J-S25021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LEON MOSLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3122 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at CP-46-CR-0002911-2001

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2023

Leon Mosley (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as 

untimely his fifth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

This Court previously explained: 

A jury convicted Appellant on May 31, 2002, of one count of each

of robbery of a motor vehicle, terroristic threats, recklessly

endangering another person [], simple assault, conspiracy to

commit robbery, and two counts of theft. [Appellant had been

convicted of escape in a separate case a month prior.] The court

sentenced Appellant [in both cases] on August 1, 2002, to an

aggregate term of 281⁄2 to 60 years’ imprisonment. The sentence

included a 25 to 50 year term under Pennsylvania’s three strikes

law, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9714(a)(2). Appellant did not file a direct

appeal, so the judgment of sentence became final on or about

September 1, 2002.

Commonwealth v. Mosley, 1595 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished

memorandum at *1).
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Between 2003 and 2018, Appellant filed four unsuccessful PCRA

petitions. In two of the petitions, Appellant challenged the legality of his

sentence. See id.; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 1/24/23, at 2-3.

On August 18, 2020, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his fifth. 

Appellant again claimed that his sentence is illegal. PCRA Petition, 8/18/20,

at 5 (unnumbered). The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a no-merit 

letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On 

October 18, 2022, the PCRA court granted counsel’s request to withdraw and 

issued notice of intent to dismiss the petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

Appellant filed a response claiming ineffective assistance of PCRA

counsel. Response, 11/7/22, at 1-6. On November 18, 2022, the PCRA court

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely filed. Appellant filed this

appeal. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue:

[Did the] PCRA court err[] in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition 

[and] failing to address Appellant’s illegal sentence[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization modified).

 We review the dismissal of Appellant’s petition to determine “whether 

the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of 
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the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the petitioner’s

judgment of sentence becoming final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The timeliness of a PCRA petition is 

jurisdictional. If a PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks jurisdiction. 

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005). 

“Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the 

substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. 

Super. 2013).

Appellant concedes his PCRA petition is untimely. Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 1, 2002, and he

did not file his petition until August 18, 2020. A petitioner may overcome the 

PCRA’s time-bar if he pleads and proves one of the statutory exceptions set 

forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 

678 (Pa. 2017). The exceptions are: “(1) interference by government officials 

in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an afterrecognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 

233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A 
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petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed 

within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective December 24, 2018). If a petitioner fails to 

plead and prove an exception, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the petition 

or provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.

Appellant argues the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021) created an exception 

to the PCRA time-bar because it recognized a new constitutional right. 

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. We disagree.

This Court recently explained:

Reliance on Bradley for purposes of overcoming the 

untimeliness of the underlying PCRA petition is misplaced. In 

Bradley, our Supreme Court extended the opportunity for a PCRA 

petitioner to raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

Previously, “the sole method by which a petitioner c[ould] 

challenge the ineffectiveness of his PCRA counsel [wa]s through 

the filing of a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 dismissal 

notice.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 386. The Bradley Court 

abandoned that approach, holding “that a PCRA petitioner may, 

after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel 

or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at 

the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 401.

Bradley, however, did not announce a new constitutional 

right, much less one applicable retroactively. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2023 WL 2379233 (Pa. Super. 

2023) (unpublished memorandum) (noting “[a]lthough [Bradley] 

did not specifically address the timeliness exception upon which 

[a]ppellant relies, it is clear Bradley did not recognize a new 

constitutional right,” id. at *4); Commonwealth v. Dixon, [290 

A.3d 702] (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (holding 

Bradley does not trigger the timeliness exception of Section 

9545(b)(1)(iii)); Commonwealth v. Parkinson, 2022 WL 
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5237927 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding “Bradley did not create a 

new, non-statutory exception to the PCRA time bar,” id. at *3).

Furthermore, this Court has continually declined to extend 

the holding of Bradley to cases involving untimely petitions, like 

the instant one. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stahl, [292 A.3d 

1130] (Pa. Super. 2023) (concluding that “[n]othing in Bradley

creates a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s 

one-year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA 

counsel,” id. at [1136]); Commonwealth v. Mead, [277 A.3d 

1111] (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 284 A.3d 118 (Pa. 2022) (emphasizing that Bradley

involved a timely first PCRA petition and did not apply to 

appellant’s appeal from order denying his untimely petition); 

Commonwealth v. Morton, [292 A.3d 1075] (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(unpublished memorandum) (holding that appellant’s reliance on 

Bradley does not afford relief in his appeal from the denial of his 

untimely second PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Gurdine, 

[273 A.3d 1076] (Pa. Super. 2022) (same)[, appeal denied, 286 

A.3d 707 (Pa. 2022)]. 

Commonwealth v. Ruiz-Figueroa, 1531 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Jun. 22, 

2023) (unpublished memorandum at *2) (footnote omitted, emphasis 

added).1

As explained above, Bradley did not announce a new constitutional 

rights. Thus, Appellant has not satisfied an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.2

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1 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the 

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive 

value).

2 Further, Appellant first raised his claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

his response to the Rule 907(a) notice. Response, 11/7/22, at 1-6. Appellant 

cites Bradley in his brief, but does otherwise argue that PCRA counsel was 

ineffective; Appellant argues only that his sentence is illegal. Appellant’s Brief 

at 6-8; see also Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In addition, Appellant may not circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements by challenging the legality of his sentence. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has explained: “Although legality of sentence is always subject 

to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits 

or one of the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 

223 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). Appellant cannot elude the PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements based on a claim of an illegal sentence.3 See id.

Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition is untimely. Because he failed to plead

and prove an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, we affirm the order dismissing

his PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

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behalf of an appellant.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 

A.3d 1274, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Although this Court is willing to construe 

liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no 

special benefit ....”).

3 Appellant’s legality of sentence claims in the underlying petition are the same 

as the claims he raised in his third and fourth PCRA petitions. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 1/24/23, at 3-4; PCRA Petition, 8/18/20, at 5 (unnumbered). Even 

if the petition was timely, the claims would be barred as previously litigated. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023