Final Cut 8.5 X 11 with Full Ble

Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 

Iraq’s WMD

March 2005
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800: DC area (202)512-1800 

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP. Washington, DC 20402-00001 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072488-6 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072488-0 (Vol. 1) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072489-3 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072489-9 (Vol. 2) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072490-9 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072490-2 (Vol. 3) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072491-6 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072491-0 (Addendum) 

ISBN-13: 978-0-16-072492-3 / ISBN-10: 0-16-072492-9 (Set) 
Prewar Movement of WMD 

Material Out of Iraq
This page intentionally left blank.
1

Prewar Movement of WMD 

Material Out of Iraq

ISG formed a working group to investigate the possibility of the evacuation of WMD-related material 

from Iraq prior to the 2003 war. This group spent 

several months examining documents, interviewing 

former Iraqi offi cials, examining previous intelligence 

reports, and conducting some site investigations. The 

declining security situation limited and fi nally halted 

this investigation. The results remain inconclusive, 

but further investigation may be undertaken when 

circumstances on the ground improve.

The investigation centered on the possibility that 

WMD materials were moved to Syria. As is obvious 

from other sections of the Comprehensive Report, 

Syria was involved in transactions and shipments of 

military and other material to Iraq in contravention 

of the UN sanctions. This indicated a fl exibility with 

respect to international law and a strong willingness 

to work with Iraq—at least when there was considerable profi t for those involved. Whether Syria received 

military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other 

reasons has yet to be determined. There was evidence 

of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security offi cer, and ISG received 

information about movement of material out of Iraq, 

including the possibility that WMD was involved. In 

the judgment of the working group, these reports were 

suffi ciently credible to merit further investigation.

ISG was unable to complete its investigation and 

is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was 

evacuated to Syria before the war. It should be 

noted that no information from debriefi ng of Iraqis 

in custody supports this possibility. ISG found no 

senior policy, program, or intelligence offi cials who 

admitted any direct knowledge of such movement of 

WMD. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledge 

of residual WMD that could have been secreted to 

Syria.

Nevertheless, given the insular and compartmented 

nature of the Regime, ISG analysts believed there 

was enough evidence to merit further investigation. 

It is worth noting that even if ISG had been able to 

fully examine all the leads it possessed, it is unlikely 

that conclusive information would have been found. 

At best, barring discovery of original documentary 

evidence of the transfer, reports or sources may have 

been substantiated or negated, but fi rm conclusions on 

actual WMD movements may not be possible.

Based on the evidence available at present, ISG 

judged that it was unlikely that an offi cial transfer of 

WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unoffi cial movement 

of limited WMD-related materials.
This page intentionally left blank.
Iraqi Detainees: Value to Investigation of 

Iraq WMD and Current Status
This page intentionally left blank.
1

Iraqi Detainees: Value to 

Investigation of Iraq WMD 

and Current Status

The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to 

the DCI on Iraq WMD relied upon multiple sources 

for the collection of information regarding Iraq’s 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The 

Comprehensive Report made extensive use of the 

information provided by numerous detainees, including Saddam Husayn. The unprecedented access to 

this type of regime information provided a unique 

perspective on the intentions, policies, programs, and 

mechanisms of the former Regime’s WMD programs 

and international policy.

Unique Access to Key Individuals

Immediate access to the detainees allowed ISG to 

interview knowledgeable Iraqis on a broad range 

of issues. ISG analysts were able to compare the 

accounts of multiple high-ranking or well-placed 

detainees with information from captured documents and other (nondetained) Iraqis. These multiple 

sources provided rich detail and allowed ISG to gauge 

the consistency and reliability of the information 

provided.

These interviews provide an in-depth understanding 

of the former regime’s strategic intent, its military 

industrial complex and its security organizations. 

They also provided ISG with comprehension of Iraq’s 

WMD programs, including management, funding, 

and use as seen from within the regime. For example, 

detainee debriefs allowed ISG to confi rm the use of 

the chemical agent VX during the Iran-Iraq war and 

the use of nerve agent in Karbala during the Shia 

uprising following the 1991 war.

The opening chapter of the report, “Regime Strategic Intent,” particularly benefi ted from access to the 

detainees who embodied the top leadership of the 

Regime—including Saddam. Much of the chapter is 

based upon information from detainee interviews. The 

depth of knowledge on the regime’s structure, operations, programs, and functional WMD infrastructure 

would not have been nearly as detailed or credible 

without this direct access.

Nevertheless, it is essential to bear in mind that these 

interviews were custodial interviews and statements 

made by detainees would have been affected by these 

conditions. Moreover, once detainees are freed or face 

trial they may make statements at variance with what 

they told the ISG.

Identifi cation and Detention

The “blacklist” of individuals targeted for arrest and 

detention was drawn up prior to the 2003 war, and it 

was shaped by various organizations with a range of 

considerations and objectives.

CENTCOM and intelligence agencies initially 

engaged in compiling lists based on their own criteria 

and for their own purposes. WMD as a criterion 

existed because of the projected existence of WMD 

and concern that such materials be located quickly for 

force protection reasons in the fi rst instance and other 

nonproliferation concerns secondly. Individuals were 

also included on the list if they were judged central 

to maintaining the regime in power, able to infl uence 

events on the battlefi eld, or had responsibility for the 

regime’s past actions.

While the top 55 names on the list were well publicized (due in part to their circulation as faces on 

decks of cards), the blacklist contained over 300 

names and the full list was not publicly known. This 

created sizeable uncertainty among Iraqis concerning 

whether they were wanted or not. Moreover, in the 

period following the war, many Iraqis, whether listed 

or not, were captured and detained for a wide range 

of causes. It was also announced after the war that 

WMD participants could be subject to arrest and prosecution. These factors combined to cause Iraqi WMD 

participants at virtually all levels to attempt to remain 

undetected by coalition forces. Many were successful, 

but almost all the top WMD personalities were either 

captured or turned themselves in—many with the 

expectation that their detention would be short.
2

Prewar intelligence was the basis for constructing the 

blacklist and hence it was subject to some of the same 

inaccuracies and also, by the nature of constructing 

a list, was the product of a certain amount of capriciousness. Some very despicable individuals who 

should have been listed were not, while many technocrats and even opponents of the Saddam regime made 

the list and hence found themselves either in jail or on 

the run. Up to the publication of this report 105 of the 

blacklisters were detained. Some of the WMD fi gures 

and other detainees were assessed to have been erroneously detained and were released in the fi rst few 

months after the war. 

Debriefi ng

The Iraqis of interest to ISG were mostly senior level 

scientists, engineers, or program managers known 

from UN inspection activities. Other detainees of 

relevance to the WMD investigation were senior 

military, security, or regime leaders. Many individuals who were key to, or very knowledgeable about, 

WMD programs were not listed and thus not detained 

but some were located and submitted voluntarily to 

debriefi ng. All these individuals proved to be valuable 

sources of information.

In general terms, technocrats tended to be quite cooperative with the ISG. Those who may have perceived 

a risk of prosecution for one reason or another may 

have been less forthcoming. In some cases ISG subject matter experts (SMEs), often former UN inspectors, had been dealing with these individuals for many 

years. This provided an unusually strong base from 

which to debrief in detail. Moreover, the detainees 

were more inclined to be forthcoming with counterparts for whom they had a level of respect. Several 

detainees made a considerable effort to help facilitate 

understanding of the former regime and the WMD 

programs.

The debriefi ng process was not without diffi culties. 

Control of the detainees and the ultimate responsibility for debriefi ng belonged to the military. Standard 

military procedures are designed more to collect intelligence of tactical importance with an immediate goal 

of collecting information either for force protection 

purposes or to guide offensive military actions. The 

standard doctrine for debriefi ng detainees was thus 

not well suited to the accumulation of understanding of previous activities of the regime. The standard 

process requires the creation of a source directed 

requirement (SDR) from a SME (usually not located 

in theater) to a collector in the fi eld, which proved to 

be a cumbersome approach. While in Iraq the debriefers (collectors) and SMEs were often collocated and 

could talk face-to-face on a daily basis, the process 

quickly abbreviated and SMEs generally participated 

directly in debriefi ngs. This modifi cation of procedure 

for the purposes of developing understanding of Iraq’s 

WMD programs was essential. It should be emphasized that these debriefi ngs were not hostile.

It should be noted that the DCI’s Special Advisor met 

with many of the senior detainees directly. He had 

known them quite well from his previous position as 

Deputy Chairman of UNSCOM during the 1990s. 

There was signifi cant candor on the part of these 

former ministers during these discussions.

An area of diffi culty emerged in recording the information. The accepted method of creating a permanent record was by writing Intelligence Information 

Reports (IIRs). However, IIRs were not written in a 

timely fashion, sources were not specifi cally identifi ed and the reports tended to be short, address 

a specifi c topic and thus do not provided context. 

Connective tissue does not exist among these reports. 

An example of absent contextual information is seen 

in an IIR developed from a debrief describing one 

detainee’s favorable remarks about a second detainee. 

However, the fact that these two detainees were married was never refl ected in the report. 

Another shortcoming concerning dependence upon 

IIRs as a method of record is that the information in 

some reports was later either confi rmed or proven 

incorrect, but earlier incorrect IIRs remain part of the 

record. Thus, incorrect information was recorded in 

the form of an IIR, classifi ed, and never amended to 

reveal a more accurate update.

The constant rotation of ISG personnel had negative 

consequences. Many detainees had as many as four 

different debriefers and were debriefed dozens of 

times, often by new, inexperienced, and uninformed 
3

debriefers. This was also the case with the SMEs 

who also rotated regularly. These individuals usually 

had even shorter terms in Baghdad—sometimes only 

a month or two. Not knowing the details of previous debriefs, new debriefers and SMEs often asked 

detainees to retrace ground already covered. This had 

two unfortunate results. First, the detainees became 

quite familiar with the type of information we wanted 

and as a result, developed a “party line” (e.g., blaming everything on Husayn Kamil or Qusay Husayn). 

Second, they failed to develop, or lost, respect for the 

debriefers.

Shortcomings in the management of staffi ng ISG contributed to debriefi ng diffi culties as well because of 

deployment of many debriefers and SMEs who were 

inexperienced and lacking in knowledge and expertise 

on Iraq. Short tours exacerbated this problem, as individuals often left just as they were gaining expertise 

and knowledge useful to the ISG investigation.

A consequence of the way detainees were incarcerated also affected the debriefi ng results. High-level 

detainees were all kept at Camp Cropper and were 

allowed contact with one another. Some detainees 

assumed the rank and presence of their status in the 

former regime. One made it a habit to debrief the 

detainees following their sessions. This may have 

allowed for some rigging of stories and intimidation.

Finally, there were some discrepancies between the 

techniques of the debriefers and the mission of the 

ISG analysts, who for the most part were civilian 

intelligence offi cers or scientists. For example, if the 

detainee’s discussion wandered into topics of strategic or political nature, many debriefers would cut 

the digression short and redirect the detainee back to 

the more specifi c tactical focus of the written SDR, 

potentially losing signifi cant information about the 

nature and operations of the regime. In addition, some 

of the information of political value was not published 

in an IIR if it was not requested in an SDR.

While results obtained when debriefi ng individuals in 

custody may differ from those received when they are 

speaking on their own volition, we believe detainees 

still provided a vital primary source of information 

on Iraq’s WMD programs and regime strategic intent. 

The result was the emergence of a fairly detailed picture that was tested against data from other individuals, physical evidence gained from site exploitation 

and captured documentation.

Conclusion of the WMD Debriefi ng

As matters now stand, the WMD investigation has 

gone as far as feasible. After more than 18 months, 

the WMD investigation and debriefi ng of the WMDrelated detainees has been exhausted. As far as the 

WMD investigation is concerned, there is no further 

purpose in holding many of these detainees. These 

individuals have shown no reluctance to engage in 

further discussions should the need for questioning 

about past WMD programs emerge.
This page intentionally left blank.
Residual Proliferation 

Risks: People
This page intentionally left blank.
1

Residual Proliferation 

Risks: People

Saddam’s WMD programs created a pool of scientifi c experts, experienced in the disciplines necessary 

to research, develop and produce these weapons. 

Although the infrastructures built to support the 

WMD program created employment for many thousands, the core of experts with unique WMD-associated skills was a subset. For example, while many 

engineers and technicians worked on the nuclear 

program, the designers of critical components were 

less numerous.

The enforced hiatus in research, development and 

production of WMD, post 1991, probably deteriorated 

their skills, and many found alternative employment. 

Nevertheless some Iraqis with knowledge of proliferation concern remain.

Such individuals may not be attractive to countries of 

concern because of a possible reluctance to rely on 

foreigners of questionable loyalty or reliability. However, there is also some risk such expertise may attract 

the attention of terrorists or insurgents who desire any 

WMD capability.

Key Judgments

The precise population of participants in Iraq’s 

WMD programs is impossible to quantify. A senior 

Iraqi offi cial associated with the pre-1991 program 

stated that the numbers of WMD-associated scientists reported in Iraq’s declarations to the UN were 

grossly infl ated to confuse inspectors. He also stated 

that there probably were no more than approximately 

1,100 scientists and possibly as few as 600 with core 

expertise specifi c to WMD research, development 

and production requirements. However none of these 

fi gures can be verifi ed.

In the 12 years under sanctions since the end of the 

fi rst Gulf war, many members of Iraq’s scientifi c and 

technical communities have increasingly struggled to 

fi nd any job let alone employment that would preserve WMD skills. Because skills specifi c to WMD 

development undergo a natural decay, it is likely that 

the subset of former regime scientists who still possess potentially dangerous expertise is shrinking.

So far there is very little evidence that either foreign 

jihadists operating in Iraq or Iraqi insurgent groups 

are attracting experts from the former regime’s WMD 

programs.

Introduction

This section looks at the potential proliferation risk of 

Iraq’s former WMD-associated personnel working for 

countries of concern, terrorists, or insurgent groups. 

It characterizes the scale of the problem, examines 

motivations that may infl uence personal decisions 

made by members of this community, and describes 

the options we believe they currently face.

Scoping the problem

While the number of individuals involved in the Iraq 

WMD programs throughout the past thirty years is in 

the thousands, there is a fairly small subset who may 

remain of concern today. Precision is impossible, but 

it is worth noting that one or two individuals with the 

right skills could make a signifi cant impact in a WMD 

effort.

UN sanctions and intrusive UNSCOM inspections 

dampened the Regime’s ability to retain its WMD 

expertise. During the course of the 1990s, staffs 

were directed to civilian enterprises. Concomitantly, 

attrition through emigration, retirement and natural 

processes occurred.

• UN inspectors identifi ed approximately 3,500 

former WMD-associated individuals in Iraq prior 

to OIF based on Iraqi declarations of WMD-associated personnel. However, according to an NMD 

offi cial interviewed after the war, this list included 

many non-WMD personnel to confuse the inspectors.
2

• By way of reference, in 2002, the Intelligence 

Community identifi ed approximately 1,000 personnel believed associated with the Regime’s WMDrelated activities.

The Regime made efforts through the 1990s and up 

to 2003 to maintain the expertise of former WMD 

scientists and engineers. Saddam instituted the law 

of scientifi c patronage in the early 1990s as a legal 

mechanism to minimize the risk of losing his scientifi c community and to maintain their skills. The law 

enabled Iraqi scientists to augment their meager salaries through government payments. At the same time 

he also encouraged scientists to form close fraternities 

(as in the case of the nuclear scientists).

• The law for the patronage of scientists provided 

cash grants twice yearly up to OIF to a list of 

key scientists under the guise of academic grant 

schemes.

• An Iraqi document recovered by ISG identifi ed 

136 scientists from many scientifi c disciplines as 

“would be” benefi ciaries of the law of scientifi c 

patronage. ISG identifi ed 48 of the 136 scientists 

that reporting indicates were involved in Iraq’s pre1991 WMD programs.

Current Environment: Limited Employment 

Opportunities

Unemployed WMD experts may have economic reasons to seek markets for their talents, and if civilian 

occupations are unavailable, they may seek to work 

in WMD capacities. For some, there may also be a 

political motivation as a consequence of the removal 

of Sunni Ba’athist power, Coalition and IIG policies, 

and the current security environment in Iraq. As a 

result of the ongoing shift in the Iraqi social order, 

many have lost their positions, both within society 

and in their places of employment.

Academic Institutions

Currently, Iraq’s university system may have the 

potential to absorb some of the WMD-associated 

community; however, de-Ba’athifi cation policies 

and the rise of violence at Iraqi universities since 

OIF deter their employment. Before OIF, Iraq had an 

extensive university system, with at least one university in every province. Key national universities, such 

as University of Baghdad and Saddam University, 

provided employment in the 1990s to personnel previously associated with Iraq’s WMD programs. Under 

Saddam, WMD scientifi c personnel were shuffl ed 

in and out of universities in an attempt to maintain 

their core skills and ensure their employment. A reliable senior former National Monitoring Directorate 

(NMD) offi cial now working for the Iraqi Government supported the following claims made in Iraqi 

newspapers:

• Today, universities are not Baathist friendly and 

often display violence against the perceived wealthy 

(for example, ex-WMD-associated scientists).

• The largely secular WMD experts may be uncomfortable with the emerging religious direction of 

Iraqi academic life.

Interim Iraq Government

Interim Iraqi Government institutions, such as NMD 

and the Ministry of Higher Education employ some 

of the former WMD experts. We believe the numbers 

are small and at NMD, according to an NMD offi -

cial interviewed after the war, former WMD experts 

are relegated to lesser positions because of deBa’thifi cation policies.

Risk of Migration to Countries of Concern

Migration of some WMD-associated program 

personnel to countries like Iran or Syria is possible. 

Previous contact, fi nancial inducements, academic or 

professional opportunities and possibly the prospect 

of frustrating coalition countries, may be motivators. 
3

Although the potential recruitment of WMD scientists 

by hostile states is an obvious threat, there is only 

very limited reporting suggesting that this is actually 

taking place and no reports that indicate scientists 

were recruited to work in a WMD program.

• Unidentifi ed members of the Supreme Council for 

Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) allegedly smuggled an Iraqi rocket scientist into Iran at the request 

of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

Recruitment by Terrorists or Insurgents

Since OIF, the ISG is aware of only one scientist 

associated with Iraq’s pre-1991 WMD program 

assisting terrorists or insurgents. However, there are 

multiple reports of Iraqis with general chemical or 

biological expertise helping insurgents to produce 

chemical and biological agents.

• An Iraqi scientist (no known affi liation with the 

former regime’s WMD program) was involved with 

the production of chemical mortar munitions.

• Iraqi entities (no known affi liation with the former 

regime’s WMD program) aligned with Sunni 

extremists established chemical laboratories for the 

fabrication of chemical weapons at various locations in and around Baghdad (the Al Abud network).

Emigration From Iraq

There are many reports of Iraqi professionals who 

have left Iraq because of the lack of security, rampant 

crime and kidnapping in Iraqi cities, especially Baghdad. Kidnapping for ransom and death threats allegedly have forced doctors, scientists and many from 

the wealthier sector of the population to migrate to 

safer countries. However, professionals leaving Iraq 

probably have also done so for a variety of benign 

reasons.

• Reporting indicates that unidentifi ed groups conducted both kidnapping and assassination of Iraqi 

professionals and have threatened violence, some 

of which was carried out, against the scientifi c and 

medical communities to pressure these individuals 

to leave the country. 

• An Iraq gang, aided by Iraqi police, reportedly has 

kidnapped wealthy Iraqis for ransom. The money 

generated allegedly funds anti-coalition attacks.

• One prominent Iraqi doctor allegedly paid a 

$30,000 ransom and was forced to leave Iraq on 

threat of death. A prominent nephrologist allegedly 

paid a $1 million ransom with the prospect of a 

similar fate if he stayed in country. 

• By March 2004, according to press reports, insurgents assassinated more than 1,000 Iraqi professionals and intellectuals, including Muhammad 

al-Rawi, the President of Baghdad University. 

Whether such reports are accurate or not they 

refl ect a widespread concern among the technical 

elite.

• Many (especially older) scientists and engineers 

have links with Europe and the United States; many 

have language and cultural familiarity with the 

West so that their integration into those professional 

networks should still be suffi ciently robust enough 

to help them fi nd work in the West.

• Many of the western academic institutions are competitive in the way they attract lecturers and most 

would probably be open to accepting members of 

the Iraqi scientifi c community.

• Marriage and family links to the West give a 

number of former WMD scientists and engineer’s 

dual citizenship or permanent residence in the West.

• Many members of the scientifi c population would 

probably prefer to migrate to the West, although 

this is not necessarily indicative of their political 

allegiances.
4

Some former WMD participants had academic and 

professional links to countries within the former 

Soviet Union. However, former Soviet countries have 

little to gain from Iraqi WMD expertise. The emigration of scientists to other Arab states, where the civil 

and commercial infrastructures could benefi t from 

their expertise, has been occurring for years and will 

continue.

Conclusion

“Brain drain” is an ongoing phenomenon in Iraq 

today. Former WMD scientists led privileged lives 

before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. For over ten years 

they have endured, much like the rest of the Iraqi 

population, a steady decline in their living conditions. Post-OIF Iraq for them is worse still. However, 

despite the obvious risk factors, former WMD program participants are most likely to seek employment 

in the benign civil sector, either in Iraq or elsewhere. 

While the danger remains that hostile foreign governments, terrorists or insurgents may seek Iraqi expertise, the subset of individuals who possess the unique 

WMD skills of proliferation concern is numerically 

small. However, because a single individual can 

advance certain WMD activities, it remains an important concern.
Residual Pre-1991 

CBW Stocks in Iraq
This page intentionally left blank.
1

Residual Pre-1991 CBW Stocks

in Iraq

ISG assesses that Iraq and Coalition Forces will 

continue to discover small numbers of degraded 

chemical weapons, which the former Regime mislaid 

or improperly destroyed prior to 1991. ISG believes 

the bulk of these weapons were likely abandoned, 

forgotten and lost during the Iran-Iraq war because 

tens of thousands of CW munitions were forward 

deployed along frequently and rapidly shifting battlefronts.

• All but two of the chemical weapons discovered 

since OIF were found in southern Iraq where the 

majority of CW munitions were used against Iran in 

the Iran-Iraq war.

• As the Coalition destroys the thousands of conventional munitions at depots around the country the 

possibility exists that pre-1991 vintage chemical 

rounds could be found mixed in with conventional 

munitions at these locations.

—ISG identifi ed 43 bunkers and depots where the 

Coalition is in the process of destroying conventional munitions and that were suspected of being 

associated with the pre-1991 WMD programs.

However, ISG believes that any remaining chemical 

munitions in Iraq do not pose a militarily signifi cant 

threat to Coalition Forces because the agent and 

munitions are degraded and there are not enough 

extant weapons to cause mass casualties. However, 

if placed in the hands of insurgents, the use of a single 

even ineffectual chemical weapon would likely cause 

more terror than deadlier conventional explosives.

• Since May 2004, ISG has recovered 41 Sakr-18 

CW rockets and eight Buraq CW rockets. Coalition military explosive experts doubted the rockets 

could be effectively launched because the physical 

state of the munitions was degraded from years of 

improper storage.

 • Since 2003, insurgents have attacked Coalition 

Forces with two CW rounds (not including attacks 

with riot control agents) that ISG judges were produced by Iraq prior to 1991. Neither attack caused 

casualties and ISG believes the perpetrators did not 

know the rounds contained CW agent because the 

rounds were not marked to indicate they contained 

CW agent and they were used no differently than 

insurgents had employed conventional munition 

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

• The mustard round used by insurgents as an IED 

near Abu Ghurayb Barracks on 2 May 2004 contained agent degraded to such an extent to be ineffective.

Sakr 18 Rockets

Buraq warheads
2

• There continues to be reporting that indicates terrorists and insurgents possess chemical or biological weapons, although there is no evidence 

indicating that they have obtained “functional” 

CBW weapons or agents from the former Regime’s 

programs. An insurgent captured in Fallujah stated, 

“If we had chemical weapons, we would have used 

them.”

 Iraqis seeking rewards have added toxic chemicals to 

unfi lled pre-1991 chemical munitions to fool Coalition Forces into believing that they had found CW 

munitions.

• Polish Forces recovered 41 Sakr-18 rockets in June 

and July 2004. Of the rockets tested one contained 

residual sarin, fi ve contained petroleum and a pesticide, and the remainders were empty. ISG believes 

that the Iraqis who provided the rockets added the 

pesticide because we have no previous reporting 

indicating that Iraq weaponized pesticides.

ISG has not found evidence to indicate that Iraq 

did not destroy its BW weapons or bulk agents. 

However, even if biological agents from the former 

program do remain they probably have signifi cantly 

decreased pathogenicity because Iraq never successfully formulated its biological agents for long-term 

storage.

• According to a former Iraqi BW researcher, Iraq 

was not able to acquire drying technology because 

of sanctions. 

Sarin IED

Mustard IED
Residual Proliferation Risk: 

Equipment and Materials
This page intentionally left blank.
1

Residual Proliferation Risk: 

Equipment and Materials

In autumn 2004, ISG systematically reviewed available information on facilities suspected to be associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, or nuclear 

programs to develop a snapshot of the remaining 

infrastructure in Iraq and its potential for diversion to WMD use—either by Iraq or others. The 

mission to look for dual-use or residual capabilities 

was started late in the ISG process and the declining security situation halted our site visits; therefore, 

the judgments in this paper refl ect only a small and 

incomplete sampling of Iraq’s infrastructure.

Chemical and Biological Facilities

ISG judges that Iraq’s remaining chemical and 

biological physical infrastructure does not pose a 

proliferation concern. The effects of sanctions, war, 

and looting have destroyed, displaced, or severely 

degraded much of Iraq’s dual-use equipment. 

However, the missing equipment could contribute 

to insurgent or terrorist production of chemical or 

biological agents.

• Muthanna and Fallujah chemical production facilities—sites formerly associated with Iraq’s CW 

Program—were completely razed and looted. Many 

buildings were removed piece by piece.

• ISG found no stockpiles of precursor chemicals 

necessary for synthesis of militarily signifi cant 

quantities of agent.

• Offi cials from NMD stated that souks (market 

areas) are selling small- and large-scale (pilot plant 

size) laboratory equipment. The offi cials suspect 

that the equipment was looted from Iraqi industrial 

facilities.

Nuclear-Related Facilities

ISG judges that Iraq’s current industrial and technical 

infrastructure, with its dual-use equipment and materials, probably does not pose a nuclear proliferation 

concern as long as the Iraqi Government maintains 

control over the equipment and materials—a diffi cult 

task for the new government. This judgment also 

includes an assumption that Iraq will not restart its 

WMD programs.

• From September to November 2004, ISG surveyed 

16 of 45 sites that reporting indicated had potential 

nuclear-related dual-use equipment and/or materials 

prior to OIF. ISG found about two-thirds destroyed 

or nonoperational and the remaining sites secured 

and operating. (See table 1.)

• ISG found potential nuclear-related dual-use equipment at 10 of the 16 sites visited. However, only 

six sites had equipment that appeared operable 

and all sites were fenced or walled and protected 

by the Iraqi Facility Protection Service (FPS). 

ISG identifi ed machines as potentially dual-use 

based on IAEA’s general description of dual-use 

machine categories, such as multi-axis CNC milling 

machines.1

 (U)

• ISG observed IAEA- or UNSCOM-tagged equipment at seven of the 16 sites, fi ve of which were at 

least partially operating and protected by the Iraqi 

Facility Protection Service.

1

 A true determination of dual-use status requires an 

understanding of an individual machine’s capabilities and 

specifi cations, such as camming and runout tolerances, 

positioning (rotary and linear) accuracies, and axes 

coordination, as well as its software capabilities, such as 

the capability to control multiple axes simultaneously for 

“contouring” and fl exibility to provide “real-time processing” 

by means of multiple detection techniques. Due to the limited 

nature of the survey, the ISG did not determine the actual 

dual-use status of potential dual-use equipment; such a 

determination requires a detailed investigation into the actual 

capabilities and specifi cations of individual machines, a task 

beyond the nature of the survey.
2

• An Iraqi court recently acquitted an Iraqi offi cial 

who allegedly negotiated, but did not complete, the 

sale of machine tools from the Al Karama Company 

to Iran. The Iraqi Government has successfully 

appealed the decision in a higher court. The higher 

court has sent the case back to the lower court, 

where a new judge will retry the case.

Only in a few instances did ISG site surveys look for 

nuclear-related dual-use materials. The Al Qa’qa’a 

missile propellant and high explosives production 

facility was surveyed for the presence of dual-use 

explosives, while the Rashid State Company’s Dhu 

al-Fiqar Factory was investigated to verify the presence of high-strength aluminum tubes. The ISG did 

Table 1. Findings for Sites Surveyed in September to November 2004 Time Frame

Facility Facility Status

17 Nissan State Company Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; remnants of some 

machinery/equipment found; deserted and no security

Al Zawra State Company Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Al Hamath Intact; nonoperating; no machinery/equipment; deserted except 

for armed security

Al Salaam State Company Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; remnants of 2 

presses found; deserted except for unarmed security

Ash Shaykhili Warehouses Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; no machinery/

equipment; occupied by squatters and no security

Ibn Yunis Center Structurally intact and occupied by US forces; nonoperating; no 

machinery/equipment

Specialized Institute for Engineering 

Industries (SIEI)

Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Al Nasr State Company Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Rashid State Company’s Dhu al-Fiqar 

Factory

Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State Company (formerly 

State Establishment for Heavy Equipment 

Engineering (SEHEE))

Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Al Raya State Company Totally destroyed and razed; nonoperating; remnants of some 

machinery/equipment found; deserted except for South Taji 

Industrial Complex armed security

Al Zahf Al Kabir State Company Intact with minor looting/vandalism; nonoperating; some 

machinery/equipment found; deserted except for possible local 

security guard and South Taji Industrial Complex armed security

Tarmiya Technical School Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; no machinery/

equipment; deserted and no security

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center Damaged and looted; partially operating; neutron generator 

found; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Baghdad (Tuwaitha) Nuclear Research 

Center Tools Workshop

Heavily damaged and looted; remnants of some machinery/

equipment found; deserted except for armed Facility Protection 

Service guards in the vicinity

Al Qa’qa’a State Company Explosives 

Bunkers

All surveyed bunkers empty or destroyed
3

Table 2. UNSCOM- or IAEA-Tagged or 

Monitored Equipment Identifi ed by ISG

Facility Machine Type IAEA/UNSCOM

Specialized Institute for Engineering 

Industries (SIEI)

C.E. Johansson CMMe IAEA Tag # 157128

Al Nasr State Company DEA CU/01 CMMa IAEA Tag # 148953

Hauser S50L Milling Machinea IAEA Tag # 149419

Bridgeport Milling Machinea IAEA Tag # 157045

DEA QCM1 CMMa IAEA Tag # 146789

Rashid State Company’s

Dhu al-Fiqar Factory

Rexroth Flow Forming Machineb IAEA Tag # 3344290

H&H Flow Forming Machineb UNSCOM Tag # ME05045

Flow Forming Machineb UNSCOM Tag # ME05170

Al Raya State Company Arcardini CMMe IAEA Camera Monitored

Al Zahf Al Kabir State Company Gloveboxc UNSCOM Tag # B002486

Gloveboxc UNSCOM Tag # B002487

Unidentifi ed Itemd UNSCOM Tag# B002488

Unidentifi ed Itemd UNSCOM Tag# B002489

Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State Company 

(formerly State Establishment for 

Heavy Equipment Engineering 

(SEHEE))

Boldrini 2500/4500 Dual Column Pressa IAEA Camera Monitored

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center Neutron Generatorf

a

 Operational

b

 Dismantled

c

 Repairable

d

 Condition unknown

e

 Inoperable

f

 Partially dismantled, and needs reconditioning

not specifi cally look for maraging steel but offi cials 

at the secured and operational sites said that none was 

present at these facilities.

• In October 2004, ISG surveyed all 56 bunkers in 

the southern complex at Al QaQa’a, which include 

the 10 bunkers previously sealed and monitored by 

the IAEA. ISG found the facility unoccupied and 

the explosives storage bunkers empty (see pictures).

• Approximately 70,000 high-strength aluminum 

81-mm tubes are located in two padlocked warehouses (see pictures) at Dhu al-Fiqar Factory, 

which is within a secure facility protected by armed 

Facility Protection Service personnel. According 

to a current NMD offi cial, Dhu al-Fiqar Factory 

employees were cutting the tubes into pieces for 

use in the private sector. 

Missing Equipment

ISG found that some potential nuclear-related 

dual-use equipment was missing from heavily damaged and looted sites, but ISG did not determine the 

ultimate disposition of the missing equipment. Some 

of it probably has been sold for its scrap value. Other 
4

81-mm aluminum tubes in a Dhu al-Fiqar Factory

warehouse.

81-mm aluminum tubes in a second Dhu al-Fiqar Factory

warehouse.

pieces might have been disassembled for valuable 

subassemblies such as motors and condensers. Still 

others could have been taken intact to preserve their 

function.

• National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) offi cials 

stated that employees and facility management had 

removed some equipment at former suspect facilities in an effort to prevent equipment loss to looting 

or bombing. This technique was consistent with 

prior Iraqi war practices.

• An example of possible removal of equipment to 

preserve its function was seen at the Iraqi Atomic 

Energy Commission’s Tuwaitha Tools Workshop. 

During the IAEC modernization Iraq purchased fi ve 

new CNC machines (see main report). Two new 

Chen Ho multi-axis machines reportedly purchased 

for Tuwaitha and some older machines were not 

found. The absence of any components of these 

machines may suggest they were removed in their 

entirety.

• The Ash Shaykili storage site located near the 

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center contained 

(prior to OIF) a variety of equipment and materials 

associated with Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons 

program. While judged insuffi cient to reconstitute 

a nuclear weapons program, some of these items 

could be exploited to obtain information of potential use to a proliferant.
5

Intact, empty former HMX bunker at Al Qa’qa’a. Destroyed former HMX bunker at Al Qa’qa’a.

Destroyed Al Qa’qa’a bunker that, according to IAEA, 

contained RDX/PETN prior to OIF.

Destroyed Al Raya State Company.
6

Al Raya State Company—damaged and looted Arcardini

CMM camera-monitored by IAEA.

Destruction of Tuwaitha Tools Workshop Site.

Tuwaitha Tools Workshop—stripped Chen Ho 

Machine Tools.

Tuwaitha Tools Workshop—stripped Kao Fong

Machine Tool.
7

Annex 1

Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 

Equipment and Materials

Dual-use equipment and materials as defi ned by 

the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 

Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 

Material and Related Technology, INFCIRC/254/

Rev.5/Part 2 and Annex, are equipment or materials 

“that could make a major contribution to a ‘nuclear 

explosive activity’”. 

Examples include:

• Computer-Numerically-Controlled (CNC) 

Multi-Axis Machine Tools (turning, milling, 

grinding, or combination)—capable of producing 

high precision parts, such as for enrichment centrifuges or even nuclear weapons parts.

• Computer or Numerically Controlled MultiAxis Coordinate or Dimensional Measuring 

Machines—capable of providing quality control 

for high-precision parts, such as for enrichment 

centrifuges or even nuclear weapons parts.

• Computer or Numerically Controlled Multi-Axis 

Spin-Forming or Flow-Forming Machines and 

precision Rotor Forming Mandrels—capable of 

producing high-precision cylindrical rotors, such as 

for enrichment centrifuges.

• Computer-Controlled Vacuum and Controlled 

Atmosphere Metallurgical Melting and Casting 

Furnaces—capable of producing weapons parts.

• Coordinated Multi-Axis Electrical Discharge 

Machines (EDM)—capable of producing contoured high-precision parts, such as for enrichment 

centrifuges.

• Special Software—software specifi cally designed 

to support and enhance the capabilities of the above 

machines.

• Maraging Steel—special steel alloy for highstrength parts, such as enrichment centrifuges.

• High-Strength Aluminum—special aluminum for 

high-strength parts, such as enrichment centrifuges.

• Specialty High Explosives—high explosives, such 

as HMX, RDX, TATB, and HNS, HS, which may 

be useful to a nuclear weapons program.
8
9

Annex 2

Sites Suspected Prior to OIF to 

Contain Potential Nuclear 

Dual-Use Equipment and 

Materials

The following sites were identifi ed from reviews of 

intelligence as well as collaborative discussions with 

the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate. These sites 

are related to the pre-1991 nuclear program and/or are 

sites suspected of possessing dual-use equipment. 

ISG acknowledges that potentially sites are not listed 

here that a more comprehensive study would have 

identify.

ISG visited sites in bold during the September to 

November 2004 time frame.

1. 17 Nissan Factory

2. Former Al Athir site belonging to Rashid State 

Company

3. Al Badr State Company

4. Milad State Company (Al Furat site)

5. Al Hadr high-explosive testing site

6. Al Hamath, Tuwaitha

7. Al Kindi State Company

8. Al Jazira plant site (Al Kindi State Company)

9. Al Karama State Company Waziriyah Plant 

10. Al Nida State Company

11. Al Qa’qa’a State Company

12. Al Qa’qa’a State Company Explosives 

Bunkers

13. Al Qaim Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant

14. Al Radwan State Company

15. Al Rashid State Company

16. Al Rashidiya (site of the Al Faw State Company headquarters)

17. Al Raya State Company

18. Al Razi State Company

19. Al Salaam State Company

20. Al Samud State Company

21. Al Shahid State Company

22. Al Shuhada Mechanical Workshop, Saddam 

State Company

23. Al ‘Ubur State Company 

24. Al Zahf Al Kabir State Company

25. Al Zawra’ State Company

26. Amin Factory, Rashid State Company

27. Amir Factory, Saddam State Company

28. Ash Sharqat (former EMIS enrichment site)

29. Ash Shaykhili Warehouses, Tuwaitha

30. Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center

31. Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center 

Tools Workshop (IAEC Training Center, 

Tuwaitha Training Institute)

32. Dhu-al-Fiqar Factory Rashid State Company

33. Factory for the Repair of Jet Engines (FRJE), 

Taji

34. Hittin State Company

35. Ibn al-Haitham Factory, Saddam State Company

36. Ibn-Firnas State Company 

37. Ibn-Yunis Center, Sa’d State Company

38. Al Nasr State Company

39. Saddam State Company

40. Salah-al-Din State Company

41. Specialized Institute for Engineering Industries (SIEI)

42. Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State Company (formerly 

known as State Establishment for Heavy 

Equipment Engineering (SEHEE))

43. Ibn Sina State Company, Tarmiya

44. Tarmiya Technical School

45. Umm-al-Ma’arik State Company
This page intentionally left blank.
Iraq’s Military Industrial 

Capability—Evolution of the Military 

Industrialization Commission
This page intentionally left blank.
1

Iraq’s Military Industrial 

Capability—Evolution of the 

Military Industrialization 

Commission

Introduction

Iraq’s Military Industrialization Commission operated 

all of Iraq’s military-industrial complexes, including industries and activities supporting the research, 

development, and production of chemical weapons 

and missile delivery systems. Iraq’s nuclear and 

biological weapons programs were separate from the 

commission’s institutional framework throughout 

most of its history, though like MIC, these programs 

reported to Husayn Kamil Hasan Al-Majid, Saddam’s 

son-in-law. The creation and evolution of Iraq’s 

military industrial capability, and Saddam Husayn’s 

association with it, provides an important case study 

of how Saddam handled one of the Iraqi state’s most 

valuable assets. 

This paper will trace the history of military industry 

in Iraq with special emphasis on its structures and 

functions primarily through the eyes of three former 

senior offi cials: ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sa’di, ‘Amir 

Muhammad Rashid Al-’Ubaydi, and ‘Abd al-Tawab 

‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh. Taken together, their 

relevant experience spans the entire period of Iraqi 

military industry after the Ba’thist Revolution. It is 

sectioned chronologically starting with Initial Steps 

(1930-1968) and FOLEX—SOTI (1968-1987), followed by The Husayn Kamil Era (1987-1995) and 

Transition (1995-1997) covering Kamil’s mercurial management of military industry and then his 

defection. Finally, The Huwaysh Years (1997-2003) 

describes the operating environment of MIC during 

the tenure of ‘Abd al-Tawab Abdallah Al-Mullah 

Huwaysh.

Following the main text are four annexes: Annex A 

outlines the infl uential people in the history of Iraq’s 

military industrialization; Annex B expounds great 

detail on the growth of the military industrial complex 

and the entities it absorbed; Annex C provides insight 

to Saddam Husayn’s role in Iraq’s military-industrial 

projects; and Annex D is a reference for the various 

establishments, companies, and centers of the Military Industrialization Commission.

Editorial Note: This paper is based primarily on 

custodial interviews of Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan AlSa’di, Dr. ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al-‘Ubaydi, and 

‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh; these 

interviews are supplemented by a handwritten document drafted in English by Dr. Al-Sa’di and a handwritten document drafted in Arabic by Huwaysh. As is 

often the case with participants of the former Regime, 

a certain degree of embellishment is presented by 

detainees to disassociate themselves from the Regime. 

Huwaysh had diffi culty remembering exact dates and 

on some occasions provided a date that contradicted 

his previous statement. Alternate sources, both human 

and documentary, were used for corroboration whenever possible, yet some details of the account differ 

from Iraqi declarations.
2

History of Military Industry

in Iraq

Initial Steps (1930s-1968)

In the years before the Ba’th Party came to power 

in 1968, the Iraqi Government took several steps to 

develop a domestic arms industry. In the 1930s under 

the monarchy, Iraq entered into an agreement with 

the British to gradually develop the capability to 

manufacture small arms, small-arms ammunitions, 

and artillery ammunition. Manufacture of small-arms 

ammunition for rifl es (.303 Lee Enfi eld) and machineguns (Bren and Vickers) began in the 1930s in the 

basement of the Ministry of Defense but World War II 

interrupted progress on the project. Several years after 

the war, Iraq moved production to a location known 

as Karantina while a modern new plant was built at 

Abu Ghurayb. The new plant, which later became 

Yarmuk State Company, contained new lines for .303 

cartridge production with a single-shift capacity of 

5 million rounds per year and for 9-mm Parabellum 

pistol and submachinegun cartridges with a capacity 

of 3 million rounds per year. The coup that overthrew 

the monarchy in 1958 delayed completion of the plant 

until the early 1960s.

Iraq and the British also built a facility at the 

Musayyib military camp for overhauling and reconditioning British-made small arms. The facility was 

equipped with machines to produce the various metal 

components for the Lee Enfi eld service rifl e. Work on 

this facility was also interrupted by World War II and 

also delayed by the 1958 coup.

In 1939, Iraq signed a contract with the British to 

supply equipment for manufacturing artillery ammunition for the British-built guns in service with the 

Iraqi Army. As with the other plants, work was 

interrupted by World War II. The machines were 

delivered after the war and stored in a shed adjacent 

to the Musayyib small-arms facility. According to Dr. 

Amir al-Sa’di, these crates were opened once a year 

for inspection and regreasing of the machines, but the 

plant was never built because Iraq changed from British to Soviet weapons after the 1958 coup.

After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, the 

Qassim government invited the USSR to conduct 

a survey and initial studies for the development of 

Iraq’s civilian and military industrial capabilities. 

These were carried out in 1959 and 1960. Iraq then 

requested the establishment of four projects:

• The Waziriyah electrical equipment plant

• The Samarra pharmaceutical production plant

• The Ramadi glass production facility, and 

• The Iskandariyah Mechanical Complex, which 

included two facilities:

—Project #1 for the production of agricultural 

equipment

—Project #2 for heavy ammunition production

Project design reports were made and submitted for 

approval in 1962 and 1963. The Iraqi Government 

was considering the voluminous project reports when 

the Ba’th Party and their allies ousted and killed 

Qassim in 1963. Although the Ba’thist faction was 

soon ousted, the new government continued to study 

the proposed projects. With credit facilities and very 

low prices for the supplies and technical assistance, 

Iraq had only to provide funds for the construction of 

the buildings, as well as lodging and local expenses 

for the Russian experts. All of the projects were 

approved, with the exception of the heavy ammunition plant, which was turned down on political 

grounds. All of the other projects were completed 

during the 1960s.
3

FOLEX—SOTI (1968-1987)

Iraq’s program to develop its indigenous militaryindustrial capability gained momentum after the Ba’th 

party returned to power in 1968. In the years after 

1968 but before 1972, the new Iraqi Government 

planned to convert the Musayyib refurbishment factory for the production of Russian-designed weapons—initially the SKS rifl e and later the Kalashnikov 

AK-series weapons. Similarly, Iraq planned to convert 

the Abu Ghurayb ammunition plant to produce the 

7.62 x 39-mm and 7.62 x 54-mm cartridges fi red by 

the Russian weapons. With Egyptian technical assistance, the Musayyib plant was converted to produce 

the Egyptian version of the Russian Simonov SKS 

rifl e. Egypt also assisted with the Abu Ghurayb plant 

conversion effort. 

The Follow-up and Executive Committee

In 1972, Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sa’di formed 

and chaired a committee to plan, negotiate, and 

implement a program to develop self-suffi cient Iraqi 

military industries, named the Military Industry 

Follow-up and Executive Committee (FOLEX). Taha 

Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, who was both Minister 

of Industry at the time and a member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), oversaw FOLEX 

throughout its existence. In addition to ‘Amir AlSa’di, the committee included a munitions expert, a 

small-arms manufacturing expert, an engineer who 

had been the Director General of the Iskandariyah 

State Establishment for Agricultural Implements, 

and a civil engineer who previously headed the State 

Company for Construction. Taha Yasin Ramadan Al 

Jizrawi, then Minister of Industry and member of 

the RCC, supervised FOLEX and kept Saddam well 

informed about its activities. FOLEX committee 

members later became directors general of newly constructed facilities specializing in ammunition production of all types and calibers that became the heart of 

Iraqi military industry. 

To accomplish this task, FOLEX revived and 

expanded Iskandariyah Project # 2, a mechanical 

complex for producing fi nished heavy ammunition, 

including production of metal components, explosive 

and propellant fi lling, integration, and test facilities. With the revival came expanded product lines 

and larger capacity than the original project that had 

been abandoned in the 1960s. FOLEX took over the 

artillery ammunition equipment purchased from the 

British and moved it to Iskandariyah, where the new 

plant had been constructed. With Russian technical 

assistance, the machines were incorporated into the 

Hittin complex for heavy ammunition production. 

FOLEX also constructed a chemical complex for 

producing explosives, propellants, and pyrotechic 

compositions from indigenous raw materials. The 

complex, later known as Al Qa’Qa’a, included test 

facilities and laboratories. FOLEX also constructed an 

industrial facility for producing specialized tools and 

dies for use in the ammunition and weapons factories, 

and training centers to prepare the local workforce to 

operate the factories without foreign assistance.

Saddam’s Role in Iraq’s Weapons Programs

Saddam’s interest in controlling Iraq’s weapons 

programs dates back to his days as Vice President of 

Iraq. In the early 1970s, he became the head of the 

all-important “Committee for Planning and Followup of Development Projects.” “Development Projects” in this context encompassed everything from 

agriculture to industry, infrastructure to health and 

education, as well as the armed forces. Each government organization drew-up fi ve-year plans that 

required approval by the Committee. Saddam’s investments in high technology, research and development, 

and indigenous weapons’ production yielded results 

that varied widely in their success. Saddam wanted 

immediate results and did not have an appreciation 

of the long leadtime of most large industrial projects. 

As a general rule, Saddam’s personal involvement in 

one project or another was not a strong predictor of 

its rapid progress or eventual success (for additional 

information, see Annex C: Saddam Husayn and Military Industrialization).
4

‘Amir Al-Sa’di’s Sabbatical in Yugoslavia

‘Amir Al-Sa’di left his job as Vice President of SOTI 

in November 1981, during the tenure of Lt. Gen. 

‘Abd al- Jawad, and moved to Belgrade as the head 

of a group of Iraqi engineers working to develop a 

multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). This project 

was a joint development program with Yugoslavia 

that started in 1980 and was to take seven years to 

complete two functional prototypes.

State Organization for Technical Industries

FOLEX became the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) in April 1974. A Ba’th party 

member and artillery offi cer, Maj. Gen. Sabbar Sirhan 

Al-Ani became the fi rst president of SOTI, with ‘Amir 

Al-Sa’di as vice president. In 1978 or 1979, Sabbar 

was suddenly pensioned off, leaving ‘Amir Al-Sa’di 

as Acting President for about three weeks. Lt. Gen. 

‘Abd al-Jawad Majid Amin Lawand, an offi cer from 

the Electrical and Mechanical Corps, was appointed 

by Saddam to replace Sabbar. ‘Abd al-Jawad led 

SOTI for the following fi ve or six years. The SOTI 

President reported directly to Taha Yasin Ramadan 

who, in turn, reported directly to Saddam Husayn, 

at fi rst when Saddam served as Vice President and 

Chairman of the Committee for Planning and Development, and later—after 1978—when Saddam served 

as President and Prime Minister. Just as with FOLEX, 

Ramadan also oversaw military industries as the 

Mushrif (Supervisor) of SOTI, with a direct line to 

Saddam. Ramadan became the Minister of Housing 

and Construction in 1976 and Deputy Prime Minister 

in 1979, but he remained Supervisor of SOTI until 

the mid-1980s, when Saddam appointed a new, more 

powerful board of directors for SOTI.

This new SOTI board of directors was appointed in 

February 1985 as the Iran-Iraq war dragged on and 

SOTI struggled to meet the ammunition and supply 

needs of the Iraqi military. Saddam designated Lt. 

Gen. Muhammad Jisam Hanash, the former commander of the Air Force, President of SOTI, with 

‘Amir Al-Sa’di, again, appointed as the Vice President 

of SOTI. Saddam recalled Al-Sa’di from the MLRS 

project in Yugoslavia in an effort to get production 

back on track. Muhammad Jisam served as President 

of SOTI until the arrival of Husayn Kamil Hasan 

Al-Majid, Saddam’s son-in-law, in February 1987. 

Even before Kamil assumed a formal leadership role, 

however, he exerted powerful, although informal, 

infl uence on SOTI affairs beginning in 1985 or early 

1986.

Taha Yasin Ramadan’s supervision of SOTI ended at 

that time when Saddam placed his personal secretary, 

Hamid Yusif Hammadi, on the SOTI board of directors. In the early years, Taha Yasin Ramadan oversaw 

military industry for Saddam, but the presidential 

secretary’s position on the board of directors created a 

direct link between the Presidential Offi ce and SOTI, 

eliminating the need for Ramadan’s position. Neither 

was an industrial specialist by training. Their primary 

qualifi cation was loyalty to Saddam.

Upon his return, ‘Amir Al-Sa’di found that SOTI 

was having problems fulfi lling the Army’s munitions 

requirements, particularly for heavy artillery rounds 

and mortar shells. The outnumbered Iraqi Army 

was locked in a trench-warfare stalemate with Iran, 

which forced the Iraqis to rely heavily on artillery and 

mortar munitions. Al-Sa’di took over Al QaQa’a State 

Establishment, the principal propellant and explosives 

manufacturing facility, for a month and a half to solve 

production problems at its munitions factories, after 

which he returned to the management of SOTI.

SOTI Board of Directors, February 1985

• Muhammad Jisam 

Hanash

President of SOTI

• ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan 

Al-Sa’di

Vice President of SOTI

• Hamid Yusif Hammadi Secretary of the 

President

• Director, Procurement 

and Supplies

Ministry of Defense

• ‘Adnan ‘Abd al-Majid 

Al- ‘Ani, 

Director, State Org. of 

Industrial Design and 

Construction.

Ministry of Industry

• ‘Amir Muhammad 

Rashid Al-’Ubaydi,

Director, Research and 

Development Institute

Ministry of Defense
5

The Husayn Kamil Era 

(1987-1995)

Creation of the Military Industrialization 

Commission

SOTI was renamed the Military Industrialization 

Commission (MIC)1

 in late 1987. The starting point 

for this change was in early 1985 or early 1986 when 

Husayn Kamil, with Saddam’s blessing, inserted himself informally in SOTI affairs, and then in February 

1987 ousted its head Muhammad Jisam Hanash, and 

seized an active role in managing SOTI. ‘Amir AlSa’di became SOTI President under Kamil’s supervision. Kamil never assumed a formal title in SOTI. At 

the time, he was the Director of the Special Security 

Organization (SSO) and Supervisor of the Republican 

Guard (RG), including the Special Republican Guard 

(SRG). To ensure that Al-Sa’di understood that he 

was subordinate to Kamil, Kamil appointed Al-Sa’di 

as Deputy Director of the SSO for Military Production for a brief period, but Al-Sa’di contends he never 

had any SSO or security-related responsibilities.

SOTI and MIC Acquisition of WMD Programs 

and Key Industrial Facilities

Between 1986 and 1988, SOTI and then MIC were 

very successful, enjoying public admiration and 

prestige, and attracting talented personnel to its ranks. 

This organization, particularly under Husayn Kamil’s 

infl uence, became a predator gobbling up various 

organizations and projects, such as the Petrochemical Project No. 2 (PC-2) and the Dawrah Factory 

(an industrial workshop)2

 from the Ministry of Oil 

(MoO); the General Establishment for Iron and Steel 

in Basrah and Nasr State Establishment from the Ministry of Industry; the State Establishment for Pesticide 

Production (SEPP), which was a chemical weapons 

program, and the Military Research and Development 

Institute from the Ministry of Defense (MoD); and 

the Technical Research Center, which included the 

Regime’s nascent biological warfare program. MIC 

also took over the Petrochemical Project No. 3 (PC3), Iraq’s nuclear weapons development project, in 

1988 (for additional details see Annex B: SOTI—MIC 

Acquisitions, Mergers, and Expansion and Annex C: 

Saddam Husayn and Military Industrialization).

Development of Extended Range Scud missiles

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran acquired Scud missiles and launchers from Libya. Baghdad was within 

range of the newly acquired Scuds from fi ring positions well inside Iranian territory, and missiles began 

hitting Baghdad every few days. Iraq possessed Scud 

missiles with one-ton high-explosive warheads but 

could not retaliate because the Iranian capital was 

well beyond the missile’s 300-km range. This sparked 

frantic Iraqi efforts to obtain missiles with a minimum 600-km range—at any price—but overtures to 

Russia, China, and Brazil failed. Iraq embarked on a 

$2 billion joint project with Egypt for the development 

and production of the Badr 2000, a 750- to 1,000-km 

range missile with a 560-kg payload, but this project 

was not expected to produce such a missile for four to 

fi ve years.

1987 was the turning point both in SOTI’s versatility 

and the fortunes of the Army at the battlefront. SOTI 

extended the range of Iraq’s Scuds to deliver a 300-kg 

high-explosive warhead 650 km. Every Scud missile 

hitting Baghdad was answered with 10 Al Husayn 

missiles (Iraqi modifi ed Scuds) fi red at Tehran. Senior 

Regime fi gures believed this turnabout contributed to 

Iran’s acceptance of Iraq’s offer of a reciprocal halt 

to missile attacks on the capitals.

1 In its original Arabic form, “hi’at al-tasnia’ al-‘askarri” can 

be translated various ways. “Hi’at” is “organization,” “corps,” 

“corporation,” “association,” “society,” and a number of other 

meanings. “Al-tasnia’ al-‘askarri” is “military industrialization.” 

Therefore, “Military Industrialization Commission,” “Military 

Industrialization Organization,” and “Organization of Military 

Industrialization” are synonymous translations. The Iraqis refer to the 

entity in English as the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC).

2 In 1990, MIC commissioned the State Establishment for Heavy 

Engineering Equipment (SEHEE), a new, much bigger facility built 

next to the Ministry of Oil’s former Dawrah Factory, according to AlSa’di.
6

Creation of the Ministry of Industry and Military 

Industrialization

Husayn Kamil wanted Iraq’s entire industrial apparatus under his control, including the Ministry of 

Industry. Saddam divided the Ministry of Industry 

and Minerals (MIM) in 1982 to create a Ministry of 

Industry (sometimes referred to as heavy industry) 

and a Ministry of Light Industry. The Ministry of 

Industry controlled the heavy industries, including 

sulfur and phosphate mining and processing these 

minerals into fertilizers; the chemical industry for 

producing petrochemicals, plastics, and rayon; paper 

mills; and electrical power generation and distribution; and the State Organization for Engineering 

(Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic) Industry. The 

Ministry of Light Industry controlled dairy and food 

production, textiles, and other consumer products.

In July 1987, Husayn Kamil stepped in as Acting 

Minister of Industry for about one month, replacing 

Kasim Al-‘Urabi (who was undergoing medical treatment in Germany), and attempted to rearrange key 

facilities in the ministry. Eight months later, a major 

consolidation occurred under Husayn Kamil.

In March 1988, Kamil combined MIC with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Light Industry to form the Ministry of Industry and Military 

Industrialization (MIMI). Saddam appointed Husayn 

Kamil as the Minister of Industry and Military 

Industrialization. ‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah 

Huwaysh, the Minister of Industry at the time, felt 

that this was a direct result of Kamil’s successful 

campaign to undermine his position. Huwaysh, who 

earlier served Kamil loyally, nevertheless considered 

him unqualifi ed and did not hide his disdain. Saddam 

would not tolerate Huwaysh’s open humiliation of 

Kamil (and by extension Saddam’s family). Huwaysh 

and the Minister of Light Industry both lost their jobs 

to Kamil, according to Huwaysh.

‘Amir Al-Sa’di and ‘Amir Rashid, whose Research 

and Development Institute was earlier folded into 

MIC, were given tremendous authority, as long as 

they honored and respected Husayn Kamil. Al-Sa’di’s 

title changed to Senior Deputy Minister of MIMI for 

Military Production, other deputy ministers included 

‘Amir Rashid, responsible for military R&D; ‘Adnan 

Al ‘Ani, responsible for civilian industries; and 

Ahmad Al Dulaymi, responsible for electrical power 

production and distribution, as well as head of the 

trade unions. Dr. Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far Hashim became 

the fi fth deputy minister of MIMI, when Husayn 

Kamil took control of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program later in 1988.

Saddam’s creation of an industrial super ministry 

under Husayn Kamil’s supervision was designed to 

lead Iraq technologically into the 21st century, according to one Iraqi offi cial. MIC’s strength, as the centerpiece of MIMI, lay in its sound planning philosophy, 

including particular attention to workforce training 

prior to project initiation, and its in-house design and 

construction capability for buildings and other large 

structures.

Post-Desert Storm Changes to MIMI

In the turmoil following the 1991 Gulf war, Saddam 

initiated a major shake-up of the Council of Ministers, 

appointing Sa’dun Hammadi—a veteran Ba’th Party 

member and Shia—as Prime Minister, and Husayn 

Kamil as the Minister of Defense. As a result, ‘Amir 

Al-Sa’di became the Minister of Industry and Military 

Industrialization for a period of about fi ve months; 

Al-Sa’di also served briefl y as the Acting Minister of 

Oil following the shake-up. During the summer of 

1991, MIMI dissolved, leaving MIC and the former 

Ministries of Industry and Light Industry as individual components. MIC became independent, whereas 

the two remaining entities, once again, merged into 

the single Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM), 

identical to its pre-1982 state.

In September 1991, after the restoration of refi neries and power stations destroyed in the war, Husayn 

Kamil called Al-Sa’di and told him that he (Al-Sa’di) 

was only the MIM Minister—that is, that MIC 

reverted to the control of the Presidency. Husayn 

Kamil got into a dispute with Minister of Agriculture 

Mahmud Dhiyab Ahmad over the reconstruction of 

the Jumhuriyah (Republic) Bridge in Baghdad, and 

Kamil resigned as Minister of Defense the fi rst week 

of November 1991. ‘Ali Hasan Al-Majid replaced 

Kamil as the Minister of Defense, which left Husayn 

Kamil without a ministry.
7

Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far, who had become the Deputy at 

MIC in April 1991, became the Acting Director of 

MIC in November 1991 and continued in the post for 

about a month. In late November or early December, either Minister of Defense ‘Ali Hasan Al-Majid 

or Secretary of the President ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud 

Al Khatab Al Nasiri called Ja’far and told him he 

was being transferred from MIC to the MIM. ‘Amir 

Rashid, as the only remaining former MIMI Deputy 

Minister, then succeeded Ja’far at MIC with the 

title Senior Deputy Director, which he retained until 

February 1992, when Husayn Kamil returned to MIC. 

Ja’far became head of the electrical power generation and distribution enterprise within MIM under 

Al-Sa’di.

By the summer of 1994, Rashid began to attend 

Council of Ministers meetings in Husayn Kamil’s 

absence and at his urging. Kamil was receiving medical treatment at the time in Jordan for a brain tumor. 

‘Amir Rashid remained MIC Director until July 1995 

when he became the Minister of Oil, though he was 

recalled to MIC for several months following Husayn 

Kamil’s defection to Jordan the following month.

Husayn Kamil returns to MIC

In February 1992, Saddam reinstated Husayn Kamil 

as Supervising Minister overseeing MIC, MIM, MoO, 

and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), 

and as head of the minister-level Economics Committee. ‘Amir Rashid acted as Kamil’s deputy, though his 

formal title was Director of MIC, which he retained 

until July 1995. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, now Minister of 

Industry and Minerals, sought the return of several 

enterprises poached from MIM in the 1980s, including Nasr State Establishment, General Establishment 

for Iron and Steel in Basrah, and a plant in Waziriyah, 

Baghdad. Husayn Kamil, however, refused to return 

these companies to MIM.

When Husayn Kamil returned as the Supervising 

Minister, he directed the reconstruction of MIC 

facilities destroyed during the 1991 war and tried to 

expand MIC into civilian production. MIC and the 

former nuclear weapons program (PC-3) personnel 

and resources played an important role in restoring 

Iraqi infrastructure, including refi neries, power stations, and bridges.

During this period, however, UN sanctions and 

inspections imposed huge restrictions on MIC. A 

lot of equipment that was used or purchased for the 

WMD program was at risk of destruction by the UN. 

Iraq was required to prove to the UN Special Committee (UNSCOM) that a machine had not been used 

in proscribed programs to save the machine from 

destruction. 

MIC was also strapped for resources. All of the ministries fought for resources, including hard currency, 

within the ministerial Economics Committee. SOTI 

and MIC received a substantial percentage of money 

from oil revenues during the 1980s, but this went to 

zero after 1991. While it did not help its fi nancial situation, MIC became involved in printing Iraqi currency 

during this period. 3 After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq 

switched the printing of its currency from the United 

Kingdom to MIC. (Serial numbers were added to the 

bills by the Central Bank, however.)

‘Amir Al-Sa’di Ousted From MIM

On 4 September 1993, the Presidential Diwan 

instructed ‘Amir Al-Sa’di to turn over MIM to Husayn 

Kamil, who told Al-Sa’di the change was being made 

for “administrative reasons.” Al-Sa’di has stated 

that he expected this removal, as reconstruction was 

mostly fi nished, he was not a member of the Ba’th 

Party, and Saddam had taken Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al-Samarra’i’s place as Prime Minister, 4 which 

provided Kamil additional leverage to infl uence 

Al-Sa’di’s removal. According to an acquaintance of 

Al-Sa’di, Kamil took Al-Sa’di’s ministerial position 

because Kamil wanted to become a minister again 

and because there was money to be made through 

control of MIM. Husayn Kamil remained the Minister of Industry and Minerals and the Supervisor of 

Military Industrialization until he fl ed to Jordan in 

August 1995.

3

 According to Dr. Amir Al-Sa’di, the British company De La Rue 

printed Iraqi currency, and a shipment of Iraqi currency was on 

its way to Iraq in 1991 but was stopped in Malta because of the 

imposition of UN economic sanctions. Consequently, Iraq began to 

print its own currency.

4

 Dr Saq’dun Hammadi, who was appointed Prime Minister in April 

1991, was ousted 18 months later. Muhammad Hamza Al-Zubaydi 

replaced him. Al-Zubaydi lasted about nine months and was replaced 

as Prime Minister by Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al-Samarra’i who had 

served as Finance Minster since April 1991.
8

Husayn Kamil’s Demise

By 1995, UN sanctions had caused serious disruption 

of the Iraqi economy. Kamil’s capricious and selfserving oversight of MIC, his lack of accountability, 

and the intrusive nature of UN inspections combined 

to erode Iraq’s military industrial capability. Husayn 

Kamil, his brother Saddam Kamil, their wives and 

children (Saddam Husayn’s grandchildren), and a 

handful of others sought political asylum in Jordan on 

9 August 1995. According to Huwaysh, Kamil took 

with him several million dollars that he had withdrawn from MIC bank accounts. 

Various reasons may explain why Husayn Kamil 

left Iraq. The most important reason may have been 

the growing tension between him and his bitter 

family rival ‘Uday Saddam Husayn. According to 

King Hussein of Jordan, “as far as we know, it was a 

family feud on the personal level which went on for 

a rather long period of time.” A further explanation 

revolves around the terrible state of the Iraqi economy 

under sanctions and the possibility that he wanted to 

escape Iraq before a popular or tribal revolt unseated 

Saddam and his family. For his part, Husayn Kamil 

said Saddam’s rule had “lost its creditability on the 

international and Arab level,” and that his defection “shows to what extent the situation in Iraq has 

deteriorated.” The Iraqi media and leadership fi rst 

accused him of fi nancial improprieties, and then said 

he was “no more than an employee in this state and 

his responsibilities were limited.” Finally, they made 

him the ultimate “fall guy” for all Iraq’s problems—

from the Regime’s decision to invade Kuwait to Iraq’s 

duplicitous relations with UNSCOM.

Husayn Kamil, Saddam Kamil, and their families 

decided to return to Iraq in February 1996, supposedly with the promise of a pardon from Saddam. 

Upon their return from Jordan, he and his brother 

were detained, separated from their families, and 

placed under house arrest. Within days, Saddam’s 

daughters divorced their husbands. While under house 

arrest Husayn Kamil and his brother were confronted 

by ‘Ali Hasan Al-Majid and members of their family, 

come to reclaim “tribal honor.” Husayn Kamil, his 

brother Saddam, their father, their sister and her 

children were killed in the ensuing shoot-out. Saddam 

Husayn “explicitly endorsed the killings, which, as he 

saw them, ‘purifi ed’ and healed the family by amputating from the ‘hand’ an ‘ailing fi nger.’” Trying at 

the same time to distance himself, Saddam assured 

his listeners that, had he been notifi ed about it ahead 

of time, he would have prevented the assault, because 

“when I pardon, I mean it.”
9

Transition (1995-1997)

‘Amir Rashid Returns as MIC Caretaker

In June 1995 Saddam advised ‘Amir Rashid that 

he intended to appoint him Minister of Oil, which 

occurred the following month. Shortly after Kamil’s 

fl ight to Jordan in August, Saddam called ‘Amir 

Rashid and told him to “take care of MIC” until a new 

minister could be found. He remained in this dual 

capacity as Acting Director of MIC and Minister of 

Oil until January or February 1996, when Saddam 

appointed Dayf ‘Abd al-Majid Ahmad as the new 

MIC Director.

While ‘Amir Rashid headed MIC he returned a 

number of companies poached by Husayn Kamil 

to their original ministries, including the Nasr State 

Establishment, the General Establishment for Iron 

and Steel in Basrah, and the State Establishment for 

Heavy Engineering Equipment (renamed Al Nasr 

Al ‘Azim in 1997). Certain companies were later 

reclaimed by MIC when ‘Abd al-Tawab Al-Mullah 

Huwaysh became Minister of Military Industrialization. ‘Amir Rashid abolished the MIC Follow-up 

Directorate, 5 an instrument that Husayn Kamil used 

in his capacity as Supervising Minister to track production in the ministries he oversaw. ‘Amir Rashid 

felt there was no longer any need for such a directorate within MIC because the Supervising Minister 

position no longer existed.

Dayf ‘Abd al-Majid Ahmad’s Tenure at MIC

Dayf replaced ‘Amir Rashid as MIC Director in 1996. 

Dayf had been Deputy Director to ‘Amir Rashid 

since 1994 and his appointment as MIC Director 

freed ‘Amir Rashid to focus on MoO. Years earlier, 

Dayf was working at the State Establishment for 

Vegetable Oil when Al-Sa’di sent him to Yugoslavia 

with 60 others to be trained to operate the Al Qa’qa’a 

munitions complex. When this group returned from 

Yugoslavia, Zuhayr Al ‘Ani became Director General 

of Al Qa’qa’a State Establishment and Dayf became 

the number-two offi cial. When Zuhayr died, Fa’iz 

‘Abdallah Shahin became Director General of Al 

Qa’qa’a. When the Director General of Al Muthanna 

State Establishment (MSE) was dismissed in 1987, 

Shahin was moved to MSE to replace him, and Dayf 

became Director General of Al Qa’qa’a.

According to ‘Amir Rashid, Dayf was an “honest 

and clean manager, though perhaps not very clever.” 

Saddam wanted things from him that Dayf could not 

deliver. Dayf, on the other hand, believed that Saddam 

did not favor MIC during this time. During his tenure 

of just over a year, Dayf’s main concern was how to 

operate MIC’s production plants without funds, spare 

parts, or raw materials. He lamented that his budget 

was only $5 million a year, although carrying out 

traditional MIC tasks, such as producing ammunition 

and arms, required a minimum of $50 million annually. MIC needed much more, if it was to continue 

special missile projects.

Huwaysh, however, contends that these fi gures are 

not correct and that Dayf did not even use what 

hard currency the government had allocated to him. 

Huwaysh wrote that when he took over MIC in March 

1997 there was still hard currency available in MIC 

accounts from the previous year. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di is 

more supportive of Dayf, arguing that MIC’s main 

problem was the lack of support and funds.

On 9 March 1997, Saddam summoned Dayf and 

some of his subordinates to a meeting. The topics of 

discussion were MIC’s ongoing munitions production problems at Al Qa’qa’a and the lack of progress 

on the Al Samud missile. Saddam also invited ‘Abd 

al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh, the former 

Minister 5 According to Dr. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, all the directors at MIC and at 

the state entities under MIMI hated the MIC Follow-up Directorate 

because is was staffed by personnel “whose qualifi cation was 

arrogance and loyalty to the boss. They were perceived as the whip in 

the hand of the coach driver”—Husayn Kamil.
10

of Industry, to attend the meeting as an observer.6

After listening to Dayf’s complaints, Saddam asked 

for Huwaysh’s evaluation. Huwaysh was critical 

of MIC’s failure to adopt and implement standard 

industrial management practices, which he felt were 

instrumental to solving its problems. Saddam then 

asked to see Huwaysh alone and inquired what he 

thought of Dayf. Huwaysh told Saddam that Dayf was 

a weak man unsuited to run MIC. Saddam agreed and 

said that was why he wanted Huwaysh to take the job.

The Latter Years (1997-2003)

After Husayn Kamil’s departure, many of the companies and enterprises he had incorporated into MIC 

were returned to other ministries. MIC was rudderless under Dayf ‘Abd al-Majid Ahmad. According to 

‘Amir Al-Sa’di, MIC’s personnel were in a state of 

shock after Husayn Kamil’s fl ight. Many were called 

for questioning and all were afraid of the ramifi cations of what was described publicly as Kamil’s 

treachery and treason. By the time Saddam dismissed 

Dayf, MIC headquarters was already in chaos. 

• MIC’s primary customer, MoD, had lost confi dence 

in MIC’s capability to meet military production 

requirements, and MIC was seriously stressed.

• According to Huwaysh, large segments of industrial 

capacity were either out of service or underutilized, 

raw materials were in short supply, quality control 

was weak, MIC employees were dispirited, wages 

were below subsistence levels, corruption was rampant, managers and workers lacked technical skills, 

and there was no fi scal accountability and no adherence to accepted standards of industrial practice.

• ‘Amir Al-Sa’di contends that lack of resource can 

cripple any enterprise—no matter how healthy it 

is—and that this lack of resources was really what 

was responsible for the dire state of MIC. Sa’di also 

disputed the assertion that MIC technical skills had 

deteriorated, and he stated that there was no corruption under Husayn Kamil, while under Dayf there 

were was hardly any money available to be squandered or embezzled.

‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh

Huwaysh was appointed to direct MIC on 9 March 

1997. Concurrent with Huwaysh’s appointment, 

Saddam chose Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b Hasan 

Muhammad Al Nasiri as MIC Senior Deputy Director 

and Lt. Gen. Hazim ‘Abd al-Razzaq Shihab AlAyyubi as Deputy Director. Both men were experienced military offi cers: Muzahim had commanded the 

6 According to ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, this was one of Saddam’s time honored 

practices. When problems appeared at any ministry, Saddam would 

send one of the many previously ousted ministers or commanders who 

had been kept as a presidential advisor without specifi c duties, waiting 

in the wings. The adviser would visit the problem sites, talk to people 

there—preferably the disgruntled one—and write a report directly to 

Saddam. Saddam would then call a meeting to discuss the matter in the 

presence of the “observer”. If the observer showed eagerness and an 

appetite for the job, he would often be appointed to the position. For 

example, that was how Lt. General Muhammad Jisam got the job as 

President of SOTI.
11

Iraqi Air Force and the Fedayeen Saddam and served 

as a bodyguard for Saddam; Hazim was a missile 

offi cer who had commanded the Iraqi surface-to-surface missile forces during the 1991 Gulf war. Neither 

had any experience in managing military industry, but 

both had Saddam’s confi dence.

Over the course of time, Huwaysh’s deputies took on 

additional roles, or left MIC altogether. For example, 

Muzahim Sa’b was appointed by Saddam to the Air 

Defense Command for six months in 2001, but he 

retained his position of Senior Deputy Director of 

MIC. Hazim remained a deputy director until he was 

replaced by Muyassir Raja Shalah Hassun Al-Tikriti 

in 2000, who subsequently was appointed Minister of 

MIM a year later. Daghir Muhammad Mahmud was 

MIC Deputy Director from 2001 to 2003.

An unlikely choice to head MIC, Saddam brought 

back Huwaysh, who had been languishing as a 

presidential advisor for nine years. Refl ecting on his 

reemergence, Huwaysh admitted he actually relished 

the opportunity to have Saddam invite him back 

into government. He felt that Saddam’s summons 

was an implicit admission he had been wrong to fi re 

Huwaysh nine years earlier.

Saddam promoted Huwaysh to Minister of Military 

Industrialization in late 1997 and in July 2001 made 

him a Deputy Prime Minister. Huwaysh substantially 

restructured MIC by 1999, and his new framework 

continued virtually unchanged, except by expansion, until 2003. MIC’s reemergence provided the 

research, technological, and industrial foundation 

on which Saddam hoped to rebuild and modernize 

Iraq’s military-industrial capabilities. Drawing on 

these capabilities, Saddam was determined that if 

the Security Council could not enforce a WMD-free 

zone in the Middle East (as prescribed in UN Security 

Council Resolution 687, paragraph 14), Iraq’s ability 

to defend itself against regional threats should be not 

be constrained, according to Huwaysh.

• To revitalize MIC, Huwaysh instituted strict 

organizational and fi nancial reforms centered on 

mandatory planning, and required institutional and 

personal accountability. MIC immediately raised 

salaries across the board. Externally, MIC reengaged with its customers, especially MoD.

• Reforms centered on one-year, fi ve-year, and 10-

year planning cycles, meticulously administered 

from MIC headquarters. While MIC’s directors 

general were given broad authority to conduct 

business and implement these plans, Huwaysh held 

them directly accountable for plan performance.

• Embedded in each plan was a range of requirements 

covering education and training, technical research, 

safety, quality control, and industrial effi ciency, in 

addition to clearly defi ned production goals. The 

plan linked these performance factors to explicit 

fi nancial and promotion incentives, including a new 

MIC-wide bonus system approved by Saddam. 

• In 1998, Huwaysh created a program to involve 

university academics and graduate students directly 

in MIC research and development efforts. The 

next year, he introduced incentives to encourage 

outsourcing of specifi c production projects to the 

private sector. Both programs fl ourished.

• According to ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, these measures were 

common practices in government establishments, 

and many of these practices were required by law 

or by instructions from the Presidential Diwan.

In the years after coming to MIC, Huwaysh became 

the most powerful Iraqi industrial offi cial since 

Husayn Kamil, rising to Deputy Prime Minister, 

Minister of Military Industrialization, and head of the 

Industrial Committee.

The Special Offi ce and the IIS Procurement

Connection

In November 1997, Saddam Husayn approved a MIC 

proposal to enlist the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) 

to develop new procurement, technology transfer, and 

technical assistance channels to supplement existing 

MIC Commercial Directorate channels. Huwaysh 

formed the MIC-IIS relationship to support Iraq’s 

missile program after Saddam instructed him to 

improve Iraq’s missile capabilities.
12

MIC’s end of this second procurement channel operated through a MIC staff section called the “Special 

Offi ce,” headed by Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun Muhammad Al-‘Abuddi, Director General of MIC’s Research 

Directorate. Hadi’s offi ce handled the entire secret, 

special contracting process with Russia, Belarus, 

Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria.

The IIS’s procurement activity operated through 

the IIS Scientifi c and Technical Information Offi ce, 

designated M4/4/5. (A full discussion of the Special 

Offi ce and its relationship with IIS M4/4/5 is found in 

the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to 

the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Volume I, Regime Finance 

and Procurement, pp. 69-70.)

Changing of the MIC Establishment Names

in March 1997

The names of some MIC entities were changed in 

March 1997 as a security measure. Huwasyh said that 

the idea for the name change originated with him and 

was designed to conceal the nature of the establishment business. The State Establishment for Industrial 

Chemical Research, for example, became Ibn-Sina 

Center. Most of the renamed establishments had been 

created after the 1991 war, and these were given the 

same type of classical Arab names that had long been 

used with other MIC establishments.

Conversion of State Establishments, Centers,

and Factories to Companies

On 1 August 1998, all MIC establishments, autonomous centers, and autonomous factories were redesignated as state companies. This change was required 

by the new Law of Companies as a move toward 

self-management and fi nancing, and applied to all 

state establishments, not just those in MIC. Huwaysh 

saw the change as a way to boost the authority of the 

heads of factories and centers. The heads of factories 

and centers carried the rank of director. To raise their 

status, he elevated them to the rank of director general, the same as the heads of other state companies.

The conversion to state companies also forced MIC’s 

establishments, centers, and factories to adopt a 

common staff structure, with technical directorates, 

design and research directorates, training directorates, 

and so forth. Finance departments were redesignated 

as economics departments in an effort to broaden the 

view of establishment fi nance offi cials. Huwaysh also 

required the implementation of training and quality 

control programs in all MIC companies.

For discussion of post-1998 improvements in the Iraqi 

munitions industry (see Annex E).

Funding MIC With Oil Revenues

The UN Oil-For-Food Program (OFF) began in 1997 

and operated without interruption until the 2003 war. 

The UN Security Council (UNSC) not only renewed 

the original OFF mandate under UN Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 986, but raised the revenue ceiling for Iraqi oil exports in October 1999 with UNSCR 

1266. The revenue ceiling was then eliminated with 

UNSCR 1284 (although the resolution reaffi rmed 

sanctions). The former Regime managed to collect 

signifi cant hard currency revenues by illicitly exploiting the OFF contracting process increasing monetary 

returns directly to the Iraqi Government as the UNSC 

raised oil production ceilings, increasing benefi ts to 

the Iraqi people as the UNSC raised oil production 

ceilings. Iraq controlled the contracting process for 

both selling its oil and arranging purchases of humanitarian goods, which allowed it to take advantage of 

lax UN oversight.

As a result, between 1996 and 2002, the MIC budget 

increased over forty-fold from Iraqi dinar (ID) 15.5 

billion to ID 700 billion, despite ongoing UN sanctions and Coalition attacks on its facilities. In 2002, 

MIC negotiated short- and long-term, hard currency 

procurement contracts amounting to approximately 

USD 364 million. MIC front companies adapted to 
13

changing circumstances by importing signifi cant 

amounts of technology and raw materials through 

formal, but technically illegal, arrangements with 

Syria, Turkey, and Jordan (for additional information 

on MIC’s funding practices, see the Comprehensive 

Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s 

WMD, Volume I, Regime Finance and Procurement 

chapter).

Over the course of 31 years, Iraq’s military industrial 

complex grew, absorbing and acquiring numerous 

entities. From its inception, as an institution within 

Iraq MIC had historical continuity, however organizationally, it evolved over time refl ective of its leadership and historical circumstances. This evolution can 

be simplifi ed into the periods before, during, and 

after Husayn Kamil, and the period of ‘Abd al-Tawab 

Al-Mullah Huwaysh. See Annexes A through D for 

additional details on Iraq’s military industrial leaders, 

facilities, and programs, and how Saddam infl uenced 

the entire enterprise.

Overall, MIC was seen by the Regime as a refl ection 

of the strong Iraqi character of being builders and 

engineers.
This page intentionally left blank.
15

Annex A

Infl uential 

Personalities of Iraq’s Military 

Industrialization

Lt. Gen. Dr. ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sa’di

‘Amir Al-Sa’di formed the Follow-up 

and Executive Committee (FOLEX) 

to plan, negotiate, and implement a 

program to develop Iraq’s military 

industries in 1972. When the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) 

was formed in April 1974, he sat as the 

Vice President of SOTI for seven years.

Al-Sa’di went to Yugoslavia from 1981 to 1985 as a 

technical advisor for the Ababil-50 multiple launch 

rocket system. He was recalled in 1985 to return as 

the Vice President of SOTI to assist the organization’s 

oversight of munitions production during the IranIraq war. In February 1987, he was promoted to SOTI 

President under the supervision of Husayn Kamil. 

During the summer of 1988, Al-Sa’di was promoted 

to Senior Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry 

and Military Industrialization (MIMI) for Military 

Production, again under Husayn Kamil.

Following Desert Storm, Al-Sa’di was promoted to 

Minister of MIMI and Acting Minister of Oil, until 

the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) 

was stripped from MIMI during the summer of 1991, 

leaving him as the Minister of MIM. Husayn Kamil 

pushed al-Sa’di out of this position in September 

1993. From 1993 to 1995 Al-Sa’di served as the 

supervisor of the Al Samud missile. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di 

remained a Scientifi c Advisor to Saddam Husayn up 

to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Lt. Gen. Dr. ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al-’Ubaydi

‘Amir Rashid’s start in military industry 

began in 1984 as he was appointed head 

of the Ministry of Defense’s commission 

of military research and development. 

In February 1985 he was appointed 

to SOTI’s Board of Directors, and his 

Research and Development Institute was absorbed by 

MIC in 1988.

Rashid was promoted to Deputy Minister for Military 

Research and Development at the formation of MIMI 

during the summer of 1988. He served in this capacity 

until he was appointed Minister of Oil in late June or 

early July 1995, but he consecutively served as MIC’s 

Acting Director when Husayn Kamil Hasan Al-Majid 

defected to Jordan in August 1995. This lasted until 

the beginning of 1996 when Dayf Al-Majid assumed 

the MIC directorship.

‘Amir Rashid retired as the Oil Minister in late 2002, 

and he was appointed as a Presidential Advisor. He 

only served as a Presidential Advisor for about one 

or two months in 2003 before Saddam recalled him 

as Minister of Oil. (Samir ‘Aziz Al Najim served as 

Minister of Oil during those two months.) ‘Amir was 

the Minister of Oil at the start of the 2003 war.
16

Gen. Husayn Kamil Hasan Al-Majid1

Born in 1955 within the Al-Majid 

branch of Saddam’s family, Husayn 

Kamil was the son of Saddam’s fi rst 

cousin on his father’s side, Kamil Hasan 

Al-Majid. More importantly, Husayn 

Kamil became Saddam’s son-in-law, 

married in 1983 to Saddam’s eldest and 

favorite daughter, Raghad. Husayn Kamil began his 

rise to power within the Regime’s security services as 

part of Saddam’s personal detail. According to Tariq 

‘Aziz, Husayn Kamil was a second lieutenant when 

Saddam became president in July 1979.

In 1983, Saddam appointed him Director of the SSO 

and later Supervisor of the Republican Guard (including the Special Republican Guard). In effect, he 

controlled all of Saddam’s security organizations, an 

unprecedented level of trust for any single individual. 

In 1987, Saddam appointed Husayn Kamil as Supervisor of Military Industrialization. He rose to Minister 

of Industry and Military Industrialization in 1988 

after acquiring the Ministries of Industry and Light 

Industry as well as exerting control over the Ministry 

of Oil (MoO), the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 

(IAEC), and Petrochemical Project No. 3 (PC-3), 

Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program. By 1990, Husayn 

Kamil was, very likely, the second most powerful 

man in Iraq.

Husayn Kamil received broad administrative and 

fi nancial authority from Saddam to consolidate Iraq’s 

research and development programs and industrial 

resources to support military production, including 

production of WMD and missile delivery systems. 

Although not technically trained, Kamil oversaw 

Iraq’s program to modify the Regime’s Scud missiles to the longer-range Al Husayn variant, and the 

development and production of nerve agents, including tabun, sarin and VX.

His relationship with Saddam gave Husayn Kamil 

opportunities to act outside the law and with minimal 

personal and fi scal oversight. Because of his family 

ties and proximity to Saddam, he could have anyone 

fi red or placed under suspicion. Although ‘Amir 

Al-Sa’di was the Deputy Director of MIC and a key 

subordinate, Kamil did not rely on deputies. A former 

subordinate noted: “Husayn Kamil did not have a 

right-hand man, as he was too arrogant.” His successor at MIC, who was also one of Kamil’s former 

subordinates said, “No one in MIC could control him, 

and everyone feared him.”

‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh

Huwaysh served in the Ministry of 

Industry from 1982 to 1988 and rose to 

Minister of Industry until the formation 

of MIMI and transfer of his position to 

Husayn Kamil. Huwaysh continued in 

government service as a presidential advisor as well as working in the private sector for nine 

years until his appointment as MIC Director in 1997. 

Within less than a year’s time of Huwaysh’s return to 

government service, Saddam appointed Huwaysh the 

“Minister of Military Industrialization,” (though there 

was no ministry of military industrialization) and 

in July 2001, Deputy Prime Minister. Credited with 

turning MIC around after its decline in the wake of 

Husayn Kamil’s defection and maintaining operations 

under UN sanctions, Huwaysh was the last Director 

of MIC prior to OIF.

1

 From the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 

Iraq’s WMD, Volume I, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 45.
17
This page intentionally left blank.
19

Annex B

SOTI—MIC Acquisitions, 

Mergers, and Expansion

Both the State Organization for Technical Industries 

(SOTI) (beginning in 1986) and the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) (after its creation in late 

1987), developed appetites for grabbing and taking 

over projects, plants, and establishments belonging to 

other ministries or Iraqi Government agencies. Sometimes these other organizations were facing fi nancial 

trouble due to lack of budget allocations or other 

reasons tied to Iraq’s prolonged war with Iran. SOTIMIC raids and takeovers included the following:

State Establishment for Pesticide Production and 

Chemical Weapons

In 1987, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) relinquished 

control of its chemical weapons production facilities, the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP), to MIC. MoD had built and nurtured 

SEPP since its inception in 1981. In November 

1981, Staff Maj. Gen. Nizar ‘Abd al-Salam Ra’uf Al 

‘Attar, Director of the MoD Chemical Corps, began 

to work on chemical agent preparation at a small lab 

at Shammaiya in northeastern Baghdad with a group 

of Chemical Corps offi cer chemists. Maj. Gen. Nizar 

was considering expansion of this work at a suitable 

location.

‘Amir Al-Sa’di, at that time the SOTI Vice President 

had a suitable location: the then-defunct facilities at 

Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham (Al Hasan) [alternative 

spelling Al Hazan Ibn Al Haitam]. The equipment 

formerly associated with Al Hasan remained unused 

since its closure in 1975, and the buildings at the site, 

the future location of Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE), included several unfi nished structures. 

‘Amir Al-Sa’di offered the site to Maj. Gen. Nizar 

along with leftover Al Hasan equipment, some still in 

its original crates. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di considered SOTI an 

organization for conventional weapons production; 

he was not interested in getting involved with other 

types of weapons with which MIC had no experience. 

When SOTI took over Al Hasan in 1975, ‘Amir AlSa’di dissolved the biological weapons (BW) and the 

chemical weapons (CW) research sections and sent 

CW personnel back to the Army Chemical Corps. 

To make his proposition more attractive to Nizar, AlSa’di offered to have the SOTI contracting company, 

Sa’d State Establishment, complete the buildings at 

the site for SEPP.

When ‘Amir Al-Sa’di returned from Yugoslavia to 

SOTI in 1985, he saw how successful Nizar was in 

his project. SEPP was supplying the Iraqi Army with 

chemical munitions using empty 155-mm artillery 

shells procured from Spain originally designed for 

white phosphorus. SEPP replaced the white phosphorus in these rounds with mustard agent. SEPP 

similarly modifi ed LD250 aviation bombs, originally 

designed for high explosives, for use with mustard 

agent.

Al-Sa’di recognized the feasibility and economy 

of combining SOTI-produced shells, bomb bodies, 

explosives, propellant powders, and fuses with 

SEPP’s chemical agents. MoD procurement offi cers, 

however, preferred to deal with foreign munitions 

suppliers, rather than using an Iraqi Government 

organization. In some cases, the motivation for this 

preference had nothing to do with the quality of 

indigenously produced munitions. Foreign suppliers 

often provided lucrative contracts with fringe benefi ts 

for the procurement offi cers, including VIP treatment 

on travel abroad. Such amenities were much more 

attractive than doing business with another government department within Iraq. Importing munitions 

components, however, drained scarce hard currency 

from the Iraqi Government. Not only were foreign 

munitions more expensive than those produced 

locally, but shipment by air into Iraq was also very 

costly. MoD bore these costs willingly and with very 

little accountability because SEPP was a secret project, and its CW-production capabilities were critical 

to the Iraqi war effort against Iran.

This began to change in 1986 when Minister of 

Defense Staff Gen. ‘Adnan Khayrallah, Saddam’s 

brother-in-law, sought help in controlling SEPP’s high 
20

spending costs. Nizar was spending large amounts 

of hard currency to have foreign contractors build 

nonspecialized structures such as a fully fi nished 

library, a mess hall with kitchen, a VIP restaurant for 

the offi cers, a housing area for the employees, and 

lakeside villas with entertainment and recreations 

centers for the offi cers. All were fully furnished from 

abroad. The construction arm within SOTI could have 

built these facilities at much lower cost.

Saddam ordered SOTI to take responsibility for 

SEPP’s nontechnical and administrative activities and 

audit SEPP’s accounts. Approximately 18 months 

later (in 1987 when SOTI was transitioning to MIC), 

Saddam directed Husayn Kamil to assume control of 

SEPP and fi re its Director General, Staff Maj. Gen. 

Nizar. After a MoD inquiry into SEPP’s affairs, a few 

SEPP personnel were jailed. Kamil appointed Col. 

Fa’iz ‘Abdallah Shahin, who was the Director General 

of SOTI’s Al Qa’qa’a State Establishment, as the new 

SEPP Director General, and SEPP became MSE. 

Shahin was a chemist who was originally trained as 

a Chemical Corps offi cer; MSE thrived under his 

leadership.

Technical Research Center and Biological 

Weapons

A small group of biologists led by Dr. Rihab Rashid 

Taha Najm Al ‘Azzawi joined SEPP in 1985 to study 

the physiological effects of chemical agents. Rihab’s 

mentor, biology professor Dr. Nasir ‘Abd al-Husayn 

‘Abd al-‘Amir Al Hindawi, suggested that she work 

on BW agents and expressed a willingness to supervise her work on a part time basis. Maj. Gen. Nizar, 

who was still Director General of SEPP at that time, 

readily agreed and the small group started work under 

Nasir. By 1987, their agents of choice were mainly 

Bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin.

The new Director General of MSE, Col. Fa’iz, carefully considered the work of the BW group. The 

effort was at a decision point and Col. Fa’iz had either 

to expand the work (which he did not want to do 

because MSE was essentially a CW facility) or to get 

rid of the group. Husayn Kamil became familiar with 

the BW group’s work and decided to take the group 

under his wing. In the second half of 1987, Kamil 

moved the group to the Technical Research Center 

(TRC) at Salman Pak. Kamil had taken over the TRC 

in February after he assumed control over SOTI. At 

TRC he could directly oversee the group’s work.

TRC’s functions included chemical and biological 

analysis of food and beverages for Saddam and other 

VIPs. TRC worked on special electronic equipment 

for secure communications and surveillance countermeasures. When he took over TRC, Husayn Kamil 

replaced the organization’s director and selected Dr. 

Ahmad Murtada Ahmad Khalil Al Zuhayri, the Director General of Badr State Establishment, to serve both 

as the new TRC Director General and to continue as 

the Director General of Badr.

The BW group expanded its activity with continued 

support by TRC and under tight controls by Husayn 

Kamil. In 1989, the group again moved to a new site 

and became an establishment known as Al Hakam. 

While the BW group’s work suffered from the isolation of tight security and a lack of experience, it 

eventually succeeded in creating large amounts of 

biological agents that were used to fi ll R-400 bombs 

and Al Husayn (Iraqi-modifi ed Scuds) missile warheads.

Military Research and Development Organization

The Ministry of Defense created the Military 

Research and Development (R&D) Organization in 

November or December 1983 and initially had only 

one employee, ‘Amir Muhammad Rashid Al-’Ubaydi. 

‘Amir Rashid was assigned an offi ce, a driver, and 

one soldier. The Minister of Defense designated him 

a Deputy Commander of the Air Force and promoted 

him to Lieutenant General in January 1984. He built 

his organization over the next few years, accumulating 50 to 60 personnel, composed mainly of military 

but also university academics.

The mission of the Military R&D Organization was 

tactical—artillery, armor, naval, air force, radar, and 

air defense, but not weapons of mass destruction. It 

dealt with air-to-air and short-range surface-to-surface 

missile systems. The Military R&D Organization 
21

maintained a liaison relationship with SOTI because 

it had no infrastructure; it was only a think tank that 

“worked through other elements.”

As ‘Amir Rashid had no laboratories or workshops of 

his own, he proposed to take over the SOTI’s Al Kindi 

Research Center in Mosul. He lobbied the Presidential Secretary and the MoD Director of Procurement and Supplies who, together with ‘Amir Rashid 

himself, made up half of the SOTI board of directors. 

SOTI Vice President ‘Amir Al-Sa’di opposed the 

transfer, as did the SOTI president and the MIM representative on the SOTI board, and thus the proposed 

transfer was not approved by the board. 

The Presidential Secretary presented the SOTI board’s 

decision on the matter to Saddam, and Saddam sent 

Husayn Kamil, who was a major at the time, to listen 

to further discussion of the matter at another SOTI 

board meeting. According to ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, this 

meeting was Husayn Kamil’s introduction to SOTI 

and the fi rst time Al-Sa’di had seen Kamil. Kamil 

listened carefully, did not say much, and the decision of the previous board meeting on the Al Kindi 

issue stood. Al-Sa’di stated that he subsequently 

became familiar with ‘Amir Rashid’s staff and worked 

together with them for a while. He then suggested 

that Husayn Kamil bring ‘Amir Rashid’s whole R&D 

organization, including the boss, ‘Amir Rashid, into 

MIC.

When it appeared that Husayn Kamil had designs 

on the Military R&D Organization, ‘Amir Rashid 

advised MoD Chief of Staff Nizar Khazraji that it 

would be in MoD’s best interest to retain control of 

the Military R&D Organization. Despite this warning, 

MoD transferred it to Kamil in the spring of 1988, 

although ‘Amir Rashid initially remained in MoD, 

Kamil came to MoD the next day with an order from 

Saddam to transfer ‘Amir Rashid also. When ‘Amir 

Rashid arrived at MIC to continue his work in military R&D, Kamil accepted him warmly and appointed 

him to Director General.

Petrochemical Project No. 2 (PC-2)

PC-2 was one of the largest projects approved by the 

Iraqi leadership for the Ministry of Industry, but a 

contractor was never selected for the project because 

of a lack of funds. It would have been Iraq’s second 

major petrochemical complex. The fi rst, Petrochemical Project No.1 (PC-1) in Al Zubayr, was commissioned in 1980 at the start of the confl ict with Iran, 

but the plant shut down after production trials because 

of its proximity to the war danger zone along the Iranian border. PC-1’s capacity was about 120,000 tons 

of polyethylene and PVC, and its feedstock was gas 

from the gas separation station in the southern Iraq oil 

fi elds.

PC-2 had a design capacity of 1.25 million tons of 

polyethylene and other polymer products, roughly 

ten times the capacity of PC-1. MIC took over PC-2 

with the understanding that MIC would be the prime 

contractor for civil engineering and infrastructure 

work on the project. MIC planned to award separate 

subcontracts to various suppliers for petrochemical processing equipment and technology. The Iraqi 

Government signed a contract with the US company 

Bechtel for overall consultancy. Work was in progress 

on PC-2, when the Gulf war started in January 1991.

Central Refi nery

PC-2 was to obtain its feedstock from the nearby 

strategic gas pipeline and draw on other basic materials to be extracted from a refi nery that was to be built 

adjacent to the PC-2 complex. The Ministry of Oil 

(MoO) completed planning and design work for this 

refi nery, but construction did not begin because of 

the Iran-Iraq war. MIC then took over the project and 

continued with the MoO plan to build the refi nery at 

Jurf-al-Sakhr, west of the Euphrates River. MIC had 

begun construction when the 1991 Gulf war intervened. The refi nery had a design capacity of about 

250,000 barrels per day of petroleum.
22

State Establishment for Heavy Engineering 

Equipment (Al Nasr Al ‘Azim Company)

When MIM gave up PC-2 and MoO gave up the 

Central Refi nery, MIC asked for and obtained the 

Al Dawrah factory, which produced heat exchangers 

for oil refi neries as well as other heavy engineering 

equipment. This factory consisted of a workshop with 

an overhead crane and some welding, cutting, and 

rolling equipment. Immediately after taking over the 

facility, MIC drew up plans to build a completely new 

plant to produce a full range of equipment needed 

by the MoO and its refi neries—large boilers, pressure tanks and tubes, reactors, and vessels for various 

purposes—plus stainless steel vessels and other items 

used in the chemical, food, and pharmaceutical industries. The amount of capital invested in the facility 

was over 100 times the original amount invested by 

the MoO. The original plant’s experienced personnel 

easily adapted their skills to the activities, and new 

graduates of MIC’s training centers joined them.

MIC completed the plant’s fi rst expansion in 1990, 

naming it the State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment. It became the main supplier of 

heavy equipment to the Iraqi oil industry and was 

later renamed Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State Company. MIC 

began a second expansion in 1998 that remained 

unfi nished when war broke out in March 2003.

Oil Research Institute

The Oil Research Institute in Jadriyah, Baghdad 

originally belonged to the Scientifi c Research Council 

(SRC), but the Iraqi Government disbanded the SRC 

in 1986, another casualty of the Iran-Iraq war. MIC 

absorbed this well-equipped research center and its 

staff. After the 1991 Gulf war, the Oil Research Institute became part of Al Basil Center, later called Al 

Basil State Company, specializing in petroleum and 

petrochemical research.

The Center for Space Research and Astronomy

The Center for Space Research and Astronomy in 

Jadriyah, Baghdad was another Scientifi c Research 

Council component “orphaned” by the Iran-Iraq war 

and the SRC’s demise. MIC took over the center, but 

did not want the astronomy component and transferred it to Baghdad University. The remaining Center 

for Space Research worked mainly on remote sensing 

and satellite communications and was a contributor to 

the Al ‘Abid satellite launch project, eventually halted 

by the 1991 Gulf war. (The Al ‘Abid booster was 

tested in late 1989, and a second test was expected in 

1990, but the effort was derailed by the August 1990 

invasion of Kuwait.) The Center became Al Battani 

State Company in the late 1990s. Al Battani engaged 

in the development of microwave and unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) control technology and renewed 

its remote-sensing and space science research activities.

State Establishment for Iron and Steel

The merger of MIC with the Ministries of Industry 

and Light Industry did not happen immediately with 

the creation of the Ministry of Industry and Military 

Industry (MIMI) in March 1988. It was preceded by 

SOTI’s takeover of specifi c industrial establishments 

considered essential for the Iran-Iraq war effort. In 

1986, the Ministry of Industry shut down the iron 

and steel mill in Basrah, formally known as the State 

Establishment for Iron and Steel. The plant was 

located in southwest Basrah, within range of Iranian 

artillery positions. Iranian troops crossed the Shatt 

al-Arab waterway near Al Faw in February 1986 and 

made a determined push up the Al Faw peninsula to 

be stopped by the Iraqi Army just short of Basrah. 

There the Iranians dug in along a line stretching from 

the Shatt al-Arab just south of Basrah to the southwest, directly across the Al Faw peninsula to a point 

close to the road leading to Kuwait. Just to the north 

of this line were a number of facilities belonging to 

the Ministry of Industry, including a fertilizer plant 
23

(urea from gas), the iron and steel mill, the PC-1 complex, the Southern Refi nery, and a gas-fi red power station belonging to MoO. Initially, all of these facilities 

were shut down when Iranian advances placed them 

within range of Iranian artillery.

In 1987, the Ministry of Industry restarted the Basrah 

iron and steel mill and the fertilizer plant, and made 

plans to restart the PC-1 complex by the end of 1988. 

The latter required reconditioning many derelict components (pipes, valves, seals, pumping stations, control panels, etc.) because the plant had been shutdown 

for six years, not because it had suffered damage from 

shelling. MIC, then MIMI, took over the Basrah iron 

and steel mill in 1988 because its output was essential 

for production of artillery shells for the Iraqi Army. 

MIMI was willing to accept the risk of daily bombardment by Iranian artillery and MIC’s gamble paid 

off. After carefully studying the bombardment pattern, 

MIC supervisors determined that shelling occurred 

daily around 10 o’clock in the morning (good time 

for a mid-morning tea break for the workers), and it 

lasted for less than 10 minutes—the time needed for 

effective counterbattery fi re by Iraqi gunners. The Iranians also used shells with impact fuses, so even their 

direct hits exploded on the roof and superstructure 

of the workshops causing only superfi cial damage. 

For an entire year, not a single shell penetrated to the 

shop fl oor where the furnaces and rolling mills were 

located, and no casualties occurred.

MIC planned to expand and modernize the facility 

to triple its production in quantity and product range. 

This work was under way when the 1991 war interrupted the project.

Al Nasr State Establishment

Al Nasr State Establishment in Taji was the most 

advanced factory in Iraq and the Ministry of Industry’s most prized possession, with modern, numerically controlled (NC) and computer numerically 

controlled (CNC) machines capable of manufacturing 

sophisticated special tools and molds. Swiss, German, 

and Italian fi rms built the plant from 1981 to 1983, 

under a contract that also included a six-year technical assistance package. The plant was equipped with 

a modern foundry and forging shop, heat treatment 

and surface treatment facilities, and a factory for 

producing prefabricated steel structures for industrial 

construction. Foreign skilled labor, primarily from 

China, supplemented the Iraqi work force at Al Nasr. 

Beginning in 1986, as the confl ict with Iran deepened, SOTI began to encroach on Al Nasr’s facilities 

to increase war materiel production. The Ministry of 

Industry resisted, but by 1988 it was forced to turn 

over the entire complex to SOTI/MIC for producing 

components for armaments. 

According to Dr. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, MIC saw that Nasr 

could be expanded to produce engineering equipment 

and products of various kinds, including machine 

tools and specialty steels needed for the military 

and civilian markets. MIC planned, constructed, and 

equipped new workshops between 1987 and 1990 that 

expanded Nasr threefold. MIC added a new foundry 

with state of the art special steel production capability using electroslag remelting (ESR) technology and 

a forging shop that could produce various articles, 

including artillery tube blanks and special tool steels. 

A new rolling mill was being equipped to produce 

stainless steel sheet metal and various bars and rods, 

but the 1991 war halted its progress. Nasr also gained 

a galvanizing shop and facilities for producing mobile 

overhead cranes, towers, and pylons. Another plant 

was equipped with vertical and horizontal fl ow forming machines and produced multiple launch rocket 

system (MRLS) rocket metal components. These 

plants became part of Nasr as it expanded under MIC 

until the end of 1990. The expansions later formed 

what became known as Al Samud and Dhu Al Fikar 

Companies.

‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh, 

Deputy Minister and then Minister of Industry during 

this period, contended that Husayn Kamil wasted 

much of the precise machinery at Al Nasr casting 

bomb shells and making ammunition, instead of the 

tools and molds Al Nasr was designed to produce. 

Al-Sa’di maintained that in the 1987 to 1990 period, 

Husayn Kamil heeded the advice of his senior experts 

in production technology, though he pressed hard for 

increased output during the height of the Iran-Iraq 

war in 1987 to 1988. He added that there was little 

demand for munitions once the Iran-Iraq war ended.
24

 State Establishment for Electrical Industry

The State Establishment for Electrical Industry in Al 

Waziriyah, Baghdad was the next Ministry of Industry 

facility that MIC acquired. Built by the Russians in 

the 1950s it had die casting and precision tool shops 

and depended on foreign skilled labor. It was running 

well under the Ministry of Industry, but MIC needed 

some of its industrial components to increase wartime 

production. With these components missing, the Al 

Waziriyah plant could not meets its production goals 

within the civil sector so it was ripe for MIC’s total 

absorption. 

Under MIC, the facility reached its full production 

capacity, including the reactivation of a light bulb production plant. Production at that plant had been halted 

by a lack of spare parts and raw materials.

Iskandariyah State Establishment for 

Agricultural Implements 

This plant, built with Russia assistance in 1958, was 

the oldest engineering company in Iraq. It was originally called Iskandariyah Project No. 1 and was later 

known as the State Establishment for Mechanical 

Industries (SEMI). MIC took over the facility because 

its foundry and forge shops were needed for the IranIraq war effort. Without these key components the 

company could no longer meet production goals for 

agricultural implements. 

After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, 

however, the plant again reached full capacity production with its full range of products. The plant also produced new products including diesel pump engines, 

small dump trucks, and a range of electrically driven 

pumps.

State Establishment for Vehicle Production

The State Establishment for Vehicle Production 

(SEVP) in Iskandariyah assembled Renault trucks 

and buses until 1979 when the Ministry of Industry 

determined that France was selling completed models 

for 8 percent less than it cost Iraq to buy and assemble 

the components. The Ministry of Industry then transferred the Renault assembly line to Iskandariyah State 

Establishment for Agricultural Implements for tractor 

production. In 1980, SEVP opened a new bus factory 

for producing modern Reem intercity busses with 

Skania power trains. Iraq purchased a license agreement from US automaker General Motors to produce 

a range of vehicles, including Oldsmobile Delta 

88 front-wheel-drive cars and Blazer four-wheeldrive sport utility vehicles. Likewise, Iraq pursued 

an expensive license agreement with Mercedes to 

produce busses and trucks. These license agreements 

were to be core elements of Iraq’s future industrial 

development; however, when the Gulf war intervened, 

both projects stopped.

Sa’d State Establishment

Another important component of MIC’s strength was 

building an engineering and construction group that 

designed and erected buildings and structures. This 

group started modestly in 1972 with the construction 

of sheds, bungalows, administrative buildings and 

roads. Gradually, working side-by-side with foreign 

contractors, they acquired experience which enabled 

them to compete with the best international contractors. This construction arm of military industries was 

inaugurated in 1974 as the Sa’d State Establishment. 

In 1987, it became Al Faw State Establishment. Dr. 

Mujbil Al Marsumi led the organization. He was 

a civil engineer and a charter member of the Military Industry Follow-up and Executive Committee 

(FOLEX) formed in 1972.

The Sa’d (later called Al Faw) Construction Company 

quickly attracted civil and construction engineers and 

architects from various idle establishments at other 

ministries. They took on tasks that previously they 

had only watched foreign contractors perform. These 

tasks included the design and construction of factories and bridges (two on the Euphrates at Rawa and 

Yusufi yah) and fi gured prominently in reconstruction 

projects after the 1991 war. 
25

Al Faw restored Baghdad’s 14 July Bridge, a suspension bridge originally built by an Austrian company 

in the mid-1960s. The Ministry of Housing and 

Construction, after inspecting the destroyed bridge, 

recommended the construction of a new conventionaldesign bridge to replace the suspension bridge. The 

ministry assessed it was impossible to build a new 

suspension bridge without foreign assistance, which 

was unavailable because of economic sanctions 

imposed on Iraq. MIC took a different view and came 

to the conclusion that it could salvage parts of the old 

structure and rebuild the bridge as it was before. Only 

the cable strands had to be procured from abroad, 

which was not impossible. The successful reconstruction of the bridge was led by Brigadier ‘Abd al-Khaliq 

Al Azzawi. Al Faw State Establishment also built the 

test bed for the Supergun project.

Al Faw State Establishment expanded its activities 

to include the construction of hydroelectric power 

dams. Al Faw became involved in this business when 

the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture requested 

help solving its water seepage problem under the 

main body of the Saddam Dam on the Tigris River. Al 

Faw studied the problem and took part in the remedy, 

which required continuous grouting with fi ne cement 

under the main body of the dam. Iraqi offi cials 

decided to build the Baddush Dam 10 to 15 km south 

of Saddam Dam to prevent catastrophic fl ooding of 

Iraqi cites from Mosul to Basrah if the Saddam Dam 

failed. Al Faw took up the project in the late 1980s 

using about 1,000 Vietnamese workers. The Baddush 

project was halted by the 1990 invasion of Kuwait 

and never resumed, despite Husayn Kamil’s efforts 

to revive it. The cost to complete the dam was not 

justifi ed by the benefi ts it would provide for irrigation 

or power generation. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, 

with hard currency at a premium, there were other 

more cost-effective projects.

Technical Corps for Special Projects (TECO)

The Technical Corps for Special Projects (TECO) was 

a project management element created within SOTI 

in 1986 to help SOTI implement its fi ve-year plan for 

expansion. TECO was involved in large, high-technology projects, both military and civilian. (TECO 

was not, however, involved in the construction of the 

Al Hakam BW agent plant or the Fallujah CW precursor facilities.) ‘Amir Al-Sa’di headed TECO, while 

also serving as the Vice President of SOTI.

The fi rst section of TECO dealt with intermediaterange missile projects, using both liquid and solid 

propellants, including the Badr 2000 missile program 

and, later, Project 144, the indigenous Scud-variant 

manufacturing effort. This section was also involved 

in the Al ‘Abid space launch vehicle development 

effort.

Section 2 was the T-72 tank project. In 1986, Iraq 

signed an agreement with the former Soviet Union for 

indigenous manufacture of the T-72 tank at the Ibn-alWalid facility.

TECO section 3 was Petrochemical Project No. 2 

(PC-2) and the Central Refi nery in Jurf-al-Shakr, as 

previously discussed. PC-2 was originally a MIM 

project that was taken over by MIC. The US contractor Bechtel was a general consultant on the project, 

but TECO handled all project integration.

Section 4 dealt with aircraft development, including a 

trainer (Tucano) project, MI-8 and MI-25 helicopter 

projects, and an SU-25 project.

Other TECO elements also were planning for antiaircraft missile and weapons manufacturing. Dr. Gerald 

Bull’s projects, including the Supergun, a Gatling 

gun, and 155-mm and 210-mm self-propelled artillery 

pieces, were also TECO undertakings. These efforts 

began in 1987 and 1988.

Col. Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin headed the 

technical bureau within Al-Sa’di’s TECO offi ce. 

(Maj. Gen. Husam Amin later served as the Director 

General of MIC’s National Monitoring Directorate 

and was a key fi gure in UN and International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection activities.) This 

technical bureau had oversight of many projects, but 

according to ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, the organizational lines 

were “all very loose and informal.” 

Huwaysh contends that TECO spent billions of dollars, with little practical application or result, in part 

because of corruption. When Huwaysh took over MIC 

he said that he found many partially completed buildings on MIC properties, which had no apparent connection to any project, and he quoted Husayn Kamil 

as saying, “Without work you cannot steal.”
This page intentionally left blank.
27

Annex C

Saddam Husayn and Military 

Industrialization

Saddam Husayn’s Role in Iraq’s Weapons

Programs

Saddam’s interest in controlling Iraq’s weapons programs dates back to his days as Vice President of Iraq. 

In the early 1970s, he became the head of the “Committee for Planning and Follow-up of Development 

Projects.” “Development Projects” in this context 

encompassed everything from agriculture to industry, 

infrastructure to health and education, as well as the 

armed forces. Each government organization drew up 

fi ve-year plans that required approval by the committee. Implementation of the plans in all fi elds started in 

parallel as far as fi nancial resources from oil revenues 

and credits allowed. After Saddam nationalized oil 

production and marketing there was a considerable 

increase in oil prices. With the resultant increase in 

revenues, implementation of plans accelerated at 

high speed. Projects became more ambitious as they 

increased in number.

Saddam’s personal involvement in one project 

or another was not a strong predictor of its rapid 

progress or eventual success, but it did ensure those 

projects a certain degree of notoriety. Likewise, 

Saddam’s investment in high-technology research 

and development and indigenous weapons production yielded results that varied widely, independent 

of resources allocated. Saddam wanted immediate 

results and did not have an appreciation of the long 

leadtime of most industrial projects. In the early 

years, Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi oversaw military industry for Saddam, but Husayn Kamil Hasan 

Al-Majid, Saddam’s son-in-law and the son of his 

paternal fi rst cousin, eventually replaced him. Neither 

was an industrial specialist by training. Their primary 

qualifi cation was loyalty to Saddam. That pattern 

changed, following Kamil’s 1995 defection. Saddam 

eventually turned to ‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah AlMullah Huwaysh, a former Minister of Industry who 

Saddam had fi red in 1988, to lead the rehabilitation 

of Iraq’s military-industrial complex. Angry with 

Huwaysh after he humiliated Kamil in a ministers’ 

meeting in 1988, Saddam did not talk to Huwaysh for 

the next nine years, but retained him on the government payroll as a presidential advisor nonetheless. 

Although Huwaysh was not a member of Saddam’s 

inner circle, he was a competent engineer and manager, with a reputation for speaking his mind. After 

Kamil’s defection, Huwaysh’s earlier opposition to 

Kamil probably worked in his favor for selection to 

head MIC.

Except for a brief interregnum in 1991 to 1992 while 

he served as Minister of Defense, Husayn Kamil 

supervised Iraqi military industry and the Military 

Industrialization Commission (MIC) beginning in 

1987 and ending with his escape to Jordan in 1995. 

Kamil had nearly unlimited access to Saddam because 

of their close ties. According to one of Kamil’s senior 

subordinates, ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sa’di, Kamil 

used this access to obtain “decisions from his fatherin-law, with whom he had lunch two or three times 

per week.” Given Kamil’s close relationship with 

Saddam, Kamil’s decisions regarding MIC were 

probably aligned closely with Saddam’s broader 

strategic goals. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, however, contended 

Saddam showed very little interest in MIC until 

after the shock of Kamil’s departure for Jordan. One 

possible explanation for Al-Sa’di’s observation is that 

Saddam trusted Kamil so completely he felt no need 

to exert control over MIC outside of his discussions 

with Kamil.

Saddam’s relationship with ‘Abd al-Tawab AlMullah Huwaysh, the major Regime fi gure who 

dominated Iraqi military industry following Husayn 

Kamil’s departure, was characterized by ad hoc 

interventions, bereft of strategic guidance or a broad 

vision of MIC’s role in the future of Iraq. In most 

cases, Saddam’s style was leadership by exception.

When Saddam issued “orders” he expected quick 

results. While he was averse to changing his mind, 

he would listen to a well-reasoned argument, and if 
28

convinced it was credible, adjust his decision. These 

“orders” had considerable impact on a variety of 

military industrial projects, some of which related to 

WMD issues, UN restrictions, conventional weapons 

production, and civilian infrastructure requirements. Others were related to pet projects, many 

without technical merit, which Saddam adopted from 

well-meaning or unscrupulous entrepreneurs and 

then passed along to MIC (see Saddam’s Other Pet 

Projects section).

Responding to Orders

The examples below form a picture of how Saddam 

directed his military industrial complex, beginning 

as early as 1970, but with primary emphasis on the 

period from 1997 to 2003, and illustrate the results of 

his involvement.

Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham

Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham [alt. spelling Al Hazen Ibn 

Al Haithem] enjoyed high priority in allocation of 

funds and close attention from Saddam. The objectives for this project, which began in 1970, were to 

establish three research and development centers in 

high-technology fi elds where it would be diffi cult or 

impossible to obtain foreign assistance. The fi rst was 

in the fi eld of secure communications starting from 

solid state physics labs and silicon chip production, 

and leading to circuit design and special communications equipment production. The second area was 

creating laboratories for development of chemical 

warfare (CW) agents, leading to pilot and eventually 

full-scale production. The third area was creating biological laboratories for the development of biological 

warfare (BW) agents.

Saddam appointed Sa’dun Shakir Mahmud, Chief 

of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), to supervise 

the project, yet the project came to grief. It ended 

abruptly and was abandoned completely in 1975, 

failing because of bad management, ignorance, and 

fraud. The central personalities were prosecuted and 

punished for their roles in the failure. The remaining 

pieces, including a physics laboratory, a mainframe 

computer (largest in Iraq at the time), some buildings 

at the future site of Al Muthanna State Establishment 

(MSE), and the Mansur electronics plant, Sa’dun 

handed over to ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sa’di, then 

Vice President of the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI), to do with as he saw fi t. ‘Amir 

Al-Sa’di dissolved the BW section and disbanded 

its personnel. He also dissolved the CW section and 

sent its personnel back to the Iraqi Army Chemical 

Corps. New construction for Al Hasan was stopped, 

and much of the equipment purchased for the project 

remained crated and unused.

IAEC and Nuclear Weapons Research

The Iraqi nuclear program began with the creation 

of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 

the 1950s. Nuclear weapons, however, were not the 

original goal of Iraq’s nuclear program, according to 

Dr. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di. Iraq wanted to acquire experience 

in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and 

signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. 

Iraq signed contracts with the Soviet Union for a 

small research reactor in the 1960s and in November 

1976 signed a contract with France for a larger reactor. Beginning in the 1970s, Saddam began to take 

a special interest in and supervise IAEC activities. 

According to Al-Sa’di, IAEC programs took an abrupt 

turn toward weaponization, only after the Israelis 

bombed the newly installed reactor at Tuwaitha in 

June 1981. Al-Sa’di alleged that previous to the 

attack, Israel sought to undermine the progress of 

Iraq’s nuclear program by sabotaging key equipment 

while it was en route to Iraq and even assassinating 

Iraqi nuclear scientists. Al-Sa’di contended that Israel 

perpetrated these misdeeds against an Iraqi program 

that at the time was in full compliance with international safeguards and regulations.

Saddam formally assumed the presidency of Iraq 

in 1979. Following the destruction of the Tuwaitha 

reactor in 1981, Saddam charged Revolutionary Command Council Deputy Chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al 

Duri with overseeing a clandestine program to build 

a nuclear weapon. The program enjoyed Saddam’s 

full support and received priority in allocation of 
29

funds, according to Al-Sa’di. In 1987, when Saddam 

made Husayn Kamil his direct overseer of Iraq’s 

military-industrial complex he also gave him responsibility for the country’s nuclear program, although 

Kamil had no technical training whatsoever. By 1988, 

the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians 

in the IAEC exceeded 6,000 and included the brightest and best qualifi ed in Iraq, according to Al-Sa’di. 

Under great pressure from Saddam to show results, 

Kamil and his senior subordinates provided Saddam 

with a series of glowing reports on the progress of the 

nuclear program. According to Dr. Mahdi Ubaydi, 

one of Iraq’s leading nuclear scientists who was then 

working on uranium enrichment, “everyone deceived 

each other in order to survive.” In reality, according 

to Al-Sa’di, the nuclear program was falling short of 

the objectives briefed to Saddam. Eventually, Al-Sa’di 

contended, rivalries and jealousies took hold, and 

critical reports from disgruntled scientists reached 

Saddam revealing the program’s major inadequacies.

To address this problem, Saddam directed MIC and 

IAEC to meet at the level of project leaders and 

scientists in the presence of their respective supervisors—Husayn Kamil for MIC and Dr. Humam ‘Abd 

al-Khaliq Abd-al-Ghafur for the IAEC—to review the 

progress of individual projects and to identify shortcomings and suggest remedies. According to Al-Sa’di, 

after two such meetings, Saddam surprisingly divided 

the IAEC into two components. He transferred the 

weapons program to Kamil, directing the creation of 

Petrochemical Project No. 3 (PC-3) complex, comprised more than 3,000 of Iraq’s top nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians managed by Ja’far 

Diya’ Ja’far Hashim. Civilian nuclear applications 

remained in the IAEC. According to Al-Sa’di, after 

the creation of PC-3, the nuclear weapons program 

accelerated and expanded its range of activities. AlSa’di maintained that the history and achievements of 

the nuclear weapons program are well documented in 

Iraq’s December 2002 Completely Accurate, Full, and 

Complete Declaration (CAFCD).

In the wake of the 1991 Gulf war, Saddam directed 

PC-3 to restore Iraq’s heavily damaged electrical 

grid and communications infrastructure, according 

to Al-Sa’di. Husayn Kamil abolished PC-3 in 1992 

and sent most of its personnel to MIC companies and 

research centers, according to Huwaysh and Al-Sa’di. 

Although a few returned to IAEC, all remained under 

Kamil’s overall supervision. Saddam’s guidance was 

to avoid dispersing former PC-3 scientists, but this 

was impossible because of MIC’s structure, according to Huwaysh. In many companies, however, they 

retained a separate identity for several years and 

remained under a separate pay and promotion system 

until 2000, when Minister of Military Industrialization Huwaysh directed their full integration within 

MIC.

According to Huwaysh, a number of former PC3 employees assigned to MIC were disenchanted 

because they were no longer doing nuclear research. 

Huwaysh noted that in MIC “most of my [morale] 

problems were PC-3 people.” To ease these problems, 

Huwaysh said he sent some scientists to university 

faculties and moved others back to IAEC. A few 

former PC-3 scientists and engineers left Iraq for 

other countries, including Libya, which was heavily 

recruiting scientists through its embassy in Baghdad, much to Saddam’s displeasure, according to 

Huwaysh. Early in 1998, Huwaysh said Saddam 

ordered him to take over what remained of Iraq’s 

nuclear power generation program. According to 

Huwaysh, he strenuously disagreed, fi nally convincing Saddam that to do so would further isolate Iraq’s 

nuclear scientists from their international counterparts, by creating the impression that Iraq’s nuclear 

program was focused primarily on military applications. Saddam rescinded his order.

Renewed Interest in IAEC Activities

The following narrative is drawn almost entirely from 

custodial interviews of ‘Abd al-Tawab Al-Mullah 

Huwaysh.

According to Huwaysh, in 1998, the directors general 

of the IAEC came to Dr. Humam, the former Director of the IAEC (then serving as Minister of Culture), 

to complain that the IAEC was suffering from low 

morale and productivity because of reduced budgets. 

Humam carried this message to Saddam Husayn.
30

In response, Saddam summoned his senior nuclear 

scientists, IAEC Director Dr. Fadil Muslim ‘Abd 

al-Janabi, former head of PC-3 Dr. Jaf’ar Diya 

Jaf’ar, along with Humam and the directors general 

of the IAEC, to hear their concerns and seek their 

advice. Saddam offered them whatever they needed, 

Huwaysh said. Over the protests of the Minister of 

Finance, Saddam directed a large budget increase 

for the IAEC and increased IAEC salaries tenfold 

from 2001 to 2003 (plus liberal bonuses). Saddam 

also directed Fadil to keep nuclear scientists together, 

instituted new laws and regulations increasing privileges for IAEC scientists, and invested in numerous 

new projects, according to Huwaysh.

Beginning in late 2001, Saddam convened frequent 

(often weekly) meetings with the IAEC, including 

TV appearances to highlight IAEC achievements. 

Huwaysh did not recall much substance associated 

with these so-called “achievements.” All this positive 

attention, particularly the increased salaries, attracted 

the attention of MIC’s former PC-3 scientists and 

engineers, several of whom requested transfer to 

IAEC. Huwaysh, under pressure to let them go, said 

he countered with salary increases of his own, and 

most remained with MIC. Also, Saddam ordered 

certain projects in MIC to be transferred to IAEC, an 

arrangement Huwaysh said he got partially reversed 

after protesting directly to Saddam.

In late 2001 or early 2002, Fadil told Huwaysh he 

had an order from Saddam directing Huwaysh to help 

the IAEC purchase undisclosed specialized equipment. Huwaysh, a deputy prime minister, outranked 

Fadil and resisted taking orders from him. According to Huwaysh, he delayed acting on Fadil’s order 

until after the next ministers’ meeting where Saddam 

confi rmed the order was valid. The IAEC, which 

had its own procurement system, required MIC’s 

help to disguise the IAEC as the customer. Assisting 

Fadil was Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa’id, IAEC’s senior 

nuclear scientist. Huwaysh was mildly surprised by 

Dr. Khalid’s involvement because he was approaching 

mandatory retirement age, something Saddam rarely 

waived. Once assigned to this project, Huwaysh 

noted, Khalid’s 64th birthday came and went and the 

subject of retirement never arose. Huwaysh presumed 

that Khalid’s expertise was so critical to the project’s 

success that normal rules did not apply.

To aid the transaction, Huwaysh said he introduced 

Drs. Fadil and Khalid to Munir Mamduh ‘Awad 

Al-Qubaysi, general manager of Al Basha’ir Trading Company, a MIC front company specializing in 

covert procurement. Huwaysh said he emphasized to 

Fadil and Khalid the terms of the deal: MIC wanted 

no part of the project, required the IAEC make all 

commercial arrangements, and required hard currency 

from the IAEC for all payments. Munir Al-Qubaysi 

would be the only link between IAEC and MIC. 

There was no bidding process, according to Huwaysh. 

Selected companies responded to private tenders 

fronted by Al Basha’ir. Another source stated that at 

this same time, Drs. Fadil and Khalid sent an IAEC 

employee to MIC’s Al Badr State Company to determine specifi cations for computer numerical control 

(CNC) machines. Supposedly, MIC’s most advanced 

CNC machines were located at Al Badr. Other reporting suggested Al Badr may have assisted Al Basha’ir 

in preparing the contracts, possibly to further mask 

IAEC as the ultimate recipient of the machines. Once 

offers were received, Khalid made the fi nal selection.

All paperwork went directly from Munir Al-Qubaysi 

to the IAEC, Huwaysh stated, except on one occasion 

when an administrator passed an invoice to Huwaysh 

by mistake. When Huwaysh realized it was most 

likely connected to the IAEC project, he signed it, 

reiterated that the transaction be completed in hard 

currency, and ordered it processed immediately. This 

was the only time he got a clue about what the IAEC 

was buying. The detailed invoice referred to a highly 

precise CNC machine, so precise that Huwaysh said 

he mentally questioned why such precision was necessary. Asked why, as the Minister of Military Industrialization, he did not follow-up on his reservations, 

Huwaysh said, “of course I wanted to know what was 

being bought, out of professional interest, but I knew 

better than to ask.”

According to Huwaysh, Saddam wanted to apply the 

IAEC’s scientifi c skills to support MIC activities, an 

idea Huwaysh believed had originated with Fadil. 

Huwaysh said that in 2002, based on this suggestion, 

Saddam ordered MIC and IAEC to work together 

on selected projects, with MIC outsourcing specifi c 

project elements to the IAEC. Huwaysh was unhappy 

with this arrangement, he asserted, and tried to limit 

it, doing just enough to satisfy Saddam. Huwaysh 
31

assigned oversight of the MIC-IAEC relationship 

to Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b Hasan Muhammad AlNasiri, his senior deputy at MIC. Day to day supervision resided with Maj. Gen. Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun 

Muhammad Al-‘Abbudi, MIC director general for 

research who also headed MIC’s “special procurement offi ce.” As part of this arrangement, Huwaysh 

recalled IAEC personnel working on projects dealing 

with insulating materials, electronics, and possibly 

the Ababil missile, all of which were nonproscribed 

activities and unrelated to former nuclear programs.

Saddam Husayn’s renewed interest from 2001 to 2003 

in IAEC, and his emphasis on raising the profi le of 

his nuclear scientists, rewarding their expertise, and 

purchasing specialized equipment made Huwaysh 

suspicious that Saddam might be attempting to restart 

a nuclear weapons program. At least one IAEC 

scientist shared Huwaysh’s suspicions, according to 

reporting. In addition, Huwaysh did not believe that 

the new machine tools shop, then under construction at Tuwaitha, would be a MIC facility. Huwaysh 

could not comprehend why Saddam would take that 

chance because nuclear research and development 

was not something easily kept hidden. For the same 

reason, ‘Amir Al-Sa’di dismissed Huwaysh’s suspicions, arguing that even if sanctions were removed it 

was no longer feasible in 2001 for Saddam to rebuild 

Iraq’s nuclear weapons program no matter how much 

Saddam might wish to do so.

Continuing the L-29 UAV Program

Huwaysh inherited the L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle 

(UAV) program along with Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b 

Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri when Saddam assigned 

Muzahim to be his deputy minister in MIC. Lt. 

Gen. Muzahim, a cousin of Saddam’s half brothers, 

previously served as the Air Force and Air Defense 

commander and in other security-related positions 

working directly for Saddam. 

In late 1997 or early 1998, Muzahim arranged a 

demonstration of the L-29 UAV for Huwaysh to help 

him decide whether to continue to fund the project. 

Huwaysh learned previously that Husayn Kamil 

(others suggest it was ‘Uday Saddam Husayn) began 

this program, originally using a MiG-21 fi ghter 

aircraft as the UAV, to develop an aerial platform to 

disseminate chemical or biological agents against 

invading military forces. In 1995, the L-29, a jet 

trainer with greater fl ying stability, was substituted 

for the MiG-21. However, according to Muzahim, the 

goal of the program now changed to battlefi eld aerial 

reconnaissance. Huwaysh found the L-29 UAV’s 

range and maneuverability woefully inadequate for 

this mission and the aircraft extremely vulnerable to 

enemy air defenses. He believed the revised mission 

was misleading, since the Air Force, supposedly the 

intended user of the L-29 UAV, never showed much 

interest in the aircraft, and it was never tested with 

reconnaissance cameras. Huwaysh suspected that the 

L-29 UAV was being developed as an aerial dispenser 

for chemical or biological agents, although he had 

no direct supporting evidence. As ‘Amir Al-Sa’di has 

pointed out, this conclusion presumes that CW or 

BW agents were available or forthcoming. Huwaysh 

wanted to cancel the project immediately, but relented 

when Muzahim told him the “order” to continue the 

project came from Saddam.

The program limped along for the next three years 

with no signifi cant technical breakthroughs and 

several failures, in Huwaysh’s words “consuming 

people, time, and money.” After an L-29 UAV crash in 

October 2000, Huwaysh and the Minister of Defense 

convened an internal progress review for the program. 

Huwaysh wanted to cancel the program after listening to Dr. Ibrahim Husayn Isma’il Al-Jaburi, who 

was responsible for the project, point out numerous 

technical weaknesses, and the Air Force commander 

complain about losing too many L-29s. He felt he 

needed additional justifi cation because of Saddam’s 

direct interest in it. The crash of the third L-29 UAV 

in spring 2001 gave Huwaysh the impetus to immediately cancel the program. Fearful of Saddam’s reaction, he did not inform him. Lt. Gen. Muzahim was 

angry about the cancellation, but Huwaysh told him 

“if the President asks, I will tell him why.” Saddam 

never asked.
32

Building RPV-20s for the SSO

Following MIC’s abandonment of the L-29 UAV 

project in early 2001, Ibrahim Husayn Isma’il Al 

Jaburi, Director General of Ibn-Firnas State Company, renewed his efforts on developing and producing an improved version of the Al Yamamah UAV. 

The resulting remotely piloted vehicle (RPV)-20 

was a more effective and less costly aerial reconnaissance alternative to the L-29 UAV. In early 2003, a 

major from the Special Security Organization (SSO) 

contacted Ibrahim with a verbal order from Saddam 

Husayn to supply three RPV-20s to the SSO. Ibrahim 

referred the order to Huwaysh, who questioned the 

major in detail about the intended use of the UAVs. 

The major told him that they would be armed with a 

high explosive (TNT) warhead for use against “the 

enemy.” Huwaysh explained to the major that the 

UAV, which had a total payload of 20 kg, including 

its guidance system, could carry at most 10 kg of high 

explosives as a replacement for its planned photo 

reconnaissance package. He believed this would be 

a poor strike weapon for the SSO. As an alternative, 

Huwaysh suggested the SSO consider either the Al 

Samud or Al Fat’h missiles, both with ranges exceeding that of the RPV-20 and carrying much larger 

warheads (350 kg of high explosives). The major 

insisted on the RPV-20s. When Huwaysh persisted in 

seeking more details about its intended mission, the 

major said Huwaysh had no need to know. Huwaysh 

responded that he could not support the request unless 

he had a written order from Saddam. By the next day 

the major provided one, but it did not specify how the 

RPV-20s were to be used.

Huwaysh notifi ed Ibrahim to begin work on the 

modifi ed RPV-20s but not to deliver them unless “I 

give you a direct order.” In the meantime, the SSO 

major came to see Ibrahim every day asking when 

his RPV-20s would be ready. Twice Ibrahim called 

Huwaysh to tell him the RPV-20s were ready for 

delivery and twice Huwaysh refused to release them. 

He was concerned about the possibility of chemical 

or biological warheads being placed on the RPV20s, even though, as ‘Amir Al-Sa’di has contended, 

“I cannot see how [this] is even remotely possible.” 

If the SSO did intend to put special warheads on the 

RPV-20s, Huwaysh was concerned this activity would 

be discovered by the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation and 

Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which was in 

Iraq conducting inspections, and it would implicate 

MIC. MIC never delivered any RPV-20s to the SSO. 

The war with the Coalition began before the Regime 

caught on to Huwaysh’s stalling tactics.

Explaining the Ion Implantation Project

Huwaysh inherited the ion implantation project (IIP) 

in the same way as the L-29 UAV program: Senior 

Deputy Muzahim brought it with him when he came 

to MIC in 1997. At the time, Huwaysh was not 

interested in the project because he felt the associated 

research had no application to practical and achievable military-industrial requirements. According to 

Huwaysh, Muzahim told him the goal of the IIP was 

to develop a coating to improve the stealth characteristics of aircraft surfaces. Huwaysh believed this idea 

to be far-fetched, but he chose to reserve judgment for 

the time being. He did know that Iraq had no aircraft 

industry where this technology could be used, and 

none was planned. 

Huwaysh said he visited the IIP for his fi rst and only 

time in 1997. While Huwaysh admitted he did not 

feel qualifi ed to judge the IIP’s technical merit, he 

likewise was not satisfi ed that the alleged purpose of 

the project justifi ed its existence. He considered the 

IIP more appropriate for university research than MIC 

research, but he did not have enough information to 

shut it down. Huwaysh said he knew canceling the 

IIP would not be easy because of Lt. Gen. Muzahim’s 

personal interest in it and Muzahim’s close association with Saddam. Therefore, Huwaysh continued to 

fund it from MIC accounts independent of any MIC 

company because it was inexpensive.

Until 1999, Dr. Mansur Sukr Fadhan managed the IIP 

under Lt. Gen. Muzahim’s direct supervision, according to Huwaysh. Then, under unusual circumstances, 

Mansur left Iraq and later, according to the IIS, turned 

up in Iran. Even without Mansur, Muzahim was keen 

to continue IIP research, Huwaysh stated. In response, 

Huwaysh agreed to place the IIP in Al Tahaddi State 

Company, one of the companies Muzahim supervised, 
33

and to assign it to Dr. Hikmat ‘Arrak Hamid Thuwayni. Although Huwaysh was still not convinced the 

project had practical value, by 2002 his view of the 

research value of ion implantation changed. Huwaysh 

said he came to believe the IIP had some scientifi c 

merit, “without burdening us too much. Learning is 

important in [developing] new technology.” Huwaysh 

accepted that that research in ion implantation and 

plasma streams could have important applications in 

other fi elds like cutting and welding stainless steel.

Asked specifi cally about applying ion implantation 

research skills to electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS) for uranium enrichment, Huwaysh said 

he never knew the two were related until after the 

Americans took him into custody and they explained 

it to him. One of his subordinates, however, provided 

a different view: 

• A nuclear physicist claimed that at an unspecifi ed 

date after March 1997 Huwaysh met with him in 

his laboratory at Al Tahaddi State Company and 

instructed him to pursue ion implantation as a way 

to preserve EMIS technology for a time when Iraq 

could reconstitute its nuclear program.

• The physicist also asserted that Saddam implicitly 

directed him to preserve nuclear-related research 

during a short conversation as Saddam presented 

him with an award for other work in March 2001. 

He expressed to Saddam the “pain in [my] heart” 

from the lack of appreciation for what he and other 

nuclear scientists achieved during their earlier 

nuclear research and development activities. The 

physicist said that Saddam then told him to continue with his projects, a move that he interpreted 

to mean keeping EMIS technology active. Saddam 

reportedly told him “I am the Godfather of the 

IAEC and I love the IAEC...I will make you 

happy.” 

Leading the National Mobilization Committee

In a ministers’ meeting in late 1998, Saddam ordered 

Huwaysh and MIC to lead a national campaign to 

rehabilitate Iraq’s electric power generation and distribution capability. Though wide in scope, Saddam’s 

decision was not strategic, it was a tactical response 

to a persistent and perplexing problem. For some time 

preceding Saddam’s order, Iraq’s electric power problems were a hot topic of discussion at weekly ministers’ meetings. Under Saddam’s questioning, Minister 

of Industry and Minerals ‘Adnan ‘Abd al-Majid, who 

supervised the Iraqi power grid, blamed the power 

outages and instability of the network on UN sanctions, and promised each week that things would soon 

improve. Instead, they got worse. 

According to Huwaysh, ‘Adnan’s fellow ministers 

were increasingly unhappy with him both personally 

and professionally. No one, not even Saddam, was 

immune from power outages and nothing ‘Adnan 

or his electricity advisor, then the former nuclear 

weapon program chief Dr. Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far, was 

doing seemed to improve the situation. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di 

maintained that Saddam may have been as much to 

blame for the continuation of these problems as his 

subordinates. According to ‘Amir, Dr. Ja’far submitted a full report to Saddam explaining the nature of 

the problem and the long-term strategy required for 

its solution, but Saddam, always desirous of a quick 

fi x, did not direct Ja’far to implement this strategy. 

Finally, Huwaysh told Saddam that he believed Iraq’s 

electrical system was about to collapse, threatening 

not only Iraqi military-industrial production, but also 

the well-being of the entire economy, if nothing was 

done. Saddam, tired of hearing ‘Adnan’s excuses, 

handed the challenge of fi xing it to Huwaysh.

Saddam gave Huwaysh full authority to requisition 

whatever resources he needed from the government 

and to involve the private sector. Huwaysh organized 

the National Mobilization Committee and began the 

restoration campaign on 1 January 1999. Besides 

MIC and the Ministry of Industry and Minerals 

(MIM), the committee included the Ministry of Oil 

(MoO), the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research, and private sector partners, such as 

university professors. In addition, Saddam authorized 

the creation of an Electricity Commission, separate 

from MIM. The committee’s goal was to reduce 

power outages countrywide and to provide more predictability when outages could not be avoided. First, 

the committee calculated national power requirements, estimated available resources and reserves, and 

assessed existing infrastructure. It then implemented a 
34

comprehensive plan to shift available power reserves 

from one local grid to another on a predictable schedule, while using preplanned outages to repair and 

maintain the grids. Finally, the committee approved 

the purchase from China of new, more effi cient power 

plants and directed the upgrade of the distribution 

system to increase power output and availability.

Specialist teams from across the Iraqi public and private sectors carried out the plan. These teams pooled 

their engineering, technical, and industrial skills to 

indigenously produce equipment and spare parts that 

Iraq had been unable to obtain in suffi cient quantity 

because of UN sanctions and subsequently repaired 

and rebuilt much of the power grid. In its two and 

a half years of existence the National Mobilization 

Committee restored and stabilized Iraq’s electrical 

network, not only reducing outages to a minimum 

(an average of two hours a night in Baghdad), but 

also absorbing a large increase in demand for electric 

power across Iraq. Having fi nished its work, on 1 July 

2001 the committee handed over the network to the 

Iraqi Electric Commission.1

‘Amir Al-Sa’di suggested that the results achieved by 

the National Mobilization Committee were temporary 

and even more serious power outages returned shortly 

after the conclusion of Huwaysh’s campaign. According to ‘Amir, it was only when the government began 

to implement the long-term investment strategy that 

Dr. Ja’far had called for earlier, that the situation truly 

began to improve. The Iraqi Government hired the 

Italians to overhaul the Bayji power plant, the biggest 

in Iraq at 1200 MW, and the Russians to refurbish 

the 550 MW Nasiriyah plant. Both of these projects 

were completed before the war began in 2003 and 

other projects were also under way at that time. ‘Amir 

argued that these successes vindicated Ja’far.

Preparing for a Massive Artillery Barrage on 

Israel

‘Amir Al-Sa’di recalled that in early 1987, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) had planned to buy more 

artillery from foreign suppliers in preparation for a 

fi nal push on Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. Husayn Kamil 

objected to the purchase and offered to supply all of 

MoD’s needs for D-30, 122-mm, and 155-mm artillery. MoD countered that it needed more than the 100 

guns per year that Saddam State Establishment was 

then capable of producing. Not to be outdone, Kamil 

boasted that he was ready to commit MIC to produce 500 artillery guns a year, including both D-30 

and 155-mm. Before MoD could call Kamil’s bluff, 

Saddam forced MoD to recalculate its D-30 requirements, which came to 100 guns for that year. As a 

result, MIC did not have to fulfi ll Kamil’s promise, 

which would have been very diffi cult since no production line existed at that time for 155-mm guns. 

MIC’s supposed capacity to produce 500 artillery 

guns annually must have remained in Saddam’s mind, 

because in late 1999, Saddam ordered the indigenous production of 500 artillery pieces (155-mm 

and 210-mm) a year. Saddam’s goal was to deploy 

2,000 artillery pieces in Jordan and 1,000 pieces in 

Syria to launch a massive artillery barrage on the 

Israelis to liberate Palestine. However, Saddam did 

not explain how he would get permission from Jordan 

and Syria for such a deployment. Upon receiving 

the order, Huwaysh told Saddam it was at odds with 

his existing artillery production plan already worked 

out with the MoD. That plan called for only 25 new 

artillery pieces a year. It would take time to reallocate 

resources, reconfi gure factories, startup a new production line, as well as fi nd potential foreign buyers for 

artillery pieces that could not, over time, be absorbed 

1

 According to Huwaysh, sometime before the turnover of the 

network to the Electricity Commission, ‘Amir Rashid proposed to 

Saddam (at a cabinet meeting) that he select Dr. Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far 

as the new head of the Electric Commission, because of his work in 

restoring Iraq’s electrical power grid following the Gulf war and his 

more recent experience as advisor on electricity to MIM. Saddam 

was about to approve Ja’far’s nomination when Huwaysh strongly 

objected. Huwaysh told the ministers that controlling electricity is 

like controlling war and that Ja’far was not suffi ciently courageous 

or technically capable to lead such a large and complicated network. 

Saddam was surprised and asked Huwaysh somewhat sarcastically, 

“He is good enough to make a nuclear bomb, but not good enough 

to run Iraq’s electrical power system?” Huwaysh answered that Dr. 

Ja’far was a very good scientist but a weak administrator. While 

Ja’far was serving as the MIM electric power adviser, power plants 

ran continuously without regular maintenance being performed and 

spare parts were misused, according to Huwaysh. From 1991 to 1998, 

Huwaysh claimed, Iraq’s power potential fell from 10,000 MW to 

2,500 MW, and he considered Ja’far responsible. Many ministers were 

surprised that Huwaysh was so outspoken. Dr. Ja’far’s nomination was 

put on hold and Saddam solicited new nominations. Dr. Ja’far’s name 

was not among those nominated in the next round. 
35

by the Iraqi military. The whole process would take 

MIC at least three years—it could produce 100 new 

artillery pieces the fi rst year, 200 the second year, and 

500 by the end of the third year. Saddam accepted 

this explanation and told Huwaysh to proceed as he 

proposed.

MIC produced 100 artillery pieces by the end of 

2001, 200 by the end of 2002, and was on track to 

meet its quota of 500 in 2003 when the war intervened. Saddam Husayn’s fi rst public threat to use 

them occurred in January 2001 during a visit to 

Iraq by Palestine Liberation Organization Political 

Development head Faruq Qaddumi. On Baghdad 

TV, Saddam shared his vision of Iraqi forces fi ring 

at Israel from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt 

with long-range artillery. “When artillery guns begin 

to fi re their shells...[the Israeli immigrant] settler 

[will] pack up and leave... Israel cannot stand in the 

face of continuous artillery shelling for six months.” 

Although this was a novel approach to liberating 

Palestine it was not a spur of the moment threat. 

Saddam’s strategy and his orders to produce weapons 

that would make his threat appear credible also had 

other motives, according to Huwaysh. Iraqi artillery 

posed little practical threat to Israel; however it gave 

Saddam great propaganda value among the Palestinians while improving Iraq’s capabilities against its 

real threat—superior Iranian ground forces.

Restarting a Chemical or Biological Weapons 

Program

Huwaysh recalled that Saddam approached him 

immediately following a ministers’ meeting to ask 

how long it would take to restart production of chemical agents (Huwaysh thought it was in 1999, but he 

also indicated this conversation may have occurred in 

2001). After checking with his scientists, Huwaysh 

told Saddam he probably could begin production 

of Mustard in six months, but other more complex 

agents would take much longer. Production of VX or 

sarin, for example, would require obtaining specialized equipment, reestablishing laboratories, building 

new factories, and reassembling chemical weapons 

team. 

Saddam did not raise this issue again for another 

year or more. In 2001, Saddam approached him in a 

one-on-one conversation after a ministers’ meeting 

and asked, “Do you have any programs going on that 

I don’t know about?” Clearly was implying chemical 

or biological weapons programs. Huwaysh, answered 

no, absolutely not. He assumed that Saddam was testing him, so Huwaysh added that since these programs 

were prohibited by the United Nations, he could not 

pursue them unless Saddam ordered it. Huwaysh said 

Saddam seemed satisfi ed, asked no further questions, 

and directed no follow-up actions. This incident was 

perplexing to Huwaysh, because he wondered why 

Saddam would ask him this question. While Huwaysh 

had no evidence of the existence of WMD programs 

in Iraq, if such work were being done, then the SSO’s 

ability to compartment projects and assign individuals 

to do special work made it the most likely place for 

WMD activity. Disagreeing with Huwaysh’s speculation, ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, noted that it showed Huwaysh’s 

ignorance about what it takes to produce viable and 

signifi cant quantities of CW and BW agents and to 

weaponize them.

Asked about the context of Saddam’s question on 

restarting chemical weapon production, Huwaysh 

could point to no specifi c internal, regional, or 

international events that might have prompted it, nor 

did he have any specifi c warning from Saddam that 

such a request might be coming. Saddam had become 

increasingly paranoid about the impact of sanctions 

on Iraq’s conventional military capability. Specifi -

cally, Saddam feared the Iranians, who constantly 

were interfering in the south. Saddam anticipated 

that Iraq might have to fi ght another war with them. 

According to Huwaysh, “this was not a stable situation; every day was a problem.” Saddam knew Iraq’s 

armed forces were not capable of defeating Iran in 

another war and was looking for a quick alternative to 

stem an invasion, if it came. While Saddam mouthed 

the conventional anti-Israeli rhetoric, he was convinced Iran was the real threat.

‘Amir Al-Sa’di agreed that Saddam perceived Iran as 

Iraq’s primary threat, however ‘Amir is convinced that 

Saddam did not fail to comprehend the consequences 

if he used CW or BW against Iran. As ‘Amir pointed 

out, Iran suffered dearly from Iraq’s use of CW and 

missiles during the Iran-Iraq war. In the succeeding 

years, Iraq’s military capabilities have degraded, crip-
36

pled by UN sanctions. Iran, during the same period, 

has been rebuilding its military arsenal, including 

covert production of CW and BW, unconstrained by 

sanctions and enjoying good relations with its technology suppliers. According to ‘Amir, “does any sane 

leader or military commander think that Iran will not 

retaliate in kind if Iraq used such weapons, even on 

a limited scale, against them? I don’t think Saddam 

is that mad. If Saddam was that mad or irrational, 

why did he not use them when he had them in 1991 

against the Coalition? Or, if he had any hidden WMD, 

as suspected by the new Coalition and perhaps some 

Iraqis like Huwaysh, during the second Gulf war 

when Baghdad was about to fall?”

In early 2002, Qusay asked Huwaysh to compile a 

list of Iraqi BW experts that Qusay intended to pass 

to Syria. Huwaysh delivered this request to NMD 

Director Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, who 

worked for Huwaysh, and instructed him to retain 

the list, when completed, unless Qusay requested it. 

Huwaysh told Husam not to include Dr. Rihab Rashid 

Taha Najm Al ‘Azzawi, at the request of her husband Minister of Oil ‘Amir Rashid. Huwaysh did not 

know if Husam ever passed the list to Qusay; however, Huwaysh believed no Iraqi scientists were sent 

to Syria. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di also believed that no Iraqi 

scientists worked with the Syrians on BW or other 

WMD projects. According to ‘Amir, the Syrians, fearing discovery by Israeli intelligence, would never risk 

such collaboration with the Iraqis. As for Huwaysh’s 

claim that he did not know if Husam ever passed 

the list he compiled to Qusay, ‘Amir believed it was 

inconceivable that Husam would not have informed 

his boss, Huwaysh, on such a sensitive issue.

Supporting Saddam and the Air Defense 

Committee

After 1998, Saddam showed increased personal 

interest in air defense issues, including almost daily 

television appearances with voice-over commentaries. 

Desperate to shoot down a Coalition aircraft for both 

national security and propaganda reasons, Saddam 

convened an interagency committee in late 2001 to 

overhaul and reconfi gure Iraqi air defenses. This is 

the only time Huwaysh recalled Saddam directing 

what was essentially a MIC research and development effort. While Saddam appointed Huwaysh as 

chairman of this committee for day-to-day business, 

Saddam himself presided over monthly meetings and 

its members reported directly to him. The members 

included the Minister of Defense and members of 

his staff, the Minister of Industry and Minerals, the 

Air Defense Commander, the Director of the IAEC, 

and all the directors general in MIC headquarters. 

Saddam’s sons, Qusay and ‘Uday, also attended the 

meetings. The initial term of the committee was six 

months, but Saddam extended it twice. Main topics of 

discussion included technical development, logistical 

support, and protection measures for the air defense 

missile forces.

Saddam sacked the Air Defense Commander, Staff 

Lt. Gen. Shahin Yasin Muhammad, immediately 

after the fi rst meeting because all Volga (SA-2) missiles were nonfunctional —deployed for “decoration, not for war.” As an excuse for the Air Defense 

Command’s defi ciencies, Shahin complained that 

MIC had not adequately supported him. Huwaysh 

vigorously defended MIC, explaining to Saddam that 

Iraq’s air defenses failed because Shahin tried to do 

his own research and development, independent of 

MIC, instead of concentrating on operational matters. Saddam appointed Staff Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b, 

Huwaysh’s senior deputy who previously served as 

Air Force Commander, to replace Shahin.

Muzahim fared little better. Available air defense 

weapons were obsolete and poorly maintained, and 

morale was low among air defense personnel. Rapid 

improvement in performance was nearly impossible. 

Still Saddam sought a “silver bullet” that would bring 

him success against Coalition aircraft patrolling the 

“no-fl y zones” in southern and northern Iraq. The 

Air Defense Committee proposed many technical 

improvements for Iraqi air defense systems, but the 

Air Defense Command was not able to apply them, 

because its personnel were poorly trained. Despite 

this, Iraqi air defenses made some gains, using new 

techniques to mislead enemy antiradiation missiles 

and to interrupt laser guidance systems. Others have 

argued that Saddam’s focus on air defense was not 

only a failure, but encouraged schemes that were 

dangerous as well as expensive.
37

Providing ‘Another Explosive Material’ 

for Missile Warheads

In 2000 Saddam asked Huwaysh, “Do you have 

another explosive material for missile warheads?” 

Huwaysh assumed he was asking about alternatives 

to HMX, TNT, or RDX conventional explosives. MIC 

was working on a new explosive at the time designated C-20 that was similar to C-4. MIC engineers 

had not perfected the stabilizing agent for C-20, however, so it was not ready for weaponization. Huwaysh 

briefed Saddam on this situation, but Saddam said 

nothing and the issue did not come up again. At the 

time, Huwaysh did not interpret Saddam’s query 

to be about a WMD warhead, but based in part on 

comments Saddam made in the late 1990s Huwaysh 

later speculated that it may have been. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di 

contended that if Saddam’s query was truly about the 

availability of a WMD warhead, and Huwaysh did 

not understand that, Saddam would have replaced 

Huwaysh immediately. Instead Saddam promoted him 

to Deputy Prime Minister.

Designing a Sanctions-Busting Missile

According to Huwaysh, Saddam asked him—possibly 

in the spring of 2002—if MIC could produce a missile with a range of 650 to 750 km in six months and 

added that he had decided not to allow UN inspectors 

to return. Al Fat’h and Al Samud II missiles, nominally restricted in range to 150 km, were now in production, and Saddam was very pleased at the promise 

his missile programs were showing. Saddam said 

he needed a minimum of 650 km to threaten targets 

in Iran and Israel. He did not mention other targets. 

Huwaysh believed that Saddam thought this was the 

ideal time to “jump to a new missile” with suffi cient 

range to deter regional adversaries. Besides being 

a violation of UN restrictions, such an effort would 

take three to fi ve years and required fl ight-testing, 

which would be detected by US satellites, Huwaysh 

told Saddam. Saddam was disappointed with this 

answer, but ordered MIC to begin design work and to 

report back in six months. To avoid disclosure of this 

program, Saddam ordered that no written documentation and no phone calls were allowed. All associated 

discussions were to be conducted face to face.

‘Amir Al-Sa’di questioned whether the orders for 

secrecy associated with Saddam’s request came from 

Saddam or from Huwaysh. According to Al-Sa’di, 

Saddam openly ordered government offi cials to 

defend Iraq’s missile programs, arguing that they 

should be disassociated from WMD, because they 

were a legitimate aspect of Iraqi self-defense. Saddam 

anticipated objections from the UN Security Council 

on this matter, but believed that the Security Council’s only recourse would be to continue sanctions. 

By early 2002, Saddam was convinced support for 

sanctions was eroding and they would soon disappear irrespective of what happened with Iraqi missile 

programs.

In response to Saddam’s order, Huwaysh commissioned design studies building on available missile 

programs. One was based on the solid-propellant Al 

Fat’h, designed by ‘Abd al-Baqi Rashid Shia’ Al Ta’i, 

at Al Rashid State Company. The other centered on 

the liquid-propellant Al Samud II, designed by Dr. 

Muzhir [Modher] Sadiq Saba’ Khamis Al Tamimi at 

Al Karama State Company.

Within a month, ‘Abd al-Baqi encountered a serious setback with the solid-propellant design. While 

suffi cient indigenously produced ingredients were 

available to make the solid propellant, MIC had no 

facilities large enough to do continuous casting of 

the larger rocket motor required for the extended 

range. Work on the liquid-propellant alternative under 

Muzhir continued, based on two Volga engines (the 

same engine used by the Al Samud II) confi gured 

side-by-side. At the end of six months, Muzhir’s 

team completed a preliminary design, but its maximum theoretical range was only 550 km. Muzhir told 

Huwaysh the design could be expanded to accommodate as many as fi ve clustered engines to gain additional range, but provided him no design drawings for 

that alternative.

In late fall of 2002, Huwaysh briefed the 550-km 

design results to Saddam. When Saddam learned that 

the missile’s projected range did not exceed 550 km, 

he left the room without comment and the briefi ng 

abruptly ended. Although Saddam saw Huwaysh on 

a weekly basis from then until March 2003, Saddam 

never raised this issue again. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di noted 

that Saddam had clearly given up on Huwaysh at this 
38

point, but it was too late to do anything about it. In 

the project’s aftermath, Huwaysh said he required 

Muzhir to bring him all the documents relating to the 

missile design. Huwaysh took the documents to his 

house and burned them on 17 March 2003 to avoid 

their confi scation.

Several credible former Iraqi offi cials and ISGrecovered documents suggest that work on a ballistic 

missile designed to exceed UN restrictions began 

much earlier than the above account provided by 

Huwaysh and that he directed this work to be done.2

By his own admission, one of Huwaysh’s highest 

priorities when he became Director of MIC in March 

1997 was to develop a workable design for a new 

surface-to-surface missile. Repeated failures to do so 

was one reason Saddam fi red Huwaysh’s predecessor. 

• Maj. Gen. Ra’d Isma’il Jamil Muhammad Al 

‘Azawi, former Director General of Al Karama 

State Company, said that in 1987 Huwaysh 

requested him to convert a Volga (SA-2) air defense 

missile into a surface-to-surface missile. After fi eldtesting, supervised by two Iraqi general offi cers, 

Ra’ad speculated the missile had an accurate range 

of at least 250 km. Maj. Gen. Ra’d said Huwaysh 

told him to stop work immediately and destroy all 

documentary evidence of the tests. 

• ‘Amir Al Sa’di noted that Ra’d had fi rst attempted 

to convert a Volga missile, as described above, in 

1988 and 1989, but failed to achieve satisfactory 

results and eventually abandoned the work. AlSa’di was surprised that Ra’d would make another 

attempt after what Ra’d had learned the fi rst time 

about the diffi culty of controlling the Volga when 

converted to a surface-to-surface missile. According to Al-Sa’di, since the Volga used aerodynamic 

vanes to control its direction of fl ight, it had to 

remain in the atmosphere during its boost phase. 

This required the missile to fl y a fl attened trajectory 

until engine cut-off resulting in shorter range (no 

more than 130 to 140 km) and dubious accuracy. 

In Al Sa’di’s opinion, Huwaysh stopped the work 

a second time because of pressure from the NMD 

or because someone explained to Huwaysh that the 

proposed conversion was fruitless.

• In mid-1998, Huwaysh ordered ‘Abd al-Baqi to 

develop a solid-propellant missile capable of a 

range of 1,000 to 1,200 km. The source speculated 

Huwaysh’s order came directly from Saddam, who 

wanted to use this missile with a chemical warhead. 

The initial testing of missile components began in 

mid-2000, with a test of a complete missile in late 

2001. MIC’s intended use of the two 300-gallon 

mixers that it began repairing in 2000 was to make 

composite propellants for this missile, not for the 

Al Fat’h, as Huwaysh maintained. The mixers were 

originally made inoperable by UNSCOM inspectors 

in 1992. 

• ‘Amir Al-Sa’di believed the above account is 

highly unlikely. ‘Abd al-Baqi, although an expert 

in propellants, lacked experience in overall missile 

design. If Huwaysh did order ‘Abd al-Baqi to work 

on an extended range missile in 1998, ‘Amir maintained that the logical procedure would have been 

to design a scaled-down confi guration for the rocket 

motor and then carry out static tests, a process

within ‘Abd al-Baqi’s capability at Al Rashid State 

Company. The fi nal confi guration of an extended 

range missile (1,000 to 1,200 km), however, would 

have required continuous casting of the composite 

grain, solid-propellant rocket motor, a process not 

possible until the 300-gallon mixers were repaired 

in 2002. It would have also required fl exible nozzle 

technology for thrust directional control, something 

the Iraqis had never before attempted. According 

to ‘Amir, the above scenario, if true, may explain 

Huwaysh’s frantic efforts to repair the 300-gallon 

mixers beginning in 2000 and his strong resistance 

to declaring or dismantling them when Saddam 

allowed UN inspectors to return to Iraq in late 

2002. 

• Muzhir disputed Huwaysh’s timeline in his account 

of the design of the 650 to 750-km missile. Muzhir 

alleged that in 2000 Huwaysh ordered two computer designs be done to extend the range of the Al 

Samud missile, one for 500 km and the other for 

2

 ISG recovered drawings of long-range missiles based on clustered 

SA-2 engines. The drawings were dated August 2000, indicating 

more reliably than debriefi ngs that the design work began earlier than 

Huwaysh’s assertion. The work may have begun or was completed in 

August 2000, consistent with Muzhir’s claims. 
39

1,000 km. When Muzhir requested written authority 

from Saddam to proceed on a project that violated 

UN missile range restrictions, Huwaysh refused and 

became angry. 

• In late 2000, Muzhir claimed he gave a report to 

Huwaysh detailing results of a feasibility study for 

missiles with 500- and 1,000-km ranges. The study 

was based on clustered Volga engines, two for 500 

km and fi ve for 1,000 km. This work was put aside 

to focus on the Al Samud project until the fi rst 

quarter of 2002. 

• In an attempt to explain the discrepancy between 

Muzhir’s recollections of missile development 

timelines and his own, Huwaysh stated that a young 

engineer named ‘Uday from Al Karama State 

Company visited him in 2001 after complaining 

in writing that Muzhir had “stolen” his design for 

a long-range missile. Earlier, the engineer submitted his design, based on clustered Volga engines, to 

Muzhir. ‘Uday was proud of his work and brought 

sketches to show Huwaysh. He was surprised when 

Huwaysh reprimanded him and then gave him an 

administrative punishment for proposing a missile 

design that exceeded UN restrictions. Huwaysh 

insisted that Saddam was also upset when Huwaysh 

informed him of ‘Uday’s work. Maybe Muzhir’s 

memory of ‘Uday’s design, Huwaysh mused, had 

confused Muzhir about the sequence of events in 

the timeline.

• ‘Amir Al-Sa’di suggested that Dr. Muzhir and other 

Iraqi engineers thoroughly investigated the clustering of liquid-propellant engines in 1988 and 1989. 

An example is the clustering of fi ve Scud engines 

in the Al ‘Abid booster that Iraq tested successfully 

in November 1989. Clustering Volga engines would 

be simply a scaled-down version of that earlier 

enterprise. ‘Amir said it was very unlikely, based 

on Dr. Muzhir’s familiarity with this research, 

that Muzhir would need to “steal” ‘Uday’s alleged 

designs. ‘Amir believed that Mudhir may have 

informed Huwaysh about the potential for increased 

range offered by clustering, which might explain 

Huwaysh’s reaction to ‘Uday’s work.

Supporting Saddam’s Other Pet Projects

Huwaysh cited several examples of military technology projects that Saddam sent to him from government agencies outside MIC. Often their proponents 

exaggerated these projects’ technical merit to attract 

Saddam’s attention and to obtain independent funding. Other times individual scientists or university 

professors would approach Saddam seeking sponsorship for their projects. Saddam, desperate to fi nd 

and exploit any potential advantage, would direct the 

projects to MIC for further research and development. (Two groups that were key proprietors of these 

projects, the 404 Group and the 28 Nisan Group, are 

outlined in greater detail in Annex D: Iraq’s Military 

Industrialization Facilities.) Huwaysh considered 

most of these projects to be scams. To his chagrin, 

once projects got Saddam’s backing, Huwaysh had 

great diffi culty ending them, even if their technical 

basis was clearly erroneous. The process constantly 

played havoc with MIC planning.

Others argued that Huwaysh and other senior Iraqi 

offi cials were at the heart of an institutional deception of Saddam Husayn that convinced him he had 

a much stronger weapons arsenal than actually 

existed. Allegedly out of fear of Saddam’s reaction, 

Huwaysh and his subordinates at MIC faked plans 

and designs to show progress in programs that did not 

exist. Saddam was not well informed enough to catch 

them in their lies and never sought a demonstration 

of the newly developed weapons. In the process, MIC 

offi cials squandered or embezzled huge amounts of 

Iraqi money, and Iraq was left unprotected and unprepared for war.

• For example, in 2000 Saddam ordered Huwaysh 

and Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ to build a cruise missile with a range of 2,500 km. They knew it could 

not be done, but to satisfy Saddam they created a 

complete plan on paper and briefed him on it. Three 

months later when Saddam sought an update on 

the plan, Huwaysh indicated it was on schedule. 

However, when Saddam pursued the matter again, 

he was told UN sanctions were limiting Iraq’s ability to fully develop, test, and complete the missile 

system. Saddam was upset with this answer, but did 

not challenge it.
40

Fadil Salfi j Mihaymid Al ‘Azzawi, a former ambassador and Deputy Director of the IIS, considered 

Huwaysh to be “stupid and a liar.” Fadil said that 

Huwaysh was very infl uential in the Iraqi Regime and 

he convinced Saddam that Iraq had weapons capabilities that, in fact, it did not possess. According to 

Fadil, “if Iraq had these weapons, it would have used 

them.” ‘Amir Al-Sa’di thought that Fadil’s comments 

were prompted by Saddam’s apparent confi dence in 

the face of real and serious threats, a reaction from 

Saddam that many people found perplexing. Others 

believed that Saddam was playing a political game of 

brinkmanship, and all his posturing was for local and 

regional consumption.

Although ‘Amir Al-Sa’di agreed that the public 

perception of MIC had suffered by 2003, he maintained that Saddam was not as easily deceived as 

some of the sources above claim, unless it suited his 

larger scheme. For example, Al-Sa’di cited Saddam’s 

actions during the 1987 to 1988 development, testing, 

and fi rst use of the extended range Al Husayn missile. 

Saddam sent his own private team of photographers to 

tape the tests and provide the videos to him separately 

from normal MIC reporting channels. In addition, 

he had “eyes” inserted in the development teams, 

who reported independently of normal channels. In 

February 1988, after Baghdad was hit yet again by 

Iranian Scuds, Saddam decided to retaliate using Al 

Husayn missiles that MIC claimed could now reach 

Tehran. Prior to their use, Saddam brought his Al 

Husayn development team together in front of the 

Regime leadership and announced “these young men 

from MIC assured [me] that they are ready to carry 

out [my] warning to Iran.” According to Al-Sa’di, this 

was Saddam’s way of telling all present that he was 

relying on what MIC had told him and if the missiles 

failed to hit Tehran, then everyone would know who 

was to blame.

Al Quds Project

During 1999, Saddam prompted MIC to restart its 

small UAV development program, which lapsed 

when Brig. Dr. Imad ‘Abd al-Latif ‘Abd al-Ridha 

retired from the Air Force in 1997. Saddam reportedly 

wanted a UAV program on par with the United States, 

although ‘Amir Al-Sa’di commented that making such 

a comparison was not typical of Saddam. In late 1999, 

Imad approached Hadi Tarish Zabun, MIC Director General for Research and a personal friend, to 

seek MIC funding for his new UAV project, Al Quds 

(Jerusalem). Imad did not, however, want to be under 

MIC control. Despite Saddam’s interest, Huwaysh 

was skeptical about supporting Al Quds, because he 

did not want it to draw resources from MIC’s existing 

program to upgrade the Al Yamamah UAV.

With Hadi’s endorsement and his promise to oversee 

Imad’s work, in January 2000 Huwaysh allowed the 

project to proceed, funded by the Ibn-Firnas State 

Company. MIC did not specify a mission for Al Quds 

and Imad did not propose one. During the next two 

years, Imad produced nine prototypes, eight with 

a payload capacity of 15 kg, less than that of the 

RPV-20. ISG does not know the payload capacity of 

the ninth prototype. While the end user for Al Quds 

was not specifi ed, recovered Iraqi documents show a 

contractual agreement from December 2000 between 

MIC, the Iraqi Air Force, and Fedayeen Saddam for 

two probable Al Quds prototypes.

In May 2002, MIC levied a new fl ight duration 

requirement of four hours for Al Quds. Extrapolating Al Quds’ nominal airspeed of 125 km/hr over a 

four-hour period gave it a maximum fl ight distance 

of 500 km, well in excess of the maximum range 

allowed under UN restrictions. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di 

claimed that Al Quds never actually violated UN 

restrictions for UAVs. He and NMD Director Husam 

Amin, after requesting and receiving a MIC report on 

Al Quds, determined that the project did not involve 

any UN-proscribed activity. ‘Amir and Husam forwarded the report to UNMOVIC for further discussion and the matter was still awaiting resolution when 

the war began.

In August 2002, Huwaysh’s senior deputy, Lt. Gen. 

Muzahim, told Imad that MIC did not need two 

separate entities producing small UAVs. Muzahim 

directed Imad to increase the payload of Al Quds 

to 100 kg, probably to accommodate an electronic 

warfare package then under development by Al Milad 

Electronic Warfare Center or Al Battani State Company.
41

According to another source, Imad stated Al Quds 

was designed to be a fl ying bomb. Four Al Quds, 

each to be loaded with 5 kg of C-4 explosives, were 

to go to one of Saddam’s friends in Jordan, a former 

member of Hamas, who intended to use them against 

Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon when he visited 

the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem at some unspecifi ed 

time in the future. Huwaysh contends this account is 

illusion, not reality, and the information is incorrect.

In March 2003, Imad demonstrated the latest Al Quds 

prototype for Muzahim, but it crashed. Imad begged 

to be given another chance in two weeks; Huwaysh 

told him to take a month. Despite giving Imad a 

reprieve, Huwaysh was disappointed with Al Quds’ 

progress. After three years of development, the Al 

Quds project failed to produce a UAV capable of fully 

autonomous fl ight. Before the month expired, Iraq 

was at war with the Coalition and work on the project 

ended.

 ‘Usama the Computer Hacker

In late 2002, Saddam directed Huwaysh to “provide 

equipment and funding, whatever is needed” for 

a high priority project conducted by a young Iraqi 

male, with the cover name “Usama.” According to 

Huwaysh, ‘Usama was the nephew of Saddam’s 

second wife, had a master’s degree in computer science, and was an accomplished computer hacker. 

While Saddam assigned ‘Usama to MIC, he 

instructed ‘Usama to work alone and report directly 

to him. Saddam challenged Huwaysh to test ‘Usama’s 

hacking skills against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

encrypted telephone system developed and produced 

by MIC’s Al Salam State Company. Huwaysh felt certain this system was secure, so he was very surprised 

when ‘Usama appeared to have deciphered messages 

from it. ‘Usama’s success caused Saddam to rebuke 

Al Salam for creating supposedly secure communication devices that were easily compromised. To 

further test ‘Usama’s skills, Huwaysh assigned him to 

gain access to the computer software in the Iraqi Air 

Force’s F-1 aircraft simulator. The simulator, produced by the French, was malfunctioning because of 

glitches in its proprietary software and UN sanctions 

made arranging for repairs diffi cult. Sophisticated 

protection controls made gaining access to the simulation software seemingly impossible without French 

assistance. Again, to Huwaysh’s surprise, ‘Usama was 

able to penetrate the simulator system’s fi rewall. Once 

inside, MIC technicians were able to make the necessary repairs.

Allegedly ‘Usama could hack into US military 

satellites by attacking their computer systems with 

a virus. When the system responded to destroy the 

virus, it transmitted a code that ‘Usama captured. 

This code gave him sensitive access to the entire US 

military satellite system including overhead imagery. According to Huwaysh, he and Muzahim Sa’b 

visited ‘Usama in his offi ce and ‘Usama displayed on 

his computer screen real-time, overhead video supposedly of military activities on US installations in 

Turkey, Kuwait, and Qatar. Huwaysh acknowledged, 

however, that he could not verify these locations 

from the scenes depicted. ‘Usama also demonstrated 

his ability to intercept communications. Huwaysh 

recalled that he heard voices within the communications, but he could not understand what was being 

said. ‘Usama claimed he had eavesdropped on Iraqi 

and Coalition communications systems, including 

decoding encrypted Iraqi Government telephone calls 

as well as unencrypted communications between the 

Pentagon and forward-deployed US forces.

‘Usama said his goal was twofold: (1) to jam signals 

from US military satellites, and defeat US and Coalition guidance systems dependent on those signals; 

and (2) to use a virus to alter the computer memory 

of the US Airborne Warning and Control System to 

disrupt command and control of Coalition tactical 

aircraft. Huwaysh believed the primary advantage 

‘Usama offered was advance warning of Coalition 

attack. Just prior to the start of Coalition operations, 

Saddam ordered MIC to equip a top-secret facility 

according to ‘Usama’s specifi cations. Included were 

computers, digital transceivers, and satellite dish 

antennas. As a venue, Huwaysh gave ‘Usama the 

building which contained his alternate MIC headquarters. After Coalition operations began, Huwaysh 

went by the facility to see it in operation. Though 

‘Usama failed to provide warning of the Coalition 

attack, Huwaysh wanted to see what progress he was 

making on the other proposed tasks. ‘Usama was not 
42

there, and Huwaysh never saw him again. According 

to Huwaysh, the equipment remained but it was never 

used.

Separating fact from fi ction regarding ‘Usama’s 

hacking skills is tricky. Huwaysh claimed fi rsthand 

knowledge of ‘Usama’s ability to penetrate the F-1 

simulator’s sophisticated fi rewall and to decode 

encrypted Iraqi telephone calls. ‘Usama’s alleged 

ability to download classifi ed satellite imagery, however, is suspect. The streaming video that Huwaysh 

described seeing on ‘Usama’s computer screen may 

have come from a satellite down-link, but it was not 

satellite imagery, which is never provided in that 

format. Later analysis confi rmed that ‘Usama’s secret 

facility, located on the Baghdad Aerospace Research 

Center compound (Al Battani State Company), was a 

logical place for satellite intercept activities because 

of its access to satellite-tracking data from the center. 

Obtaining imagery from US intelligence satellites 

would have required ‘Usama to hack into secure US 

networks without the intrusion being detected and 

then to decode the signals’ sophisticated encryption. 

No such compromise has been verifi ed. More likely, 

‘Usama located and downloaded the unencrypted 

satellite feed from US military UAVs and possibly 

used the Internet to download commercial imagery. 

Both are feasible explanations of how he might have 

obtained products to support his story and impress 

Saddam. 

Independent Entrepreneurs

Some projects that attracted Saddam’s attention came 

from the private sector, often through members of 

Saddam’s family or through academics doing research 

independent of MIC. University professors were not 

well paid, so if they could convince Saddam to adopt 

a new technical scheme, especially one enhancing air 

defense or military capability, the originator would be 

rewarded with money or a car. Faced with desperate 

economic circumstances these entrepreneurs often 

exaggerated their claims to win Saddam’s approval.

One academic, Dr. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr, proposed to create an air defense missile tracking and targeting system using sound waves (Dr. Ahmad Husayn 

Khudayr is not the same individual as Ahmad Husayn 

Khudayr, Chairman of the Presidential Diwan). He 

wanted 700 million Iraqi dinar to develop it. Saddam 

referred the professor to MIC to obtain funding. 

Huwaysh refused, convinced the project was not 

technically feasible and a likely scam. Because the 

project had Saddam’s support, the professor sought 

his intervention to force Huwaysh to fund it. Upon 

receiving a letter from Saddam, asking why he had 

refused, Huwaysh explained the project’s defi ciencies. 

Saddam persisted and Huwaysh eventually arranged 

a contract between the Air Defense Command and 

the Diwan, with the Diwan paying for the professor’s 

project.

Another engineer, ‘Abd al-Latif Al-Ani, submitted 

a plan for a “centrifugal force gun” and persuaded 

Saddam to sponsor it. Huwaysh thought it was 

a totally spurious design and refused to provide 

MIC funding for it. Once again Saddam protested 

Huwaysh’s rebuff, accusing him of being worried 

about competition. On the contrary, said Huwaysh, 

“I have to decide what to fund and what not to fund 

based on whether it is logical or not logical. If I 

fund something that is not logical, I am cheating 

the government and I’m cheating you (Saddam).” 

According to ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, ‘Abd al-Latif eventually got funding for his project from the Presidential 

Diwan and produced what he called a “functional 

model.” Although his model was successful, ‘Abd 

al-Latif claimed MIC refused, because of jealousy, to 

provide the assistance required to build a prototype. 

Unlike Huwaysh, ‘Amir believed the concept, with 

further refi nements and validation, was feasible. If 

the design was workable, ‘Amir said, a “centrifugal 

force gun” could be cheaper than a Gatling gun (with 

similar muzzle velocity), although not as compact and 

mobile. ‘Amir had planned to go see ‘Abd al-Latif’s 

model, but never found time during the fi ve months 

before the war began. 
43

R&D, Design, and Construction Companies

Company Name and 

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Al Milad State Company Military electronics R&D—radar, communications, command and control systemsAl Mahmudiyah, Baghdad

Al Quds State Company Ammunition and mechanical military R&D—

artillery, armor, camoufl age

Al Iskandariyah

Al Battani State Company Microwave and space research, remote sensing Al Jadriyah, Baghdad

Al Khawarizmi State 

Company

Farabi Computer Center

Computer programming, training, and services

Administrative, fi nancial, and planning software; MIC data processing

Al Jadriyah, Baghdad

Al Kazimiyah, Baghdad (Kadhimiya)

Al Rayah State Company Measurement, metallurgy, polymers research, 

catalysts

South Taji industrial area

Ibn-Sina State Company Chemical, silicon, and explosive materials 

research, missile propellant R&D, pilot-scale 

production

Al Tarmiyah

Al Basil State Company

Nahrawan plant 

Petroleum, petrochemical, missile propellant 

research

Pilot-scale chemical production

Al Jadriayh, Baghdad

Nahrawan section of Baghdad

Al Kindi State Company Electronic, mechanical, munitions, chemical, 

and communications research; rail and highway 

signals and telephone exchange manufacturing, 

liquid-propellant production

Mosul

Al Razi State Company Military and industrial laser research Al Kazimiyah, Baghdad

Al Fat’h State Company Solid-propellant missile research Al Amiriyah, Baghdad 

Al Faw State Company

Southern Regional Offi ce

Northern Regional Offi ce

Central Regional Offi ce

Baghdad Regional Offi ce 

Industrial plant construction, other large construction projects

Hay al-Rabi, Al ‘Azimiyah, Baghdad

Basrah

Mosul

Al Yusifi yah

Al Tajiyat, Baghdad

Sa’d State Company

Ibn-Yunis Center

Al Zahrawi Center

Al Khazin Center

Al Waddah Center

Facility design and project management

Mechanical Engineering Design Center

Chemical Engineering Design Center

Electrical and Electronic Engineering Design 

Center

Civil engineering Design and Construction 

Center, utilities installations

Near Rashid Hotel, Baghdad

‘Uwayrij, Baghdad

Sa’d headquarters

Al Za’faraniyah

Sa’d headquarters

Al Majd State Company Production technology technical design Al Jadriyah, Baghdad

Annex D 

Iraq’s Military Industrialization

Facilities

MIC Subordinate Companies and Facilities in Early 2003
44

General Purpose Manufacturing and Metal Working Establishments

Company Name and 

Subordinate Elements

Primary activities Location

Al Nida’ State Company Molds and other tooling, specialized metal products, precision machiningAl Za’faraniyah

Badr State Company Molds and other production tooling, tungsten carbide 

tools, specialty manufacturing

Al Yusifi yah, adjacent to 

Umm-al-Ma’arik State 

Company

Umm-al-Ma’arik State 

Company

Rocket motor cases, heavy machining, specialty welding Al Yusifi yah, adjacent to 

Badr State Company

Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State 

Company (formerly the 

State Establishment for 

Heavy Engineering Equipment [SEHEE]) 

Petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical equipment; tanks, 

reactors, heat exchangers, boilers, boats; transferred from 

Ministry of Oil to MIC in 1998

Al Dawrah, Baghdad

Ibn-Majid State Company Same range of products as Al Nasr Al ‘Azim but serving 

the southern Iraq market; began production in 1999 

Basrah/Az Zubayr

Al Samud State Company Specialty steel products, artillery tube rough shapes, heavy 

alloys, forgings, electric poles/towers, mobile roof cranes, 

galvanized products; moved from MIM to MIC in 2001

Taji

Ibn-al-Walid State CompanyTank and armored vehicle manufacturing, refurbishment Abu Ghurayb

Al Radwan State CompanyArtillery gun carriages; tanks and vessels; parts and equipment for oil, petrochemical, and chemical industriesKhan Dari

Al ‘Ubur State Company T-72 engine block castings, aluminum and magnesium 

casting, pumps, and precision casting

Khan Dari
45

Missile and UAV Manufacturing Facilities

Company Name and 

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Al Karama State Company

Waziriyah site

(Karama plant)

Kazimiyah site 

(Ibn-al-Haytham)

Al Samud Factory 

Al Fat’h Factory 

Al Quds Factory 

Al-Rafah test site

Liquid-propellant missiles HQ in Al Waziriyah, Baghdad 

Al Waziriyah, Baghdad 

Al Kazimiyah, Baghdad 

Abu Ghurayb 

Al Tajyiat, Baghdad 

Al Tajyiat, Baghdad 

Al-‘Amiriyah, Al Anbar

Al Rashid State 

Company

Al Athir site

Al Mamun Factory

Al Mu’tasim Factory

Dhu-al-Fiqar Factory

Al Amin Factory 

Solid-propellant missiles (Al Fat’h, Al Ra’d, Al 

Nida’, 122-mm, 107-mm, 81-mm) components, 

assembly, and testing

Solid-propellant components, rocket motor casting

Solid-propellant motor testing, missile assembly

Rocket bodies, motor cases

Motor cases

HQ in Al Latifi yah, adjacent to Al 

Qa’qa’a Company

Jurf-al-Sakhr, near Al Musayyib

Al Latifi yah Adjacent to Al 

Qa’qa’a 

Jurf-al-Sakhr, near Al Musayyib

Taji, adjacent to Nasr Company

Al ‘Amiriyah, adjacent to Saddam 

Company

Al Harith State 

Company

Air defense research, production and refurbishment 

of air defense equipment and radars

Taji

404 Group R&D of the SA-6 (Kvadrat) air defense missile Taji

Al Fida’ State Company Missile launch equipment (TELs and MELs), hydraulic equipmentAl Dawrah, Baghdad

Ibn-Firnas State 

Company 

Trainer aircraft factory 

UAVs, air and sea munitions, aircraft maintenance 

and engineering

Al Tajiyat, Baghdad 

Near the International Airport
46

Military Electronics Companies

Company Name and 

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Salah-al-Din State 

Company

Radar equipment, antennae, communications equipment, printed circuit boardsAd Dawr

Al ‘Izz State Company Military electronic equipment—computers, radio 

relays, antennae, telephone exchanges

Al Tajiyat, Baghdad

Al Salam State Company Surveillance equipment, secure communications 

equipment, electronic systems

Al Tajiyat, Baghdad

Al Mansur State 

Company

Solar panels, silicon chips, electronic components, 

industrial gases, distilled water

Al Kazimiyah, Baghdad

Al Zawra’ State Company Electrical control panels, machine tool controls, various military and civilian electrical productsAl Za’faraniyah

Al Tahaddi State 

Company

Electrical motor and generator repairs, magnets, ion 

implantation

Al Rashad site, northeast 

Baghdad

28 Nisan (28 April) Center 

for Scientifi c Research

Communications and surveillance equipment Al Waziriyah, Baghdad

Propellant, Explosives, and Munitions Companies

Company Name and

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Al Qa’qa’a State 

Company

Nitric acid, explosives, gunpowder, propellants, bomb 

and rocket explosives fi lling, sea mines

Al Latifi yah

Hittin State Company 57-mm, 122-mm, 130-mm, 152-mm, 155-mm and 

210-mm artillery rounds; 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-

mm mortar rounds, RPG rounds

Al Iskandariyah

Tabuk State Company Single- and double-base gunpowder, TNT, explosive 

projectile fi lling

Site of former Hittin Al Fat’h 

ammunition plant, northeast of 

Karbala.

Al Hadar State Company Nitric acid for explosives and propellants production North of Bayji near Ash Sharqat

Al Nu’man State 

Company 

Submunition bodies for Al Fat’h and Ababil missiles, 

drip irrigation equipment

Southeast Baghdad

7 Nisan (7 April) State

Company 

All types of fuses for rockets, mortars, and artillery; 

artillery projectiles

Nahrawan, Baghdad

Al Yarmuk State 

Company 

Small-arms ammunition Abu Ghurayb

Al Shahid State Company Brass, bronze, and copper products; brass for munitionsAl ‘Amiriyah, south of Fallujah
47

Conventional Armaments Companies

Company Name and 

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Saddam State Company 122-mm and 210-mm artillery pieces, military 

optical goods

Al ‘Amiriyah, south of 

Fallujah

Al Qadisiyah State Company Small arms—Kalashnikov rifl es; machineguns; 

RPG-7 launchers; 60-mm, 82-mm, 120-mm mortars

Al Mahmudiyah, Baghdad

Hammurabi State Company Tariq and Babil pistols Al Hillah

Chemical Companies

Company Name and 

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Tariq State Company Chlorine, sodium hydroxide, insecticides, rodenticides, phenolNorth of Fallujah 

Al Zahaf Al Kabir State 

Company 

Mosul location

Basrah location 

Tar paper, calcium chloride, metal products 

Mineral and chemical products 

Magnesium oxide (MgO), salt materials

South Taji industrial area 

Former Al Jazirah plant—

west of Mosul 

Basrah

Procurement Companies

Company Name and

Subordinate Elements

Primary Activities Location

Al Basha’ir Trading Company, 

Ltd.

Imports of equipment, tools, components, and materials for MIC and other ministriesLocated near Baghdad 

Hotel, Baghdad

Al Mufakhir Company for 

Trading & Exporting, Ltd. 

Imports of equipment, tools, components, and materials for MIC and other ministriesLocated near Baghdad 

Hotel, Baghdad

Armos Trading Company, Ltd. Import of equipment, tools, components and materials for MIC and other ministries; primarily from 

Russia and states using Russian equipment 

Located near Baghdad 

Hotel, Baghdad
48

Miscellaneous

Company Name and Subordinate 

Elements

Primary activities Location

Ibn-Rushd (also Abu al-Rushd) State 

Company

Formerly the Safety and Quality Control Center—product testing, safety 

equipment

 ‘Uwayrij, Baghdad 

Sinharib State Company Irrigation and sprinkler systems, established early 2001Al Dawrah, Baghdad, adjacent to Al 

Walid Training Center

Training and Qualifi cation 

Directorate

Training centers:

Employee Development Center

Al-Mu’tasim Center 

Al Amin Institute 

Al Walid Center 

Al Ba’th Institute for Electrical 

Training 

Al Faruq Institute

 

Al Tahrir Institute 

Al Tahadi Center 

Al Mutaz Center 

 MIC staff directorate

CAD and computer training, budgeting and administration training, technical lectures by foreign and academic 

experts

Mechanical training 

Chemical industry training 

Mechanical training 

Electronics/electrical training 

Mold-making, mechanical training

Welding training 

Mechanical training 

Mechanical training

HQ on top fl oor of the Sa’d State 

Company building, Baghdad 

Al Waziriyah, Baghdad 

Al Waziriyah, Baghdad 

Al Waziriyah, Baghdad 

Al Dawrah, Baghdad 

Al Dawrah, Baghdad, adjacent to Al 

Fida’ Company 

Al Za’faraniyah, near Al Nida’ 

Company 

Al Waziriyah 

Al Iskandariyah 

Al Iskandariyah

National Monitoring Directorate Interface with UNSCOM/UNMOVIC 

and the IAEA Iraq Action Team/Iraq 

Nuclear Verifi cation Offi ce (INVO)

 Al Jadriyah, Baghdad
49

Annex E

Iraq’s Military Industrialization 

Facilities

Production of Munitions and Armaments

Overall Assessment of Improvements in Munitions 

Manufacturing

According to Minister of Military Industrialization ‘Abd al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh, 

innovations in Iraqi munitions production, a major 

source of income for MIC military production, created a “100 percent improvement” in this vital sector, 

including the renovation or construction of many 

factories.

Heavy Munitions Production

MIC’s biggest advance in heavy munitions production—artillery and tank ammunition—was a change 

from brass cartridge cases to polymer (plastic) cases. 

Production of brass cases was dirty work, and it 

required the use of imported copper and brass, while 

MIC was able to produce plastic cases from locally 

made petrochemicals. MIC Deputy Daghir Muhammad Mahmud went to Russia to observe plastic munitions production, but the Russians would show him 

neither their techniques nor their production line. As 

an alternative, MIC used the private sector to aid in 

plastic molding. Shrinkage of the cases during molding was a problem, but Baghdad and Basrah Universities helped to solve the problem.

MIC concentrated on producing 210-mm, 155-mm, 

and 122-mm artillery rounds using the new polymer 

case process. The 210-mm round had a range of 47 

km (70 km with rocket assist), the 155-mm had a 

range of 43 km, and the 122-mm rounds had a range 

of 23 km. MIC continued to produce 152-mm and 

130-mm rounds using the old brass-case techniques 

because these calibers were still used in Iraq’s arsenal.

Iraq was attempting to master the technology of tank 

ammunition production; however problems producing sabot rounds hindered its success. MIC was in the 

process of solving these problems prior to the beginning of OIF.

Al Yarmuk State Company

Al Yarmuk, an old plant with very old machinery, 

produced light ammunition. MIC installed new fully 

automated machinery that boosted production from 

21 million to 140 million pieces per year. There were 

two main production lines: one line produced 12.7-

mm, 14.5-mm and 20-mm ammunition, while the 

newly installed line produced 7.62 X 39-mm rounds. 

This line was also capable of producing 7.62 x 54-

mm rounds. The ammunition produced on the new 

line used steel cartridge cases instead of brass.

Al Shahid State Company

Al Shahid specialized in manufacturing copper and 

bronze rolls, tubes, sheets and rods for civilian and 

military purposes. It also produced coils of brass 

sheet for use in munitions plants. The plant at one 

time had very poor quality control and a high level of 

waste, but the company eventually solved its production problems, both quantity- and quality-related. The 

former Director General (DG) of Al Shahid, Dr. Faris 

‘Abd al-‘Aziz Mahmud, played a key role in improving the production at Al Shahid. 

Al Qa’qa’a State Company

Al Qa’qa’a complex consisted of several factories responsible for making and supplying powder 

(propellant) and explosives for MIC munitions 

production. In the late 1990s, this production stopped 

completely due to damage sustained at Al Qa’qa’a 

nitric acid plant in December 1998 from Coalition 

cruise missile attacks. As a result, Iraq became totally 

dependent on imported nitric acid from Egypt for a 

period of time while MIC rebuilt its facilities at Al 

Qa’qa’a. This was a serious problem for MIC’s munitions industry, which required large amounts of nitric 

acid. In addition to rebuilding Al Qa’qa’a’s nitric acid 

plant, MIC also built a residual nitric acid production 

capability at Al Hadar State Company, to ensure Iraq 

remained self-reliant in nitric acid.
50

Hittin State Company

MIC constructed a new factory at Hittin State Company for the production of 57-mm antiaircraft artillery ammunition, and a second new factory produced 

RPG-7 rounds. Hittin succeeded in extending the 

range of the 57-mm ammunition from 5.5 km to 9.7 

km. Many parts for these rounds were produced by 

the private sector and by the MIC training centers. 

Hittin also produced complete lines of several calibers 

of heavy ammunition including 122-mm, 130-mm, 

152-mm, and 210-mm.

The foundry at Hittin was used to produce 60-mm, 

82-mm, and 120-mm mortar projectiles. The foundry 

was completely renovated with Russian assistance to 

solve a few unspecifi ed problems at the facility. This 

Russian assistance ended with the outbreak of OIF.

Tabuk State Company

The Tabuk State Company was another new company 

that specialized in the manufacturing of single- and 

double-base powders, TNT explosives, and fi lling 

hard ammunition. It was to include the fi lling plant 

that once belonged to Hittin State Company (Hittin’s 

Al Fat’h Factory). The DG of Tabuk, Karim Daydan 

‘Umran Rimayid Al Kartani, was previously the 

Deputy DG of Al Qa’qa’a’.

Arms Production

Al Qadisiyah State Company

Al Qadisiyah State Company, which produced pistols, rifl es, RPG-7s, and mortars, improved both the 

quantity and quality of its production from 1997 to 

2003. The Al Qadisiyah plant had a number of serious 

problems when Abd-al-Tawab Al-Mullah Huwaysh 

took over MIC, including many inoperable machines, 

the inability to obtain imported parts, and poor 

production practices. There were also problems with 

sizing and tools which resulted in improper machining tolerances.

To remedy these problems, MIC reorganized the Al 

Qadisiyah tooling shop and gave authority to the 

shop’s quality-control personnel to stop production 

whenever tolerances exceeded standards. For needed 

replacement parts MIC gave authority to obtain some 

from private sector suppliers and to import others. In 

1997, many machines at Al Qadisiyah were idle and 

inoperable for lack of maintenance, but none were 

idle in 2003.

Huwaysh appointed Yahya Nasif Jasim to be the DG 

of Al Qadisiyah. ‘Amir Al-Sa’di described Yahya 

Nasif Jasim as one of Iraq’s brightest and most 

capable managers. Jasim came to MIC from PC-3, 

and he was the DG of Al Nida’ State Company when 

he was appointed head of Qadisiyah. By 2003, Al 

Qadisiyah was producing rifl es, pistols, and RPG-7s 

at maximum plant capacity.

Hamurabi State Company

MIC also created the Hamurabi State Company in 

2002. The Hammurabi pistol factory, subordinate to 

Al Qadisiyah State Company, existed for many years 

but pistol production was divided between Hammurabi and the main Al Qadisiyah plant. MIC intended 

to consolidate all pistol production at Hammurabi and 

built a new plant in Hillah, imported new machinery 

for the company, and moved some equipment to the 

site from Al Qadisiyah. The plant was still under 

construction when OIF began in March 2003. Iraq 

produced three pistol models: a 7-mm, the 9-mm 

Tarik, and the 9-mm Babil.

Saddam State Company

Saddam State Company (name changed to Al Akha 

State Company after the Regime fell) produced 122-

mm artillery pieces, 155-mm gun barrels, 260-mm 

Ababil-50 rocket launchers, and 82-mm and 120-

mm mortar tubes. For the 122-mm artillery pieces, 

Saddam cooperated with Al Radwan State Company and Ibn-al-Walid State Company. Al Radwan 

made the base and frame, Ibn-al-Walid produced 

the gears, and Saddam manufactured the barrels and 

mounts, and performed fi nal assembly. Saddam State 

Company also made military optical goods such as 

artillery and mortar sighting devices, binoculars, 

sniper rifl e sights, and RPG-7 sights. Other activities 

included a factory that produced mechanical parts 

for different Saddam departments, a project doing 

research and development on graphite cylinders for 

electrodes in electric metalworking furnaces, and 
51

a project to design a self-propelled 210-mm gun or 

howitzer using T-54 and T-55 tank chassis that did not 

come to fruition.

Production of artillery tubes at Saddam was dependent on barrel castings and forgings, either imported 

or obtained from Al Samud State Company, and 

efforts to correct problems at Al Samud were motivated by the desire to boost output at Saddam. In 

1999, Saddam Husayn directed MIC to increase its 

artillery production (155-mm and 210-mm) from 

25 per year to 500 per year. Huwaysh determined 

that the transition process would take at least three 

years—100 artillery pieces during the fi rst year, 200 

the second year, reaching 500 by the end of the third 

year. According to ‘Amir Al-Sa’di, the design capacity 

of the Saddam plant was 200 pieces per year with the 

ability to double this fi gure by adding some critical 

equipment and farming some of the work out to sister 

companies, exactly the tack MIC was taking by 2003.

To meet these production goals, the artillery manufacturing effort was split between Saddam State Company and other establishments, principally Al Radwan 

State Company. Saddam concentrated on production 

of gun tubes, while Al Radwan produced the undercarriages. Saddam and Al Radwan also subcontracted 

some work to the private sector. Saddam produced the 

gun tubes, assembled the components, and performed 

all quality control checks on the completed systems. 

Al Nida’, Al ‘Ubur, Al Amin, and Al Radwan were 

all involved, given the huge scale of the project. Al 

Samud was to provide near-net-shape forgings to be 

used to make the tubes. Previously Saddam received 

only rough shapes from Al Samud. The plants also 

boosted production by expanding to three shifts. 

Saddam State Company achieved production of 100 

artillery pieces by the end of 2001, 200 by the end 

of 2002, and was on track to meet its target of 500 

pieces in late 2003.

New and Evolving MIC Companies

(as of March 2003)

Sinharib State Company

Sinharib was a new company that MIC established in 

early 2001. Sinharib produced agricultural irrigation 

and sprinkler systems using plastic pipe and had an 

income of 23 billion ID per year. The company manufactured its products with the assistance of 120 private 

sector subcontractors. Huwaysh saw this arrangement as permitting a small number of government 

employees to guide the production activities of a large 

number of private sector personnel. The Ministry of 

Industry and Minerals (MIM) also produced irrigation 

equipment but used metal pipe, which was subject to 

corrosion and required imported materials, whereas 

the plastic pipe was locally made from indigenous 

materials.

Al Samud State Company 

MIC created facility with its foundry and forging 

shop within the Nasr State Establishment in 1989-90, 

and the facility was originally designed to provide 

intermediate product to the Saddam State Establishment artillery plant. The plant, along with the rest of 

Nasr, was returned to MIM after the fl ight of Husayn 

Kamil. MIM created Al Samud as an independent 

state company in 1996, but Huwaysh convinced 

Saddam Husayn to allow him to move it to MIC in 

2001, because it served MIC’s needs exclusively. 

It specialized in heavy alloys, forging, galvanizing, 

mobile roof cranes, and equipment specifi c to electrical and communications requirements. As mentioned 

earlier, Al Samud provided forged steel blanks for 

artillery gun barrels. The forging plant also had the 

capability to produce components for the Iraqi railways. 

Previously, MIC imported its artillery tubes from 

Russia and Yugoslavia. As part of a self-suffi ciency 

move, Saddam decided to begin manufacturing them 

indigenously. Such production required high metallurgical standards to create satisfactory barrels.
52

Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State Company

From 1990 until 1997, Al Nasr Al ‘Azim State Company was known as the State Establishment for Heavy 

Engineering Equipment (SEHEE). The Ministry of 

Oil initially established a workshop in Dawrah to 

serve as an industrial service facility for the oil industry. Husayn Kamil took control of the Dawrah factory 

and transferred it to MIC after MIC assumed responsibility for Petrochemical Project #2 and its accompanying refi nery. MIC greatly expanded the plant’s 

capacity and range of products in order to produce 

large boilers, pressure tanks and tubes, reactors, highpressure vessels for gases and heat exchangers. After 

Husayn Kamil fl ed to Jordan in August 1995, ‘Amir 

Muhammad Rashid Al-‘Ubaydi, then acting Director 

of MIC and Minister of Oil, returned SEHEE to the 

Ministry of Oil. The company was renamed ‘Al Nasr 

Al-‘Azim’ in March 1997. Huwaysh reclaimed the 

company for MIC in 1998 after a struggle with ‘Amir 

Rashid. Later MIC had a contract with China for the 

production of boilers with a capacity of up to 1,000 

tons of steam to be produced at Al Nasr Al-‘Azim.

Ibn-Majid Company

Ibn-Majid was originally a unit created in 1990 for 

the production of steel plate barges and river platforms, as well as small boats of up to 100 tons capacity. It was then expanded by MIC to produce the same 

range of products as Al Nasr Al ‘Azim. Ibn-Majid 

produced items to meet the demands of the southern 

Iraq oil industry concentrated in the region around 

Basrah. Ibn-Majid became a company in 1999.

Al ‘Ubur State Company

Al ‘Ubur produced pumps and castings, such as T-72 

engine blocks. The facility also conducted die casting, 

including the die casting of magnesium components 

for the electronics industry, and produced oil tanks.

Umm al-Ma’arik State Company

Umm-al-Ma’arik’s mission was to manufacture heavy 

mechanical parts for large projects such as dams, 

irrigation systems, and cement and phosphate factories. It had a foundry for producing cast iron and 

steel. Its heavy mortar shell casting line for 120-mm 

mortar projectiles was equipped with new machinery 

from Russia and Belarus and produced 200 pieces 

per day. MIC moved the fl ow forming machines from 

the Rashid State Company’s Dhu-al-Fikar factory to 

Umm-al-Ma’arik where they were used to produce 

motorcases for Al Ababil-50 and Al Nida’ rockets, 

and the Al Fat’h missile. Umm-al-Ma’arik also had a 

special welding capability for aluminum and stainless 

steel similar to the capability at Al Nida’ and Al Nasr 

Al ‘Azim.

Al Radwan State Company

MIC was constructing a huge vessel factory in the 

northeast corner of the Al Radwan plant site. Al 

Radwan was also to produce artillery system undercarriages in conjunction with Saddam State Company 

and the private sector. Another project was the production of water purifi cation units capable of handling 

200 cubic meters of water per hour.

Al Basha’ir, Al Mufakhir, and Armos Companies

Al Basha’ir Trading Company, Al Mufakhir Company 

for Trading and Exporting, and Armos were MICowned procurement companies that helped Iraq evade 

UN trade sanctions. These three companies were 

headed by directors, not directors general, which was 

the typical rank of the 49 other state company chiefs 

within MIC. Munir Mamduh ‘Awad Al-Qubaysi, for 

example, was the Director of Al Basha’ir. All three 

companies were located in the same building located 

on a side street west of Sa’dun Street near the Baghdad Hotel in central Baghdad. MIC began work to 

construct a headquarters building for the companies 

in the Al-Waziriyah quarter of Baghdad.

The 404 Group

The 404 Group consisted of four individuals, two of 

whom were former MIC directors general in the early 

1990s. Since 1997, the group attempted to modify 

the Kvadarat (SA-6) air defense missile system to 

enhance its performance and make it less vulnerable 

to antiradiation missile attack. The proposal included 

long-range radar detection and acquisition linked 

to a passive video tracking and targeting system 

with a range of 25 km. Dayf ‘Abd al-Majid Ahmad, 

Huwaysh’s predecessor at MIC, created and funded 

the 404 Group while he was Deputy Director of the 
53

Presidential Diwan. After Saddam designated Dayf 

to be the Iraqi ambassador to Belarus in 2001, Dayf 

briefed Saddam on the group’s research and suggested it continue under MIC auspices and funding. 

Saddam endorsed this proposal without consulting 

Huwaysh. Huwaysh was angry when he discovered 

MIC inherited from Dayf a new, unfunded project. 

Wedded to his plans, Huwaysh resented “any activity 

that was distracting to us [in MIC].”

Independently, the 404 Group decided to design and 

build a long-range cruise missile, possibly by replacing the engine in the HY-2 (Silkworm). This effort 

was still in the concept stage when Huwaysh inherited 

the 404 Group, but rumors about its projected 2,500-

km range spread widely. As soon as the group came 

under MIC control, Huwaysh canceled further work 

on the long-range cruise missile because he believed 

the proposed concept was not feasible. However, 

Huwaysh allowed it to continue for one more year 

because Saddam already approved the 404 Group’s 

air defense work. At year’s end, he intended to 

integrate their results into ongoing air defense efforts 

at Al Harith State Company. War with the Coalition 

intervened before the project produced any concrete 

results.

The 28 Nisan Group

Headed by a university professor, the 28 Nisan Group 

included over a hundred people. Its genesis in 1997 

in the Presidential Diwan, under Dayf ‘Abd al-Majid 

Ahmad’s sponsorship, and its eventual handoff to 

MIC paralleled that of the 404 Group. Both groups 

were accustomed to unlimited budgets and minimal 

oversight. The 28 Nisan Group sought the capability 

to intercept and decode enemy air-to-air and air-toground radio transmissions in the “S” band for Iraqi 

military intelligence, and also to produce a signal 

range fi nder. The equipment it developed, including 

antennae array, would fi t inside a van.

The group produced and delivered four vans and had 

an order for another four when Coalition operations 

intervened. Dr. ‘Abd al-Husayn Al Haariri, the group 

leader, was also using the group to pursue another 

scheme called Al Fil (the Elephant) that Huwaysh 

found incredible. Al Fil, projected by ‘Abd al-Husayn 

to cost millions of dollars, centered on attacking 

American naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and 

in the Persian Gulf using small, explosive-laden, 

remote-controlled boats. A secret facility in Abu 

Dhabi, linked to a master site in Baghdad by Thuraya 

telephone, would provide command and control for 

the boats. When Huwaysh questioned ‘Abd al-Husayn 

about how he was going to operate a clandestine command and control site in a hostile environment, while 

actively transmitting to a fl eet of small boats, ‘Abd 

al-Husayn did not have satisfactory answers.

Huwaysh attempted to stop the research; however, 

he was immediately censured by Saddam (who ‘Abd 

al-Husayn had already co-opted) and ordered to 

continue the work. As an alternative, Huwaysh convinced Saddam to shift Al Fil to the Iraqi Intelligence 

Service (IIS), because IIS was to be the ultimate end 

user. In short order, Huwaysh got a call from IIS 

Director Tahir Jalil Habbush, who complained about 

the “impossible project” that Huwaysh had handed 

off to him. Finally, with the IIS Director weighingin, Saddam canceled Al Fil. Two months after ‘Abd 

al-Husayn and the 28 Nisan Group joined MIC, 

Huwaysh fi red him. ‘Abd al-Husayn protested directly 

to Saddam who again challenged Huwaysh’s decision. 

Huwaysh explained to Saddam that he could not have 

someone who refused to work within the MIC system 

and insisted on an unconstrained budget. After replacing ‘Abd al-Husayn, Huwaysh moved the 28 Nisan 

Group under Al-Milad State Company to impose 

planning and budgetary discipline on its activities.
This page intentionally left blank.
This page intentionally left blank.
Final Cut 8.5 X 11 with Full Blee