Table 3. Estimated Members of Military Region 

National Defense Mobilization Committees.
239

Chengdu MR (CDMR) 

• Chairman—Wang Jianmin, Commander, CDMR

• Other probable members include ranking Deputy Commander Chen 

Shijun; Deputy Commander Fan Xiaoguang; Deputy Commander, CDMR and 

Commander, Tibet Military District Meng Jinxi; Chief of Staff Lu Dengming; 

and Director, Joint Logistics Department Zeng Jianguo.

Guangzhou MR (GZMR)

• Chairman—Liu Zhenwu, Commander, GZMR

• Before he retired in January 2004, Gong Gucheng, former GZMR Deputy 

Commander, was probable executive vice chairman of Guangzhou’s 

National Defense Mobilization Committee. His replacement, Ding 

Shouyue, is likely at least on the National Defense Mobilization Committee 

but probably does not act as executive vice chairman because he is new 

to the GZMR and not familiar enough with the MR. Deputy Commander 

Ou Jingu is likely a member. Chief of Staff Fang Fenghui is probably also 

involved, though he also is new. The MR chief of staff is frequently involved 

in mobilization issues as part of his responsibilities for coordinating 

between MR headquarters and units.

• Tang Xinqiu, Director, Joint Logistics Department, is almost certainly 

involved in the National Defense Mobilization Committee.

Jinan MR (JNMR)

• Chairman—Chen Bingde, Commander, JNMR.

• Zhong Shengqin, Deputy Commander, JNMR, is likely involved. He has 

spent his entire career in the Jinan MR. Chief of Staff Li Hongcheng and 

Joint Logistics Department Director Zhang Zhende also likely are involved 

due to their positions and long experience in the JNMR. 

Lanzhou MR (LZMR)

• Chairman—Li Qianyuan, Commander, LZMR

• Executive Vice Chairman—Zou Gengren, Deputy Commander, LZMR. 

Zou Gengren has participated extensively in MR and Military District 

mobilization meetings. He was a former GA commander in the LZMR.

• Vice Chairman—Uncertain. Formerly Deputy Commander Qu Fanghuan, 

who retired in 1/04 and was an expert in training issues probably 

worked on mobilization, particularly related to training of reserves. Qu's 

replacement, Song Caiwen, an expert on armaments, may also have taken 

over his probable responsibilities for mobilization.

Table 3. Estimated Members of Military Region 

National Defense Mobilization Committees (Continued).
240

• Secretary General—Liu Dengyun, Deputy Chief of Staff, LZMR. As 

secretary general, Liu Dengyun works on border defense and mobilization 

issues, with a particular focus on militia and reserves. He often acts as 

the MR representative at Military District meetings on militia issues. In 

August 2003, he had a high visibility profi le in border defense issues as 

the “director of the Chinese military specialists group” during “joint” 

exercises with several countries from the Shanghai Cooperation Group. He 

has many years of expertise in mobilization issues: as deputy commander 

of the Gansu Military District in at least 1996-1997, he was also executive 

vice chairman of the Gansu Military District's national defense mobilization 

committee.

Nanjing MR (NJMR)

• Probable Chairman—Zhu Wenquan, Commander, NJMR

• Vice Chairman—Dong Wanrui, Deputy Commander, NJMR. Not 

surprisingly, Dong Wanrui also has responsibility for logistics issues in the 

MR. He brings long experience in the NJMR to the table: he was a former 

commander of the 31st GA and deputy chief of staff, NJMR. 

• Probable member- Zhong Minghui, Director, Joint Logistics Department, 

NJMR. While Zhong is not listed as being a member of the National Defense 

Mobilization Committee, he is almost certainly involved. As former Anhui 

MD commander and vice chairman, MD National Defense Mobilization 

Committee, he established reserves and worked hard on national defense 

mobilization issues, to include people’s air defense and “three attacks, three 

defenses.” Extremely frequent press coverage of his activities suggests that 

his was a model effort. Zhong was also a deputy commander of the Jiangsu 

MD, where he worked on PLA business diverstiture issues. His experience 

in the MDs makes him a valuable link to the MDs. Note--NJMR has made 

an especially concerted effort to fuse economic development and national 

mobilization efforts (including building highways) and has had especially 

vigorous campaigns on air defense and the “three attacks, three defenses” 

due to its proximity to the Taiwan Strait and its probable involvement in 

any Taiwan-related contingency. An important lesson from NATO strikes 

on Yugoslavia was that China needed to learn to better defend its territory 

against precision guided munitions (PGMs). 

Shenyang MR (SYMR)

• Chairman—Qian Guoliang, Commander, SYMR

Table 3. Estimated Members of Military Region 

National Defense Mobilization Committees (Continued).
241

• Probable Executive Vice Chairman or Vice Chairman—Wu Yuqian, Deputy 

Commander with the probable portfolio for logistics and may be the 

executive vice chairman of the National Defense Mobilization Committee 

also. Wu has worked on air defense, logistical support, MR housing reform, 

and sanitation and health issues. Like other executive vice chairmen or vice 

chairmen, he was chief of staff, SYMR, before becoming deputy commander 

and has extensive experience coordinating issues in the SYMR. Wu Yuqian 

also has a strong political record: He has been an alternate member of 

the Central Committee since the 15th and was reelected at the 16th Party 

Congress in November 2002. 

• Vice Chairman—Mao Fengming, Deputy Commander, SYMR. Like Su 

Rongsheng of the Beijing MR, Mao Fengming was once the General Staff 

Department Military Affairs Department director. His experience and 

contacts in the Military Affairs Department likely ensures that SYMR 

properly implements new regulations on national defense mobilization. 

Mao was also the former vice president of the National Defense University. 

He brings experience in national-level administration, regulation, 

enforcement, and personnel issues.

Table 3. Estimated Members of Military Region 

National Defense Mobilization Committees (Concluded).

Internal Stability/Ethnic Unrest.

The military district commander of sensitive ethnic minority 

areas in the Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs, is also a MR deputy 

commander. The Tibet Military District Commander, Meng Jinxi, is 

also a deputy commander of the Chengdu MR; the Xinjiang Military 

District Commander, Qiu Yanhan, is also a deputy commander of 

the Lanzhou MR. As refl ects the sensitivity of these positions, Meng 

Jinxi is a full member of the 16th Party Congress Central Committee, 

and Qiu Yanhan is an alternate member of the 16th Party Congress 

Central Committee. In Chengdu MR, two other leaders in the MR 

headquarters also have extensive experience in Tibet. Deputy 

Commander Gui Quanzhi reportedly led the 13th GA’s 149thMotor 

Infantry Division during the 1989 crack down in Tibet. Armament 

Department Director Dong Guishan began his career in the Tibet 

Military District, including a stint as the deputy commander in 

charge of training. He has written articles on using equipment in 

icy conditions, which could apply to many areas of the Chengdu 
242

MR but certainly applies to Tibet. The Beijing Garrison Commander 

is also simultaneously a deputy commander of the Beijing Military 

Region—not the case with any of the other Garrison Commands. 

Up and Coming Leaders and Other PLA Priorities. 

Some leaders in the MRs in the “Chart: Time Remaining for 

Current MR Leaders, as of 1/04” are likely to be promoted from 

their current positions once their time is “up” in the current position, 

extending the number of years remaining in their careers. As they 

move on, other rising stars within the military regions will emerge to 

take their places. The chart below lists some leaders who have been 

promoted since the pre-16th Party Congress January 2002 round of 

promotion. Some of these leaders have been promoted twice or even 

three times. Short assignments offer them a breadth of experience in 

a condensed time period. Those who are promoted often are because 

their skills or operational backgrounds are sought after. A glance at 

their backgrounds suggests a variety of operational experiences that 

match up to a great extent with the PLA’s modernization priorities. 

Areas in which these particular leaders excel include: 

• information-ization and mechanization; 

• training and operations; operations in diffi cult (here, cold) 

climates; 

• Blue Army (OPFOR) exercises and training; 

• armaments/equipment integration; 

• logistics, including “precision” logistics; 

• information operations; 

• rapid reaction/mobile operations;

• communications; 

• amphibious operations; 

• air defense, fl exible command, and lessons learned from 

Operation ALLIED FORCE in Serbia; 

• transformation of divisions to brigades; tactics against aircraft 

carriers and other asymmetric tactics; 

• national defense mobilization; and 

• border defense.
243

This impressive array of experience on issues directly related to PLA 

modernization priorities suggests future leaders will be increasingly 

well qualifi ed to steer the PLA’s modernization. Table 4 is intended 

to act as a sample of potential future leaders and not as a complete 

inventory. 

Name/ MR Date 

of 

Birth

Promotions 

or changes 

between 1/02 

and 01/04

Specialty 16th Central 

Committee 

member

Deputy 

Commanders

Gao 

Chunxiang, 

GZMR

 ? Three Armaments. Advocates 

“leap-frog technology” but 

also weapons integration 

and equipment/tactics for 

asymmetric warfare; former 

COS, 54th GA, which has 

aviation, “rapid reaction” 

unit, and good equipment; 

DDir and Dir, Arm Dept, 

JNMR; COS, JNMR; COS, 

GZMR29

No

Liu Yahong, 

CDMR

2/46 Two (COS, 

DCDR)

Former CDR, 14th GA; 

background otherwise 

unknown.

No

Song Caiwen, 

LZMR

? Two (Dir, 

GZMR Arm 

Dept, DCDR, 

LZMR)

Armaments; Dir, Arm Dept, 

GZMR; DCOS, GZMR; 

DCDR, 41st GA; probably 

transferred to LZMR 

due to strong armaments 

background (GZMR already 

has two DCDRs with arm 

experience). Studied at NDU 

Research Department.

No

Gui Quanzhi, 

CDMR

1943 One Former 13th GA CDR; former 

CDR, 149th Motor Inf Div, 

“rapid reaction” troops, cold 

mountainous areas, 13th GA; 

in 1989, led 149th to enforce 

crackdown in Tibet30

No

Zhong 

Shengqin, 

JNMR

? One Training portfolio, MR 

discipline; COS, JNMR; CDR, 

26th GA

No

Table 4. Up and Coming Leaders: A Sample.
244

Ye Aiqun, 

JNMR

10/

45

Two (COS, 

DCDR)

COS, GZMR; CDR, 42nd GA; 

as 42nd GA CDR, initiated 

discussion on lessons learned 

from NATO bombings of 

Yugoslavia; better training, 

“fl exible command” (to 

Yug credit), and air defense 

measures needed.31 Son of a 

general.

No

Chiefs of Staff

Fang Fenghui, 

GZMR

? One Former 21st GA CDR; 

advocates better logistics 

support, improving fi ghting 

capability; prob work on 

comms; army management; 

probable exercises in Western 

China (WEST-EX)

No

Li 

Hongcheng, 

JNMR

? One Armaments, Blue Army 

training. Dir, JNMR Arm 

Dept; DCOS, JNMR; CDT, 

Army Academy (featured in 

interview on his academy’s 

“Blue Army” training). 

Wang 

Guosheng, 

LZMR

? One or two Training and operations; 64th 

GA and 40th GA, SYMR. 

Praised consistently early in 

career ex & training; headed a 

small group to transform 40th 

GA’s inf div to motor inf bdes 

(signifi cant: the 40th was the 

fi rst GA to experiment with 

transforming divisions to 

brigades). Likely co-authored 

an article on threats to aircraft 

carriers.32 MA, Military 

Studies, NDU.

No

Xu Chengyun, 

NJMR

? Two Armaments. Was Dir, Arm 

Dept during critical period 

of equipment integration for 

NJMR (2002-2003). 12th GA 

CDR (amphibious operations; 

rapid reaction, and lots of 

new equipment: leaps in 

technology, informationization; armaments as a whole 

system—need to take into 

account repair, personnel, 

comms, information/intell, 

and integration). 33

No

Table 4. Up and Coming Leaders: A Sample (Continued).
245

Department 

Leaders

Zhong 

Minghui, Dir, 

Log Dept, 

NJMR

? One Logistics, National Defense 

Mobilization, Air Defense (“3 

attacks, 3 defenses”); former 

Anhui MD CDR and Exec VC 

National Defense Mob Cte 

for MD; extremely frequent 

press appearances suggest he 

was a model on these issues. 

For NJMR, which assesses it 

might be struck in a Taiwan 

confl ict, his portfolio very 

important. Background 

suitable for MR Log Dir.

No

Zhang 

Zhende, Dir, 

Log, JNMR

? One “Precision logistics” and 

lessons learned from Iraq 

War, U.S. logistics.34

No

Liu Shenyang, 

Dir, Arm 

Dept, NJMR

? One Armaments, Armor; 

probable NJMR link to GSD’s 

Armament Department; 

former Dir, Armored Force 

Bureau, Service Arms Dept, 

GSD. Also just over one 

year’s experience as former 

DCDR, 31st GA, NJMR, 

likely a rotation to obtain one 

year’s experience in a GA 

with armored component.35

Liu’s appointment and his 

background further indicates 

the NJMR is working hard to 

develop tactics, training, and 

integration/ weapons systems 

for armor forces in the NJMR.

No

Zeng Jianguo, 

Dir, Log, 

CDMR

? None Logistics in CDMR and 13th 

GA (female general).

Alt memb, 

15th and 

16th Central 

Committee 

(CC)

Xun 

Zhenjiang, 

Dir, Arm, 

SYMR

? None Armaments and logistics. 

Former DDIR, Log, SYMR 

and COS, Jilin MD. Has 

written a couple of articles 

on armament research and 

development.36

No

Table 4. Up and Coming Leaders: A Sample (Continued).
246

GA Commanders

Qi Jianguo, 

12th GA, 

NJMR

? One Information operations; 

amphibious operations; 

communications. Previous 

CDR, amphibious mechanized 

division, 1st GA. Published 

on amphibious operations 

to seize beaches and was on 

compilation committee of 

publication on “Sea Crossing 

Landing Operations” with 

NJMR CDR Zhu Wenquan. 

Similar background to Zhu.

No

Li Shaojun, 

38th GA, 

BJMR

1949 One 38th GA CDR. Prominent 

proponent of mechanization 

(has spoken at the National 

People’s Congress and a well 

publicized forum). Interested 

in informationization—

Information Warfare (IW), 

Electronic Warfare (EW) 

concepts. 38th GA was the 

fi rst GA to have army aviation 

units in 1988; 54th GA 

followed shortly.

No

Liu Yuejun, 

42nd GA, 

GZMR

1954 

or 

1955 

(48 in 

01/

03)

One 42nd GA known for 

amphibious ops, rapid 

reaction, and good 

technology. CDR, Macau 

Garrison; Dir, Shenzhen Base, 

HK Garrison Unit; probable 

CDR, 123rd motor infantry 

division, 42nd GA. Son of a 

general.

Youngest 

alt member, 

16th CC

Jia Xiaowei, 

41st GA, 

GZMR

 ? One Amphibious operations; 

information technology; 

Information Operations 

(network warfare).37

No

Xu Fenlin, 

47th GA, 

LZMR

? One Training and operations. 

Rose through 47th GA. 

Was Director, Training and 

Operations, when the 47th 

deployed to near the border 

with Vietnam, late 1980s. 

The 47th has produced many 

generals.

No

Table 4. Up and Coming Leaders: A Sample (Concluded).
247

MOVING ON: WHAT SELECTED FORMER MR LEADERS 

BRING TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Table 4 maps out some up and coming leaders who likely will 

infl uence PLA modernization in the MRs and, eventually, at the 

national level. Several of those leaders are “up and coming” precisely 

because of their experiences working in priority areas of PLA 

modernization. The PLA also appears to try to distribute promotion 

opportunities among the many GAs, and recent promotions at both 

the MR and national levels refl ect this trend. It is only over a longer 

period of time that certain GAs demonstrate a pattern of consistent 

promotion.38 Over the past several years, several military region 

leaders have been promoted or transferred to the national level. In 

the case of transfers, these have not always involved a promotion, 

but in all cases they involve a candidate whose credentials gained in 

the MRs are viewed as valuable for a national-level position—even 

when other factors, such as connections, were a strong factor in a promotion. 

Some examples include:

• Central Military Commission and General Staff 

Department. Chief of the General Staff of the PLA (or 

Director of the General Staff Department) Liang Guanglie 

was deputy commander of the Beijing MR and commander 

of the Shenyang and Nanjing MRs and before becoming chief 

of the General Staff Department in November 2002. Early in 

his career, Liang Guanglie was commander of the 20th and 

54th GAs in Jinan MR. As chief of staff, he is responsible for 

PLA-wide operations; therefore, his familiarity with several 

military regions would be essential during a major military 

campaign. Moreover, as former Nanjing MR commander, 

Liang is familiar with some of the PLA’s most innovative 

training, best high technology equipment, and Taiwanrelated operations. 

• Fan Changlong, Assistant Chief of the General Staff 

Department (Former COS, SYMR). Fan Changlong was 

promoted to assistant chief of the General Staff Department 

in January 2004, after two years as the Shenyang MR chief of 

staff. Fan had previously spent his entire career in the SYMR 
248

and was former 16th GA commander. Fan Changlong seems 

to have a strong training background and wrote an August 

2000 article in Jiefangjun Bao on new training concepts. Fan 

has spoken about “army building” at the National People’s 

Congress on several occasions. Fan Changlong is an alternate 

member of the 16th Party Congress, an early indicator that he 

would be promoted. Fan Changlong was born in March, 1947. 

He is a key example of an early “fast burner” and likely has a 

strong career ahead.

• General Political Department—no recent known promotions.

• Central Military Commission and General Logistics 

Department. General Logistics Department Director Liao 

Xilong was deputy commander of the Chengdu MR for ten 

years and commander of the Chengdu MR for seven years 

before he was appointed to his current position in November 

2002. General Liao could have been appointed for a number 

of reasons. First, he was a well-seasoned commander of a MR 

with complicated logistics issues. The Chengdu MR is the 

PLA’s largest and includes diffi cult terrain such as Tibet. Liao’s 

strong operational credentials date back to his early career, 

when he was a war hero from China’s "defensive” border 

war with Vietnam in 1979 and, later, 14th GA commander. 

Second, he has probable connections with General Secretary, 

State President, and CMC Vice Chairman Hu Jintao, a likely 

factor in his promotion.

• General Armament Department. Zhang Shiming, Deputy 

Director of the General Armament Department since January 

2002, was the former director of the Nanjing MR Armaments 

Department. Nanjing MR, directly across from Taiwan, is 

the MR receiving some of the PLA’s most advanced high 

technology equipment and weapons acquisitions in recent 

years. Zhang’s knowledge of Nanjing MR equipment issues 

therefore is valuable at the national level. His expertise 

could be particularly useful in overseeing the Nanjing MR’s 

equipment integration and development and in planning for 

a Taiwan Straits contingency.
249

• Air Force Headquarters. Four new leaders were appointed 

to the Air Force Headquarters in July 2003, at least three 

of whom came directly from the military regions: Deputy 

Commanders Ma Xiaotian and Wang Chaoqun, and Chief of 

Staff He Weirong. Ma Xiaotian was a Nanjing MR Air Force 

commander until July 2003. The Nanjing MR’s air force is 

arguably one of the most advanced in the PLA Air Force. 

Wang Chaoqun was the Chengdu MR Air Force commander, 

and He Weirong was Jinan MR Air Force commander, giving 

the Air Force Headquarters a breadth of experience from the 

MRs. Furthermore, Shenyang MR Air Force Commander Xu 

Qiliang is rumored to become the next Air Force commander, 

in part because of his status as only one of two full members 

of the 16th Party Congress Central Committee from the Air 

Force. 

• People’s Armed Police. Xi Zhongchao, Deputy Commander 

of the People’s Armed Police since January 2004, was the 

former commander of the 63rd GA in Shanxi Province, BJMR 

since at least November 1997. His promotion probably is due 

mostly to good timing; his GA was abolished in January 2004 

as part of PLA downsizing. Xi Zhongchao is an alternate 

member of the 16th Party Congress, an early indicator that he 

would be promoted. 

• Academies. National Defense University (NDU) 

Commandant Pei Huailiang and Academy of Military 

Sciences (AMS) Commandant Zheng Shenxia (Air Force) 

both have extensive experience in the military regions. Pei 

Huailiang was the deputy commander of the Jinan MR for 

nine years before he became the NDU commandant in 2003. 

While it is unclear why he was promoted over others, his 

long fi eld experience will probably be valued at a time when 

the NDU is attempting to break down (with limited success) 

the gap between classroom and fi eld experience. Zheng’s 

experience in the MRs was not as recent. Zheng was a 7th 

Air Army commander in Guangzhou MR and Shenyang MR 

Air Force commander before becoming fi rst chief of staff of 

the Air Force and then commandant of the AMS. Zheng also 
250

was the commandant of the Air Academy in Beijing. He is a 

proponent of air power and precision guided munitions—both 

areas of PLA interest. As the PLA attempts to move towards 

combined arms and joint operations and the Air Force and 

Navy become increasingly important in shaping the PLA’s 

evolving doctrine, Zheng’s selection as commandant of the 

institution that shapes PLA doctrine, following that of the 

Navy’s Zhang Dingfa, fi ts the PLA’s needs. 

CONCLUSIONS

Examining the backgrounds of military region leaders reveals a 

keen interest amongst those leaders in issues related to the PLA’s 

modernization priorities—information warfare, mechanization, 

amphibious operations, mobile operations, realistic training, and 

equipment integration are just a few examples. This is especially 

true of the younger leaders such as GA commanders and recently 

promoted leaders, who tend to be more vocal and more recently 

involved at the operational level in PLA modernization. Due to 

expected continued high rates of turnover at the MR level, we should 

expect to see an increasing infl ux of highly qualifi ed personnel enter 

the MR, and eventually, national-level leadership. 

There will be several challenges for PLA leaders attempting to 

meet the PLA’s goals at the military region level. While this chapter 

has not discussed joint operations, the drive for increased joint 

operations is one such example. While the military regions with Air 

Force and Navy components have representatives for those services 

serving as deputy commanders, the majority of military region 

headquarters staff are army. The chief of staff, a key position in the 

military region headquarters is always an army offi cer,39 and the 

distribution of power in the chain of command does not refl ect the 

growing emphasis on the importance of the Air Force and Navy in 

operations and doctrine.

It would be diffi cult to point to any one area as being an area of 

expertise that the PLA is looking for in a future national-level leader. 

Collectively, however, the military leaders refl ect PLA priorities, 

even in some cases when what the leader has to offer is continuity 

rather than new ideas or techniques. 
251

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. See Li Cheng, “The New Military Elite: Generational Profi le and 

Contradictory Trends,” a talk given at a conference on “Swimming in a New Sea: 

Civil-Military Issues in Today’s China,” The CNA Corporation, March 22-23, 2004. 

This article will be published in a conference volume by M.E. Sharpe. See also 

William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, New York: Praeger, 1973; and 

James Mulvenon, The Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Offi cer Corps, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997.

2. See Kenneth Allen and John Corbett's chapter in this volume for more on 

predicting turnover based on position and grade.

3. The sections of this article dealing with the characteristics of military region 

leaders rely heavily on the methodology and research of Li Cheng, throughout. 

See, for example, Li Cheng, “The New Military Elite”; Li Cheng, China’s Leaders: 

The New Generation, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefi eld Publishers, 

2001; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: 

Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 

1993, pp. 757-786. See also Li’s articles in the China Leadership Monitor. For reference 

to provincial leaders as a training ground for national leaders, see Li Cheng, “After 

Hu, Who? China’s Provincial Leaders Await Promotion,” China Leadership Monitor, 

No. 1, Winter 2002, p. 1. While the coalition-building that Li refers to in his article 

certainly is one factor for becoming national-level military leaders, this article will 

focus more on the skills and knowledge cultivated at the military’s equivalent 

of Li’s “provinces,” the military regions. Also, this chapter will not focus on 

characteristics of military leaders such as birthplace, educational level, or transfers 

between military regions as a means of preventing “warlordism” in the military 

regions. It mainly will focus on how career patterns, background, and expertise in 

the context of their current positions refl ect PLA operational objectives. 

4. Probably the best example of such a leader representing continuity in a 

military region who was later promoted is current Central Military Commission 

(CMC) member and General Logistics Department Director General Liao Xilong. 

Liao had been the commander of the Chengdu MR for seven years, 1995-2002) 

and deputy commander of the Chengdu MR for a decade, 1985-95) before he was 

selected for his current position. 

5. The author is grateful to Li Cheng for making this point. While provincial 

leaders seem to have a wider “age band,” Li discusses the importance of age to 

turnover, due to regulations mandating retirement at 65 for top-level provincial 

leaders, in “After Hu, Who?” pp. 5-6.

6. With some exceptions—for example, there are two former 31 GA deputy 

commanders of the Nanjing MR and two former 65 GA commanders in the Beijing 

MR. 
252

7. See Kenneth Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Administrative and 

Operational Structure,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, People’s 

Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, pp. 42-43, for an 

organizational breakdown of the responsibilities of operations, political, logistics, 

and armaments. This breakdown of responsibilities begins at the national General 

Department level (General Staff Department, General Political Department, 

General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department), and is 

replicated at the MR level, both in MR-level deputy commander “portfolio” 

responsibilities and in MR-level headquarters (operations), political, logistics, and 

armament departments.

8. See Susan Puska, “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistics 

Department (GLD): Toward Joint Logistics Support,” in Mulvenon and Yang, 

pp. 247-271, for a good discussion of PLA logistics.

9. See Harlan Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” in Mulvenon 

and Yang, pp. 273-308, for a discussion of armament reforms in the PLA and 

an overview of the General Armament Department. Unit-level armament 

departments are covered on pp. 298-299.

10. This does not include Air Force or Navy now serving in MR headquarters. 

Many Air Force and Navy offi cers have had experience in service headquarters 

- Shenyang MR Air Force Commander Xu Qiliang is one such example. This also 

includes the Nanjing MR Armament Department Director.

11. The author is grateful to David F. Helvey for making this point and other 

valuable points in this chapter.

12. Zheng Shouzeng, “Article on Information War, Training,” in Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Jiefangjun Bao, July 9, 1996.

13. For the WEST-EX exercise, see “Group Army Stages 'West-98' Exercise,” 

in FBIS, Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, November 1, 1998, p 4; for the “four-level” 

on-line command post exercise, see Zhang Feng, “Army Presses Toward Virtual 

Battlefi eld,” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, November 24, 1999, p. 5. The “four 

levels” are the MR headquarters, group army, division, and regiment.

14. The PLA’s 2001 Active-Service Offi cers law states that there are maximum 

term service limits on offi cers serving in peace time at the Division level and above. 

Presumably the term limit is around fi ve years; this would explain one reason for 

Ding Shouyue’s transfer to the Guangzhou MR after at least four and a half years 

of service in the Jinan MR. However, it is unclear what the term of service is at the 

MR deputy commander level and the extent to which this regulation is enforced. 

For example, this does not explain how Chen Shijun could serve at his current 

post since 1995, particularly when he still has two or three years left in his career. 

Regulations concerning retirement ages are enforced. “PLA General Political 
Dept's Explanations on PRC's Active-Service Offi cers Law,” in FBIS, Beijing

Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), January 18, 2001, p. 2.

15. See “’Full Text’ of PRC “Offi cers on the Active List” Law,” in FBIS, 

Beijing Xinhua, December 28, 2000; and “’Full Text’ of PRC Amendment to 

Offi cer Enlistment Regulations,” in FBIS, Beijing Xinhua, December 28, 2000. 

Other scholars have used the information from these laws for analysis, including 

Kenneth Allen, John Corbett, and Cheng Li (see notes 16 and 17). 

16. The matrix as structured here also appears in Kenneth W. Allen and John 

F. Corbett, Jr., “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions” in this volume. 

17. Li Cheng at Hamilton College has commented that high turnover is 

expected to continue in the PLA due to the small band of age differences amongst 

leaders in the MRs. Based on the requirement that deputy commanders retire at 

63, most leaders will retire within 5 years or be promoted to the next level, where 

they can remain in their posts until 65 years old.

18. David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, 

and Prospects, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002, 

pp. 69-87, 94-107; Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power 

of the People’s Republic of China: Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 

National Defense Authorization Act,” July 30, 2003, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

20030730chinaex.pdf, pp. 5-9.

19. Based on Shambaugh, pp. 100-106; Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Ground Forces: 

Moving Toward a Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Force,” 

in Mulvenon and Yang, pp. 309-345; research on GAs (mainly press reports); and 

a scan of GA order of battle. 

20. The extent to which the PLA is succeeding in achieving its priorities, or 

how it is attempting to do so, is beyond the leadership and intentions focus of this 

paper.

21. Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the 

People’s Republic of China," p. 5.

22. “Sea Crossing Landing Operations—Chinese and Foreign Sea Crossing 

Landing Operation Revelations Put Out by Nanjing MR and NDU,” on Topcool 

Forum (an unoffi cial website), 01/29/2002. The source is not offi cial, but the 

individuals selected as committee members and compilers of this publication have 

the backgrounds to be plausibly involved in a joint publication put out by the 

Nanjing MR and National Defense University (NDU). Those committee members 

include: Zhu Wenquan, Deputy Compiler; Compilation committee members: Qi 

Jianguo; Zhao Keshi; and Xi Zhongchao. 

253
23. “ On-Site Report on Sci-Tech Training Drills in Nanjing Military Region,” 

in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), August 10, 2000, p. 2.

24. “PRC: Guangzhou MR 7-Day Amphibious Exercise Enhanced 

Coordination,” in FBIS, Guangzhou Zhanshi Bao, September 13, 2003, p. 1; Jia 

Xiaowei, “Article on Shock Landing Tactics,” in FBIS, Jiefangjun Bao, July 2, 1996.

25. I am indebted to Mr. David F. Helvey for much of the information in this 

section.

26. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 87-88.

27. Blasko, “PLA Ground Forces,” p. 313.

28. David Finkelstein, “The General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, and Missions,” in Mulvenon and Yang, 

pp. 171-173.

29. Gao Chunxiang’s articles on equipment clearly point to the PLA concept 

of “defeating the superior with the inferior.” For example, see two articles from 

January, 2003 and December, 2000: Gao Chunxiang, “Article on Dialectics of 

Superior Weapons Versus Inferior Ones in Modern Warfare” in FBIS, Zhongguo 

Guofang Bao (Internet Version-WWW), January 6, 2003, p. 3; Gao Chunxiang, 

“Scientifi c View of PRC Weapons' Capabilities Urged,” in FBIS, Jiefangjun Bao 

(Internet Version-WWW), December 5, 2000, p. 6.

30. For reference on Gui’s role in Tibet, see: “PLA Reshuffl es Said Part of 

Power Play in Lead-up to PRC Leadership Transition,” in FBIS, Hong Kong South 

China Morning Post (Internet Version-WWW), March 27, 2002.

31. Reference found in “PLA Unit Takes Warning From NATO Bombing,” in 

FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, April 20, 1999, p. 6. Presumably this “unit” holding a 

discussion on lessons learned from Yugoslavia for training is the 42nd GA, which 

was headed by Ye Aiqun at that time.

32. The article appeared in Feng Changson, Xu Jiafeng, and Wang Guosheng, 

“China: Article Discusses Six Threats Faced by Aircraft Carriers,” in FBIS, Beijing

Zhongguo Guofang Bao, March 5, 2002, p. 4. His name, Wang Guosheng, is common 

in Chinese, and it could be a different author. However, it is most likely that Wang 

co-authored this with two others who, like Wang, were working on their MA in 

Military Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) or associated with 

NDU at the time of the article (Wang received his degree in 2003). The six “threats” 

noted are submarines, sea mines, anti-ship missiles, fi ghter aircraft, surface-tosurface missiles, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Two years earlier, there had 

been an article in the Hong Kong press (March 2000) on the 40th GA (along with 

254
255

other GAs) participating in exercises targeting aircraft carriers. The content of this 

article also is unconfi rmed. “PLA Stages War Maneuvers to Deal With US Aircraft 

Carriers,” in FBIS, Hong Kong Tai Yang Pao, (Internet Version-WWW), March 1, 

2000, p. A18. 

33. Xu Chengyun has written several articles on “army building,” framed 

in terms of Jiang Zemin thinking, but really addressing some of the PLA’s 

shortcomings. See Xu Chengyun, “JFJB Article on Studying Jiang Zemin Thinking 

on National Defense and Army Building,” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, (Internet 

Version-WWW), October 27, 2003, p. 9; Xu Chengyun, “JFJB: Reform is Impetus 

for Development of PLA” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), 

October 14, 2003, p. 6; Xu Chengyun, “JFJB Article Discusses New Ways of 

Speeding Up Development of PLA Weaponry,” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 

(Internet Version-WWW), July 30, 2002 p. 6.

34. Zhang Zhende, “JFJB Article on Ways for PLA to Accomplish ‘Precision 

Logistics,’” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW), September 23, 

2003, p. 6.

35. See Finkelstein, pp. 196-201, for information on the GSD Service Arms 

Department. This is a technical division of the GSD in charge of the ground forces. 

The armored forces bureau is one of several bureaus; the others include army 

aviation; artillery; anti-chemical warfare; special operations; armament; and so 

on.

36. See Major General Xun Zhenjiang and Captain Geng Haijun, “Chinese 

General Recommends R&D Strategy for Weapons and Equipment,” in FBIS, 

Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, June 20, 2002, pp. 50-55; Author of Guan Yu 

Zhuangbei Jianshe De Lilun Sikao, (Theoretical Considerations Regarding the Theoretical Considerations Regarding the 

Buildup of Weapons and Equipment). See also Xun Zhenjiang, “Jiefangjun Bao 

Discusses Armament, Equipment Issues,” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet 

Version-WWW), June 4, 2002, p. 6.

37. Jia Xiaowei seems sharp on a number of issues of importance to the PLA. 

He reportedly led the “Sea Crossing” amphibious exercise, “realistic” training 

culminating supposedly several years of training in September 2003. See “PRC: 

Guangzhou MR 7-Day Amphibious Exercise Enhanced Coordination,” in FBIS, 

Guangzhou Zhanshi Bao, September 13, 2003, p. 1. For Major General Jia on 

amphibious operations, see Jia Xiaowei, “Article on Shock Landing Tactics”; for Jia 

on Information operations, see: Jia Xiaowei, “Jiefangjun Bao Article on Network 

Warfare,” in FBIS, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, August 24, 1999, p. 6. Jia was also quoted 

on information technology in “Liaowang Article on Need for PLA To Mechanize, 

Informationize Concurrently,” in FBIS, Beijing Liaowang, No. 20, May 19, 2003, 

pp. 34-35. He commented on the use of command, control, communication, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms and 

electronic weapons to fundamentally transform combat operations.
38. Some of these include the 1st GA, 12th GA, 20th GA, 47th GA, and 54th 

GA. This could be the subject of another paper. Li Cheng and others equate these 

emerging promotion trends (best viewed by examining the backgrounds of 

national-level leaders, MR commanders, service commanders, and major military 

academy commandants over time) to a new version of William Whitson’s fi eld 

army groupings. These promotion trends are due to a number of factors, including 

both connections and operational experience gained in these MRs.

39. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 149.

256
257

CHAPTER 8

PREDICTING PLA LEADER PROMOTIONS

Kenneth W. Allen

John F. Corbett, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses regularization of the People’s Liberation 

Army’s (PLA) promotion process for its fl ag-rank offi cers and 

the various analytical tools that can be used to predict the PLA’s 

future senior leaders. The chapter begins by providing an historical 

context for the PLA offi cer grade and rank system. It then examines 

“formal factors” of the current promotion criteria that are mandated 

by regulations, such as offi cer grades, ranks, retirement-age 

requirements, and billet minimum and maximum terms of service. 

This section also provides some specifi c examples of current senior 

PLA leaders and the promotion squares they have fi lled. The chapter 

concludes by looking at “other factors,” such as the guanxi system 

of relationships, Chinese Communist Party Congress and National 

People’s Congress (NPC) membership, education requirements, 

foreign travel, place of birth, and political reliability, as well as 

limiting factors and other possible “tickets” that must be punched as 

the offi cers climb the promotion ladder.

PLA OFFICER GRADE AND RANK SYSTEM

The terms “rank” and “grade” are basically synonymous in the 

U.S. military. In the PLA, however, grades, which are based on an 

offi cer’s position, are more important than ranks. As a result, PLA 

writings usually refer to offi cer positions or grades and have few 

references to ranks. 

Within the PLA, an offi cer’s grade, not the rank, refl ects authority 

and responsibility across service, branch, and organizational lines. 

Thus, while rank is a key indicator of position within the hierarchy 

of foreign militaries, grade is the key indicator within the PLA. For 
258

example, PLA commanders and political commissars (PC) are coequals and hold the same grade, but they often do not have the same 

rank due to time-in-grade (TIG) requirements.1

It is helpful to look back at the PLA’s history to understand 

how the grade and rank system evolved. The Red Army, which was 

formed in 1927, and the PLA, which was formally established in the 

late 1940s, have always had an offi cer (cadre) grade system (ganbu 

dengji zhidu).2 However, the rank system was not introduced until 

the 1950s. These grade and rank systems, which have evolved over 

the years, consist of four basic components: grade categories, grades, 

rank categories, and ranks. The Chinese use four terms to describe 

the components: zhiwu, jibie, dengji, and junxian. These terms do not 

always translate directly into English, but their meaning is usually 

clear from the context.

Zhiwu or zhiwu dengji is translated as position or post and 

indicates the specifi c position someone holds. Jibie is translated as 

grade. These two terms are used interchangeably and refer to a 

specifi c position such as regiment commander. The third term, dengji, 

which means rank, is used more in the sense of an organizational 

level, such as division level, rather than a rank such as colonel. 

The fourth term is junxian, which means the military ranks, such 

as company grade (second lieutenant through captain), fi eld grade 

(major through senior colonel), and fl ag grade (1-star major general, 

2-star lieutenant general, and 3-star general). 

Prior to 1952, cadre in the Red Army and PLA were assigned 

grades that were based on their position (zhiwu), such as regiment 

commander or operations department director. In 1952, the PLA 

established a formal unifi ed grade system which consisted of 10 

grade categories and 21 grades (10 dengji 21 jibie).3 In 1955, the 

“Central Military Commission (CMC) member” grade category was 

abolished, leaving 9 categories and 20 grades.

In 1955, the PLA combined its existing grade system with a 

new military rank system (junxian zhidu junxian zhidu) based on the Soviet rank 

system. As shown in Table 1, the new combined system included 

fi ve rank categories (dengji) and fi fteen ranks (jibie).4 Each grade 

was assigned at least one rank. However, at the beginning of the 

Cultural Revolution in 1965, the PLA abolished all ranks and did not 

reintroduce them until 1988.5
259

Rank Categories Ranks

Company grade (weiguan) Warrant Offi ce (zhunwei)

2nd Lieutenant (shaowei)

1st Lieutenant (zhongwei)

Captain (shangwei)

Senior Captain (dawei)

Field grade (xiaoguan) Major (shaoxiao)

Lieutenant Colonel (zhongxiao)

Colonel (shangxiao)

Senior Colonel (daxiao)

Flag grade (jiangguan) Major General (shaojiang)

Lieutenant General (zhongjiang)

General (shangjiang)

Senior General (dajiang)

Marshal (yuanshuai) Marshal (yuanshuai)

Generalissimo (dayuanshuai) Generalissimo (dayuanshuai)

Table 1. PLA Ranks: 1955-65.

In 1988, the PLA established ten ranks in three categories as 

shown in Table 2. All three of the services--army, navy, and air force-

-use ranks associated with the ground-forces, but the terms “Navy,” 

“Air Force,” or “Special Technical” are placed in front of the ranks 

for those offi cers. When PLA Navy ranks are referred to in English, 

however, they are usually translated or spoken using Western terms 

such as ensign, commander, and admiral. For example, a PLA fl ag 

rank naval offi cer is called a “Navy general (haijun shangjiang)” in 

Chinese but an “admiral” in English. 

Categories Ranks 

(Chinese)

Army, Air Force, Special 

Technical Ranks 

(English)

Navy Ranks (English)

Company grade Shaowei

Zhongwei

Shangwei

Second lieutenant

First lieutenant

Captain

Ensign

Lieutenant junior grade

Lieutenant

Field grade Shaoxiao

Zhongxiao

Shangxiao

Daxiao

Major

Lieutenant colonel

Colonel

Senior colonel

Lieutenant commander

Commander 

Captain

Senior captain

Flag grade Shaojiang

Zhongjiang

Shangjiang

Major general (1 star)

Lieutenant general (2 star)

General (3 star)

Rear admiral (1 star)

Vice admiral (2 star)

Admiral (3 star)

Table 2. Current Rank Categories and Assigned Ranks.
260

THE PLA OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM TODAY

Grades and Ranks Today.

In 1988, the number of grades was reduced from 21 to 15. Since 

then, all offi cers, regardless of service or position (e.g., command, 

political, staff, combat support, researcher, or professor), have been 

assigned one of the 15 grades. From 1988 to 1999, most grades had 

three ranks.6 However, the NPC issued revised active duty service 

regulations in 1999 that reduced the number of ranks per grade to 

two--a primary rank and a secondary rank.7 For example, the current 

regulation stipulates, “Military region (MR) leaders shall be either 

general or lieutenant general, with general as the primary military 

rank.”

Between 1955 and 1965, China promoted a total of 1,614 senior 

offi cers to a rank at or above the major general rank, including 10 

marshals, 10 senior generals, 57 generals, 170 lieutenant generals, 

and 1,360 major generals.8 When the PLA reinstituted ranks in 

1988, it conferred ranks on 17 3-star generals/admirals, 146 2-star 

lieutenant generals/vice admirals, and 1,251 1-star major generals/

rear admirals.9 The ranks of generalissimo, marshal, and senior 

general were not reinstituted.

The PLA has not provided any fi gures for the total number 

of fl ag rank offi cers promoted since 1988, but a 2002 Hong Kong 

newspaper report noted the PLA promoted about 100 offi cers to 

1-star and 2-star in 2002 and had a total of about 1,500 1-star to 3-

star generals and admirals on active duty.10 The 7 offi cers promoted 

in 2002 averaged 62 years of age and had been lieutenant generals 

from 6 to 9 years. Following the 2004 promotions to 3-star general 

in June 2004, a total of 96 fl ag offi cers had received their third star, 

32 of whom were still on active duty as of December 2003 (see the 

appendix). Of the 96, Deng Xiaoping promoted 17 and Jiang Zemin 

promoted 79.11

Of note, offi cers must have a minimum amount of time in a 

particular grade before they receive the primary rank. This is why 

various military region and service commanders and political 

commissars received their third star 2 to 4 years after they assumed 

their positions. Furthermore, while promotions to 1-star and 2-star 
261

rank occur annually, it appears that 3-star ranks, generally, have 

been handed out every 2 years since 1994--with the one exception 

being the 1999 promotions of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. It must 

be remembered, however, that it is the grade, not the rank, that 

defi nes the person’s authority. 

Offi cer Retirement Ages.

PLA offi cers serve until they reach mandatory retirement ages 

based on their grade level. Prior to 1994, the PLA had mandatory 

retirement ages only for platoon through army leaders (age 30 

for platoon, 35 for company, 40 for battalion, 45 for regiment, 50 

for division, and 55 for army-level).12 It was not until May 1994 

that mandatory ages were established for grade 3 MR leaders and 

grade 4 MR deputy leaders (65 and 63, respectively). There are no 

mandatory retirement ages for grade 1 and 2 offi cers (i.e., CMC 

members and heads of the four general departments).13 That is why 

most of the CMC members prior to the 16th Party Congress were 

over 70 years old. Table 3 shows the current retirement ages. 

With the restoration of ranks in 1988, the PLA went through 

an incremental process to bring active-duty general offi cers into 

compliance with the retirement-age regulations. First major generals, 

then lieutenant generals, and fi nally full generals were brought 

into compliance--with the more senior generals who exercised 

greater political leverage being the hardest to place into retirement. 

The process was completed, for the most part, by the 14th Party 

Congress in 1992, when President Yang Shangkun and his halfbrother General Yang Baibing were purged from the CMC. Since 

then, there have been few, if any exceptions to the retirement-age 

standards. In the one notable case, Deng Xiaoping’s assistant, Yang 

Ruilin was promoted to full general and--as an exception to past 

precedents--made a member of the CMC (grade 2), despite holding 

only the grade 3 position of Deputy Director of the General Political 

Department. To the extent the information can be tracked, lieutenant 

generals and full generals, since the early 1990s, have retired soon 

after they reached their mandatory retirement age.14
262

Grade Retirement 

Age

Position Primary

Rank

Secondary

Rank

1 CMC Chairman (junwei zhuxi)

Vice Chairmen (junwei fuzhuxi)

NA

General

2 CMC Member (junwei weiyuan) General

3 65 MR Leader (daqu zhengzhi) General Lieutenant 

General

4 63 MR Deputy Leader (daqu fuzhi) Lieutenant 

General

MG

5 55 Army Leader (zhengjun) MG Lieutenant 

General

6 Army Deputy Leader (fujun) MG SCOL

7 50 Division Leader (zhengshi) SCOL MG

8 Division Deputy Leader (fushi)

Brigade Leader (zhenglü))

COL SCOL

9 45 Regiment Leader (zhengtuan)

Brigade Deputy Leader (fulü)

COL LTC

10 Regiment Deputy Leader (futuan) LTC COL

11 40 Battalion Leader (zhengying) MAJ LTC

12 Battalion Deputy Leader (fuying) CPT MAJ

13 35 Company Leader (zhenglian) CPT 1LT

14 Company Deputy Leader (fulian) lLT CPT

15 30 Platoon Leader (zhengpai) 2LT 1LT

Note: Noncommissioned offi cers are squad leaders.

Table 3. PLA Offi cer Grades, Ranks, and Retirement Ages.

Regularizing Offi cer Billet Terms of Service. 

The PLA has made a concerted effort to promote younger 

offi cers while at the same time standardizing the job qualifi cations 

and establishing the minimum and maximum time offi cers can 

be assigned in different billets. To regularize qualifi cations, the 

PLA issued “Provisional Rules on Appointment and Dismissal of 

Leading Cadres at the Regiment or Above.” Factors considered 

include an offi cer’s job experience, years of service, educational 

levels, school training, and health. These standards have become 
263

important as a force management tool during the PLA’s periodic 

streamlining and reduction-in-force programs conducted since the 

1985 reorganization.15

One negative aspect of the provisional rules was that age 

requirements and minimum terms of service for certain positions 

could leave younger offi cers in the same post for several years. As a 

result, the December 2000 “Active-Service Offi cers Law” attempted 

to adjust existing rules and regulations so as to create an environment 

in which an accelerated career path is possible for “fast burners” at 

all levels. Under this law, most offi cers are still required to fi ll the 

minimum service requirement for each of their postings before being 

transferred laterally for career broadening or promoted to the next 

grade and move up one grade at a time through the ranks. In special 

cases--where an offi cer is characterized as possessing outstanding 

ethical conduct, talent, and possessing prominent performance 

achievements and is needed to fi ll a higher post--it is possible to relax 

some of the minimum-service terms and level-by-level promotion 

requirements.16

The PLA has made an effort to increase rotation and turnover of 

leadership positions in order to bring up new leaders and broaden 

offi cer opportunities for growth and development. As a result of 

various decisions by the CMC, the Active-Service Offi cers Law 

promulgated provisions creating a maximum term for an offi cer to 

remain at a specifi c post during peacetime to avoid “homesteading.” 

Upon the expiration of this term, if not promoted, an offi cer is 

removed from the current post. At that time, if the offi cer does 

not meet the retirement requirements, he or she is transferred to 

a different lateral post. Currently, the PLA has instilled maximum 

terms of service for all positions above the regiment level. Offi cers at 

the regiment level and below do not have maximum service terms, 

but they do have specifi ed retirement ages. Meanwhile, transfers 

can take place as needed and are not limited to offi cers who have 

reached their maximum term of service.17

For the most part, the PLA continues to retain offi cers in the 

same organizational chain until they reach the division-leader level 

(grade 7). At that time, and apparently assuming the offi cer has 

future promotion potential, he will be transferred to a different unit. 
264

This can be within the “army-level” unit organization, to another 

“army-level” unit in the same military region, or to a different 

military region or national-level organization. There are exceptions 

at the regimental level where rising stars are moved to regional 

or national headquarters staffs, major military schools, or other 

specialty organizations and functions, such as attaché duty. 

Flag Rank Offi cers: Filling the Squares.

As the PLA continues to standardize its promotion system, it 

should become easier to predict, at least in a gross manner, who 

potential senior leaders will be several years in the future. This 

section examines how fl ag-rank offi cers move laterally and up the 

promotion ladder from grade 6 (army deputy leader) to grade 1 

(CMC vice chairman). 

Grade General 

Departments

Military 

Regions, Service 

Hqs, NDU, AMS

Command 

Colleges & 

Engineering 

Universities

Army-Level

2 

CMC Member

• Principal Leaders

3 

MR Leader

• Deputy Leaders • Principal 

Leaders

4 

MR Deputy 

Leader

• Sub-Department 

Directors

• Deputy Leaders

• Chief of Staff

• 1st Level 

Department 

Directors

5 

Army Leader

• Bureau Chiefs • 2nd Level 

Department 

Directors

• Principal 

Leaders

• Principal 

Leaders

6 

Army Deputy 

Leader

• Bureau Chiefs • Deputy 

Leaders

• Deputy 

Leaders

• Chief of Staff

Note: Principal Leaders = Commander and Political Commissar

Deputy leaders = Deputy Commanders and Deputy Political Commissars

Chief of Staff = Director of the Headquarters Department

1st Level departments = Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Armament

2nd Level Departments (often identifi ed in English as sub-departments) = 

Operations, Intelligence, Communications, Training, Military Affairs, etc.

Table 4. Flag Rank Grades and Billets.
265

Flag Rank Matrix. Table 4 provides a matrix depicting command 

and administrative billets for fl ag-rank offi cers in grades 2 to 6. The 

matrix does not show every billet, but is representative of the primary 

positions. Note that the PLA’s colleges are also assigned grades 3 

through 7, with the appropriate fl ag offi cers assigned as the leaders 

and department directors. Note also that deputy commanders and the 

chief of staff, who is the director of the Headquarters Department, are 

the same grade at each level.

Using the Matrix. The matrix allows analysts to see on a gross 

basis roughly who is moving up through the system as shown in the 

following examples of some current Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Academy of Military Science leaders. It should be noted that many 

“promotions” are actually lateral moves in the same grade, but some 

positions on the same level include greater responsibilities. For 

example, the PLAAF chief of staff is the same grade as a PLAAF 

deputy commander and an MRAF commander--grade 4. In the past, 

offi cers have moved among these three positions in different order.

Other Factors Affecting Promotions.

The Guanxi System. Guanxi, or the system of interpersonal 

relationships that provides mentoring, patronage, and sponsorship 

during the course of an offi cer’s career, is commonly accepted as 

a major factor in an offi cer’s rise to the top positions. Politics and 

personalities play a major role in breaking into the fl ag-level ranks, 

as well as the process of continuing the climb up the promotion 

ladder. Conceivably, if one could ascertain who are the trusted 

underlings tied to the PLA’s senior offi cers, observers would have a 

good idea of the pool from which the next generation of leaders will 

emerge. 

However, our lack of understanding of this informal, mostly 

hidden system limits this type of analysis. This has been the case, 

for the most part, since the demise of the major fi eld army system. 

Up to the early 1990s, the fi eld armies provided an indication 

of professional association and interpersonal relationships, but 
266

Army General Liang Guanglie: Born in 1940, Sichuan Province.

• Grade 2 billets

o Chief of the General Staff and CMC Member (2002-Present)

o Promoted to general in 2002

• Grade 3 billets

o Commander, Nanjing MR (1999-2002)

o Commander, Shenyang MR (1997-1999)

• Grade 4 billets

o Deputy Commander, Beijing MR (1995-1997)

o Chief of Staff, Beijing MR (1994-1995)

o Promoted to lieutenant general in 1996

• Grade 5 billets

o Commander, 54th Group Army (1990-1994)

o Commander, 20th Group Army (1985-1990) 

o Received the rank of major general in 1988

Army General Qian Guoliang: Born 1939, Jiangsu Province.

• Grade 3 billets

o Commander, Shenyang MR (1999-Present)

o Commander, Jinan MR (1996-1999)

• Grade 4 billets

o Student, National Defense University (1995-1996)

o Chief of Staff, Jinan MR (1993-1995)

o Promoted to lieutenant general in 1995

• Grade 5 billets

o Commander, 26th Group Army (1990-1993)

o Commander, 27th Group Army (1985-1990)

o Received rank of major general in 1988

PLA Navy Vice Admiral Zhang Dingfa: Born in 1943, Shanghai.

• Grade 3 billets

o Commander, PLA Navy (2003-Present)

o Commandant, PLA Academy of Military Science (2002-2003)

• Grade 4 billets

o Deputy Commander, PLA Navy (2000-2002)

o Commander, North Sea Fleet (1997-2000)

• Grade 5 billets

o Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet (1996-1997)

PLA Air Force General Qiao Qingchen: Born in 1939, Henan Province.

• Grade 3 billets

o Commander, PLA Air Force (2002-Present)18

o Political Commissar, PLA Air Force (1999-2002)

o Promoted to general in 2002

• Grade 4 billets

o Deputy Commander, PLA Air Force (1997-1999)

o Commander, Beijing MR Air Force (1996-1997)

o Promoted to lieutenant general in 1996

• Grade 5 billets

o Deputy Political Commissar, Jinan MR Air Force (1993-1996)

o Political Commissar, Xian Command Post (1992-1993)

• Grade 6 billets

o Student, Central Party School (1990-1991)

Table 4. Flag Rank Matrix.
267

o Director, Political Department, 8th Air Corps, Fuzhou (1985-1990)

o Deputy political commissar, 4th Air Corps in Shanghai (1983-1985)

o Received rank of major general in 1988

PLA Air Force Lieutenant General Zheng Shenxia: Born in 1942.

• Grade 3 billets

o Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) (2003-Present)

• Grade 4 billets

o Chief of Staff, PLAAF Headquarters (1999-2003)

o Commander, Shenyang MR Air Force (1997-1999)

• Grade 5 billets

o Commandant, PLAAF Command College (1995-1997)

o Commander, 7th Air Corps (1990-1995)

Table 4. Flag Rank Matrix (Concluded).

multiple reforms and restructuring, as well as the passing of the 

revolutionary generation, have reduced the effectiveness of this 

tool. Current military region, group army, naval base, and air corps 

structures do not provide the cohesiveness of cliques around certain 

leaders that the old fi eld armies provided. 

Further, more regularized promotions and transfers among 

general offi cers work to prevent such interpersonal relationships 

and alliances from forming--or at least that is the way it appears 

from the outside.19 For example, in 1990, 10 of the 14 military region 

commanders and political commissars were shuffl ed--a move 

designed clearly to break links between local political leaders and 

their military counterparts following the debacle at Tiananmen. 

Since then, senior changes at this level have occurred on a routine 

basis.20

Party Congress and NPC Membership. PLA offi cers throughout 

the ranks are selected as delegates to the major Party and National 

Party Congresses (NPC) held every 5 years. Selection is an indication 

of seniority or future potential, but it is not a good predictor of 

promotion except at the very senior level of the Chinese Communist 

Party Central Committee (CCPCC). Selection as an alternate CCPCC 

member at a relatively junior level or young age--in the context of 

rank--is a positive indicator; however, if the offi cer is already at a 

very senior level and near mandatory retirement, selection as an 

alternate generally indicates the offi cer is near the end of his career. 

The career of General Xiong Guangkai, a 3-star or full general 

who fi rst became an alternate CCPCC member at the 14th Party 
268

Congress in 1992, provides an example of both cases. When fi rst 

elected, he was a major general and Director of the General Staff 

Department (GSD) Intelligence Department. Immediately following 

the Congress, he was promoted to lieutenant general and Assistant 

to the Chief of the GSD, a staging position for eventual promotion to 

full Deputy Chief of the GSD--which happened in 1996. Xiong was 

reelected as an alternate at the 15th Party Congress in 1997, signaling 

he was still a “player.” Consistent with his continued importance, 

Xiong was promoted to full general (3-stars) in 2000. In the lead-up 

to the 16th Party Congress in 2002, rumors were rampant that Xiong 

would be promoted to Minister of National Defense, a position that 

would include promotion to the Central Military Commission and 

signal extension of his career beyond age 65. However, at the 16th 

Party Congress, Xiong was re-elected as an alternate and not to the 

full Central Committee. At age 63, with mandatory retirement as a 

full general looming at age 65 or March 2004, his selection as only an 

alternate signaled Xiong had reached the peak of his military career. 

The CMC appointments at the end of the Party Congress reinforced 

this point.

Nonselection to the Central Committee of a serving member 

further demonstrates how the CCPCC works as a predictive tool. 

For example, another Deputy Chief of the GSD, General Kui Fulin, 

as well as the Commander of the Second Artillery, General Yang 

Guoliang, were both full members of the 15th CCPCC. They were not 

reelected to the 16th CCPCC, thus indicating imminent retirement. 

Yang retired in January 2003, and Kui retired by August 2003. 

On the other hand, selection to full membership in the CCPCC 

is a near-absolute indicator of imminent promotion to a senior 

position. New full members of the 16th CCPCC included Lieutenant 

General Jing Zhiyuan, later promoted to Commander, Second 

Artillery; Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, Commander of the 

Nanjing Military Region Air Force (MRAF) until he moved laterally 

to Air Force Deputy Commander in August; and Lieutenant General 

Chi Wanchun, who was soon promoted from Political Commissar 

of the National Defense Science and Technology University to be 

Political Commissar of the General Armament Department (GAD). 

New alternate member, Lieutenant General Pei Huailiang, was also 

later promoted to Commandant of the National Defense University. 

Some of the other newly selected full CCPCC members were also 
269

promoted in rank to lieutenant general, including Sun Zhiqiang, 

Deputy Director of the General Logistics Department (GLD), and 

Chang Wanquan, Chief of Staff of the Lanzhou MR.21

Education Requirements.

Basic education--civilian and/or military--plus professional 

military education (PME) are requirements for promotion and, 

increasingly, have become discriminators in that offi cers without 

proper educational credentials, particularly PME, will not get 

promoted. Since its establishment in 1985, the National Defense 

University has become a key PME step for promotion to fl ag rank. 

Attendance in the full 1-year program appears mandatory. In 

addition, the short 3- to 4-month-long senior offi cer course appears 

to be required for new lieutenant generals and senior major generals. 

Attending, however, does not guarantee promotion. Professional 

skill certifi cation--prior to attaining fl ag or general offi cer rank--

in the form of exams, tests, peer reports, or similar management 

tools also likely serve as similar prerequisites for promotion as well 

as discriminators against those who do not meet the evaluation 

standards.

Foreign Travel.

Foreign travel has not been clearly established as an indicator 

of future promotion potential. On one hand, the PLA is making a 

deliberate effort to expose senior offi cers to the world outside China, 

either as members of a delegation led by a CMC leader or service 

leader, or by leading their own lower-level delegations.22 For example, 

as a PLAAF deputy commander, Liu Shunyao accompanied Defense 

Minister and CMC Vice Chairman Chi Haotian to the United States 

in November 1996 and became the commander the next month. In 

September 1998, PLAAF Deputy Political Commissar Qiao Qingchen 

accompanied CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian to the United 

States and became the political commissar 3 months later. 

In some cases, however, a major trip abroad in the last 1 or 2 

years of service serves as a retirement gift and perk. For example, 

Second Artillery Commander General Yang Guoliang accompanied 
 270

General Zhang Wannian on a visit to Australia in April 2001; he 

retired in late 2002. Another example is the visit by General Wang 

Zuxun, then Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences, to the 

United States in August 2000, near the end of his career.23 

Place of Birth. 

 Place of birth has long been cited as contributing to an officer’s 

ability to gain sponsorship and assistance along the promotion track. 

References to the “Shandong” clique surrounding former Minister of 

National Defense Chi Haotian exemplify this association. The lack of 

detailed biographic information, however, makes it difficult to 

authoritatively address this factor. Common birthplaces may be more 

a coincidence and a reflection of history’s circumstances than a major 

contributing factor to the likelihood that a general will be promoted to 

a top position. 

Political Reliability. 

Political reliability is one of the absolute prerequisites for 

promotion to and within the flag officer ranks. The system of party 

committees, political departments, and political officers from the 

company level through the four general departments supports the 

core fabric of the political vetting and loyalty assurance process. The 

party committees at each level play a key role in selecting or 

recommending an officer for promotion by attesting to the political 

qualifications of an officer.24 Then, other factors such as technical 

proficiency, tactical skills, and meritorious performance come into 

play. However, for the outside observer, this aspect of the selection 

process is opaque. Further, biographic information on officers below 

the top ranks is almost nonexistent, making it next to impossible to 

judge and rank potential senior leaders from outside the PLA system. 

Limiting Factors. 

Although we focus our analysis on those factors that would 

enhance our ability to predict promotion, there are also variables 
271

that would enable the observer to eliminate certain individuals from 

consideration. This is an area for further exploration, but at least one 

career track--logistics--provides an example with an apparent cap 

on how far an offi cer can progress during a career. Offi cers on the 

professional logistics career track peak at the GLD deputy level. Since 

at least 1980 when General Hong Xuezhi became a Director of the 

GLD, no career logistics offi cer has been promoted to military region 

or general department head. Hong’s successor in 1987, General Zhao 

Nanqi, was a political commissar, not a logistician. Since then the 

Directors of the GLD have all come from military region commands 

while the career deputy directors went on to retirement.25

Other Possible “Tickets.”

The PLA apparently has other “tickets” to be punched on the 

way up the promotion ladder. The role of combat experience as a 

factor contributing to promotion to the senior-most levels of the 

PLA is not as clear as with the previous generations of leaders who 

were “blooded” in full-fl edged wars against the Japanese in World 

War II, during the civil war against the Nationalists, and then in the 

Korean War. Preliminary research using limited resources indicates 

some of the six members elected to the 16th Party Congress Central 

Committee’s Military Commission have limited combat experience 

based on the 1979 border war with Vietnam and the decade-long 

series of clashes along the border that followed. But more study 

is needed to determine the extent such experience was a primary 

factor in their rise up the promotion ladder. As with many of the 

other factors that go into defi ning the qualifi cations and potential 

of an offi cer, such experience helps but is not suffi cient to facilitate 

predicting future promotions.26

Yet another “ticket” for promotion to certain positions could be 

attendance at the Central Party School, but not enough is known 

about who attends this course. 
272

Future Developments Impacting General Offi cer 

Promotions.

As the PLA continues to modernize, standardize its structure, 

and regularize its administrative and offi cer management processes, 

further changes will affect our ability to predict the rising stars. 

Reductions in force and streamlining, obviously, will reduce the 

overall number of fl ag-rank offi cer billets. More importantly, 

however, restructuring of headquarters organizations and command 

levels will reduce the proportion of fl ag-rank billets. On one hand, 

observers should be better able to identify the fl ag-level positions—

and maybe track the occupants—but, on the other hand, little is being 

done to increase the amount of biographic information or openness 

that would be necessary to assess the candidates for promotion to 

senior ranks.

Also, as reform accompanies restructuring and streamlining, 

it is reasonable to anticipate that age limitations for various fl ag 

ranks and grades will be further reduced. Shorter careers, with less 

history, will continue to limit biographic information needed to 

predict promotions.

CONCLUSIONS

Predicting the PLA’s future leaders is more of an art than a 

science. However, as the PLA continues to regularize its promotion 

system and the number of fl ag offi cer billets decreases, it should be 

easier to use the tools laid out in this chapter to help accomplish 

this task. For example, tracking lateral and vertical movement 

through the grade system for as many offi cers as possible beginning 

at the grade 6 army deputy leader level should provide a better 

understanding of the entire promotion process. As noted, there are 

also many “other factors” such as guanxi and Party positions that 

must be taken into account, but this information is more diffi cult to 

attain and quantify. Therefore, greater access to public information 

in China about the PLA’s leaders and discussions with the leaders 

themselves during their travels abroad will be necessary to gather 

enough data to make accurate predictions. 
 273

APPENDIX 

ACTIVE-DUTY FULL GENERALS AND POSITIONS 

(33 AS OF 20 JUNE 2004) 

Promoted 27 March 1998 

Cao Gangchuan Vice Chairman of the CMC and Minister of National Defense 

Promoted 29 September 1999 

Guo Boxiong Vice Chairman of the CMC 

Xu Caihou Member of the CMC and Director of the GPD 

Promoted 21 June 2000 

Liao Xilong Member of the CMC and Director of the GLD 

LiJinai Member of the CMC and Director of the GAD 

Wu Quanxu Deputy Chief of the GSD 

Qian Shugen Deputy Chief of the GSD 

Xiong Guangkai Deputy Chief of the GSD 

Tang Tianbiao Deputy Director of the GPD 

Yuan Shoufang Deputy Director of the GPD 

Zhang Shutian Deputy Director of the GPD 

Promoted June 2002 

Liang Guanglie Member of the CMC and Chief of the GSD 

Qiao Qingchen Commander of the Air Force 

Wen Zongren Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Sciences 

Chen Bingde Commander of the Jinan MR 

Qian Guoliang Commander of the Shenyang MR 

Jiang Futang Political Commissar of the Shenyang MR 

Liu Shutian Political Commissar of the Chengdu MR 

Promoted June 2004 

Ge Zhenfeng Deputy Chief of the GSD 

Zhang Li Deputy Chief of the GSD 

You Xigui Director of the Central Guards Bureau 

Zhang Wentai Political Commissar of the GPD 

Hu Yanlin Political Commissar of the Navy 

Zheng Shenxia Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences 

Zhao Keming Political Commissar of the National Defense University 

Zhu Qi Commander of the Beijing MR 

Liu Zhenwu Commander of the Guangzhou MR 

Yang Deqing Political Commissar of the Guangzhou MR 

Liu Dongdong Political Commissar of the Jinan MR 

LiQianyuan Commander of the Lanzhou MR 

LeiMingqiu Political Commissar of the Nanjing MR 

Wu Shuangzhan Commander of the People’s Armed Police 

Sui Mingtai Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police. 

275

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. The PLA’s time-in-grade requirements for offi cer promotions in rank 

are not specifi ed in the various service laws and are not readily available to the 

public.

2. The CMC began using the terms Liberation Army (jiefangjun) and People’s 

Liberation Army (renmin jiefangjun) as early as 1945 to identify the concept of a 

single armed forces. These terms, however, were not formally used with unit 

designations (i.e., the PLA 32nd division) until the CMC issued a general order 

to this effect on 1 November 1948. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang Jun Da Shiji 1927-1982

[People’s Liberation Army Chronicle 1927-1982], Beijing: PLA Academy of Military 

Science, November 1983, pp. 83, 285.

3. The 10 grade categories and corresponding grades were as follows: Category 

1 (CMC) included grade 1 chairman and vice chairmen; category 2 (military 

region) included grade 2 leaders (e.g., commander and political commissar); 

category 3 (CMC member) included grade 3 members; category 4 (bingtuan) 

included grade 4 leader, grade 5 deputy leader, and grade 6 who was the number 

3 leader; category 5 (army/corps) included grade 7 leader, grade 8 deputy leader, 

and grade 9 the number 3 leader; category 6 (division) included grade 10 leader, 

grade 11 deputy leader, and grade 12 the number 3 leader; category 7 (regiment) 

included grade 13 leader, grade 14 deputy leader, and grade 15 the number 3 

leader; category 8 included grade 16 leader and grade 17 deputy leader; category 

9 (company) included grade 18 leader and grade 19 deputy leader; and category 

10 (platoon) included grade 20 leader. Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu [Chinese 

Military Encyclopedia], Beijing, Academy of Military Science Publishers, July 1997, 

Vol. 4-40.

4. Ibid.

5. From 1965 to 1988, the only way, visually, to tell the difference between 

enlisted troops and offi cers was that the offi cers had four pockets on their jackets 

and enlisted troops had two. When two offi cers from different units met, they 

would identify themselves by saying, “I’m deputy regiment commander Zhang,” 

and “I’m division commander Li.” It was not readily apparent who outranked 

whom until they established their grades verbally. “Regulations for PLA Offi cers’ 

Ranks,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 20 July 1988, Xinhua, July 2, 1988; Zhongguo 

Junshi Baike Quanshu, Vol. 4-392.

6. “Regulations for PLA Offi cers’ Ranks.” National People’s Congress (NPC) 

adopted the “Regulations for PLA Offi cers’ Ranks in accordance with relevant 

provisions of the Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China,” effective 

October 1988. 

7. Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu, Vol. 4-392.

8. Chang Ching-Erh, “Jiang Zemin Promotes 10 Senior Officers, Generals,” 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service ( Foreign Broadcast Information Servicei (FBIS)-CHI-98-128, May 8, 1998, from Hong FBIS)-CHI-98-128, May 8, 1998, from Hong 

Kong Kuang Chiao Ching in Chinese, No. 307, April 16, 1998, pp. 50-53. For the 

complete list of generals and fl ag offi cers promoted between 1955 and 1965, see the 
three volume set, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Jiangshuai Minglu [Chinese PLA List of 

Generals and Marshals], PLA Press, 1986.

9. According to the 1989 issue of Shijie Junshi Nianjian [World Military Yearbook], 

published by PLA Press, Beijing, p 6. 

10. “Jiang Zemin Signs Order to Promote More Than 100 Generals,” Hong 

Kong Wen Wei Po (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese, August 2, 2002, in FBIS. 

From 1988 to 2000, China promoted 81 senior military and armed police offi cers 

to 3-star fl ag rank as follows: September 1988 (17); June 1993 (6); June 1994 (19); 

January 1996 (4); May 1998 (10); September 1999 (2); June 2000 (16); and 2002 (7). 

Chang Ching-Erh, “Jiang Zemin Promotes 10 Senior Offi cers, Generals,” FBISCHI-98-128, May 8, 1998, from Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching in Chinese, No. 307, 

April 16, 1998, pp. 50-53; “Sixteen Chinese Military, Police Offi cers Promoted to 

General,” Xinhua, June 21, 2000. For the list of names of all full generals, see Xiao 

Tian: “Inside Story of Communist China Military’s Promotion of Seven Generals”; 

Hong Kong Ching Pao in Chinese, July 1, 2002, No. 300, pp. 38-40, in FBIS. 

11. Xiao Tian, “Inside Story of Communist China Military’s Promotion to 

Seven Generals,” Hong Kong Ching Pao, July 1, 2002, translated by FBIS. The total 

number of full generals has been updated to refl ect the June 2004 promotions; the 

list of active duty full generals is the authors' compilation.

12. Shijie Junshi Nianjian [World Military Yearbook], Beijing, PLA Press, 1995-

1996, p 76. The Chinese term jun is translated as either army or corps. 

13. Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu, Vol. 7 and 9.

14. Authors have tracked PLA general offi cer retirements since 1986 using 

the Directory of People’s Republic of China Military Personalities, published annually. 

Based on this experience, it appears that the PLA may also have specifi c retirement 

limits for certain ranks based on the grade, particularly for major generals holding 

deputy army-level (fujun) positions. However, available references for the PLA’s 

organizational system (zuzhi tizhi) address only the full army-level (zhengjun) 

positions.

15. The PLA announced a 1,000,000-man reduction in 1985, and a 500,000-man 

reduction in 1997. See China’s National Defense, Beijing: Information Offi ce of 

the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July 1998. A further 200,000-

man reduction was announced in 2003. See “Chairman Jiang Zemin Speech at 

Anniversary Meeting of Defense S&T University,” in Xinhua Domestic Service, 

September 1, 2003, in FBIS; see also Peng Guangqian and Zheng Yanping, “The 

Strategic Signifi cance of Reducing 200,000 Troops,” Liaowang, September 15, 2003, 

pp. 30-31, in FBIS.

16. “Explanation on the Active-Service Offi cers Law of the People’s Republic 

of China,” Liberation Army Daily, January 18, 2001, in FBIS.

17. “Explanation on the Active-Service Offi cers Law of the People’s Republic 

of China,” Liberation Army Daily, January 18, 2001, in FBIS.

18. Qiao will reach age 65 in 2004 and must retire at that time unless he is 

promoted to the CMC.

276
19. The fi eld army system is described in William Whitson, The Chinese 

High Command: A History of Chinese Military Politics, 1927-71, New York: Praeger 

Publishers, 1973. The situation at the beginning of the 1990s when the fi eld army 

system was in its fi nal stages is described well in Michael D. Swaine, The Military 

& Political Succession in China: Leadership Institutions Beliefs, Santa Monica: RAND, 

1992.

20. Directory of PRC Military Personalities, USDLO Hong Kong, June 1990. pp. 

ii-iii. There were no military region level changes reported in the annual Directory

in 1991. Since then, the Directory reported the following changes in military region 

commanders and political commissars: one in 1992; eight in 1993; four in 1994; 

four in 1995; four in 1996; three in 1997; three in 1998; four in 1999; four in 2000; one 

in 2001; and six in 2002. There should be at least two changes in 2003 or early 2004 

when General Chen Bingde, Commander, Nanjing Military Region, and General 

Du Tiehuan, Political Commissar, Beijing Military Region, reach their mandatory 

retirement age. 

21. Sun Zhiqiang and Chang Wanquan were major generals at the time of the 

Party Congress; both have since been promoted to lieutenant generals. See also: 

Tieh Yun-cheng: “Latest Developments With China’s Military Leadership,” Kuang 

Chiao Ching (Wide Angle), January 16, 2003, No. 364, pp. 12-15, in FBIS.

22. Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations, 

Report 32, The Stimson Center, October 1999, describes in detail how the PLA uses 

foreign travel and military diplomacy to further national interests and to expose 

senior offi cers to the world outside China.

23. For Yang Guoliang, see Qi Zijian, “Zhang Wannian Meets Australian 

Defense Minister” in Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, April 2, 2001, in FBIS. For 

Wang Zuxun, see “Chinese Military Academy Delegation Leaves for US.” Xinhua

in English, August 18, 2000, in FBIS.

24. Larry Wortzel, “The General Political Department and the Evolution of 

the Political Commissar System, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, 

eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, 

pp. 237-238.

25. General Fu Quanyou, from Commander, Lanzhou MR replaced Zhao in 

1992. General Wang Ke, from Commander, Shenyang MR, replaced Fu in 1995, 

and General Liao Xilong, from Commander, Chengdu MR, replaced Wang in 

2002. General Li Jiulong, in the early 1990s spent a brief stint as Deputy Director of 

the GLD, following serving as Commander of Shenyang MR, and before returning 

to MR command in Lanzhou. Several deputy directors have been transferred, but 

not necessarily promoted out of the GLD, but they have not yet made it to the top 

rung of leadership. Examples include now Vice Admiral Shen Binyi, Deputy PLA 

Navy Commander, who was promoted from rear admiral, and MG Zong Shunliu, 

who was actually demoted to Deputy Chief of Staff of Shenyang MR in 1990.

26. Edward C. O’Dowd and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The 1979 Chinese Campaign 

in Vietnam: Lessons Learned,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. 

Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, 

Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003, pp. 364-366.

277

279

CHAPTER 9

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE:

ASSESSING THE ROLE OF CHINESE FOREIGN 

POLICY RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS 

AFTER THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS

Evan S. Medeiros

INTRODUCTION

China’s foreign policy has emerged in recent years as a fast moving 

axis of transformation. Although numerous international scholars 

have already chronicled the reform-era evolution in Chinese foreign 

policy and foreign relations, the pace of change has been particularly 

rapid in recent years. China has become much more engaged in 

the activities of regional and multilateral organizations, including 

shaping their agendas in limited ways. Chinese policymakers pay 

attention to a more diverse set of international issues. Moreover, 

China’s senior leaders have begun to look at the world through a 

set of lenses which are far less tinted and jaded with the vestiges of 

history and ideology than in past years.1 China’s classic insecurity, 

overconfi dence, entitlement mentality, and pedantic moralism 

no longer dominate Chinese interactions with the international 

community. These changes beg the question: where are these new 

and “correct” foreign policy ideas coming from?2

Chinese think tanks and research institutes serve as a central 

source for the collection and formulation of information, analysis, 

and intelligence on foreign policy issues. Their infl uence has grown in 

the last 10-15 years as foreign affairs decisionmaking has pluralized, 

demand for regional and functional expertise has grown, and access 

to information has increased. Thus, Chinese foreign policy think 

tanks are one important window through which to understand more 

clearly the changes in Chinese perceptions and policies on current 

foreign policy challenges. Examining these organizations sheds light 

on the genesis and evolution of the newest and most novel Chinese 

thinking on foreign affairs. 
280

The existing literature on Chinese foreign policy and national 

security research institutes essentially is built around three analytical 

pillars: institutions, processes, and content. Past and recent research 

by Bates Gill, Bonnie Glaser, James Mulvenon, Michael Pillsbury, 

Phillip Saunders, and David Shambaugh, among others, is focused 

heavily on, fi rst, mapping the structure and regional/functional 

expertise of the various organizations in the foreign policy think 

tank community; second, identifying the processes that govern 

think tank interactions; and, third, identifying and analyzing the 

content of think tank debates.3 These analytical foci are the hallmark 

of these scholars’ collective effort to assess the roles and infl uence of 

the numerous think tanks that populate the skylines and hutongs of 

Beijing and Shanghai.4

Their approach leaves additional questions unanswered, 

however. Do these think tanks and research organizations simply 

feed information, analysis and intelligence to ministerial leadership 

or do they also possess the intellectual capabilities and political 

space to offer new ideas and novel approaches to foreign policy 

problems? How do they do this? Furthermore, to what extent do 

these think tanks shape both the content of government policy as 

well as the ways in which policymakers think about foreign policy? 

How have these organizations changed in recent years and how has 

this affected Chinese discourse on foreign policy. 

In an attempt to get at these “second order” questions, this 

chapter explores several new trends in the roles and functions of 

China’s community of foreign policy research organizations. The 

most prominent trends include the emergence of new actors, new 

debates, and new venues/forums for discussing foreign policy. To 

what extent do these phenomena tell us about changes in think tank 

research agendas, the political space think tanks now inhabit and, 

ultimately, the impact of their work on actual policymaking? To be 

clear, this is an exploratory exercise. The goal of this chapter is to 

determine how much one can learn about foreign policy think tanks 

by analyzing these new phenomena. This research does not aim to 

supplant existing work on institutions, processes and content, but 

rather to build on it in an effort to elucidate further the roles and 

infl uence of foreign policy think tanks in recent years and especially 

in the post-16th Party Congress environment. 
281

This chapter begins with an assessment of the major organizational 

characteristics of China’s community of foreign policy think tanks 

in order to provide a necessary empirical baseline for further 

analysis. The second section details some of the newest trends 

among the foreign policy think tank community that are affecting 

its ability to infl uence policymaking. The third section explores 

the relative importance of key foreign policy journals to determine 

what, if any, additional information about think tanks (vice broader 

Chinese debates) can be gleaned from analyzing these periodicals.5

The fourth section describes new characteristics of foreign policy 

decisionmaking in the post 16th Party Congress environment to 

explore whether and how new ideas are being operationalized in 

actual foreign policy. The paper ends with tentative conclusions 

about the changing infl uence of foreign policy think tanks in China. 

REVIEWING THE LANDSCAPE OF CHINESE FOREIGN 

POLICY THINK TANKS

In China, there exists a rich assortment of research institutes 

focused on foreign policy research, analysis, and intelligence. Most 

are based in Beijing, with a few notable ones in Shanghai. Most of 

these organizations have been in existence for decades and were set 

up in the 1950s to provide analytical support to ministries involved 

in the formulation of national security and foreign policy positions. 

Most of these were closed during the Cultural Revolution and 

then reopened (and began rebuilding) in the late 1970s and early 

1980s as China under Deng Xiaoping re-engaged the international 

community. A few research organizations were established in the 

1980s when certain institutions, such as the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA), sought to create organizations or “cut-outs” to bolster 

their interactions with international analysts and policymakers. A 

list of the main foreign policy and national security think tanks is 

provided below. (A detailed description of their structure and areas 

of expertise can be found in numerous recent publications).6

Foreign Policy Research Institutes:

• Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 

• China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
282

• China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)

• Foreign Affairs College (FAC)

• Xinhua Center for Foreign Affairs

• Institute for International Strategic Studies, Central Party School

• Institute for World Information 

• China Society for Strategy and Management 

• Shanghai Center for International Studies (SCIS)

• Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS)

• Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS)

Military-linked Research Institutes:

• Academy of Military Sciences (AMS)

• China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS)

• Center for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS)

• Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS)

• Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense 

University (INSS/NDU)

• China Defense Science Technology Information Center (CDSTIC)

China’s foreign policy research institutes share many attributes 

related to organizational structure, function, and lines of authority. 

Most, though not all, have a single line of authority to a ministry 

under the State Council, the Central Committee, or the PLA. The 

China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) 

and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), for example, 

are supervised by the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, respectively. As an outgrowth of the Soviet model, 

this system had a strong bias toward stove-piping; requests fl owed 

downward from ministerial leadership and research products and 

reports fl owed upward. Moreover, ideology was a major constraint 

on the quality of research. For decades, most of the research and 

analysis of foreign policy institutes clearly refl ected a Marxist-Leninist 

view of the world.7 The vast majority of reports were produced to 

support China’s ideologically motivated foreign policy positions. 

Chinese analysts interpreted information and events through the 

thick lenses of Mao’s three world’s theory, the inevitability of great 

power war thesis, and the belief that China was a revolutionary 

power combating the “imperialism” and “revisionism” of the 
283

United States and the Soviet Union. In this sense, think tank analyses 

produced in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and most of the 1980s may have 

been “correct” but not necessarily accurate. According to Lu Ning, 

a former Foreign Ministry offi cial, most think tank reports were 

useless given the strong ideological bias, absence of analysis, and 

lack of quality information.8

The quality of the research and analysis of these think tanks 

was further limited by organizational attributes of the bureaucracy. 

For decades most foreign policy research institutes were 

compartmentalized due to a highly vertically integrated bureaucracy. 

As a result, analysts with similar expertise seldom talked with one 

another and often produced redundant research. The high degree of 

secrecy surrounding foreign policy and national security research 

until the 1990s further inhibited sharing of information and ideas 

among Chinese analysts. These barriers were especially strong on 

sensitive security issues such as arms control and nonproliferation 

where the foreign policy analysts seldom talked with scientists from 

the ultra-secretive nuclear and aerospace establishments.

Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the outlooks, 

operations, and skills of these research institutes and their analysts 

began to shift. Prior to this period, they were heavily focused 

on classic security issues and area studies. They possessed little 

expertise on functional topics in the late 1980s. Chinese foreign 

policy think tanks started evolving in terms of their “functions, 

responsibilities, and infl uence.”9 Foreign policy and national 

security specialists moved away from interpreting global events 

using Marxist syllogisms; they started drawing on analytical and 

theoretical tools from Western teachings on foreign policy analysis 

and international relations (IR). Indeed, many now talk about foreign 

policy and international security using Western IR terminology as 

their lingua franca. This is refl ected in the broadening of research 

agendas beyond classic security issues and areas studies, which 

were analytical preoccupations for decades.10 Chinese scholars and 

analysts now focus on the importance of multilateral organizations, 

the links between domestic and foreign policy, and a whole range of 

functional foreign policy issues such as nonproliferation, regionalism, 

multilateral organizations, energy security, and counterterrorism. In 

the late 1990s, the use of IR theory to analyze problems became a 
284

growing tendency among Chinese foreign policy scholars as well. 

In more recent years, Chinese IR specialists have demonstrated a 

particular penchant for non-state centric approaches in analyzing 

foreign policy and international affairs.11

Some of the most salient changes have been in the type and 

nature of interactions within the community of foreign policy 

research analysis.12 In the 1990s, horizontal interactions among 

government think tanks proliferated; exchanges among analysts 

within and outside the same bureaucratic system (xitong) became 

increasingly common. Scholars and analysts would regularly meet 

at ministry-sponsored conferences convened to gather opinions 

on pressing foreign policy issues such as a pending trip abroad of 

a senior offi cial. Other key changes in the foreign policy think tank 

community included: a growing competition for getting information 

and analysis to senior leaders; an expanding cadre of better informed 

and educated analysts; a broadening of research agendas; the use 

of more and better research materials; and dramatically increased 

contacts with foreigners. In the 1990s in particular, Chinese think 

tank analysts regularly attended conferences and seminars in 

foreign countries. These trips were used to gather information and 

opinion as well as to infl uence the views of foreigners. Indeed, in 

recent years, Chinese think tank delegations to the United States are 

on the rise. Many are often self-funded, and their purposes range 

from fact-fi nding to message dissemination.13

Most of these trends resulted from a gradual liberalization of 

the political environment in which think tanks operate. As China’s 

interaction with the international community expanded and a host 

of new functional issues (i.e., environmental degradation and energy 

security) jumped onto its foreign policy agenda, the government’s 

demand grew for accurate information and quality analysis. 

Similarly, a demand for expertise on functional foreign policy 

issues emerged. A far greater premium was placed on experience 

and expertise over ideological purity and political correctness. In 

this sense, the political environment became far more conducive to 

higher quality research on a broader set of foreign policy topics.

In sum, one can conceive of the evolution of China’s foreign policy 

research community as having evolved in roughly three related 

stages. These stages refl ect changes in the capabilities of Chinese 
285

foreign policy analysts and the political space for participation in 

foreign policy decisionmaking. First, from the late 1950s to the mid1980s, their research focused mainly on general assessments of the 

international security environment, specifi c bilateral relationships 

and classic security issues (e.g., arms races and alliances). There 

was minimal public debate about the implications of these trends 

for China’s foreign policy. As argued above, the vast majority of the 

work was ideological and the community was compartmentalized. 

In the second stage, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, 

interactions among the members of the community proliferated, 

and foreign policy specialists began to interact more regularly with 

the transnational community of foreign policy analysts. Ideology 

dissipated from their work, which showed greater attention to and 

interest in a wider mix of policy and theoretical IR issues. Public 

discussions about the implications of various trends for China also 

increased.14 A third stage began in the mid-1990s, when Chinese 

scholars and analysts demonstrated a willingness to debate in 

public not only various international trends but also importantly the 

implications of these trends for Chinese foreign policy. As of 2003, 

a nascent marketplace of ideas (albeit a regulated one) on foreign 

policy is developing. Scholars and analysts now openly disagree 

with one another about Chinese policy options, and in some cases 

they express disagreement with China’s offi cial policy.15 In addition, 

in this environment of active discourse on foreign policy, the debates 

often cut across organizational lines and coalesce around ideas rather 

than institutions. 

THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF CHINESE FOREIGN 

POLICY THINK TANKS 

Some of the most unique and interesting changes in the 

community of foreign policy research institutes emerged in the last 

few years. Whereas the 1990s saw a broadening of China’s foreign 

policy interests, more active participation in various multilateral 

forums and a gradual improvement in the quality of foreign policy 

research, analysis, and intelligence, the early part of this decade 

is witnessing an acceleration and qualitative evolution of these 

phenomena. These trends suggest that the political space for these 
286

think tanks to broaden their research agendas and to propose 

innovative ideas is expanding. As a result, their relevance to both 

public and internal/governmental debates and policymaking is 

increasing. 

First, university based foreign policy research programs are 

rapidly growing in capabilities and importance. As the danwei

system and its cumbersome social trappings (i.e., provision of 

housing) have begun to dissolve in recent years, there is far greater 

employment mobility within China’s labor markets, including 

among foreign policy research organizations. A direct result of this 

enhanced mobility is the migration of scholars and offi cials toward 

university-based IR research programs.16 Qinghua University has 

been one of the greatest benefi ciaries of this trend to date. Both 

Yan Xuetong and Chu Shulong, prominent former scholars from 

CICIR, moved in 2001 to Qinghua University. Similarly, Li Bin, a 

nuclear physicist and arms control expert, moved from a Beijingbased nuclear weapons research institute to Qinghua’s Institute for 

International Relations and started a robust and active arms control 

research and teaching program. Li’s move is particularly unique 

given the secretiveness and insularity of China’s nuclear weapons 

community. Yan Xuetong, in establishing Qinghua University’s fi rst 

Institute for International Relations, is building an active program 

by recruiting government experts to join the academic world. In 

addition to hiring Li Bin, Yan recently acquired a Japan specialist 

from the Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs offi ce. Furthermore, 

Niu Jun, a well-known expert of U.S. foreign policy and Cold War 

history, recently left the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 

Institute for American Studies for Beijing University. People’s 

University recently reinvigorated its international relations program 

with the addition of Shi Yinghong (formerly of the PLA’s Institute for 

International Relations), Jin Canrong (formerly of CASS’s Institute 

of American Studies), and others. University employment provides 

greater intellectual freedom, more opportunities to interact with 

international scholars and the national and international media, and 

greater freedom to solicit funding from international foundations 

and entrepreneurs.17

There are also a limited number of examples of movement from 

academia to the government. Su Ge, a dean from the Foreign Affairs 
287

College, became a vice president at CIIS in 2000 and then recently 

moved again to the Chinese Embassy in Washington. To be sure, 

China is still far from the “revolving door” model (common in the 

United States, for example), which allows so many U.S. academics 

and think tank analysts to serve temporarily in government posts 

in Washington.18 However, should more Chinese foreign policy 

specialists begin to enter government, this mobility would give 

them new and direct channels to infl uence China’s foreign policy 

decisionmaking.

As a result of the above trend, the relevance and impact of 

university-based research and commentary on foreign policy 

has increased dramatically in the last few years, especially given 

that such scholars were nonplayers in the policy process in past 

years.19 This trend also interestingly coincides with a more open 

political environment to discuss foreign policy and national security 

topics and a more robust public debate on them. Scholars from 

Qinghua University, Beijing University, and People’s University are 

increasingly active in public debates and have been at the forefront 

of new thinking in Chinese foreign policy. Shi Yinghong at People’s 

University initiated a robust debate among analysts about changing 

China’s bilateral policy toward Japan. Shi has also been one of the 

most outspoken critics of North Korea’s nuclear program and a vocal 

advocate of China’s need to stop North Korea at all costs. Indeed, 

Shi wrote articles which went farther than China’s offi cial policy 

by advocating that China support regime change in Pyongyang.20

Beyond Shi’s work, other scholars have written similarly provocative 

articles on the North Korean nuclear issue.21 Ye Zicheng from Beijing 

University has written some of the most provocative and innovative 

articles on China’s need for both a great-power mentality and China’s 

need to adopt great-power diplomacy.22 Li Bin has consistently been 

at the forefront of Chinese research on responses to missile defenses 

and is currently leading a task force on this issue under the China 

Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). Through 

his teaching at Qinghua, he is also training students in the technical 

and policy intricacies of arms control and nonproliferation. Many 

of these students end up in government agencies, the military, or 

Chinese defense industry corporations.23 Scholars from the newly 
288

invigorated Institute for Strategic Studies at the Central Party School 

have also produced articles with innovative themes on controversial 

topics such as Taiwan and the future of Chinese diplomacy.24

In addition to the emergence of university based foreign policy 

programs, a small number of private (nongovernment funded) foreign 

policy-related think tanks have sprouted up in recent years. They 

are also new actors in China’s community of foreign policy research 

organs. Prominent examples include the Beijing Pacifi c Institute 

for International Strategic Studies, Ding Xinghao’s new Institute 

on American Studies in Shanghai, and Chen Qimao’s Shanghai 

Center for Rim of the Pacifi c (RIMPAC) Strategic and International 

Studies, which is also based in Shanghai. These organizations get 

much of their funding from wealthy entrepreneurs seeking access 

to channels of infl uence on governmental foreign and economic 

policy.25 This provides them with greater fl exibility in choosing 

research topics and articulating innovative and provocative views. 

Their board members can include senior Party and State Council 

offi cials who provide a degree of status, authority, and political 

cover for the organization’s work. Given the lack of institutional 

affi liation of these organizations, they rely solely on personal 

relationships to ferry their ideas to senior policymakers. By contrast, 

on economic issues, there are several prominent, independent think 

tanks; examples include Lin Yifu’s Economic Research Center at 

Beijing University, Mao Yushi’s Unirule Institute and Hu Angang’s 

National Conditions Research Institute at Qinghua University.26

Another prominent trend among foreign policy research 

institutes is the rise of a punditocracy and the use of the media by 

foreign policy specialists. In the last 3 years, Chinese foreign policy 

and national security experts have ramped up their interactions 

with both print and broadcast media―domestic and international. 

Scholars now regularly use the pages of Southern Weekend (Nanfang 

Zhoumo), Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), and 21st Century News

(Ershiyi Shiji Baodao) to debate current foreign policy issues.27 These 

venues are particularly suitable to rapidly unfolding debates such 

as the one in 1999 and 2000 over the continued relevance of “peace 

and development” or more recent ones about China’s Japan policy 

and North Korea’s nuclear program.28 The fi rst articles about the 
289

need to develop a “great power mentality” (daguo xintai) were 

published in these newspapers and websites. The debate on China’s 

policy toward Japan regularly appeared in the pages and websites 

of Renmin Wang and Nanfang Zhoumo in addition to China’s major 

IR journals. In addition, scholars from major think tanks like 

CICIR, CIIS, and CASS, analysts from the PLA National Defense 

University, and academics from universities like Beijing University 

and Qinghua regularly appear on CCTV talk shows. Some scholars, 

such as Yan Xuetong, have become virtual talking heads given the 

frequency of their appearances. Chinese scholars were relatively 

free to comment on CCTV during the war in Iraq and only received 

very general guidance on the boundaries of acceptable punditry.29

Perhaps most interesting, some scholars strategically use the media, 

and specifi cally TV appearances, to articulate new ideas which 

otherwise would not get a hearing among senior policymakers.30

In this sense, the media in China have become a new arena for the 

growing competition for infl uence among foreign policy think tanks. 

Scholars can use the media to grab the attention of senior leaders and 

also to shape the general contours of the public debate on foreign 

and security policy issues. This growing interaction and exploitation 

of media outlets serves as an important indicator that the political 

space for new ideas and opinions on sensitive foreign policy issues 

has expanded in recent years. 

A Curious Contrast: Foreign Policy and Economic Policy 

Think Tanks.

In assessing the role and infl uence of foreign policy think 

tanks, one of the most curious dimensions is how they differ―as 

political entities―from some of China’s economic policy research 

institutes. The majority of China’s foreign policy research institutes 

were traditionally far more static, less politicized, and thus less 

volatile than some of China’s economic think tanks. (Though, as 

argued above, the foreign policy think tank community appears 

to be changing, albeit in different ways from some of China’s more 

dynamic economic think tanks.)31 Over the past 25 years, Chinese 

political leaders have from time to time established research 
290

organizations under the State Council to do research they could 

trust (i.e., not from the bureaucracy) and use as the basis for sound 

policymaking. Similar entities never existed on foreign policy. As 

early as the mid-1970s Deng Xiaoping set up the Political Study 

Offi ce (Zhengzhi Yanjiu Shi) in the State Council to compete with 

the Gang of Four on ideological issues. When Deng was purged 

in 1975, the offi ce staff disbanded due to the unfavorable political 

environment for their continued work. Following the demise of the 

Gang of Four, the offi ce was reconstituted and served as one of the 

mechanisms for Deng’s third and fi nal ascent to power.32

 The 1980s saw the establishment of a few ad hoc economic think 

tanks to support reform-oriented policies. (These were in addition to 

the several main-line economic research institutes linked to ministries 

and government organs such as CASS). The aim of the former was to 

conduct systematic investigations which refl ected the on-the-ground 

economic realities in China and not to selectively interpret data to fi t 

predetermined, ideologically infl uenced policymaking. Chen Yizi set 

up the Agricultural Development Group to report on and assess the 

effect of the household responsibility system. Zhao Ziyang formed 

a similar organization, the Institute for Economic Structural Reform 

(Tizhi gaige yanjiusuo), in the mid-1980s to evaluate the success of his 

efforts to move China away from planned economics.33 This think 

tank and a few others were opened by Zhao in the 1980s but were 

quickly closed after the Tiananmen incident in 1989.

The origins, functions, and ultimate political fate of some of 

China’s economic think tanks stand in contrast to China’s foreign 

policy research institutes. There is no evidence that senior Chinese 

leaders in the 1980s or 1990s established their own foreign policy 

think tanks to provide them with informed, unbiased, accurate and 

nonideological reports on foreign affairs.34 Possible explanations 

may be that foreign policy was not seen as an area in need of great 

reform; it was already heavily controlled by the most senior leaders; 

or that China’s policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s may have 

been comfortable with the reports they were receiving from the 

bureaucracy. The gradual emergence in recent years of some semiindependent foreign policy think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai 

suggests that this may be changing.35
291

PARSING CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

To further assess the roles and infl uence of foreign policy think 

tanks, this author examined a variety of journals published by key 

Chinese research institutes. The aim of this effort was to see what 

could be gleaned about specifi c foreign policy research institutes 

from examining the content of their journals. The author looked at 

four journals: International Studies (Guoji Wenti Yanjiu) published 

by CIIS, Contemporary International Relations (Xiandai Guoji Guanxi) 

published by CICIR, World Economics and Politics (Shijie Jingji yu 

Zhengzhi) published by the Institute for World Economics and 

Politics at CASS, and International Strategic Studies (English edition)

published by CIISS.36 The author focused on issues from 2000 to 

2002, but also looked at journals during specifi c past time periods 

to see the degree of correlation of journal content with the release 

of specifi c policy initiatives.37 In examining these journals, I looked 

at three factors: authors and affi liation, article topics, and research 

approach/methodology. The examination of journal articles yielded 

some general insights about foreign policy research organizations. 

However, my overall conclusion is that these journals are of limited 

value in evaluating and specifying the roles and infl uence of specifi c foreign 

policy research organizations. While it is generally accepted that these 

institutes have infl uence and that journals communicate debates, 

more specifi c claims beyond this general understanding are hard 

to make. Yet, at the same time, these journals offer rich details on a 

plethora of current debates on foreign policy and national security 

topics and, as such, are a useful resource for analysts. 

First, my analysis of the content of these journals further confi rmed 

many of the key trends in the evolution of China’s foreign policy 

research establishment that were identifi ed above. These include 

diversifi cation of expertise; development of substantial functional 

specialization on numerous issues; greater transparency on sensitive 

foreign policy topics and a corresponding willingness to address 

the implications of these for China’s interests; consistent horizontal 

interactions among scholars from different organizations; more 

attention to IR theory; and dramatically improved methodological 

approaches to research and writing. The last point is evidenced most 

directly by the prominent use of extensive sourcing and footnoting 

in a growing proportion of journal articles.
292

The journals are of greatest assistance in mapping and 

evaluating the functional expertise of various foreign policy research 

organizations. For example, the numerous trans-organizational 

discussion forums (such as the zhuanti yanguo and redian duihua 

sections in the CICIR journal Xiandai Guoji Guanxi) provide a guide 

to the scholars and organizations working on specifi c topics. Journals 

also help in assessing the general political disposition of think tanks. 

CIISS’s International Strategic Studies, for example, offers some 

of the most pessimistic assessments of the international security 

environment and can be considered one of the most conservative 

voices in the think tank community. This is consistent with its 

affi liation with the Chinese military. Scholars and analysts can then 

use this information to conduct interviews and in-country research 

based on the data and insights gleaned from these journals. Much 

of the existing research on Chinese foreign policy by Bonnie Glaser, 

David Shambaugh, and others has used this technique of pairing 

analysis of journal articles with interviews to elucidate the range of 

Chinese views on foreign policy issues. 

There is little indication that these journals serve as the primary 

venue for formulating, incubating, articulating, and debating issues 

which could end up as offi cial government policy. They should not 

be viewed as such tools. Based on the author’s conversations with 

Chinese scholars from several foreign policy research institutes, the 

primary role of these journals is to function as an intellectual outlet 

for scholars, to generate a marketplace for ideas “with Chinese 

characteristics,” to propagate offi cial Chinese policies to readers, to 

justify policy positions, and for foreign consumption. While some 

of the broader ideas and discussions in these journals may inform

policymaking (and increasingly so in recent years), it is diffi cult 

to evaluate the extent to which the journal content refl ects nascent 

policy without knowing a journal’s specifi c editorial policies (e.g. 

what makes it in and why). Policy relevant research most commonly 

takes the form of internal research reports (diaoyan baogao) that are 

sent up the organizational food-chain to policymakers; though there 

are several channels and mechanisms that a Chinese analyst can use 

to transmit research to policymakers.38

Furthermore, Chinese foreign policy journals are not a consistent 
293

or reliable source of “early warning indicators” of pending policy 

decisions, as some have argued. There are limited instances in which 

articles in these journals have been used as venues to publicize 

ideas before the emergence of a new policy decision.39 My research 

found that, more often than not, the articles in these journals are an 

indication that a policy debate has fi nished. The articles function 

more as an ex-post facto indicator or a signal of a policy decision 

than an early warning indicator of a pending one. In this sense, 

such articles often serve as signaling devices to both Chinese and 

foreigners. China’s “great debate on peace and development” in 

1999 serves as one recent example. Following a volatile period in 

U.S.-China relations, the debate did not occur in journals but rather 

in closed meetings (neibu huiyi) and to a limited extent in print 

media. It was not until after the debate concluded that Chinese 

foreign policy journals were fi lled with articles about the issues that 

were debated. As such, these articles provide a rough guide to the 

general consensus opinion about Chinese views on the international 

security environment in 1999.40

Other examples suggest a closer relationship between journals and 

the policymaking process. Prior to China’s March 1997 articulation 

of its New Security Concept (NSC), there was literally no discussion 

of the intellectual content of the NSC or the need for such a policy 

gesture in major foreign policy journals. Yet, in 1995 and 1996 there 

was a burgeoning body of writings arguing that China needed to 

be more aware of the perception by its neighbors that China’s rise 

could threaten their economic and security interests. This suggests 

a broad―but still signifi cant―linkage between journal publications 

and policies to come. The content of journal articles, when examined 

over a long time period, may presage an evolution in certain aspects 

of China’s foreign policy. Alastair Iain Johnston argues that journal 

arguments themselves are not epiphenomenal to the policy change, 

but often only when looked at over a long time interval.41 A similar, 

broad correlation likely exists between Chinese writings about the 

value of multilateralism and changes in China’s participation in 

Asian multilateral forums. In this sense, journal articles play a role in 

the policy evolution process but not necessarily in the policymaking 

process per se. 
294

Beyond using articles for signaling purposes, the appearance 

of certain articles following internal discussions may importantly 

indicate a deliberate decision by the government to allow greater 

public discussion of certain topics, possibly to explore future 

directions for China’s policies. The current discussion in Chinese 

journals and newspapers about Beijing’s policies toward Japan and 

North Korea may be a recent manifestation of this. This phenomenon 

may become increasingly common in the coming years if the political 

space for public foreign policy debates continues to expand. 

To be sure, this chapter is not arguing that these journals lack 

value for international scholars and analysts trying to understand 

better Chinese foreign policy. Rather, this chapter maintains that their 

value is limited to trying to elucidate the degree of infl uence of foreign 

policy research organizations. Some of the most useful and instructive 

content in these journals are the debates among scholars.42 The 

occurrence of debate on a particular issue, the frequency of debate, 

the participants, and the arguments put forward all provide insights 

into general thought trends. They also serve as a general barometer of 

political environment for foreign policymaking in China. Perhaps, in 

this sense, these debates indicate the general parameters (e.g., wide 

or narrow) of the accepted discourse on a specifi c topic and as such 

offer indications of the types of policies Beijing will not adopt, as adopt, as 

these presumably would lie outside the parameters of the prevailing 

discussion. 

Interestingly, much of the current discourse on policy and 

theoretical issues does not occur within the pages of a specifi c 

journal but rather across journals. Key debates in recent years 

have included China’s response to U.S. missile defense policies; 

whether a security dilemma exists in U.S.-China relations; China’s 

advocacy of mulitpolarity; and China’s need to assume a great 

power diplomacy.43 These intellectual exchanges tend to be broad 

and provide a sense of the political environment and guide to the 

parameters of intellectual discourse among analysts and scholars. 

They offer minimal insight into actual policies, however. To delve 

into the policymaking process, scholars of Chinese foreign policy 

must complement the analysis of journal articles with interviews. 

Discussions with the authors of key articles are often the only channel 
295

that provides the context necessary for understanding the origins of 

particular articles and any connections that may exist between those 

articles and internal policy decisions. 

A NEW ERA: FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE 16TH PARTY 

CONGRESS 

From the vantage point of late 2003, it is far too early in the 

tenure of Hu Jintao and the new Politburo Standing Committee 

to distinguish their foreign policy preferences from those of their 

predecessors. Yet, based on events in recent months and emerging 

intellectual trends in China, there are a number of new themes that 

may come to defi ne the foreign policy of China’s new leadership. 

Many of these themes importantly represent some of the newest 

and most innovative thinking among university-based scholars and 

analysts in key foreign policy research institutes.

China’s diplomatic response to the outbreak of SARS, while 

admittedly delayed, signals a recognition by China’s most senior 

leaders that they too need to pay attention to nontraditional 

security challenges (such as large scale health threats) as well as 

the implications of such crises for China’s foreign policy. As noted 

above, Chinese foreign policy specialists have been writing about 

both these issues for years, in particular the dangers posed by 

transnational security threats. 

The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 

in China and the international community’s reaction to its spread 

represented not only an early domestic challenge, but also the 

fi rst major foreign policy crisis for the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao 

administration. The rapid spread of SARS to the Asia-Pacifi c region 

(Singapore and Vietnam, among other nations) threatened to 

undermine China’s decade-long effort to charm Southeast Asian 

nations and address the growing perception that China’s rise (as an 

economic and military power) threatened their interests. Similarly, 

in the Western world, China’s initially lax treatment of SARS 

renewed latent Western concerns about the volatility and instability 

of the political and economic environment for business development 

in China. Some commentators claimed that SARS was more 

destructive to China’s image than the Tiananmen incident.44 These 
296

reactions rapidly alerted China’s new leaders to the real impact of 

globalization on Chinese security and economic interests. Up to this 

point, debates about globalization had largely been a theoretical 

issue about sovereignty. In addition, for most Chinese strategists 

globalization for China was mainly an economic phenomenon 

commonly linked to questions of World Trade Organization (WTO) 

accession and the value of China’s currency. The SARS episode 

was the fi rst time that security aspects of globalization had a direct, 

material impact on Chinese foreign policy. Chinese strategists 

and policymakers are beginning to realize the dangers associated 

with health threats and recognize the need to be transparent in 

order to limit the proliferation of such dangers. Following SARS, 

Foreign Ministry practitioners now publicly discuss the value of 

openly, frankly, and immediately addressing such threats with the 

international community, as noted in a recent article by Foreign 

Ministry offi cials.45 Stressing the role of globalization in China’s 

foreign affairs is also consistent with Hu Jintao’s and Wen Jiabao’s 

broader effort to create a populist identity that demonstrates greater 

concern for the socio-economic challenges facing all Chinese―not 

simply the elites and wealthy business constituents in the coastal 

provinces. 

Hu Jintao’s decision to attend the G-8 meeting in May 2003 

symbolizes another emerging foreign policy preference: China’s 

identifi cation with major power interests. Jiang Zemin in his work 

report to the 16th Party Congress placed “great power relations” (da 

guo guanxi) as a top priority for China’s foreign relations, and thereby 

relegated China’s ties with its neighbors and developing nations as 

secondary and tertiary concerns.46 There are strong indications that 

Hu has picked up this mantle. Chinese leaders increasingly see their 

foreign policy interests as more akin to those of the major powers (the 

United States, Russia, Japan, India, and Europe) and less associated 

with the developing nations. As a result, Chinese academics and 

analysts openly talk about the need to assume a “great power 

mentality” (daguo xintai) and “great power consciousness” (daguo 

yishi) in China’s interactions with the international community.47

This shift in mentality manifested itself in the decision to participate 

in the G-8 meeting as well as to be active in various Asian regional 

forums.48
297

Moreover, new thinking has emerged which argues that China 

needs to pay attention to not only its rights, but also its responsibilities 

as a major power. As Beijing’s infl uence increases, Chinese analysts 

argue that more nations will call upon China to shoulder its global 

responsibilities. Although many Chinese foreign policy mavens 

for years have emphasized Deng Xiaoping’s aphorism “hide our 

capabilities and bide our time” (tao guang yang hui), a growing school 

of thought emphasizes Deng’s related claim about the need “to do 

some things” in foreign affairs (you suo zuo wei).49 China’s prominent 

role in addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis provides the most 

immediate evidence of an embrace of the latter aphorism. China 

has worked both behind the scenes and publicly to help deescalate 

the crisis. Senior Chinese political leaders such as Qian Qichen and 

Wu Bangguo have traveled to Pyongyang to help bring the North 

to negotiations. Chinese diplomats such as Dai Bingguo and Wang 

Yi have shuttled between Pyongyang, Beijing and Washington to 

ensure the fi rst three–party talks, the fi rst round of six-party talks, 

and a second round of the latter discussions. China has also used 

coercive measures. Beijing suspended crucial oil shipments to the 

North, detained a North Korea ship over a “business dispute,” and 

shifted troops to the China-Korean border. 

A related trend in Chinese foreign policy is increased emphasis 

on transnational/nontraditional security issues. Following 

9/11/01, counterterrorism and nonproliferation appear to have 

become central issues in Chinese diplomacy. Beijing has made 

consistent (albeit limited) efforts to support the war against 

terrorism. Chinese diplomats tout the renewed emphasis on 

preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, though 

the government’s effort to implement its formal commitments has 

been spotty. Just as 9-11 catalyzed shifts in China’s approach to 

international terrorism and greater vigilance on nonproliferation, 

the SARS incident sensitized Chinese leaders to the dangers (to 

China’s image and its material interests) posed by nontraditional 

security issues as disease and environmental degradation. The 

United States and China have also cooperated fairly extensively 

in counternarcotics and antismuggling operations; the degree of 

information sharing and joint operations on this issue between the 

law enforcement establishments in the United State and China is 

unprecedented.50
298

In the vein of the classic Marxist dialectic and the embrace of 

contradictions, there is continuity within change in China’s current 

foreign policy. China’s new senior policymakers will no doubt 

continue to emphasize the classic, well-worn themes of “building 

a favorable international security environment for domestic 

development” (wei guo nei jingji jianshe chuangzao yi ge youli de guoji 

huanjing) and viewing the next 20 years as a strategic opportunity to 

accomplish many things (da you suo zuo wei de zhuyao zhanlue jiyuqi).51

Chinese diplomats will continue to build China’s soft power in the 

international community. Gone are the days of Maoist advocacy of 

proletarian internationalism and calls for a radical restructuring of 

an international system designed to keep China down. Currently, 

China has far too much staked in the international system of 

economic and security roles, norms, and institutions to maintain 

such anachronisms. In this sense, China is a status quo power. That 

said, Beijing is decidedly uncomfortable with the current US role in 

international politics. Chinese policymakers grudgingly accept that 

the U.S. unipolar status will continue for decades, and there is little 

that China can do about it.52 This accommodation to geopolitical 

realities facilitates a stability of sorts in U.S.-China relations. In 

this context, Chinese diplomats continue to hail the dual virtues 

of globalization and multipolarity in international relations. They 

also call for the construction of a “new international political and 

economic order that is stable, just, and rational.” For Beijing, this is 

code language for their discomfort with a U.S. dominated system. 

China’s accelerating integration into the current international 

system, paired with its obvious discomfort with a system currently 

dominated by U.S. economic and military power, is a prime tension 

that will continue to infl uence Beijing’s foreign policy decisions in 

the decades to come. 

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 

Several preliminary conclusions about the changing roles and 

infl uence of foreign policy research organizations emerge from 

the preceding assessment. The Chinese marketplace of ideas on 

foreign policy is undergoing an important evolution. The quality 
299

of research produced by foreign policy think tanks is improving 

and new institutional players are becoming prominent competitors. 

Main-line think tanks, like the CASS institutes, CICIR and CIIS, have 

expanded their research agendas, are using a bigger analytical tool 

box, and are generating new ideas. One of the most novel features of 

this period is that foreign policy research centers at universities such 

as Beijing University, Qinghua University, and People’s University 

are emerging as active players in China’s increasingly robust public 

discourse on foreign policy. University-based institutes have 

morphed into active sources of new thinking on foreign affairs. This 

suggests that international analysts should increase their interactions 

with Chinese academic specialists in IR, security studies, and foreign 

policy. Focusing primarily on the traditional foreign policy and 

national security research institute community risks overlooking 

some of the most provocative, cutting-edge academic and policyrelevant research which is occurring in China today.

Even as the methodological skills and quality of analysis of 

Chinese foreign policy specialists improve, however, an important 

caution is in order. There is no magic bullet in the study of Chinese 

foreign and national security policy. No one think tank analyst or 

journal indicates defi nitively the future direction of Chinese foreign 

policy. Furthermore, the major Chinese foreign policy journals are 

of limited value as early warning indicators of imminent changes in 

Chinese foreign relations and foreign policy. While journal articles 

have most commonly served as signaling devices, their roles have 

broadened. They can indicate a willingness to allow public debate to 

further elucidate general policy positions, and these publications can 

offer signposts to gradual changes in foreign policy. The articles are 

of maximum value when they supplement the type of contextual and 

background information that often can be gleaned from interviews 

with the authors. 

This chapter has presented an exploratory assessment of new 

trends in foreign policy research organizations in China. It also 

importantly leaves the door wide open for further research. Little 

remains known about the actual operations of these research 

organizations; and how and when they are best able to shape actual 

policymaking. Has the new leadership changed the ways that it uses 

these research organizations? Which ones wield the most infl uence 
300

on particular issues? Our understanding of China would signifi cantly 

benefi t from further elucidating the relationship between broad 

policy debates among analysts and internal deliberations about 

specifi c policy proposals. Along these lines, it is not clear what role 

is played by quasi-private foreign policy think tanks and how they 

fi t into the changing landscape of foreign policy discourse in China. 

These questions are ripe for future research as U.S. and international 

analysts make further efforts to reduce misunderstanding and 

prepare for the diplomatic challenges posed by China’s rise. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” 

Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2003, p. 22-35; also see Avery Goldstein, 

“The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging 

Choice,” China Quarterly, 2001, p. 835-864. 

2. This question is a variation on a similar theme in Joseph Fewsmith, “Where 

do Correct Ideas Come From,” in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivelhan, 

eds., China’s Leadership in the 21st Century, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2002, pp. 152-

164. 

3. The classic article on this issue is David Shambaugh, “China’s National 

Security Research Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly, June 1987, pp. 276-304. 

Several important articles are included in a special edition of The China Quarterly, 

September 2002: David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think 

Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” pp. 575-596; Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip 

C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutions,” pp. 597-

616; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military Related Think Tanks,” 

pp. 617-624. The classic work on the military is Michael Swaine, The Role of the 

Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 

Corporation, 1998. Additional important sources include Michael Pillsbury, 

“China’s Research Institutes,” paper commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission, 2002, http://www.uscc.gov/cri.pdf; He Li, “The ; He Li, “The 

Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Problems of Communism, March/

April 2002, pp. 33-43. 

4. The majority of foreign policy and national security research organizations 

are located in these two cities. However, certain specialized think tanks are not 

based in Beijing and Shanghai. These include the Institute for Taiwan Studies at 

Xiamen University in Fujian and the Military Economics Research Institute in 

Wuhan. 
301

5. In doing this, I fully recognize the extensive past use of journals by 

Western scholars to understand Chinese debates on issues such as U.S.-China 

relations, China’s regional diplomacy, arms control and nuclear doctrine, PLA 

threat perceptions, and other issues. Rather, my explicit effort is to explore what 

can be learned about the far more narrow issue of foreign policy think tanks by 

examining the content of foreign policy journals. 

6. David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks”; He Li, 

“The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy.” 

7. David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1991. 

8. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China, Boulder, 

CO, Westview Press, 2000, p. 34. 

9. David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks,” p. 581. 

This point is also made in Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese 

Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutions.”

10. See Alastair Iain Johnston, The State of International Relations Research in 

China: Considerations for the Ford Foundation, unpublished manuscript, January 

2003. 

11. In recent years, a growing number of articles in Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, one 

of China’s top nonpolicy IR journals, have refl ected not only a growing interest in 

IR theory but also a nonstate centric approach to interpreting global tends such as 

constructivist theories of IR. This represents a further evolution in Chinese interest 

in Western IR literature. 

12. On these trends, see Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese 

Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutions.”

13. Presumably, another purpose of overseas research trips is that they also 

serve to enhance the reputation, status, and infl uence of institutions and individual 

analysts; though this is probably less of a factor today then it was in past decades 

when such trips were less commonplace and were typically reserved for senior 

scholars from the most well-connected organizations.

14. David Shambaugh, “China’s National Security Research Bureaucracy”and 

Glaser and Saunders. 

15. One of the most active debates to emerge in the last two years has been 

on China’s Japan policy. Scholars have openly debated such issues as the role 

of “history” in China-Japan relations and the extent to which power transition 
302

dynamics will infl uence the future of the relationship. See Liu Xiaobao, “Where 

are Sino-Japanese Relations Heading: A Commentary on Observations by Scholars 

and Concerns Among People,” Renmin Wang, August 13, 2003, as translated in 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). 

16. This argument is not meant to suggest that China’s main-line foreign 

policy think tanks are hollowing out as a result of the migration of some experts 

to universities. Think tanks such as CICIR still have active staffs who are writing 

about the most pressing foreign policy and national security issues. The CICIR 

journal has signifi cantly improved the quality of its content in recent years. 

17. This conclusion is based on numerous discussions with many universitybased researchers since 2000. 

18. The Foreign Affairs College is in the same bureaucratic xitong as the 

Foreign Ministry, so this example is limited in its value, though the Foreign 

Ministry in the past has sent offi cials to Beijing University for graduate degrees, 

after which they returned to the Ministry for career postings. 

19. This point is made in Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist. 

20. Among Shi’s recent articles, see Shi Yinhong, “The Arms Control 

Mechanism and Nonproliferation Issues in East Asia: Current Status and 

Dangers,” Zhanlue yu guanli, No. 5, October 2002, pp. 29-33, in FBIS, October 2002; 

Shi Yinhong, “How to Understand and Deal with the DPRK Nuclear Crisis,” Ta 

Kung Pao, January 15, 2003, in FBIS, January 2003; and Shi Yinhong, “The DPRK 

Nuclear Crisis: New Turn for the Better and the Still Existing Dangers,” Ta Kung 

Pao, August 1, 2003, in FBIS, August 2003.

21. Xu Weidi, “Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis and Moving 

the Korean Peninsula out of the Cold War,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, September 14, 

2003, p. 59-64. 

22. See Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing: 

guanyu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue de jidian sikao” [Adopting a Great Power 

Diplomatic Strategy is Imperative for China: Several Considerations Concerning 

China’s Diplomatic Strategy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and 

Politics], No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-10; Ye Zicheng and Li Ying, “Zhongguo Suoyi Bixu Jian 

Daguo Waijiao Xintai,” Huanqiu Shibao, July 20, 2001; and Ye Zicheng, “Guanyu 

taoguang yanghui he yousuo zuowei: zai tan zhongguo de daguo waijiao xintai” 

[Concerning Hiding One’s Capabilities and Biding One’s Time and Doing 

Something Worthwhile: Revisiting China’s Great Power Diplomatic Mentality], 

Taipingyang xuebao [Pacifi c Journal], No. 1, 2002, pp. 62-66. See also Jin Xide, 

“Zhongguo Xuyao Daguo Xintai,” Huanqiu Shibao, September 12, 2002 p. 4.
303

23. See Li Bin, “The Impact of NMD on China’s Nuclear Modernization,” 

Pugwash Online, April 2001; and Li Bin, “Absolute Gains, Relative Gains, and 

U.S. Security Policy on China” Qinghua University website as translated in FBIS, 

November 2002. Li Bin’s Arms Control Program at Qinghua operates a website 

full of data and opinions on arms control and nonproliferation issues in Chinese. 

These can be found at http://learn.tsinghua.edu.cn/homepage/S00313/archive.htm.

24. Liu Jianfei has written some of the most provocative articles about Taiwan 

and U.S.-China relations. See Liu Jianfei “The Building of Democratic Politics In 

China and Sino-U.S. Relations,” Strategy and Management, March 2003, pp. 76-82, 

as translated in FBIS, March 2003. Also see Liu Jianfei, “China-U.S. Relations 

and the Taiwan Question in the Post-Cold War Era―Basic Characteristics and 

Development Trends,” Strategy and Management, December 2003, pp. 102-109. 

25 The Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies, it 

is funded by media such as Jeifang Daily, Wenhuai Daily, and Xinmin Daily and 

local large enterprises including Bao Steel Group, Shanghai Port Construction 

Corporation, Orient International Co. Ltd., Shanghai Airlines, Shanghai Dongmao 

Import Export Company, Shanghai Asia Business Consulting Co. Ltd., and 

Shanghai East Best International Co. Ltd. The new Shanghai Institute of American 

Studies is funded by grants from the Huajin Real Estate Company, Ltd. This 

information was drawn from the offi cial publication of both these organizations. 

26. Fewsmith, “Where do Correct Ideas Come From,” p. 159. 

27. For example, Global Times (which is part of the People’s Daily Group) 

has a weekly column called International Forum (Guoji Luntan) which regularly 

includes op-ed articles from well known foreign policy specialists. See Niu Jun, 

“Zhongguo de Jueqi, Zhong-Wai Lijie Bu Tong,” Huanqiu Shibao, November 15, 

2003. 

28. Liu Xiaobao, “Where are Sino-Japanese Relations Heading,” and Sun 

Yafei, “Is New Thinking Needed on Japan?” Nanfang Zhoumo, June 12, 2003, as 

translated in FBIS. On North Korea, see citations in note 21 and 22. 

29. Scholars reportedly received general guidance that their comments should 

be “comprehensive” (quanmian) and “objective” (keguan), and that they should 

“keep some distance” (chaotuo). More specifi cally, the guidance indicated that 

they were free to criticize the policies of the U.S., UK, or Iraqi governments, but 

they should refrain from personal criticism of foreign leaders, including President 

Bush, Prime Minister Blair, and Saddam Hussein. Conversations with Chinese 

scholars, Washington, DC, May 2003. 

30. The author is grateful to David Finkelstein for pointing this out to him. 
304

31. Data on economic think tanks is drawn from Joseph Fewsmith, “Where 

Do Correct Ideas Come From”; also see Barry Naught, “China’s Economic Think 

Tanks: Their Changing Role in the 1990s,” The China Quarterly, September 2002, 

pp. 625-635. 

32. Deng fell from power three times, and each time returned to political 

prominence, hence Chinese analysts often describe his remarkable resilience with 

the phrase “san xia, san shang.”

33. According to Joe Fewsmith, the Tigaisuo was the fi rst research organization 

in China to use the term “think tank” (sixiang ku) to refer to itself. 

34. One possible exception to this is when Jiang Zemin invited Wang Huning, 

former head of the International Politics offi ce of Fudan University, to head 

the Political Section of the CCP’s Policy Research Offi ce. Yet, since the latter 

organization is a key part of the Party bureaucracy, the analogy to Zhao Ziyang’s 

efforts in the 1980s is a weak one. 

35. To be sure we are not suggesting that the rise of independent foreign 

policy think tanks in China is the same phenomenon as the rise of economic ones 

in the 1980s; the rise of this new type of foreign policy think tank is largely due to 

personal initiative and the availability of funds from entrepreneurs as opposed to 

senior leaders setting up these research organs to circumvent the bureaucracy. 

36. These periodicals were chosen because they represent the different “types” 

of journals in the foreign policy community. The fi rst two journals published by 

CIIS and CICIR, respectively, are policy journals; the IWEP journal is one of 

China’s most prominent nonpolicy, theoretical IR journals, and the CIISS journal 

represents military viewpoints exclusively. 

37. This time period was chosen for two reasons: fi rst, it was the most recent 

time period that would allow for reading of 2 years’ worth of journals; second, 

during this time period there were substantial changes in international relations, 

U.S.-China ties, and Chinese perceptions of the latter two factors. Chinese think 

tanks actively debated these issues. Thus, this time period provides numerous 

opportunities for exploration of the roles and infl uence of think tanks. 

38. Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy 

Research Institutions,” p. 597-616.

39. David Shambaugh makes this claim in his 2002 China Quarterly article on 

page 581; this claim would benefi t from further empirical testing. 

40. David Finkelstein, The Great Debate on Peace and Development of 1999, The 

CNA Corporation, 2000. 
305

41. Personal communication with author, November 2003. 

42. Two of the most interesting sets of debates have centered on China’s 

international security environment and China’s foreign policy response to it. 

An overview of these debates is presented in a series of articles published in 

CICIR’s journal, Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 11, 

November 2002. Among the most interesting of these articles are the following: 

Dao Shulin, “Some Refl ections on China’s Peripheral Security Environment,” 

p. 9-10; Gao Haikuan, “Viewing China’s International Environment from the 

Asia-Pacifi c,” p. 10-11; Jin Canrong, Beijing University, “An Assessment of Two 

Types of New Factors in China’s International Environment,” p. 7-9; Ye Zicheng, 

“Adopting a Diplomatic Strategy that Adapts to Changes in the Environment,” 

pp. 24-25; and Zhang Baijia, Party History Research Center, “Seeking Progress in 

Stability, Smoothly Passing Through the ‘Security Bottleneck,’” p. 20-22.

43. On China’s response to U.S. missile defense policies, see Shi Yinghong, 

“Meiguo Guojia Daodan Fangyu Jihua yu Zhongguo ke you de he yinggai you 

de duice,” [U.S. Missile Defense Plan and the Countermeasures China Could and 

Should Take], Harbin Gongye Daxue Xuebao [Harbin Industrial University Journal], 

No. 3, 2000, pp. 12-16. For discussion of China and security dilemma dynamics 

see Tang Shiping, ”Zai Lun Zhongguo de Da Zhanlue,” [Reconsidering China’s 

Grand Strategy], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], No. 4, 2003. For a 

survey and assessment of the debate over China’s advocacy of multipolarization, 

which draws on a rich array of Chinese-language journal articles, see Alastair Iain 

Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” p. 25-38. Finally, on whether China 

needs to assume a great power diplomatic strategy, see Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo 

shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing: guanyu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue 

de jidian sikao,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 1, 

2000, pp. 5-10; Ye Zicheng, “Guanyu taoguang yanghui he yousuo zuowei: zai 

tan zhongguo de daguo waijiao xintai,” Taipingyang xuebao [Pacifi c Journal], No. 

1, 2002, p. 62-66; Xiao Huanrong, “Zhongguo de daguo zeren yu diquzhuyi 

zhanlue” [China’s Great Power Responsibilities and the Strategy of Regionalism], 

Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 2003, No. 1, p. 46-51; and 

Liu Shengxiang, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue weishi shangzao: 

yu Ye Zicheng shangque” [It’s Still Too Early for China to Have a Great Power 

Diplomatic Strategy: Response to Ye Zicheng], Shijjie jingji yu zhengzhi [World 

Economics and Politics], No. 7, 2000, p. 76-80.

44. John Pomfret, China Orders End To SARS Coverup; Offi cials Begin Belated 

Campaign Against Disease,” Washington Post, April 19, 2003, p. A08; John Pomfret, 

“Outbreak Gave China’s Hu an Opening; President Responded to Pressure Inside 

and Outside Country on SARS,” Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A01. 

45. “Waijiao: Zouxing Kaifeng, Touming yu Hezuo,” Shijie Zhishi, June 16, 

2003, pp. 12-13; the article was written by the staff of the MFA Policy Planning 
306

Department. The Policy Planning Department is currently headed by Cui 

Tiankai. 

46. To be sure, China’s relations with neighboring nations is a very close 

second priority for Chinese policymakers as they realize the importance of a stable 

regional security environment for domestic development. In fact, some Chinese 

commentators argue that China’s ties with its neighbors should be the top foreign 

policy priority. There is much agreement, perhaps except among dedicated leftists, 

that ties with developing nations is a distant third priority. 

47. Ye Zicheng, the most prominent advocate of this position, argues that 

China must adopt a great power diplomatic strategy to cope with the new 

challenges it faces in international politics. He asserts that the principal elements 

of this strategy are focusing on great power relations and assuming responsibilities 

and obligations in promoting multipolarization and solving global problems that 

accord with China’s status as a major power. In addition, Ye holds that the fi rst 

step in adopting a great power diplomatic strategy is adjusting China’s foreign 

policy mentality. This means emerging from the shadow of the “diplomacy 

of humiliation” (quru waijiao) and escaping from the trappings of a traditional 

“victim mentality’ (shouhaizhe xintai). See Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo 

waijiao zhanlue shizai bixing: guanyu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue de jidian sikao” 

[Adopting a Great Power Diplomatic Strategy is Imperative for China: Several 

Considerations Concerning China’s Diplomatic Strategy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi

[World Economics and Politics], No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-10. For a response that is critical 

of Ye’s position, see Liu Shengxiang, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue 

weishi shangzao: yu Ye Zicheng shangque” [It’s Still Too Early for China to Have a 

Great Power Diplomatic Strategy: Response to Ye Zicheng], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi

[World Economics and Politics], No. 7, 2000, pp. 76-80.

48. On this latter point, see Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s 

New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, pp. 22-35. 

49. Ye Zicheng is also a forceful proponent of this related argument. He 

contends that Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim, “hide one’s capabilities and bide 

one’s time, do something worthwhile” (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei), was 

raised in a specifi c historical context and cannot serve as the long-term strategic 

guideline for Chinese foreign policy. Now that China is a maturing great power 

(chengzhangzhong de shijie daguo), Ye writes, that approach to diplomacy is no 

longer appropriate. See Ye Zicheng, “Guanyu taoguang yanghui he yousuo 

zuowei: zai tan zhongguo de daguo waijiao xintai” [Concerning Hiding One’s 

Capabilities and Biding One’s Time and Doing Something Worthwhile: Revisiting 

China’s Great Power Diplomatic Mentality], Taipingyang xuebao [Pacifi c Journal], 

No. 1, 2002, pp. 62-66.

50. John Pomfret, “China, U.S. Cooperate In Large Heroin Sting; Distrust Had 

Hampered Previous Efforts,” Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A10. 
307

51. The entire expression as described in the July 1, 2003, speech to the 

Communist Party by Hu Jintao is: “ershiyishiji touershinian, dui wo guo lai shuo, 

shi yi ge bixu jinjin zhuazhu bingqie keyi da you suo zuo wei de zhuyao zhanlue 

jiyuqi.” 

52. Medeiros and Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy.” 

309

CHAPTER 10

DEMYSTIFYING SHASHOUJIAN:

CHINA’S “ASSASSIN’S MACE” CONCEPT

Jason E. Bruzdzinski

KEY QUESTIONS

In the absence of a comprehensive base of knowledge or 

intellectual debate on shashoujian, this chapter seeks to develop a 

baseline for understanding shashoujian in the context of current 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) military affairs and aspirations for 

transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the early 

21st century. To this end, this chapter will seek initial responses to 

three fundamental questions: 

1. What are the historical origins of shashoujian and what does the 

term mean in a military context?

2. How has shashoujian emerged as a topic of signifi cance within the 

Chinese national defense establishment?

3. How might shashoujian satisfy Chinese national defense 

requirements?

BACKGROUND

For those interested in the potential of the Chinese military to 

challenge or threaten U.S. interests, shashoujian is an important 

concept that must be properly understood and appreciated. 

While omitted from many discussions about Chinese military 

modernization in recent Western books and essays on the PLA, the 

shashoujian concept is a component of China’s strategic culture that 

infl uences grand strategy, in addition to Chinese national security 

policy and PRC military affairs. As will be discussed in this chapter, 

shashoujian is an important part of China’s effort to transform the 

PLA into a modern, effective, and professional force and should 

be important consideration for those studying PLA trends and 

developments.
310

CHALLENGES

Chinese Secrecy. 

Military affairs are a very sensitive topic for discussions and 

publications in the PRC. The PRC regime considers nearly all of 

China’s information on military subjects to be restricted (neibu) or 

internally published (junnei faxing junnei faxing). In fact, very little useful offi cial 

information is publicly available or accessible to foreigners. Moreover, 

the national defense information that is made available by the PRC 

must be scrutinized carefully by researchers as it is commonly 

propagandist in nature and may be deliberately inaccurate for the 

purposes of perception management. Secrecy and a general lack of 

transparency on the part of the PRC often prove to be the greatest 

challenges to American understanding of the PRC government and 

the PLA. Much of the primary source material cited in this chapter 

was obtained from the Chinese (.cn) and Taiwan (.tw) domains of 

the Internet and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); 

some was drawn from earlier research by experts in government and 

academia. Internet searching in the Chinese and Taiwan domains 

was enabled by the search engines provided by Google© and Yahoo©, 

but there can be little doubt that the PRC authorities have sanitized 

data of any sensitive or classifi ed information in sources that are 

searchable by using these tools. 

Open Source Publications Acquisition/Translation Issues. 

The U.S. National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, 

DC, has a formalized publications-sharing program with the PLA 

National Defense University. This program was established in 1985 

by a U.S.-PRC memorandum of understanding that was re-affi rmed 

in 1995. The documents exchange program is a component of the 

U.S.-PRC military-to-military relationship, but from an American 

perspective the program has not been very successful. PLA NDU 

representatives have not demonstrated reciprocity by sharing 

unclassifi ed PLA NDU military journals and other publications. 

Conversely, the U.S. NDU has given its PLA interlocutor virtually 

every document published by the U.S. NDU Press. Regrettably, 
311

the military-to-military program has reportedly failed to produce a 

comprehensive collection of documents from the PLA NDU and at 

present none of the limited Chinese documents shared by the Chinese 

are catalogued, translated, or otherwise available to researchers 

using the U.S. NDU Library.1

FBIS carries out relatively limited collection and translation of 

PRC publications that focus on military and military-related topics. 

In light of this fact, many researchers within the PLA-watching 

academic community make regular visits to China to conduct 

interviews and visit bookstores and newsstands to obtain the latest 

information available on developments within the PRC defense 

establishment. Regrettably, this chapter did not directly benefi t from 

project-specifi c travel to the PRC or from interactions with PRC 

government or Chinese military offi cials. 

At FBIS, the translation and dissemination of Chinese publications 

transitioned from hardcopy/in-print to online/softcopy availability 

in 1996. Documents dating from 1993 to present are available from 

FBIS on CD-ROM. For U.S. Government personnel and contractors 

with access to classifi ed government networks, FBIS provides 

additional archived publications (all unclassifi ed) from 1988 to 1993; 

materials that predate 1988 are only available “in transfer” from the 

original hardcopy to microform.2 Unfortunately, FBIS materials that 

exist on microform, while available with full tables of contents, are 

not searchable using automated research tools.

Varying precision of FBIS translations poses another challenge 

for researchers. FBIS translations of Chinese documents into English, 

in some instances, have been found to be inconsistent. For example, 

since 1996, FBIS appears to have translated the three-character term 

shashoujian using at least 15 different interpretations.

3

 Multiple 

interpretations of a term can severely complicate a researcher’s ability 

to identify a topic of signifi cance and perform trend analysis against 

terms and topics or to identify frequency spikes or changes in usage 

in primary sources. For the U.S. Government, such shortcomings 

hold the potential to undermine the monitoring of key indicators for 

warning against strategic surprises.

Problems in identifi cation, translation, and media/trend 

analysis may be one of several reasons for the relatively long time 

that elapsed between the emergence of shashoujian in the PLA and 
312

evidence of American interest in the term. They may also be why so 

little is known in the United States about shashoujian as it pertains to 

the current and future interests of the Chinese military. 

When a single translation/interpretation for shashoujian is 

applied to all documents containing the term, it appears that 

shashoujian is more than a mere idiom or metaphor in the vernacular 

of the PLA cadre and individuals within the PRC defense 

establishment. This fi rst becomes noticeable in materials published 

in 1995 and becomes increasingly obvious by 1999. In 2000, there are 

indications that shashoujian could be part of a formalized, clandestine 

weapons research, development and acquisition (RD&A) effort. 

To demonstrate this point, the term shashoujian is not translated, 

but presented in Chinese pinyin transliteration throughout this 

document.

EXISTING RESEARCH

Only limited research examines the topic of shashoujian. In 

the United States, a small number of researchers have attempted 

to defi ne and contextualize the term, but none of the research 

discovered in the course of this project examined the subject of 

shashoujian comprehensively. The work of Dr. Michael Pillsbury 

comes closest. While American and Taiwan academics share some 

common views, there are also clear differences in their respective 

interpretations and assumptions about the context of shashoujian.

WHAT ARE THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF SHASHOUJIAN

AND WHAT DOES THE TERM MEAN?

To correctly examine the concept of shashoujian, it is important 

to understand its historical origins and the context of the term. 

The three Chinese characters that make up the term shashoujian 

are literally translated as kill (sha), hand (shou), sword, club, or 

mace (jian). The most common English language interpretation of 

shashoujian is “assassin’s mace.”

Dissection of the term shashoujian by non-Chinese (who lack 

deep cultural and linguistic skill) can be misleading, and the true 

meaning and context of shashoujian can be easily lost. For example, 
313

the meaning of the Chinese compound “shashou” is interpreted as 

“hitman” or “assassin,” and jian as “sword,” “club,” or “mace.” 

This approach most often results in the translation/interpretation: 

“assassin’s mace.” Alternatively, shashoujian might be dissected as 

sha (meaning kill or killing) followed by the compound “shoujian” 

(“hand sword,” “hand club,” or “hand mace”). The result in this 

case is most often the interpretation of shashoujian as “killer mace” or 

“killing mace.”

Interestingly, the Chinese characters jiaan and jian are different, 

but have very similar meanings and are used by most Chinese 

interchangeably. The jiaan is a short wood, iron, or steel rod with 

three or four angled edges. Some jiaan are tipped with a mace-type 

head. The jiaan does not have a sharp blade as a sword (jian) does. 

According to the Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center 

in Taiwan, the Chinese characters for these weapons are probably 

derived from zhujiaan: a bamboo strip that was used as a medium by 

the Chinese for writing before the invention of paper.4

As American scholars have argued, shashoujian has its origins 

in Chinese antiquity. Shashoujian has been frequently referenced in 

Chinese legends, folklore, and history, and the term is particularly 

common in Chinese contemporary martial arts novels.5 However, 

determining its origin, defi ning the term, and understanding its 

important context can be somewhat challenging.

In ancient China, when wars were common and often long, the 

martial arts emerged to serve the needs of individuals and armies. As 

a result, the “way of the fi st” (quanfa), the sword art (jianshu), and the 

war art (wushu) became a way of life for many Chinese people and 

set the martial arts as a cornerstone in Chinese culture. The practice 

of jianshu, which remains very popular in China today, emphasizes 

not only the disposition of an adversary and the desired effect of 

one’s strikes, but also one’s own attacking position and the forms 

(techniques) of strikes that one should use. Great attention is paid 

to the precision of one’s position and use of forms in the practice of 

jianshu, as is the case in the practice of taichi quan (shadow boxing).

Historical references to martial arts weapons in Chinese legend 

and folklore pre-date the Southern and Northern dynasties period 

that began in 386 A.D. and can be traced to the Warring States 

(475-221 B.C.) and the Spring and Autumn (770-476 B.C.) periods.6
314

However, early records of Chinese fi ghting movements known 

as “hit and thrust” exercises were practiced as early as the Shang 

dynasty (1700-1027 B.C.).7 The establishment of the Shaolin Temple 

by Emperor Xiao Wen during the Northern Wei dynasty (356-534 

A.D.) was a key catalyst for the development of the martial arts 

in China. During this period, the original Shaolin style of gong fu

(martial arts) was practiced with only 18 basic weapons―among 

them, the hand mace (shoujian). 

The shoujian was a surprisingly small and light weapon, 

measuring only about 15-20 inches in length and weighing just a few 

pounds. Modern day analogues might resemble a lead pipe, crowbar, 

or hammer. Both the jian and jiaan were considered highly lethal 

close combat weapons and could be concealed within a wide sleeve. 

However, effective use of these weapons required considerable skill 

based on deception, good training, and long practice. Using the 

proper forms (techniques), the shoujian was a weapon that could 

be immediately employed with little or no warning against an 

adversary. A forged shoujian was capable of breaking swords and 

crushing a human skull or bones―even if an enemy was protected 

by the type of helmets or armor available during early periods of 

Chinese history.

The historical origin of the term shashoujian is elusive. According 

to one Taiwan source, it is found in a legend about General Xin 

Xiong of the Tang Empire (618-907 A.D.). General Xin is said to have 

had a great reputation for very rare skill with a (nonbladed) jiaan

that was passed down to him by several generations of ancestors.8

He used the weapon in fast striking forms, including the “moving 

serpent” and “dropping snowfl ake” movements. General Xin’s 

most powerful form, however, was called “shashoujiaan.” The 

legend relates that when General Xin taught his cousin, Lou Cheng, 

the most effective forms to employ with the jiaan, he kept secret the 

“shashoujiaan” form because he realized that he might no longer be 

the best user of the jiaan if he taught the form to his cousin. Hence, 

the form “shashoujiaan,” with the implication of “the most powerful 

and secret skill,” is allegedly derived from this historic Chinese 

tale. From this story it seems clear that while the jian and jiaan are 

weapons, shashoujian is also a form―a well-practiced technique or 

movement.
315

HOW HAS SHASHOUJIAN EMERGED AS A TOPIC 

OF SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN THE CHINESE NATIONAL 

DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT?

Interestingly, very few modern defi nitions of shashoujian can be 

documented. The most comprehensive Chinese military statement 

about shashoujian―that resembles a formal defi nition―comes from a 

PLA Air Force (PLAAF) offi cer, Senior Colonel Yang Zhibo, who, in 

2002, served as a deputy researcher at the PLAAF Command College 

in the Offi ce for Planning and Management Research. According to 

Yang, shashoujian can be “weapon systems and equipment” and/or a 

certain type of “combat method.” In a Kongjun Bao article, he wrote:

Basically, it is whatever the PLA needs to win future local wars under 

modern high-tech conditions. It includes two aspects: (1) weapon 

systems and equipment (e.g., hardware); and (2) every type of combat 

method (e.g., software). Weapons and equipment are the systems needed 

to deal with the enemy’s electronic warfare and information warfare, 

and to counter every type of weapon and equipment the enemy can use 

for fi repower attack. [Shashoujian] [c]ombat methods include attacking 

different types of weapons, such as early warning aircraft, stealth 

aircraft, and cruise missiles, as well as the combat principles to deal with 

different situations.

To build a shashoujian, China must fi rst complete a development 

program. It is a diffi cult, systematic process and not just one or two 

advanced weapons. It is something that all the services will use. It is 

an all-army, all-location, composite land, sea, and air system. It must 

also be a Chinese program that can use advanced foreign technology, 

but should not be purchased as a full system from abroad. One reason 

for not purchasing it from abroad is that these types of technology and 

tactics are common knowledge to everyone else, including the enemy. 

Second, other countries may not want to give China those types of 

technology and tactics, which are secret. Third, during wartime, political 

and foreign affairs (diplomacy) could possibly cut the fl ow of technology 

off from China In developing new combat methods research, combat 

methods constitute the full development of weapons and equipment 

technical and tactical capabilities, and the effective methods of raising 

combat effectiveness. The development of weapons, equipment, combat 

methods, and training must go hand-in-hand for them to be effective.9

Postings on two popular Chinese military enthusiast 

websites offered additional defi nitions of shashoujian. One writer 
316

described shashoujian in the context of “weapons” and “system 

countermeasures” and also hinted that plans to develop a shashoujian

program originated in the early 1990s.

A shashoujian is a weapon that has an enormous terrifying effect on the 

enemy and that can produce an enormous destructive assault. System 

countermeasures involve comprehensive development of land, sea, 

air, and strategic weapons that increase the overall countermeasures 

capability of equipment systems. It should be said that these are two 

different trains of thought in the development of weaponry, but the two 

are not opposites. Shashoujian are not isolated weapons, but rather should 

become important constituent parts of equipment systems. Development 

of shashoujian is aimed at further perfection of equipment systems, and 

can promote faster development of equipment systems; it is a step in the 

improvement of systems countermeasures capabilities. . . . The concept 

of system countermeasures is a new train of thought proposed in the 

early 1990s for the development of weaponry. . . . Under conditions 

where military funding was constrained and scientifi c/technical forces 

were limited, China could focus on the development of a few shashoujian

weapons . . .10

Another writer cited the popular emergence of the term 

shashoujian in China in the 1990s, offered a historical defi nition of the 

term, and spoke of a shashoujian “designation” for specifi c weapons 

systems. This enthusiast wrote:

Shashoujian is a term often heard in China beginning in the mid-to-late 

1990s. It is a synonym for a secret weapon as originally used in traditional 

Chinese storytelling to describe an ancient weapon of surprising 

power. . . . several domestically made weapons have their names on the 

list of successful candidates for the designation shashoujian.

11

As Dr. Michael Pillsbury and Dr. Alistair I. Johnston have noted, 

the Chinese also use the terms wangpai (trump card) and shashoujian

to characterize certain U.S. and Russian weapons.12 Johnston 

observed that “this implies that PLA writers believe Americans and 

Russians can conceptualize [and develop] shashoujian just as Chinese 

can.”13 One PLA writer validated Pillsbury’s and Johnston’s ideas 

when he commented that,

U.S. troops had at least fi ve shashoujian on the battlefi eld [during 

Operation DESERT STORM], i.e., the F-117A stealth fi ghter bombers, 
317

the B-1B stealth bombers, the B-52H bombers (specialized in launching 

cruise missiles outside the air defense zone), the ship-based Tomahawk 

cruise missiles, and the B-2A stealth bombers which can take off or touch 

down from domestic airbases to carry out shock tasks. Moreover, the 

U.S. troops would also use various kinds of ammunition which are more 

powerful and more accurately guided.14

Understanding the origins and context of shashoujian is very 

important for discovering the meaning of the term, realizing its 

true signifi cance, and assessing the implications of shashoujian for 

the PLA. For example, learning the historical origins and context 

of shashoujian allows researchers to appreciate the term’s resilience 

despite the signifi cant changes that have occurred in China over the 

last 2,000 years. Such strong endurance of the concept of shashoujian

through transgenerational storytelling or “vignettism”15 highlights 

the signifi cance of the term in Chinese society, strategic culture, and 

as a possible driver for the development of Chinese military strategy, 

tactics, and weapons in the 21st century. Correctly translating and 

interpreting shashoujian are also important to facilitate meaningful 

research, to establish a baseline of knowledge, and to make 

new discoveries. Indeed, while there are Western analogues to 

and applications of shashoujian, “mirror-imaging” for analysis 

to understand the term is a pitfall to be avoided. The Chinese 

defi nitions and context must be the genesis of scholarly work on this 

unique subject.

The PLA Debates Alternative Paths for Military Strategy and Force 

Modernization.

Since the mid-1980s, Chinese military scholars have been 

studying trends in the development of U.S. defense policy and 

strategy, operational doctrine, and the enhancement of overall 

combat capability of the U.S. armed forces. During this period, 

many of these scholars also have been engaged in debate about the 

requirements for future warfare and the most appropriate direction 

for the modernization of the PLA. These military studies and debates 

have served as signifi cant agents for change within China’s national 

defense establishment.
318

In 1986, at a military campaign theory seminar where 60 new 

warplans were submitted and discussed by leading Chinese military 

strategists, a majority of those strategists espoused a move from 

China’s traditional “war of annihilation” goal to a focus on “fi ghting 

a full-fl edged war and attacking key-points.”16 In June 1991, at the 

direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Chinese 

Academy of Military Science (AMS) held a forum on Operation 

DESERT STORM to explore new approaches to “development of 

defense-related scientifi c research and army building,” among 

other major topics.17 Infl uenced by the Revolution in Military 

Affairs (RMA) trend and the overwhelming combat effectiveness 

of U.S. military operations from 1991 to present,18 China’s military 

scientists broke into three distinct schools of thought on military 

modernization; “the People’s War school,” “the Limited, HighTechnology War school,” and “the RMA school.”19

According to Michael Pillsbury, from the early to mid-1990s, 

individuals and groups within the three schools of thought publicly 

debated alternative paths for PLA modernization in an apparent 

campaign for recognition by the PRC leadership.20 Leaders of 

the PLA’s RMA school of thought sought to persuade the PRC 

leadership that China must quickly develop the capability to deter, 

counter, or defeat U.S. military capabilities. The group held that 

nonlinear modernization by leaps was the best path.21 Gradually, 

PLA strategists shifted their thinking from a “People’s War Under 

Modern Conditions” mindset toward “Local, Limited War Under 

High-Technology Conditions,” as articulated in 1993 by then PRC 

President Jiang Zemin. 

By 1996, public statements from PLA general offi cers and PRC 

leaders indicated a strong move away from that school of thought and 

toward the nonlinear RMA or counter-RMA22 approach to military 

modernization.23 American PLA scholars observing China’s military 

debates often opined that PLA writers were merely mimicking 

or “mirror-imaging” the U.S. RMA for their own purposes, but a 

closer examination reveals that the ideas espoused by many Chinese 

military scholars were indeed different from those driving the 

American military modernization. The following statement from 

Major General Xu Yanbin is characteristic of professional discussions 

about modernization of PLA in the 1990s.
319

We should not mechanically follow U.S. theory. As a military 

revolution is an inevitable outcome of scientifi c and technological 

progress and thus a general tendency, we should not try to meet a new 

challenge by running after others . . . We should try to create our own

superiority. . . . We should combine Western technology with Eastern 

wisdom. This is our trump card for winning a 21st century war.24

A “Transformation” for the PLA?

The American RMA and China’s study of trends in U.S. military 

operations during the 1990s sparked a period of critical thinking 

and intense publishing on alternative views in military affairs in the 

PRC. These developments resulted in unprecedented discussions 

and debate among the PLA cadre that prompted China’s senior 

leaders to evaluate PRC national military strategy, as well as PLA 

force structure and warfi ghting capabilities. By 1998, signifi cant 

policy, strategy, organizational, training, and operational reforms 

were underway within China’s defense establishment. However, 

despite the American focus on “transformation,” China’s senior 

leadership remained committed to carry forward the military 

doctrines of Mao and Deng. It would be another 5 years before the 

phrase military “transformation” would be publicly uttered by the 

Chinese president and CMC chairman, Jiang Zemin. In 2002, at the 

16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress, Jiang 

said, “Our national defense and army building should keep in line 

with the world’s military transformation.” According to the Nanfang 

Zhoumo news magazine, this was the fi rst time the term “military 

transformation” was used publicly by a leading member of the 

CCP.25

In the spring of 2003, China’s senior political leaders and 

military offi cers participated in a series of signifi cant meetings to 

encourage China’s own military transformation among the rank 

and fi le of the PLA and institutions that support it. These events 

served to promulgate a signifi cant evolution in strategic thinking by 

China’s senior leadership and establish slogans to properly motivate 

members of these communities.

At the National People’s Congress (NPC) and National Committee 

of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March, 

CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin said it was “necessary to push forward 

military transformation within Chinese characteristics.”26
320

In May, PRC President Hu Jintao attended the fi fth meeting of 

the CCP Political Bureau to study “trends in the development of 

the world’s new military transformation.” Members of the CCP 

Political Bureau heard lectures on military transformation from 

several Academy of Science speakers. Discussions at this event 

explored the history of the world’s six military transformations and 

the signifi cance of information technology for the sixth (current) 

military transformation.27 AMS scholar Pi Mingyong identifi ed and 

described the six major “military revolutions,” noting that all have 

been linked to “the rise and decline, the glory and humiliation of the 

Chinese nation.”28 Importantly, Pi argued that developing countries 

in a relatively “backward position” can catch-up with military 

revolutions. He cited the Japanese Meiji Reform, Turkey’s military 

revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and China’s “nuclear 

revolution” as examples. PLA General Liang Bi of the AMS also 

highlighted the signifi cance of information as the catalyst of the sixth 

transformation. He argued that: 

The extensive use of information technology can multiply the people’s 

capacity to fi nd out about the battlefi eld situation and enable the 

commanders to deploy an appropriate type of combat force, on an 

appropriate scale, at an appropriate time, in an appropriate location, and 

to carry out highly integrated combined operations in an appropriate 

manner.29

Several months before the CCP Political Bureau meeting at the 

Human Studies Forum of Chinese Scientists, Deputy Chief of the 

PLA General Staff Xiong Guangkai articulated details of the PLA’s 

new modernization path in a speech titled, “On the New Military 

Transformation.” Xiong stated that “the essence of the new military 

transformation is a refl ection of the information revolution in the 

military fi eld.”30

Jiang Zemin’s 2002 utterance of the phrase “military 

transformation” and the subsequent campaign of speeches on 

this topic by other senior leaders―to educate and indoctrinate 

PLA offi cers and enlisted personnel―were signifi cant events. The 

consistent use of the phrase “military transformation” served to 

acknowledge the success of efforts by the PLA’s RMA scholars in 

their campaign to break from China’s long adherence to “People’s 
321

War” doctrines and the PLA’s practice of linear, reactive approaches 

to force modernization. 

Some American observers of the Chinese military have argued 

that China’s ethnocentrism and bureaucracies are the principal 

reasons for the PLA’s lagging combat capabilities and resistance to 

adopting foreign ideas. Moreover, some contend that Chinese pride 

or ineffi ciency may be the reasons for the 5-year delay in Jiang’s use 

the term “transformation.” However, a more rigorous examination 

of these events, with an understanding of the cultural and political 

dynamics in China, produces alternative conclusions.

China’s reluctance to abandon the “People’s War” doctrines of the 

recent past probably has as much to do with the Marxist philosophy 

of “dialectical materialism” and the application of the scientifi c 

method to military affairs as it does with Chinese pride, “face,” or 

inertia.31 Decades of training, indoctrination, and belief meant that 

China’s military scholars and senior leaders probably could not 

be convinced to move away from “People’s War” until the laws of 

warfare that they had accepted as valid could be demonstrated to 

be “incorrect.” The capabilities employed by the U.S. armed forces 

in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and other U.S. military actions up to 

2002 validated the hypotheses of many Chinese RMA scholars and 

severely damaged the validity of “People’s War” for the 21st century. 

As the practical application of “People’s War” doctrines for modern 

warfare eroded in the mid-1990s, an opening was created for new 

military thinking in China. The historical and cultural grounding 

of shashoujian in Chinese society and strategic culture afforded the 

PRC leadership an opportunity to blend Chinese tradition with the 

requirements of the future, or, in the words of an ancient Chinese 

stratagem, to “borrow a corpse to raise the spirit.”32 With his term 

as president nearing an end, Jiang Zemin did not fail to seize this 

uncommon opportunity to secure his legacy as a visionary leader for 

the PLA.

Emergence of Shashoujian Within the PLA.

As noted by Johnston, the term shashoujian does not appear in 

the major published military writings of Mao Zedong.33 However, 

usage of the term within the PLA probably began in about 1955 

under Mao’s regime, when China embarked on its “two bombs and 
322

one satellite” program.34 Some Chinese articles published since 1997 

include historical references and comparisons of shashoujian with that 

program. Perhaps surprisingly, research for this chapter uncovered 

no comparisons of shashoujian with China’s “863 Program.”35

By the mid-1990s, Chinese military scholars and other senior 

offi cers were advocating the development of shashoujian for 

deterrence, and as a means to defeat a superior adversary in 

modern, high-tech warfare.36 In his research, Pillsbury identifi ed 

and translated more than 20 articles mentioning shashoujian and 

has commented on the rise of positions and ranks of the PLA cadre 

discussing shashoujian from the mid-1990s to 2000. According to 

Pillsbury, the earliest, recent references to shashoujian weapons by 

Chinese military writers appear in scholarly books37 as well as the 

AMS journal, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, in 1995.38 The Guang Jiao Jingkan

journal also reported on a military program to develop shashoujian

weapons in 1995.39 The emergence of the term shashoujian at that time 

suggests a link to China’s internal debates about military strategy 

and modernization. 

From 1995 to 1997, leading PLA scholars from the RMA school 

of thought appeared to be campaigning to convince senior PLA 

leaders and the core leaders of the CCP to initiate programs to cope 

with the impact of the American RMA. According to Pillsbury, this 

campaign was probably led by General Wang Pufeng, the fi rst senior 

PLA offi cer known to advocate the PLA’s use of shashoujian weapons 

to defeat of the U.S. military.40 Pillsbury also commented that he 

came to realize that the term was sensitive when he asked a senior 

PLA strategist about shashoujian and was told that the term could 

not be discussed.41 By early 1997, senior PLA offi cers (warfi ghters) 

were advocating the positions espoused by General Wang 2 years 

earlier.42

While some advocates for shashoujian may have come from the 

RMA school of thought, the historical and cultural signifi cance of 

the term to the Chinese means that in a modern context shashoujian

blends tradition (the old) with modernity (the new). Given its 

lineage, shashoujian is a term that probably holds appeal for PLA 

scholars within the People’s War and Local, Limited War schools of 

thought as well. For example, a statement by General Huang Bin of 
323

the PLA NDU demonstrated continuing emphasis on the People’s 

War maxim of protracted warfare in combination with shashoujian:

We can fi ght a war with them [the United States], they will not be able to 

continue the war after a while. Moreover, we also have our shashoujian.

43

Additional research will be necessary to demonstrate conclusively 

the relationships among the three schools of thought and the term 

shashoujian.

A Traceable Chronology of Documents.

Statements made by the Chinese military’s most senior offi cers 

after 1996 clearly encouraged the development of shashoujian as a new 

direction for the PLA. Pillsbury cited a March 1997 issue of Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue which featured an article by General Liu Jingsong, then 

president of the AMS. In the article, General Liu associated the classic 

Chinese stratagem of the “inferior defeating the superior” with the 

use of shashoujian weapons.44 Pillsbury’s examination of the journal 

also revealed that several articles containing discussions about 

shashoujian were presented by the commander of the Guangzhou 

Military Region, commander of the Chengdu Military Region, and 

commander of the PLA Navy. Pillsbury also obtained a copy of the 

Journal of the PLA National Defense University (junnei faxing junnei faxing) where 

General Liu discussed methods to successfully attack a U.S. aircraft 

carrier using shashoujian weapons.45

In April 1997, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Commander Liu Shunyao 

hinted at a change in PLA direction when he discussed the PLA’s 

need to “form, as soon as possible, a certain scale of shashoujian” 

and also said, “The prospect has emerged for the study of a 

tactical methodology aimed at defeating enemies possessing hightechnology armament.”46 In the same month, the restricted AMS 

journal Junshi Xueshi contained an article by Admiral Yang Yushu 

of the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) East Sea Fleet in which the author 

advocated the development of an information warfare system as a 

shashoujian weapon to defeat an enemy.47 A September 1997 article in 

a Hong Kong newspaper further indicated that changes were taking 

place within the PLA when it reported, “the State’s third generation 
324

leading collective calls on the armed forces to adapt themselves to 

the requirements of modern local warfare and to have their own 

shashoujian.”48

By 1998, advocacy of shashoujian programs for the PLA 

had reached the highest levels of the PLA and China’s civilian 

leadership. PRC National Defense Minister Chi Haotian disclosed 

in August that President Jiang Zemin had advanced “a general train 

of thought on China’s national defense and army modernization 

drive and outlined tasks for specifi c stages in the run up to the mid21st century . . .” Among those tasks disclosed by General Chi, the 

development of shashoujian is specifi cally called out. In discussing 

China’s military modernization plans, he said: 

We should learn and master advanced science and technology; keep 

abreast with the latest high-technology developments in the world; 

develop key technologies in the main; develop weaponry and equipment 

with a substantially higher scientifi c and technological standard; create 

some shashoujian; and explore a weaponry and equipment development 

path with Chinese characteristics.49

In February 1999, Vice Chairman of the CMC General Fu Quanyou 

also spoke of the need for shashoujian: 

To defeat a better equipped enemy with inferior equipment in the 

context of high-technology, we should rely upon high-quality personnel, 

superior operational methods; and high-quality shashoujian weapons.50

In May 1999, in the wake of the accidental NATO bombing of the 

Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Jiang Zemin stressed to the PLA 

leadership that “It is necessary to master, as quickly as possible, 

a new shashoujian needed to safeguard state sovereignty and 

security.”51

At roughly the same time, following the publication of a long 

article on the history of China’s “two bombs and one satellite” 

program written by Zhang Jingfu,52 Chinese Academy of Science 

(CAS) offi cials discussed the article and noted “that so long as it 

is needed for state security, they will work like those who did in 

earlier periods to develop the necessary items for the state as quickly 

as possible.” CAS scholar Yang Dongsheng, who took part in the 

historical research, stated that: 
325

China cannot be bullied by others at will. China must become strong 

through our own effort. Therefore, we must develop our own hightechnologies and produce some impressive and important things.53

In August 1999, Jiang Zemin repeated his call to the Chinese military 

for shashoujian weapons. This time he said:

We should set great store by stepping-up high-technology innovation 

for national defense purposes and by developing technology useable 

for both military and civil purposes as well, and we should also master 

several new shashoujian for safeguarding our national sovereignty and 

security as quickly as possible.54

In early March 2000, General Fu Quanyou echoed his own earlier 

statements on shashoujian, and also reinforced Jiang Zemin’s calls for 

shashoujian development at the National People’s Congress before a 

panel of PLA deputies. He said:

We must lose no time developing and building shashoujian, strengthening 

military theoretical research and overall planning for preparations 

for military struggles, making increased efforts to acquire scientifi c 

and technical knowledge, increasing the scientifi c and technological 

drilling of troops, and improving construction for war preparedness 

and the study and practice of task-specifi c methods of operation in 

order to comprehensively improve our army’s ability to fi ght combined 

operations under high-technology conditions.55

In August 2000, following a statement by the U.S. Government 

that the United States regards China as a “strategic competitor,” 

Jiang issued a memo to the senior PLA cadre. In the secret memo, 

Jiang Zemin rejected PLA requests for large budgetary increases. 

Instead, he specially ordered the development of shashoujian.

56 He is 

reported to have said:

. . . As a big nation, China should have procured some shashoujian

weapons in the struggle against global hegemony . . . As our internal 

resources are limited, we should concentrate them fi rst and foremost in 

areas of strategically vital importance to safeguard our national security, 

territorial integrity and to oppose hegemony in today and tomorrow’s 

world.57
326

A November 2000 leak to a Hong Kong newspaper validated this 

report, which claimed that Jiang gave direction on PRC preparations 

to deal with the Taiwan situation. In the context of the possibility of 

a U.S. intervention, he discussed the importance of shashoujian for 

China’s ability to maintain options for its strategy against Taiwan, 

stating:

The long delay of [resolution of] the Taiwan issue is detrimental to its 

peaceful solution. It is imperative to step-up preparations for a military 

struggle so as to promote the early solution of the Taiwan issue. To this 

end, it is necessary to vigorously develop some shashoujian weapons and 

equipment. In this way, we will always have the initiative in solving the 

issue in either a peaceful or nonpeaceful way.58

Shashoujian: A Secret Program?

In 2000, reports surfaced that China’s senior military offi cers 

and national leaders had indeed outlined a secret project to develop 

shashoujian (warfi ghting concepts and weapons).59 Details of the 

project (assigned the code number 998) were leaked in June 2000. Dr. 

Pillsbury discovered a February 2001 Jiefangjun Bao article (written 

by a bona fi de CCP Central Committee offi cial) that verifi ed the plan 

to develop shashoujian weapons.60 In February 2001, Wang Congbiao 

of the Policy Research Unit of the CCP Central Committee quoted 

Jiang Zemin as having said:

We should have a high regard for enhancing the innovation in advanced 

national defense technology, stressing the development of military/

civilian dual-use technology and mastering as quickly as possible the 

new shashoujian needed to safeguard our national sovereignty and 

security.61

The Chinese leadership probably established the 998 Project 

in response to their growing concerns about the implications of 

an interventionist U.S. military strategy, missile defense program 

decisions, and the on-going American RMA. It was formalized 

by a strategic resolution adopted at Beidaihe in early August 1999 

during an enlarged session of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central 

Committee.62 However, references to shashoujian in Chinese military 
327

writings and statements appear to indicate that preliminary work on 

this program could have begun as early as 1995. If so, China could be 

as many as 7 years into a shashoujian weapons acquisition program.

China’s 998 State Security Project has several components that 

respond to U.S. foreign policy decisions (including decisions to use 

force) and the development of new military capabilities.63 The 998 

Project calls for the PLA to “. . . accelerate the research, development 

and installation of new weapons . . . to resist U.S. hegemonism.”64 It 

is managed under the direction of the Political Bureau of the CCP 

Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. The 998 

Project Leading Group is reported to include the members shown 

in Figure 1. The work conferences supporting the 998 Project are 

directed by the four PLA General Staff Departments.65

(From left to right)

Jiang Zemin - Former PRC President, CMC Chairman

Hu Jintao - PRC President, CCP General Secretary, CMC Vice 

Chairman

WU Bangguo - Chairman, Standing Committee of the National 

People’s Congress

Cao Gangchuan - CMC Vice Chairman, Minister of National 

Defense

Guo Boxiong - Member, Political Bureau - CCP Central Committee. CMC Vice Chairman

Liu Jibin - Director, Commission on Science, Technology and 

Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).

Figure 1. The 998 State Security Project Leading Group.
328

The 122 (December 2) Project and 126 (January 26) Program: 

Components of a Shashoujian Research and Development Effort? 

In December 2000, Jiang Zemin announced that the CMC, the 

Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and the State Council had 

adopted a new “decision on the development of strategic weapons 

to meet the needs of the situation in the new period.”66 The decision 

is referred to as the “Resolution on the December 2 Project.” The 

objectives of the December 2 (122) Project are said to be to improve 

the combat effectiveness, counterattack capability, and “winning 

edge” of the PLA. These goals are to be achieved by developing 

a new generation of “strategic high-tech weapons” and “strategic 

nuclear weapons” and by “improving the readiness of PLA strategic 

weaponry.” At the meeting, Jiang Zemin is said to have announced 

the members of the 122 Project Leading Group, which reportedly 

includes Hu Jintao (as leader); Wen Jiabao and Chi Haotian (as 

deputy leaders); and members Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Wang 

Zuxun (Commandant of the AMS), Yang Guoliang, Huang Cisheng 

(Deputy Commander of the Second Artillery and Chief of Staff for 

Nuclear Weapons), Shen Binyi (Deputy Commander of the PLAN), 

Li Yongde (Deputy Commander of the PLAAF), and others.

China’s 126 Program was approved by CMC Chairman Jiang 

Zemin following a national conference on science, technology, and 

industry for national defense held in January 2000. The program 

focuses on the acceleration of China’s development and production 

of high-technology weaponry. According to a Chinese news source, 

the 126 Program is the second national-level program established 

for China’s development of military equipment. (China’s fi rst such 

program was the 863 Program established by Deng Xiaoping in 

March 1986). Under the 126 Program, China will develop six major 

projects within a period of 12-15 years. These projects are reported 

to include the development of an aerospace technological system, 

an electronic information technological system, a strategic defense 

technological system, a deep-level counterattack technological 

system, an optical laser technological system, and a nonconventional 

and conventional materials technological system.67 Under these six Under these six 

projects, 36 “theme projects” have been developed by expert groups, 
329

technology groups, and logistics groups established to support the 

126 Program.68

The 126 Program is said by a Chinese source to be regarded by 

the PLA as “a development program for the new century.” The 

program is overseen by PRC President Hu Jintao, with Vice Premier 

Wu Bangguo serving as the program leader. Wang Zhongyu, Cao 

Gangchuan, and Liu Jibin serve as deputy leaders of the program’s 

leading group.69 Interestingly, the members of this leading group are 

very similar to those in charge of China’s 998 Project.

Although the term shashoujian is not used in reference to the 

122 Project or the 126 Program, additional research is necessary to 

determine whether these initiatives are associated with or related to 

the 998 Project or shashoujian in any way.

Shashoujian and PLA Research, Development and Acquisition 

(RD&A).

China’s military-industrial sector is a large and complex 

network of PRC academic, civil, and military organizations. Some 

of these organizations are independent; others remain state-owned 

enterprises. Within this large network there are three principal 

organizations where Chinese military RD&A decisions are made. 

This smaller set of critical organizations includes the PRC State 

Council, the CMC, the PLA General Staff Department, and the 

Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National 

Defense (COSTIND).

At the direction of Jiang Zemin, a sweeping series of military 

reforms was initiated across China’s national defense establishment 

in 1998. In that year, the PLA’s General Armament Department 

(GAD) was established as a PLA General Staff department to manage 

and fund military RD&A plans. At the same time, the function and 

authority of COSTIND were examined, and the commission was 

reorganized and streamlined. If shashoujian weapons and tactics 

development are indeed components of a larger PRC state security 

project, as evidence suggests, it is highly likely that leaders and 

senior offi cials within the PRC State Council, CMC, PLA General 

Staff Department, and at COSTIND have addressed considerations 

and decisionmaking for these issues. All of these organizations are 
330

represented in the 998 State Security Project Leading Group.

In addition to the numerous calls for shashoujian made by China’s 

senior leaders, a number of various publications include statements 

about shashoujian in the context of PLA modernization efforts. These 

references occur mostly (beginning in 1998) in articles in Chinese 

military newspapers, such as Jiefangjun Bao, which are intended 

for a PLA audience. In many instances, these articles refer to the 

development of shashoujian weapons in an aspirational context. 

June 1998: “The PLA should stress both real war preparations and 

deterrence preparations by fi rst developing a number of deterrent 

shashoujian of a standard identical to that of an enemy’s as it did 

in the past when developing “two bombs and one satellite” and a 

nuclear submarine.”70

August 1998: “We must give priority to the development of 

defense-related research and high-tech weapons and equipment, 

concentrate resources on the tackling of key technologies, exert 

ourselves to tackle “bottlenecks” which prevent the improvement of 

our combat effectiveness, and strive to achieve major progress in key 

projects which will play an important part in the winning of future 

wars, so that our army will have a number of powerful shashoujian as 

quickly as possible.”71

April 1999: PLA scholar An Weiping observed that China’s 

shashoujian program should be responsive to China’s “one low and 

fi ve insuffi ciencies.” The “one low” refers to China’s low integration 

of information technology with armaments and equipment, 

while the “fi ve insuffi ciencies” are identifi ed as (1) high-power 

armaments, (2) weapons for launching attacks, (3) precision guided 

munitions, (4) reconnaissance, early warning, command and control, 

and (5) electronic armaments. The scholar recommended a focus on 

“key projects and development of our own shashoujian weapons . . . 

We should concentrate our resources on developing a number of 

shashoujian weapons with great deterrent power, thus making up for 

the insuffi ciencies of our armaments.”72

February 2000: Michael Pillsbury translated a Zhongguo Junshi 

Kexue article in which General Wang Ke, a member of the CMC and 

director of the PLA’s General Logistics Department, discussed three 

priority areas for military investment. The three areas General Wang 
331

identifi ed were defense infrastructure, education and training, and 

shashoujian weapons.73

June 2000: Party committees of various services and arms made 

meticulous efforts to organize the research and development and 

further improve measures related to weaponry development, 

particularly the development of shashoujian.74

June 2002: An article from Huajianbing Bao indicated that the 

CMC and the PLA’s four General Departments had approved the 

establishment of “several projects for shashoujian weapons.”75 The 

article also reported that “some shashoujian weapons have already 

been fi elded in units and have formed up combat capability . . . 

[while] others already have fi nal designs and are about to be issued 

to [Second Artillery Corps] units.”76 Further reporting in the article, 

if correct, seems to indicate a program featuring a signifi cant level of 

investment, effort, and dedication.

So as to put shashoujian weapons in the hands of units as soon as possible, 

numerous scientifi c and technological cadre of the Fourth Institute . . . 

spend nearly 200 days each year [performing operational research] . . . 

producing more than 10,000 technical reports and documents of various 

kinds to submit to leaders at all levels to use in their decisionmaking. 

Nearly 4,000 of their recommendations have been adopted by staff and 

research and development organizations, and as many as 10,000 diffi cult 

problems have been discovered and resolved. Science and Technology 

personnel have also completed more than 600 scientifi c research projects, 

of which eight received fi rst, second, and third class commendations 

as National Science and Technology Advancements, and 187 received 

awards as Military Science and Technology Advancements. Some of the 

research fi lled either military or national gaps.77

June 2003: In the course of innovation in military technology, 

vigorously developing critical technological equipment with 

independent intellectual property rights and strategic impact is 

an endeavor to forge shashoujian of our army for informationized 

warfare and to build our army’s modern operational system 

centering on informationization.78

These discussions about shashoujian weapons by no means 

indicate or prove that China has a secret shashoujian weapons RD&A 

program. However, it also cannot be proven that such a program does 

not exist. The examples of PLA references to shashoujian weapons in 
332

the context of military RD&A are provided to offer food for thought 

and perhaps a starting point for further research to examine these 

possibilities.

HOW MIGHT SHASHOUJIAN SATISFY CHINESE NATIONAL 

DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS?

As the previous discussion has shown, shashoujian is an element 

of Chinese strategic culture that infl uences military thinking and 

preparations within the PLA. If it has been formalized as a PRC 

state security program, shashoujian has signifi cant implications for 

the Chinese national defense establishment and also U.S. national 

security interests. The fi nal section of this chapter examines the 

implications of the PRC’s shashoujian concept as it relates to 1) 

Chinese views about modern warfare, 2) the PLA’s calculus for 

military assessments, and 3) the PLA’s developmental efforts to cope 

with inferiority.

A View of Warfare in the Early 21st Century―

Characteristics of Information Age Wars.

Chinese military scholars have dedicated great effort to study 

the change in the requirements of warfare from the mechanizationfi repower age to the information-fi repower era.79 As an example, 

Major General Wang Baocun, a leading PLA scholar on military 

strategy and an expert on information warfare, concluded in 1997 that 

ten defi ning features will characterize warfare in the informationfi repower era of the 21st century: 1) limited goals in confl icts; 

2) wars of short duration; 3) less damage; 4) larger battlefi elds 

and less density of troops; 5) transparency on the battlefi eld; 6) 

intense struggle for information superiority; 7) unprecedented 

force integration; 8) increased demands for command and control; 

9) strategic objectives achieved through precision, not mass; and, 

10) attacks on weaknesses, not strengths, of the enemy’s “combat 

system.”80

Interestingly, these characteristics represent strategic and 

operational objectives, centers of gravity (key points of strength or 

weakness), and opportunities for the PLA to seize the initiative in 
333

confl ict. Wang advocated the consideration of these features for the 

development of Chinese military strategy, warfi ghting methods, 

and the PLA’s transformation process. 

To be sure, it is diffi cult to know for certain whether General 

Wang’s ideas have been accepted by China’s senior leaders. 

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that such expert judgments 

about future warfare can infl uence PRC military strategy, warfi ghting 

methods, and the PLA modernization. General Wang’s judgments 

may also help China’s national defense community establish 

requirements that support strategy, policy, and the development of 

shashoujian (weapons and tactics). In this sense, the characteristics of 

future wars described by Wang (as well as those identifi ed by other 

PLA scholars) can reveal hints or cues about the focus and direction 

of China’s shashoujian programs for PLA watchers.

Shashoujian and Military Strategy―Using the Inferior to Defeat 

the Superior.

Mao Zedong: Historically, . . . absolute superiority is present at the end, 

but is rare at the beginning of a war or campaign.81

Deng Xiaoping: Even if we could modernize our military equipment in 

the next 10 or 20 years, compared to our enemies, our weapons would 

still be inferior. We are moving forward, but our enemies are not asleep 

either. Therefore, by that time, if we have to fi ght, we will still be the 

weak trying to defeat the strong.82

Jiang Zemin: At present, our army’s modernization standard is still 

incompatible with the need of fi ghting a modern war, this being a major 

contradiction faced by our army building. . . . our army still lags behind 

armed forces in developed countries in the West in terms of weapons and 

equipment, intelligence and reconnaissance, telecommunications and 

liaison, command and control, joint operations, logistics support and in 

other basic fi elds as well.83

Hu Jintao: High-tech developments have greatly facilitated new 

military changes in the world. . . . China must improve its research into 

the change so as to constantly improve national defense and military 

modernization.84

Hu Jintao: [China must]...achieve a leap-forward style of development 

in defense and army modernization.85
334

PRC leaders have recognized that the PLA has trailed behind 

foreign militaries in its ability to integrate science and technology 

with weapons and equipment―and, in this context, that the PLA 

is relatively inferior to advanced foreign militaries. For much of 

China’s pre-revolutionary history, the same can be said to have been 

true of China’s armies. Historically, Chinese forces emphasized and 

depended upon superior (and asymmetric) strategies and tactics to 

cope with the inferiority of weapons and equipment.86 This trend 

continues today inside the PRC.87 The emphasis on superior strategy 

and tactics is an important characteristic of Chinese strategic culture 

and has a signifi cant impact upon Chinese military thinking, despite 

the relatively recent (and certainly more visible) priority placed on 

introducing advanced military hardware into the PLA.

Although China’s leading military strategists and scholars 

recognize the relative inferiority of PLA weapons and hardware, 

it is important to note that this acknowledgment is not consistent 

with their judgments about China’s ability to prevail against a 

superior military adversary in an information age war. In fact, 

American academic reviews of Chinese military literature reveal 

that China’s best-known military scholars calculate that the PLA 

can prevail in an asymmetric confl ict against a superior military 

under the right conditions, despite the shortcomings of Chinese 

military hardware.88 For many American military strategists, this 

inconsistency is illogical and confusing, but the assertion is, in fact, 

quite logical and reconcilable from the Chinese perspective. Chinese 

strategic culture, modes of thinking, and the concept of shashoujian

consistently support the Chinese belief that the inferior can defeat 

the superior. The research of both Dr. Pillsbury and Lieutenant 

Colonel Mark Stokes fi rst identifi ed the linkage between shashoujian

and the Chinese inferior-superior stratagem.89

China’s robust community of military scholars has been working 

hard for more than a decade to study the new characteristics 

of modern warfare amidst the period of the so-called “sixth 

transformation” in military affairs. PLA scholars apply a holistic 

approach to the assessment of military capabilities, potential, and 

opportunities to seize initiative on the battlefi eld. This holistic view 

often is complemented by disciplined application of dialectical and 

relativistic reasoning. Using dialectical and relativistic approaches, 
335

they judge the military strength, weakness, and capability of the 

U.S. armed forces in comparison to those of the PLA. While rare 

among U.S. military analysts, dialectical and relativistic thinking 

is a defi ning characteristic of Chinese military science and strategic 

thinking. This important intellectual difference is precisely what 

enables PRC military scholars to rationalize (and believe in) the 

ability of the inferior to defeat the superior. Ancient and modern 

Chinese military literature is replete with examples of dialectical 

and relativistic reasoning that seeks to demonstrate this ability. 

This approach to military assessment is taught to offi cers at the 

PLA’s NDU and refl ected in the scholarship of AMS researchers. 

It is probably practiced by PLA forces in the fi eld during training 

exercises.

In 1995, Major Yu Guangning, an assistant researcher at the AMS, 

published an essay in a military journal that highlighted the historical 

signifi cance of dialectical thinking through his examination of 

differences between Chinese and Western approaches to geostrategic 

thinking. He also identifi ed four major differences between Chinese 

and Western geostrategic thinking:

China’s best known classical statesmen, strategists, diplomats, and 

even philosophers all favored treating war-making might dialectically. 

They had a whole set of dialectical war-making logic such as the weak 

defeating the strong, the inferior winning out over the superior, a 

standoff between weak and strong, and the conversion of weakness into 

strength. . . . We always seek to keep our opponents from bringing their 

might into full play, while strengthening ourselves through weakening 

our opponents. . . . In Western military history, the strongest military 

forces often do not win the fi nal victory. That is the case in the oft stated 

“winning the battle, but losing the war,” which is related to the West’s 

military thinking of controlling means and emphasizing might to the 

neglect of winning the war.90

Yu concluded that Western geostrategic thinking is an expansive 

“rivalry for superiority” with an emphasis on “technological might,” 

while China’s thinking values “balance” and stresses the importance 

of “strategy.” The impact of China’s traditional use of dialectical and 

relativistic thinking on matters of state is unmistakable in the writing 

of this PLA scholar.
336

The impact of China’s historical traditions and practices are 

also visible in PLA scholarly writings. Two PLA senior colonels 

highlighted these characteristics in their discussion about seizing 

combat initiative and using relative strengths against a superior 

enemy’s points of weakness.

It is natural that the core idea of our army’s operational doctrine for hightech conditions is deeply rooted in our army’s rich operational traditions. 

An overview of our army’s war history shows that, in most cases, our 

army was inferior to its enemies in terms of the overall strength and 

the quality of weapons and equipment. Apart from political factors, the 

main reason our army managed to defeat time and time again its strong 

enemies, Chinese or foreign, was because our army had reached higher 

standards in the art of war and operational guidance.91

Using a holistic approach and dialectical thinking, many PLA 

scholars assess military strengths and weaknesses with a focus 

on the “relative.” In an example that is characteristic in Chinese 

military literature, Colonel Yu Guohua, a lecturer at the PLA NDU, 

demonstrated the PLA’s consideration of the “relative” in its military 

assessment methodology, arguing that:

. . . the relative nature of our enemy’s strength and our own weakness is 

manifest in the fact that although the other side may be strong, they are 

not strong in all things; they have some weaknesses, and our side may be 

weak, but we are not weak in all things; we have some strength.92

Yu’s essay also showed the signifi cant infl uence of Chinese history 

and tradition on assessments of strength and weakness. In his 

paper, he recommended that the PLA turn weakness into strength 

through the use of classic stratagems: undermine the righteousness 

of the enemy’s cause, sow discord, create confusion in the enemy’s 

communications, cause the enemy to deplete war materials without 

achieving objectives, and target weaknesses (not the strengths) of the 

enemy’s war apparatus (systems, equipment, and weapons). In his 

essay, Yu anticipated what might be a common foreign criticism of 

his arguments and approach to reasoning―such as “Can examples 

of the inferior defeating the superior be identifi ed in the case of a 

modern, local high-tech war?” Yu’s answer seems astonishingly 

simplistic:
337

. . . so far, among the local high-tech wars that have occurred, there has 

never been an actual case of the weak defeating the strong or the inferior 

defeating the superior. There are two main reasons: One, the history 

of high-tech local war is relatively short; we have not seen all of its 

forms and shapes yet. Second, the high-tech local wars so far have been 

unique.93

Another example of the PLA’s use of a holistic approach to 

military assessments, which included a reference to shashoujian, 

appeared in a May 2000 newspaper article. According to the article, 

in 1999 the PLA NDU established a Center for the Study of Military 

Operations against Taiwan.94 Since then, this Center has conducted 

in-depth studies of tactics, campaigns, and other subjects and drawn 

lessons from the limited wars of the late 1990s, including the confl icts 

in Kosovo and Chechnya. The fi ndings from the Center’s work were 

forwarded to the CMC and PLA General Staff Department for 

consideration. Later, in April 2002, the PLA General Staff sponsored 

an all-army conference to hear an exchange of views among PLA 

scholars on campaigns and tactics for operations against Taiwan.95

An authoritative source from the PLA conference argued that some 

foreign methodologies for military assessments are incorrect because 

they are not holistic and fail to appreciate the virtue of dialectical 

and relativistic reasoning:

The foreign assessment that currently China does not have the ability 

to invade Taiwan is not correct . . . In comparing military strengths, not 

only the extent of modernization of one’s weaponry, but also the use of 

tactics, one’s mastery of weaponry, and the morale of the troops must 

be included. When all the factors, including a certain degree of U.S. 

involvement, are considered, the PLA can win the war without any 

doubt. Besides, the PLA has a shashoujian unknown to outsiders.96

While China’s military scholars approach military assessments 

holistically, employ dialectical and relativistic thinking, and often 

arrive at judgments favorable to the PLA, most Chinese military 

scholars also emphasize the PLA’s need to make up for having less 

(in terms of technology, weapons, and equipment, etc.). It is here 

that the Maoist philosophy (the value of man over material) comes 

into play. Increasingly, PLA scholars seem to straddle the issue and 

highlight the virtues of both sides. Their judgments often lead to 
338

three common recommendations. First, the PLA must continue to 

study and apply China’s rich tradition of superior strategy and art 

of warfare. Second, the PLA must progress rapidly in developing 

science and technology and in integrating advanced technology with 

the PLA’s weapons and equipment. Third is a defense or validation 

of the “inferior can defeat the superior” stratagem. Quotations from 

the writings of three Chinese military scholars demonstrate a range 

of views within the PLA.

Reverse the Balance of Combat Strength with Superior Strategy.

Western countries have made rapid progress in science and technology 

in modern and contemporary times. They enjoy an obvious scientifi c 

and technological superiority in wars. In order to win a victory in their 

wars for national liberation or war against aggression, some developing 

countries naturally have to count on their traditional superiority in the 

use of strategy for making-up for their technological weakness. This 

indicates that the use of strategy can reverse the balance of combat 

strength despite the varying technological standards of weapons and 

equipment.97

Employ Deadly Weapons.

We need to change our traditional way of thinking that we can win 

against superior forces by stressing tactics, but even more so by having 

shashoujian weapons.98

Develop New Equipment While Carrying Forward Tradition.

. . . we should speed-up the development of equipment for reconnaissance 

and early warning, the automation of air defense command and 

electronic warfare, and of shashoujian weapons for hard destruction 

of the enemy, to narrow the technology gap between ourselves and 

powerful enemies. While developing new technology, we should also 

pay close attention to drawing sustenance from our national culture, and 

inheriting and carrying forward our army’s tradition in being skilled at 

applying strategy, that is, as experts say: “Let thought and technology 

soar together.”99

The concept of shashoujian is attractive to the PLA’s warfi ghters 

and intellectuals regardless of whether they represent the PLA’s “old 
339

guard” or its “young turks.” Shashoujian is also appealing to China’s 

senior leaders who seek to motivate, professionalize, and modernize 

the PLA. Because it blends the traditional with the modern, the 

shashoujian concept does not threaten China’s legacy philosophy and 

doctrine, but it does allow an exciting way forward for the Chinese 

military in an uncertain period of transformation. For the PLA, in 

terms of military strategy, the shashoujian concept effectively bridges 

the divide between the past and the future.

Shashoujian and PLA Operational Art.

There has been a great deal of discussion in PLA literature about 

how and when weapons and tactics (including shashoujian) should be 

optimally employed against superior adversaries to achieve military 

objectives. Pillsbury discussed several of these “employment 

concepts” in his November 2001 report for the U.S. China Economic 

and Security Commission.100 Five specifi c methods are common in 

Chinese military writings: 1) identify and exploit weaknesses, 2) 

seize initiative through surprise, 3) employ extraordinary means, 4) 

attack vulnerabilities (key points/at certain moments), and 5) ensure 

survivability and counter-strike capability.

Identify and Exploit Weakness. According to Pillsbury, the Chinese 

believe that the successful employment of shashoujian against a 

superior adversary requires good intelligence and assessments 

of the adversary’s strategy, tactics, weapons, platforms, and 

systems.101 This is necessary to identify the centers of gravity 

(weaknesses) within the enemy’s military structure. Once strengths 

and weaknesses have been identifi ed and assessed, the strengths 

can be avoided, and the weaknesses (particularly key nodes) can 

be targeted for attack using shashoujian (weapons and methods). In 

1996, a passage from a Zhongguo Junshi Kexue essay highlighted the 

need to correctly identify and fatally attack structural weaknesses 

(key nodes supporting military operations) while avoiding enemy 

strengths. Notably, the recommendation to focus on striking 

weaknesses is complemented by recommendations to employ other 

shashoujian methods, including surprise and precision targeting.

. . . in operations under high-tech conditions, we must not only focus 

on annihilating the enemy’s combat effectiveness, but we must, fi rst of 
340

all, pay attention to and place stress on striking nodes of the enemy’s 

operational structure. With regard to operational guidance, we must try 

our best to fi nd out in good time the structural weaknesses of the enemy’s 

operational system, including the essential weak links of the enemy’s 

whole national infrastructure which supports the enemy’s operations; 

then we can use precision guided weapons, deep striking forces, and 

special operational forces to swiftly bypass the enemy’s strong nodes, 

skillfully direct our fi repower to enemy’s weak links, and give it a fatal 

strike. . . . It is necessary to realize the combination of mobility with 

fi repower and shock attack at a higher level, and concentrate operational 

effectiveness in a decisive time and at a decisive place to attack decisive 

spots and to strike at the enemy’s critical part.102

 In 1999, the Lanzhou Military Region Headquarters conducted 

studies of “local wars of the 1990s.” A Jiefangjun Bao editorial about 

the study effort made some revealing comments concerning the 

PLA’s needs and requirements for shashoujian, calling for 

. . . prioritizing and slanting our manpower and fi nancial resources 

in an effort to develop a few world-class and directed shashoujian for 

an extreme deterrent against a strong enemy. . . . We need to intensify 

our asymmetrical combat preparations aimed at enemy weak points. 

We need to counter enemy asymmetrical weapons with our own 

asymmetrical countermeasures. A strong enemy with absolute 

superiority is certainly not without weakness that can be exploited 

by a weaker side that fi nds the weakness of the stronger one and [at 

the same time] striking larger weaknesses with smaller strengths . . 

. [we need to be] able to take a certain initiative by making a small 

move that would affect the overall situation. So our military combat 

preparations need to be more directly aimed at fi nding tactics to 

exploit the weaknesses of a strong enemy.103

Seize Initiative Through Surprise. For the Chinese, operational 

surprise is an essential condition for an inferior force to seize initiative 

and achieve victory in combat against a superior adversary. It is fi rst 

necessary to keep secret some shashoujian weapons and tactics (others 

are made known for the purpose of deterrence) and to prevent an 

adversary from knowing the ways and means of shashoujian strikes. 

To maximize the effect of such strikes the PLA will also engage an 

adversary in conditions when attacks are not expected. In these 

circumstances, the PLA’s combat effectiveness can also benefi t from 

the shock effect of shashoujian strikes. Inversely, infl icted damage 
341

and the shock effect of shashoujian strikes severely impact the ability 

of the adversary to observe, orient, decide, and act. In this sense, 

surprise also delays and degrades the combat effectiveness of the 

superior adversary.

. . . we should not fi ght with the enemy in a way anticipated by the 

enemy, in a time and in a place that the enemy are expecting. Only in this 

way will we be able to change inferiority into superiority, and passivity 

to activity, and thus win the initiative in conducting operations.104

Employ Extraordinary Means. Chinese military operations 

researchers believe that the use of secret, deceptive, or otherwise 

unorthodox methods (stratagems, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures) that are unknown to an adversary can signifi cantly aid the 

employment of shashoujian weapons. The use of such extraordinary 

means for attacks with conventional, nuclear, and shashoujian

weapons can transform weakness into strength by generating 

shock and inducing chaos and paralysis in the forces of a superior 

adversary. In this context, tactical surprise (the use of unorthodox 

and/or unanticipated methods) is distinctly different from strategic 

surprise (in the context of time, location and conditions). Both forms 

of surprise are typically viewed by PLA operations researchers as 

force multipliers.

The key principle of the stratagem of prevailing over the enemy with 

extraordinary means is that it is necessary, on the basis of having technical 

shashoujian [methods] to make surprising uses of such weapons when the 

opponent is not psychologically or materially prepared at all.105

Everyone knows that shashoujian weapons can be used surprisingly 

effectively at a certain time, place and under certain conditions, but these 

shashoujian weapons in turn require rational combinations with other 

weapons.106

Attack Vulnerabilities. In 2001, a PLA researcher examined two 

U.S. military operational incidents in an effort to identify lessons of 

value for military tactics development. The researcher highlighted 

the “gray critical states” (what other Chinese military scholars have 

called “defi nite blind spots” or “dead zones”107) of two U.S. military 

platforms: the U.S. Marine Corps’ MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and 
342

the USS Kittyhawk aircraft carrier.108 In December 2000, an MV-22 

crashed during a night training mission. The cause of the crash was 

investigated and found to be the result of a rapid vertical descent that 

created unstable airfl ow. This occurred in the aircraft’s transition 

from horizontal to vertical fl ight. In another instance, in October 

2000, USS Kittyhawk was participating in a joint military exercise 

with elements of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and 

conducting underway replenishment operations when two Russian 

Sukhoi-27 fi ghter aircraft overfl ew the deck of the carrier at very low 

altitude. The PLA operations researcher concluded that:

The crash of the tilt-rotor craft MV-22 Osprey and the penetration into the 

USS Kittyhawk aircraft carrier’s defense zone have shown that dangerous 

critical gray states exist in both high-tech weaponry systems and modern 

joint combat operation processes. We ought to earnestly study it [critical 

gray states] to get to the heart of the problem and discover measures 

to deal with this problem. Only by doing so can we transform this 

contradiction into something benefi cial to us and enable us to defeat the 

enemy.109

Coping with U.S. aircraft carriers is a common topic of 

examination by Chinese military analysts. Dr. Pillsbury was among 

the fi rst to identify the specifi c interest of PLA operations researchers 

in determining the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft carriers.110 A number 

of articles explore strategies and tactics that Chinese military 

researchers believe might permit the PLA to effectively deter, 

deny, or destroy an aircraft carrier.111 A 2001 Junshi Wenzhai article 

highlighted the use of combined attacks that employ asymmetric 

measures such as: “sea mine emplacement, timely jamming, and 

electronic confusion, submarine ambush, focused surprise attack 

with guided missiles, and [other] raids which take the enemy by 

surprise.”112 In 2002, another article highlighted fi ve shashoujian

weapons that could be successfully employed in operations against 

U.S. aircraft carriers:

. . . the aircraft carrier has an immense body like an island, leaving it 

basically no hiding ground on the vast seas, and no way to evade enemy 

reconnaissance and tracking. Aircraft, submarines, anti-ship missiles, 

torpedoes, and mines are the fi ve major killers the aircraft carrier must 

face.113
343

The article highlighted the utility of advanced mines, citing their 

unanticipated effectiveness against the U.S. Navy during Operation 

DESERT STORM when USS Tripoli and USS Princeton suffered 

signifi cant damage from mine explosions.

These examples are characteristic of many contained in Chinese 

military writings. They serve as clear indicators that PLA analysts are 

carefully studying the operational vulnerabilities of U.S. weapons, 

platforms, and military systems. The identifi cation and discussions 

about the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the U.S. armed forces 

reveal a key part of PLA’s systematic effort to develop operational 

methods to counter technologically superior adversaries in a future 

war.114

Ensure Survivability and Counter-Strike Capability. The Chinese 

believe that shashoujian (in the context of weapons, platforms, 

systems, and methods) must remain denied to intelligence 

collection, both before and after use in combat, to ensure the 

effectiveness of strikes as well as the survivability of shashoujian 

units and equipment. Deception, concealment, and mobility all 

help to avert the opportunity to mitigate against shashoujian strikes. 

These practices also minimize the likelihood of surprise (effective 

preemptive attacks) against shashoujian units and equipment. For the 

Chinese, shashoujian forces must serve as a credible deterrent and an 

effective tool in preemption, but must also be able to survive initial 

attacks by a superior adversary to ensure the PLA’s ability to achieve 

victory through devastating counterstrikes.

. . . we must guarantee that our strategic units still have nuclear 

counterattack and retaliation strengths even after receiving several 

attacks. China has already formed a network of strategic nuclear 

weapons using land-based fi ring (from deep wells and underground 

tunnels), mobile fi ring (from strategic highways and exclusive railway 

lines), and sea fi ring (from nuclear submarines).115

The strategic missile nuclear submarine is the shashoujian of the 

Chinese navy. It is characterized by a large cruising radius, broad 

operations area, good stealthiness, strong mobility, and high speed. 

In coming wars against aggression, a nuclear submarine will be a 

mobile and stealthy missile base, striking after the enemy has struck, 

to make a surgical fatal blow against an enemy.116
344

Effects of Shashoujian Strikes.

In addition to PLA discussions about methods, Chinese military 

scholars also frequently discuss the effects of shashoujian strikes. 

These effects include: deterrence, decapitation, blinding, paralysis, 

and disintegration.

Deterrence. According to China’s ancient strategists, the best 

military leader wins his objectives without resorting to warfare. 

This virtue is still respected and practiced in the PRC today and 

directs emphasis on psychology (through strategy, deterrence, and 

negotiation) over armed confl ict.117 Most Chinese military writing 

on shashoujian weapons includes discussion of psychological 

warfare and the requirement for credible deterrence. Frequently, 

PLA scholars characterize China’s strategic missile forces -including 

the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps and, increasingly, the PLA Navy’s 

strategic submarine fl eet―as shashoujian forces.118 It is, therefore, 

apparent that China regards its nuclear forces as shashoujian because 

of their psychological deterring effect and overwhelming destructive 

power. The missions and methods of both the Second Artillery Corps 

and the PLAN strategic submarine fl eet include requirements for 

survivability and counter-strike capability.119 Moreover, PRC leaders 

judge these elements of the PLA to possess the ability to decapitate, 

paralyze, disintegrate, and blind (e.g., through electromagnetic 

pulse) the most powerful adversary that China might face in confl ict. 

This belief is the basis for China’s declared deterrence strategy and 

nuclear weapons program.

Appropriately developing the military deterrent threat force required by 

an active defense policy, such as a limited and effective nuclear force, and 

constantly developing air force, space forces, elite armed forces, and the 

overall people’s war waging capability, we will possess a shashoujian that 

will leave the enemy trembling; this is the basis of China’s intimidation 

psychological war.120

Despite the focus of this quotation on nuclear weapons, it is 

important to reiterate the earlier point that PLA scholars value the 

signifi cant deterring power of conventional shashoujian weaponry.121

As previously discussed, Chinese military researchers conclude that 

mobile ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, sea mines, and torpedoes all 
345

serve as means to deter U.S. air and naval forces from entering into 

a military engagement with the PLA.

Decapitation. In the traditional sense, the defeat of an adversary 

by a single fatal strike or “death blow” is the intended outcome 

of a shashoujian strike. Ideally, such a strike is executed with 

foreknowledge. It comes deceptively and swiftly, and without any 

perceptible indication or warning to alert the enemy. If employed 

perfectly, a shashoujian strike kills the adversary instantly, without 

the victim ever seeing it coming. The grim result is fi nal and 

irreversible. In a discussion about the PRC nuclear weapons policy 

one PRC analyst said,

Enlightened by the Iraq war, in waging war against Taiwan in the future, 

the PLA is considering applying “decapitation action” against the leading 

elements of Taiwan independence, together with precision lightning 

strikes on Taiwan’s major military, economic, and political targets.122

Blinding, Paralysis, and Disintegration. As in martial arts (specifi cally 

quanfa) and the medicinal practice of acupuncture, pressure point 

warfare against key nodes is intended to have debilitating systemic 

effects within a military structure or organization. PLA strategists 

often discuss the importance of conducting shashoujian strikes on 

critical infrastructure that supports military operations. Some targets 

frequently identifi ed by Chinese military scholars include command 

and control centers and networks, early warning and intelligence 

systems, remote sensing platforms (specifi cally unmanned aerial 

vehicles and reconnaissance satellites), and military logistics systems. 

PLA scholars view these systems as operational dependencies―the 

relative weaknesses of a superior enemy―and as more vulnerable 

to attack than the relative strengths (weapons and platforms) 

of a superior adversary. Effective shashoujian strikes on the key 

nodes of a superior adversary can cause paralysis and initiate the 

disintegration of a superior force. In the minds of Chinese operational 

research experts, these effects can enable the inferior to overcome the 

superior by transforming the PLA’s weakness into strength and the 

adversary’s strength into weakness. In an authoritative PLA NDU 

document, two editors highlighted the importance of “vital points” 

attacks on military systems to achieve “blinding, paralyzing, and 

lethal” effects. 
346

Attacks on vital points in the enemy’s systems should take as their main 

targets three basic links in the enemy’s information systems; namely, 

sources from which the enemy probes for information, information 

channels, and information processing centers. The sources from which 

the enemy probes for information are the “eyes and ears” of the enemy’s 

combat operations system. The information channels are the system’s 

“nerve centers,” and the information processing centers are its “brains 

and heart.” It is not diffi cult to see that these three basic links are key 

links, which assure that an information system, and even an entire 

system of combat operations, can operate normally. Attacks on these 

three basic links in an enemy’s information systems should be part of a 

single, coordinated whole. Through “blinding, paralyzing, and lethal” 

actions against the enemy’s combat operations system, these attacks 

create conditions favorable for decisive combat. . . . By striking directly 

at the “brains, heart, and nerve centers” of the enemy’s systems, this 

method paralyzes powerful troop formations and makes them collapse 

without being attacked.123

In another essay, two PLA senior colonels explained the 

importance of dominance across the electromagnetic spectrum to 

create chaos for an adversary in modern warfare. They characterized 

electronic warfare as an “intangible power on the modern 

battlefi eld.”

Electronic warfare has obscured the demarcation line that marks the 

beginning of an engagement and [EW] has become an intangible power 

on the modern battlefi eld. Whichever side loses in an electronic war will 

be reduced to blind and deaf, so its weapons will be disabled, and it 

will lose its initiative in battle or a campaign or even a whole strategic 

situation.124

PLA Major General Dai Qingmin has discussed the critical role 

of information warfare as an element of electronic warfare to deny 

critical information to an adversary.

Integrated network-electronic warfare uses electronic warfare to disrupt 

the opponent’s acquisition and forwarding of information. It uses 

computer network warfare to disrupt the opponent’s processing and 

use of information. And it makes integrated use of electronic warfare 

and computer network warfare to form up overall, combined power to 

paralyze an opponent’s information systems.125
347

In an interview about U.S. dominance of the electromagnetic 

spectrum in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Dai observed:

. . . the United States used the space-based strategic-class reconnaissance 

advanced warning and positioning system with very high resolution, 

Airborne Warning and Control System planes, unmanned aircraft, other 

campaign-class information systems, all types of sensors and other 

tactical-class information systems to conduct round-the-clock continuous 

reconnaissance on Iraq, and provide real-time information about the 

targets to U.S. and British special forces and ground forces, thereby 

considerably raising the hit rate. To the U.S. troops, the battleground was 

“crystal clear,” and the battle situation was “in full view.” But because 

the other side did not have complete reconnaissance positioning system 

of all classes, it could not see clearly and even was completely blind 

about what the other side was doing; to them, the battleground was 

“shrouded” with heavy “battle fog.”126

From a defensive perspective, several strategies to minimize 

the impact of an adversary’s high-technology advantage in warfare 

were proposed by Sun Zian in 1995. This scholar identifi ed the 

following as key areas for PLA strategy development: employing 

long-range interception weapons, maintaining communications 

during warfare, maintaining secrecy, exploiting intelligence derived 

from commercial channels, conducting saturation ballistic missile 

strikes against key nodes, ensuring camoufl age and dispersal of 

equipment, deceiving the enemy with false targets, jamming enemy 

targeting systems, and enhancing the mobility of existing weapons. 

He also noted that other factors can minimize an enemy’s high-tech 

advantage, including seasonal and weather factors and terrain.127

In summary, shashoujian is an important concept for the Chinese 

military because it impacts thinking on military strategy, weapons 

acquisition programs, and also the PLA’s warfi ghting methods. The 

stratagem that the “inferior” can overcome or defeat “the superior” 

is a separate concept that is also an important element of Chinese 

strategic culture. However, the two concepts are linked because 

shashoujian (weapons and tactics) make valuable contributions to 

support the stratagem (as shashoujian can serve as both the ways and 

the means by which an inferior military can defeat a more powerful 

military). However, it is important to emphasize that, for China, the 

question is not whether whether the weak can overcome the strong, but the weak can overcome the strong, but how. 
348

This seems the critical question being considered by contemporary 

Chinese military strategists and PLA analysts of foreign military 

capabilities. For the Chinese, shashoujian is not necessarily a “silver necessarily a “silver 

bullet” that automatically brings victory in warfare. The Chinese 

seem to believe that shashoujian will assure victory against a superior 

adversary only if used appropriately, in the context of the correct 

strategy, under the proper conditions, and at optimal moments. The 

Chinese also recognize that superior adversaries can also possess 

and employ shashoujian weapons and tactics that can force a weaker 

enemy to capitulate, as the U.S. armed forces have done on two 

separate occasions in wars against Iraq.

CONCLUSIONS

China’s history and traditions profoundly infl uence the thinking 

of China’s leaders and senior military offi cers. Ancient Chinese 

history, as well as more recent experiences and observations, are 

guiding internal PLA debates about strategy, methods, and the 

development of new weapons and military equipment. In these 

debates, China’s military scholars are also reexamining philosophical 

issues, such as Mao Zedong’s emphasis upon the relative value of 

strategy and methods (man) versus new weapons, platforms, and 

systems (material). Practical matters, such as the applicability of 

traditional approaches versus the modern methods and others, are 

also being considered by scholars, particularly at the AMS and the 

PLA NDU.

For China, the initial years of the 21st century will serve as 

an interesting and appropriate period of refl ection, examination, 

reexamination, and experimentation where old and new ideas 

compete―and sometimes mix―to drive the development of the PLA. 

Such is the case for shashoujian as it relates to PRC military strategy, 

methods (doctrine), and the PLA’s transformation campaign. While 

China’s leaders seek to rapidly improve both the PLA’s warfi ghting 

methods and the quality of weapons and equipment through 

resource reallocations and the acquisition of shashoujian (weapons), 

PRC military strategy will likely remain asymmetric vis-à-vis the 

United States. China’s long tradition of minimizing the relative 

superiority of adversaries while employing effective stratagems and 
349

tactics will also endure. The PLA’s transformation is underway, but 

it will take time. The infl uence of ancient Chinese military concepts 

and stratagems will likely remain strong within the PLA throughout 

this transformation. In the minds of China’s military strategists 

and, increasingly, of the PRC leadership, the shashoujian concept is 

not only compatible, but also potentially catalytic for current and 

emerging military strategy and for the PRC’s ambition to develop 

new capabilities to credibly deter, and if necessary defeat, military 

superpowers. At a minimum, shashoujian serves as a function to help 

Chinese military offi cials prioritize a select set of military programs 

for special funding and rapid development to guide China’s military 

modernization program.

Shashoujian holds signifi cance for Chinese military affairs, 

strategic culture, and military preparations. A spike in the usage of 

the term by PLA scholars in the mid-1990s indicates that shashoujian

was an element or outgrowth of the PLA’s post-DESERT STORM 

debates over military strategy. In 1995, references to shashoujian

began appearing in China’s most authoritative military journal, 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue. By 1997, numerous references to and 

indications of PLA discussions about shashoujian appeared in 

other signifi cant PRC military journals and in PLA newspapers, 

particularly in Jiefangjun Bao. From 1996 to 1998, China’s senior 

military offi cers, including PRC military region commanders and 

PLA service chiefs, wrote a series of PLA articles about shashoujian. In 

1998, PRC Defense Minister Major General Chi Haotian said publicly 

that President Jiang Zemin had advanced a new line of thinking on 

military modernization and had specifi cally called out the need for 

shashoujian. During the same year, China’s military RD&A system 

began to implement an unprecedented reform that included the 

restructuring of COSTIND and the establishment of the PLA’s GAD. 

From 1999 to 2000, several of China’s most prominent senior leaders 

and military offi cers undertook a campaign of speeches about 

military preparations that included slogans calling upon the PLA to 

develop shashoujian (weapons and tactics). By the summer and fall 

of 2000, several Chinese newspapers reported that Jiang Zemin had 

ordered the creation of the 998 State Security Project, a secret project 

to develop shashoujian. And, fi nally, in 2002 Jiang Zemin advocated 

a “transformation” with shashoujian weapons for the PLA.
350

During this remarkable period, the shashoujian concept appeared 

to be a response to changes in military strategy. It also infl uenced 

PRC leadership decisions about reform within the PLA, military 

transformation, plans for the development of new weapons, and 

tactics tailored for asymmetric warfare.

Despite the traceable chronology of events over a period of 5 

years and the relevance of the shashoujian concept to the classic 

stratagem of “overcoming the superior with the inferior,” there has 

been surprisingly limited study of shashoujian in the United States. 

With the exception of Pillsbury’s groundbreaking discoveries, the 

PLA’s unusual focus on shashoujian has gone largely unnoticed and 

uninvestigated by the American PLA-watching community. Perhaps 

a more comprehensive examination of open source materials from 

and on the Chinese military is necessary. 

At present, due to resource limitations and prioritization, the 

U.S. Government directs FBIS translation of only selected articles 

from Jiefangjun Bao, with virtually no full-text translations of other 

PLA (military region or PLA service) newspapers, military journals, 

or books specifi c to Chinese military affairs.128 Absent the specifi c 

direction and resources from various U.S. Government communities 

of interest―to shift the emphasis of FBIS translation work to perform 

these tasks―FBIS was quite understandably unable to recognize 

the signifi cance of shashoujian―that shashoujian is more than a mere 

idiom or metaphor for those discussing it within China’s national 

defense establishment. 

For U.S. policymakers, analysts, and academics, routine and 

comprehensive coverage and translation of publicly available 

Chinese military literature is important for several reasons. First, 

an increasing amount of published information is becoming 

available from authoritative Chinese military sources, including 

the AMS, the PLA NDU, and other military research institutions. 

Importantly, these documents appear to be precisely where new 

ideas, theories, and concepts are initially raised within the PLA. 

Moreover, the reporting in Chinese military newspapers, such as 

the popular Jiefangjun Bao, tends to lag from 6 to 12 months behind 

the appearance of key issues in the PLA’s more prominent military 

journals and full-length books. 
351

Second, surprising as it may seem, few American PLA watchers 

can read Chinese well enough to perform primary source research 

or are trained with machine language translation and other tools. 

They remain largely dependent upon Chinese military literature 

in translation. Third, failure to keep up with developments 

in the Chinese national defense establishment by exploiting 

primary sources (especially PRC military journals and books) can 

prevent identifi cation of key indicators of change―or warning of 

developments that are of interest to U.S. policymakers. In a worst 

case scenario, the failure to monitor Chinese military literature could 

be a contributing factor in a future miscalculation or intelligence 

failure.

While the United States and China both conduct military 

assessments of their own and each other’s armed forces and 

military operations, they reach starkly contrasting conclusions.129

In a cautionary 1996 report for the Department of Defense Offi ce 

of Net Assessments, Pillsbury wrote of PRC judgments about U.S. 

military strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities, concluding that 

these judgments could lead to “dangerous misperceptions” with 

potentially catastrophic consequences.130 An example of such a 

“dangerous misperception” is found in a PLA judgment made about 

the performance of the Yugoslav army during NATO’s ALLIED 

FORCE operation in Bosnia, which stated that

From the outstanding performance of the Yugoslav army in resisting 

NATO airstrikes, we can see that there are great prospects for overcoming 

a superior enemy with an inferior force in a high-tech war.131

While the deception and denial campaign of the Yugoslav army 

may have been effective against NATO air forces, it seems a leap for 

the PLA military scholar to conclude that the Yugoslav army was 

successful in overcoming NATO’s superior forces. 

The contrast between U.S. and PRC assessments and judgments 

is troubling because these views can lead either nation toward 

miscalculation and possibly military disaster. It is dangerous for 

China’s leaders to believe that the PLA can prevent a confl ict or 

prevail in a military campaign against a superpower such as the 

United States with “superior strategy,” despite the generational 
352

gaps between the United States and China in hardware and in the 

integration of science and technology with military equipment. The 

notion that China’s leadership could decide to order a shashoujianequipped PLA into what would almost certainly be a disastrous 

confl ict with the United States is, indeed, very troubling. 

These grim possibilities are the fundamental reasons why PLA 

watchers must consider dozens of new research questions concerning 

the implications of shashoujian for PLA organizational reform, 

warfi ghting capability and readiness, and PLA professionalization. 

In addition, researchers should carefully study the impact of the 

shashoujian concept on strategic issues, including Chinese negotiation 

strategy, PRC deterrence and military coercion theory, China’s 

propensity to use force for confl ict resolution, and escalation issues.

When considered in the context of current Chinese threat 

perceptions concerning the United States, PRC assessments of 

PRC and U.S. military capabilities and vulnerabilities, and the 

potential for miscalculation, the shashoujian concept and weapons 

development programs hold disturbing implications for American 

defense strategy and military operations in the Asia-Pacifi c region. 

Shashoujian is a concept that merits watching as it continues to 

be incorporated into the lexicon, weapons acquisition plans, and 

practices of the PLA.

Can China successfully develop and use shashoujian to enhance 

its position as an inferior military force? On the one hand, it can 

be argued that leaders within the PLA think so and will persevere 

to achieve these objectives. It is also evident that increasingly 

sophisticated research is being performed and published at the 

AMS. Similarly, the PLA offi cer corps is becoming more professional 

as a result of improvements in PRC and PLA education programs. 

Operational training of PLA offi cers and enlisted personnel is also 

more realistic and challenging than in the past. On the other hand, 

China’s military is rising from a low base of professionalism and 

capability, and has few discernible areas of world-class excellence. 

China has also had a long history of military inferiority and has 

traditionally trailed the world’s leading militaries in the development 

and integration of cutting-edge military hardware. The PRC defense 

industrial base, although reforming, remains a complex, corrupt, and 

ineffi cient network of organizations where personal relationships 
353

continue to heavily infl uence important investment decisions and 

outcomes. Thus, the outlook for the PLA’s successful development 

and employment of shashoujian is uncertain.

Dr. Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attaché to China and 

long-time scholar of the Chinese military, examined a similar set of 

questions in a 1998 essay titled “Chinese Military Potential.”132 In 

his essay, he asked and answered the question, “Can the Chinese 

[PLA] get it all together? . . . The short answer is probably not.” 

But Wortzel added an important caveat in the form of a case study: 

another possible scenario. He noted that in 1984 Zhang Ruimin took 

over China’s leading producer of home appliances, the collectively 

owned and failing Haier Group, and by 1989 had turned the failing 

collective into one of China’s most successful companies. Zhang 

incorporated world-class “best practices” in leadership, management, 

and production; established an effective quality control system; 

dealt out incentives and penalties to govern employee performance; 

and enhanced the company’s systems engineering and integration 

capabilities. Wortzel concluded that if the PLA could similarly 

attract and properly assign individuals with these talents, then the 

PLA could achieve its military potential―as Wortzel claims the PLA 

has already done for its M-class missile programs, as well as its sea 

and air launched cruise missile programs.

Whether the PLA can develop and effectively use shashoujian is 

perhaps less important than whether China’s senior leaders believe 

in the possibility, and whether the PLA would attempt to defeat the 

superior with the inferior, plus a few “assassin’s maces.”

Senior American policymakers should concern themselves with 

and watch out for the following elements or combinations of elements 

to counter shashoujian and the stratagem of the ability of an “inferior 

defeating the superior”: 1) the possibility of China presenting a 

military operational concept that takes the United States by surprise, 

2) weapons systems and infrastructure that can enable the PLA to 

implement the operational concept, and/or 3) a strategic or tactical 

context in which the successful use of this operational concept is 

decisive.

This chapter is an effort to address these important issues. 

However, these and many other questions about shashoujian and 

its impact on the PLA merit serious attention and dedicated study 
354

by PLA watchers in academia and government. It is hoped that this 

research will complement a larger foundation of existing work―

upon which to build a stronger, more robust base of knowledge.

CHAPTER 10 - ENDNOTES

1. Dr. David Shambaugh has led other efforts to encourage greater collection 

and sharing of Chinese military literature by the academic community and the 

U.S. Government, in part by establishing the Chinese Documents Center, a library 

of Chinese military publications at The George Washington University’s Gelman 

Library.

2. Conversation with Mr. Jeffrey Dyrek, FBIS Customer Service Offi ce, August 

21, 2003.

3. Some FBIS interpretations include: assassin’s mace, decisive weapons, 

killer mace, killing mace, killing sword, killer weapons, leap ahead weapon, leap 

forward weapon, magic weapon, new type weapons, powerful weapons, silver 

bullets, sure-to-win striking power, trump card weapons, and vital acupuncture 

point weapons.

4. Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center Online: http://edu.ocac.gov.tw/

taiwan/kungfu/e/5123-3.htm.

5. See Michael Pillsbury, Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions: The Implications for 

DoD, prepared for the Offi ce of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 1996; Michael 

Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 1997; Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for 

the United States, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies 

Institute, 1999; Alistair Iain Johnston, “Toward Contextualizing the Concept of 

a Shashoujian (Assassin’s Mace),” unpublished manuscript, August 2002; Dennis 

Blasko, “PLA Ground Forces Lessons Learned: Experience and Theory,” Laurie 

Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 61-89.

6. Discussion with Michael Pillsbury in August 2003. Also see “Security 

Issues: Strategic Perceptions.”

7. See “The History of Kung Fu” at http://www.prodigymartialarts.com/wing_

chun.htm.

8. This paragraph draws from Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center 

Online.
355

9. Yang Zhibo, “An Attempt at Analysis of Sashoujian,” Kongjun Bao, May 

16, 2002 [sashoujian has a slightly different meaning than shashoujian: sa implies a 

“sudden thrust” of a hand mace].

10. Anonymous explanation posted at http://army.tom.com, September 29, 

2000.

11. Posting by Kadey, www.redfox88.com/w090htm (originally carried on 

Zhonghua Wang Luntan [China Network Forum]), August 2, 2002.

12. Michael Pillsbury 12. Michael Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S.: A View from , China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S.: A View from 

Open Sources, November 2, 2001, http://www.uscc.gov/beseanchieports/200_2003/

pdfs/strat.pdf, p. 16. , p. 16. Also see Johnston, “Toward Contextualizing the Concept of a 

Shashoujian.

13. Johnston, “Toward Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian, p. 1.

14. Dong Wenxian, “Diplomatic Success Comes From the Sky―Analyzing U.S. 

Troops’ Military Deterrent During the Iraqi Arms Inspection Crisis,” Jiefangjun 

Bao, April 14, 1998, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter 

FBIS).

15. A term coined by Dr. Dore Levy of Brown University, author of “Vignettism 

in Chinese Poetics,” in a paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies, 

Washington, DC, April 4-7, 2002. Abstract available at http://www.aasianst.org/

absts/2002abst/China/sessions.htm#138. I am grateful to Dr. Michael Pillsbury for 

highlighting the importance of “vignettism” as it pertains to Chinese military 

history and strategy.

16. Gao Guozhen and Ye Zheng, “Operational Doctrine Must Change Over 

Time,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1996 in FBIS.

17. Li Xuanqing, Fan Juwei, and Su Kuoshan, “Defense Science and Technology 

Forges Sharp Sword for National Defense―Second Roundup on Achievements 

of Army Building Over the Past 50 Years,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 7, 1999, in 

FBIS.

18. An incomplete list of events examined by the PLA cadre at the PLA 

National Defense University and AMS includes, but is not limited to, the sale of 

U.S. defense articles to Taiwan (1991-present), Operation DESERT STORM (1991), 

Desert Hammer Exercise (1994), the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96), and Operation 

ALLIED FORCE (1999).

19. Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare.
356

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid. Also see discussions with Dr. Michael Pillsbury in summer 2003. 

22. Thomas Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” 

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 10. For additional comments on the 

“counter-RMA” approach, also see Zhang Dejiu’s excerpt of Major General Xu 

Yanbin’s “Academic Report at the National Defense University,” published under 

the title “In Depth Information Warfare Is Psychological Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao, 

August 13, 1996, in FBIS.

23. This movement was likely vindicated (from a Chinese perspective) as a 

result of the strong U.S. military response to PLA operational exercises during the 

1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 

24. Zhang Dejiu.

25. Wu Chenguang, “Push Forward Military Transformation,” Nanfang 

Zhoumo, June 12, 2003, in FBIS.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid. Also see Wang Baocun, “Subduing Enemy Force Without Battle and 

Informationized War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, May 4, 1999, pp. 60-63, in FBIS; 

Peng Guangqian, “Meeting the Challenge of the New Military Transformation,” 

Liaowang, No. 23, June 9, 2003, pp. 52-54, in FBIS.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. I am grateful to Dr. John Battilega for sharing his expertise on the impact 

of Marxist dialectical materialism and use of the scientifi c method on military 

affairs.

32. “Borrow a Corpse to Raise the Spirit”: to “take an institution, a technology, 

or a method that has been forgotten or discarded and appropriate it for your own 

purpose. To revive something from the past by giving it a new purpose, or to 

reinterpret and bring to life old ideas, customs, and traditions” (from http://www.c

hinastratagies.com).

33. Johnston, “Toward Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian,” p. 1.
357

34. Unattributed article, “Take the Road of Building Crack Troops with 

Chinese Characteristics,” Ta Kung Pao, September 3, 1997, in FBIS; Yi Jan, “The 

People’s Liberation Army Will Conduct Massive Anti-Hegemony Military Drill; 

Breakthroughs Will Be Achieved in Deadly Equipment,” Ching Pao, No. 263, 

June 1, 1999, in FBIS; Li Xuanqing, Fan Juwei, and Su Kuoshan, “Defense Science 

and Technology Forges Sharp Sword for National Defense―Second Roundup on 

Achievements of Army Building Over the Past 50 Years,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 

7, 1999, in FBIS; Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War Under the Background 

of Larger Military Strategy,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 20, 2000, p. 67-76, in 

FBIS; Zhang Yining and Sun Kejia, “Understanding Development by Leaps in the 

Build-Up of the Armed Forces,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, June 1, 2001, pp. 123-131, 

in FBIS; Wang Congbiao, “Studying Jiang Zemin’s ‘On Science and Technology’,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001, in FBIS.

35. China’s 863 Program was a national-level program initiated in March 

1986 to advance Chinese science and technology through indigenous research and 

development, foreign acquisition, and other hybrid approaches as a component 

of, and to achieve the objectives of, Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Modernizations.” 

Some U.S. scholars believe it to have been responsive to President Ronald 

Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program that was presented on March 

23, 1983. See Su Enze, “Observer: ‘863’ and Military Modernization,” Jiefangjun Bao

(Internet Version), February 28 2001, p. 9.

36. You Ji, “The Evolution of China’s Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 

1949-2001,” Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 25. Also 

see Dr. You’s references to Zhang Youcai, “Several Issues Regarding Electronic 

Warfare in a Landing Operation” and “Research on Operational Command Under 

High-Technology Conditions,” Beijing: PLA National Defense University, 1997, 

pp. 327-333.

37. As identifi ed by Michael Pillsbury: Wang Pufeng, Information Warfare and 

the Revolution in Military Affairs, Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1995.

38. Wu Jianguo, “The Nuclear Shadow in High-Technology Warfare Cannot 

Be Ignored,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1995, in FBIS. Also, as identifi ed 

by Michael Pillsbury: Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, “A 

Rudimentary Exploration of 21st Century Naval Warfare,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 

No. 1, February 20, 1995, pp. 28-32, in FBIS.

39. Xu Zhzhi, “Jiang Zemin Deploys Highly Intelligent Defense System,” 

Guang Jing Yuekan, March 1995.

40. Michael Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 12. Also see 

General Pan Junfeng’s essay, “Several Views on New Military Affairs,” Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue, Summer 1996, p. 111, translated in part by Dr. Michael Pillsbury in 
358

China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2000, p. 70.

41. Interview with Dr. Michael Pillsbury, September 3, 2003.

42. Interview by Xu Bodong, Director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies, with 

Major General Huang Bin, Professor of the PRC National Defense University, 

published in Ta Kung Pao, May 13, 2002, in FBIS.

43. Ibid.

44. Michael Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 13.

45. Ibid., p. 12.

46. Sun Maoquing, “Make Efforts to Build Modernized People’s Air Force―

Interview with Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao,” Liaowang, 

April 14, 1997 in FBIS.

47. Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 14.

48. “Take the Road of Building Crack Troops with Chinese Characteristics,” 

Ta Kung Pao, September 3, 1997, in FBIS.

49. Tseng Hai-tao, “Jiang Zemin Defi nes Cross-Century Military Strategy,” 

Chiao Ching, August 16, 1998, in FBIS.

50. Fu Quanyou, “Deepen the Study of Characteristics and Laws of HighTechnology Local War and Raise the Standard of Guidance for Winning HighTechnology Local Wars of the Future,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20, 1999, 

pp. 6-14, in FBIS.

51. Yi Jan, “Zhongnanhai Plans New Military Strategy,” Ching Pao, No. 284, 

March 1, 2001, pp. 38-39. Also see Pei Fang, “Major Operation to be Performed on 

Military Logistical System,” Chiao Ching, March 16, 1999, pp. 50-52.

52. Zhang Jingfu is a former Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese 

Academy of Sciences.

53. Yi Jan, “The People’s Liberation Army Will Conduct Massive AntiHegemony Military Drill; Breakthroughs Will Be Achieved in Deadly Equipment,” 

Ching Pao, No. 263, June 1, 1999, in FBIS.

54. As identifi ed by Dr. Michael Pillsbury: Wang Congbiao, “Studying Jiang 

Zemin’s ‘On Science and Technology’,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001, in FBIS.
359

55. Zheng Shuyan, “Fu Quanyou Emphasizes at NPC Panel That It Is 

Necessary to Make Solid Preparations for Military Struggles With Great Sense of 

Political Responsibility and Urgency,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 8, 2000, in FBIS.

56. Cary Huang, “Jiang Zemin Reportedly Urges the Development of Strategic 

Weapons,” Hong Kong iMail (internet version) August 5, 2000.

57. Ibid.

58. “Jiang Zemin Orders Effectual Preparations for Use of Force,” Ching Chi 

Jih Pao, November 29, 2000.

59. Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 5.

60. Wen Jen, “Revealing Secrets of Beijing’s 998 State Security Project,” Tai 

Yang Pao, June 13, 2000; and Cary Huang, Hong Kong iMail (Internet Version), 

August 5, 2000, p. A3. Also from Pillsbury, see Wang Congbiao, “Studying Jiang 

Zemin’s ‘On Science and Technology’,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001 in FBIS.

61. Wang Congbiao.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid. According to the source, the components are as follows: “Set-up the 

research and manufacture of new weapons to deal with new strategic tactics, 

develop naval ship-launched missiles and cruise missiles, equip the troops ahead 

of schedule with electron laser and light beam weapons, stop discussing the 

issue of proliferation with the United States, revise some original policies on not 

being the fi rst to use nuclear weapons, revise the improper policy on not forming 

alliances or blocs.” 

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Wen Jen, “Beijing Starts December 2 Strategic Weaponry Project,” Tai Yang 

Pao, December 11, 2000, in FBIS. The information in the paragraph is all taken from 

this source.

67. Wen Jen, “Jiang Orders Hi-Tech Aerospace Weapons Development,” Tai 

Yang Pao, March 21, 2000, in FBIS.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.
360

70. Cheng Jian, “Take Information Warfare as a Starting Point of Military 

Preparations,” Jiefangjun Bao, June 2, 1998.

71. Qiu Jichen, Cai Jicheng, and Gao Huai, “Vigorously Strengthen the Army’s 

Quality Building in the New Period,” Jiefangjun Bao, August 27, 1998, p. 6.

72. An Weiping, “Thoughts on Developing Armaments by Leaps and Bounds, 

Jiefangjun Bao, April 6, 1999, in FBIS.

73. Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 14.

74. Tang Wu and Zhu Ruiqing, “Leading Cadre Should Set an Example in 

Practicing the Three Represents―Roundup of the Study and Implementation 

of Chairman Jiang’s Important Thinking on the Three Represents by Party 

Committees at and Above the Army Level of the Armed Forces and the Armed 

Police,” Jiefangjun Bao, June 3, 2000, in FBIS.

75. Fang Bin and Chen Zhenzhong, “Fourth Research Institute Provides 

Powerful Support for Fighting and Winning,” Huojianbao, July 2, 2002, in FBIS.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Peng Guangqian, “Meeting the Challenge of the New Military 

Transformation,” Liaowang, No. 23, June 9, 2003, in FBIS.

79. Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi, “The Generalization, Conservation, and 

Development of ‘Strategy’,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, September 30, 2001, pp. 120-

127, in FBIS.

80. Wang Baocun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Information Warfare,” 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1997, pp. 102-111. Also see Peng Guangqian, 

“Meeting the Challenge of the New Military Transformation,” and Li Zhangrui 

and Liu Chunjun, “Firepower Cannot be Excluded from Information Warfare,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, September 19, 2000, in FBIS.

81. Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing, Renmin Chubanbshe, 1964, p. 456.

82. Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, Jiefang Chubanshe, 2nd edition, 

Vol. 2, October 1994, p. 78.

83. Wang Congbiao, “Studying Jiang Zemin’s ‘On Science and Technology’,” 

Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao, February 13, 2001, in FBIS.
361

84. Untitled article, Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2003. Also see Agence France Presse, 

Beijing, May 25, 2003.

85. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “PLA Seeks a New Leap Forward,” China Brief, 

Jamestown Foundation, June 2, 2003, p. 1.

86. Zian Ruyi, Command Decision-making and Strategems, Beijing: Kunlun

Publishing House, 1999, in FBIS. Of course this focus on asymmetric efforts by a 

weaker, poorly armed military to wage war against a larger and better armed foe 

is not unique to China.

87. PLA scholarly literature since 1993 is replete with discussions and 

examples. 

88. The following PLA experts have made extensive efforts to study Chinese 

military literature: Michael Pillsbury, Thomas Christensen, Mark Stokes, and 

Timothy Thomas (Foreign Military Studies Offi ce, Ft. Leavenworth, KS).

89. See Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the 

United States, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, p. 27. Also see Pillsbury, 

China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 8.

90. Yu Guangning, “A Comparison of Chinese and Western Geostrategic 

Thinking,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1995, in FBIS.

91. Senior Colonel Huang Xing and Senior Colonel Zuo Quandian, “Holding 

the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to 

Our Own Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy―A Study in the Core Idea of the 

Operational Doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 

No. 4., November 20, 1996, pp. 49–56, in FBIS.

92. Yu Guohua, “On Turning a Strong Force Into Weak and Vice Versa in a 

Local High-Tech War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, May 20, 1996, in FBIS.

93. Ibid.

94. Huang Lien-cheng, “The PLA Makes All-Out Preparations for War with 

Taiwan,” Ching Pao, No. 274, May 1, 2000, in FBIS.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Huang and Zuo, “Holding the Initiative in Our Hands,” pp. 49-56.
362

98. Jia Weidong, “Asymmetrical War and Smart War,” Jiefangjun Bao, April 

17, 1999, in FBIS.

99. Fan Chunglong, “Stand in the Forefront of the New Military Revolution 

in Deepening Troop Training Through Science and Technology,” Jiefangjun Bao, 

April 4, 2000, in FBIS.

100. Pillsbury, China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S., pp. 9-14.

101. Ibid., p. 9.

102. Huang and Zuo, “Holding the Initiative in Our Hands.”

103. Unsigned editorial, Jiefangjun Bao, June 22, 1999, p. 6.

104. Huang and Zuo, “Holding the Initiative in Our Hands.”

105. Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Duhui, “On Information Warfare 

Strategems,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, August 20, 2000, pp. 115-122, in FBIS.

106. Dong Guishan, “Pursuing Development in Strides in Military Equipment 

Construction Calls for New Trains of Thought―Several Points of Consideration 

Regarding Our Army’s Equipment Development and Support Guarantees,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2000, in FBIS.

107. See Zhou Yi, “Aircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins,” Junshi 

Wenzhai, March 1, 2002, pp. 4-6, in FBIS.

108. Liu Jiangping, “Let’s Begin with the Crash of the MV-22 Osprey and 

the Penetration in the USS Kittyhawk Defense Zone,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 14, 

2001, in FBIS. Also see Zhou Jianguo and Xiao Wen, “A Breath-taking Scene from 

the Sea of Japan: Russian Fighter Jets Conduct ‘Sneak Attack’ on U.S. Aircraft 

Carrier,” Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version), November 20, 2000, in FBIS.

109. Ibid.

110. Pillsbury, ed., China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2000, pp. 83-85. 

111. Among numerous other articles, see Major General Guo Xilin, “The 

Aircraft Carrier Formation Is Not an Unbreakable Barrier,” Guangming Ribao

(Internet Version), December 26, 2000; Zhou Yi, “Aircraft Carriers Face Five Major 

Assassins,” Junshi Wenzhai, March 1, 2002, pp. 4-6; Feng Changsong, Xu Jiafeng, 

and Wang Guosheng, “Six Aircraft Carrier Busters,” Zhongguo Guofang Bao, March 

5, 2002, p. 4; Dong Hua, “Aircraft Carrier’s Natural Enemy Anti-ship Missiles,” 
363

Junshi Wenzhai, July 1, 2002, pp. 50-52; Xiao Yaojin and Chang Jiang, “China’s 

Existing Tactical Missiles Can Fully Meet the Need of a Local War Under HighTech Conditions,” Guangzhou Guangzhou Ribao (Internet Version), October 21, 

2002.

112. Wang Jiasuo, “Aircraft Carriers: Suggest You Keep Out of the Taiwan 

Strait!,” Junshi Wenzhai, April 1, 2001, pp. 58-59, in FBIS.

113. Zhou Yi, “Aircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins,” pp. 4-6.

114. Also see ibid., and Huang and Zuo, “Holding the Initiative in Our 

Hands,” pp. 49-56.

115. Wen Jen, “Simultaneously Hitting Five Targets Five Thousand Kilometers 

Away in Mid-December Test Firing,” Tai Yang Pao (Internet Version), December 

25, 2000, in FBIS.

116. Chiang Shang-chou, “China’s Naval Development Strategy―Building an 

Offshore Defensive Naval Armed Force,” Kuang Chiao Ching, December 16, 1998, 

in FBIS.

117. Lieutenant General Zhao Xijun, “Victory Without War and Modern 

Deterrence Strategy,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 31, 2001, pp. 55-60, in FBIS.

118. Liu Xiaodu and Kang Fashun, “A Certain Brigade Builds Itself into an 

All-round, Perfectly Masterful ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Unit,” Huojianbing Bao, May 25, 

2002, in FBIS. Also see Liu Xiaodu and Wang Xuezhong, “Charging to Control the 

High Ground of Training,” Huojianbing Bao, October 6, 2001, in FBIS.

119. Tseng Shu-wan, “China Test-Fires A New Missile Which Cannot Be 

Intercepted So Far,” Wen Wei Po, August 3, 1999, in FBIS.

120. Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War Under the Background of 

Larger Military Strategy,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 20, 2000, p. 67-76. 

Also see Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiangcheng, “The Doctrine of Psychological 

Operations in Ancient China,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 2002, No. 5, pp. 88-94, in 

FBIS.

121. Yuan Zhengling, “On Conventional Deterrence,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 

September 30, 2001, in FBIS.

122. Tien Ping, “Space for Readjustment in Nuclear Policy,” Hsiang Kang 

Shang Pao, June 23, 2003, p. A2.

123. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue (The Science of 

Campaigns), Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House, May 2000, 
364

pp. 168-182. Also see Liu Jun and Zhou Ruhong, “How to Concentrate Capability 

in Joint Operations,” Jiefangjun Bao, June 12, 2001, in FBIS.

124. Huang Xing and Zuo, “Holding the Initiative in Our Hands,” pp. 

49-56. Also see Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, “A 

Rudimentary Exploration of 21st Century Naval Warfare,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 

No. 1, February 20, 1995, pp. 28-32; Major General Dai Qingmin, “Innovating and 

Developing Views on Information Operations,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, August 20, 

2000, pp. 72-77; and an untitled article by Lin Zheng published in Huoli Yu Zhihui 

Kongzhi, Beijing: Ministry of Electronic Industries, October 1996, pp. 16-21.

125. Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare,” 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 1, 2002, pp. 112-117, in FBIS. Also see Niu, Li, and 

Xu, pp. 115-122.

126. Bao Guojun, “Military Expert Urges China to Promptly Eliminate ‘Era 

Gap’ in Military Technology―An Interview with Major General Wang Baocun, 

Renowned Military Expert of the Academy of Military Science,” Tzu Ching, No. 

153, June 1, 2003, pp. 57-60, in FBIS.

127. Sun Zian, “Strategies to Minimize the High-Technology Edge of the 

Enemy,” Xiandai Bingqi, No. 8, August 8, 1995, in FBIS.

128. As an example, FBIS is not directed to routinely perform full-text 

translations of the periodical Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, published by the AMS.

129. Chinese judgments concerning the performance of the U.S. military in 

the 1950-1953 Korean War, the Vietnam confl ict, and the operations of the U.S. 

military in the 1990s starkly contrast with U.S. assessments. These examples and 

judgments are common in publicly available Chinese military literature.

130. Pillsbury, Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions.

131. Guo Anhua, “Evaluation and Thoughts on the Kosovo War Situation,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, May 4, 1999, in FBIS.

132. Larry Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army 

War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, pp. 20-22.
365

CHAPTER 11

THE FUTURE OF PLA MODERNIZATION:

BUMPS AND BOOSTERS

Ellis Joffe

After more than 2 decades of continuous but uneven efforts, the 

Chinese leaders have transformed their armed forces from the huge 

backward contingents of Maoist days into a modernizing army. 

They have reformed all major areas of China’s conventional military 

establishment and upgraded their nuclear capability.

Their achievements have been impressive. Most outstanding 

has been the achievement of a capacity to deter or defeat a largescale conventional or nuclear attack on China. However, this 

objective was achieved more than a decade ago, after the Chinese 

had substantially improved their existing weapons and acquired a 

second-strike nuclear capability. And its achievement was due as 

much to China’s natural assets as to its military development. 

Since then, the Chinese have doubtless greatly strengthened this 

capacity. However, they are still a long way from achieving their 

most fundamental objectives outside China: to confi dently deter, or 

defeat, American intervention in a war with Taiwan; to effectively 

challenge U.S. military presence in the Pacifi c; and, over the long 

haul, to acquire a military posture that will underpin recognition of 

China as a great power. 

The desire to attain these objectives--strengthened by the political 

clout of the military and by China’s projected economic progress-

-ensures that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization will 

continue in the coming decades. However, while this combination 

sets the direction for the Chinese armed forces, it alone does not 

determine the pace, scope, and content of military modernization. 

These will be shaped by concrete circumstances that will infl uence 

the modernization process as bumps or boosters.

External Realities.

While long-term aspirations may drive China’s military 

modernization, its mode in a particular period has been determined 
366

by a realistic assessment of China’s external situation. During the 

Maoist period such an assessment was infused with a heavy dose of 

ideology, which for 2 decades had blocked the advance of China’s 

conventional forces due to Maoist reliance on a “people’s war” and a 

“people’s army” for defending China, and on foreign revolutionaries 

to promote China’s external objectives. Shortly after the end of the 

Maoist period, this approach was abandoned in favor of a focus on 

military modernization.

However, despite the appalling backwardness of Chinese 

conventional forces, their modernization in subsequent years has 

been uneven in intensity and scope. While leadership statements 

uniformly stressed the need for modernizing, on the ground there 

were more compelling considerations.

The fi rst was the leadership’s perception of external threats, 

which determined the degree of urgency with which it viewed the 

need to acquire military wherewithal. And throughout the period of 

post-Mao modernization, only in a few instances did a heightened 

sense of urgency accelerate the PLA’s military modernization: the 

1995-96 crisis with Taiwan; the 1999 NATO bombing campaign 

against Yugoslavia; and Taiwan President Lee Tenghui’s 1999 

provocative declaration that Taiwan should be treated as a separate 

state. 

Even in these instances, the Chinese leadership did not perceive 

a direct military threat to China from the United States, as it had, 

for example, for a few years after the border clashes with the Soviet 

Union in 1969. The improvement of relations with the United States 

after 9/11/2001 has apparently reduced Chinese concerns that the 

Bush Administration would lend support to provocative acts on the 

part of the Taiwan government. Together with a growing feeling 

among Chinese leaders (despite deep suspicion of Chen Shuibian) 

that time is on their side on the Taiwan issue, the Chinese seem to 

be much more relaxed regarding the danger of a war in the Strait. 

How long this situation will last, and how it will affect military 

modernization, remains to be seen, but for the time being it appears 

to have removed a sense of military urgency from the Taiwan 

situation.

However, such urgency could return quickly and drastically. This 

could happen if, in the campaign leading up to the elections of 2004, 

Taiwan President Chen Shuibian continues to provoke the Chinese 
367

with statements that Taiwan is moving toward independence. If he 

goes too far from China’s standpoint, major military action by the 

Chinese to interdict this unacceptable trend should not be ruled 

out.

Economic Uncertainties.

In the absence of a direct military threat to China, the 

modernization of the PLA, for more than 10 years after Mao, 

proceeded slowly and selectively. Despite the sorry state of its 

weapons and equipment after 2 decades of neglect, and despite 

proclamations about the need to change this situation, the leadership 

focused primarily on improving the nontechnological areas of the 

military establishment. The bulk of the PLA’s arsenal—especially 

tanks and planes--were upgraded, not replaced, while new weapons 

were purchased from abroad sparsely and in very small quantities. 

There were several reasons for this policy, but the main one 

was economic. The Deng leadership decided that economic and 

technological progress would precede major military advances that 

required fi nancial outlays. The result for the PLA was low military 

budgets that not only severely hampered the conversion of its 

armaments, but also created hardships in the daily life of its troops. 

The military leadership complained about the shortage of funds but 

accepted this policy--because it did not dispute Deng’s decisions, 

because it was committed to Party control, but also because the 

generals accepted the rationale behind the policy. The expectation, 

however, was that once the economy advanced, the military would 

receive more money.

The change came in 1989, after which the military budget grew 

steadily. The catalyst was the Tiananmen crackdown and the desire 

of Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, to curry favor with the generals. 

But the underlying factor that facilitated these increases throughout 

the 1990s and beyond has been China’s rapid economic growth. And 

the anticipation of continued military modernization is based on the 

assumption that the Chinese economy will continue to grow.

If it does, economic growth will be a strong booster to military 

modernization. But what if it does not? After all China’s economic 

progress, especially at the rapid pace needed to cope with social 
368

problems, is not guaranteed, and economists do not rule out a 

slowdown in varying degrees of severity. In assessing the future 

course of PLA modernization, this possibility should also be taken 

into account.

For the military, an even more important factor than the state 

of the economy is their share of the national budget. From the 

start of post-Mao modernization, the mantra repeated by political 

and military leaders alike has been that economic development 

must come before military advances because the economy is the 

foundation on which national defense is built. However, this vague 

formulation still leaves open the question of how much the generals 

will get in a given year.

This will be determined by the condition of the economy and the 

external situation. But no less important are the state of civil-military 

relations and the position of the paramount leader.

Civil-Military Friction.

Until after the 16th Party Congress of 2002, it generally had been 

expected by analysts that Party-Army relations would be based 

on several premises. First, that the paramount Party leader would 

continue to be head of the military hierarchy, as had been the case 

since the founding of the People’s Republic. Second, that Jiang’s 

successor, Hu Jintao, would also continue to be an exceptionally 

PLA-friendly paramount leader, because, like Jiang, he completely 

lacked the personal authority that had enabled Mao and Deng to 

dominate the military. And, third, that, like Jiang, Hu would work out 

an arrangement with the military that would give them substantial 

allocations and broad autonomy in return for their support.

This expectation was undermined by Jiang. By clinging to the 

chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) even 

when he had to give up his post as supreme Party leader, Jiang 

caused the separation of political and military leaderships at the 

very top. The result has been an untenable situation. It deprived 

Hu, as paramount leader, of supreme formal command of the armed 

forces and subordinated him to Jiang in the CMC. It deprived the 

generals of unique access to the Standing Committee of the Politburo 

that they had when the chairman of the CMC was also chairman 
369

of the Standing Committee. And it abolished the unifi ed control 

of the Party and the military by the paramount leader that had 

been essential to the smooth cooperation between the political and 

military leaderships.

The implications for the PLA of this unprecedented setup have 

been signifi cant. It has generated or exacerbated tensions between 

Hu and Jiang, and between the Party and the Army. It has made it 

harder for the generals to present their case to the Party’s highest 

decisionmaking body. It has probably generated bad blood between 

Hu and the generals who supported Jiang enthusiastically, which 

will presumably leave a legacy even after Jiang retires and Hu 

becomes chairman of the CMC. It has most likely caused splits in 

the military between military leaders who have reservations about 

Jiang’s chairmanship and those who have supported him fervently, 

each group for its own reasons. And it may have even weakened 

Jiang’s position, as refl ected in the fawning campaign to study 

and implement the “three represents” in the PLA, despite their 

irrelevance to military affairs. 

It is not clear how these frictions might infl uence the future 

development of the PLA, but it is clear that they are harmful to 

a harmonious relationship between the political and military 

leaderships that is essential for a smooth and sustained modernization 

drive. Such frictions will become particularly harmful if personal 

rivalries become entangled with policy issues.

Policy Issues.

Policy differences over two issues surfaced again in 2003. The fi rst, 

pertaining to economic versus military development, is not new, but 

it undoubtedly drew fresh force from the tensions between Hu and 

Jiang and between the Party and the Army. The second, pertaining 

to the relation between conventional and information-based warfare 

in PLA modernization, has presumably been reinvigorated by the 

Iraq War and is limited to the military establishment, but might also 

have ominous political overtones. 

From its fi rst days, the Hu administration has played up its 

sensitivity to social issues and to the need for more efforts to 

alleviate social grievances. The decision to reduce the increase 
370

in military spending, taken by the new Party leadership despite 

the presumed dissatisfaction of Jiang and the military chiefs, was 

probably designed to demonstrate this sensitivity. 

Furthermore, in his only publicly-reported statement on military 

policy, Hu placed military modernization in a subordinate position to 

the nation’s central task of economic development and the building 

of a prosperous society. On the other hand, statements attributed to 

Jiang have placed military modernization on a par with social and 

economic tasks.

Regarding PLA modernization, since the Iraq War, Jiang and 

the military press have kept up a steady drumbeat of exhortations 

on the need of the PLA to make a transition to information-based 

warfare. Invoking the example of the stunning American victory 

in Iraq, articles have emphasized that this transition cannot wait 

for the completion of mechanization, but must be carried out 

simultaneously. Other articles, moreover, have given precedence 

to information-based warfare over mechanization, and have also 

condemned offi cers who refuse to change their mindsets in line 

with changing times. These are clearly the surface ripples of a major 

debate on the future of the PLA. 

The awareness that information technology is crucial in modern 

warfare in not new in the PLA. In the late 1990s it had already 

been discussed by Chinese military commentators, and in 2000 

Jiang himself supposedly emphasized its importance as a force 

multiplier. Following the Iraq war, information technology has shot 

to new prominence in PLA commentaries, which portray Jiang as its 

originator and staunchest advocate. 

However, since Jiang is not a military thinker or innovator, it 

is obvious that he has formed an alliance with generals who favor 

a rapid transition to an information-driven PLA. The Iraq War has 

clearly given them fresh ammunition to demand new technologies. 

For Jiang, this alliance has probably provided an opportunity to 

shore up his personal position and to leave a much-coveted mark on 

the military. 

This does not portend a new PLA surge to information-based 

warfare. Most of the articles that call for a transition explain in detail 

why information technology is decisive in war and how the United 

States exploited it in Iraq, but, beyond general pep talks on the need 
371

to adopt it, they are vague on what the PLA should do. The few 

commentaries that are more concrete emphasize that the PLA must 

continue mechanizing, while the transition to information-driven 

warfare, given China’s resources, has to be gradual and limited.

Furthermore, the new stress on information-based warfare has 

generated resistance that is apparently coming from the ground 

forces. This possibly derives from a combination of reasons. 

One, ground force generals may believe in continued reliance on 

fi repower over information power. Second, they probably have a 

vested interest in opposing the transition, which involves troop 

cutbacks, control centralization, and abolition of command levels. 

Finally, it is exceptionally diffi cult to change any army, and the 

Chinese army is particularly resistant to change due to entrenched 

traditions, cultural patterns, and personal ties.

In sum, the Chinese army is changing, but, it is not moving into 

the information age by “leaps and bounds.” Differences among its 

leaders as to how it should change are not going to speed up the 

process. 

373

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

KENNETH W. ALLEN is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Naval 

Analyses Corporation, a nonprofi t research and analysis organization. He 

was previously a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and the 

Executive Vice-President of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. During 

his 21-year career in the U.S. Air Force, he was an Assistant Air Force 

Attaché in China and also worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He 

has written extensively on China’s air force and China’s foreign military 

relations.

JASON E. BRUZDZINSKI is a specialist on defense policy, military 

strategy and intelligence matters with more than a decade of Washington 

experience. Currently a Senior Professional Staff Member at the MITRE 

Corporation, Bruzdzinski provides consultative and technical support 

for the U.S. Government on a variety of national security-related issues. 

Bruzdzinski was previously a Senior Consultant in the Government 

Services practice of Arthur Andersen, LLP. where he led teams supporting 

the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Agencies and the U.S. Intelligence 

Community. Bruzdzinski also served the U.S. Congress for nearly four 

years on the Professional Staff of the U.S. House of Representatives–

Committee on Armed Services, and as a Research Analyst in the offi ce of 

former Senator and Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen. Bruzdzinski 

has conducted research on U.S. national security affairs at some of 

Washington’s most prominent public policy research organizations, 

including: The American Enterprise Institute, The Johns Hopkins Foreign 

Policy Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and The Asia Pacifi c Policy 

Center. Concurrent with his civilian career, Bruzdzinski serves at the 

rank of Lieutenant, as a Special Duty Offi cer, in the U.S. Navy (Reserve). 

Assignments have included tours at the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, 

Naval Air Facility-Pensacola, Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Training 

Center, Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacifi c, Offi ce of the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Naval War College, and three tours 

at the Defense Attaché Offi ce of the U.S. Embassy (Beijing). Bruzdzinski 

conducted U.S.-PRC military-to-military relations research as a Visiting 

Fellow at the U.S. National Defense University from 1998–2001. He holds 

an M.A in National Security Studies from Georgetown University’s 

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and an A.B. in Government 

from St. Lawrence University in upstate New York.
374

EVAN S. MEDEIROS is currently a Political Scientist at the RAND 

Corporation in the Washington, DC offi ce. He specializes in research on 

China’s foreign and national security policies. Prior to joining RAND, Dr. 

Medeiros was a Senior Research Associate for East Asia at the Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 

During 2000, he was a visiting fellow at the Institute of American Studies 

at the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing and an adjunct 

lecturer at China’s Foreign Affairs College. 

DEAN CHENG has spent over a decade studying Chinese and Asian 

security and economic issues. He is currently a Research Analyst with 

Project Asia at the CNA Corporation, where he specializes in Chinese 

security issues. Prior to joining CNA, he was a senior Asia analyst with 

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Mr. Cheng has also 

worked with the U.S. Congress Offi ce of Technology Assessment, and the 

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Mr. Cheng has written extensively 

on Chinese security issues, including commentaries in China OnLine, and 

chapters in several books examining aspects of China’s economy and 

defense policy. 

JOHN F. CORBETT, JR., is a Senior Analyst with CENTRA Technology, 

Inc., specializing in China, Taiwan, and Asian security issues. He retired 

as a colonel after serving 29 years as a U.S. Army Military Intelligence/

China Foreign Area Offi cer. Colonel Corbett’s last Army position was as 

Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan in the Offi ce of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. During his military 

career, he served in a variety of operational, intelligence, and policy 

positions in the 82d Airborne Division, U.S. Army Pacifi c, and Defense 

Intelligence Agency. Colonel Corbett also served as an Army Attaché in 

Beijing from 1986-88 and in Hong Kong from 1992-98. He has published 

articles in The China Quarterly and The China Strategic Review. Colonel 

Corbett is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the Armed Forces 

Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, and holds M.A. degrees in 

Political Science and Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii.

JOSEPH FEWSMITH is Professor of International Relations at Boston 

University and Director of the East Asian Interdisciplinary Studies 

Program. He is the author of Party, State and Local Elite in Republican China: 

Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890-1930 (1985), The 

Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Confl ict and Economic Debate (1994), 

Elite Politics in Contemporary China (2000), and China Since Tiananmen: The 
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Politics of Transition (2001). He has written extensively on contemporary 

politics in China, with articles appearing in such journals as Asian Survey, 

Current History, Journal of Contemporary China, Problems of Communism, 

Modern China, China Journal, China Quarterly, and Comparative Studies in 

Society and History.

KEN GAUSE is a Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies 

of the CNA Corporation in Alexandria, VA. He has spent the last 20 years 

focusing on issues related to leadership structures around the world. He 

has done extensive research on authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea 

and China. Mr. Gause has written over 200 articles, which have appeared 

in such publications as Jane’s Intelligence Review, RUSI’s China Military 

Update, SP Military Yearbook (India’s premier defense journal), and The 

Worldwide Government Report. 

ELIZABETH HAGUE analyses Chinese leadership and political-military 

affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Before joining DoD 

in 2000, she worked in the Voice of America’s East Asia Division and 

Mandarin Service. She received her MA in East Asian Studies (China) from 

Stanford University in 1998 and her Bachelor’s in East Asian Languages 

and Literatures from Bates College in 1992. She lived in Taiwan and China 

for four years and speaks fl uent Mandarin.

ELLIS JOFFE is Professor of Chinese Studies at the Hebrew University of 

Jerusalem and a Senior Fellow at the Truman Research Institute at that 

university. He was educated in Jerusalem, Hong Kong, and at Harvard 

University. Among Dr. Joffe’s works are Party and Army: Professionalism 

and Political Control in the Chinese Offi cer Corps, 1949-1964 (1965), The Chinese 

Army After Mao (1987), and many articles in journals and books.

MARYANNE KIVLEHAN-WISE is an Asia Security Analyst at the CNA 

Corporation’s “Project Asia.” A specialist in Chinese politics, foreign 

policy, and China’s new generation of leaders, she also recently published 

an in-depth study of the political, legal, economic, environmental, and 

security dimensions of the South China Sea entitled The South China Sea, 

a Regional Survey, and co-authored a study entitled Institutional Reforms of 

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges. She holds 

an MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of Foreign Affairs 

at the George Washington University, and is a graduate of the HopkinsNanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies, as well Capital Normal 

University in Beijing, where she studied Mandarin. Before joining the 

CNA Corporation, she worked for an international nonprofi t organization 
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directing projects on Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian affairs. She also 

spent time in Bosnia working with the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in support of the 1997 municipal elections.

JAMES R. LILLEY is Senior Fellow in Asian studies at the American 

Enterprise Institute. Mr. Lilley was the U.S. Ambassador to the People’s 

Republic of China from 1989 to 1991 and to the Republic of Korea from 

1986 to 1989. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs from 1991 to 1993. Mr. Lilley wrote the forewords for the 

AEI publications Chinese Military Modernization, Over the Line, and China’s 

Military Faces the Future. He is also the coeditor of He is also the coeditor of Beyond MFN: Trade Beyond MFN: Trade 

with China and American Interests and Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. He has just 

published his memoirs: China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, 

and Diplomacy in Asia, available in English and Chinese.

JAMES C. MULVENON, a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation 

in Washington, DC, is a specialist on the Chinese military. His current 

research focuses on Chinese strategic weapons doctrines (information 

warfare and nuclear warfare), theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) in 

Asia, Chinese military commercial divestiture, and the military and civilian 

implications of the information revolution in China. He is the author of 

Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 

1978-1998 (2001); and other publications. Dr. Mulvenon received his Ph.D. 

in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles.

ANDREW SCOBELL was born and raised in Hong Kong. He joined the 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in August 1999 and is SSI’s specialist on 

Asia. He taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers 

University, New Jersey. He is the author of China’s Use of Military Force: 

Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (2003). Dr. Scobell holds a Ph.D. 

in Political Science from Columbia University.

MURRAY SCOT TANNER is Professor of Political Science at Western 

Michigan University. Currently on a leave of absence, he is a senior 

political scientist at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC. He has 

published widely on Chinese politics, in particular leadership politics and 

succession, the dilemmas of legal reform, policing, internal security and 

political stability. His articles have appeared in such journals as Comparative 

Politics, China Quarterly, China Journal, Problems of Post Communism, Current 

History, and others. He is also the author of The Politics of Lawmaking in 

Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects (1998).
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JOHN J.TKACIK, JR., has been Research Fellow in Asian Studies at The 

Heritage Foundation specializing in China since 2001. Of his 24-year 

career in the U.S. State Department, 15 were spent in China- and Taiwanrelated assignments, including tours in Taipei, Peking (now Beijing), Hong 

Kong and Guangzhou, and in the Department as Chief of China Analysis 

in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He left the State Department in 

1994 and was Vice-President of RJR-Nabisco China based in Hong Kong. 

In 1998, he returned to Washington where he formed a small consulting 

operation called “China Business Intelligence” which published the 

“Taiwan Weekly Business Bulletin” for China Online. He has BSFS in 

International Relations from Georgetown University and a Master’s in 

Public Administration from Harvard University. 

LARRY M. WORTZEL is Vice-President for Foreign Policy and Defense 

Studies for the Heritage Foundation and a member of the U.S.-China 

Security Review Commission. He retired in November 1999 as a colonel 

in the U.S. Army after 32 years of military service. During his military 

career, he served in infantry and intelligence positions in Morocco, Korea, 

Thailand, Singapore, and China. Dr. Wortzel also served in the Offi ce of 

the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Pacifi c Command, and on the Department 

of the Army Staff. His last position before retiring was as Director of the 

Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Wortzel is 

the author of two books on China and has edited and contributed to two 

other books, as well as many journal articles and monographs. Dr. Wortzel 

earned a B.A. from Columbus College, Georgia, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in 

Political Science at the University of Hawaii.