[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-10474

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cv-01812-VEH

MYRA CORLEY,

CHARLES CORLEY,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

LONG-LEWIS, INC., individually and as successor to Burrell Corp., f.k.a. Lewis 

Hardware Co.; BIRMINGHAM RUBBER AND GASKET CO., et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

_______________________

(July 16, 2020)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and LUCK, Circuit 

Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to resolve three difficult questions of appellate 

jurisdiction before deciding a single issue on the merits. The jurisdictional issues 

are (1) whether an order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, Fed. R. 

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Civ. P. 41(a)(2), is a “final decision[],” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; (2) whether we have 

territorial jurisdiction, id. § 1294, to review an interlocutory decision by an out-ofcircuit district court that merged into the final judgment of a district court in this 

Circuit; and (3) whether an appellant has standing to appeal from a final judgment

accompanying an order granting his motion for a voluntary dismissal. Charles

Corley and his wife, Myra Corley, filed this lawsuit against dozens of companies

that allegedly supplied products containing asbestos that caused Charles’s 

malignant mesothelioma. Although the Corleys commenced their suit in an 

Alabama court, the companies removed it to the Northern District of Alabama. The 

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then transferred the suit to the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania, which eventually returned it to the Northern District of 

Alabama. After the Northern District of Alabama granted the Corleys’ motion to 

voluntarily dismiss the last two companies in the suit, the Corleys sought our 

review of an order entered by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that denied their 

motion to reconsider a partial summary judgment in favor of several companies. In 

that motion, the Corleys had argued for the first time that the district court should 

apply maritime law, not state law, to determine the merits of their claims. We 

conclude that the order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a final 

order, that we have territorial jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and that the Corleys 

have standing to appeal. We also affirm the judgment against the Corleys.

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I. BACKGROUND

Charles and Myra Corley sued dozens of companies that allegedly supplied

asbestos-laden products that Charles used when he served in the United States 

Navy and later when he was a self-employed mechanic and repairman. The 

Corleys alleged that these products caused Charles’s malignant mesothelioma and 

sought damages under state law. After Charles’s death, his son, Oscar Corley, 

joined the suit as the executor of Charles’s estate. Oscar and Myra amended their 

complaint to add a claim under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act. The Corleys 

originally filed their complaint in an Alabama court, and the companies removed 

the suit to the Northern District of Alabama.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred this action to the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where several of the companies filed motions for 

summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania district court

granted summary judgment in favor of 17 companies that supplied products that

Charles used when he was in the Navy—a group we will call the “Navy suppliers.” 

The district court determined that the statute of limitations had expired on the

claims against these companies. The Corleys filed a motion to reconsider, which

asked for “leave to elect the application of maritime law and, in so doing, the 

[extended] statute of limitations recognized under maritime law.” After explaining 

that the Corleys had not previously argued that maritime law applied, the district 

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court denied the motion on the ground that a motion for reconsideration was far too 

late in the litigation for the Corleys to change their theory of liability.

Over the next year, the Pennsylvania district court whittled the suit down to 

what it thought were the final two companies in the suit—Honeywell International, 

Inc., and Ford Motor Company. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then 

remanded the suit to the Northern District of Alabama. The Alabama district court

later dismissed Honeywell and Ford from the suit with prejudice.

The Corleys filed an appeal to this Court that challenged the Pennsylvania 

order denying their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of the 

Navy suppliers. Two defendants, Fairbanks Morse Pump Corporation and Garlock 

Sealing Technologies, LLC, filed suggestions of bankruptcy in this Court. After 

investigation, we discovered that the Corley’s claims against Fairbanks and 

Garlock were still pending in the district court and dismissed the Corleys’ appeal. 

On remand to the district court, the Corleys reported that Fairbanks and 

Garlock had filed petitions for relief in a bankruptcy court in 2010, which had 

stayed proceedings against them in this suit. Three months later, the bankruptcy 

court confirmed a reorganization plan that prevented the Corleys from litigating 

their claims against Fairbanks and Garlock in this suit. Because their claims against 

the two companies had “already been eliminated as a matter of law” in the 

bankruptcy court, the Corleys asked the district court to voluntarily dismiss those 

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claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (permitting the dismissal of 

“an action . . . at the plaintiff’s request . . . by court order, on terms that the court 

considers proper”); see also Plains Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that 

plaintiffs can voluntarily dismiss individual parties from a suit). The district court 

granted their motion and entered what it called a “final judgment with respect to all 

claims asserted in this action.” The Corleys then filed this appeal, which again 

challenges the denial of their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor 

of the Navy suppliers.

II. JURISDICTION

We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear an 

appeal, for “[w]ithout jurisdiction [we] cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Ex

parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869); accord Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. 

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Because we are a court of 

limited jurisdiction, adjudicating an appeal without jurisdiction would “offend[] 

fundamental principles of separation of powers.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). In practical terms, our jurisdiction “must be both 

(1) authorized by statute and (2) within constitutional limits.” OFS Fitel, LLC v. 

Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2008).

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To say that the odd procedural history of this appeal tests the boundaries of 

our jurisdiction would be an understatement. The Corleys challenge an 

interlocutory order from a district court in another circuit, and they do so by 

appealing from an order granting their motion for a voluntary dismissal without 

prejudice. But even so, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to address the merits.

We divide our discussion of the jurisdictional issues into three parts. First, 

we address whether an order granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss an action 

without prejudice is a “final decision[].” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Second, we consider 

whether we have territorial jurisdiction to hear an appeal challenging an 

interlocutory order issued by a district court outside this Circuit that merged into 

the final judgment of a district court in this Circuit. See id. § 1294. Finally, we 

examine whether the Corleys have standing to appeal from an order that granted 

their motion for a voluntary dismissal. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

A. The Corleys Appealed a Final Decision.

The Corleys invoke our subject-matter jurisdiction over “appeals from all 

final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Because the district court entered an order granting the Corleys’ motion to 

voluntarily dismiss their only remaining claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), the 

Corleys contend that we can hear their appeal. The Navy suppliers respond that we 

still lack jurisdiction. They argue that an order granting a plaintiff’s motion to 

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voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is not a final 

decision under section 1291.

Under section 1291, “[a] ‘final decision’ is one by which a district court 

disassociates itself from a case.” Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 408

(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 409 (“[T]he statute’s core 

application is to rulings that terminate an action.”). The voluntary dismissal 

underlying this appeal arguably fits that definition. It ended the involvement of the 

district court, and the Corleys have conceded that the bankruptcy court 

“eliminated” their claims against Fairbanks and Garlock “as a matter of law.”

“That the dismissal was without prejudice to filing another suit does not make the 

cause unappealable, for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit so 

far as the District Court was concerned.” United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 

336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949).

But we do not write on a blank slate. Indeed, “the canvas looks like one that 

Jackson Pollock got to first.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). Our 

precedent splinters in multiple directions on whether voluntary dismissals without 

prejudice are final. Compare, e.g., McGregor v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1017, 

1020 (11th Cir. 1992) (“An order granting a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary 

dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of 

appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with, e.g., State Treasurer v. Barry, 

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168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[V]oluntary dismissals, granted without 

prejudice, are not final decisions themselves . . . .”), with, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. 

City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 

voluntary dismissal without prejudice was final when “there was no attempt to 

manufacture jurisdiction”).

Our divergent decisions can be traced to two opinions of the former Fifth 

Circuit: LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976), and Ryan v. 

Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978). To “determine which 

of our precedents binds us,” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 846 F.3d 1333, 

1337 (11th Cir. 2017), we must begin with them.

LeCompte involved a plaintiff’s appeal from an order granting his motion

under Rule 41(a)(2) to dismiss his complaint without prejudice subject to certain 

conditions. 528 F.2d at 602. Before reaching the merits, our predecessor court

considered whether the order was appealable. Id. It devoted most of its attention to 

whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the stringent conditions on refiling 

that the district court attached to its dismissal order. See id. at 603–04. But before it 

reached that issue, LeCompte addressed whether the order was final, see id. at 603, 

which was also necessary to its holding that the order was appealable, see 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. It concluded that “[w]here the trial court allows the plaintiff to 

dismiss his action without prejudice, the judgment, of course, qualifies as a final 

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judgment for purposes of appeal.” LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). After concluding that the voluntary dismissal order was final and 

that the plaintiff was adverse to that order, LeCompte vacated and remanded the 

order on the merits. Id. at 603–05.

Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, came two years later.

After the district court in Ryan had dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s claims, 

the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the paragraph of his complaint that 

contained his remaining substantive allegation. Id. at 300. Although the district 

court granted the plaintiff’s narrow motion, it “did not purport to dismiss the 

jurisdictional allegations of [the] complaint . . . and it specifically noted that the 

dismissal was without prejudice to [the plaintiff’s] right to file again.” Id. When 

the plaintiff tried to appeal, the former Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction. 

Id. It concluded that no final judgment existed because “the torso of the plaintiff’s 

complaint—including the identification of the parties and the jurisdictional 

allegations—remain[ed] before the district court.” Id. at 301. Ryan later explained 

that the “chief problem” with finality in the appeal was that the plaintiff’s dismissal 

motion was “more appropriately considered to be an amendment to the complaint 

under Rule 15” and that an order granting leave to amend “lacks finality” when it 

“permits judicial proceedings to continue.” Id. at 302 n.2. Ryan separately 

concluded that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the Jetco exception to 

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finality, which allows parties to appeal interlocutory decisions that were part of a 

series of orders that “effectively terminated the entire litigation.” Id. at 301–02; see 

also Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973).

Because the “language of the district court’s order, along with its retention of the 

jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, appeared to contemplate that [the 

plaintiff] would pursue this same action in the same court,” the voluntary dismissal

did “not amount to a termination of the litigation between the parties.” Ryan, 577 

F.2d at 302. And because the order “neither amount[ed] to an appealable final 

decision nor [met] the requirements of any exception to the finality rule,” Ryan

dismissed the appeal. Id. at 303.

LeCompte and Ryan are not in conflict. We can read LeCompte to establish 

that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is a final decision for the purposes 

of appeal at least when the court places stringent conditions on refiling. See 528 

F.2d at 603. Ryan qualifies that voluntary dismissals are deprived of finality when

part of the complaint remains before the district court, which occurs when a 

plaintiff moves to voluntarily dismiss only part of his remaining complaint without 

prejudice, the district court grants the motion without purporting to dismiss the 

remainder of the complaint, and the dismissal order contemplates future filings in 

the court. See 577 F.2d at 300–02 & n.2. Under these circumstances, the dismissal 

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is akin to an order granting leave to amend, which is not final when it “permits 

judicial proceedings to continue.” See id. at 302 n.2.

Perhaps because no conflict existed, both the former Fifth Circuit and, at 

least initially, this Court held that voluntary dismissals without prejudice were final 

in a variety of circumstances. Shortly after Ryan, our predecessor court explained 

that LeCompte “stated the usual rule governing the appealability of orders granting 

motions for voluntary dismissal” and reiterated that voluntary dismissals under 

Rule 41(a)(2) are final decisions. Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 

(5th Cir. 1978). This Circuit initially allowed appeals from voluntary dismissals 

without prejudice without addressing whether a voluntary dismissal was final. See, 

e.g., Black v. Broward Emp’t & Training Admin., 846 F.2d 1311, 1312 & n.3 (11th 

Cir. 1988); Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 

1986); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1986). But 

we later cited LeCompte and held that an “order granting voluntary dismissal 

without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is final and appealable” by a defendant who 

had opposed the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal. Kirkland v. Nat’l 

Mortg. Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 1989). Because the 

voluntary dismissal was a final judgment, we explained, “it incorporate[d] and 

[brought] up for review the preceding nonfinal order” that the defendant 

challenged. Id. at 1370. Finally, in McGregor v. Board of Commissioners, which 

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involved a plaintiff’s challenge to several claims that the district court had 

dismissed on the merits before granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss his 

remaining claims, we quoted LeCompte and Yoffe and held that “[a]n order 

granting a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) 

qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” 956 F.2d at 1020 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The conflict came in Mesa v. United States, which also involved an order

granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss a suit without prejudice. See 61 F.3d 20, 

21 (11th Cir. 1995). Mesa held that the order of dismissal before it was not final. 

See id. It interpreted Ryan to hold that “the voluntary dismissal of [a] plaintiff’s 

remaining claim could not be considered final because a voluntary dismissal is 

without prejudice to the moving party to file those claims again.” Id. at 22. This 

understanding of finality became the standard in this Circuit for addressing 

voluntary dismissals without prejudice. See State Treasurer, 168 F.3d at 13; 

Constr. Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334, 1335–37

(11th Cir. 1998) (extending Mesa to stipulated dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)).

We first spotted the tension in our precedent in State Treasurer v. Barry, 168 

F.3d 8. After the district court in State Treasurer granted a partial summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss 

the remaining claim in the suit. Id. at 9–10; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

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(allowing the plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order if all parties sign a 

stipulation of dismissal). We dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal because we concluded 

that Mesa and its reading of Ryan controlled. See State Treasurer, 168 F.3d at 16. 

Although we failed to mention McGregor, we acknowledged that LeCompte and 

Kirkland had allowed appeals from voluntary dismissals without prejudice. Id. at 

14. But we concluded that the reasoning of these two decisions did not extend to 

stipulated dismissals. Id. at 15. LeCompte and Kirkland, we explained, involved 

court orders of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), not stipulated dismissals under Rule 

41(a)(1). Id.; see also Kirkland, 884 F.2d at 1369–70 (concluding that a voluntary 

dismissal without prejudice “under Rule 41(a)(2) is final”); LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 

603 (concluding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is final “[w]here the 

trial court allows the plaintiff to dismiss his action without prejudice” (emphasis 

added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We added, in dicta, that LeCompte “is 

limited to a subset of Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals”: dismissals in which the court 

“placed stringent conditions on the plaintiff’s ability to re-file its dismissed 

claims.” State Treasurer, 168 F.3d at 15.

This appeal picks up where State Treasurer left off. To be sure, we have 

revisited whether stipulated or noticed dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1) are final. 

See, e.g., Equity Inv. Partners, LP v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338, 1341–42 n.2 (11th Cir. 

2010); Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 1999); Univ. of S. 

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Ala., 168 F.3d at 408 n.1. But we have not addressed the tension between our 

earliest precedents and Mesa as applied to voluntary dismissals under Rule 

41(a)(2). Cf. Hood v. Plantation Gen. Med. Ctr., Ltd., 251 F.3d 932, 933–34 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (holding that an order granting a motion for voluntary dismissal was not 

final when a claim remained pending in the district court and that voluntarily 

dismissing the remaining claim did not trigger the Jetco exception). That tension is 

squarely presented in this appeal.

Two principles govern our approach to resolving conflicts in our precedent. 

First, we are “obligated, if at all possible, to distill from apparently conflicting 

prior panel decisions a basis of reconciliation and to apply that reconciled rule.” 

United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993). And second, if we 

cannot reconcile our precedent, we must follow the oldest decision that governs the 

issue. See Gen. Mills, 846 F.3d at 1338; accord Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of 

Judicial Precedent § 36, at 303–04 (2016).

We see no way to give force to Mesa in the light of our earlier precedents. 

Even if State Treasurer is correct that we can limit LeCompte to situations in 

which the district court attached “stringent conditions” to the voluntary-dismissal 

order, 168 F.3d at 15, we must still reconcile Mesa with our other earlier decisions, 

at least one of which is materially identical to it. In both McGregor and Mesa, the 

plaintiff suffered an adverse decision on some of his claims and voluntarily 

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dismissed his remaining claims without prejudice to challenge the earlier decision 

on appeal. See Mesa, 61 F.3d at 21; McGregor, 956 F.2d at 1018–20. McGregor 

concluded that “an order granting a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal 

pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) ‘qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.’” 

956 F.2d at 1020 (quoting Yoffe, 580 F.2d at 129, and LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603). 

Conversely, Mesa later concluded that these orders were not final. 61 F.3d at 21–

22. Because Mesa did not even mention McGregor, it provided no reason to 

distinguish that decision. And we cannot find one. 

Because we cannot harmonize our decisions, the earliest-precedent rule 

applies. See Gen. Mills, 846 F.3d at 1340. And under that rule, we must follow 

McGregor, which both predates Mesa and is consistent with our earlier decisions. 

So we hold that an order granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss the remainder of 

a complaint under Rule 41(a)(2) “qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of 

appeal.” McGregor, 956 F.2d at 1020 (quoting Yoffe, 580 F.2d at 129, and 

LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603). And because the Corleys appealed from such an 

order, we have jurisdiction under section 1291.

B. We Have Territorial Jurisdiction to Hear This Appeal.

The next issue concerns our territorial jurisdiction under section 1294, which 

mandates that “appeals from reviewable decisions of the district . . . courts shall be 

taken . . . to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district.” 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1294. The Corleys urge us to hold that “reviewable decisions” in section 1294 

refers to appealable decisions—that is, decisions that federal laws grant circuit 

courts jurisdiction to review. Here, that decision is the voluntary-dismissal order.

See id. § 1291. Because the Northern District of Alabama issued that order, we 

would have jurisdiction to review the order as “the court of appeals for the circuit 

embracing [that] district.” Id. § 1294; see also id. § 41. The Navy suppliers counter 

that the reviewable decision is the order that the Corleys challenge—that is, the 

denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—

which would deprive us of jurisdiction. See id. § 41.

The parties’ disagreement tracks a circuit split over the application of section 

1294 to interlocutory orders that precede an inter-circuit transfer. Most circuits to 

reach the question have concluded that they can review an out-of-circuit 

interlocutory decision so long as they have jurisdiction over the district court that 

issued the appealable decision. See Kalama v. Matson Navigation Co., 875 F.3d 

297, 305 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2006);

Jones v. InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 532–34 (7th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Henderson, 

195 F.3d 671, 674–75 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Chaiken v. VV Publ’g Corp., 119 F.3d 

1018, 1025 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 

1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992). Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that it lacks

jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by an out-of-circuit district court, 

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even when the appealable decision comes from within its boundaries. See 

McGeorge v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1989). In its view,

jurisdiction under section 1294 depends on whether the district court that issued 

the interlocutory order under review lies within its territorial boundaries. See id.

We agree with the majority interpretation and hold that the phrase 

“reviewable decisions” in section 1294 refers to appealable decisions. Congress 

has not given us the power to review interlocutory orders at will. Outside of narrow 

circumstances not relevant here, we can review those orders only when they 

“merge into a final judgment of the district court.” Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d 

1550, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993). So even when we consider the merits of an 

interlocutory order, we still “review” the final decision into which the earlier order 

merged. See Kalama, 875 F.3d at 305 (“A partial dismissal is not ‘reviewable’ 

until it can be appealed—generally, when it ‘merges’ into a final, appealable 

judgment.”). That final decision is necessarily the reviewable decision.

The rest of section 1294 dispels any lingering ambiguity about the meaning 

of “reviewable decision.” See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56 (1995) (“[I]t is a 

fundamental principle of statutory construction . . . that the meaning of a word 

cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it 

is used.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 1294 concerns “appeals from

reviewable decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (emphasis added). This language, of 

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course, presumes that the “reviewable decision[]” is an appealable decision. After 

all, there can be no “appeal[] from” a non-appealable decision. Cf. Cox v. Adm’r 

U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (“When reviewing 

an appeal from a final judgment, this court can review rulings on previous 

interlocutory orders.” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See 

generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (giving courts of appeals jurisdiction over “appeals 

from all final decisions” of district courts). Adopting the minority interpretation

would require us to ignore this context, which we cannot do.

The Navy suppliers argue that our decision in Roofing and Sheet Metal 

Services, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1982), 

requires a different interpretation of section 1294. In Roofing, the Western District 

of Arkansas transferred the underlying suit to the Southern District of Alabama, 

and the appellant sought to challenge that transfer order on appeal to this Court. 

See id. at 984–85. We held that section 1294 prevented us from reviewing the

transfer order. Id. at 986–87; see also Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (holding the same); cf. In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litig., 

620 F.2d 1086, 1090–91 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1294 required 

dismissing an appeal from a final order of contempt issued by the Southern District 

of New York against a third-party witness). The Navy suppliers argue that Roofing

demands that we dismiss the Corleys’ appeal. 

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We disagree. The holding of Roofing does not extend beyond transfer orders. 

Roofing reached its decision in the shadow of what it called the “well established” 

rule that “a transferee court cannot directly review the transfer order itself.” 689 

F.2d at 986 (quoting Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en 

banc)); see also id. at 987 (“[W]e know of no case in which [any] circuit . . . has in 

fact reviewed a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit.”). When 

Roofing held that it could not review the transfer order before it, it joined the 

uniform consensus of our sister circuits that an out-of-circuit transfer order is not 

reviewable on appeal in the transferee circuit. See Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 

977, 980 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Copley, 25 F.3d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 

1994); Lewelling v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 

1989); McGeorge, 871 F.2d at 953–54; Reyes v. Supervisor of the Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 834 F.2d 1093, 1095 (1st Cir. 1987); Linnell v. Sloan, 636 F.2d 65, 67 (4th 

Cir. 1980); Starnes, 512 F.2d at 924; Purex Corp. v. St. Louis Nat’l Stockyards 

Co., 374 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1967); see also Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of 

Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2000) (requiring a party to file a retransfer 

motion in the transferee court to appeal a transfer order). But see Nascone v. 

Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 772 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984) (suggesting in dicta that a 

transferee circuit could review a transfer order). This bar does not encompass other

out-of-circuit interlocutory decisions. See Hill, 195 F.3d at 677 (concluding that 

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the “complex and somewhat conflicting pattern of reviewability” of transfer orders 

does not affect the reviewability of other pretransfer orders).

In sum, we have territorial jurisdiction. The term “reviewable decisions” in 

section 1294 refers to appealable decisions. The Northern District of Alabama 

issued the final, appealable decision in this suit. And, of course, we can hear 

appeals from that court. 

C. The Corleys Have Standing to Appeal.

The final jurisdictional issue concerns our jurisdiction under Article III of 

the Constitution, which limits our authority to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. 

Const. art. III, § 2. Although the parties do not dispute this issue, “[l]ongstanding 

principles of federal law oblige us to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as 

to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Green v. Graham, 906 F.3d 955, 961 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because our precedent leaves doubt 

about whether we have Article III jurisdiction to hear the Corleys’ appeal from 

their own voluntary dismissal, we address the issue. 

“To have a case or controversy, a litigant must establish that he has standing, 

which must exist ‘throughout all stages of litigation,’” including on appeal. United 

States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hollingsworth v. 

Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013)). Standing is an “irreducible constitutional 

minimum,” and a “court is powerless to continue” in its absence. CAMP Legal Def. 

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Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To establish standing, a litigant must prove that “he has 

suffered a concrete and particularized injury.” Amodeo, 916 F.3d at 971 (quoting 

Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 704). In the appellate context, “the primary meaning of 

the injury requirement is adverseness.” Id. Specifically, the litigant “must be 

adverse as to the final judgment” to appeal from that judgment. OFS Fitel, 549 

F.3d at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a general rule, a plaintiff is not adverse to a voluntary dismissal that he 

requested. See, e.g., Druhan v. Am. Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 

1999). This rule “can easily be understood,” the former Fifth Circuit explained, 

because “the plaintiff has acquired that which he sought,” so the order cannot be 

adverse. LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603. 

Appellate standing is murkier when a plaintiff appeals from a voluntary 

dismissal to challenge an adverse interlocutory order. On the one hand, we have 

held that plaintiffs have standing to appeal from a voluntary dismissal if the

adverse interlocutory order is effectively “case-dispositive” and “the district court 

bases its dismissal with prejudice on the fact that its interlocutory decision 

disposed of the entire case.” OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1359 (order excluding expert 

testimony that was legally necessary to prevail). On the other hand, interlocutory 

orders that do not address the merits of a plaintiff’s claim cannot establish 

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appellate standing. See Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1326 (order denying the plaintiff’s

motion to remand her suit to state court); accord Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d 

1043, 1044 (11th Cir. 1999). The second class of appeals lacks adverseness 

because there is “no contested court ruling, either interlocutory or final, as to the 

merits of the plaintiff’s claims” and so “the dismissal on the merits derives only 

from the plaintiff’s own written request.” OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1356. 

This appeal does not fit neatly within our precedents on voluntary 

dismissals. Unlike the plaintiff in OFS Fitel, the Corleys did not voluntarily 

dismiss their claims to contest a “case-dispositive” order. They instead challenge a 

years-old order denying their motion to reconsider a summary judgment in favor of 

some defendants. But unlike the plaintiffs in Druhan and Woodard, the Corleys 

contest an order that completely resolved their claims against certain defendants on 

the merits and merged into the final judgment. See Akin, 991 F.2d at 1563 (“When 

a district court enters a final judgment, all prior non-final orders and rulings which 

produced the judgment are merged into the judgment and subject to review on 

appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the Corleys never consented 

to that order, the final judgment contains an adverse decision on the merits that 

does not “derive[] only from the plaintiff’s own written request.” OFS Fitel, 549 

F.3d at 1356. 

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Although our precedent on voluntary dismissals does not resolve this appeal,

a broader principle of appellate standing establishes that the Corleys are adverse to 

the final judgment: “a party is ‘aggrieved’ and ordinarily can appeal a decision 

‘granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested.’” Forney v. Apfel, 524 

U.S. 266, 271 (1998) (quoting United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996)). Even 

though the Corleys are not adverse to the order of voluntary dismissal, which 

granted their requested remedy for Fairbanks and Garlock, they are adverse to the 

order that denied their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of the 

Navy suppliers. And the latter order is just as much a part of the final judgment as 

the voluntary-dismissal order. So, notwithstanding their voluntary dismissal, the 

Corleys are adverse to part of the final judgment, which is enough to establish

appellate standing. See Aaro, Inc. v. Daewoo Int’l (Am.) Corp., 755 F.2d 1398, 

1400–01 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs who prevailed at trial on some of 

their claims and consented to a remittitur order could still appeal because they 

challenged an adverse partial summary judgment that had merged into the final 

judgment); see also Forney, 524 U.S. at 271; OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1359

(“[W]hen the appeal is from a final judgment, the fact that the appeal substantively 

concerns an interlocutory ruling is no bar to jurisdiction.”). 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of 

discretion. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010). 

IV. DISCUSSION

The merits of this appeal are straightforward. The Corleys contend that the 

district court abused its discretion when it denied their motion for reconsideration, 

which argued that they had a valid claim against the Navy suppliers under 

maritime law. The Corleys argue that they had a right to “make an election 

between civil and admiralty law,” even after the district court entered a summary 

judgment. We disagree. 

When the district court denied the Corleys’ motion, it explained that the 

Corleys had “never argued previously that maritime law should apply.” In their 

complaint, the Corleys instead alleged that “no claim of admiralty or maritime law 

is raised.” They maintained this position in their response to the Navy suppliers’ 

motion for summary judgment, which discussed only Alabama law. The Corleys

waited until after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy 

suppliers to argue, in a motion for reconsideration, that they had a valid claim 

under maritime law against the Navy suppliers. The district court ruled that the 

Corleys could not argue that a different substantive law governed their complaint

at that late stage in the litigation.

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We have long held that district courts act well within their discretion when 

they refuse to consider arguments that a party made for the first time in a motion 

for reconsideration. See, e.g., Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242–43 

(11th Cir. 2004); Hashwani v. Barbar, 822 F.2d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 1987). As 

we have explained, “[t]here is a significant difference between pointing out errors 

in a court’s decision on grounds that have already been urged before the court and 

raising altogether new arguments on a motion to amend; if accepted, the latter 

essentially affords a litigant two bites at the apple.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn 

Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). This principle extends to plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration 

that urge district courts to apply a different law to govern their claims for relief. 

See id. (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected a 

choice-of-law argument that a party raised for the first time in a motion for 

reconsideration). 

The Corleys contend that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) gave them 

the right to invoke maritime law at any time, but they misread that rule. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 9(h)(1) (“If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime 

jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some other 

ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim 

. . . .”). Rule 9(h)(1) “serves only as a device by which the pleader may claim the 

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special benefits of admiralty procedures and remedies, including a nonjury trial,

when the pleadings show that both admiralty and some other basis of federal 

jurisdiction exist.” Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 

1975). It does not determine whether maritime law governs a claim. See Powell v. 

Offshore Nav., Inc., 644 F.2d 1063, 1065 & n.5 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). 

The Corleys are not entitled to a second bite at the apple. They argued that 

Alabama law applied until the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Navy suppliers. Their motion for reconsideration was the first time they even 

suggested that maritime law applied. And they do not offer a compelling 

explanation to justify their delay. For example, the Corleys’ main argument is that 

the intervening decision of a district court in an unrelated suit, Conner v. Alfa 

Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2011), changed the law and allowed 

them to bring a maritime claim. But, of course, decisions of district courts “have no 

binding precedential authority beyond the case in which they are entered,” Dow 

Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1258 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001); accord Garner et 

al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 29, at 255, so Conner could not have affected 

their ability to bring a claim under maritime law. At bottom, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion when it concluded that this motion was an incorrect vehicle 

to change the substantive law governing the suit.

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V. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, joined by LUCK, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Although this Court has jurisdiction to hear the Corleys’ appeal from their 

voluntary dismissal, I write separately both to underscore the widespread problems 

that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) creates in finality doctrine and to 

highlight better ways for many litigants to secure appellate review of decisions that 

resolve only some of their claims. 

Rule 41(a) is a poor mechanism to accelerate appellate review. The rule 

contemplates the voluntary dismissal of “an action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), which, 

we have explained, refers to “the whole case” instead of particular claims, Perry v. 

Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But see Plains Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[W]e hold that 

plaintiff is entitled to a dismissal against one defendant under Rule 41(a), even 

though the action against another defendant would remain pending.”). The rule 

also presumes that a plaintiff will want to refile the “action” later. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 41(a) (mandating that unless the notice, stipulation, or order of dismissal “states 

otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice”). Perhaps unsurprisingly, litigants’ 

attempts to hijack this rule as a means to “home-brew their own approach to 

obtaining appellate review” of particular claims, First Health Grp. Corp. v. BCE 

Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th Cir. 2001), have not always been smooth. 

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Nearly every circuit has encountered similar issues to those we considered in 

this appeal. We are not the first court to face an intracircuit split in our precedent. 

See Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333, 1338–39 & n.6 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that several inter- and intra- circuit splits exist on the 

question); Chappelle v. Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1996) 

(listing intracircuit splits); see also Terry W. Schackmann & Barry L. Pickens, The 

Finality Trap: Accidentally Losing Your Right to Appeal (Part I), 58 J. Mo. Bar 78, 

84 (2002) (cautioning litigants that judicial decisions in this area are not “assured 

of adherence in the future” and are sometimes “ignore[d]”). And although the 

panel opinion compares this Circuit’s finality doctrine on Rule 41(a) to a Jackson 

Pollock painting, we might have also called it an “egregious mess,” Williams v. 

Seidenbach, 958 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Willett, J., concurring in 

the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted), or lamented that “[i]t would be 

an understatement to say that our precedents . . . are difficult to harmonize,” West 

v. Macht, 197 F.3d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1999).

Nor are we the only circuit to riddle our doctrine with exceptions to the 

purported nonfinality of voluntary dismissals without prejudice. Many circuits, for 

example, assess the likelihood that the plaintiff will relitigate dismissed claims. 

See, e.g., Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887 

F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (10th Cir. 2018). In other circuits, this plaintiff can secure 

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appellate jurisdiction by recanting before the appellate panel any intention of 

pursuing the voluntarily dismissed claims. See, e.g., Jewish People for the

Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390, 

394 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff will receive a particularly good deal in the Third 

Circuit, which requires him to renounce pursuing the dismissed claims only in the 

same district court. See Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2016). The 

First Circuit will hear an appeal if he “unequivocally” reserved the right to appeal 

in the district court, see Scanlon v. M.V. SUPER SERVANT 3, 429 F.3d 6, 8 (1st 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), while the Federal and Ninth Circuits 

will reach the merits if he persuades them that he acted in good faith and did not 

intend to manufacture appellate jurisdiction with the voluntary dismissal, see Doe 

v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2008); James v. Price Stern 

Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). But the plaintiff should take the 

opposite approach if he finds himself in the Eighth Circuit, which has held that 

finality exists when the plaintiff tries to manufacture jurisdiction—that is, if the 

plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice to “expedite appellate 

review” of other issues. Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., Inc., 212 F.3d 1076, 1080 

(8th Cir. 2000).

In the light of the volatility Rule 41(a) brings to appellate jurisdiction, 

district courts faced with voluntary-dismissal motions would act well within their 

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discretion to redirect litigants to other avenues to appeal. See McCants v. Ford 

Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Dismissal on motion of the 

plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) is within the sound discretion of the district 

court, and its order may be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.”). The Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure provide litigants with better options to secure an appeal. 

For example, district courts can designate decisions on the merits as final 

under Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (allowing district courts to “direct entry 

of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” if they 

find that “there is no just reason for delay”). In this appeal, such a designation 

would have obviated any question about whether we could reach the merits. See, 

e.g., Perry, 891 F.3d at 958 (“[I]t is likely that a plaintiff would have little trouble 

[satisfying Rule 54(b)] where . . . the nucleus of her multi-claim and multi-party 

suit has been destroyed and she is now faced with committing the time and 

expense of trying only one claim against only one defendant.”).

Alternatively, district courts may sever a party’s remaining claims. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 21 (“The court may . . . sever any claim against a party.”). The severed 

claims would “proceed[] as a discrete suit and result[] in [their] own final judgment 

from which an appeal may be taken.” Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche & 

Asociados, 642 F.3d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 2011). As with Rule 54(b), Rule 21 can 

form the basis of an appeal. See, e.g., Estate of Amergi ex rel. Amergi v. 

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Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t was no abuse of 

discretion to sever the claims so that Saperstein could proceed to trial on his FTA 

claim and that the Amergis could take an immediate appeal for the dismissal of 

their claims.”). Here, the Corleys moved to sever their claims before they sought a 

voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but the district court denied their motion 

without explanation.

Still other possibilities remain open to explore. For example, a district court 

could grant leave to amend a complaint to drop lingering claims. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 15(a)(2) (empowering district courts to “freely give leave [to amend] when 

justice so requires”); see also Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 

816, 819 n.5 (1978); Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th 

Cir. 2004). Or, if needed, a district court could drop parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 

(“On motion . . . the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”); 

see also Lampliter Dinner Theater, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 1036, 

1045–46 (11th Cir. 1986) (stressing the “great discretion” district courts have when 

using Rule 21 to drop a party).

District courts should consider the availability of these options when 

deciding whether to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 

41(a)(2). To be sure, the panel opinion paves the way for litigants to continue using 

Rule 41(a) to secure appellate review, but this result may not be permanent. Our 

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decision is largely grounded on the force of precedent, and an en banc court would 

have colorable arguments to reconsider our approach. See, e.g., Williams, 958 F.3d 

at 362 (Oldham, J., dissenting) (arguing that litigants lack standing to appeal from 

a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because “a Rule 41(a) dismissal represents 

a voluntary abandonment of the entire action”). And in the light of the chaos both 

within and among the circuits, the Supreme Court might also intervene. 

I express no opinion on the need for such a shift, much less on the merits of 

any future dispute over our appellate jurisdiction. Regardless of these issues, 

litigants have a number of more reliable tools to use when seeking appeals. They 

should look first to them before resorting to Rule 41(a).

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