FEDERAL 

CONTRACTS

Agencies Widely 

Used Indefinite 

Contracts to Provide 

Flexibility to Meet 

Mission Needs

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

April 2017

GAO-17-329

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-329, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate

April 2017

FEDERAL CONTRACTS

Agencies Widely Used Indefinite Contracts to Provide 

Flexibility to Meet Mission Needs 

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the proportion of spending by federal 

agencies on indefinite delivery/ indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts remained 

stable and accounted for about a third of total government contract obligations. 

Agencies obligated more than $130 billion annually on these types of contracts, 

as shown in the figure. 

Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Obligations as a Percentage of Total Contract 

Obligations, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 dollars)

Notes: Obligation amounts were adjusted for inflation using the Fiscal Year Gross Domestic Product 

Price Index. 

The Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, Health and Human 

Services, and Veterans Affairs were the main users of IDIQ contracts, with DOD 

accounting for about 68 percent of all IDIQ obligations from 2011 through 2015. 

About two-thirds of government-wide IDIQ obligations were for services, with the 

remainder for products. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 

states a preference for multiple-award IDIQs, the majority of dollars governmentwide, approximately 60 percent, were obligated through single-award IDIQs. 

About 70 percent of single-award IDIQ obligations and more than 85 percent of 

order obligations under multiple-award contracts were competed. Contracting 

officials at DOD cited flexibility as the main advantage for using IDIQ contracts, 

noting that it was easier and faster to place an order under an existing IDIQ 

contract than to award a separate contract when a specific need arose.

Ten of the 18 single-award IDIQ contracts GAO reviewed at DOD were not 

competed, generally because only one contractor could meet the need. For the 

competed single-award contracts, contracting officials cited various reasons for 

choosing a single-award IDIQ approach, such as the need to build and maintain 

knowledge as orders were awarded over time. For about one-third of the 

multiple-award IDIQ orders GAO reviewed, DOD did not provide an opportunity 

for all contract holders to compete due to urgency or other reasons. 

Prices on IDIQ contracts and orders at DOD were established at different points, 

depending on how well-defined the requirements were at the time of contract 

award. For example, for a Navy contract to buy commercial radios used in fixedwing aircraft, the pricing was established upfront in the contract since the radios 

were defined products that have been used for many years. In contrast, for an 

Air Force contract to buy research and development services for cybersecurity 

and malware detection, all pricing was established at the order level since 

specific research needs were not known when the contract was awarded.

View GAO-17-329. For more information, 

contact William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or 

woodsw@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past 5 years, the federal 

government obligated over a hundred 

billion dollars annually through the use 

of IDIQ contracts. IDIQ contracts are 

awarded to one or more contractors

when the exact quantities and timing 

for products or services are not known 

at the time of award. DOD uses IDIQ 

contracts more than all other agencies 

combined. The FAR establishes a 

preference for awarding multiple-award 

IDIQ contracts under a single 

solicitation such that a number of 

contract holders compete for 

subsequent orders. 

GAO was requested to examine 

federal agencies’ use of IDIQ 

contracts. This report addresses (1) 

federal agencies’ use of IDIQ contracts 

from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, 

the latest year for which complete data 

were available; (2) the role of 

competition when awarding selected 

IDIQ contracts and placing orders at 

DOD; and (3) when and how DOD 

contracting officers established prices 

for these contracts and orders. GAO 

analyzed Federal Procurement Data 

System-Next Generation data on 

civilian and DOD obligations for fiscal 

years 2011 through 2015; reviewed 

and analyzed a nongeneralizable 

sample of 31 IDIQ contracts and 76 

IDIQ orders selected across four DOD 

components—Army, Navy, Air Force 

and Defense Logistics Agency; and 

interviewed DOD contracting and 

program officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is not making any 

recommendations at this time. DOD 

had no comments on a draft of this 

report.
Page i GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Letter 1

Background 3

Agencies Obligated over $130 Billion Annually on IDIQ Contracts, 

Primarily for Services 6

Extent of Competition on DOD’s IDIQ Contracts and Orders 

Depended on Various Factors 15

DOD Established Prices at the IDIQ Contract or Order Level 

Based on How Well-Defined Requirements Were at Contract 

Award 20

Agency Comments 25

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 29

Table

Table 1: Numbers of Department of Defense Contracts and 

Orders GAO Reviewed 27

Figures

Figure 1: Government-wide Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Obligations in Comparison with Total Contract 

Obligations, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 

dollars) 7

Figure 2: Comparison of Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Obligations for DOD and Civilian Agencies, 

Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 dollars) 8

Figure 3: Proportion of Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Obligations by Agency, Fiscal Year 2015 9

Figure 4: Service and Product Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite 

Quantity Contract Obligations at DOD and Civilian 

Agencies, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 

dollars) 10

Figure 5: Single- and Multiple-Award Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite 

Quantity Contract Obligations at DOD and Civilian 

Agencies, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 

dollars) 11

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 6: Percentage of Single-Award Indefinite Delivery / 

Indefinite Quantity Contract Obligations That Were 

Competed, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 12

Figure 7: Percentage of Multiple-Award Indefinite Delivery / 

Indefinite Quantity Order Obligations That Were 

Competed, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 13

Figure 8: Extent to Which 18 DOD Single-Award Indefinite 

Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contracts Reviewed Were 

Competed 16

Figure 9: Extent of Competition on 23 Orders under MultipleAward Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contracts 

Reviewed, and Reasons Not Competed 18

Figure 10: Where Pricing Was Established for 31 Indefinite 

Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contracts Reviewed 21
Page iii GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Abbreviations:

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

DOD Department of Defense 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FPDS-NG Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

IDIQ Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 

VA Department of Veterans Affairs 

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Page 1 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 13, 2017

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator McCaskill:

The federal government has obligated over a hundred billion dollars in

each of the past 5 years through the use of indefinite delivery / indefinite 

quantity (IDIQ) contracts. IDIQ contracts—which can be awarded to one 

or more contractors for the same or similar products or services—are 

used when the exact quantities and timing for products or services is not 

known at the time of award. An IDIQ contract provides for the issuance of 

orders, which are used to procure specific products or services during the 

period of the contract. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses IDIQ 

contracts more than all other agencies combined. The Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) establishes a preference for awarding multiple-award 

IDIQ contracts, under a single solicitation, such that a number of 

contractors are awarded contracts and compete for subsequent orders. 

However, in certain circumstances, such as when only one contractor can 

provide the needed products or services or when the expected cost of 

administration of multiple contracts outweighs the benefits of making 

multiple awards, agencies also have the ability to award IDIQ contracts to 

a single contractor, in which case all subsequent orders are placed 

without additional opportunities for competition.

Given the large amount of IDIQ contract obligations, you asked us to 

examine federal agencies’ use of IDIQ contracts. This report addresses 

(1) federal agencies’ use of IDIQ contracts from fiscal years 2011 through 

2015, the latest year for which complete data were available; (2) the role 

of competition when awarding selected IDIQ contracts and placing orders 

at DOD; and (3) when and how DOD contracting officials established 

prices for these contracts and orders.

To examine the use of IDIQ contracts by federal agencies, we analyzed 

government-wide Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 

(FPDS-NG) data on IDIQ obligations from fiscal year 2011 through 2015. 

Data that were adjusted for inflation were adjusted to fiscal year 2015 

dollars using the Fiscal Year Gross Domestic Product Price Index.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

To assess the reliability of the FPDS-NG data, we electronically tested for 

missing data, outliers, and inconsistent coding, and we compared the 

data on selected IDIQ contracts to contract documentation we obtained. 

Based on these steps, we determined the data were sufficiently reliable to 

present IDIQ contract obligations for fiscal years 2011 through 2015. To 

provide context on agency use of IDIQ contracts, we also interviewed 

DOD contracting officials.

To address IDIQ competition and pricing at DOD, we selected the four 

DOD components with the highest obligations on IDIQ contracts—the 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency. From these 

components, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 31 IDIQ 

contracts, 53 single-award IDIQ orders and 23 multiple-award IDIQ 

orders.1 We selected these contracts and orders based on factors such 

as obtaining a mix of products and services, whether the contracts were 

competed or noncompeted, and the number of offers received. For the 

contracts and orders selected, we collected and analyzed contract 

documentation, including acquisition plans, justification and approval 

documents, price negotiation memoranda, and other pertinent 

information. In addition, we conducted interviews with DOD contracting 

and program officials. A more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology, including how we selected contracts and orders, is 

presented in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based 

on our audit objectives.

 1

The 53 single-award IDIQ orders were placed under 18 single-award IDIQ contracts, 

while the 23 multiple-award IDIQ orders were placed under 13 multiple-award IDIQ 

contracts. Only one offer was received on each of the 23 multiple-award orders selected, 

either because DOD only solicited one contractor or because only one contractor 

submitted an offer. We selected orders where only one offer was received so as to 

understand reasons why competition did not take place.
Page 3 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

The federal government may consider a wide selection of contract types 

when purchasing products and services. One of those types is an IDIQ 

contract.2 An IDIQ contract provides flexibility in cases where the 

government cannot determine the exact quantities and required timing of 

a product or service. Under an IDIQ contract, the government must order, 

and the contractor must provide, a minimum agreed-upon quantity of 

products or services, also known as a minimum guarantee. In addition, 

the contractor must provide any other quantities ordered by the 

government up to a stated maximum.

A contracting officer determines whether, for a specific solicitation, to 

award multiple IDIQ contracts or only one. The FAR establishes a 

preference for “multiple-award contracts.” For purposes of this report, we 

describe these two approaches as “single-award IDIQ contracts” and 

“multiple-award IDIQ contracts.”

• “Single-award IDIQ contracts” refers to situations when only one 

contract is awarded under a solicitation. These contracts may have 

been competed or may have been awarded on a non-competitive 

basis. If a contract is awarded without competition, it must follow 

certain procedures, for example, a justification and approval 

document must be prepared and approved.3 In addition, if a singleaward IDIQ contract is expected to exceed a certain threshold—raised 

from $103 million to $112 million on October 1, 2015—a written 

determination by the head of an agency is required.4 Single-award 

 2

An IDIQ contract provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or 

services during a fixed period. The government places orders for individual requirements. 

FAR § 16.504(a).

3

FAR § 6.303. Similarly, there may be situations where multiple-award IDIQ contracts are 

awarded noncompetitively.

4

FAR §16.504 states that no IDIQ contract estimated to exceed $112 million, including all 

options, may be awarded to a single source unless the head of the agency determines in 

writing that one of the following situations exists: the products or services expected are so 

integrally related that only a single source can reasonably perform the work; only one 

source is qualified and capable of performing the work at a reasonable price to the 

government; it is necessary in the public interest to award the contract to a single source 

due to exceptional circumstances; or the contract provides only for firm-fixed priced task 

or delivery orders for products for which unit prices are established in the contract or 

services for which prices are established in the contract for the specific tasks to be 

performed. The contracts we reviewed were all awarded before October 1, 2015, thus, we 

used $103 million as the threshold for our review.

Background
Page 4 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

IDIQs are used under certain circumstances, such as when only one 

contractor is capable of providing the products or services.5

• “Multiple-award IDIQ contracts” refers to situations when contracts are 

awarded to two or more contractors under a single solicitation. These 

contracts allow agencies to establish a group of prequalified 

contractors to compete for future orders under streamlined ordering 

procedures once agencies determine their specific needs. Contracting 

officers must avoid situations in which contractors specialize in one or 

a few areas of the work, creating the likelihood that orders would be 

awarded noncompetitively.

An order, which is placed when a concrete need arises, obligates funds 

and authorizes work. Orders must be within the scope, period of 

performance, and maximum value and or quantities agreed to in the 

contract. The ordering processes for a multiple-award IDIQ contract and 

single-award IDIQ contract differ somewhat. For orders under single 

award IDIQ contracts, once a requirement is known, contracting officials 

can place an order following the procedures outlined in the contract. 

When multiple-award IDIQ contracts have been awarded, and a need 

arises, the requirement must be generally competed, through “fair 

opportunity”, among all of the IDIQ contract holders. The specific 

procedures required to provide fair opportunity differ based on the dollar 

value of the orders. Contracting officers must provide each contractor a 

fair opportunity to be considered for each order unless exceptions apply. 

Exceptions to fair opportunity requirements for orders are permitted in 

certain circumstances, such as when only one source is capable of 

 5

Other situations where a contracting officer must use a single-award approach are: (1) 

based on a contracting officer’s knowledge of the market, a single-award IDIQ would 

result in more favorable terms and conditions, including price, (2) the expected cost of 

administration of multiple contracts outweighs the expected benefits of multiple awards, 

(3) the expected orders are so integrally related that only a single contractor can 

reasonably perform the work, (4) the total estimated value is less than the simplified 

acquisition threshold (typically $150,000), or (5) multiple awards would not be in the best 

interest of the government. FAR §16.504 (c)(1)(ii)(B). 
Page 5 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

providing the particular products or services sought.6 Beyond the 

requirement to meet a minimum guarantee, contractors can choose to 

submit offers or not.

The FAR requires that before purchasing supplies and services, 

contracting officers must determine that the prices proposed by 

contractors are fair and reasonable. The FAR states that adequate price 

competition normally establishes a fair and reasonable price, but in some 

situations contracting officers may need to, or be required to, obtain other 

types of data to help establish pricing. Generally, the information that is 

used by contracting officers to determine the reasonableness of price 

depends on a series of circumstances, including whether the particular 

product or service procured is for a commercial or noncommercial item, 

and whether the requirement is being competed or awarded 

noncompetitively. The data examined could be cost data, such as the 

cost of materials, labor, and overhead, or pricing information, such as 

invoices for the same or similar items sold to commercial customers. 

When required, contracting officers must ask contractors for certified cost 

and pricing data.7 Once contracting officers obtain the data needed, there 

are several techniques they can use—singly or in combination—to 

determine price reasonableness, such as comparing proposed prices to 

historical prices paid, or comparing prices to an independent government 

cost estimate.

 6

FAR § 16.505(b)(2) describes the exceptions to the fair opportunity process. Contracting 

officers are required to give every awardee a fair opportunity to be considered for a 

delivery-order or task-order exceeding $3,500; with the following exceptions: (1) the 

agency need for the supplies or services is so urgent that providing a fair opportunity 

would result in unacceptable delays, (2) only one contractor is capable of providing the 

supplies or services required at the level of quality required because the supplies or 

services ordered are unique or highly specialized, (3) a sole source award is in the interest 

of economy and efficiency because it is a logical follow-on to an order already issued 

under the contract, provided that all awardees were given a fair opportunity to be 

considered for the original order, (4) it is necessary to satisfy a minimum guarantee, (5) for 

orders above the simplified acquisition threshold, a statute expressly authorizes or 

requires that the purchase be made from a specified source, and (6) contracting officers 

may at their discretion set aside orders for certain eligible small business concerns.

7

FAR § 15.402(a) describes the types of data that contracting officers must obtain in order 

to establish a fair and reasonable price. Our prior work found that DOD contracting 

officials faced challenges when determining price reasonableness, such as data currency 

and contractor reluctance to share data. See GAO, Defense Contracts: DOD’s Requests 

for Information from Contractors to Assess Prices, GAO-15-680 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 

12, 2015).

Pricing Contracts and 

Orders
Page 6 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

About one-third of all federal government contract obligations from fiscal 

years 2011 through 2015 were through IDIQ contracts. Obligations on 

IDIQ contracts were more than $130 billion annually during these years, 

with DOD accounting for more than two-thirds of all IDIQ obligations. 

IDIQs were used more often for services than products across 

government agencies and most IDIQ contracts and orders were 

competed. While the FAR states a preference for multiple-award IDIQs, 

federal agencies obligated more dollars through single-award IDIQs than 

through multiple-award IDIQs. Most single-award IDIQ contracts were 

competed. DOD contracting officials cited various reasons for the wide 

use of IDIQ contracts, including flexibility and administrative ease.

From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the proportion of IDIQ obligations 

relative to total government contract obligations remained relatively 

constant, accounting for about a third of total obligations (see figure 1). 

Total IDIQ obligations ranged from about $180 billion in fiscal year 2011 

to about $130 billion in fiscal year 2015. Overall, total contract obligations 

declined from fiscal year 2011 through 2015, and the changes in IDIQ 

obligations during this time frame were consistent with this decline.

Agencies Obligated 

over $130 Billion 

Annually on IDIQ 

Contracts, Primarily 

for Services

IDIQ Obligations 

Accounted for about OneThird of Government-wide 

Contract Spending
Page 7 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 1: Government-wide Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contract 

Obligations in Comparison with Total Contract Obligations, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 

(fiscal year 2015 dollars)

Note: Obligation amounts obtained from FPDS-NG were adjusted for inflation using the Fiscal Year 

Gross Domestic Product Price Index.

From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, DOD accounted for more than twothirds of total IDIQ obligations annually, while all civilian agencies 

combined accounted for less than one-third (see figure 2).
Page 8 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 2: Comparison of Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contract 

Obligations for DOD and Civilian Agencies, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 

dollars)

Note: Obligation amounts obtained from FPDS-NG were adjusted for inflation using the Fiscal Year 

Gross Domestic Product Price Index.

The three civilian agencies with the highest amounts of IDIQ obligations 

were the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Health and Human 

Services (HHS) and Veterans Affairs—(VA). From fiscal years 2011 

through 2015, these agencies combined accounted for about 8 to 13 

percent of government-wide IDIQ obligations each year. For example, in 

2015, DHS, HHS, and VA each accounted for about 4 percent of IDIQ 

obligations, as shown in figure 3.
Page 9 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 3: Proportion of Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contract Obligations 

by Agency, Fiscal Year 2015

From fiscal years 2011 through 2015 about two-thirds of governmentwide IDIQ obligations were for services, while about one-third were for 

products. For example, in fiscal year 2015, government-wide IDIQ 

obligations for services accounted for about 70 percent of total IDIQ 

obligations. However, the proportion of IDIQ obligations on services 

versus products differed between DOD and civilian agencies—with IDIQ 

obligations on services accounting for 62 percent of total 2015 IDIQ 

obligations at DOD, but 85 percent at the civilian agencies.

Figure 4 shows the annual breakdown of products and services by civilian 

agencies and DOD from fiscal years 2011 through 2015.

Agencies Primarily Bought 

Services through IDIQ 

Contracts
Page 10 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 4: Service and Product Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contract 

Obligations at DOD and Civilian Agencies, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal year 2015 

dollars)

Note: Obligation amounts obtained from FPDS-NG were adjusted for inflation using the Fiscal Year 

Gross Domestic Product Price Index.

While the FAR states a preference for multiple-award IDIQs, the majority 

of all government-wide IDIQ contract dollars were obligated through 

single-award IDIQ contracts from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. 

Specifically, across the government, approximately 60 percent of IDIQ 

obligations were awarded through single-award IDIQs and 40 percent 

through multiple-award IDIQs. Approximately eighty percent of all singleaward IDIQ obligations were at DOD. See figure 5 for a breakdown of 

single- and multiple-award IDIQs by DOD and civilian agencies.

Agencies Obligate the 

Majority of IDIQ Dollars 

through Single-Award IDIQ 

Contracts and Most IDIQ 

Contract and Order 

Obligations Were 

Competed
Page 11 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 5: Single- and Multiple-Award Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Obligations at DOD and Civilian Agencies, Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (fiscal 

year 2015 dollars)

Note: Obligation amounts obtained from FPDS-NG were adjusted for inflation using the Fiscal Year 

Gross Domestic Product Price Index.

From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, IDIQ contract and order obligations 

were generally competed. About 70 percent of all single-award contract 

obligations were competed from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, and that 

percentage was fairly consistent across DOD and civilian agencies, as 

shown in figure 6.8

 8

The proportion of single-award contracts competed (72 percent) from fiscal year 2011 

through 2015 was roughly similar to the proportion of obligations competed (69 percent). 
Page 12 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 6: Percentage of Single-Award Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

Contract Obligations That Were Competed, Fiscal Years 2011-2015

For multiple-award IDIQ orders government-wide—more than 85 percent 

of all order obligations were competed from fiscal years 2011 through 

2015.9 In each year, a higher percentage of order obligations were 

competed at DOD than at civilian agencies, as shown in figure 7.

 9

The proportion of orders competed from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 (72 percent) was 

lower than the proportion of obligations competed (87 percent). 
Page 13 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 7: Percentage of Multiple-Award Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity 

Order Obligations That Were Competed, Fiscal Years 2011-2015

Based on FPDS-NG data, agencies identified a variety of exceptions to 

fair opportunity for multiple-award IDIQ orders, for example, that only one 

contractor was capable of providing the products or services required, a 

noncompetitive order was needed to satisfy a contract’s minimum 

guarantee, or that there was an urgent need.

Our review of DOD contracts revealed several reasons for the use of IDIQ 

contracts. Contracting officials noted it was easier and faster to place an 

order under an IDIQ contract than to solicit and award a separate contract 

each time a need arose. Price and technical approach can still be 

evaluated at the time of placing an order, but the overall turnaround time, 

they said, is significantly less than for a new contract. Contracting officials 

also stated that IDIQ contracts were easier to administer. First, they noted 

that it was more efficient to track funds and requirements for different 

customers through orders, rather than making modifications to standalone contracts for the same purpose. Second, officials told us that the 

close-out of orders from IDIQ contracts was much faster, as each order 

DOD Contracting Officials 

Cited Various Reasons for 

the Wide Use of IDIQ 

Contracts
Page 14 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

can be closed-out individually when the last payment is made rather than 

waiting until the entire contract was complete.10

According to DOD contracting officials, IDIQ contracts also provide more 

funding flexibility as funds are obligated as needed through orders and 

not at contract award—as may be required for some other types of 

contracts. Once the minimum guarantee is satisfied on an IDIQ contract, 

there is no further government obligation to procure additional products 

and services under an IDIQ contract. For example, on an Air Force IDIQ 

contract for roofing services, contracting officials established a pricing 

structure that allowed for repairs to different types of roofing. The Air 

Force placed an order only when a specific need arose. These needs 

may vary—such as when repairs are needed due to wear and tear. This 

contract allows work to be performed on an as needed basis, which may 

help the Air Force begin or continue work in an uncertain funding 

environment.

In addition, DOD officials told us that the contracts they used served a 

broader customer base, for example, multiple commands, other federal 

agencies, and foreign military sales. By not needing to specify an exact 

quantity or timing of delivery at the time of contract award, program 

offices can accommodate unforeseen needs on an ongoing basis through 

issuance of orders. For example, an Army contract for Aerial Target 

Systems training and testing is intended for use by all military 

departments as well as foreign military partners. Since the need for 

testing and training varies depending on the customer, these 

requirements were less defined at contract award, and will be more 

clearly specified at the time of order.

 10Our prior work has identified challenges in closing out contracts, for example, GAO, 

Defense Contracting: DOD Initiative to Address Audit Backlog Shows Promise, but 

Additional Management Attention is Needed to Close Aging Contracts, GAO-13-131 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2012).
Page 15 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

DOD can award IDIQ contracts on a competitive or noncompetitive basis. 

Ten of the 18 single-award IDIQ contracts we reviewed were not 

competed, generally because only one contractor could meet the need. 

The remaining single-award IDIQ contracts reviewed were competed. For 

these contracts, a single-award contract was used for a variety of 

reasons; for example, orders under the contract were to be for integrally 

related tasks and therefore there was a need to build knowledge with 

each order. Orders under multiple-award contracts also can be awarded 

on a competitive or noncompetitive basis. The orders we reviewed that 

were not competed cited a variety of reasons, such as that there was an 

urgent need, there was only one contractor capable of completing the 

work, or the order was a follow-on to other work. Some orders we 

reviewed were competed, but only one contract holder chose to submit an 

offer. In most cases, the competitive orders for which the government 

received one offer were either in compliance with DOD’s policy that 

solicitations for competitive actions be open for at least 30 days, or the 

order met one of the exceptions to that policy.

DOD awarded single-award IDIQ contracts—which are awarded to one 

contractor on a competitive or noncompetitive basis—for a variety of 

reasons. Of the 18 single-award IDIQ contracts we reviewed at DOD, we 

found that 10 contracts were awarded noncompetitively because only one 

contractor was capable of fulfilling the need. Eight single-award IDIQ 

contracts in our sample were competed (see figure 8).

Extent of Competition 

on DOD’s IDIQ 

Contracts and Orders 

Depended on Various 

Factors

DOD Awarded SingleAward IDIQ Contracts for 

a Variety of Reasons
Page 16 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 8: Extent to Which 18 DOD Single-Award Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite 

Quantity Contracts Reviewed Were Competed

For the 10 single-award IDIQ contracts that were not competed, contract 

files contained the required justification and approval memorandums in all 

cases. In terms of the reasons why DOD chose not to compete the 

contract, in 8 of the 10 contracts we found that the government 

determined that it did not possess the data rights to proprietary 

technologies or processes needed to perform a service, for example:

• The Navy awarded a noncompeted single-award IDIQ contract with a 

value of up to $15 million per year for the deactivation of Tomahawk 

missiles, missile testing, and engineering services. Officials stated 

that they used an IDIQ because they could not determine the number 

or types of missiles that would be selected for deactivation and added 

that the manufacturer of the missiles was the only source capable of 

providing this service as the government lacked the data rights and 

certified facilities needed to perform this service.

• The Army awarded a noncompeted single-award IDIQ contract with a 

value of up to $1.7 billion to procure engines and associated data for 

several types of helicopters, including the Army’s UH-60 helicopter. 

The Army anticipates an ongoing need for these products and 

services over 5 years, but could not pinpoint the exact schedule for 

these deliveries. In addition, according to DOD, it does not own the 

manufacturing drawings, specialized processes, or technical data that 

would be required for production of the engines.

For the 8 single-award IDIQ contracts we reviewed that were competed, 

contracting officials cited various reasons for using a single-award IDIQ 
Page 17 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

contract, such as that orders were being used for interrelated tasks and 

therefore there was a need to build knowledge over time. For example:

• The Air Force competitively awarded several single-award IDIQ 

contracts under its program to procure research and development 

efforts to improve aviation engine technology. We reviewed one of the

single-award IDIQs with a value of up to $75 million. The single-award 

IDIQ contract we reviewed was part of a larger research and 

development effort that included several government agencies, 

including DOD, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

and the Department of Energy. In this case, the Air Force awarded 

single-award IDIQs using a broad agency announcement—a general 

announcement of an agency’s research interest used to procure and 

advance broad scientific knowledge or understanding, rather than 

focusing on unique research required to develop a specific system or 

hardware solution.11 Contracting officials told us that single-award 

IDIQs were used rather than multiple-award contracts because each 

of the contractors had specialized expertise in a specific propulsion 

research area such as fuel efficiency. Additionally, each order would 

be built upon prior research; therefore, orders could not be competed 

among multiple contractors.

• The Army competitively awarded a single-award IDIQ contract with a 

value of up to $38 million to procure a suite of seven different aircraft 

maintenance and repair toolkits. Officials cited the need for 

commonality among the tool kits and manuals, and the requirement 

that replacement tools match previous purchases.

Nine of 18 single-award IDIQ contracts that we reviewed required a 

determination and findings document due to an estimated value of over 

$103 million. All 9 IDIQ contracts met the requirement.

 11The primary basis for selection of proposals resulting from a broad agency 

announcement is technical, importance to agency program, and fund availability. Cost 

realism and reasonableness are considered, as appropriate. FAR § 35.016 (e).
Page 18 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

To understand the reasons why competition was not obtained, we 

reviewed 23 multiple-award IDIQ orders where DOD received only one 

offer. Specifically, we found for 9 of the 23 orders reviewed, contracting 

officers did not provide IDIQ contractors a chance to compete and cited 

exceptions to fair opportunity. We found that the remaining 14 orders 

were all competed, but only one contractor chose to submit an offer. 

Figure 9 depicts whether or not one-offer orders we reviewed were 

competed, and the reasons cited for exceptions to fair opportunity.

Figure 9: Extent of Competition on 23 Orders under Multiple-Award Indefinite 

Delivery / Indefinite Quantity Contracts Reviewed, and Reasons Not Competed

Note: We selected orders where the government received only one offer. Competed orders include 

small business competitive set asides where only one contractor submitted an offer.

For the 9 orders that were not competed, contracting officers obtained the 

required justification and approvals that provided reasons for using an 

exception to fair opportunity. The reasons included: urgent need, only one 

contractor was capable of completing the work, the order was a logical 

follow-on to other work, or there was a need to satisfy a minimum order 

guarantee.

• We reviewed two contracts awarded by the Navy to procure landbased and sea-based Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance services. Specifically, we reviewed 

About One-Third of 

Multiple-Award IDIQ 

Orders Reviewed Where 

Only One Offer Was 

Received Were Not 

Competed
Page 19 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

three noncompeted orders that were awarded under these two 

contracts to provide support for overseas contingency operations. 

Urgency was the primary factor in not providing fair opportunity in two 

of the orders. Contracting officials cited the need for flight clearances, 

explaining that only two of their three contractors possessed this 

capability. The remaining contractors did not have enough capability 

at the time to perform the work, and the contracting officer decided to 

split the work between the two contractors. For the third order, only 

one contractor was capable of providing the needed services.

• The Army awarded multiple-award IDIQ contracts that included two 

contracts for the procurement of aviation systems modifications. We 

reviewed one order which was for the installation of threat detection 

systems for the UH-60 helicopters. The contracting officer cited 

urgency as the reason for not providing fair opportunity. The Army 

placed the order, describing the threat detection system as 

survivability equipment, and explained that failure to install the 

modifications would likely interfere with troop deployments.

• The Air Force awarded multiple-award IDIQ contracts that included 34 

contracts to provide roofing maintenance services across the United 

States. We reviewed one order with a value of $1,000 to participate in 

a post-award orientation, which satisfied the IDIQ contract minimum 

guarantee. According to contracting officials, all 34 contractors were 

awarded orders to meet the minimum guarantee.

As shown in figure 9 above, 14 orders under multiple-award contracts we 

reviewed, where DOD received only one offer, were competed. In 

addition, only one offer was received because only one contractor chose 

to submit an offer.

DOD regulations generally require that, when only one offer is received in 

response to a competitive solicitation, certain steps need to be taken if 

the solicitation was not open for at least 30 days, including allowing for an 

additional solicitation period of at least 30 days.12 DOD allows exceptions 

to this requirement in certain instances, such as when a contract or order 

is part of a broad agency announcement, or is a small business setaside.13 Of the 14 orders we reviewed that were competed but DOD 

received only one offer, 7 of them had solicitations that were open for less 

than 30 days. Of these, 1 order was exempted because it was a broad 

 12Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) § 215.371.

13DFARS § 215.371-4.
Page 20 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

agency announcement, 3 orders were exempted because they were 

small business set-asides, and 3 orders did not comply with DOD 

regulation. These 3 orders were all awarded under the same multipleaward IDIQ vehicle. The contracting officer acknowledged that although 

the orders did not meet any of the exceptions listed in the DFARS, he did 

not revise the solicitations or allow for an additional solicitation period. 

The contracting officer further stated that the orders were not resolicited 

due his lack of familiarity with the DFARS requirement. The contracting 

officer added that, apart from delaying award, he did not believe that a 

30-day extension would have had any effect on competition. After we 

discussed our findings and the DFARS requirements with this contracting 

officer, he stated that he now understands the requirement and will 

comply with the provision when placing future orders.

For the contracts we reviewed, prices for well-defined products and 

services were typically established at the IDIQ contract level. For less 

defined products and services, prices were established at the order level. 

In situations where an IDIQ contract had both well-defined and less 

defined items, some price elements were established in the IDIQ contract 

and some were established in the order. Contracting officials use a 

variety of data and methods to help establish pricing, such as comparing 

historical prices for similar items, and obtaining certified cost and pricing 

data, among others.

IDIQ prices can be established at the time of contract award, at the time 

of order award, or both. We reviewed 31 contracts. For 5 of the IDIQ 

contracts, all of the pricing was established upfront and agreed to at 

contract award. For 8 contracts pricing was established only at the time of 

the order. And for 18 IDIQ contracts, pricing was established in both, with 

some price elements established at IDIQ contract award and some at 

order award (see figure 10).

DOD Established 

Prices at the IDIQ 

Contract or Order 

Level Based on How 

Well-Defined 

Requirements Were 

at Contract Award
Page 21 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Figure 10: Where Pricing Was Established for 31 Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite 

Quantity Contracts Reviewed

For the 5 DOD IDIQ contracts for which pricing was established upfront in 

the IDIQ contract, all had well-defined requirements at the time of contract 

award. Once prices are established at contract award, those prices were 

referred to when placing an order, for instance:

• The pricing for a noncompeted Navy single-award IDIQ contract with 

a value of up to $420 million to procure commercial radios used in 

fixed wing aircraft was established in the IDIQ contract. The radio is a 

well-defined product and has been a requirement for many years. 

With known requirements and historical knowledge of the need, Navy 

contracting officials were able to establish prices before contract 

award. To establish prices, contracting officials compared commercial 

pricing of the product to the contractor’s proposal, reviewed published 

prices obtained from federal supply schedules, and reviewed historical 

prices paid in previous contracts. The 3 orders we reviewed followed 

the pricing established in the contract.

• The Navy awarded a competed single-award IDIQ contract with a 

value of up to approximately $789 million to procure six different 

variants of sonobouys, devices used to detect and identify underwater 

objects. Sonobouys are well-defined products that have been used by 

the Navy since the 1940s. Contracting officials established prices for 

Prices for Well-Defined 

Products Established at 

Time of IDIQ Contract 

Award
Page 22 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

each variant. The government’s estimate was based on certified cost 

or pricing data submitted by contractors. In addition, contracting 

officials also enlisted support from the Defense Contract Audit 

Agency, and the Defense Contract Management Agency, both of 

which helped examine and determine if labor rates were reasonable. 

In addition to reviewing the contract, we reviewed three orders placed 

under this IDIQ and found that the prices paid for in the orders were 

consistent with what was agreed to in the IDIQ contract.

• The Army competitively awarded a single-award IDIQ contract with a 

value of up to $38 million to procure a suite of seven different aircraft 

maintenance and repair toolkits. All pricing for this contract was 

established before contract award as this requirement was well 

defined. Contracting officials relied on competition to establish pricing. 

This contract was awarded to the contractor who had the lowest price 

and whose proposal was deemed technically acceptable.

DOD contracting officials established prices at the order level when they 

were not established at the contract level, primarily for services and 

undefined products. Within our selected sample of 31 DOD contracts, 

there were 8 contracts where prices were determined at the order level 

only, and the contracts only included a ceiling value. Six of these 8 

contracts were primarily for research and development efforts. The 

following are examples where prices were established at the order level.

• The Air Force awarded a competed single-award IDIQ contract for up 

to $24.9 million that, according to a program official, was to procure 

research and development for cybersecurity and malware detection. 

No prices were established at the time of IDIQ contract award 

because specific requirements were not known at the time of contract 

award. The orders we reviewed were for the development of software 

and hardware to detect malware and other cybersecurity threats 

within medical equipment. Once a well-defined requirement arose 

pricing was established at the order level. To establish the pricing on 

the orders we reviewed, the program office performed a technical 

evaluation to determine if the proposed labor mix was appropriate. 

Subsequently, contracting officials collected and analyzed certified 

cost and pricing data or other cost data provided by the contractor.

• We reviewed two multiple-award IDIQ contracts awarded by the Navy 

to procure UAS imagery services. Though it was known that imagery 

services would be procured, it was not known where, when or for how 

long these services would be needed until an actual mission need 

arose. We reviewed 3 orders awarded under these IDIQ contracts. All 

Prices for Less Defined 

Products and Services 

Were Established at the 

DOD Order Level
Page 23 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

three orders were noncompeted and were for deployment of 

personnel to provide imagery services from specific platforms such as 

ship or ground in specific locations. Since the platforms, locations, 

and timeframes for the missions could not be known at time of IDIQ 

contract award, the prices were established at the order level once the 

scope and location of each mission need was known. To establish 

pricing for one of the orders, we found that contracting officials 

compared the contractor’s proposal with historical pricing, as well as 

verified labor rate information provided by the contractor.

Eighteen DOD IDIQ contracts, which include both multiple- and singleaward, in our selected sample had some price elements established at 

the time of contract award and some price elements established at the 

time of order award. This arrangement occurred in situations where some 

elements of the requirement were well defined and pricing could be 

established upfront at the contract level, while other requirements were 

less defined and the prices were established when the order was placed. 

For instance, in DOD’s multiple-award IDIQ contracts, some pricing 

elements may be negotiated upfront at contract award, such as not-toexceed labor rates; however, since further competition is expected at the 

order level contractors may offer labor rates below the not-to-exceed 

rates. Therefore, actual labor rates were determined when an order was 

placed, for instance:

• The Air Force established a multiple-award IDIQ vehicle for roofing 

repairs with a ceiling of $325 million. According to officials, each IDIQ 

contract has a not-to-exceed price for 11 different roofing scenarios. 

When a need arises, the contracting officer solicits offers from the 

multiple-award IDIQ contract holders. According to contracting 

officials, these contractors submit proposals and base their pricing on 

defined requirements such as the type of roof, extent of repair, and 

location. The proposal with the lowest price that is technically 

acceptable—which cannot exceed a contractor’s not-to-exceed 

pricing—is awarded the order.

• A Navy noncompeted single-award IDIQ contract was awarded for the 

deactivation and disposal of Tomahawk missiles with a value of up to 

$15 million per year. Pricing for the deactivation of the missiles was 

established upfront in the IDIQ contract; however, some elements of 

the contract, such as unscheduled maintenance and testing, were not 

defined at contract award and therefore no price was established. We 

found that in one of the orders we reviewed, the contractor was to

provide software for missile testing. In order to establish pricing on 

Prices for DOD IDIQ 

Contracts with a Mix of 

Well-Defined and LessDefined Products and 

Services Established at 

Both IDIQ Contract Award 

and Order Levels
Page 24 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

this order, contracting officials conducted a cost analysis of the 

proposed offer. They asked the Defense Contract Management 

Agency to review the labor pricing that was submitted and pricing for 

similar labor categories the government paid on a different contract.

• The Army awarded a noncompeted single-award IDIQ contract with a 

value of up to $42 million that, according to a contracting official, is for 

a broad range of efficiency management services, such as 

determining ways to improve the function and efficiency of logistical 

processes. Not-to-exceed values for labor rates and the fee were 

determined for the IDIQ contract, but actual prices are determined at 

the order level. To establish the not-to-exceed rates in the IDIQ 

contract, contracting officials used certified cost and pricing data and 

support from the Defense Contract Management Agency to determine 

reasonable rates. For the 3 orders we reviewed under this IDIQ, a 

technical evaluation was conducted to ensure that the labor mix was 

acceptable, and contracting officials compared proposed labor rates 

with those not-to-exceed rates agreed to in the IDIQ contract.
Page 25 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 

had no comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 

interested congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact 

William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

William T. Woods

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Agency Comments 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

This report addresses (1) federal agencies’ use of indefinite delivery / 

indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, 

the latest year for which complete data were available; (2) the role of 

competition when awarding and using selected IDIQ contracts and orders 

at the Department of Defense (DOD); and (3) when and how DOD 

contracting officials established prices for these contracts and orders.

To examine the use of IDIQ contracts by federal agencies, we analyzed 

government-wide Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 

(FPDS-NG) data on IDIQ obligations from fiscal year 2011 through 2015 

to identify information such as overall agency obligations on IDIQ 

contracts, obligations for products and services, obligations for single-and 

multiple-award IDIQ contracts, and extent of competition for single-award 

IDIQ contracts and multiple-award orders. Data that were adjusted for 

inflation were adjusted to fiscal year 2015 dollars using the Fiscal Year 

Gross Domestic Product Price Index. To assess the reliability of the 

FPDS-NG data we used, we electronically tested for missing data, 

outliers, and inconsistent coding, and we compared data on selected IDIQ 

contracts to contract documentation we obtained. Based on these steps, 

we determined the data were sufficiently reliable to present IDIQ contract 

obligations for fiscal years 2011 through 2015. To provide context on 

agency use of IDIQ contracts, we also interviewed DOD contracting 

officials.

For our second and third objectives, we focused our review on DOD since 

DOD was the largest user of IDIQ contracts. Within DOD, we focused on 

the four DOD components with the highest obligations on IDIQ 

contracts—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency. 

From these components, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 31 

IDIQ contracts, 53 single-award IDIQ orders, and 23 multiple-award IDIQ 

orders. The 53 single award IDIQ orders were placed under 18 singleaward IDIQ contracts, while the 23 multiple-award IDIQ orders were 

placed under 13 multiple-award IDIQ contracts (see table 1). Only one 

offer was received on each of the 23 multiple-award orders selected, 

either because DOD only solicited one contractor or because only one 

contractor submitted an offer. We selected orders where only one offer 

was received so as to understand reasons why competition did not take 

place. We selected these contracts and orders based on factors such as 

obtaining a mix of products and services and whether the contracts were 

competed or noncompeted. The selection process for the components, 

commands, contracts and orders is described in detail below.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

Table 1: Numbers of Department of Defense Contracts and Orders GAO Reviewed

Component

Single-award 

contracts 

Single-award 

orders associated 

with the single-award 

contracts

Multiple-award 

contract orders where

only one offer was 

received

Multiple-award IDIQ 

contracts associated 

with the multiple-award IDIQ 

orders

Army 5 15 8 3

Navy 5 15 7 5

Air Force 5 14 8 5

Defense Logistics 

Agency 3 9 0 0

Total 18 53 23 13

Source: GAO analysis of DOD’s contract documentation. | GAO-17-329

IDIQ= indefinite delivery / indefinite quantity

To address the role of competition when awarding and using selected 

IDIQ contracts and orders at DOD, we collected and analyzed contract 

documentation, including acquisition plans, justification and approval 

documents, and other pertinent information, for contracts in our sample of 

IDIQ contracts and orders. In addition, we conducted interviews with DOD 

contracting and program officials to further discuss the reasons why 

single-award IDIQ contracts were needed, and why the government 

received only one offer on multiple-award IDIQ orders.

To address when and how DOD contracting officials established prices 

for contracts and orders in our sample, we collected and analyzed 

contract documentation, including contract and order award documents, 

price negotiation memoranda, and other pertinent pricing information. In 

addition, we conducted interviews with contracting and program officials 

for the selected contracts and orders to discuss changes, if any, to pricing 

since award and to clarify information found in contract documentation. 

Furthermore, for orders where prices were established in the contract, we 

ensured that the orders followed the pricing agreed to in the contract.

We selected the following four components within DOD—the Army, Navy, 

Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency—because they had the 

highest obligation dollars on IDIQ contracts within the department from 

fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Within these components, we selected 

one command and location for review taking into consideration factors 

such as the total obligations at the command/location for single-award 

IDIQs from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the proportion of contracts for 

products and for services, and the extent to which contracts at the 

Methodology for Selection 

of Components, 

Commands, Contracts and 

Orders
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

command/location were competed or noncompeted. With consideration of 

these factors, we selected the following commands for review—the Army 

Materiel Command in Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Navy Air Systems 

Command in Patuxent River, Maryland; Air Force Materiel Command in 

Dayton, Ohio; and the Defense Logistics Agency (Energy) in Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia.

Within commands and locations listed above, we selected single-award 

IDIQ contracts awarded from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, ensuring 

our selections included a mix of products and services contracts, and 

competed and noncompeted contracts. We further selected orders from 

each of the single-award IDIQ contracts that were awarded in fiscal years 

2014 and 2015, and were among those with the highest obligations. In 

addition, within the selected commands and locations, we selected 

multiple-award IDIQ orders where the government only received one offer 

and were placed in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. We also selected the 

multiple-award IDIQ contracts associated with these orders.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based 

on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 29 GAO-17-329 Federal Contracts

William T. Woods, (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Janet McKelvey, Assistant 

Director, Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Analyst-in-Charge, Karen Cassidy, 

Lorraine Ettaro, Kurt Gurka, Stephanie Gustafson, Julia Kennon, Victoria 

Klepacz, Carol Petersen, Roxanna Sun, and Alyssa Weir made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100537)
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