United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-60005

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Justin Stabler, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:17-CR-130-1

Before Stewart, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Justin Stabler pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in 

violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Stabler 

to the statutory maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment followed by a 3-year 

term of supervised release. Stabler challenges the length of his sentence and 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 4, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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two of his special conditions of supervised release. We affirm the judgment 

of the district court.

I. Facts & Procedural History

Police officers responded to a call stating that a man in a black and 

white jacket and blue shorts was walking in the street brandishing a weapon. 

The officers approached the scene and saw a man matching that profile. 

Officers demanded that the man drop the weapon and get on the ground. The 

man complied dropping a loaded 45/.410 caliber revolver. Officers identified 

and confirmed that the man was Stabler, a convicted felon on parole. As a 

result, Stabler was arrested and charged under § 922(g)(1) for being a felon 

in possession of a firearm. He pleaded guilty to the offense, pursuant to a plea 

agreement. 

The U.S. Probation Office compiled a Presentence Report (“PSR”) 

detailing Stabler’s criminal history. The PSR calculated Stabler’s offense 

level to be 13, taking into consideration that the weapon was stolen and that 

Stabler accepted responsibility for his actions. Stabler’s total offense level 

considered alongside his criminal history score of VI resulted in an advisory 

Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months of imprisonment. The Government 

recommended, in accordance with the plea agreement, that Stabler be 

sentenced within the lower half of the Guidelines range.

However, the district court sentenced Stabler to 90 months’

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district court noted

that Stabler received suspended sentences for his prior convictions and 

“never really served any significant time for all those violations that have 

come up in his lengthy criminal past.” The district court also revealed that 

the probation officer recommended a 120-month sentence in the sealed 

sentencing recommendation and stated that, while it did not impose this 

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sentence, it thought “that 120-months could have been a legitimate and 

appropriate sentence for [Stabler’s] prior conduct.” 

The district court imposed seven special conditions of release, 

including that Stabler (1) “shall refrain from consuming alcohol while under 

supervision of the probation office” and (2) must “submit his person, his 

house, his residence, his vehicle, his papers, electronic communication 

devices, or office to a search conducted by a United States Probation 

Officer.” The court limited the search condition stating that “[a]n officer 

may conduct a search . . . only when reasonable suspicion exists that [Stabler] 

had violated a condition of his supervision and that the areas to be searched 

contain evidence of the violation. Any search must be conducted at a 

reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.” 

Stabler objected to the above-the-Guidelines sentence, the alcohol,

and the electronics-search conditions. He argued that he only had “one arrest 

when he was 18 years old in 2004 for a DUI refusal” and that there was “no 

evidence presented to the court that he has any kind of alcohol issues.” The 

district court responded that it was going to leave that condition in place as 

he did not “quite understand why he was walking down the street with a 

loaded gun.” As to the electronics-search condition, Stabler argued that such 

a condition “is typically associated with sex offenders as a special condition,” 

but there was no evidence that Mr. Stabler ever used electronic devices “for 

that purpose or for any other reason such as drug use.” The district court 

stated it was going to keep that provision in place as well since Stabler had 

escaped or absconded in “at least two places in his criminal record.” 

Stabler appealed to this court challenging, inter alia, whether the 

confidential sentencing recommendation of the United States Probation 

Office contained additional factual matters that were not part of the PSR. The 

Government filed an unopposed motion seeking to vacate Stabler’s sentence 

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and remand for resentencing, and we granted the motion. On remand, the 

PSR was revised to reflect that after pleading guilty, Stabler engaged in 

additional criminal behavior while he was incarcerated including numerous 

minor infractions and offenses such as “destruction of government property, 

failure to obey commands, refusing to work, assault on fellow inmates, 

possession of contraband, possession of a weapon, lewd sexual behavior, and 

making sexual advances towards a staff member.” Accordingly, Stabler’s 

PSR was revised to reflect an increased offense level of 16. That combined 

with his criminal history score produced a new advisory Guidelines range of 

46 to 57 months of imprisonment. The district court adopted the PSR and 

the new supplemental PSR addendum in full. 

At resentencing, Stabler was sentenced to 120 months in prison, 

which is the statutory maximum term of imprisonment.1 The district court 

found that an above-the-Guidelines sentence was appropriate “due to the 

nature and characteristics of the defendant, to promote respect for the law,

and to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant.” The court 

emphasized that Stabler was on parole for four separate crimes at the time of 

the offense, and that “nearly every time [Stabler] [had] been paroled, he 

[had] absconded or committed new crimes or had that parole revoked.” The 

court also noted that the crimes included multiple offenses against the 

property of others. The district court concluded that it was “apparent 

[Stabler had] no respect for the law and no respect for others in the 

1 At both the sentencing and resentencing, although Stabler denied membership in 

a gang, the district court heard testimony and determined that Stabler was a member and, 

therefore, was untruthful to probation. Despite this determination, the district court stated 

that it would have sentenced Stabler to the same 120-month sentence “regardless of its 

finding as to this matter of gang membership.” 

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community” and that Stabler’s record was an “abomination” that “cries out 

for such a sentence.” 

Along with the 120 months’ imprisonment, Stabler was again 

sentenced to a 3-year term of supervised release, including the 

aforementioned electronics-search and alcohol special conditions. Stabler 

objected on the same grounds as before, and the district court overruled the 

objections. Stabler timely appealed.

II. Discussion

Stabler argues (1) that his 120-month above-the-Guidelines sentence 

is substantively unreasonable given that the advisory Guidelines range was 46 

to 57 months; and (2) that the district court abused its discretion when it 

imposed the electronics-search and alcohol special conditions of supervised 

release. We address each argument in turn.

A. Sentencing Decision

We review a district court’s sentencing decision for reasonableness. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). First, we ensure that the district 

court did not commit a “significant procedural error.” Id. at 51. If the district 

court’s decision is procedurally sound, we “consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an [abuse of discretion]

standard.” Id. 

Stabler does not argue that the district court made a procedural error,

nor could he. The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, 

treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors, allowed both parties to present arguments, and made an 

“individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Id. at 50. 

Accordingly, the central issue is whether Stabler’s sentence was

substantively unreasonable, or in other words, whether the district court

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abused its discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors justified a 

substantial deviation from the Guidelines range.

Stabler argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because 

the district court erroneously balanced the sentencing factors. Primarily, 

Stabler emphasizes that most of his prior crimes do not involve violence 

against others.2 We disagree. 

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we look 

at the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107, 

123 (5th Cir. 2015). We “may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness”

where, as is the case here, the sentence is outside the Guidelines range. Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51. Instead, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but 

must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) 

factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. That this court 

“might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate 

is insufficient to justify reversal.” Id. In this circuit, “[a] non-Guidelines 

sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the statutory sentencing factors set 

forth in § 3553(a) where it (1) does not account for a factor that should have 

received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or 

improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the 

sentencing factors.” United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015)

(citing United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir. 2006)).

2 Stabler also contends that the district court erred in considering his prior 

convictions as a basis to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range because the convictions 

were already accounted for in the offense level calculation. However, this court has already 

rejected this same argument in Smith, holding that “[a] defendant’s criminal history is one 

of the factors that a court may consider in imposing a non-Guideline[s] sentence.” Smith, 

440 F.3d at 709 (citing United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)).

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Here, even if many of Stabler’s past convictions do not involve 

violence against others, Stabler’s extensive criminal history supports the 

conclusion that the maximum sentence would promote respect for the law. 

The district court gave specific attention to the fact that Stabler was on parole 

for four separate convictions when he committed the instant offense; nearly 

every time Stabler was on parole he absconded or committed a new crime; 

and he had not yet served any significant time for his previous convictions. 

The district court acknowledged that the sentence was above the Guidelines 

but determined that such a deviation was necessary here particularly because 

it was apparent that Stabler had “no respect for the law and no respect for 

others in the community.”

The district court further determined that the maximum sentence was 

appropriate due to the nature and characteristics of the defendant and to 

protect the public from future crimes. We agree. Many of Stabler’s 

convictions were against the property of others, and the district court 

reasonably assigned great weight to the fact that even after the initial 

sentencing, Stabler committed numerous criminal acts that spanned nearly 

the entire time he was imprisoned. While the 120-month sentence

significantly deviated from the advisory range, the district court provided a 

reasoned basis for imposing the maximum sentence. Indeed, “[e]ven a 

significant variance from the Guidelines does not constitute an abuse of 

discretion if it is ‘commensurate with the individualized, case-specific 

reasons provided by the district court.’” Diehl, 775 F.3d at 724 (citation and 

quotation omitted). For these reasons, we conclude that Stabler’s sentence 

was substantively reasonable. 

B. Conditions of Supervised Release

We next address Stabler’s arguments regarding his special conditions 

of supervised release. Though “[a] district court has wide discretion in 

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imposing terms and conditions of supervised release,” it is subject to the 

limitations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). United States v. Vigil, 989 F.3d 

406, 409 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 

155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001)). First, under § 3583(d), the condition must be

“reasonably related” to at least one of the following factors: (1) “the nature 

and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant”; (2) “afford[ing] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; (3) 

“protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and 

(4) “provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 

manner.” § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D); § 3583(d)(1); see Vigil, 989 F.3d at 

409. 

Second, “the condition must be narrowly tailored such that it does not 

involve a ‘greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’to fulfill 

the purposes set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562, 570

(5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 398 (5th Cir.

2015) (per curiam)); see § 3583(d)(2). Lastly, the condition must “be 

‘consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission.’” Vigil, 989 F.3d at 409 (quoting § 3583(d)(3)).

The district court must also provide factual findings justifying the 

conditions. United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014). In the 

absence of such a justification by the district court, “a court of appeals may 

nevertheless affirm a special condition ‘where the [district] court’s reasoning 

can be inferred after an examination of the record.’” United States v. 

Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451). “On the other hand, ‘[w]here 

the district court’s rationale’ in imposing the special condition ‘is unclear’

even after a review of the record, the special condition must be vacated . . .”

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Id. at 272 (quoting Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451). Because Stabler objected to the 

conditions before the district court, we review for abuse of discretion. Id.

i. Electronics-search

Stabler argues that the electronics-search condition does not meet the 

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). We disagree. Although the district 

court did not explain why it imposed the condition at the resentencing, at the 

initial sentencing it explained that Stabler had a lengthy criminal history 

which included multiple occasions of abscondment or escape. We can, 

therefore, reasonably infer that Stabler’s criminal history and characteristics

were a basis for the electronics-search condition. This court has previously

held that criminal history can justify imposing electronics-search conditions.

See United States v. Hathorn, 920 F.3d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding

electronics-search condition was “reasonably related” to conviction, history 

of drug use, and need to deter crime and protect the public); United States v. 

Balla, 769 F. App’x 127, 128–29 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (affirming

electronics-search condition for defendant convicted of being a felon in

possession of a firearm and ammunition because defendant’s criminal history 

implicated the sentencing goal of deterring future crime and protecting the

public). The instant condition is likewise reasonably related to the necessary 

§ 3553(a) factors.

The electronics-search condition is also narrowly tailored. In United 

States v. Dean, 940 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 2019) we upheld, on plain-error review, 

a virtually identical condition against a defendant that was also convicted of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm and had the same criminal history 

score of VI. Dean included a special condition which required the defendant 

submit his electronic communications to a search upon reasonable suspicion 

and required probation officers to conduct the search “at a reasonable time 

and in a reasonable manner.” Dean, 940 F. 3d at 890. We held that, given the 

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defendant’s criminal history, the special condition was narrowly tailored

because “the condition further requires that the probation officer must 

reasonably suspect that the areas to be searched contain evidence of the 

violation.” While Dean was reviewed for plain error rather than abuse of 

discretion, we find it persuasive. We, thus, hold that in this case the limited 

electronics-search condition does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty 

than is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose of § 3553(a).3

ii. Alcohol

Stabler argues that the alcohol condition does not meet the 

requirements of § 3583(d) because he does not have a history of abuse. We 

disagree. The district court did not state a reason for the special condition. 

However, we can infer from the record that the basis of this condition is 

Stabler’s 2004 conviction of DUI refusal, possession of marijuana in a 

vehicle, and possession of alcohol by a minor. The record also shows that

Stabler was arrested for consumption of alcohol as a minor. Additionally, in 

a separate incident, Stabler was found in possession of a “green leafy 

substance” while incarcerated on other charges and refused to provide drug 

screens to correctional officers. Thus, Stabler’s record shows multiple

incidents involving alcohol and drugs and an extensive criminal history 

exemplifying a lack of respect for the law. Applying the deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review, under these circumstances, we cannot say that 

3 Stabler also argues in conclusory fashion that the Sentencing Commission policy 

statement does not state anything “about ordering any special condition of supervision in 

relation to a felon in possession conviction.” However, we have held that “[a] district court 

has discretion to craft conditions of [supervised release], even if the Guidelines do not 

recommend those conditions.” United States v. Windless, 719 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2013);

Hathorn, 920 F.3d at 985–87; United States v. Acosta-Navarro, 781 F. App’x 318, 325 n. 9 

(5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (recognizing that “we have affirmed electronic-search 

conditions even when the underlying conviction is not a sex crime”).

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the district court’s rationale is unclear or that its reasoning cannot be inferred 

from the record. See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 275 (holding that a special 

condition will not be disturbed on appeal if the district court’s reasoning can 

be inferred from the record). We therefore hold that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in imposing the alcohol condition. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Stabler’s sentence in full.

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