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AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE OF 

UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY 

IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 3, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2016

Page 

AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE OF UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION .............................................................. 1 

Green, Michael J., Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, The 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 4 

Conant, Lieutenant General Thomas L., USMC (Ret.), Former Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command .......................................................... 9 

(III) 

(1) 

AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE OF UNITED 

STATES DEFENSE POLICY IN THE ASIA– 

PACIFIC REGION 

Wednesday, February 3, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Ayotte, Fischer, 

Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, 

Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and 

King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on United States 

defense policy in the Asia-Pacific. The National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2015 instructed the Secretary of 

Defense to commission an independent review of United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. This review would assess the risks to 

U.S. national security interests in the region, analyze current and 

planned U.S. force structure, and evaluate key capability gaps and 

shortfalls. 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies was selected 

to conduct this review, and they have now provided it to the Congress. I offer my thanks and appreciation to CSIS for a first-rate 

independent assessment of our policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Reports like these are an invaluable way for this committee to gain 

insights and consider serious recommendations on the way forward. 

To present the review’s findings, I am pleased to welcome Dr. Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at CSIS 

and one of the report’s study directors; and Lieutenant General 

Thomas Conant, former deputy commander at U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] and a member of the report’s senior review board. 

America’s national interests in the Asia-Pacific region are deep 

and enduring. We seek to maintain a balance of power that fosters 

the peaceful expansion of free societies, free trade, free markets, 

and free commons—air, sea, space, and cyber. These are values 

that we share with an increasing number of Asia’s citizens. And for 

7 decades, administrations of both parties have worked with our 

2 

friends and allies in the region to uphold this rules-based order and 

to enlist new partners in this shared effort. 

This is what the rebalance to Asia-Pacific is supposed to be all 

about. The rebalance has shown some success, including efforts like 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]; new levels of cooperation between Japan, Australia, and India; and new forms of military access to the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 

But ultimately, the rebalance policies fail to adequately address 

the shifting military balance in any serious manner. I note the report’s conclusion that, and I quote, ‘‘The Obama administration has 

not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent rebalance strategy. 

The U.S. rebalance must be enhanced if the United States is to defend its vital interests in the PACOM area of responsibility.’’ 

China is engaged, as we all know, in a rapid military modernization deliberately designed to counteract or thwart American military strengths. Under Xi Jinping, China is not just building up its 

military but reorganizing it to better wage modern, joint warfare 

at the close direction of the Chinese Communist Party. 

Despite their claims to the contrary, make no mistake, the Chinese are not done with their land reclamation activities in the 

South China Sea. Indeed, it has been disappointing to see how the 

United States seems to have been totally caught off guard by the 

pace and scope of these activities. 

A year ago this month, this committee held a hearing with Director Clapper where we discussed Chinese reclamation. At that time, 

China had reclaimed a total of 400 acres in the Spratly Islands. 

Today, that figure is a staggering 3,200 acres, with extensive infrastructure construction underway or already complete. 

It is shameful that what is known publicly about China’s reclamation activities has come from the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and not the United States Government, which 

should have been providing needed strategic clarity by releasing 

photos of these developments every step of the way. 

While our government has fallen short, we owe a debt of gratitude to CSIS for providing true transparency of China’s maritime 

activities. 

Going forward, routine naval and aviation presence and freedom 

of navigation operations are necessary to demonstrate that the 

United States will not recognize the legality of China’s excessive 

claims, and will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. 

I was pleased to see the freedom of navigation operation in the 

Paracel Islands last week, and I look forward to seeing another 

conducted inside 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef in the near future. 

The Pacific theater of World War II taught this Nation, at a terrible price, that we cannot afford to garrison our military power 

back in Hawaii or the continental United States. If anything, China’s activities in the South China Sea, and the instability and uncertainty they have generated in the Asia-Pacific, are a reminder 

of the importance of sustaining a predictable, credible, and robust 

forward presence capable of shaping the peacetime security environment and prevailing in the event of conflict. 

3 

This is a major focus of the CSIS report, and we look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses on its specific recommendations. 

For example, given the demands on our carrier fleet globally, the 

sailing time required to traverse the Pacific Ocean, the additional 

combat power a second carrier would provide, and the strong signal 

it would send our partners in the region, I believe we should take 

a hard look at the trade-offs associated with stationing a second 

carrier in the Pacific. 

Even as we devote the preponderance of our attention and funding to large platforms like aircraft carriers, we must remember 

that they are only as effective as the payloads they are able to deliver. We cannot lose sight of the importance of weapons, sensors, 

decoys, jammers, and other technologies to our warfighting effectiveness. And we must continue to push the envelope in adapting 

and innovating existing payloads to deliver new capabilities. 

These will be a key element in closing the gap identified by the 

CSIS report in capabilities that give the United States an asymmetric, cost-imposing counter to potential competitors. 

I also would like to note the CSIS report’s endorsement of the relocation plan for United States facilities in Okinawa. I continue to 

support the current relocation plan, including the construction of 

the Futenma Relocation Facility; the ultimate closure of Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma; and the redeployment of Marines to 

Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. 

Taken together, this plan will reduce our overall presence in Okinawa, relocate United States forces to less populated areas of the 

island, and generate a more operationally resilient force posture 

across the region. 

Despite a series of setbacks in the past year, I continue to have 

confidence that Prime Minister Abe and the Government of Japan 

will be able to execute the necessary realignment of United States 

force in Okinawa. 

This committee will also continue its oversight of the buildup on 

Guam, including the cost of new housing construction there. 

There are several more important issues I hope we will discuss 

throughout the course of the hearing, and this committee’s ongoing 

consideration of the CSIS report and its recommendations. 

Once again, I would like to thank all those at CSIS who worked 

so hard on this important report, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

thank you for calling this very, very important hearing. 

I also want to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Green and General 

Conant. Thank you for your extraordinary service. 

The report recently issued by CSIS is very thoughtful in addressing the challenges that we face in the Asia-Pacific region. Thank 

you for that. 

In the last few years, security in the region has grown more complicated and challenging for the United States. China has become 

more assertive in the South China Sea, alarming its neighbors and 

4 

militarizing land features in a body of water that is critical for 

trade and regional peace. 

Kim Jong-un has destabilized the Korean Peninsula even further 

with nuclear and ballistic missile developments. 

Regimes as authoritarian and insulated as North Korea are brittle and prone to collapse. How we would deal with such a collapse, 

and the security and humanitarian problems that would ensue, is 

an ongoing debate and challenge for United States Forces Korea 

and PACOM. 

As the Asia-Pacific region grows more complicated, the Defense 

Department faces an increasing number of international challenges 

also, including ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] as 

a growing international threat; and a resurgent Russia, which is 

exerting its military influence to undermine European security, further destabilizing the Middle East and also obviously has access to 

the Pacific. 

Additionally, we face an increasingly austere fiscal environment. 

We must learn to do more with less. 

While the administration has sought to rebalance the Asia-Pacific region, where most of our long-term strategic interests lie, that 

effort has faced challenges from the exigencies of the day. 

I appreciate the time and effort that went into producing this 

thoughtful report, and I would like to hear from the witnesses 

about how we should position ourselves to better implement the rebalance within the context of the global challenges facing the Department of Defense and the government as a whole. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Green? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR ASIA AND JAPAN CHAIR, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, members of 

the committee, and staff, thank you for this opportunity on behalf 

of my co-leads at CSIS, Dr. Kathleen Hicks and Mark Cancian, and 

all of the contributors to the report, including our excellent senior 

review panel, represented today by Lieutenant General Conant. 

This is an opportunity that we appreciate, to give you the results 

of our study. 

We conducted this study in a first iteration in 2012 and concluded that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is worthy of our support and our efforts but needed more intense strategic 

conceptualization and resourcing. We concluded at that time that 

the United States interest is in shaping an environment in the 

Asia-Pacific region where cooperation with China and among all 

countries is possible but that to build that future we had to have 

deterrent capabilities, the partnerships, the presence, the capacity, 

to ensure that no one country tried to change the rules that have 

governed this region and led to peace and prosperity for many decades. 

Since 2012, four developments have made a reassessment of the 

rebalance necessary. 

First, defense budget cuts have limited the Department of Defense’s ability to implement critical rebalance initiatives, particuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Apr 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24931.TXT WILDA
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larly as those resources come under stress from challenges in 

EUCOM [United States European Command] and CENTCOM 

[United States Central Command]. 

Second, the threat from so-called anti-access/area denial, A2/AD 

[anti-access/area-denial], is growing as states in the region seek to 

deny the United States the ability to project power or even maintain bases in the Western Pacific. 

Third, I think we have found in the last 2 years that China’s tolerance for risk in relations with the United States and neighboring 

countries is significantly higher than anyone would have anticipated. 

And fourth, North Korea has demonstrated that it will continue 

with impunity on its program to develop nuclear weapons and the 

ballistic missiles to deliver them against our allies and, their ultimate goal, the United States itself. 

Taken together, these trends suggest that the United States rebalance must be enhanced, if the U.S. is to defend our interests 

and our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. To that end, CSIS, in this 

report, has made four major recommendations for strengthening 

the rebalance. 

First, and this was a theme in our first report, and one the chairman just mentioned, the United States has to align our Asia strategy within the United States Government and with allies and partners, and articulate the strategy in a way that is compelling, that 

provides guidance to our forces, and confidence to our allies. 

When we began working on this project, we asked where we 

could find a document that described the strategic concept of the 

rebalance, and we were recommended to read the speeches about 

the rebalance by principles in the administration, and we did. And 

you will see in the report our findings that, in many cases, the articulation of our strategy is inconsistent, that priorities are listed 

differently, appear and disappear. 

And so there is still, in the region among our allies, and I think 

with our commands, some confusion about not the importance of 

the Pacific—I think that is clear—not the importance of rebalancing our forces in the Pacific, but what is our bottom line? What 

are we willing to defend? How do we view, for example, China’s operations in the South China Sea? What is the degree of our willpower? These are questions we continue to hear. 

So our first recommendation is that the administration needs to, 

with Congress and with our allies, work on aligning our views of 

the strategy and clarifying our concept. The Congress has already 

required the next administration to do an interagency report on 

Asia strategy. We fully endorse that. We recommend that the Congress consider establishing an Asia-Pacific observers group, comparable to the arms control observers group in the Cold War era, 

to help make sure that our message to allies and between branches 

of government is well-aligned. 

The second recommendation, the United States, in our view, 

needs to strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability. We have different allies and partners in 

the Asia-Pacific region at different levels of technical competence, 

different geographic circumstances. At the high end, with allies like 

Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, we recommend moving toVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Apr 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24931.TXT WILDA
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ward more of a federated defense concept, where we are pooling 

our best technology and resources. A good example of that potential 

is evident in the Japanese and Australia discussions of jointly developing a new diesel attack sub. 

Second, we believe that states that are struggling to maintain capacity and resilience in the face of a significantly larger Chinese 

military presence, the Philippines and so forth, need our help with 

basic capabilities such as maritime domain awareness. Fortunately, 

Japan, Korea, Australia, our major partners, are helping, and we 

should network with these allies to help frontline states, like the 

Philippines, with their own capacity and resilience. 

And third, we recommend creating a new joint task force for the 

Western Pacific. The reason is that, in discussions with our allies 

in particular, we found a disconnect in command and control when 

it comes to these maritime problems. We have a joint and combined 

command in Korea, very effective. But the challenge in the East 

China Sea and South China Sea is such that we think that both 

the Pacific Command and our Japanese allies need to create command-and-control structures that in real-time are working together 

constantly, that are agile and ready for the challenges we face. 

Our third recommendation, the U.S. should sustain and expand 

our regional presence. We recommend continuing to implement and 

resource key posture initiatives in Japan, Australia, and, of course, 

Guam, and also increasing in some areas our forward capabilities. 

Particularly important are amphibious lift, which is insufficient for 

the Marine Corps even before we distribute them to Guam, to 

northern Australia. Second, additional attack subs—undersea warfare is our trump card, our long-term advantage. 

And we recommended studying the deployment of a second carrier in the Western Pacific, probably in Yokosuka. That is a big 

thing to take on, but we think there is merit, as the chairman mentioned. 

Finally, we recommended that the United States accelerate the 

development of innovative concept capabilities to deal with the A2/ 

AD environment that is becoming increasingly challenging, including things like innovative missile defense from direct energy to 

railgun, to powder guns to prevent competitors from imposing costs 

on us and to develop more cost-effective countermeasures ourselves. 

This will cost money, but, in our view, many of the initiatives described are within the realm of the possible if we take the threat 

and our interests seriously. 

And I would conclude by saying, while the committee asked us 

to focus, in particular, on the Department of Defense [DOD] and 

the Pacific Command’s responsibilities, Asia is a region where the 

United States has, on the whole, succeeded for over 200 years because we have combined our military capabilities with a commitment to trade, to supporting our democratic values, and to building 

partnerships. So we are describing one tool in a broader strategic 

toolkit necessary for the United States. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:] 

7 

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT BY DR. MICHAEL J. GREEN AND LT. GEN. THOMAS L. 

CONANT

Thank you Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the Committee, and staff. We appreciate this opportunity to testify today on our views of 

the United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and the importance of strengthening 

United States commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. 

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

Congress directed in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 that the Department of Defense solicit an independent organization to assess United States 

strategy and force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as that of U.S. allies 

and partners. The Department of Defense chose CSIS to conduct that assessment. 

CSIS built on a previous Congressionally-required assessment of United States defense posture in the Asia-Pacific. That assessment looked specifically at the realignment of U.S. Marines and their dependents and was concluded in 2012. 

The current study required us to assess the region more broadly, and to achieve 

that wider view we assembled CSIS experts on the full range of the Asia-Pacific, 

as well as on defense capabilities and development. Research included interviews 

with leading defense and security officials, experts, and military officers throughout 

the United States government and foreign capitals. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, 

and Mark Cancian led that study for CSIS and were aided by a senior advisor group 

that includes General Conant. The report before you reflects the seriousness with 

which CSIS undertook this assessment as well as the range of challenges and opportunities facing the United States across the Asia-Pacific region. 

KEY FINDINGS

The CSIS study team made four main findings about the security situation in the 

Asia-Pacific. The first two findings concern the need for greater commitment and 

direction from Washington, the second two findings address Beijing’s growing capabilities and increased appetite for risk. 

First, the Obama administration has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent rebalance strategy, particularly when it comes to managing China’s rise. 

Many U.S. allies and partners in the region are looking to uphold the regional and 

international order that has enabled so many people throughout Asia to enjoy greater security and prosperity. Yet, too often U.S. statements have listed different objectives and priorities for the rebalance to Asia, confusing even the most careful observers. Without a single strategy document to guide the rebalance, this confusion 

will continue. 

Second, defense budget cuts have limited the Defense Department’s ability to the 

implement critical rebalance initiatives. Cuts to the defense budget, and in particular the uncertainty caused by the combination of sequestration and the Budget 

Control Act, leave the Defense Department insufficient resources, and insufficient 

flexibility, to prepare for the growing range of challenges confronting the United 

States. Additionally, meeting demands in other regions—from ISIS to Russia—will 

require a level of resources and agility that is impossible under the current budget 

arrangements. 

Third, the threat from so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats is rising 

as some states seek to deny the United States the ability to project power in Asia. 

The breadth and pace of A2/AD investments throughout Asia, especially by China, 

are creating the potential for countries to hold at risk U.S. forward deployed and 

forward operating forces throughout the Western Pacific. Regional A2/AD capabilities are evolving more rapidly than the U.S. ability to counter them, requiring that 

the Department of Defense and regional allies work together if they are to maintain 

the ability to project power in East Asia. 

Fourth, China’s tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations. China has surprised many experts by engaging in a series of coercive actions against neighboring 

states, including the creation of artificial features in disputed waters of the South 

China Sea. China’s apparent willingness to challenge vital elements of the existing 

rules-based regional and international order should be of concern to U.S. policymakers, and to others around the world who believe a rules-based order provides 

benefits to all. 

Taken together these trends suggest that the U.S. rebalance must be enhanced 

if the United States is to defend its vital interests in the PACOM area of responsibility. Executing an effective Asia strategy will require a clear and consistent but 

agile approach; continuous dialogue with regional allies, partners, and competitors; 

robust economic engagement throughout the region; development of new military 

8 

concepts and capabilities for deterrence, defense, and crisis management; and close 

cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. We suggest 29 recommendations for doing so. 

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

The report’s recommendations fall into four key areas, discussed briefly below. Efforts are ongoing in many of these areas and should remain top priorities, but additional efforts are needed in other areas to adequately implement the rebalance. 

First, the United States should align Asia strategy within the U.S. government 

and with allies and partners. Although the Obama administration issued a series 

of speeches and documents on the rebalance, there remains no central U.S. government document that describes the rebalance strategy and its associated elements. 

In interviews with leaders throughout the Department of Defense, in various U.S. 

agencies, on Capitol Hill, and across the Asia-Pacific, the study team heard consistent confusion about the rebalance strategy and concern about its implementation. Indeed, a 2014 study by CSIS found that language used to describe the rebalance has changed substantially since its announcement in 2011. Addressing this 

confusion will require that the executive branch develop and then articulate a clear 

and coherent strategy and discuss that strategy with Congress as well as with allies 

and partners across the world. We recommend preparing an Asia-Pacific strategic 

report; increasing administration outreach to Congress through an Asia-Pacific Observers Group; ensuring alignment between strategy and resources in the next QDR 

(now known as the Defense Strategy Review); better coordinating U.S. strategy with 

allies and partners; and expanding confidence building mechanisms and crisis management with China. 

Second, the United States should strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity, 

resilience, and interoperability. The United States needs robust allies and partners 

across the Asia-Pacific, but we found growing concern that security challenges are 

outpacing the capabilities of regional states. Many allies and partners are struggling 

to mitigate security risks, particularly those having to do with maritime disputes 

in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The United States seeks and benefits 

from the success of all states throughout the region, so building ally and partner 

security capability and capacity is in the U.S. interest. Working together more closely, through coordination of strategic approaches and greater interoperability, is an 

important step in this direction. Strengthening regional security capability, capacity, 

resilience, and interoperability requires a differentiated strategy that works with 

highly capable militaries like Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, and Singapore 

while also assisting states in Southeast Asia struggling to meet basic defense needs. 

We recommend pursuing what we call federated approaches with highly capable regional allies; building maritime security capacity in Southeast Asia; forming a 

standing U.S. joint task force for the Western Pacific; encouraging Japan to establish a joint operations command; and deepening regional whole-of-government humanitarian assistance and disaster relief expertise. 

Third, the United States should sustain and expand its regional military presence. 

We encountered concern both in Washington and in foreign capitals about the sustainability of U.S. military presence throughout the region. Forward-stationed U.S. 

forces are one of the most important ways to signal U.S. political commitment to 

the region. The political and military value of forward presence is enormous. U.S. 

military presence serves as a stabilizing force in the region, helping to deter conflict 

on the Korean Peninsula and manage crises from the South China Sea through the 

Indian Ocean. Forward presence provides opportunities for partnership, interoperating, training, and exercising with allies and partners that U.S.-based forces cannot support. We recommend continuing to implement and resource key posture initiatives; increasing surface fleet presence; improving undersea capacity; deploying 

additional amphibious lift; continuing to diversify air operating locations; bolstering 

regional missile defenses; advancing and adapting the U.S. Army’s Regionally 

Aligned Forces concept; addressing logistical challenges; stockpiling critical precision 

munitions; and enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cooperation 

with allies. 

Fourth, the United States should accelerate development of innovative capabilities 

and concepts. We identified capability gaps in two types of areas. First are those 

capabilities required to offset an emerging risk to U.S. forces, such as the growing 

ballistic missile risk to U.S. ships and forward bases. Second are those capabilities 

that the United States could develop to provide an asymmetric counter to potential 

regional competitors. Both will be needed for the U.S. military to retain a resilient 

forward presence and the ability to project combat power in the Asia-Pacific, despite 

competitors’ efforts to constrain U.S. leaders by increasing the risk to U.S. forces. 

9 

Existing concepts and capabilities must be updated to ensure that the future force 

is capable of deterring and prevailing in potential conflicts. China’s development of 

anti-access/area-denial capabilities aims to restrict U.S., ally, and partner freedom 

of maneuver. To overcome this challenge, the United States is developing new concepts of operation and next-generation capabilities. However, the security environment is highly dynamic and will require a culture of adaptability, a willingness to 

try new approaches and risk failure through experimentation, and the ability to 

move rapidly from concept to acquisition. We recommend institutionalizing a culture 

of experimentation; encouraging rapid platform evolution; developing advanced longrange missiles; funding innovative missile defense concepts; fielding additional air 

combat systems; exploiting the U.S. undersea advantage; and augmenting space, 

cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. 

Many of the efforts described above would require additional resources, as we describe in more detail in the full report. If the United States is to protect its interests 

in Asia, then meeting these resource challenges should be a top priority for U.S. 

leaders, both in the administration and in Congress. 

CONCLUSION

The initiatives outlined above are focused on the defense portion of the rebalance, 

as directed by Section 1059 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. However, additional effort is needed not just on the defense component of the rebalance, 

but on the prosperity and values aspects as well. Passing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example, is an economic initiative but is vital to regional security, as well 

as prosperity. Strengthening the rebalance to Asia will require that Washington use 

all the tools at its disposal if the United States and its allies and partners are to 

maintain a secure, peaceful, prosperous, and free Asia-Pacific region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General? 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS L. CONANT, 

USMC (RET.), FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED 

STATES PACIFIC COMMAND 

General CONANT. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members, 

thank you for allowing us to come here to talk to you. 

My message is simple, as it says in the report. I am a strong believer that there is a strategic imperative, that we have a very 

clear and concise message to our partners and allies and to the 

world on what the rebalance really means. I think that strategy 

and that message needs to be consistent in its vision and in its articulation across the whole of government. 

And then I think you need that continuous engagement with allies and partners throughout the region to reassure them that we 

are there for them, and that the rebalance is, in reality, a fact. 

From the defense side of the house, Chairman, I think we will 

see new concepts we will have to look at as we study this problem 

set that China has presented to us. 

You will see more distributed operations, dispersal of forces, and 

such. Long-range strike in both weapons and platforms will become 

an imperative. 

And then I think there will be the proper investment in both 

naval platforms and air platforms, not to include Army. 

So there is a lot to discuss, and I look forward to your questions, 

sir, instead of me just carrying on. So thank you so much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. I thank the witnesses. 

In your report you say, ‘‘The Obama administration has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent rebalance strategy, particularly when it comes to managing China’s rise.’’ 

It seems to me that we have, in this behavior of China, an opportunity to strengthen our relationships with other nations in the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Apr 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24931.TXT WILDA
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gion—Philippines, Vietnam, in particular—that would not have 

been thought of in some years past. What steps do we need to take 

to take advantage of this new deep concern that the Pacific Region, 

nations in the region, have concerning China, Dr. Green? 

Dr. GREEN. We have done a survey, Senator, at CSIS of elites in 

10 Asian countries several times over the past 5 years. And it is 

remarkable how much strategic thinkers, political leaders, from 

Vietnam to India to Japan, want more of us. They want more cooperation. They want more exercises. They want more trade agreements. They do not want bases. They do not want bases, in most 

cases. But they are willing to accept new arrangements. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Like the Australia arrangement. 

Dr. GREEN. Like the Australia arrangement, where we rotate 

Marines through Darwin, where we will, if we can move the negotiations forward, have access to Royal Australian Air Force airfields. In the Philippines, where the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 

Agreement has passed the Supreme Court test, we will be able to 

move people through, that kind of thing. Cam Ranh Bay, perhaps, 

in Vietnam, that is an opportunity. 

We suffer a bit, in my view, Senator, because the way we articulate our vision of the future of Asia has been quite inconsistent. At 

times, senior administration officials have embraced Chinese leader 

Xi Jinping’s vision of what he calls a new model of great power relations, which is designed to stabilize U.S.-China relations, but to 

do so by recognizing that China and the United States and Russia 

are great powers that should settle the affairs of Asia. 

And we at various points at senior levels have said we embrace 

that idea, and we want to operationalize that idea. The fundamental flaw, from our perspective, should be this new model of 

great powers does not include great democracies like Japan, India, 

Australia, Korea, Indonesia as great powers. They are considered 

second-tier. 

So the way we have talked about how we see order in Asia, the 

relations, has sent confused signals. We need to get that straight. 

We also should be realistic that while we are getting more access 

and more cooperation with the Philippines, with Vietnam, with Malaysia, these are all systems where political leadership could 

change. In Vietnam, there was just a change. The Philippines have 

an election. 

So we need to be patient, and we need to be in this for the long 

game. And we need to build it on professional relationships between the militaries. 

It may not always be us, in a case like Vietnam. It may be Japan 

or Korea, which are providing patrol boats that take the lead in 

helping build capacity. But we all have the same interests. 

So we, in the report, suggest we need a venue or a framework 

with our allies and partners to make sure that we are all helping 

these states, irrespective of how our specific bilateral relations with 

them or leadership changes affect our expectations. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am very interested in your recommendation 

about a second carrier to Japan. We are sending our carriers from 

the West Coast on 10-month deployments. That is too long to in 

any way maintain a sustainable all-volunteer force. 

11 

But one of the sources of frustration for me and other members 

of this committee is the situation in Okinawa and the relocation. 

Talk about fits and starts and setbacks and political problems in 

Okinawa itself. It is one of the more difficult issues, but yet, I 

think one of the most important. 

What is the witnesses’ latest assessment of that situation? 

Dr. GREEN. We have spent a lot of time on this issue, Senator, 

in 2012 and in this report. My colleague Nick Szechenyi spent time 

in Okinawa, talking to local political officials. We did meet with the 

governor of Okinawa, as you did, sir. 

It is complicated. The Okinawan people suffered in the Second 

World War like no other Japanese in that terrible battle. But it is 

not as black and white as it often appears in the media. 

Prime Minister Abe has committed to moving forward with the 

Futenma Replacement Facility. His chief cabinet secretary, Mr. 

Suga, is working this strenuously. He is responsible for a whole 

host of issues, but he is focused on this. And they are committed. 

It is in Japan’s national interests, and it is in their political interests, to move forward on this. 

The mayoral election in Ginowan, the town closest to the current 

Marine Corps Air Station, resulted in a victory for someone who 

supports moving forward. 

It will not be easy, but I think—and this is based on detailed 

looks at the operational questions but also the local politics—this 

is the best of a lot of hard options. And I think, and we agreed in 

our group unanimously, we need to move forward. 

We also, frankly, need to remember that that are other airfields 

in Okinawa. They may not provide the solution for the Marine’s requirements, but as we look at the A2/AD threat and the ballistic 

missile threat and the increasing requirements for humanitarian 

disaster relief, we ought to be working with Japan’s defense forces. 

And that is an important development, by the way, Senator. The 

Japan Self-Defense Forces were viewed very negatively in Okinawa 

after the war, because of what the Imperial Japanese Army did to 

them. That has changed significantly. There is considerable pride 

and support for Japan Self-Defense Forces in Okinawa. 

So we ought to, in the longer term, be looking at joint use of 

bases. The Ground Self-Defense Force wants to create a marine 

corps capability. And General Conant can speak to this. We can colocate with them. 

In other words, we can give Japan more ownership of these bases 

and build more support, I think, as we go forward. 

General CONANT. Sir, thank you for that question. 

I think, looking at the carrier, we just do not need to restrict ourselves to Japan. There other places you could possibly put it, 

whether it is Guam, whether it is back in Hawaii, whether it is 

even in Australia, in Perth. There are ways to look at the situation. 

It is easiest to go to Japan, because the infrastructure is there, 

and so the investment and the additional investment for the Navy 

probably carries the day on that. 

As you look, the A2/AD and the ballistic and cruise missile threat 

out of an adversary, then you are already under that umbrella if 

you are stationed that far forward in Japan. So depending on the 

12 

strategic messaging you want to send, we could look and possibly 

look at putting it someplace else. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Green, I noticed that when you were talking, in your comments, you described our undersea assets as the trump card. I 

think, for the record, you were making a gambling allusion, not a 

political allusion. 

But I think there are several factors here, and you both have 

talked about it, is the increased precision strike capability of Chinese forces from land-based and other bases, which makes surface 

ships much more vulnerable. They would have to launch, in the 

case of a carrier, from much further away. Submarines do not have 

those particular vulnerabilities. Also, just in terms of technology, 

we have a significant advantage over what we are seeing right now 

in the waters with the Chinese and others. 

So I would assume that, for that reason, we want to make a 

much more vigorous investment in deployment of undersea assets 

into this area. That could be the leading-edge of the sword. Is that 

fair? 

Dr. GREEN. Senator, that is right. We have an advantage undersea, over any potential adversary, that is considerable. And if you 

add into the mix the really first-class undersea capabilities of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces and the Royal Australian Navy, 

and increasingly the Indian Navy, that is a pretty strong undersea 

net around the entire Indo-Asia-Pacific, which would cause any potential adversary pause, if they thought about challenging us in a 

serious military way. 

So we thought it was very, very important. And one of the areas 

we need to focus on more is interoperability with these other navies, one more reason why our group thought discussions between 

Japan and Australia about not only a common platform but also increasing cooperation is the kind of development we should want to 

see. 

Senator REED. General Conant, any comments? 

General CONANT. Yes, sir. In my time as deputy commander at 

PACOM as a Marine, I found out the significance of what that submarine force provided for us. In so many other things that we can’t 

talk about in open source, but really, in its capability sets in ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and just discovering 

what is going on. 

It is also a way to send a message to those who want to threaten 

our access in the region that there is a cost to that activity, if 

somebody chooses to bring it to conflict. 

That submarine force is very, very capable. And if I had one 

more marginal dollar, and you weren’t going to spend it anywhere 

else, as a Marine, I would probably put it in the submarine force, 

sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

One other aspect of this, and I think it is implicit in your report, 

is that, most likely, if we are engaged in a serious confrontation in 

the area, that the cyber activity would be so extensive that we will 

be operating literally in the dark. GPS [Global Positioning System] 

13 

will go down. Systems on aircraft and surface ships, everything, 

will be operating almost as we were 50, 100 years ago. 

Is that realistic, General? Or is that sort of more apocalyptic? 

General CONANT. No, that is a very good assessment. 

In fact, when we were out at PACOM talking with Admiral 

Locklear one day, I thought we ought to do a Nimitz project. Admiral Nimitz fought World War II with about a 65-man staff that 

grew to 200-some. And he thought it grew too big. 

What they did is they provided specific mission guides, mission 

orders, and then sent them out on task forces. I think you would 

have to get something like that, where you could have, within the 

task force, internally assured mission sets through some classified 

work. But then you wouldn’t be beholden to the GPS and some 

other things. But space will become a new issue and then navigation. 

So it is a good way to think about it, but I don’t think just cyber 

alone, it is hard for all of us to understand, even at my level, what 

it can do and what it won’t do. And then you are into law and policy. 

But they don’t care. They will shut us down quickly, sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Green, in the report, you talked about the relationship between China and North Korea. And there have been some reports 

that the Chinese are willing to tolerate a nuclear-armed North 

Korea to a certain degree, which is very dangerous to the world, 

given the instability in that government. 

And the other aspect, and this is a real question, not a rhetorical, 

is that any sort of effective solution, I would assume, would have 

to take the United States and the Chinese together to be able to 

bring the appropriate political and diplomatic influence on the 

North Koreans to behave better. Is that fair? And what is your 

sense of the whole issue? 

Dr. GREEN. Sir, I would agree that an ultimate resolution—and 

I worked on the North Korea problem in the previous administration and spent time in Pyongyang and Beijing, and frankly, came 

away very pessimistic about any near-, medium-, and maybe even 

long-term diplomatic solution. 

But ultimately, if we are going to denuclearize the peninsula, we 

are going to need to do it with our allies first, but with China and 

Russia. And if we have a sudden or cataclysmic collapse of the 

North Korean state, which is feasible, is possible, at a minimum, 

we are going to want to deconflict with China. So it is very important. 

But we have not had much success. When I was in the previous 

administration, we kind of bullied the Chinese into helping us in 

the six-party talks. And we thought we were making progress and 

that China would be helpful. But frankly, the Chinese have an interest in a denuclearized peninsula, but it is, I think, becoming evident that they have a greater interest in stability and in maintaining a dominant position over the peninsula in the long term. 

So I believe they will tolerate a nuclear program in North Korea, 

so long as it is not destabilizing the whole region. And then they 

can settle it when, in their view, they have greater strategic purchase, greater influence. 

14 

Our approach generally has been to respond to these North Korean nuclear tests and missile tests in the Security Council and try 

to get consensus with China. And I think this most recent test, and 

China’s rather anemic reaction, demonstrates that that is not an 

approach that is going to get us results. 

And the other approach would be to do more with our allies to 

make it evident that we will increase our missile defense capabilities, we will increase the joint operations, and all of these things 

which are necessary because of the North Korean threat, and that 

from Beijing’s perspective their nonaction will have consequences. 

As we take care of ourselves and our allies, they may not like— 

we need to think about how we incentivize the Chinese beyond trying to point out their interests in denuclearization at this point. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Green, in your testimony, you recommend fielding additional 

air combat systems as a means to counter China’s increasing A2/ 

AD capabilities. Specifically, you state in your abridged report that 

developing a fleet of next-generation aircraft with the right combination of capabilities will be critical to prevailing in a major conflict against a peer competitor. 

Does our fleet of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, specifically the 

number of operational F–22s, currently meet the need? And I think 

we are probably being optimistic if we say we can anticipate 140 

of those aircraft in a reasonable time frame. 

Does that meet our need today? And if not, what would our need 

be? And is this the right question, in terms of the F–22 being part 

of that solution? 

Dr. GREEN. Senator, General Conant should speak to this as 

well. 

The F–22 and the F–35 have had various challenges as programs, but talking to our allies, talking to the air component commander’s on our side in the Pacific, it is pretty clear to me what 

we do get for this, and it is significant. 

We do not just get a squadron of F–22s or F–35s. We get stealthy 

platforms that can coordinate fourth-generation aircraft. It is a 

multiplier effect that, frankly, when I went out and talked to people, was not coming from the generals, with all respect to the generals. It was coming from captains and majors innovating with this 

new platform. And this is what the Royal Australian Air Force, the 

Koreans, and the Japanese are starting to discover as well. So 

there is a multiplier effect we have to consider, and then the interoperability and jointness effect among our allies. 

The next generation, meaning the sixth, seventh generation, and 

I defer to General Conant on this, may not be manned, ultimately. 

But for what we have in the fifth generation, we get a lot. 

If I had a concern, and Admiral Harris, the Pacific commander 

spoke to this, our platforms are stealthy, they are excellent. But 

our air-to-air missiles, our surface-to-surface missiles, do not have 

the range that the Chinese, with much less capable platforms, increasingly are fielding to hit us. 

So that is one of the capability gaps that I think needs near-term 

addressing. 

15 

General CONANT. Senator Rounds, good question. 

The F–22 or the F–35 as a fifth-generation fighter is very capable. But it is not the end-all and be-all, as Dr. Green alluded to. 

When I was at 3rd MAW [Marine Aircraft Wing], we had an exercise where we brought F–22s out and worked with our F/A–18A 

Pluses and Cs, a fourth-generation legacy airplane. And we had the 

capability to share that picture that F–22 presented. 

What those majors and what those captains did with those packages, once they got wiped out by just trying to fight the F–22, they 

then went into a strike package type training scenario. It was phenomenal. 

And I am a stronger believer that you do not have to put all your 

eggs in one basket. In fact, we have kind of gone down the road 

where we really are almost doing that. 

So F–22s have tremendous capability. Nothing else can match it. 

The F–35s are great. 

But we have fourth-generation fighters we can do things with 

that give more respectful numbers that you are going to need out 

in this problem set. And then there is a value of quantity to this 

problem set, and China sees that. So they are sticking with four 

and four-plus gen. But they are very, very capable. 

So it all doesn’t have to be fifth gen, sir, but it is part of the mix. 

Senator ROUNDS. What role do you see long-range strike systems, 

the LRS–B [Long-Range Strike Bomber], as an example, that particular bomber? How do you see that playing into the U.S. defense 

strategy in Asia in the coming years? 

General CONANT. As we wargame various scenarios, and as we 

look at the ballistic and cruise missile threat out there, as I said 

on the Defense Science Board for that task force, you are going to 

need long-range strike. And you ought to have the capable platform 

that brings that strike in. 

We have always done, as Dr. Green alluded to, fifth-generation 

fighters with fourth- and third-generation weapons. So we need to 

match that capability and the platform with a weapon system. 

As you look at long-range strike, it is not just the airframes. Our 

SAGs, surface action groups, need that long-range strike capability 

also. We are putting it on submarines. 

So that creates a bigger problem set for the adversary and gives 

you more decision space, if you do come up into a problem set, sir. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The stability in the Asia-Pacific area is hugely important. And 

the U.S. role in being a part of creating the stability is critical. We 

have articulated our commitment as rebalance—and yes, I agree 

that it would be helpful to have a much clear articulation of this. 

But a lot of what we talk about in rebalance is in the implementation. Part of our rebalance strategy, as implemented, is in our force 

posture. 

So I did want to ask you a little bit more about your suggestion 

that we should consider deploying a second carrier in that area, 

and also mentioned by the chairman. 

16 

So, for example, if we wanted to locate a second carrier at 

Yokosuka, which already has infrastructure, is there a time frame 

when it would be most advantageous for us to pursue a study and 

come to a decision, i.e., while Prime Minister Abe is still in office? 

Can you talk a little bit more about the time frame for locating a 

second carrier in the Pacific? 

Dr. GREEN. There is a saying in Japanese politics, because they 

have a parliamentary system, so you can have an election at any 

moment, that one step ahead is darkness. 

But Prime Minister Abe, or if not Prime Minister Abe, someone 

with a comparable commitment to our alliance, is likely to be in 

power for some time. The year 2019 is something of a date, because 

that is when the USS Gerald Ford will be ready for deployment. 

It seems to me that would be the opportunity. 

Now, we did not come out with a hard recommendation on this, 

because there are operational questions and costs and infrastructure questions. If you deployed this new carrier in Yokosuka, you 

would have to find a place for the air wing. Iwakuni, which handles 

the air wing now, could probably expanded. But that is a political 

lift for the Japanese Government, questions of host nation support. 

But when we put this suggestion out, it got covered in the Japanese press, and there was not a lot of pushback. A number of senior officials and military officers in Japan were quite intrigued, because of the signal it sends and the firepower it provides. 

And it addresses a concern our allies have, which is the Seventh 

Fleet’s one carrier is out of the Pacific, or PACOM AOR [area of 

responsibility], a lot, and they watch that. So they would have constant coverage, in their view, in an increasingly difficult region. 

But 2019 and the USS Gerald Ford, that is a heavy lift for Japanese politics. It would have to be Japan’s decision. 

I was in the White House when we asked Japan to take the 

George Washington, the first nuclear carrier. Everyone said they 

would never do it. They needed and wanted that firepower, that 

commitment, that connectivity with us. 

I think it is politically feasible, and 2019 would be the target 

date, I would think. 

Senator HIRONO. So we should move ahead with a study, so that 

we can make the decision in an appropriate time frame. 

I think the Japanese are well aware of the changing environment 

with North Korea and China. 

Dr. Green, can you talk more about your suggestion that we 

should form an Asia-Pacific observers group? I am not familiar 

with where that suggestion is coming from. And what would it do 

to enhance the rebalance implementation? 

Dr. GREEN. This was John Hamre, the president of CSIS, my 

boss, his idea. Of course, as you know, he worked for this committee for a long time and in the Pentagon. He suggested it after 

looking at the problem of articulating our strategy to the Congress, 

to our allies. And I think, for him, the comparable group that monitored arms control negotiations in the Reagan administration, bipartisan, was the model. 

But I would offer another model, Senator, in all sincerity, and 

that is a great Senator from Hawaii, who, with Ted Stevens from 

Alaska, Senator Inouye, provided constant oversight of our strategy 

17 

in Asia. I was in the White House for 5 years, and when the 

Inouye-Stevens combination went out to the region, it was like another aircraft carrier. I mean, it was quite powerful. 

So both in terms of monitoring and coordinating in Washington, 

but also as a bipartisan group that could speak to the region, not 

always about reassuring about our commitment, but telling sometimes our friends and allies what they have to do. 

Senator HIRONO. And this would not require legislation. 

Dr. GREEN. No. 

Senator HIRONO. So my time is almost up, but I did want to ask 

you, as we look 10 to 20 years in the future, what would a successful rebalance look like in this region? 

Maybe you can think on it and respond to me in writing. 

Dr. GREEN. No, I would be happy to do that, Senator. We have 

thought about it. We were tasked with—— 

Senator HIRONO. Senator McCain, would it be all right for him 

to respond now? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Absolutely. 

Dr. GREEN. I apologize. 

Our tasking was to look out 10 years, so we took that seriously 

and considered this. I think my colleagues at CSIS, and I think I 

will speak also for our senior advisory review board, would say that 

the friction we have with China right now over the South China 

Sea and the East China Sea is not going to go away, that we are 

going to probably be living with this for 5 or 10 years, because it 

is built into the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] operational concept, their force structure building, their doctrine. And the Foreign 

Ministry or others in the China system are not going to knock 

them off of that trajectory. And in my view, that is true whether 

the Chinese economy slows down or not. 

So in 10 years and for the next 10 years, we will have some friction in our relationship with China, and we should know that, and 

we should not be afraid of it. We need to manage it. But in 10 

years, if we have a relationship with our allies and partners, not 

a collective security arrangement like NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], almost no one wants that. And that is a bit too 

much for China. That would produce a China we do not want. But 

the kind of network and cooperation that incentivizes China to play 

within the rules; and the kind of capacity-building for the Philippines and for smaller micro states, CNMI [the Commonwealth of 

the Northern Mariana Islands] and so forth, where they can handle 

earthquakes and tsunamis or internal corruption problems in a 

way where they are not vulnerable strategically; and where we 

have, frankly, a trade agreement, the TPP plus the regional agreements, fusing toward more of a rules-based open Pacific order—I 

think that is what we should be thinking about. And if we do think 

in those terms, I think it will add some discipline to how the administration and others articulate our strategy, what we are aiming for. We are not containing China. We are looking for a rulesbased order, and here is how it might look in terms of our relations 

with allies and other partners. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

18 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your service. 

If I may ask you this, Dr. Green, your report assesses that Chinese President Xi Jinping has a less awestruck view of the U.S. 

power than his predecessors, contributing to a greater tolerance for 

risk and a reduction of emphasis on the China-U.S. relations. 

So I would ask, that is a pretty striking observation. What do 

you think has led to his diminished view of U.S. power? And what 

do you think it will take to alter his views? 

Dr. GREEN. Xi Jinping is the first Chinese leader since Deng 

Xiaoping who is not, as the Chinese say, helicoptered, picked up 

personally by Deng Xiaoping and groomed for leadership. So he is 

not beholden to the Deng Xiaoping vision of relations with the U.S., 

which was competitive but one where China dampens down any 

sense of competition as much as possible in order to focus on economic development, ending the Cold War to balance the Soviet 

threat to China. 

He is unconstrained by that, because of his independence from 

being groomed and brought up by Xiaoping. That is one factor. 

The other factor is that I think the financial crisis in 2008 and 

2009 led a lot of Chinese observers to conclude that America’s best 

days were over, and that there was going to be a pretty fundamental shift. They are probably rethinking that now, but that set 

this—— 

Senator MANCHIN. That sets me up for the following question 

then. Does China’s economic slowdown affect its regional military 

capabilities? 

And also, should the U.S. rebalance strategies take into account 

lower Chinese economic growth? Should we be considering what 

they were thinking of us in 2007, 2008, 2009? Should we be thinking that same type of thought process now, since they are having 

a reversal? 

Dr. GREEN. It is an excellent question, Senator. It is an interesting one to contemplate. We should learn from the Chinese mistake underestimating American wherewithal and not assume that 

the nature of Chinese rule in Asia will dramatically change. 

Senator MANCHIN. You believe that they are going to double 

down, just as Russia might be doubling down, even at the expense 

of their own people? 

Dr. GREEN. I think there is a debate among experts about whether China’s increased aggressiveness and their military modernization reflects their economy or reflects a more fundamental definition of interests. I think it is the latter. 

Even if we are talking about a China growing at 3 percent or 4 

percent, that is a huge economy. Those are a lot of resources. It absolutely dwarfs anybody in the region, except us and Japan. And 

it changes the trajectory, but I do not think it minimizes the complication for us in any way that would lead us to change our strategy. 

We may want to change the way we think about U.S.-China relations in economic terms. But in terms of creating a military presence capability and alliances and partnerships—— 

Senator MANCHIN. We should be—— 

Dr. GREEN. We should be doing what we are doing. 

19 

It could be that you have a more humble China in 5 years. It 

could be. You could also have a China that is more nationalistic 

and grumpy. 

But in terms of their capabilities, I do not think the trajectory 

changes all that much. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me follow up with General Conant. 

General, your report notes that most military, economic, and diplomatic conditions favor a future Russia strategic alignment with 

China, but that Russia is ultimately likely to seek a balance between collaborating with and hedging against China. 

So I would ask, what concrete Russian or Chinese interests stand 

in the way of a strategic alliance? 

General CONANT. Sir, from my personal experience, I think there 

is still mistrust between the two powers. But they are working closer together than they have ever worked before. And they are starting to do exchanges. 

To follow up what Dr. Green, a little bit, thought on this slowdown on the growth of China, we know they had a target at 10 percent, went down to 9.5 percent, went down to 9 percent. I was once 

told that if they could not grow at 9 percent, then they thought 

they would have internal problems. 

Now they are down to 7 percent, 7.5 percent. But you still see 

them, even in their maritime and military buildup of what we 

would call a coast guard, they are building larger ships. They are 

arming those ships. And they are building fourth-generation fighters. They have a series of five to six new fighters, new ships. 

So I do not see it slowing down. They may worry about what the 

people think, but that Politburo of seven people answers to nobody 

but the party. 

Senator MANCHIN. If this alignment would take effect, the alignment between Russia and China would take effect, even though 

there was distrust there, but let’s say that it moves in a different 

way economically but militarily that they basically start teaming 

up, if you will, what action should the United States undertake basically in security, economic, or diplomatic realms to affect the likelihood of that? 

General CONANT. Well, I think you have to have a dialogue, first 

of all, of why that alignment is necessary. 

Senator MANCHIN. Following up really quick—and I know my 

time is up, Mr. Chairman, if I may. Following up, what type of dialogue do we have basically on the military aspects between Russia 

and China, between the U.S.? What would you say, how those relationships—— 

General CONANT. Well, between Russia and China, we have very 

little. 

Senator MANCHIN. We, the country? 

General CONANT. We. So when I was deputy, to have the Russian 

engagement, I had to go to Stuttgart, and we were going to have 

the EUCOM lead to the Russian piece. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

General CONANT. So together, though, we could build that discussion and bring that into the China realm. 

Senator MANCHIN. Right now, we have very little interaction. 

20 

General CONANT. I am not current enough to try to make a statement for Admiral Harris, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Dr. Green, General, thank 

you. 

I would like to ask you just a couple things about advancing and 

adapting the U.S. Army’s regionally aligned forces concept, particularly as it relates to our Army Reserve and National Guard forces, 

and if you could talk a little bit about the State Partnership Program and how that could be usefully employed in that region. 

Iowa is a member of the State Partnership Program. We are 

partnered with Kosovo through EUCOM. I think there are 22 partnerships in EUCOM. There are 22 with SOUTHCOM [United 

States Southern Command]. But there are only eight with PACOM. 

So if you could talk through that, how that might be beneficial, 

employing those forces and developing those partnerships, I would 

appreciate that. 

Dr. GREEN. We think there is an enormous opportunity for the 

State National Guard components to play in the rebalance. The 

Army’s Pacific Pathways program is quite welcome in the region. 

The challenge is that most countries in Asia cannot handle a 

Stryker brigade or the kind of unit that the brigade formations of 

the big Army is built around. 

We were also struck, Senator, that only eight of the State partnerships are in the Pacific, which over half of Americans now consistently say in polls that Asia is the most important region to our 

future. That is not just Hawaii and California. That is the entire 

Republic. 

Now the Army tells us they cannot decide who does State partnerships, but it makes sense that National Guard units do more. 

There is another reason, which is there are some quite close sister city relationships. I think Haiphong in Vietnam, for example, 

with I think Seattle, if I remember correctly. These cities are doing 

disaster preparedness exercises, continuity of government. 

It seems to me there is a logical role for the Guard to play in 

these exercises, and it is not expensive. It is not a large-scale thing. 

And it has multiple benefits for us, among them, showing some of 

these countries that are transitioning toward a more democratic 

system how civil-military relations in a democracy should work. 

So I hope, of the recommendations that we looked at, that there 

is interest in that one, because there is enormous opportunity and 

real synergies with the region and between the Guard and local 

and municipal governments. 

Senator ERNST. General, do you have any thoughts? 

General CONANT. Yes, ma’am. 

First of all, I think when we did the Tonga State partnership 

with Admiral Locklear, that was over 1.5 years just to get through 

the wickets, whatever those wickets are. 

Senator ERNST. Right. 

General CONANT. I think it is kind of a political football between 

the Department of State, Army, and Guard. But the benefit to 

21 

those State partnerships are tremendous, and it gives a cultural 

awareness for that State partnership, and the training aspect is 

that even the smaller countries focus on small unit leadership. 

It does not take a lot to make a big impact. So I am a big proponent of it. When we first looked at it with Admiral Locklear, we 

found these small numbers not aligned. Europe has been the most 

beneficiary of that. 

So we ought to somehow figure out how to bring more into the 

Pacific at the pace and at the level those countries desire. 

Senator ERNST. That is fantastic. I am a huge proponent of the 

State Partnership Program. And we have hosted many Kosovars, 

young NCOs [non-commissioned officers] and officers, with our soldiers in the Iowa Army National Guard. It has been a great benefit 

to both countries, as well. And sister cities, we also have a sister 

city program now that came out of State Partnership, because of 

our great relationship. 

And I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, just this last Friday, we 

opened the first consulate in the State of Iowa in Des Moines, 

Iowa. That consulate is the Republic of Kosovo consulate. 

So there are many great things happening through the State 

Partnership Program. I do hope that we are able to project more 

of those into the Pacific region. 

So thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is this to send ethanol to Kosovo? Pretty 

much? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thanks to the witnesses. I have two lines of questions for 

you. 

The first deals with the U.S.-India relationship going forward. 

Senator King and I visited India in October 2014 and had dialogue 

in a number of areas, but including the mil-to-mil cooperation and 

opportunities under the government, which is not connected to sort 

of the nonalignment tradition that had been an Indian tradition. 

We saw some real opportunities. We visited the shipyard at 

Mazagon Docks in Mumbai and saw the shipbuilding expertise in 

India and encouraged them to come visit the United States. There 

has been a recent delegation of Indian military officials to see our 

shipbuilding capacity. 

And we were also told by the Indians that they do more joint 

military exercises with the United States than with any other Nation. 

Talk a little bit about that relationship and what you could realistically predict going forward 10 years or beyond, and how that 

would be helpful in our posture in the region. 

Dr. GREEN. I was in the Bush administration, and I had responsibly in the NSC [National Security Council] for India, and the bipartisan and continuous support for building this relationship is a 

very positive thing for our country. 

As you mentioned, Senator, there is still this nonalignment tradition in the Ministry of External Affairs, but it is not growing. It 

is receding. Public opinion polls about the U.S. and India are very, 

22 

very positive. As you said, we do more exercises with India than 

India does with the whole rest of the world combined. 

We also sell a lot of stuff. People forget we lost the fighter competition, but we sell a lot of things to India. 

A 10-year vision, I think, would include regular Malabar exercises that would include the Indian Navy but also Japan, Singapore, Australia, maybe China or others. Depending on the exercise, 

you can do these in sequence and have different kinds of exercises. 

We do more of that. 

In our commercial or defense-industrial relationship, I think 

there is potential for ASW [anti-submarine warfare] patrol, maybe 

even submarines. Ten years from now, I wouldn’t erase that. But 

it is not going to be a U.S. nuclear attack sub. It is going to be 

some version of a Japanese or Australian sub where maybe we help 

with the integration of the weapon systems. So there is an industrial part. 

One of the most difficult parts of the relationship has been the 

intelligence relationship, which is the lifeblood of any alliance or 

partnership. And that is moving in a good direction, too. 

So a sustained by partition commitment to the relationship is 

good. I would say, of all the aspects of U.S.-India relations, the defense component now is moving forward with the most speed. Nothing is fast in India, but with the most speed, in that context. 

Senator KAINE. General? 

General CONANT. Yes, sir. I think they are an important strategic ally and partner. 

We were told to kind of go at them and try to find a better way 

for cooperation. When I was at PACOM, we were getting there. 

They like a shared coproduction aspect in anything you want to sell 

them or produce. I do not think we should be afraid of that. 

Senator KAINE. Right. 

General CONANT. I think we ought to look at that. 

And then you get in the acquisition world. That needs a little 

with reforming. 

I was just reading today, the CEO [chief executive officer] of Boeing is out there, posturing maybe a coproduction with the F/A–18E/ 

F. The more we could share in that, the more we could get to that. 

Now, the multilateral exercises, the only way you will be successful in any multilateral activity is having a very strong bilateral relationship with those multilateral partners. So I used to tell the 

PACOM staff, make sure we are square U.S. to India before we go 

U.S. to India to Japan to Australia or anybody else, planning that. 

And make sure we are answering their concerns and assuaging 

their fears of how we are going to do the exercise. 

Senator KAINE. Great. 

General CONANT. So you listen more. So that is a key point. 

When you say multilateral, as Dr. Green said, there is a steppingstone to that process. 

Senator KAINE. The second question is, would it be valuable if 

the Senate ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, again, in terms 

of our posture in the region? 

Dr. GREEN. It would, on balance. And many of our allies and 

partners—our closest allies and partners in the region are asking 

us to ratify. 

23 

In my own personal view, though, the fact that we have not ratified UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] 

is often exaggerated as an obstacle to progress on these disputes 

in the South China Sea and so forth. We, the United States Government, the Navy, basically abide by the convention based on previous conventions and our practice and doctrine and policies. 

And the real problem, ultimately, is not that we have not ratified 

it. The real problem is that China, which says that it has, defines 

it in a way that is completely alien to the spirit of the convention 

and the understanding of all the other parties. I am not sure our 

ratifying—— 

Senator KAINE. Do we have standing to critique them on that, if 

we have not ratified? 

Dr. GREEN. It gives them a talking point to throwback at us. 

Senator KAINE. Yes. 

Dr. GREEN. Would ratifying change China’s interpretation of 

UNCLOS? I am doubtful. But it would give us some more purchase. It would align us more with other allies and partners in the 

region who have ratified. 

Senator KAINE. Great. My time has expired. 

Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Dr. Green, good to see you. I want to thank you for your 

great work that you have been doing, not only on this report, but 

for years. It is very much appreciated. 

One of the things about the Asia-Pacific—you mentioned it, Senator Hirono, earlier—a lot of us are, certainly, interested in it. My 

State is an Asia-Pacific State. 

And I think it is an opportunity, a rare one, to be honest, where 

you have the legislative branch supporting the executive branch on 

a major foreign policy strategy, the so-called pivot or rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific. I think you see a lot of support in this committee 

for that. 

However, your report kind of makes it a little bit clear that that 

is not necessarily the most cogent strategy. How would you describe that strategy right now in one word? 

Dr. GREEN. The rebalance strategy? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Dr. GREEN. Well, if I were given one word, it would be ‘‘rebalance.’’ That sounds like a copout. 

Senator SULLIVAN. It is. 

Dr. GREEN. Part of the problem with this articulation of the 

strategy is that rebalancing is a process. It is a ways, not an end. 

And I think what we have lacked in the articulation of the strategy 

is an articulation of the Asia-Pacific and the kinds of relationships 

that we are aiming for and what we will and will not tolerate. 

Senator SULLIVAN. How would you improve it, in particular, not 

just the strategy? Your report stated that the Obama administration has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for 

the region. So not just the strategy, but the FONOP [Freedom of 

Navigation Operation] issue, which I think many of us, again, bipartisan, are very interested in. We have encouraged the adminisVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Apr 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24931.TXT WILDA
24 

tration to get behind those as a regular occurrence, routine missions and operations with our allies, if possible. 

But in my discussions with some of our allies, there seems to be 

enormous confusion even on the articulation of what we are trying 

to do with those. How would you help improve that? 

Dr. GREEN. So we mentioned this in the report, Senator. The 

speeches by the senior-most officials in the administration articulate our priorities for the region differently every time. I think the 

Secretary of Defense and his predecessors have had the most consistent articulation. But there is not the kind of consistent explanation of our priorities that we need or that you had in previous 

administrations articulating our strategy towards the region. 

I mentioned this earlier, but we have, at the senior-most levels, 

embraced a vision that Xi Jinping put forward for a new model of 

great power relations, which is a great power of Russia, China, and 

the U.S. And our allies were unhappy, understandably. 

So how we have articulated this at the senior most levels, in 

terms of how we see the order and future of the region, keeps shifting. That is one problem. 

Also, I think, in the FONOPs, we do not have a story. I mean, 

the Australians, the Japanese, the Philippines, all our treaty allies 

wanted us to do freedom of navigation operations after this alarming Chinese reclamation and building of military spec airfields 

across the South China Sea. The first was near Subi island. It was 

at low-tide elevation. We did it as an innocent passage, because it 

was also within 12 nautical miles of island features. So that was 

confusing. 

The most recent one was more consistent, but ultimately, as the 

chairman articulated at the beginning of the hearing, ultimately, 

we need to demonstrate that we do not accept these new artificial 

island outposts as having any legitimacy in terms of territorial 

waters. And we need to do it consistently, and we need to make 

it appear we are not doing it reluctantly, because the first FONOP 

came after sort of Macbeth-like ‘‘to do or not to do’’ drama in the 

press. 

So we need to show how we view the region, why our values and 

allies are at the center of it; and second, that when order, freedom 

of navigation challenge are challenged, we don’t break a sweat. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I am going to ask one final quick question. 

I appreciate that you have focused a lot in this report on the Arctic and the interests of different countries in the Arctic. And at the 

same time, we have done a lot on this committee, and there is a 

lot of interest from a lot of different Senators on the issues of the 

Arctic. We required DOD to have a plan for the Arctic in the 

NDAA. 

At the same time, as the President talked about strengthening 

our presence in the Asia-Pacific, they are looking at dramatically 

cutting our military forces, particularly our only airborne brigade 

combat team in the Arctic, in the entire Asia-Pacific. 

Do you think that our potential adversaries, whether it is the Koreans, whether it is the Russians, view that kind of cutback in a 

way that undermines the credibility of our focus on the rebalance, 

and also on our focus, late to the game, of course, on the Arctic 

25 

where the Russians, as you mentioned in the report, are dramatically increasing their presence? And that is for both of you. 

General? 

Dr. GREEN. If I may start, General. 

When the President announced the rebalance in Australia in November 2011, it was well-received in the region. We have done polling where over 80 percent outside of China, over 80 percent of 

elites, welcome or would welcome a U.S. rebalance. There are questions about implementation, but the idea we are going to do this 

is important to them. 

In that speech in Australia, the President said that defense cuts 

will not, and he said, I repeat, will not, come at the expense of the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

So, technically, is the 425 part of PACOM? It is a little gray. 

Senator SULLIVAN. It is. 

Dr. GREEN. Will our allies see it as such? Yes. 

So this would be the first cut in the Pacific since the announcement of the rebalance. 

You mentioned the Arctic. There are growing uncertainties about 

the future of, frankly, not only the legal status and the exploitation 

of the Arctic but the security environment. 

So I saw that General Milley, in response to your question in his 

hearing, said he would need to look at operational requirements before force cuts. As we said in our report, that strikes us as the right 

sequence. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General? 

General CONANT. I am more simple. The Army said they regionally aligned with the forces out of I Corps, that unit that comes out 

of I Corps, which means you have less capacity and capability for 

the Pacific. 

The airborne aspect of it, I have been up there in your State and 

visited them. It is very impressive. 

I am not one for giving it away because you just do not know 

when you might need it. I understand there might be a cost factor. 

But again, I go to that regional alignment that Army has dictated 

to the rebalance, and that is the I Corps and 425th being part of 

that. 

I understand that we have gone the way with NORTHCOM, who 

owns Alaska and all that. But it is really the force should not be 

drawn down, because it is just paying another bill somewhere else. 

I would be interested in where that bill is being paid. Thank you. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this hearing, another very valuable session in the development of strategic concepts and initiatives. 

And I want to thank both of you for being here and for your very, 

very important insights and information. 

I want to come back to undersea warfare that was raised by Senator Reed, because it is identified in the report as the area of our 

greatest asymmetric advantage right now, but only if we continue 

to invest in it. We have a technological edge, but the Chinese and 

Russians and others are seeking to catch us. 

26 

So my question, Dr. Green, is, how should we target that investment to make sure we preserve and even enhance that advantage 

undersea? 

Dr. GREEN. Some of this, Senator, is in the classified report we 

provided. And I am certain that our colleagues would be happy to 

come and brief you on some of the specific ideas. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would welcome that. 

Dr. GREEN. One area we emphasized in the unclassified report 

is deployment forward. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Deployment of another six? 

Dr. GREEN. Yes. To us, it makes sense to put more Los Angeles 

class in Guam and eventually Virginia-class—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But you also identified as critical the Ohio 

replacement program. 

Dr. GREEN. Right. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And that will take a major investment. So 

my question is, in targeting resources, how would you suggest that 

we preserve that as a priority of the Navy? 

Dr. GREEN. Well, as General Conant said earlier, of the different 

assets we want forward deployed to have a credible deterrent, submarines are at the top of the list. I would say followed closely by 

amphibious capabilities for the Marines. 

But I should let General Conant answer. 

General CONANT. Senator, as I said before, it is such a valuable 

strategic asset that it does so many different missions. And I am 

talking subs, and we are looking at unmanned systems that go 

along with subs. 

Nobody is going to match that. Nobody can match our submarine 

crews. Nobody can match our ability to go on patrol and do what 

needs to be done in those special collection missions and other 

things they do anywhere else in the world. 

And it is something we should not back away from. And I think 

it is something we will have as a superior capability for some time 

to come. 

So I would be, again, really looking hard at how we do that investment. 

There is a part of the nuclear piece you need to look at, that is 

part of the triad that needs to be replaced. And that is another deterrence value that sends a strong message, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The amount of the investment in the Ohio 

replacement is so large, $100 billion, shouldn’t the financing, the 

funding for it, come from the DOD as a whole, not limited to the 

Navy budget? 

General CONANT. Being a former programmer in the Marine 

Corps, I used to hear those conversations about HMX [Marine Helicopter Squadron One] and other things that people said they cannot afford to fund. At the end of the day, the Navy has that, I 

think, responsibility. Whether they get a bigger share of the pie 

than others, I am all for that. 

But I do not who else—I mean, I do not know how you do that, 

other than creating a firestorm for the Pentagon comptroller, which 

he can handle. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. To shift to the unmanned undersea vehicles, is our investment sufficient now? 

27 

General CONANT. From what I have looked at, I think you are 

doing well. I think you can do little bit more. As you look at maybe 

doing some aspect of unmanned systems that have other things in 

them that pop up, and all of a sudden in a battle space can contribute to that knowledge and to that ability to control it. It is a 

little bit classified, but again, it is talking in generalities here. 

I think the Navy is doing a very, very good job at looking at that. 

I was briefed on that right before I left PACOM. So, again, I would 

watch it with a close eye. It may become a bill payer as other 

things come due. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I just want to finish, in the seconds I have 

left, to ask you about institutionalizing a culture of experimentation, which I view as a very promising vision, the idea of the red 

and green teams, and awarding citations, and so forth. 

Has that been proposed before? And has it ever been implemented in the Department of Defense or intelligence community? 

General CONANT. Yes, we have used that numerous times as we 

looked at different plans. But my experience with General Krulak, 

back during his commandant days when he said we do not have 

any money but we have our brains. So you can apply a very small 

investment into this red team, blue team, gold team, white team, 

whatever you want to call it, and apply the intellectual rigor 

against how we should be doing things different. That was when 

I talked about these new conceptual pieces that we are going to 

have to think about. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And that is one of the recommendations 

of the report? 

General CONANT. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General CONANT. And you see that being done up in the Naval 

War College and the Air War College and Marine War College. 

They are starting to look at these new concepts. 

But you ought to get the service labs really involved in what is 

the art of the possibility, because sometimes you are just going to 

study something you are not going to gain for 20 years, and you 

do not have the time to invest in it. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Two areas that I would like to talk about, North 

Korea nuclear policy and also the area of most immediate potential 

conflict with China, which is the South China Sea. 

Shouldn’t we change the name of the South China Sea? It is not 

anywhere near China. 

I do not understand how they claim the Spratly Islands, which 

is about the same distance from China as Venezuela is from us. 

How are we going to deal with this incredibly expansive claim, 

which does not necessarily affect us but all those other regional— 

Vietnam, Malaysia, although other regional countries that are encompassed in this? It just seems that this is fraught with risk. 

What is the thinking of the group on what we should do to deal 

with this issue? 

General Conant, do you want to take a pass at that? 

General CONANT. Sure. First of all, I do not think we let them 

define the problem set, them being China. So the nine-dash line 

28 

came out, spent a couple years trying to figure out what it was all 

about, and it comes from a historical document. And so, therefore, 

they think they have a claim. 

It kind of goes back to Senator Kaine’s question on UNCLOS. If 

you are not there at the table and you do not have your best lawyers engaging in the law of warfare, the lawfare that they use 

against us, that they think against us in a strategic context, then 

you are not going to get there. 

I wouldn’t rename anything. 

Senator KING. I was being facetious. 

General CONANT. I know, sir. But historical norms, I think it is 

worth the engagement. But again, they will say the relevancy is, 

are you a treaty signator or not? But I think that is worthy of it. 

But they are out and about, and they are reclaiming rocks, submerged assets, submerged—— 

Senator KING. Well, they are reclaiming, but they are also rebuilding airstrips on them and reconstructing. 

General CONANT. They are. 

Senator KING. I agree with you on the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

We are on the sideline, and I think we are undercutting our own 

national interests by not being at the table. 

We recently did a kind of sail-by to establish international 

waters. What should be our actions? What should we do to assist 

in trying to move toward a resolution of what I see as a long-term 

potential problem? 

Dr. GREEN. Senator, as a spinoff of this report, which was commissioned by your committee, we at CSIS have done a separate 

project, we would be happy to brief you or your staff on, on exactly 

that question. What would a counter-coercion strategy look like, to 

increase the cost to China and slow them down, frankly, try to get 

some stability in the region? 

Senator KING. Are the neighbors down there concerned about 

this? 

Dr. GREEN. Absolutely. Every single one of them now. It used to 

be just the Philippines or Vietnam. But now, across all the members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN, there 

is concern. 

One thing we do have to do is recognize this is not just a manifestation of Chinese nationalism, that there are geopolitical and 

military operational implications. 

When we had the Taiwan Straits crisis with China in 1995, 1996, 

that southern flank, that South China Sea, we could have entered 

with impunity. If we have another crisis with China in the first island chain with these airfields, they may be easy targets when the 

shooting starts, but before that point, with these airfoils, we will 

have to or our allies will have to stretch our attention and our 

forces to deal with that flank so that it is not a bastion for us, in 

effect, to be outflanked. 

Senator KING. I would appreciate a briefing on that, on your report on that particular issue. 

The second question, very briefly, how does North Korea’s recent 

actions with regard to missiles and nuclear tests change that calculus in terms of our deterrent, our commitment to our allies in the 

region? My concern is that if our allies lose confidence in our deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Apr 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\24931.TXT WILDA
29 

rent, they are going to develop their own capability, and then we 

are moving away from nonproliferation. 

General? 

General CONANT. Yes, sir. I think that is a spot-on assessment. 

We have heard forever that China can influence North Korea to 

some factor. 

Senator KING. I wish they would do it. 

General CONANT. I am here to tell you, in personal conversations 

and other times, I just do not see that happening. So the worst 

thing that could happen, if Kim Jong-un decides to not only 

nuclearize but miniaturize a delivery vehicle, put it on a threestage Taepodong, then you have an existential threat that we have 

not thought about before. 

It is in our interests to ensure that that never happens or that 

does not happen. 

To think that we can count on China helping us with that, I am 

not sure history has shown us that is going to happen. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I would like to pursue that issue, too, 

offline. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To what degree do you think the successful passage of the Pacific 

trade agreement is important to our defense policy in the Pacific 

region? 

Dr. GREEN. It is very important. Passage of TPP would indicate—I mean, there are economic advantages. But in addition to 

those, the passage of TPP, in short, indicates American competence 

and willpower. 

From an Asian perspective, TPP looks so obviously in American 

interests economically and strategically, it would be very difficult 

to explain why we could not pass it. And it would raise questions, 

and I hear these in the region. And I apologize if I am being too 

blunt, but it would great questions about our willpower to lead in 

that region and our competence in assembling tools that the region 

wants to help us assemble to lead. 

So it is not just about economics, Senator. I think it gets to the 

heart of what is ultimately the most important thing to this region. 

They care about how many subs we have. They care about how 

many Marines we have. But they care, above all, about our willpower and our competence to lead. 

Senator NELSON. General? 

General CONANT. Yes, sir. I think it is extremely important because it is another factor of U.S. strategic vision on what should 

happen out in that region. 

The factor that you have such people as Vietnam and Cambodia 

wanting it to happen for the benefit to themselves is tremendous. 

Again, it is a shared awareness that you are going to have over 

40 percent GDP [gross domestic product] production out of that 

part of the world. And not to have some kind of trade agreement 

or partnership with them would seem to be not in the best strategic vision sense for this Nation. 

But a lot of capability out there that goes both ways. 

30 

Senator NELSON. And does it get us in the economic door before 

China with those countries? 

Dr. GREEN. Senator, it does, in many cases. For example, there are estimates that $100 million a year of 

trade with the U.S. would shift from China to Vietnam because 

Vietnam is in TPP, and Vietnam would be accepting the rules, not 

just the tariff, but the behind the border rules. 

TPP is important for another reason, which is, it is sparking a 

debate in China about whether they can afford to be outside of the 

emerging rules in the Asia-Pacific region. So the complexity of the 

strategy we describe in our report is, we are trying to deter China, 

we are trying to shape China’s behavior, but we do not want to 

make China an enemy. TPP is one of the tools that allows us to 

force people in Beijing to think about the advantages of being in 

a rules-based system and the cost of being out. They can do the 

math and figure that out. 

Over the past few years, once Japan committed to TPP, the debate in Beijing changed. Instead of talking about this as containment of China, they talked about it as the external pressure they 

need to reform their economy. 

So it has a multiplier effect for us that goes beyond the job creation, recognizing, of course, that trade is hard, because there are 

winners and losers in these agreements. 

Senator NELSON. If I am correct, the sand spits that they are 

now turning into runways are between Vietnam and the Philippines. If that is the case, and if you were the commander in chief, 

what would you do and how close would you run our naval vessels? 

And beyond that, as a show of force, what would you do to deter 

this Chinese strategy? 

General CONANT. Good question. A difficult question, first of all. 

But I will not speak for anybody but myself. 

I think, in that aspect, you need an engagement process that 

shows those transits of ships, the overflight of airplanes. You are 

going to have your reconnaissance missions out there trying to see 

what they are doing and what they are not doing. 

I think that process alone sends a strong message. But every 

time we do that, there is a process it has to go through to approve 

those missions, and it is very complex, convoluted. And sometimes 

it takes days, weeks, to get that approval. Sometimes they are 

turned off at the last minute. 

So if you want true freedom of navigation through the air and 

through the sea, then we should be trying to empower those commanders on a reasonable basis in consultation with the administration on when we run them and how we should run them. 

We know how to do this, sir. We have done it before. And it 

should not threaten anybody. 

But the fact that China is squawking so hard about it is probably 

something that we ought to pay attention to. It may be a deterrence factor in the end. 

And also allies and partners, we have five allies. We have very 

many partners out there, and the partners are as important as allies. 

Dr. GREEN. If I may, Senator? 

I agree completely with General Conant’s recommendations. 

31 

First and foremost, we need to do more of these freedom of navigation operations, and we probably need to do one near Mischief 

Reef or one of these undersea features, to demonstrate that we and 

our allies will welcome it, and our partners do not accept China’s 

claim that this is an island with territorial rights. 

On a broader strategic scale, I think the assumption in Beijing 

is that time is on their side and that our bilateral alliances in Asia 

will gradually whither as China becomes more important economically. If China sees that its actions are not only strengthening our 

alliances, but causing more cooperation and networking across alliances—the U.S., Australia, Japan, India, support for the Philippines—that is not built into their assumptions about China’s 

longer term interests in Asia. 

I think that is how you cause second thought in Beijing. If they 

start creating the antibodies in the system to come together because of what they are doing, they will have to rethink their assumptions about China’s future strategic interests and position in 

the Asia-Pacific region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, I want to thank the witnesses. 

Amongst the many recommendations I am interested in is one of 

your recommendations about encouraging Japan to establish a joint 

operations command. Thinking outside of the box, now that there 

seems to have been a reconciliation between Japan and South 

Korea, you might even think about expanding that as well. 

I think one of the least noticed, but more important events of recent years is finally resolving the comfort women issue, so that we 

could have arguably the two strongest nations in the Pacific region 

with us in a much more coordinated fashion. 

And I think the witnesses would agree that things are not going 

to get quieter in the Pacific region, in the near future anyway. So 

I thank you all. 

Senator Reed do you have anything? 

Senator REED. No, sir. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ