JSOU Report 13-1 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations Yarger

21st Century SOF: Toward 

an American Theory of 

Special Operations

Harry R. Yarger 

JSOU Report 13-1

April 2013

Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to 

defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of global 

operations against terrorist networks.

USSOF mission. USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, precision, and 

lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also organizes and conducts strategic symposia, interagency curricula, international curricula, regional and 

cultural education senior level courses, and senior level professional military education.

This publication is available on the JSOU public web page located at

https://jsou.socom.mil.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Director of Research

Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret; Richard 

Rubright, Ph.D., Strategic Studies; Jason Quirin, Ph.D., Chemical Engineering; Joanna Gutierrez 

Winters, M.A., International Relations and Diplomacy, M.A. Economics, Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology 

and Justice Studies, University of 

Massachusetts Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel,

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Thomas Sass

Ph.D., International Relations

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz

J.D., Ph.D., Political Science

Professor of international affairs and law and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. A Marine with a company from 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion watches the road ahead from his position as a rear gunner 

on a Ground Mobility Vehicle while traveling toward Dixie Valley, Nevada. 

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Edmund L. Hatch)

JSOU Report 13-1

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2013

21st Century SOF: 

Toward an American 

Theory of Special 

Operations
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, 

Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB 

FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-933749-75-4
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Challenge to India’s Internal Security, 

December 2012, Prakash Singh 

Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests, September 2012, Roby Barrett 

Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces, 

August 2012, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

2012 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, May 2012

Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, May 2012, James J.F. Forest

Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing 

al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement, May 2012, Richard Shultz

Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and 

Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations, 

April 2012, Derek Jones

“We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, February 2012, Bernd Horn

Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere, 

February 2012, Thomas H. Henriksen

Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, 

Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives, November 2011, Russell D. Howard

Oman: The Present in the Context of a Fractured Past, August 2011, Roby Barrett
vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................ix

About the Author ....................................................................xi

Author’s Note .......................................................................xiii

1. Introduction........................................................................ 1

2. A Complex Security Environment and SOF Power............... 5

3. Finding Definitions ........................................................... 19

4. Perspectives on Special Operations and SOF..................... 27

5. An American Theory Stated............................................... 45

6. Implications of an American School of Thought ................ 69

7. Conclusion ....................................................................... 75

Endnotes............................................................................... 77

ix

Foreword

In the 2011 Joint Special Operations University workshop, 

SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory 

and Strategic Art, the attendees concluded that a healthy strategic culture 

and the proper practice of a SOF strategic art hinged on the development of a 

suitable special operations theory for the 21st century. Only a few individuals, 

including the current USSOCOM commander, have undertaken to offer a 

theory of SOF in the past. However, many others have provided insights and 

premises to how SOF achieve success. Not the least among these are what 

SOF culture and doctrine espouses based on SOF experience.

In this concise JSOU monograph, Dr. Rich Yarger considers the 21st century security environment, previous work on special operations theory, and 

various other perspectives of SOF gleaned from his research to synthesize an 

American SOF school of thought, which he argues provides a foundation for 

developing an American special operations theory for the 21st century. He 

offers definitions, premises, and principles that explain modern American 

special operations over the last 70 years and can serve SOF well into the 

future. Based on his research, he identifies major areas of concern for SOF 

leadership.

As USSOCOM confronts the challenges offered by the 21st century 

and policymakers continue to look at SOF as a preferred means to address 

numerous and complex security issues, theory is essential in determining 

and explaining the appropriate roles and missions for SOF in the 21st century 

and for building and sustaining the forces. It explains the strategic utility 

of SOF, bolsters the strategic art within SOF, and informs doctrine. This 

monograph offers a basis toward such a theory.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 

xi

About the Author

Harry R. (Rich) Yarger, Ph.D., is a JSOU senior fellow at the Joint 

Special Operations University and recently served as the Ministry 

Reform Analyst in the Security, Reconstruction and Transition Division 

of the Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, 

Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He has been associated with 

JSOU for over a decade. 

Prior to joining the Institute in September 2009, 

he served as Professor of National Security Policy in 

the Department of National Security and Strategy at 

the U.S. Army War College where he held the Elihu 

Root Chair of Military Studies and taught courses in: 

fundamentals of strategic thinking; theory of war and 

strategy; national security policy and strategy; grand 

strategy; terrorism; and the interagency. His research focuses on strategic 

theory, national security policy and strategy, terrorism, irregular warfare, 

effective governance, and the education and development of strategic level 

leaders.

In addition to teaching positions, he served five years as the chairman of 

the Army War College’s Department of Distance Education. Dr. Yarger has 

also taught at the undergraduate level at several colleges. His book, Strategy 

and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century was released by Praeger Security International 

in July 2008. An edited work, Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use 

of Military Power in the 21st Century, was published by the Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI) in 2010. “How Students Learn Strategy?” a chapter in Teaching 

Strategy: Challenge and Response, was also an SSI release. A second edited 

text, Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance, 

was released in 2011. 

A retired Army colonel, he is a Vietnam veteran and served in both 

Germany and Korea. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and 

obtained his doctorate in history from Temple University with fields in U.S. 

military history, U.S. diplomatic history, European diplomatic history, and 

American social history.

xiii

Author’s Note

An American special operations theory and SOF’s strategic performance 

are subjects that have fascinated me for over a decade. I am not alone in 

that fascination and the references herein represent only a few of the people 

who have struggled with these topics. Thus, I should acknowledge upfront 

that the thinking of many more than are referenced herein have influenced 

my thinking. I have used all that I have learned from my own research and 

members of the SOF community shamelessly, and sometimes in ways the 

originator may not agree with entirely. Consequently, I have that author’s 

impending sense of remorse that I may have missed acknowledging some 

specific contribution in my pursuit of articulating a concise understanding 

of American military special operations. I had a lot of help from a multitude 

who wanted a proper theory articulated. In particular, I would like to thank 

the numerous JSOU senior fellows, who listened patiently and helped clarify 

my thinking at various times over the years. Several of these fellows’ works 

are used and cited in this monograph. I would also be remiss if I did not specifically acknowledge that it was Joe Celeski and Bill Mendel who mentored 

me most and kept reminding me to put something down on paper. There is 

much more to be done in regard to special operations theory and I hope this 

monograph informs that effort.

1

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

1. Introduction

There is a need for a theory of special operations to guide the application of SOF to strategic ends beyond the ad hoc, immediate, 

and creative mind of the military planner implementing strategy. 

– Robert G. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations (2007)1

American Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess an amazing history 

and an emerging doctrine, but too little in the way of a unifying theory—a theory that explains American SOF and how it fits into U.S. national 

security. The lack of such a theory is odd given the public’s fascination with 

special operators, the U.S. Congress’ legislative support, policymakers’ penchant for their use, and the number of popular movies and books—both 

factual accounts and fiction—produced. In fact, only a handful of individuals 

have undertaken the effort to articulate a theory. Most notable among the 

more recent of these are William H. McRaven in his 1995 SPEC OPS: Case 

Studies in Special Operations, Theory and Practice2

 and Robert G. Spulak, 

Jr.’s thoughtful follow-on monograph, A Theory of Special Operations: The 

Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF.

3

 Both of these works introduced core 

insights into what special operations and SOF are and what makes them 

successful. SPEC OPS is often characterized as having a tactical focus, and 

indeed it is action focused with its case studies, but it extrapolates these 

cases into a theoretical construct and provides seeds for a broader theory. 

In A Theory of Special Operations, Spulak expands on McRaven’s contributions of the relationship of SOF and friction and distinct personnel attributes within SOF, and he argues an essential necessity of a SOF role at the 

strategic level. Others over the years from inside and outside of the special 

operations community shared insights and conclusions about the special 

operations phenomenon, scattering bits and pieces that add to an understanding. Much of this is captured in doctrine and in the SOF Truths; the 

latter reflecting what the community of special operators believes about the 

force.4 This monograph seeks to expand on these authors’ contributions as 

well as extrapolate others’ works and thoughts—and SOF practice, doctrine, 

and culture—to lay the basis of a more unified American special operations 

theory and better understanding of the American school of thought.
2

JSOU Report 13-1

The timing for advancing a comprehensive theory of American special 

operations could not be more opportune for several reasons. First, with over 

70 years of modern history, the American SOF reputation has never stood 

higher in the esteem of the public and policymakers. In the last two decades 

special operations have taken on a greater role in national defense, and policymakers and strategists have found utility in the kind of military power 

SOF projects. Such recognition is a double-edged sword. The nation has been 

confronted with significant challenges in the first half of the 21st century 

that have already strained the capacity of the United States and its strategic 

partners to deal with them. Policymakers and the 2012 Defense Strategy are 

correct to recognize the relevance of SOF to these threats and opportunities, but in advocating the greater use of special operations they clearly do 

not grasp what the SOF Truths imply about SOF capacity.5

 As a result, U.S. 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must parley the hard-earned 

esteem won by special operators over the past decade to build the force for 

the future while advising policymakers and senior military decision makers 

on how best to use a qualitatively constrained SOF capacity. Concurrently, 

a number of people question whether the greatest strategic utility is being 

made of SOF power.6 This is not a questioning of SOF personnel’s efforts, 

but a genuine concern about how unique and limited capabilities are used, 

or not used, and how they might best be used in the future. A unified theory 

would inform how best to wield the SOF sword.

Second, under USSOCOM, SOF have matured into a discrete military 

force with many of the distinguishing characteristics that define a separate 

service. Theories and schools of thought explain how each service fits into 

the nation’s security, sets the parameters for roles and missions, lays the basis 

for a strategic art, and informs doctrine and the professional development 

of the force. In the past, SOF have relied on mentoring, on-the-job experience, a limited doctrine, and a high degree of flexibility and adaptability. 

Notwithstanding the great need for and value of the latter, a theory and 

school of thought provide perspective for strategy, mission planning, and 

improvising when in contact with the enemy, significantly shortening and 

lowering the cost of the learning curve at all levels of war.

Third, theories and schools of thought, and the challenges to them, 

inform the debates about force structure and allocation of resources internal to each service and among the services in the wider arenas of the executive department and Congress. For this process to work properly, SOF must 
3

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

debate from a common, intellectually defensible basis. Theory and a coherent 

school of thought will help SOF leaders, and the force as a whole, to meet 

their professional obligations to advise political leadership on how to protect 

and advance U.S. interests, prepare for war, and conduct war.

Theory means different things to different people, and it is important to 

understand the role of theory before undertaking the writing or reading of 

it. Some within SOF oppose theory because they fear theory would box SOF 

in when one SOF strength is its opportunistic nature.7 Theory’s purpose is 

neither to provide a prescription for success nor constrain choices, but to 

serve as a framework to help broaden and discipline thinking in ways that 

lead to better understanding and choices. It helps inform the debate about 

special operations and SOF issues, but should never become dogma. Clausewitz put theory in perspective almost 200 years ago, arguing theory is best 

used to educate the mind.

Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about 

war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, training his 

judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls. ... Theory exists so that 

one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and 

plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. 

It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander.8

Various constructs exist for what constitutes the components of good 

military theory. In general, such a theory would explain the nature and purpose of the subject, provide essential terminology and definitions, explain the 

essential assumptions and premises of the theory, explain the relationships 

among these concepts and ideas internally and externally, and perhaps relate 

the theory to the past, present, and future. In essence, a coherent SOF theory 

accounts for the past and informs the debate in regard to critical questions 

that will help guide the American SOF community into the future. Not all of 

the questions are known, but the major ones are clear. What is SOF power? 

What are special operations and SOF? Why do special operations and SOF 

exist? How do they fit into the larger constructs of American national security and the American military? What are SOF’s strengths and constraints? 

How do special operations and SOF achieve success? How do SOF achieve 

strategic effect? What does the special operations and SOF experience to 

date reveal, and what does it imply for the future? 
4

JSOU Report 13-1

Special operations and SOF have been the subject of numerous publications within the military and policy worlds and in the commercial marketplace. Many of these have a tactical focus and have held the American 

public spellbound by the actions of special operators. Others have sought 

to provide a strategic or operational perspective of the role of special operations and SOF, or illuminate some particular interest of the author in special 

operations and SOF. USSOCOM has sought to develop doctrine and greater 

knowledge about what SOF are, how they have operated in the past, and 

how they must operate in the future. Joint Special Operations University 

publications contribute significantly to the latter. All of these efforts provide insights into a theory of American special operations and constitute 

an emerging school of thought. Thus, much of what constitutes a theory 

is not new knowledge. This monograph seeks to concisely and coherently 

summarize and extrapolate from the existing research and the experience, 

thinking, and practice of the SOF community the foundation for a unified 

theory and school of thought for American special operations. It follows a 

very simple logic: (1) examine the complexity of the security environment 

and the value of SOF power; (2) understand how special operations, SOF, and 

SOF power are defined and interrelated in an American theory; (3) review 

and analyze key perspectives of special operations and SOF; (4) propose a 

set of premises and principles that explain American special operations and 

SOF theoretically; and (5) illustrate some of the future implications of the 

theory for SOF leadership. By definition a monograph is a concise treatment 

of a subject, and this monograph leaves much for deeper consideration and 

further development. Its purpose will be well served if it does no more than 

help clarify the questions and focus the debate.
5

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

2. A Complex Security Environment and 

SOF Power

Thinking about the future requires an understanding of both what 

is timeless and what will likely change. – The JOE 2010: Joint Operating Environment9

Since the end of the Cold War, intellectual analyses of the contemporary 

and future security environments have proliferated. The vast majority of 

the reports, studies, and books resulting from or making use of these argue 

that it is a brand new world that requires new security solutions. It should 

be so simple! The reality is far more complex: a world in which central continuities of the past are hyper-interacting with the unprecedented changes 

characterizing the 21st century. As consequence, the strategic environment 

is in a period of flux and risk in which the United States and its strategic 

partners are confronted with a broad spectrum of old and new security 

threats and challenges.10 SOF will play a central role in dealing with and 

overcoming these but is only one aspect of the military element of power 

that must be applied.

Signposts of the 21st Century

Security analyses generally follow a similar pattern. Major trends are identified 

and security threats are inferred from the impact of the trends on the status 

quo. While the list of trend categories may vary depending on the specific goals 

of the analysis, a common list includes: demographics, globalization, economics, energy, food, water, climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, cyber, 

space, et cetera.11 An analysis can only identify possibilities; it cannot predict 

the future. For example, analysts have been predicting a new series of Middle 

East wars based on water shortages for decades. It remains a possibility, but it 

has not occurred.12 Trends interact in the environment among themselves and 

with events and the actions of state and individual actors in ways that preclude 

reliable prediction.

Such interaction complicates individual issues, adds complexity to the security environment, and sometimes begets new trends. For example, China’s rapid 

economic development, which is part of a U.S.-led strategy of integrating China 
6

JSOU Report 13-1

into the global economic security order, produced energy concerns in China 

leading to a more active diplomacy with energy rich states and subsequent 

increases in oil prices because of accelerated Chinese energy demands. Obviously, U.S. policy was not seeking higher oil prices. Similarly, democratization, 

a highly desired and welcomed re-emergent trend at the end of the Cold War, 

was accompanied by the resurgence of extremist nationalism and religion. In 

addition, the negative trends associated with urbanization, fragile and failing 

states, and rise of radical ideologies are in part the unwanted stepchildren of 

changing demographics, worldwide economic development, and globalization. 

As a consequence of the interaction among these trends and the choices of 

human actors, terrorism became a major global threat. Yet, at the same time 

other trends in demographics, economic development, and globalization are 

very positive. As the JOE 2010 notes, “The value of such efforts lays ... in ... 

wrestling with the possibilities, determining the leading indicators, and then 

reading the signposts of the times” in order to prepare and act.13

Four large “signposts” should dominate the thinking of U.S. military decision makers and strategists over the next two decades. The first of these is the 

global scale and scope of the ongoing changes in the social and economic life 

of the world’s populations. The “establishment of information and knowledge—their production, dissemination, storage, and use—as the fundamental 

social and economic activity, rather than the cultivation of agriculture or the 

production of manufactured goods,” and the subsequent changes wrought, and 

yet to be produced, have dramatic implications for states and the international 

order.14 This phenomenon and its consequences, often referred to more generally as “globalization,” represents a grand and global social-economic change 

that cuts across and interacts with all the strategic trends of analysis and every 

aspect of modern and traditional life.

Some argue that for historical precedence to understand the scale and scope 

of ongoing change, we must look back to the industrial revolution and its effects 

on the economic, social, and political orders of the time. Simply stated, the 

industrial revolution changed the world. In the process, the existing global 

order was prone to great disorder. The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, 

the colonial wars, labor disorders, anarchists, rise of socialism and communism, and World Wars I and II are but a few examples of the resulting disorder. In many ways, today’s world is a better informed and more unified world 

than in previous centuries, and the changes proffer a much better future for 

those populations that embrace them successfully.15 Hopefully, politicians and 

populations will find more peaceful and rapid ways of adaptation than in the 

past, but until this grand change is part of a new global status quo, many of the 
7

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

trends will add complexity to the security 

challenges and be harbingers of instability 

and conflict.

A second signpost military decision 

makers and strategists must heed is that 

the past is always important. Any future 

stable world order will be a mixture of 

ongoing changes and continuities from the 

past. Continuities represent stability in cultures and societies and are central 

to successful progress in human social systems. Change is an unknown and to 

some degree threatening to most people, even when it offers great opportunity. 

This is true in all societies, but particularly so in more traditional cultures. 

Continuities have a paradoxical relationship with change. On the one hand, 

the greater the change, the more people tend to cling to an idealized past or 

embrace past injustices as the reason for an increasingly unsatisfactory status 

quo. On the other hand, continuities are an essential bridge to the future. This 

paradox explains in part the rise and support of Islamic extremism and the 

solution to it.

As peoples in many of these underdeveloped states become more aware of 

their relative deprivation, they want to blame the non-Islamic interlopers for 

their plight rather than addressing the necessity to change. Both governments 

and other actors use religion to promote such views and retain or acquire 

power. Religion is a central construct in Islamic cultures, explaining for most 

believers every aspect of their lives. If those cultures are to modernize, the 

continuity of religion and faith must help explain a proper way forward. Devout 

Islamists and legitimate governments must work together for successful transition. In contrast, extremists have used religion to justify a war against modernity—even when the evidence overwhelmingly discredits their idealized past. 

Continuities that are important to people are resilient and add complexity 

to the security environment. They linger and become a part of the problem 

or a part of a solution, but invariably manifest themselves in some form in 

the future. The past and how it is considered and used in decision making 

and strategy formulation will determine to a large degree the nature of future 

stability or instability. The greater the change, the more important it is to 

understand and integrate the past.

War and conflict are major continuities in the affairs of men. As Colin Gray 

reminds us in Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, “War and warfare will 

always be with us: war is a permanent feature of the human condition.”16 Many 

of Gray’s summarizing arguments in this text are familiar: war does not change 

... but until this grand change 

is part of a new global status 

quo, many of the trends will 

add complexity to the security 

challenges and be harbingers 

of instability and conflict.
8

JSOU Report 13-1

in nature, even though it manifests itself differently; war is driven most by 

political context, but is social, cultural, political, and strategic in behavior, 

and surprise is inherent to warfare.17 However, the point of Gray’s book was 

to counter in some part the prevailing notion following the attacks on 11 

September 2001 that future warfare would be all irregular. “Irregular warfare 

may well be the dominant mode in belligerency for some years to come, but 

interstate war, including great power conflict, will enjoy a healthy future.”18

Harry G. Summers, Jr., a past faculty member at the U.S. Army War College, in discussing the nature of warfare, liked to tell students “a guy with 

a sharp stick can still poke your eye out.”19 It was his way of reminding his 

audience that while new ideas were often added to war and the military’s 

plate, few were ever removed. However, he was also suggesting that those 

who would practice sanitary “war” from the comfort of a computer station 

or “impose their will” through influence are not immune to sharp sticks 

or incoming missiles. Summers and Gray grasped the true complexity of 

the 21st century security environment confronting the American military. 

Hence, a third signpost is the U.S. military must be prepared to confront 

the historical spectrum of use of military force across the full Continuum 

of Military Operations as indicated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Continuum of Military Operations20
9

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

A fourth signpost marking the increased complexity of the security environment and portending danger is the diffusion of power within the domestic and international orders. One of the consequences of the interaction of 

modernity and globalization is the empowerment of other actors within the 

domestic and international systems. Relatively speaking, intergovernmental 

organizations, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), and other national and transnational actors (professional, social, 

religious and terrorist organizations as well as individuals) exercise more 

power within the state and international systems than previously. This rise 

of relative power results from the combined effects of national and global 

populations’ embracement of more universal values and the ability of many 

of these non-state actors to make better use of the changes resulting from 

globalization than governments who have yet to adapt.21 U.S. democratic 

liberal-capitalist ideals lie at the heart of the universal values, the empowerment of individuals and populations, and the progress of globalization. In 

an ironic twist of the ascendency of these values, the 21st century security 

environment is one in which state sovereignty and state power may be more 

easily challenged and international instability increased.

The continuing changes and their implications are so significant that 

some, like John B. Alexander, argue the very nature of war has changed, and 

the nation-state may be a failing concept.

... the nature of war has changed at a fundamental level—that of 

definition. Further, information technology is so pervasive and interpenetrating that its impact cannot be relegated to mere alteration 

in the techniques by which war is prosecuted. Rather, information 

technology facilitates new social structures, exacerbates competing 

hierarchical beliefs, and, combined with other factors, enhances the 

ability of powerful nations, or other philosophical organizations, to 

impose their will on adversaries. It is this ability for imposition of 

will, not the level of violence inflicted, that will determine whether 

or not a conflict has been won or lost.22

Dr. Alexander’s arguments about a change in the “nature” of warfare 

are both useful and debatable, but his major conclusions about the implications for SOF are critical. For reasons discussed later, SOF will increasingly 

become a tool of choice, and SOF units must be prepared to morph into new 

capabilities in order to address more and more nontraditional challenges 
10

JSOU Report 13-1

in the ongoing quest for an enduring democratic liberal-capitalist political 

economic order.23

A Mini-Strategic Appraisal

The exact nature of the 21st century order is still emerging and will be shaped 

in large part by the choices in policies and strategies developed and acted on 

by the United States and its strategic partners—and how others react to them. 

The major trends acting on its emergence are easily identifiable and portrayed 

in numerous studies and reports. Chief among these are globalization with 

its subthemes of technology diffusion, free flow of information, interdependent and competitive economies, and relative empowerment of weak state, 

non-state, and individual actors. Globalization has been dealt with extensively elsewhere and most national security professionals are familiar with 

its attributes. It suffices here to say that “globalization continued” supported 

on a strong base of democratic liberal capitalism holds forth a promising 

future of positive economic competition and assured human security by 

expanding the economic pie and advancing universal human rights. This 

vision, founded in fundamental American values, faces severe challenges, 

many of which are accentuated by the very processes of globalization. The 

purpose of this section is to highlight the complexity of the evolving security 

environment and the potential implications for SOF.

Global Trends 2025, published by the National Intelligence Council in 

2008, argues that the world is being transformed, and the next decade plus 

will be characterized more by change than continuities.24 They are certainly 

right that the world is undergoing major changes and will continue to do so 

in a bumpy manner with many ups and downs. The attributes of globalization interacting with other ongoing trends is creating synergies with unprecedented opportunities and contradictory consequences, many of which do 

not bode well for the security of the United States and its strategic partners. 

Which are which is yet to be determined, but the potential issues are visible and they portend a period of instability and changes in the security 

environment.

For example, globalization is proceeding in an uneven manner with some 

prospering while others starve. The rewards of globalization are disproportionally shared among states and regions, and within states. Some of 

this is the result of starting with significant disadvantages in resources and 
11

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

education or being unable to compete positively in the global marketplace as 

a result of inadequate governance and leadership. However, even individuals 

and states that seek to compete positively within the rule set of democratic 

liberal capitalism find themselves disadvantaged by those who are willing to 

flaunt the rule set that sustains globalization—rule of law, universal human 

rights, and positive competition in a free market where global security and 

stability is insured by all. The latter implies that security costs are shared in 

some manner and that efforts will be made to provide assistance to bring 

states into or back into globalization’s prosperity and security. It suggests a 

necessary U.S. involvement in international security and assistance.

The state capitalism models currently pursued by China, Russia, and 

India are specific examples of where aspects of globalization’s rule set are 

being flaunted. This may be a transitional period for these states as it was for 

South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, but it could also result in a competing predatory capitalist system in which the state unfairly manipulates the 

marketplace and its citizens to gain economic and ideological advantages 

contrary to U.S. interests. In addition, the adoption of the model by replicating states, retaliation by aggrieved competitors, or internal unrest due to a 

lack of perceived rights within these states all pose potential security issues 

for the United States and its partners.25 All of these broaden the scope of the 

security responses needed by United States.

Demographics in the 21st century are largely a contradictory trend. The 

global population is growing, but the growth will continue to be disproportionate in underdeveloped and fragile states. With neither jobs nor promising 

futures existing, resorting to other means of livelihood and migration are 

logical options for disenchanted youth. Crime, insurgency, terrorism, repression, and increasing and counterproductive instability are the likely results. 

On the one hand, the instability may collapse corrupt or unrepresentative 

regimes and provide opportunities for the emergence of more positive states. 

On the other hand, as global terrorism has demonstrated, the attributes and 

consequences of instability are easily exportable to other places around the 

globe. Compounding the lack of opportunity at home, most gaining nations’ 

immigration policies favor skilled professionals and the educated. Often, 

the ones most capable of building a prosperous state are the first to leave a 

failing state, making things even worse. Worsening conditions create illegal 

migration. Illegal and mass migrants are less likely to be assimilated into a 

gaining state and are fertile ground for criminal networks, social unrest, and 
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other harbingers of instability. At the same time, many developed nations’ 

working populations will further decline as a result of declining birth rates 

and aging, creating economic issues at home as productivity and tax revenues drop and security and social programs compete for decreasing state 

resources.26 As a result, more and more potential donor states will continue 

to accept the qualified immigrant and be unable or unwilling to accept or 

assist the struggling. Consequently, the United States and its strategic partners must find ways to assist troubled states to manage their own economic 

and security issues.

Economic growth is also contradictory. Despite recent economic setbacks, 

continued economic growth in the developed and developing world will 

place greater pressure on energy, food, and water resources. As more states 

enter the global competition, the pressure increases. The competition for 

resources could result in state-on-state conflicts or instability within states. 

Yet, it is also necessary that all states participate in this growth in order to 

meet the 21st century expectations of their populations for human security.27 

Governments that cannot provide human security will fail, creating the 

potential for conflict and humanitarian requirements for the international 

community. It is an area in which the United States must respond as a consequence of U.S. strategic values and in order to continue to lead and shape 

the world order.

The diffusion of power is another contradictory trend. Power is becoming 

more diffused. The rise of China, India, and others as well as the resurgence 

of Russia marks the advent of a more multipolar international system. While 

a more multipolar world is a logical and necessary outcome of globalization, 

the question is open to which rising states will be contributing strategic 

partner sharing power and which may seek to be spoilers to improve their 

relative power. In addition, multi-polarity, as well as the spread of technology, places more relative power into the hands of lesser states and increases 

the potential for conflict and instability. Like Iran, lesser states may interfere in the internal affairs of other states or threaten others’ security while 

shielded by the tensions among larger states or the implied threat of the use 

of weapons of mass destruction. The relative power and influence of nonstate actors—business, ethnic and religious groups, NGOs, and others—is 

also enhanced by many of the basic constructs of globalization, such as its 

technology, communications, interdependency, and openness. In the ongoing transformation, the wide diversity of non-state actors are crucial enablers 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

to bringing all states and populations into a positive 21st century order. 

However, non-state actors can also pursue destructive ends that contribute 

to disorder and instability. It is worth noting that other basic constructs of 

globalization, such as secularism and universal human rights, threaten some 

religious and social groups, governments, and other current elites. Globalization’s constructs can be portrayed in a negative manner to serve threatened 

elites and empower political opportunists. Any of these can threaten stability 

and U.S. interests.28 The United States must be prepared to deal constructively with a variety of non-state actors.

Global Trends 2025 further emphasizes the almost paradoxical nature of 

this transformation in noting that in resolving many of the issues created 

by these trends, a new problem set is created. For example, a transition away 

from dependence on fossil fuels might alleviate the competition for energy 

resources, but it would wreak havoc with those national economies dependent on oil production in the Middle East or that of Russia. Even here, the 

results are not predictably good or bad. They are both good and bad. Such 

a collapse and the threat of its consequences might force the new Russian 

elites toward a more representative government. What this portends is that 

the United States and its partners are confronted with a very complex and 

unpredictable security environment for the next 10-15 years, and perhaps 

beyond, until the promise of globalization can be more fully realized.29

The security environment is at a particularly vulnerable period when 

numerous factors are interacting and often in contradictory ways. At times 

like these the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of the 

strategic environment is much greater and anticipating the future is more 

difficult. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the range of possible future 

outcomes. In doing this, policymakers and strategists gain insights in how 

to both shape and prepare for the future. The range is usually expressed in 

distinct outcomes for analysis purposes and clarity. Once expressed, the 

policies and strategies to shape events toward a more favorable future can be 

determined. Such a process focused on the 2025 world order might find the 

United States is confronted with several distinct potential security futures: 

(1) a breakdown of the international order into more or less greater chaos 

in which the remaining stable states struggle to maintain some sense of 

international order and trade to provide a degree of stability and prosperity 

for their citizens; (2) the rise of peer or near-peer competitors on a global 

or regional level and the strain of a new series of small conflicts and cold 
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JSOU Report 13-1

wars that threaten stability and prosperity; (3) global or regional warfare 

on a large scale that threatens the existing order; (4) extended status quo; 

or (5) the continued evolution of the global order along democratic liberalcapitalist lines with new strategic partners contributing to and sharing in 

global stability and prosperity.

National security in its broader sense involves the use of all the nation’s 

elements of power: economic, diplomatic, military, and socio-psychological 

to shape a favorable future.30 From a policymaker or strategist’s view, how 

the United States chooses to use, not use, or fails to use appropriately the 

instruments inherent to these elements in relation to what other actors do 

and chance will determine the shape of the future. Hence, while it is impossible to predict the future, understanding the potential factors at play and 

their possibilities does illuminate the range of security concerns and ways in 

which they can be addressed. Wildcards or “Black Swans”—totally unanticipated factors or events—can undermine such projections; but such wildcards 

are rare, if the analysis process’ environmental scan is comprehensive.

The complexity of the emerging security environment has not been lost 

to those responsible for thinking about security challenges strategically. The 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report recognized the multiple challenges of irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive threats.31 The 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report also describes a “complex environment” with multiple, diverse challenges for U.S. forces and partners.32 

However, the primary missions assigned in the 2012 Defense Strategy make 

the diversity of the challenges posed by this complexity most evident. Given 

the extent of these challenges, it appears a question of not who gets what 

mission, but can it all be done if everyone works together?

The assigned missions of 2012 Defense Strategy are:33

•	 Counterterrorism and irregular warfare (IW).

•	 Deter and defeat aggression. 

•	 Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges. 

•	 Counter weapons of mass destruction. 

•	 Operate effectively in cyberspace and space. 

•	 Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

•	 Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities. 

•	 Provide a stabilizing presence. 

•	 Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations. 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

•	 Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

In the new Defense Strategy, the United States is struggling with two 

major defense changes. First, budget concerns and the need for domestic 

investment are resulting in major cuts in military spending. Second, the 

strategy is seeking to rebalance the U.S. security focus after more than a 

decade of post-9/11 warfare. While clearly recognizing the greater complexity of the security environment, the strategy is emphasizing the Pacific Rim 

and reinvestments in maritime and air power at the expense of land power. 

It clearly focuses on the rising potential of an unhealthy Chinese hegemony 

in that region and any ambition of China to become a global disruptor or 

peer competitor. The focus on the Pacific Rim reflects national economic 

concerns and foreign policy commitments as well as new security ones. It is a 

continuation of U.S. policy from the 1990s when the U.S. policymakers chose 

to seek to bring China into the global economic order. If the defense strategy 

is successful, China will continue its progress and enter into the U.S.-favored 

democratic liberal-capitalist world order as a full strategic partner.

It is clearly a hedging strategy, but one with a new balance in the joint 

paradigm calculated to help shape China toward a non-aggressive security 

strategy. Like all strategy, it has risks. In seeking to shape China’s military 

policy through such U.S. force structure adjustments, it could lead Chinese 

leaders to conclude the United States is pursuing an anti-Chinese policy. 

However, U.S. policymakers have already likely concluded Chinese calculations are that the United States merely wants to demonstrate that any arms 

race or adventurism is impracticable and counterproductive. Risk is also 

being assumed in re-stationing, the reduction of Army and Marine forces, 

and the acceptance of the inability to conduct wars in two theaters. Such 

risk is particularly problematic for the Army and SOF because the Army 

and SOF as land power instruments have significant mission responsibilities 

across the spectrum of conflict. And, most of the propensity for instability 

is land centric.

The Pacific focus, accumulated cuts, changes in warfighting perspective, and the American public’s focus on internal issues might suggest to 

some state and non-state actors the United States is no longer willing or 

cannot play a role as the world’s major security guarantor. These actors may 

rationally conclude the United States is incapable of, or reluctant to, committing forces on the ground. Despite the obvious thought in how the new 
16

JSOU Report 13-1

balance was constructed, it represents a reduction in land force capability 

at a precarious time when land-based security issues in the rest of the world 

are increasing, regardless of any success in Afghanistan or Iraq. Again, the 

Defense Strategy hedges in this regard. First, notwithstanding the cuts, the 

strategy does maintain a balance that includes responsive, if reduced land 

power. The strategy also hedges by supporting proactive measures such as 

building partnership capacity to offset U.S. force shortfalls. Importantly, the 

strategy advocates robust SOF, providing potential policy options that can 

act proactively on the ground globally. Nonetheless, the potential challenges 

and the solutions proposed—particularly from a land force perspective—are 

daunting.

The Use of Power

States, through their possession of and ability to generate and integrate all 

the elements of power, remain the international environment’s most versatile 

and potentially strongest actors. The apparent ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of governments notwithstanding, states can still acquire and integrate these elements collectively better than other actors can. Consequently, 

states are better suited to govern and make war. The community of states 

has waived some aspects of state sovereignty in order to promote mutual 

well-being, but this should not be confused with an inability of individual 

or collectives of states to act. As problematic as the Global War on Terror 

proved, it did demonstrate the power inherent in states and collective action. 

However, the advance of modernity in society and the changes brought on by 

globalization have also provided the conditions and the means for a broader 

array of non-state actors to co-flourish with state actors and extend their 

influence through the greater interconnectedness of globalism. You need to 

look no further than the global media to see how these non-state actors can 

complicate the state’s use of power at home or abroad.

Power in the international system has always been 

relative. Each state and non-state actor has the capacity to act in regard to its interests, and each possesses 

some form of power or they would not exist as actors. 

Power is the means actors use to get the outcomes they 

desire. Power can be objective—the actual assets possessed—or subjective—what others believe exists. Power 

Power can be 

objective—the 

actual assets 

possessed—or 

subjective—what 

others believe 

exists. 
17

Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

is exercised in various forms: brute force, coercion, inducement, persuasion, 

and attraction—hard and soft power. A particular actor’s power is relative 

to the power possessed by others and the willingness to use it. Power can be 

tangible or intangible. Military forces represent tangible power, but the will 

to use them is intangible. Hence, power is physical, subjective, and dynamic. 

States and non-state actors gain and lose relative power and gain and lose 

credibility in the use of power. Consequently, the use of power is highly contextual. In this complex environment, the strategic circumstances define the 

appropriateness of the type of state power and its particular use. For military 

power, these circumstances include physical attributes, such as forces available, geography and enemy defenses, and non-physical attributes such as 

moral courage, questions of international legitimacy, and issues of national 

prestige and plausible deniability.34

The use of power can be paradoxical. For example, large forces in being 

would appear to be useful as a deterrent to potential adversaries. Yet, the 

creation of such forces may lead an adversary to build similar levels of forces 

and create an arms race; or it may increase risks of conflict or result in policy 

paralysis.35 As President John F. Kennedy discovered, the national reliance 

on nuclear weapons as a singular military policy instrument and strategic 

deterrent against Soviet aggression became impractical once the Soviets 

developed intercontinental delivery systems. The consequences of massive 

retaliation made it an illogical policy option or deterrent to anything but a 

nuclear attack on the homeland. While they remained an essential deterrent 

to a nuclear attack, Kennedy needed other viable military policy options to 

counter lesser aggression. As a result, the strategy of flexible response tailored 

the strategic nuclear response for flexibility with the Triad to assure a nuclear 

response. At the same time, it created additional conventional and unconventional capabilities that could be used across a range of circumstances 

without necessarily escalating to all-out war or nuclear destruction. Modern 

U.S. Army Special Forces re-emerged during this period as a capability to 

support this strategy.

In a similar manner, the current global order, with its multitude of challenges and its empowered actors and democratic liberal-capitalist driven 

rule set, calls for a range of military options to confront an increasingly 

complex security environment. Since the end of the Cold War, policymakers 

have found SOF have a particular strategic utility in this security environment for policy options that require special military operations, use a small 
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JSOU Report 13-1

footprint, provide for plausible deniability when needed, and are not representative of a national commitment. Policymakers have increasingly relied on 

SOF to provide practical policy options for protecting or advancing national 

interests.36 SOF’s strategic performance represents a discernible and distinct 

form of military power—SOF power. As such, SOF power, like land, sea, 

and air power, is employable as a 

distinct instrument of power or 

as an integrated part of national 

military power and joint warfare. 

Thus, in the 21st century, the 

United States is again confronted with a strategic quandary of immense 

proportions. Globalization has changed the world we helped shape in the 

20th century. It has empowered individuals and non-state actors, raised the 

expectations of the world’s populations, and created the potential for the 

rise of new near-peer competitors at the regional and global levels. At the 

same time, “globalization” has yet to realize its full promise and the better 

future for all, as our predecessors foresaw it, has yet to materialize. In fact, 

such a bright future is at risk, hanging in the balance as the United States 

and its strategic partners attempt to shape the global environment along a 

democratic liberal-capitalist path. Consequently, the 21st century promises 

to be no more peaceful than previous centuries and the question that military professionals and America’s policymakers must consider is how best to 

protect and advance U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. If history is 

any guide, conventional military power will not lessen in importance even 

as the new century requires diverse and even novel applications of military 

power. In the plausible scenarios of the new century, SOF play a critical 

role—no more so than conventional forces,37 but nonetheless pivotal in providing military options for policymakers that can shape the international 

environment below the threshold of major combat. Such a role requires that 

the nature—and hence the potential—of SOF power and how it fits into the 

broader context of political and military policy be better understood.

SOF’s strategic performance represents a discernible and distinct form 

of military power—SOF power.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

3. Finding Definitions

Clear definitions are crucial to understanding an American military 

theory of special operations for several significant reasons. First, special 

operations are not unique to the American military. Various government 

agencies within the United States at the national, state, and local levels conduct “special operations” that include numerous and disparate activities 

and sometimes require dedicated special operators, such as SWAT teams in 

law enforcement. Other nations also have similar activities and label them 

as special operations. Their militaries often have a divergent view of what 

constitutes military special operations and the purpose and role of SOF. Part 

of the argument herein is that there is a specific American military special 

operations theory. While it may share some attributes with others, it is a part 

of the American strategic culture and therefore distinctly shaped by American perspectives of the military and the use of power. These distinctions are 

important. Second, unlike modern maritime and airpower theory, which 

seemingly sprang more or less fully developed into the 20th century from 

the intellects of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, 

William “Billy” Mitchell, and others, a special operations theory is ensuing 

from a slow and painful birth process. Policymakers, conventional military 

leaders, and the SOF community are still finding their way in understanding and making the best use of SOF. Nowhere is this more evident than in 

the evolution of the definitions associated with special operations. Finally, 

despite wide usage, confusion still exists concerning exactly what definitions 

refer to and how they interrelate. 

In the 1970s special operations were defined as: “Secondary or supporting 

operations which may be adjunct to various other operations and for which 

no one service is assigned primary responsibility.”38 This definition left “special operations” applicable to any service or organization and did not reflect 

the emergence of permanent SOF, or recognize such operations could achieve 

primary policy and military objectives. In 1983, at a conference on “The Role 

of Special Operations in US Strategy for the 1980s,” Brigadier General Joseph 

C. Lutz noted that before the staffing process changed the definition in 1979 

his command recommended the above definition be changed to:
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JSOU Report 13-1

... overt, covert, and clandestine operations, and mentioned specialized techniques employed by small, specially trained and configured 

formations capable of independent operations where the use of 

general purpose forces [conventional forces] is either inappropriate 

or infeasible.39

When the change emerged from the staffing process in 1979, the official 

Department of Defense (DOD) definition of special operations was:

Military operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and 

organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit 

of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives. 

They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either 

inappropriate or infeasible. Sensitive peacetime operations, except 

for training, are normally authorized by the National Command 

Authorities (NCA) and conducted under the direction of the NCA 

or designated commander. Special operations may include unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security, 

psychological operations, and civil affairs measures.40

This definition somewhat skirts the issue of who may do special operations by avoiding the term SOF and presumably allowing commanders to 

continue to conduct special operations with highly-trained conventional 

forces.

In the 1983 conference on SOF roles, Drs. Maurice Tugwell and David 

Charters offered a broad and inclusive, but more concise definition of special 

operations:

Small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox 

and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant 

political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. Special 

operations are characterized by either simplicity or complexity, by 

subtlety and imagination, by the discriminate use of violence, and 

by oversight at the highest level. Military and nonmilitary resources, 

including intelligence assets, may be used in concert.41

Today the DOD dictionary definition is:
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

(DOD) Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, 

denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by 

one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring 

regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. Also called SO.42

Each of these definitions helps define special operations as they have 

emerged in American military practice and doctrine over the last 40 years. 

However, ambiguity remains and none are quite adequate for a special operations theory. A large part of the ambiguity can be resolved by simply accepting that only SOF conduct special operations as the U.S. military defines 

them. From this perspective, conventional forces may be called upon to 

conduct special missions that require unique preparation and arrangements, but “special operations” involve SOF. The ambiguity can also simply 

be ignored as such things often are in seeking consensus in the military. For 

example, the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and SOF conduct air operations. 

The term “air operations” does not appear in the DOD dictionary, and joint 

and service doctrine explains it for their specific purposes. However, a special operations theory requires a suitable and conclusive definition to assist 

in understanding the theory. From the perspective of an American theory, 

a useful definition is: 

Military operations conducted by Special Operations Forces. Special operations are overt, covert, and clandestine operations of an 

unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve 

or support significant political or military objectives in support of 

national security and foreign policy. Such operations range across 

the spectrum of conflict from peace to war and make use of unique 

modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training. 

They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments where the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. They are characterized by one or more of 

the following: subtlety and imagination in planning and execution, 

time and political sensitivity, low visibility, support of indigenous 

forces, discriminate use of violence, need for regional expertise, 

oversight at the highest levels, and a high degree of risk. Special 

operations may support or be supported by conventional operations, 
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JSOU Report 13-1

or they may be prosecuted independently. Military and nonmilitary 

resources, including intelligence assets, may be used in concert or 

as enablers. Special operations doctrinal missions evolve with the 

changing context of the strategic environment, the needs of national 

security, and roles and missions of conventional forces.

SOF also need to be defined in order to support a theory of special operations. Surprisingly, while the definition of special operations has remained 

somewhat ambiguous, the DOD dictionary defines SOF more distinctly:

Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services 

designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, 

trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.43

This definition is succinct and makes clear what is unique about the 

designation, preparation, and use of SOF. However, for theory’s purposes 

some elaboration is useful:

A strategic asset of Active and Reserve Component forces of the 

military services designated by the secretary of defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support 

special operations. They are characterized by selectivity in personnel, 

atypically configured and equipped organizations and formations, 

specialized competencies and skill sets, and extraordinary training 

and education.

As can be seen by the two definitions offered here, in an American theory 

of military special operations, special operations and SOF are inseparable—

to say one is to infer the other.

Special Operations Forces is an inclusive term for all those organizations 

designated by the secretary of defense as a part of that force. However, the 

organizations can vary in type over time and perform differing missions 

under the rubric of special operations. Consequently, the specialized competencies and skill sets of the personnel and the types of missions of the 

organizations vary. SOF organizations are defined as:

USSOCOM and the commands and units designated by the secretary 

of defense as members of SOF. SOF organizations may consist of 

special operators; distinctive DOD capabilities, such as civil affairs 

and psychological operations; and various administrative, staff, and 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

support personnel. They are often organized in non-standard structures and make use of unique and specialized technology, equipment, 

and doctrine. They may be augmented by enablers who provide 

additional administrative and logistical support. SOF organizations 

are further characterized by multiple command, operational, and 

support relationships with USSOCOM, other combatant commands, 

and the services.

Among the various professionals who make up SOF, one type in particular needs to be defined as unique—the special operator. Spulak identifies these as SOF elite or “selected” warriors, “specially recruited, assessed, 

selected, trained, and equipped” with specific attributes and personal values 

that exceed the norm of other military personnel with a particular emphasis 

on creativity and flexibility.44 A special operator can be defined as:

The elite warrior at the epicenter of special operations—the point 

of the spear—who is specifically selected, educated, trained, and 

employed for the perilous missions of special operations. Special 

operators vary by service and mission focus, but share a common 

warrior ethos and espouse a set of values that permeates and defines 

SOF culture.

SOF is inherently joint because its personnel and organizations come 

from all the different services. However, it is also joint and interagency oriented because of essential relationships needed for successful special operations. SOF maintain a lean force structure and posture by their reliance 

on the capabilities of the military services and others to “enable” special 

operations. SOF recognize this dependence by crediting its enablers, which 

are defined as:

Other personnel, units, and activities that are not designated members of SOF or USSOCOM force structure, but who use their skills, 

competencies, and capabilities to enable and support SOF personnel 

and operations. Enablers may be military, government agency, or 

contracted and non-contracted civilian personnel and activities.

The evolution of special operations and SOF over the last three decades 

within the military suffices to justify changes in general military and war 

fighting theory. However, these changes have been accompanied by a growing 
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JSOU Report 13-1

realization among policymakers, the military, and others that because of the 

broad interconnected political, economic, military, and socio-psychological 

changes in the security environment following the collapse of the Cold War 

security paradigm, SOF, like the other military services, generate a distinct 

and useful type of military power. Ross S. Kelly, in Special Operations and 

National Purpose (1989), captures the essence of this thinking in describing 

why special operations and why SOF: 

Special operations in the generic sense address a spectrum of challenges not normally considered appropriate for regular armed military or national forces. ... In all cases, special operations constitute 

specific missions or tasks, involving individual risks, to meet specific 

situations that threaten national interests but that do not warrant 

commitment of general purpose forces [conventional forces]. They 

may also support conventional military operations, in which case 

they provide a means of circumventing enemy strengths to attack 

weaknesses, stimulating popular resistance and chaos in rear areas 

and providing otherwise unattainable intelligence. But they are also 

available for circumstances requiring military skills in peacetime, 

when declarations of war are undesirable or when there is concern 

that introduction of conventional force operations may exacerbate 

a crisis.45 SOF are therefore established and maintained by nations 

that have identified a requirement to be able to implement a range of 

specialized military and paramilitary policy options without being 

forced to resort to the use of conventional units.46

Today it is possible to speak of SOF power as a distinct instrument of 

military power and it can be defined as:

The capacity to implement a range of specialized military and paramilitary policy options to address a spectrum of challenges not usually, or for specific reasons, considered appropriate for conventional 

military forces or other instruments of national power. SOF power 

supports national security and foreign policy objectives through 

military operations that influence the political, military, economic, 

and socio-psychological realms of state, regional, and global environments. SOF power is applicable across the spectrum of conflict and 

is exercised by designated SOF specifically chosen and prepared to 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

conduct special operations. SOF power may be applied singularly, 

uniquely, or particularly, and may be more effective when used 

in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Other 

instruments, such as diplomacy, intelligence activities, economic 

assistance, or conventional military, may be supported by, act in 

concert with, or directly support SOF power.47

The DOD, joint doctrine, and service doctrine require definitions that 

serve their purposes of explanation and understanding in a real world of 

budget wrangling, cultural differences, cooperative action, and war fighting. 

Often in staffing, only the least controversial definitions escape the staffer’s 

pen. In the actual war fighting, the warriors interpret the definitions and 

doctrine in accordance with the realities on the ground as they find them. 

Theory’s definitions must also adhere to such ground truth as it finds it in the 

intellectual realm and in experience. The above definitions may differ from 

policy or doctrine, but they do conform to logic and practice. They provide 

common points of reference in articulating a theory of special operations. 

Key to an American theory is that in the emerging American approach, 

special operations and SOF are inseparable and the conceptualization of 

SOF power is a distinct instrument of national security.

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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

4. Perspectives on Special Operations 

and SOF

... special operations “are not just ordinary military operations writ 

small; they are qualitatively different.”– Edward Luttwak48

American special operations achieve their effects through how they 

interact within the strategic, operational, and tactical environments. 

Special operations may include lethal and non-lethal, or integrated lethal 

and nonlethal activities, but the exceptionality of the SOF power contribution is its method and means of interaction. Special operations are the 

method and SOF are the means. Although SOF may operate in the domains 

of other services—air, land, and sea, and across or in the seams and gaps 

among these domains—it is qualitatively different than the contributions 

of the other military services just as the military element of power differs 

qualitatively from the economic or political elements.49 This is not to suggest 

that SOF are better than other military instruments, but rather to accentuate 

that the qualities they possess and the capabilities they represent provide 

another discrete instrument within the American military element of power. 

The SOF community continues to struggle internally and externally with 

articulating these qualitative differences, trapped between sounding elitist 

and being seen as an ancillary to the services. Organizational parochial 

interests notwithstanding, the differences are important for theory and practice because they explain how special operations and SOF achieve effects. A 

number of people have undertaken explaining these qualitative differences 

and the implications.

Theories and Constructs

McRaven, writing in 1995 from his analysis of eight special operations case 

studies and personal experience as a special operator, offered a theory of special operations warfare in which he argues relative superiority is the central 

concept for success. For McRaven, in the broader context of theory of war, 

the ability to overcome Clausewitz’ friction is the key to relative superiority:
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JSOU Report 13-1

I will show that through the use of certain principles of warfare a 

special operations force can reduce what Carl von Clausewitz calls 

the frictions of war to a manageable level. By minimizing these frictions the special operations force can achieve relative superiority 

over the enemy. Once relative superiority is achieved, the attacking 

force is no longer at a disadvantage and has the initiative to exploit 

the enemy’s weaknesses and secure victory.50

In his study of special operations, McRaven concluded relative superiority consists of three basic properties. First, “Relative superiority favors small 

forces” because “Large forces are more susceptible to friction.”51 Second, it is 

achieved at the pivotal point in an engagement and once achieved, it must 

be sustained in order to be successful. The latter requires courage, intellect, 

boldness, and perseverance. And third, if lost, relative superiority is difficult 

to reestablish. It is achieved, he argues, through the adherence to six principles, which are interdependent and synergistic, in environments—places, 

conditions, and times—favorable to special operations. The proper consideration and integration of the six principles within and across the three phases 

of an operation—planning, preparation, and execution—generate relative 

superiority. While the principles of war apply to all forces, these focus on 

special operations. McRaven acknowledges his theory is focused on direct 

action missions, which he describes as tactical missions of a strategic or 

operational nature.52 The six principles he derived are:

1. Simplicity. Simplicity is achieved by limiting the number of 

tactical objectives to only those that are vital; good intelligence to 

limit the unknown factors and number of variables that must be 

considered; and innovations in equipment and tactics to overcome 

obstacles that might complicate surprise and speed.

2. Security. Security is achieved by denying the enemy of any unexpected advantage from foreknowledge of an attack. It is often 

more a denial of knowledge of timing and methods as opposed 

to the possibility of an attack.

3. Repetition. Repetition is achieved through practice and rehearsal. 

It hones individual skills and reveals weaknesses in the planning.

4. Surprise. Surprise is achieved by catching the enemy off guard 

through deception, timing, and taking advantage of his vulnerabilities.
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5. Speed. Speed is achieved by getting to the objective as fast as 

possible in order to limit your vulnerability and enhance the 

opportunity to achieve relative superiority.

6. Purpose. Purpose is achieved by inculcating an understanding 

of the prime objective of the mission and a personal commitment 

to its accomplishment in each member of the attacking force.53

McRaven concluded special operations work best with “a simple plan, 

carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with 

surprise, speed, and purpose.”54 “The principles of special operations work 

because they seek to reduce warfare to its simplest level and thereby limit 

the [opportunities for the] negative effects of chance, uncertainty, and the 

enemy’s will.”55 McRaven’s theory is valid for its purpose, but insufficient as 

a unified theory of special operations because its primary focus is limited to 

direct action missions. Nonetheless, since all policy and strategy is ultimately 

implemented by tactical action—someone physically doing something—his 

insights and conclusions inform a broader and more unifying theory of 

special operations.

Others have examined how SOF achieve effects. Lieutenant General 

Samuel Wilson, U.S. Army (retired), summarized his thinking as a set of 

principles and characteristics: surprise, effective intelligence, speed, mobility, timing, coordinated teamwork, security (ability to protect secrets and to 

achieve cover and deception at all levels), maximum delegation of authority 

and streamlined chain of command, elite forces (capable of extraordinary 

performance) with multiple capabilities (inherently joint in nature), and 

special weapons and equipment (nonstandard variety).56 His conclusions 

further inform theory.

Writing in 2007 with USSOCOM a primary actor in the War on Terrorism, Spulak sought to build on McRaven’s work and develop a more general 

theory of special operations. He stated his theory as:

A theory of special operations: Special operations are missions to 

accomplish strategic objectives where the use of conventional forces 

would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires special operations forces that directly 

address the ultimate sources of friction through qualities that are 

the result of the distribution of the attributes of SOF personnel.57
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JSOU Report 13-1

His subtitle, “the Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF,” signals the fact that 

much of the monograph is focused on understanding the nature of SOF. 

However, he makes significant contributions to a unified theory. Spulak 

nests special operations theory soundly in larger theories of war and conflict, 

but like others believes special operations “are not just ordinary military 

operations writ small; they are qualitatively different.”58 Based on his analysis 

of the war and conflict theories, Spulak adopts Michael Mazarr’s distinctions among the character of battle, the form of warfare, and the nature of 

conflict to explain the value of special operations. In Mazarr’s model, the 

character of battle is the conceptual arena in which opposing forces clash. 

It is the meeting point of armed forces and is characterized by violence, 

blood, physical and moral courage, and will power. These attributes create 

the enduring nature of war—the struggle to destroy one another. The form 

of warfare is the tactical and operational art—the organization, technology, 

and doctrine. Form changes as necessary in response to the value of the 

reasons for conflict and the interaction of the parties involved. The nature 

of conflict is determined by the causes and character of a dispute within 

the international system. Disputes may arise from political, military, and 

socioeconomic reasons and generate the context for warfare as well as the 

application of other instruments and stratagem of power, such as bargaining, coercive diplomacy, power balancing, mediation, deception, and other 

tools and gambits short of open warfare. Any conflict in the international 

arena inherently possesses the potential for deadly interaction. In any interaction in the strategic arena of conflict, opponents are striving to be able 

to destroy the other and impose their will. Yet, military commanders are 

always limited by an enduring conundrum of how to achieve a position from 

which to destroy the enemy without risking destruction of their own forces. 

This conundrum and the enduring character of battle pose what Clausewitz 

termed “friction”—the cumulative political, moral, physical, and arbitrary 

reasons for why war can never achieve an ideal form.59

The need to take friction into account and the risks it poses largely determine the structure and practices, and consequently, the limitations of conventional forces. Assurance of both successfully imposing your will and 

surviving dictate an emphasis on deliberate planning, massing of forces, rigid 

doctrine, and unity of command in order to achieve sufficient predictability and certainty. However, this is done at the expense of creating a greater 

degree of organizational inertia and the loss of flexibility to exploit evolving 
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opportunities. Yet, Spulak argues history tells us: “During wartime, special 

men emerge who have the personal capability to overcome risk and the 

skills that allow them to perform strategically important tasks (when organized into special and small units) that conventional forces cannot.”60 SOF 

are about institutionalizing this capability. Spulak demonstrates that while 

SOF are not immune to friction, the SOF selection procedures coupled with 

self-selection, unique training, and nurturing within a SOF culture yield a 

tighter distribution of personnel with physical, mental, and psychological 

attributes favorable to special operations.61 From this selectivity, SOF organizations emerge with a combination of three qualities distinct from other 

regular and elite forces and define SOF independent of missions and tasks:

•	 Warriors—SOF are engaged directly in the fundamental nature 

of war and the implementation of strategy, destroying the enemy, 

or creating his fear that he will be destroyed.

•	 Creative—SOF can immediately change the combat process, 

altering the way in which the tension is accommodated between 

threatening or performing destruction and avoiding it.

•	 Flexible—SOF units have a much larger range of capabilities and are 

more independent of other military forces than conventional units.62

These qualities allow SOF to overcome friction and be successful in missions in ways that conventional forces are not manned, structured, trained, 

expected, or called upon to undertake. SOF have their own limitations in 

regard to friction, and in these conditions conventional forces are better 

suited. Further, Spulak argues the SOF qualities define what roles SOF are 

best suited for and are the basis of the extension of military roles for SOF in 

the realms of other national elements of power.63 Spulak’s rich monograph 

offers much more than discussed here, but for the purposes of theoretically understanding how SOF achieve effects through special operations, 

his contribution ends with five operational characteristics that he considers 

generally unique to SOF:

•	 Relative superiority is the ability of small special operations units 

to gain a temporary decisive advantage, even over a larger or 

well-defended enemy force.
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JSOU Report 13-1

•	 Certain access is the ability to rapidly and securely transport, 

insert, and extract SOF, typically undetected, allowing operations in areas where or when conventional military operations 

are not possible. 

•	 Unconventional operations is the ability to directly alter the way 

in which the tension between threatening and avoiding destruction is managed to conduct operations—for example, operating 

autonomously and independently, establishing and utilizing the 

capabilities of foreign military and paramilitary forces, sabotage, 

and subversion.

•	 Integrated operations is the ability to address transnational and 

asymmetric threats by integrating elements of national power and 

operating with other military forces and nonmilitary agencies.

•	 Strategic initiative is the ability to create and maintain initiative against an enemy at the strategic level by an orchestrated 

campaign of engaging carefully selected objectives unavailable 

to conventional forces.64

Another individual contributing important insights into how SOF are 

distinctive and achieve effects is Jessica Glicken Turnley, Ph.D. Turnley’s 

background in organizational behavior, organizational culture, and anthropology bring a somewhat different but confirming and expanded perspective to an understanding of special operations and SOF. In a 2011 JSOU 

monograph, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are 

the way SOF are, she examines the issues of SOF as forward-deployed “Warrior diplomats” and the centrality of small groups. Noting states tend to 

institutionally separate war and diplomacy, she observes that in theory the 

United States DOD does war and the Department of State does diplomacy. 

In practice, as the United States pursues its aims, the lines between war and 

diplomacy are actually less distinct and war and diplomacy are better viewed 

as a continuum. This should come as no surprise as states often use coercive 

diplomacy and diplomats negotiate the political victory of a successful war. 

The tool of the warrior is force, which changes behavior. The tools of diplomacy are persuasion and negotiation, which seek to change minds, and thus 

behavior. However, in irregular warfare she argues success is contingent on 

winning over the population and requires the competencies of both, and 

often combinations of the two.65 In these environments,
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

... the nature of diplomacy changes. The discourse does not take 

place among citizens of a globalized community who may be more 

like each other in many ways than they are like their local constituents. The language becomes one not of demarches and treaties and 

agreements between states, but a local language of security, food, 

and life and death negotiated among players on a local stage. Time 

frames are immediate. Negotiators are from the local population, 

and representatives of the foreign government are those personnel 

present in local venues, not in capital cities. Often these are military 

personnel, particularly if the situation is one which has already 

erupted in violence or has the potential to do so.66

This is a lesson that conventional forces have recently relearned in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, but Turnley’s argument is that SOF are particularly wellsuited for this environment for a reason. Good diplomacy on either the state 

or local level requires “the exercise of competencies in cross-cultural interaction and communication” and the good diplomat “is able to persuasively 

engage with populations who apply different sense-making strategies ... [who 

have] profoundly different frames of references—populations that have different cultures.”67 Culture, she argues, is “not a thing but an ever-evolving 

set of sense-making strategies or frames of reference.”68 Cultural skills are 

approached in two ways. Teaching culture specific or regional knowledge 

equips an individual to behave appropriately in a specific culture. However, 

developing cross-cultural competency creates an ability to learn and adapt 

quickly so as to be able to operate well in any culture. The former is tactical 

knowledge to operate in a specific environment; the latter is a strategic skill that 

allows one to operate tactically in any environment. Conventional force soldiers learn the former to some level and the latter as exceptions, but SOF select 

for and develop cross-culture competency as a part of their inherent capability—creating a Warrior diplomat. 

The construct of Warrior diplomat 

explains SOF’s capability to provide 

both kinetic and non-kinetic means 

to achieve strategic objectives, the 

latter providing the ability to work 

by, with, and through indigenous 

populations and others.69

The construct of Warrior diplomat 

explains SOF’s capability to provide 

both kinetic and non-kinetic means 

to achieve strategic objectives, the 

latter providing the ability to work 

by, with, and through indigenous 

populations and others.
34

JSOU Report 13-1

Following McRaven’s and Spulak’s lead, Turnley also concludes SOF are 

able to overcome friction in ways in which conventional forces cannot. While 

the argument is complex, the conclusion can be stated succinctly. In theory, 

conventional forces are organized as a bureaucracy to control the large numbers of people and resources necessary to achieve mass to overcome the 

enemy. Success in the conventional forces is achieved through functional 

differentiation—infantry, armor, artillery, logistics, et cetera—and discipline. 

Functionalization and discipline together create conformity in and predictability of performance (behaviors), which can be leveraged to overcome 

friction through planning and leadership at higher levels. They create a high 

degree of certainty to deal with the uncertainties of battle. Conventional 

forces develop organizational control at the behavior level because success 

depends on task performance and larger aims are successively broken down 

into functional tasks for different organizations, subunits, and individuals. 

The focus is on certainty of task performance so the whole of the coordinated 

effort by massed forces can occur.70 It is an effective model for what large 

forces must do.

SOF evolved from a different model, one which historical experience 

shows can do some things better than the conventional force bureaucratic 

model—and conversely not do other things as well. In theory SOF organize 

into groups of broadly capable men, such as the “A” team. The division of 

labor is low and cohesion is built around the team’s purpose. Teams are relatively self-sufficient and flexibility and creativity are the means of overcoming friction. In this team-oriented SOF structure, organizational thinking 

and planning start with context (purpose, mission, and environment) and 

needed behaviors are collectively developed for the context as opposed to 

developing behaviors to support a function.71

SOF and GPF [general purpose forces - conventional forces] units 

differ fundamentally in the nature of their tasks, the nature of the 

men who compose the units, and the consequent ways in which solidarity or cohesion develops in operational groups. These differences 

in development lead to differences in performance and ultimately 

differences in the ways in which the two forces counter friction.72

In another insightful monograph, Turnley examines what makes SOF 

“special.” She makes a clear distinction between SOF operators and others 

assigned to USSOCOM and places significance on the fact SOF operators are 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

actually members of four different services. In a cautionary note, she argues 

the dilution of the special operator identity within SOF, the increasingly 

bureaucratic nature of USSOCOM, and historical hostility of the conventional forces make SOF a precarious organization—one at risk of losing its 

crucial identity and importance in military theory. Her conclusions support 

Spulak on the centrality of people to any special operations theory. The concentration through selection of personnel with character traits favorable to 

special operations and self-insulation devices, such as arduous training and 

weeding out found in the Army Special Forces Q-Course or the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training, she argues, produces unique warriors and 

teams. As a result, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts—SOF 

power. In her judgment, it is this unique human capability SOF ultimately 

bring to the U.S. military element of power.73

In short, it is the people who make SOF special, not their missions, 

equipment, or training. Although the absence of special missions 

would eliminate the need for special men, the hallmark of SOF are 

the operators, not their tasks. It is these operator qualities—the 

specialness of the people—that allow SOF to do things that other 

military components could not do, were not allowed to do, or would 

not do. The quality and caliber of its personnel thus are a core value 

of SOF. This value is captured in the SOF truth: “People are more 

important than hardware.”74

Truths, Doctrines, and Other Things SOF

The above authors bring thoughtful and important perspectives to the search 

for a unifying theory of American special operations and contribute to a 

school of thought. However, SOF culture has also embraced constructs of 

a potential theory through years of experience and doctrine exploration. 

Cultural knowledge and experience are expressed in part in what a community says about itself and how it says it. Cultural knowledge and experience can be found in a range of SOF artifacts such as mottos, sayings, 

self-descriptions, and military doctrine. These also provide insights for 

consideration. Among the best known of these are the SOF Truths, which 

encapsulate what USSOCOM commanders and their subordinates have come 

to believe are baselines in leading and managing SOF. Originally penned by 
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JSOU Report 13-1

Colonel (retired) John Collins in 1987, he stated they were derived from the 

SOF Imperatives and his understanding of SOF. Initially, the fifth was not 

adopted because the community did not want to admit to its dependence 

on others. Admiral Eric T. Olson, former commander of USSOCOM, later 

embraced it.75

SOF Truths

•	 Humans are more important than hardware.

•	 Quality is better than quantity.

•	 SOF cannot be mass produced.

•	 Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.

•	 Most special operations require non-SOF support.76

In later validating all five of the truths, Admiral Olson confirmed important aspects of a theory:

The SOF Truths have provided time-tested guidance to the special 

operations community for daily activities as well as long-range planning. When they were originally penned, there was a fifth truth that 

was never published —‘Most special operations require non-SOF 

assistance.’ It’s being included now so that we all understand the 

importance of force enablers and the contributions they make to 

mission success. To think otherwise would levy unrealistic expectations as to the capabilities SOF bring to the fight.77

The SOF Imperatives also reveal much about what the SOF community 

thinks is important to successful special operations. 

SOF Imperatives

•	 Understand the operational environment. 

•	 Recognize political implications. 

•	 Facilitate interagency activities. 

•	 Engage the threat discriminately. 

•	 Consider long-term effects. 

•	 Ensure legitimacy and credibility of special operations.

•	 Anticipate and control psychological effects. 

•	 Apply capabilities indirectly. 

•	 Develop multiple options. 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

•	 Ensure long-term sustainment. 

•	 Provide sufficient intelligence. 

•	 Balance security and synchronization.78

SOF core values are another area in which SOF distinctness is evident. 

All of the services espouse values that they believe will provide a basis for 

the individual’s and the unit’s character, decision making, and performance. 

Values serve as framework for planning when doctrine is inadequate for the 

circumstances encountered or action when plans go awry. Values express 

what service cultures believe are essential or core to their being. For example, 

the U.S. Army values are: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, 

Integrity, and Personal Courage. The U.S. Air Force core values are: Integrity 

First, Service before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. The U.S. Navy and 

Marine Corps embrace: Honor, Courage, and Commitment. The core values 

SOF have adopted are: Integrity, Courage, Creativity, and Competence.79 All 

of the services’ values are appropriate and speak to all in the military profession, but the last two core values of SOF show a different emphasis from the 

other services that is particularly representative of SOF culture and what 

might be integral to a special operations theory.

Another important source of insights to a unifying theory is found in 

doctrine. In a general sense, doctrine is a statement about what military 

forces are required or expected to do and how they should go about doing 

it. It captures both the wisdom of the past and current thinking, seeking 

to guide the choices and practices of units and individuals. Doctrine is 

informed by theory, but it is also true that doctrine might inform theory. 

Much of doctrine is tactical and detailed, but often it is also self-reflective. 

How it codifies the missions and the conditions for those missions provides insights into potential theory. Joint Doctrine in regard to SOF, particularly Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations (18 April 2011), for 

which USSOCOM is the proponent, offers such insight in its presentation 

of special operations and listing of mission criteria and core activities for 

SOF. In it, Olson, then commander of USSOCOM, stated, “This publication 

has captured our best characterization yet of the functions, organization, 

employment, and synchronization of Special Operations Forces.”80 It also 

provides a concise source of prevailing and underlying thinking.

In regard to where special operations and therefore SOF fit into the 

greater military theory, JP 3-05 states:
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JSOU Report 13-1

SO [Special Operations] are conducted in all environments, but are 

particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments. SO can be tailored to achieve not only military objectives 

through application of SOF capabilities for which there are no broad 

conventional force requirements, but also to support the application of the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments 

of national power. SO are typically low visibility or clandestine 

operations. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with 

operations of conventional forces (CF) or other government agencies (OGAs), or host nations (HNs)/partner nations (PNs), and may 

include operations with or through indigenous, insurgent, and/or 

irregular forces. SO differ from conventional operations in degree 

of physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes of 

employment, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence 

and indigenous assets.81

The SOF community has been an advocate and proponent for IW for a 

number of years. In the SOF strategic and theoretical thinking, IW is perceived as the arena where they can make the greatest contribution and have 

the greatest strategic value. In taking ownership of IW, JP 3-05 describes it as:

IW encompasses a level of conflict that is less than traditional warfare and involves an adversary seeking to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally 

armed military force, often representing the regime of a nation. 

However, the strategic objectives of IW are no less significant than 

those of traditional warfare. Unlike the force-on-force orientation 

of traditional warfare, IW focuses on the strategic purpose of gaining and maintaining control or influence over, and the support of a 

relevant population through political, psychological, and economic 

methods. IW requires a different mindset and different capabilities 

than those focused on the conventional military defeat of an adversary. The SOF mindset and capabilities make them particularly well 

suited for all forms of IW. Further, SOF capabilities complement 

those of CF [conventional forces], whom the Department of Defense 

(DOD) also has tasked with gaining a core competency in IW.82
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

The doctrine also presents what the community believes is the characteristics of SOF. It states that SOF are “inherently joint” because of their training, equipment, and special preparation that allows them to integrate special 

operations seamlessly into joint operations. It also makes an argument under 

“inherently joint” that SOF routinely operate in the interagency, international, and comprehensive domains in which nonmilitary actors dominate. 

Such operations justify selectivity of personnel and special training, education, and equipment. SOF are also “distinct from conventional forces.” 

Under this rubric, the doctrine notes the selection process and extraordinary 

training, which makes rapid replacement and regeneration problematic. It 

also notes the maturity, experience, and qualifications of SOF personnel as 

compared to conventional units. In addition, the extensive language and 

cross-cultural training are highlighted as part of the distinctness.83 As a 

result, SOF bring versatile, flexible teams into the operating environment 

capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing situations that can:

•	 Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored 

responses to many different situations.

•	 Gain access to hostile or denied areas.

•	 Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they 

support.

•	 Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.

•	 Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without 

extensive support.

•	 Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments 

rapidly.

•	 Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and 

populations.

•	 Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.

•	 Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence 

than conventional forces.

•	 Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.84

The doctrine also considers the qualifications and limitations that might 

apply to the use of SOF. It identifies mission criteria as guidance to commanders for when it is appropriate to employ SOF—or suggest when it might 

be inappropriate.
40

JSOU Report 13-1

•	 Must be an appropriate SOF mission or activity.

•	 Mission or tasks should support the joint force commander’s 

campaign, operation plan, or special activities.

•	 Missions or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and 

fully coordinated.

•	 Required resources must be available to execute and support the 

SOF mission.

•	 The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks.85

It also identifies “SOF Limitations” that are representative of the community’s concerns over the mal-utilization or needless expenditure of SOF 

assets and a recognition of SOF’s reliance on the others for support.

•	 SOF cannot be quickly replaced or reconstituted nor can their 

capabilities be rapidly expanded. Improper employment of SOF 

(e.g., in purely conventional roles or on inappropriate or inordinately high-risk missions) runs the risk of rapidly depleting 

these resources.

•	 SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. In most cases 

SOF are neither trained, organized, nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations and, therefore, should not 

be substituted for conventional forces that are able to effectively 

execute that mission.

•	 Most special operations missions require non-SOF support. 

SOF are typically provided to geographic combatant commands 

(GCCs) and are not structured with robust means of logistic 

and sustainment capabilities. SOF must rely on the supported 

GCC’s service component commands for most support except 

for those SOF-unique assets that are required to be supplied by 

USSOCOM.86

Guiding, and in some cases responding to that “understanding” of special 

operations and SOF in doctrine, DOD Directive 5100.01 lists special operations activities. These represent what the SOF community and DOD believe 

constitute current jurisdictions of special operations. All are not exclusively 

SOF particular and the services also have roles and missions requirements 

related to some.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

•	 Counterterrorism: Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional 

environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.

•	 Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Actions 

taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces, allies, and partners.

•	 Foreign Internal Defense: Participation by civilian and military 

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken 

by another government or other designated organization to free 

and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to its security. 

•	 Security Force Assistance: The DOD activities that contribute to 

unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and 

their supporting institutions. 

•	 Counterinsurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts 

taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. 

•	 Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow 

a government or occupying power by operating through or with 

an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

•	 Direct Action: Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or 

diplomatically sensitive environments, which employ specialized 

military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, 

or damage designated targets.

•	 Special Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance and surveillance actions 

conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politicallysensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic 

or operational significance, employing military capabilities not 

normally found in conventional forces.

•	 Civil Affairs Operations: Those military operations conducted 

by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between 

military forces and civil authorities in localities where military 

forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency 

organizations, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and 
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JSOU Report 13-1

(3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally 

are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct 

of civil-military operations. 

•	 Military Information Support Operations: Planned operations 

to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences 

to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 

ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originators 

objectives. 

•	 Information Operations: The integrated employment, during 

military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert 

with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or 

usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. 

•	 Activities Specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.

87

Building and Sustaining a Special Operations Force

USSOCOM’s dual roles as both a force provider and an operational command are rooted in the special operators’ long struggle for understanding, 

legitimacy, and adequate support from their parent services.88 It suffices 

to say that Congress solved the dilemma with the legislation creating 

USSOCOM and transferring most of the service’s Title 10 responsibilities 

to the new command. Most notably, Congress left personnel management in 

the individual services. Often attributed solely to the struggle for resources, 

the actual way the SOF pie was divided is itself rooted in how the participants 

theoretically perceived special operations and SOF. The Title 10 authorities 

and responsibilities are also suggestive of how Americans think about SOF 

and theory. In the legislation and the debates surrounding it, the legislative consensus was for distinct SOF for special operations, but not entirely 

separated from the services. 

•	 Develop special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics.

•	 Prepare and submit budget proposals for SOF.

•	 Exercise authority, direction, and control over special operations 

expenditures.

•	 Train assigned forces.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

•	 Conduct specialized courses of instruction.

•	 Validate requirements.

•	 Establish requirement priorities.

•	 Ensure interoperability of equipment and forces.

•	 Formulate and submit intelligence support requirements.

•	 Monitor special operations officers’ promotions, assignments, 

retention, training, and professional military education.

•	 Ensure SOF’s combat readiness.

•	 Monitor SOF’s preparedness to carry out assigned missions.

•	 Develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, 

materiel, supplies, and services.89

The perspectives highlighted in this chapter summarize the thinking of many and suggest much about an American school of thought and 

special operations theory. Special operations, as practiced by the United 

States, achieve effects through the application of SOF. SOF are specifically 

selected and trained people, who apply a distinctive set of attributes, values, 

principles, and organizational structure to the planning, preparation, and 

execution phases of missions, to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical 

objectives that are vulnerable to and better served by an alternative military 

capability. The reason for the existence of special operations is to couple 

extraordinary opportunity with extraordinary performance (exceptionality of personnel and organizations) to achieve extraordinary results. Such 

performance and results cannot be reasonably expected of conventional 

forces with their primary focuses and constraints without undesirable risks 

and costs. Both conventional forces and SOF must deal with the fog, friction, risks, and costs of war. Both seek to minimize and overcome friction, however conventional forces ultimately rely on mass and bureaucracy 

for success and therefore generate a larger footprint and more friction that 

must be overcome, creating greater risk of operational and strategic levels of 

violence and undesirable consequences. Through the use of special operations, SOF seek to avoid friction or use friction to achieve relative superiority 

by applying creativity and flexibility, leaving only a tactical footprint and 

keeping risk within acceptable bounds of loss and escalation. Yet, SOF can 

contribute to psychological and physical erosion in collaborative efforts with 

conventional forces to increase overall national strategic performance.90 For 

the United States, conventional forces and SOF are complementary essential 
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JSOU Report 13-1

capabilities needed to confront the complex security environment of the 21st 

century. Any SOF theory must acknowledge the roles and value of each and 

the relationship between them.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

5. An American Theory Stated

It is also easier to make a decision to employ force at the lower end 

of the conflict spectrum than it is to develop resolve for the use of 

any type of force at the upper end.– John O. Marsh, Secretary of 

the Army91

As stated previously, special operations and SOF are not exclusive to 

the U.S. military. Increasingly other governments have some form of 

military “special operations” and designated forces to conduct them, often 

in addition to “special operators” who are inherent to non-military agencies. Nonetheless, American values, strategic culture, and experience make 

the practice of military special operations by the United States distinctive, 

and these differences have given rise to a particular school of thought and 

set of constructs. A unified theory of American military special operations 

explains the nature, uniqueness, value, and application of this instrument of 

military power and the tensions that are inherent to it. Definitions to support 

this theory were developed in Chapter 3 and restated below. In Chapter 4, 

through an examination of pertinent intellectual works of selected researchers and presentation of examples of SOF thinking and doctrine, a foundation was laid for an understanding of special operations and SOF within an 

American strategic culture—a current school of thought. In this chapter, a 

set of theoretical premises about American special operations and SOF and 

a specific set of principles for conduct of special operations are advanced. 

Taken together, the definitions, the 26 premises, and the 14 principles represent a unified theory that explain American special operations and SOF, 

and provide an intellectual framework for considering SOF’s evolution in 

the future.

Definitions Restated

The following definitions apply to this unified theory:

SOF Power. The capacity to implement a range of specialized military and paramilitary policy options to address a spectrum of challenges not usually, or for specific reasons, considered appropriate 
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JSOU Report 13-1

for conventional military forces or other instruments of national 

power. SOF power supports national security and foreign policy 

objectives through military operations that influence the political, military, economic, and socio-psychological realms of state, 

regional, and global environments. SOF power is applicable across 

the spectrum of conflict and is exercised by designated SOF specifically chosen and prepared to conduct special operations. SOF power 

may be applied singularly, uniquely, or particularly, and may be 

more effective when used in conjunction with other instruments of 

national power. Other instruments, such as diplomacy, intelligence 

activities, economic assistance, or conventional military, may be 

supported by, act in concert with, or directly support SOF power.92

Special Operations. Military operations conducted by SOF. Special operations are overt, covert, and clandestine operations of an 

unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve 

or support significant political or military objectives in support of 

national security and foreign policy. Such operations range across 

the spectrum of conflict from peace to war and make use of unique 

modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training. 

They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically-sensitive 

environments where the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. They are characterized by one or more of 

the following: subtlety and imagination in planning and execution, 

time and political sensitivity, low visibility, support of indigenous 

forces, discriminate use of violence, need for regional expertise, 

oversight at the highest levels, and a high degree of risk. Special 

operations may support or be supported by conventional operations, 

or they may be prosecuted independently. Military and nonmilitary 

resources, including intelligence assets, may be used in concert 

or as enablers. Special operations doctrinal missions evolve with 

the changing context of the strategic environment, the needs of 

national security, and roles and missions of conventional forces.

Special Operations Forces. A strategic asset of Active and 

Reserve component forces of the military services designated by 

the secretary of defense and specifically organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct and support special operations. They are 

characterized by selectivity in personnel, atypically configured 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

and equipped organizations and formations, specialized competencies and skill sets, and extraordinary training and education.

SOF Organizations. USSOCOM and the commands and units 

designated by the secretary of defense as members of SOF. SOF 

organizations may consist of special operators; distinctive DOD 

capabilities, such as civil affairs and military information support 

operations; and various administrative, staff, and support personnel. 

They are often organized in nonstandard structures and make use of 

unique and specialized technology, equipment, and doctrine. They 

may be augmented by enablers who provide additional administrative and logistical support. SOF organizations are further characterized by multiple command, operational, and support relationships 

with USSOCOM, other combatant commands, and the services.

Special Operator. The elite warrior at the epicenter of special operations—the point of the spear—who is specifically 

selected, educated, trained, and employed for the perilous missions of special operations. Special operators vary by service 

and mission focus, but share a common warrior ethos and 

espouse a set of values that permeates and defines SOF culture.

Enablers. Other personnel, units, and activities that are not designated members of SOF or USSOCOM force structure, but who use 

their skills, competencies, and capabilities to enable and support 

SOF personnel and operations. Enablers may be military, government agency, or contracted and non-contracted civilian personnel 

and activities.

A Set of American Premises93

Over a decade of the study and observation of American special operations 

and SOF thinking and practice, illustrated only in small part by the earlier 

chapters of this monograph, suggest to this author a set of 26 premises—that 

is, propositions—that apply to American special operations and SOF. The 

challenge advanced is that collectively the offered premises explain the whole 

of American special operations and SOF from a theoretical perspective, 

that the 26 premises are inclusive, and that each premise is required. Each 

premise represents a distinct aspect of American special operations and SOF; 

however the premises are interrelated and interact. Taken or extrapolated 
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JSOU Report 13-1

from the existing body of knowledge, they are presented in a particular 

hierarchical order that generally moves from the broader perspective to the 

more specific, and encourages the reader to consider the earlier premises 

before the later. However, this is not meant to imply that earlier premises 

are more important than the later ones—the policymakers and members of 

the military profession must assess the relative importance of the premises 

for the circumstances and decisions confronting them. The purpose of the 

premises, and the theory more generally, is to help understand what might 

need to be considered in regard to American special operations and SOF.

Special operations represent a distinct military capability of strategic 

value to national security. In American strategic culture, military special 

operations and SOF—SOF power—represent a discrete type of military 

power in the same manner that land, naval, and air power differ and have 

need of theory and doctrine to guide their 

strategy, operations, and professional 

development. SOF are a distinct military 

instrument as are the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, Marines, and Joint Forces. All are 

founded in and focused on the phenomena of war and part of the military profession, but are dedicated to capabilities rooted in differing qualities, attributes, characteristics, and doctrine that 

enable them to better overcome friction and achieve success within their 

spheres.

SOF’s autonomy within the American military institution is confirmed 

by experience, the impending challenges of a complex security environment, 

and increasing demands from policymakers. Congress and the president 

enshrined this distinctness in law (October 1986) in the face of some strong 

opposition from the services and others.94 Like in many such controversies, 

the opposition’s resistance was founded in both legitimate and parochial concerns about the needs, justifications, and implications for war fighting, force 

structure, and resources. Compelled by the law, civil and military leadership 

found and are still finding solutions to those concerns. After more than 25 

years, SOF are an integral part of American military power and extend the 

military options for policymakers beyond the capabilities or prudent use of 

conventional forces, but tensions remain in regard to missions, personnel 

management, and resources.

SOF are a distinct military 

instrument as are the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, Marines, and 

Joint Forces.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

Special operations have strategic utility. Robust SOF capabilities represent real-world policy tools and options. That is to say, SOF may have a direct 

effect on the strategic outcome by their application of military power. In 

these circumstances, SOF’s superior tactical proficiency provides a leverage 

point for achieving strategic outcomes—strategic performance. Leveraging special operations capabilities—mental, moral, proficiency, technology, 

and equipment—can also create operational and tactical success; however, 

the greatest utility for the investment and risk to SOF capacity is when the 

application of SOF directly leverage the strategic outcome desired. SOF both 

shape future outcomes and provide real-time resolutions through their mission sets.

SOF are an instrument of military power. Special operations are focused 

on the potential for, preparation for, and conduct of war, operating across the 

entire spectrum of conflict and military operations. While special operations 

activities are varied and defined by the specific context of the environment 

and mission, the potential for violence always exists and the use of force—

direct and indirect—or the leveraging of force are the central focus of special 

operations. Consequently, SOF operations are subordinate to the theory 

of war, military theory, theory of conflict, and generally to principles that 

apply to war and conflict. However, SOF often make use of these principles 

in differing ways from conventional military forces and adhere to distinct 

principles for special operations.

As an instrument of military power, SOF’s purpose is to act in circumstances that imply conflict, potential conflict, or the possibility of violence. 

SOF may serve policy or complete missions in humanitarian and other 

peaceful circumstances, but SOF’s raison d’etre is war. If this were not true, 

other nonmilitary instruments of interaction would be more logical.

SOF members are part of the larger American military profession and 

subject to the obligations of the profession to the nation. While an obvious 

conclusion, its implications are often less clear. Special operations are subject 

to legal and moral restraints and moralistic and legalistic constraints. Like 

the rest of the U.S. military, American military special operations activities 

are subordinate to policy and subject to civilian control. They are also an 

integral part of the American military hierarchy and while they may perform 

missions under the direct supervision of policymakers, they are still bound 

by and subject to the values, rules, and customs of the larger military.
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JSOU Report 13-1

Special operations, like the conventional military, are also subject to and 

affected by normative constraints of the society and culture that authorizes 

and sustains them. These constraints apply to the decision to conduct the 

operation, the nature of the operation, and the success of the operation. 

For the United States these are of two kinds. Traditional American values 

and normative commitments create constraints that are matters of legal 

and moral obligation—legal and moral 

constraints. Special operations should 

be able to be rationally justified in both 

legal and moral terms by recourse to 

such things as international law and 

practice and just war theory. A second 

type of constraint is also intrinsic to 

American special operations—political-cultural constraints. Although not founded in international practice and 

law or theory, this type asserts legitimacy and plays to opinion. Couched in 

moralistic and legalistic terms, such constraints, whether justified or not, 

become diffused in popular conventional wisdom and affect decisions in 

regard to the undertaking and conduct of operations. Equally important, if 

unaddressed such constraints can undermine the strategic effects of a successful tactical operation by calling into question its legal or moral justification. Even if such criticism cannot be completely overcome, a solid normative 

case for action enables the operation to be undertaken and contributes to 

its success in achieving strategic effects. Special operations inevitably raise 

legal and moral questions and must be justifiable in legal and moral terms.95

Legal and moral and political-cultural constraints can be understood and 

given appropriate political and mission consideration as would any other 

strategic factor.96 However, SOF cannot operate so far out of convention that 

it is not accepted as a legitimate actor of the sovereign state.

Special operations and SOF exist on the cutting edge of change and 

continuity in the security environment. SOF, by virtue of the value of SOF 

power to national security in the emerging security environment, are logically policymakers’ preferred first responders to a wide range of traditional 

and nontraditional threats and opportunities. The emerging environment is 

characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) 

associated with great change. U.S. relative power is constrained by the necessity for legitimacy and the competing demands on national resources. SOF’s 

Special operations should be 

able to be rationally justified in 

both legal and moral terms by 

recourse to such things as international law and practice and 

just war theory.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

qualities, attributes, and performance are well-suited to such periods of 

ambiguity, instability, and diffused power: SOF can both deal with and 

exploit these with special operations. However, such periods place a premium on strategic thinking and performance. In such circumstances, advice 

provided, choices made, and actions taken may have extraordinary effects 

on security and in shaping the future. Special operations must achieve the 

desired strategic effects and avoid any undesirable second- or third-order 

effects. Special operations logically push the envelope in regard to changes 

and continuities within the context of their operations, but always with 

a consideration of all the potential consequences and the greater security 

concerns. SOF respond to and make use of VUCA in ways that differ from 

conventional forces and other agencies. To the degree SOF understand the 

interplay in the various realms of power—political, economic, military, and 

socio-psychological—the greater the potential for positive influence through 

selected action and non-action.

Military special operations can be conducted unilaterally, in support 

of, or supported by conventional, interagency, whole of government, and 

coalition operations, or in concert with all of the above. SOF’s capabilities 

and attributes are applicable across the spectrum of military operations. SOF 

education, training, adaptability, and flexibility enable the force to work in 

varied circumstances and among diverse populations and cultures. The attributes of Warrior diplomats apply to organizational as well as to indigenous 

cultures. Through SOF’s competencies, limited organic material capabilities 

are leveraged to realize shared and SOF-specific objectives at various levels 

of interaction with multiple and diverse actors.

SOF and conventional capabilities are complementary, integrative, and 

mutually supportive. SOF and conventional forces are selected, recruited, 

trained/educated, and equipped in support of their unique purposes. However, SOF and conventional force capabilities are complementary, integrative, 

and mutually supportive as instruments of national security in support of 

common goals and objectives. SOF function in ways and places conventional 

forces cannot or should not, complementing conventional capabilities in the 

assurance of national security. SOF are a part of national military capacity 

and are integrated into the national defense military strategies and operational and tactical planning. In military art, SOF and conventional forces 

are best seen as mutually supportive at all levels of preparation for war and 

conduct of war. 
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JSOU Report 13-1

Natural tensions exist between special operations and SOF and the 

greater American political system and conventional military. Americans 

for the most part are opposed to unconventional conflicts and any form of 

elitism. Such conflicts do not adhere to Americans’ preferences for conduct 

of a decisive war and raise political questions and moral issues for which the 

right answers are unclear and potentially controversial. As a result of who 

they are and what they are asked to do, SOF are different. The differences 

engender a degree of exclusiveness and commitment essential to sustaining 

a ready force, and that is even admired as part of an American subculture. 

However, exclusiveness and elitism run counter to America’s greater culture 

of anti-elitism and egalitarianism.97 Consequently, SOF must manage a balance of political, public, and conventional military trust and SOF cultural 

imperatives that sustain an acceptable and sharp military instrument of 

quiet professionals.

Special operations and SOF evolve over time according to strategic context. Special operations and SOF are defined by the nature of the threats or 

opportunities in the security environment, the needs of policymakers, and 

the ability or inability of conventional forces to provide appropriate policy 

options. SOF provide the opportunity for limited specialization and capabilities within the military—offering a potential human, organizational, and 

technological capability not possible, prudent, or cost effective to attempt or 

sustain as part of conventional forces. SOF “specialness” in competencies, 

capabilities, and missions are “special” only as long as these are not more 

effectively and efficiently subsumed in conventional forces.

However, the migration to or appearance of any particular SOF capability 

or attribute in conventional forces does not necessarily violate a primary or 

residual validity within SOF. Such validity is founded in SOF’s policy or military utility, mission set, and cultural imperatives. Some attributes can and 

some cannot be moved between SOF and conventional forces. Sometimes, 

knowledge and equipment can be transferred, but the actual competency 

cannot.

With strategic anticipation, special operations requirements can be identified and SOF developed that complement conventional forces without competing with them, and in a manner that optimizes efficacy of the whole of 

the American military.

Special operations and SOF are applicable at all the levels of war and 

interaction—strategic, operational, and tactical. Special operations and 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

SOF are relevant to all levels of war and across the spectrum of military activities. SOF can independently or collaboratively perform shaping, preventive, 

preemptive, and punitive operations in support of tactical, operational, or 

strategic objectives. Special operations create opportunities, alleviate sources 

of friction, restrict adversaries’ options, and otherwise directly or indirectly 

create favorable effects for achieving U.S. interests. SOF can act singularly or 

as a member of bilateral or multilateral joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

and multinational efforts. SOF can act independently of conventional forces 

or in supporting and supported roles to augment conventional forces at the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The converse is also true. Conventional forces can act independently of SOF, or in supported or supporting 

roles at the three levels of war.

Special operations missions are defined by the strategic, operational, 

and tactical contexts. Special people, doctrine, organizations, technology, 

and equipment characterize special operations missions. Otherwise, special 

operations would be accommodated as part of the conventional force’s portfolio. Essentially, military special operations prepare to do what conventional 

forces cannot and should not do or what has not been done before. Therefore, 

while there are type missions in doctrine and training, there are no “typical” 

special operations missions.98

SOF develop type doctrinal missions and training mission sets, referred 

to as activities, based on an assessment of the strategic security environment 

and anticipated requirements. These serve doctrinal and training needs. 

However, SOF conduct repetitive rehearsal missions to practice for actual 

missions based on the strategic, operational, and tactical context relative to 

the mission’s objectives. Doctrine and training are designed to hone the professional edge, but actual missions are unique and require specialized planning and the bringing together of doctrinal and practiced skill sets into new 

arrangements. The better SOF leaders, planners, and operators get context 

right, the greater the probability of success in pursuing a particular mission.

Thus, SOF mission efficacy relies in large part on developing and sustaining an appropriate nurturing and professionalizing environment. The 

SOF environment must develop the personnel with the appropriate mentalities to a high level of professional competency and proficiency for the 

anticipated requirements and the flexibility and adaptability to respond to 

unanticipated requirements at any level of engagement. Some type missions 

may endure longer than others, but logically missions migrate in and out of 
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JSOU Report 13-1

the SOF portfolio over time based on changes in the security environment 

and conventional capabilities. Changes in SOF activities result in changes in 

structure, manning, technology, and equipment, but any actual real-world 

mission is context dependent.

Factors that affect assignment of any particular mission to SOF organizations include: the objective; the strategic, operational, and tactical context; 

capabilities, availability, and responsiveness of conventional forces and SOF; 

and political and military risk.

Special operations and SOF’s relative value increase as direct strategic 

utility is approached. Special operations and SOF provide a range of creative 

policy initiatives and responses that can be exercised well below the threshold 

of open conflict or international condemnation. SOF therefore provide a 

means to exercise acceptable and effective power in complex security environments, creating a means of less risky policy action.

However, SOF as an instrument of power rely principally on the quality and celerity of singular tactical performance to achieve strategic effectiveness. The more directly the tactical objectives and action coincide with 

the desired policy or strategic objectives and effects, the more direct the 

strategic performance and the greater the value of special operations and 

SOF. Conversely, the more direct the linkage between tactical operations 

and strategic performance, the greater the need for tactical autonomy and 

initiative, and paradoxically greater strategic control. The former enables 

the mission to be shaped by the actual context on the ground. In the case 

of the latter, because of the stakes involved, decision makers want greater 

visibility and control, and tactical forces require access to decision makers 

to reconcile the strategic implications of unforeseen friction and ambiguity 

on the ground. However, the more external control that is exercised—and 

the more levels involved—the less independence SOF have and the greater 

the risk of forfeiting the SOF inherent strengths of flexibility and adaptability. Therefore, SOF tactical missions are often developed directly from 

an approved policy option, and policy guidance and control is streamlined 

between the strategic and tactical levels.

Of great value in periods of VUCA, the use of special operations as a 

direct instrument of policy normally poses less strategic risk than other military means as long as the mission is appropriate for SOF. Reduced strategic 

risk results from several factors. First, SOF are extraordinarily well prepared 

for such undertakings. Second, SOF employment does not necessarily signal 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

a national commitment, and can provide a degree of plausible deniability. 

Third, while SOF tactical success is more directly linked to strategic performance than conventional forces, SOF tactical failure seldom precludes 

strategic success by other policy means.

In addition, when unanticipated strategic crises occur, SOF can respond 

expeditiously and expediently to address a wide range of strategic threats 

and opportunities, resolving the issue or creating prospects for a considered 

response by conventional forces or other policy means.

A final perspective is that SOF are a limited military capacity; SOF can 

neither be mass-produced nor 

created after emergencies occur. 

While SOF capabilities have 

applicability at all levels of war, 

it is illogical and imprudent to 

expend the force on lesser objectives or objectives that are better 

suited to conventional force 

capabilities. Strategic value correlates to strategic performance and potential, and SOF’s capabilities represent both.99

Hence, strategic use provides relative value, but SOF may be critical to 

success at any level. Mutual trust and understanding are essential to the 

best use of SOF.

Special operations can be conducted overtly, covertly, clandestinely, or 

mixtures thereof; however any choice has potential political, legal, moral, 

and operational risks associated with it. Many SOF missions are overt. 

They are openly conducted and are acknowledged or readily attributable to 

the United States. However, SOF can plan and conduct covert operations 

to conceal the identity of the United States or permit plausible denial. SOF 

can also plan and execute clandestine operations in order to assure secrecy 

or concealment of the operation, even if the U.S. interest is known. Any 

special operation may have aspects that are overt, covert, or clandestine 

simultaneously or sequentially. The choices in regard to these have relevance 

at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Consequently, the 

deliberation of political, legal, moral, and operational considerations and 

risks are inherent to any policy or planning process.

SOF organizational culture champions creativity, adaptability, flexibility, competency, and performance in SOF personnel and organizations. 

While SOF capabilities have applicability at all levels of war, it is illogical 

and imprudent to expend the force 

on lesser objectives or objectives that 

are better suited to conventional force 

capabilities.
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JSOU Report 13-1

Contrary to the certain—hence predictable—functional behavior sought and 

brought to bear by the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of conventional forces, special operations overcome the friction of war and achieve 

objectives through individual and team cross-competencies and enabling 

innovative behaviors—new or different ways of approaching and overcoming problems.100 These behaviors, guided by special operations principles 

and aided by team organizational structure and specialized technology and 

equipment, are stressed and reinforced in planning, rehearsal, and conduct of 

operations. The organizational culture within SOF values the opportunistic 

nature of such behaviors as well as reinforcing individual and team competency and performance. Such a culture engenders the support of other actors.

Special operations are enhanced by selectivity in personnel, expressed 

in the SOF Truth that quality is better than quantity. Selectivity applies 

specifically to SOF operators, although a degree of selection or self-selection 

applies to the force as a whole. Selectivity in personnel argues that valued 

SOF personnel attributes can be elevated across the force through recruitment based on psychological and experiential testing for suggestive personal attributes, traits, and performance; rigorous culling in training; and a 

nurturing culture, once a part of the force. Different services have different 

selectivity criteria for their SOF personnel, but generally they aim at acquiring those who exemplify the attributes of warrior, creativity, and flexibility 

associated with SOF’s uniqueness.101 These attributes are further enhanced 

by continuous training, education, technology, and experience. 

Selectivity of personnel empowers the force with desirable qualities 

for special operations success, but it also creates quantitative limits on 

the number of SOF candidates and graduates, and requires extraordinary 

expenditures of time and resources to maintain the qualitative edge. The 

consequences are expressed in the SOF Truths that SOF cannot be mass 

produced nor created after emergencies occur. Selectivity contends SOF 

unique attributes are distinguishable and can be identified and nurtured by 

the proper environment. Consequently, SOF solicit, encourage, and promote 

different patterns of reasoning in recruitment and the planning and conduct 

of operations.

The proficiency of SOF personnel and the applicability of special operations are enhanced by the degree of cross-cultural competence of the forces 

involved. Cultural knowledge improves all military operations. While cultural-specific or regional knowledge has its own value, special operations 
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

require SOF to acquire the more inclusive cultural-general knowledge to 

operate successfully in any cultural environment in order to maximize the 

potential of any particular situation. To the extent special operations personnel possess the ability to quickly learn to operate efficiently in any culture, 

the higher the probability of advocating and achieving favorable strategic 

results.102

Special operations are enhanced by horizontal and particular organizational structures and practices. Rank and hierarchical and standard 

organizational structures are useful and necessary for organizational control, but special operations require a degree of flexibility and adaptability 

in such structure. In SOF, experience and understanding are recognized 

and accepted as critical mission factors. At any point in special operations, 

any individual or group of special operators may hold critical information 

and decisions in regard to mission success in their hands. SOF operating 

procedures and culture recognize and accept the most knowledgeable or 

most relevant personnel often need to be heard directly. Consequently, the 

chain of command operates in a more horizontal and streamlined manner 

in regard to knowledge and operations.

SOF have specific rank and organizational structures based on their special operations experience and service cultures. However, adaptability and 

flexibility are inherent within existing structures, and SOF practice and 

culture accept and facilitate organizational tailoring for missions.

Special operations are gender and rank independent, but are influenced 

by and subject to mission context and the conventions of the time.

Special operations are enhanced by selectivity in technology and equipment. Special operations require or are often enhanced by use of non-U.S. 

military standard technology and equipment. Such technology and equipment may be inherent to a SOF organization, tasked as support from other 

government agencies, or acquired through purchasing, contracting, or other 

means. In acquisition decisions, mission demands remain paramount, but 

the advantages and disadvantages of the methods of procurement, which 

are many and conflictive, must always be considered.

Special operations make use of and are dependent on enablers. The 

SOF Truth that most SOF operations require non-SOF assistance is an open 

acknowledgment that SOF is dependent in most circumstances on the assistance and support of the U.S. military services, government agencies, and 

others. Such assistance and support may be direct or indirect, but enable SOF 
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in preparedness and planning, rehearsing, and conducting special operations missions. Assistance and support ranges across a broad spectrum from 

transportation, to facilities, to cover and supporting attacks, to knowledge 

and expert personnel—and from the strategic to the tactical levels. Enablers 

enhance the strategic reach, competency, and effects of special operations 

personnel and organizations, but also pose potential challenges and risks 

related to operational effectiveness and security. Enablers may be in direct 

support of the SOF mission or may be pursuing their normal functions that 

indirectly enable a SOF mission.

Special operations benefit from diversity within SOF and among 

enablers. Diversity is a positive virtue in SOF. It potentially brings more 

nuanced competencies and insights to bear on special operations mission 

planning, rehearsal, and conduct. It also provides a similar enrichment to 

activities related to preparation for war. For similar reasons, SOF value and 

special operations benefit from diversity among and within enablers. Different enablers bring different perspectives and capabilities to an operation, 

generating ideas and options for consideration. However, diversity can also 

be a source of multiple frictions, and value added versus tensions is always 

a matter of consideration for SOF leaders.

Special operations inform and improve conventional forces. Successes 

and failures on multiple planes within special operations and SOF inform 

the conventional forces doctrine, manning, equipment, and operations. SOF 

are inherently early adaptors. Not only are most special operators specifically selected for this attribute and SOF culture encourage it, but the nature 

of modern special operations encourage adoption of innovative structures, 

technology, and doctrines. As the face of war and military operations change 

in response to different challenges, conventional forces logically learn from 

SOF. It would be irresponsible to do otherwise. Such adoption or adaption 

of SOF structures, technology, equipment, and practices does not make conventional forces more SOF-like: it is more correctly seen as a part of conventional forces modernization. The nature of conventional forces and SOF 

are not affected. Each continues to conduct war in accordance with their 

nature. The attributes of the forces’ personnel and processes to success are 

largely unchanged. SOF also learn from conventional forces thinking and 

experience. SOF largely recruit from conventional forces and remain integrated with the services through legislative design that affects professional 

development and personnel administration.103
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Special operations depend on vertical, horizontal, and competency hierarchies, and their simultaneous interaction, to achieve mission success. The 

active and open interaction among the three hierarchies is an inherent force 

multiplier within SOF. Interaction among hierarchies exists to some degree 

in all successful organizations; however, in conventional forces interaction is 

clearly functionally and process defined and rigidly controlled, or occurs as 

a result of exceptional circumstances. In SOF, the mission-oriented culture 

encourages a freer and less vertical and linear interaction among hierarchies. 

SOF culture encourages streamlining of processes and more horizontal interacting in order to facilitate control and knowledge sharing.

Special operations success centers on the human aspects of warfare. 

SOF personnel attributes are the key distinguishing feature of special operations. Four of the five SOF Truths emphasize the centrality of the SOF 

operator to success in special operations. Mission success is dependent on 

the warrior ethos and the creativity and flexibility of the warrior. In SOF 

culture, technology and equipment exist only to support the operator at the 

point of the spear. Founded in experience, this premise is the basis for SOF’s 

recruitment, training, education, and operational methods. However, the 

premise implies more than physical fighting or the imposition of will: SOF 

seek to understand, operate in, and exploit the human domain in order to 

lessen or increase friction and to create opportunities. Human interaction 

and relationships of all kinds matter in special operations. SOF focus on 

the human interaction involved to achieve success. In part this explains a 

SOF preference for Sun Tzu, whose approach to warfare focuses on human 

interactions.104 SOF seek relationships to enhance their own capabilities, 

but also to leverage the capabilities of others or favorably influence them—

individuals, militaries, indigenous populations, indigenous political elites, 

allies, neutral parties, and adversaries. SOF personnel understand fighting 

and the power of weapons and technology, but they fundamentally believe 

that success in specific operations, and the shaping of the environment and 

avoidance or winning of wars, are rooted in the human aspects of conflict 

and seek advantages in them.

Extraordinary relationships exist between SOF and intelligence activities, other interagency organizations, and multinational partners. A special relationship exists between SOF and activities of intelligence and other 

interagency organizations based on reciprocated wellbeing and concerns. 

SOF missions are reliant on extensive and accurate intelligence from the 
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tactical to the strategic levels. Knowledge is a key advantage that SOF exploit 

in planning, rehearsal, and conduct of missions. On the other hand, SOFspecific mission tasking, or as an additional product of presence, is a uniquely 

reliable source of human intelligence for intelligence agencies. Each serves 

the other’s needs in very direct ways, and the exercise of an extraordinary 

relationship is justified by the mutual reliance and need to share perspectives 

and deconflict missions and differences.

In a similar manner, SOF’s relationships with all interagency organizations are extraordinary as compared to other military organizations. 

Conventional force organizations cooperate and coordinate their activities with other interagency activities as required, but SOF tend to approach 

such organizations with a “by, with, and through” mentality that assimilates 

these organizations’ objectives and activities into SOF missions or integrates 

SOF objectives into these organizations’ activities. This mentality—one of 

trust building and risk mitigation—also characterizes SOF interaction with 

allies and indigenous partners. Such leveraging surpasses the direct military 

function of fighting and promotes greater stability or a quicker and easier 

return to normalcy. As a matter of practice, these relationships are more 

direct and streamlined.

In special operations, an organization’s effectiveness is inversely proportional to the complexity of the organization’s size, structure, and 

mechanisms of control. The larger the size of the organization or the more 

complex its structure and chain of command, the more resistance or friction 

is induced and the greater the probability that a special operation will fail, 

falter, or require greater than desired levels of effort. Missions that require 

mass forces, great degrees of functionality, and echelons of detailed control are more likely missions suited for conventional forces. Overburdening SOF organizations with structural overhead, redundant capabilities, 

and over control stifles the very attributes that make SOF appropriate for 

special operations. Conversely, special operations must be appropriately 

and precisely resourced and supported with constant access to the decision 

maker at the highest level of concern.105 There are tipping points in mission 

requirements and risk where the superior functional bureaucracy and mass 

of the conventional forces are better suited to an objective. However, in cases 

when SOF are better suited, mission planning and conduct should play to 

SOF’s characteristics and attributes.
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Organizations dedicated to 

special operations are inherently 

precarious.

106 Special operations 

organizations fare best in times of 

crises or in situations when unique 

skills are in urgent demand or in 

situations where politicians do not 

wish to acknowledge ambiguous 

threats as a crisis. “Nor is it odd that when the crisis abates, unorthodox 

skills should experience a diminution of legitimacy in the minds of the public 

and the military establishment.”107 SOF organization, force structure, and 

culture is a product of both what it is asked to do and what it is not required 

to do. Hence, SOF’s culture and force structure are shaped by their missions 

and the requirements for successfully accomplishing them, and differ from 

those of the conventional forces. Conventional forces are shaped by their 

own requirements. Such differences, while well justified by requirements 

of war levied on both, are not well understood by either. Consequently, as 

SOF pursue perceived needs to conduct special operations, they invariably 

encounter conflicts with the larger structure related to value, legitimacy of 

identity, and mistrust.108 Both peace and competition for resources compound SOF’s precarious status.

Even though each is a part of the same greater military and share most 

of the same values, the differences in perspective and focus can be stark. For 

example, SOF reliance on creativity and flexibility is counterintuitive to a 

conventional forces’ necessary preference for predictability through mass, 

functionality, and discipline. SOF incorporate the creativity and flexibility 

of its personnel as an integral part of a plan, but conventional forces rely 

on these only in plan development, or when the plan has failed. SOF value 

the human contribution and believe it leads to success; conventional forces 

value the predictability of performance (functionality) and reward those who 

meet standards. SOF often portray themselves as elite and unconventional. 

Conventional forces generally resent the trappings of elitism or perceive it as 

devaluing their contributions. Genuine questions of authority, relationships, 

mission and roles, force structure, and resources exist between USSOCOM 

and the services. The recurring debates have engendered a degree of mistrust among all the services, and SOF have long been entwined and often 

at odds in issues within their own services. SOF can anticipate continued 

Special operations organizations 

fare best in times of crises or in 

situations when unique skills are 

in urgent demand or in situations 

where politicians do not wish to 

acknowledge ambiguous threats 

as a crisis. 
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challenges to their value, roles, and missions, even though its existence is 

encoded in law.109

SOF are also a precarious organization as a result of internal contradictions to their own cultural identity. As USSOCOM further develops in its 

dual roles as a functional combatant command and potential operational 

command if directed, it becomes more like the conventional forces’ headquarters in functions and practices. At the same time, the growth associated 

with USSOCOM’s institutionalization and expansion is lowering the ratio of 

special operators to others assigned to SOF, and to a worrying degree those 

in critical staff positions. The rapid redeployment of special operators has 

exacerbated this. All of this is for good reasons, but it does raise issues of 

operator-centric values, identity, and trust. Precariousness is an enduring 

aspect of America’s design of SOF and requires continuing attention.110

Principles of Special Operations111

Special operations appear to succeed through adherence to a general set of 

principles particularly applicable to special operations. The better an understanding of these principles is integrated into the decision processes at all 

levels and the planning, rehearsal, and conduct of special operations, and the 

better they are adhered to, the greater the potential for mission and tactical, 

operational, and strategic success. Taken together, they overcome and make 

use of friction in ways that characterize special operations and SOF.

Both conventional forces and SOF make use of principles for the planning and conduct of war. Some are shared and others are more exclusive 

in value to one or the other. Both extrapolate the principles of war into 

lesser doctrinal principles and concepts. Even when a principle is shared, the 

emphasis and interpretation in special operations may differ. Understanding 

these differences further illuminates the distinctness of and need for special 

operations. For example, the principles of war can be argued to apply to all 

war. In that regard, an understanding of the principle of mass is useful to all. 

In the current version, it is stated in a positive sense “... to concentrate the 

effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce 

decisive results.”112 It is time tested with conventional forces and a crucial 

concept for their operations. Its central focus is on force or power ratios. 

Unstated in this version, but obvious is a general need to avoid letting the 

enemy achieve mass. However, special operations seldom, if ever, achieve this 
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kind of conventional mass in their operations. SOF are neither organized nor 

manned and equipped to achieve conventional mass on their own. Clearly, 

a principle of mass is less useful at the operational and strategic levels of 

thinking about and planning special operations. Even at the tactical level, 

conventional ideas of mass can only be temporarily achieved and cannot be 

sustained. While the principle of mass applies to surrogate warfare as indigenous forces achieve strength and move toward conventionally, the special 

operators do not directly apply mass, and mass is a desired consequence of 

the mission. In his study of special operations, McRaven recognized that 

mass was a less useful focus for SOF and argued that relative superiority was 

the crucial concept for special operations to focus on. Even though relative 

superiority can intellectually be argued as a form of mass achieved through 

speed and surprise, the idea of relative superiority is more illustrative and 

useful for special operations.113

McRaven and others as part of an American school have offered specific principles, concepts, and characteristics that taken together suggest a 

general set of useful principles for special operations.114 Founded largely in 

experience, much of which has been tactical, the principles as extrapolated 

and restated below apply to all special operations—strategic, operational, 

and tactical levels. Like the principles of war, they must be considered in 

an integrated and holistic manner to determine their relative importance 

in any particular circumstance and in order to create the synergistic effects 

necessary for success at any particular level. None appears to violate the 

principles of war and any challenge of their validity more logically lies in 

their usefulness to the community.

Relative Superiority. Relative superiority is the ability to act in 

regard to stronger adversaries or in unfavorable circumstances in a manner 

and at a time to gain a decisive advantage. In tactical situations, this may 

be as straight forward as the condition achieved when an attacking force 

gains a decisive advantage over a larger defending force. However, relative 

superiority can be achieved at any level of war or any place on the spectrum 

of conflict when decisive advantage is attained in the face of severely adverse 

circumstances or more powerful actors. For example, SOF’s ability to act 

in favorable ways in regard to national interests when other instruments of 

national power cannot or should not be used, or when an adversary believes 

the United States lacks the ability or will to act appropriately, can provide 

relative decisive advantage. At the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, 
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SOF seek to provide, attain, and sustain relative superiority—a decisive 

advantage over others or circumstances at the pivotal moment of interaction, engagement, and decision.

Direct Action. Direct action is the ability to bring tactical capabilities to bear immediately at a place and time in a manner to produce 

desired outcomes. SOF are contingent forces designed for immediate direct 

action. Any deterrent value is subsidiary. While the term is used currently 

to describe the specific activity of small scale offensive action, it is a larger 

principle with a much broader application. Special operations culture focuses 

on what direct tactical actions can be taken to achieve the response or conditions desired. Such tactical actions may provide immediate solutions or 

shape future outcomes—or direct and indirect results. They may also serve 

multiple lines of operations or policy ends. However, the principle is to focus 

on what immediate actions can be accomplished and act directly in regard 

to them. In all cases of proper use of special operations the line of control 

between what the senior decision maker desires and mission planning is 

simplified—more direct or streamlined. For example, SOF are given a policy 

option to execute moves directly to tactical mission planning, rehearsal, and 

conduct with little resort to intervening planning.

Purpose. Purpose is the ability to absorb and to inculcate the purpose of the senior decision maker into the planning and mentality of the 

mission team and individual members so that the intent of the authorizing 

authority is served regardless of changing circumstances. It is facilitated 

by maximum delegation of authority, streamlined chain of command, and 

coordinated teamwork. It enables simplicity in planning, preparation, and 

execution.

Understanding. Special operations are rooted in understanding. 

Understanding is the ability to integrate mission and strategic, operational, 

and tactical intelligence with the individual and collective knowledge and 

experience of SOF personnel to advise, plan, prepare, and act. It also incorporates a cross-cultural perspective into the decision making and mission 

development, planning, and execution. Understanding enables creativity 

and flexibility and allows SOF to deal with and make use of VUCA.

Initiative. Initiative is the ability to act under any circumstances in a 

manner to exert more positive control over the tactical, operational, or strategic environment. SOF provide strategic initiative in providing options in 

circumstances where other instruments of power are unavailable, ineffective, 
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inappropriate, countered, or too provocative or risky. Initiative seeks to place 

the adversary in a position where he is reacting to SOF or friendly actions as 

opposed to SOF or allies reacting to his. It also seeks to get ahead of probable 

negative events by proactive action. Initiative is achieved by the willingness 

and capacity to act and the selection of appropriate objectives and concepts. 

Initiative takes control of timing and contributes to the element of surprise at 

all levels of war. SOF seek opportunities for the initiative in advising decision 

makers on policy and strategy and in the planning, rehearsal, and conduct 

of operations.

Surprise. Surprise is the ability to act in such a manner as to catch 

the adversary off guard regardless of his state of preparedness. It is inherent 

to all warfare and can be achieved through timing, security, methods and 

resources used, deception, counterintuitive thinking, or by taking advantages of an adversary’s social, political, economic, military, and intelligence 

service weaknesses to include vulnerabilities in supposed strengths.

Simplicity. Simplicity is the ability to identify and limit the number 

of tactical objectives of an operation to only the ones essential to mission 

success: only ones which directly contribute to the decision maker’s purpose, 

and thus avoiding the friction, diversion of effort, and added complexity 

of subsidiary but nonessential efforts. It is achieved by understanding the 

political and military situation, the intent of higher level objectives, and 

what tactical objectives are essential to achieving the decision maker’s purpose. Simplicity requires good intelligence before and during an operation to 

understand and manage all the factors and variables relative to the mission’s 

planning, rehearsal, and execution. Technological and equipment innovation 

contributes to simplicity by overcoming obstacles and enhancing mobility, 

security, and surprise. SOF’s inherent creativity and flexibility enable simplicity in mission planning and execution.

Security. Security is the ability to plan, prepare, and operate in such 

a manner that any action is unanticipated, invisible, deniable, or purpose 

unforeseen or irresistible. Security contributes to surprise. It involves protecting secrets, managing cover and deception, and physical security. Security provides control over timing and surprise.

Risk Management. Management of risk is the ability to minimize 

risk through the processes of planning, preparation, and execution for 

friendly forces while maximizing it for others. Special operations embrace 

risk as inherent to conflict and war and make use of an understanding of it. 
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Risk management is not risk aversion; it is a calculation of probabilities and 

how an adversary will react in regard to risk. SOF’s attributes, particularly 

adaptability and flexibility, extend the boundaries of acceptable friendly risk.

Warrior Ethos. Warrior ethos is the ability to capitalize on the 

human dimension in warfare. It focuses on the attributes of the human 

equation—courage, intellect, boldness, and perseverance—in conflict and 

war and recognizes people are the catalyst for success at any level of warfare. 

Internally SOF advocate human effectiveness can be continuously enhanced 

at the individual and group levels. It is manifested in adherence to selectivity 

and the continuous education and training that contribute to creativity and 

flexibility. SOF also focus on mission rehearsal, horizontal structures, and 

learning organization attributes. However, the warrior ethos also elevates 

the importance of considering the human strengths and vulnerabilities of 

adversaries and the role of other human actors and populations in consideration of and the planning, rehearsal, and conduct of missions. It also 

involves the consideration of the human costs of war and operations other 

than war. SOF acknowledge the role of doctrine and technology in war, use 

organizations and equipment, but the warrior ethos embraces the premise 

that conflict and war are fundamentally human enterprises and won or lost 

based on advantages of intellect, moral courage, and will.

Mobility. Mobility is the ability to be rapidly deployed or redeployed 

to worldwide operational environments, or within operational or tactical 

areas. It is measured by responsiveness and reach. Mobility includes the consideration of the means of movement and insertion or extraction in hostile 

or surreptitious circumstances. Proper application of mobility contributes 

to speed and surprise at all levels of war and can be the lynchpin in relative 

superiority. The principle also implies considerations of the associated consequences and risks of a mobility decision and the means used to execute it.

Integrated operations. Integrated operations imply the ability to 

address threats to and take advantage of opportunities for national security 

through the proper integration of SOF objectives and capabilities with the 

various other instruments of national power. It also includes the development and execution of operations with other military forces and nonmilitary 

agencies, or SOF-unique operations in a shared environment. Integrated 

operations imply understanding and consideration of other actor’s objectives, practices, and cultures and the national, local, and organizational 

perspectives.
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Asymmetrical Operations. The principle of asymmetrical operations is the ability to achieve security objectives through the use of unconventional or unanticipated thinking, capabilities, and methods. It implies a 

thorough understanding and consideration of an adversary’s or other actor’s 

capabilities, intent, and expectations of action and devising an operation that 

counters or exploits them to advantage.

Preparedness. As a principle, preparedness is the ability to anticipate 

and consider the potential threats and opportunities of the strategic, operational, and tactical environments and prepare for them. At the strategic level, 

preparedness requires an entrepreneur spirit and a willingness to anticipate 

emerging threats and opportunities, new and special relationships, doctrine, 

force structure, weapons, and equipment as well as education and training. 

At the operational and tactical levels, it implies training, individual and team 

proficiency, planning, mission preparation, and rehearsals. In the conduct of 

operations, it implies never letting your guard down and anticipation of and 

preparation for potential issues. Preparedness contributes to simplicity in 

planning design, shortens response times, and enables speed and flexibility 

at the tactical level. Preparedness reduces friction at all levels. 

American military special operations have much in common with many 

other militaries’ approaches to special operations, but also differ in significant ways that make the American approach distinctive. In examining the 

literature, doctrine, and experience of American special operations and SOF 

a coherent and useful theory begins to emerge. The premises and principles 

offered above frame this American theory; however, each and its implications, as well as the relationships and interactions among them, need to be 

explored and explained in greater detail.

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6. Implications of an American School of 

Thought

In thinking reflectively about the research and the endeavor to synthesize 

an American perspective of special operations, several concerns emerged 

about what such a theory and school of thought might suggest for SOF’s 

leadership. A number of military staffs and others have addressed in detail 

manifold SOF future issues from differing perspectives. No attempt is made 

here to summarize or document these issues. Instead, this chapter highlights 

specific and fundamental concerns suggested by consideration of the proposed unified theory in light of the probable national security future. Perhaps 

not surprisingly, these concerns are interrelated and intertwined. However, 

if leadership manages these fundamental concerns over time well, the men 

and women of SOF will undoubtedly meet any challenges adversaries or 

circumstances may present.

Roles and Activities

SOF roles and activities are logically defined by the nature of the threats or 

opportunities in the security environment, the needs of policymakers, and 

the ability or inability of conventional forces to provide appropriate policy 

options. However, they are also logically defined by the qualities and limitations of special operations and SOF. In the nonconventional instability of 

the 21st century, the temptation for policymakers, and even senior military 

decision makers, will be to increasingly turn to SOF. The more successful 

special operations are, the greater the demand. However, the strategic trap 

in SOF being the “go to” solution for everything is that eventually a sort of 

strategic paralysis sets. Policymakers ignore other potential options and 

wait on a “special operations” solution for every problem. Furthermore, 

SOF become stretched too thin to respond in a timely manner to authentic 

crises best served by a SOF response. Eventually, SOF lose their distinctive 

and qualitative edge, and consequently their advantage in regard to friction. 

In the process, a naturally-constrained resource is squandered as opposed 

to optimized. A fine weapon is better used, but for the purposes for which 

it is designed.
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What this all suggests is that while SOF leadership must continue to be 

responsive to policymakers and senior military decision makers, the leadership must continuously reexamine how special operations and SOF fit into 

the spectrum of conflict and the optimal roles and activities for SOF. Any 

specific answer to this dilemma is a recurring staff issue to be revisited periodically or as conditions change; however, the questions and the framework 

for the answers are found in theory. For example, if as asserted in the above 

paragraph that instability in the 21st century is largely unconventional and 

it is extensive, exactly how best do special operations and SOF fit in? Key 

words are found in the definition of special operations—“overt, covert, and 

clandestine operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature ... 

make use of unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment 

and training. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments where the use of general purpose forces [conventional 

forces] is either inappropriate or infeasible.” Definitions of SOF and SOF 

power and the premises and principles are also a critical source of insights 

into how SOF might need to argue the roles and activities pie should be 

optimally sliced in a security environment where the unconventional challenge is the overwhelming prospect. 

Force Structure

Two facets of force structure are worth leadership’s greatest consideration. First is the question of how much SOF? In regards to the apparent 

increased requirements in the 2012 Defense Strategy, DOD appears ready to 

increase SOF’s structure.115 USSOCOM has already surfaced a concern that 

force structure growth of special operators is problematic and the issues 

are expressed in the SOF Truths. Hence, a theoretical basis for concern is 

apparent, but theory articulates an intellectual basis for the essentiality of 

the attributes and the probable consequences of waiving or diluting them. 

SOF’s recruitment from experienced service members is limited by the 

size and construct of that pool of candidates. Reductions in conventional 

forces shrink the SOF recruitment pool. Those candidates have already been 

successfully screened by conventional mechanisms, representing a degree 

of military professionalism and experience, before entering a SOF scrub. 

Changes in recruitment practices and in selectivity measures within SOF 

pose mission and consequently strategic risks. Special operations successes 
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rely on qualitative differences and any degradation of quality in any manner 

affects the ability to overcome friction. 

A second question is what kind of SOF structure? Existing on the edge 

of change and continuity in the security environment, SOF will need to 

change with the times. There is a natural temptation to assign to SOF and 

USSOCOM, or for SOF or USSOCOM to seek to acquire, missions and structure that does not easily fit elsewhere. Some capabilities may even actively 

seek SOF sponsorship. Special operations and SOF necessarily change with 

the times, but additions to SOF structure should fit within the theoretical 

nature of special operations and SOF. The current use of enablers is one 

way of not diluting special operations capacity with incongruous structure, 

but leadership vigilance is required to discriminate between needed change 

and superfluous and counterproductive growth. This is not to say growth 

and change in SOF are objectionable, but that growth and change require 

careful management and that there are criteria and cautions suggested and 

supported by theory.

Conventional Forces Linkages

SOF and conventional force capabilities are complementary, integrative, and 

mutually supportive as instruments of national security pursuing common 

goals and objectives. As a result, SOF will continue to find itself in support 

of conventional force missions, and at times calling on conventional forces 

to support special operations. “There must be mutual understanding of the 

capabilities of both special operations forces and Conventional Forces, by 

commanders of both, and an understanding of their mutual limitations.”116 

In the 21st century security is a joint endeavor. The environment portends 

plenty for all to do: it is less a contest over who defines or owns what activity/

mission and more of a question of how to best collaborate so SOF resources 

are expended where special operations capabilities are best used. There is 

a role conventional forces can play in unconventional operations and ways 

SOF can help prepare them to play these roles, even as both focus on other 

conventional and irregular requirements. Particularly, given that most state 

and non-state actors exercise power from and on land, USSOCOM and SOF 

must develop and sustain a close collaboration with the other combatant 

commands, land component commands, and the services in order to meet 

all the security environment challenges and preclude duplication of efforts, 
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or working at cross purposes. SOF theory points to where SOF can have the 

greatest strategic value.

Building Strategic Acumen—SOF Professional Education

Direct action as a principle highlights the linkage in SOF theory between 

strategic utility and tactical missions. The principle is achieved through a 

combination of strategic acumen and tactical proficiency—both are essential in understanding purpose, context, and the planning, rehearsal, and 

execution of missions. It is probably not possible to become too tactically 

proficient, but it is possible to become too tactically focused. SOF need to ask 

how to build strategic acumen and competencies in regard to special operations. It is important that SOF personnel continue to attend the service war 

colleges and senior enlisted education institutions—it builds an essential 

strategic perspective and establishes relationships that are critical to SOF’s 

roles in national security. However, SOF should also look at the opposite 

side of the coin and ask how to develop SOF-specific strategic acumen and 

competencies. In Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community: 

Considerations and a Proposal (2007), this author made an argument for 

undertaking this that is one possibility.117 The Joint SOF Leadership Competency Model offers potential competency objectives.118 Whatever solution, 

theory suggests it should not be done in a manner that further disconnects 

SOF from conventional forces or the other higher educational requirements 

essential to a knowledgeable SOF.

A Precarious Special Operations Culture

All SOF are inherently precarious organizations for the numerous reasons 

outlined earlier. However, the barometer for the state of precariousness that 

should most concern leadership is SOF culture. The organizations with SOF 

vary greatly, but a shared special operations culture and identity permeate 

all to a degree, even habitual enablers. It is most closely identified with the 

special operator and is much deeper than any prima fascia elitism. It is a 

culture that advocates a particular SOF professionalism with a belief in quality over quantity, and embraces creativity, adaptability, flexibility, competency, less hierarchical structures, and performance in ways that differ from 

conventional forces. The characteristics and attributes of SOF culture are 

embedded in the theory presented, and it in no way devalues conventional 
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force cultures. Rather, SOF culture has its distinct foci and contextual meaning rooted in how special operations overcome friction as opposed to how 

conventional forces do. Any particular value, attribute, or characteristic 

might be embraced by either, but the implications vary significantly and the 

whole is distinct. Leadership should study theory to understand the role of 

SOF culture and monitor it for a measure of the wellbeing of the force. SOF 

culture must be managed for continued success.

Any reader of theory should pause and reflect on the implications of 

the theory for today and tomorrow. The concerns may differ from those 

expressed above, but theory would still have served its purpose.

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7. Conclusion

As the United States confronts the remainder of the 21st century there 

will be no shortage of challenges or opportunities confronting it. Many 

of these will require the employment of military force in various ways. Conventional forces will be better suited for the larger and more conventional of 

these—deterrence, major combat, and other resource-intensive traditional 

security and humanitarian activities. However, increasingly state and nonstate actors will pose security dilemmas for which the traditional instruments of U.S. national power are ill-suited, inappropriate, too slow, too risky, 

or too costly. More and more often SOF will be the logical instrument of 

choice, but it may well become an instrument of preference instead. The 

former infers a thoughtful consideration of SOF’s capabilities and strategic, operational, and tactical utility: the latter may imply little more than a 

penchant. In the American school of thought, SOF is a part of the nation’s 

military sword, but is better seen as a finely honed rapier forged over time 

from finite and rare metals. For the challenges of the 21st century, it must be 

kept sharpened and wielded with skill in the duels for which it is designed. 

A theory and school of thought informs us of how to keep the blade sharp 

and when and how to best use it.

This monograph concisely presents a way toward an American military 

theory of special operations and SOF. It argues that the U.S. viewpoint is 

distinct in how it defines special operations and SOF and the relationship 

between them, the evolution of SOF power, and the roles and relationships 

of SOF within the broader national security apparatus. Its definitions and 

26 premises and 14 principles encapsulate what American special operations and SOF are and how they function together in an American model 

to serve national security. The content has been drawn or extrapolated from 

an emergent SOF literature and doctrine, only a part of which is highlighted 

herein. Consequently, it can be said that it offers nothing new. However, this 

would be too cursory a reading as its value lies in the bringing together and 

culling of multiple ideas into a theoretical construct of definitions, premises, 

and principles that are applicable to American special operations and SOF 

at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. As with any monograph, 

word length matters and much of what is offered herein would benefit from 
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greater explanation and illustration. Hopefully others will pursue this, confirming and challenging what is offered herein and further advancing the 

SOF body of knowledge. This monograph will also likely disappoint those 

who are looking for the revelation of an entirely “new” theory of special 

operations for the SOF-centric conditions of the 21st century. The focus of 

this monograph is to understand American special operations and SOF, and 

as argued the various pieces of, and foundation for a coherent “new” theory 

from a U.S. perspective have been evolving for several decades in the literature and practice. What is presented here may be useful in constructing a 

more general theory of special operations, but its “newness” will be found 

in its extrapolation and synthesis of existing thought, and what it offers to 

further a SOF strategic art.

Taken together, the school of thought and theory presented in this monograph seek to provide a strategic perspective of SOF power and special operations, and SOF’s evolving role in U.S. national security. As the basis for a 

unified theory, it explains the relationship among SOF power, special operations, and SOF and other applicable theory and means of national security. 

It provides premises and principles that explain and apply to all of special 

operations and SOF. When applied to the past, it helps explain it, and it is 

applicable to current and future context. As a start, this monograph brings 

existing knowledge within the American SOF community into a concise 

unified theory framework and lays a basis for further work in theory and the 

practice of a SOF strategic art. However, much remains to be done.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

Endnotes 

1. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Uses of SOF (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2007), 3.

2. William H. McRaven, SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations: Theory and 

Practice (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996). Admiral McRaven is currently 

commander, USSOCOM.

3. Full citation is Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, 

Qualities, and Uses of SOF (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2007).

4. U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 

2012 (Tampa, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2012), 48.

5. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 

Century Defense (Washington, D.C.: January 2012). 

6. Such a debate has been ongoing internally within the SOF community as a 

missions debate for years and has been the subject of a number of conferences 

and studies. It was asked directly most recently at the Joint Special Operations 

University, SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward for Special Operations Theory 

and Strategic Art, August 2011. It has also played out in the Department of 

Defense and the most recent Defense Strategy with its strategic reliance on SOF 

capabilities.

7. This concern has been expressed at conferences and in discussions within individuals in which the author participated.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141.

9. United States Joint Forces Command, The JOE 2010: Joint Operating Environment

(Norfolk, Virginia: USJFCOM Public Affairs, 2010), 4.

10. For an explanation of continuities and change, see Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and 

the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation 

in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger International Security, 2008), 23-24, 

30-34, 39-40, 79.

11. United States Joint Forces Command, The JOE 2010, 12-37.

12. For an example of how this is portrayed, see United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for 

Future Joint Forces (Suffolk, Virginia: Center for Joint Futures, 2008), 20-21.

13. Ibid., 4.

14. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional, 36, quoting Michael 

J. Mazarr, “Theory and U.S. Military Strategy: A ‘Leapfrog’ Strategy for U.S. 

Defense Policy,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, ed. 

David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, 1997, http://www.dodccrp.org/

files/Alberts_Complexity_Global.pdf , accessed on March 23, 2012, p. 138.
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15. Ibid.

16. Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Phoenix, 2006), 

378.

17. Ibid., 380-394.

18. Ibid., 382.

19. Summers is most remembered for his book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the 

Vietnam War (Presidio Press, 1982), but he was a veteran of Korea and Vietnam, 

a part of the peace negotiation team for the latter; a lecturer; a columnist and 

pundit; an editor; and author of numerous other works.

20. Adapted from: John Hilton, “Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound: The Relevancy 

of Airpower Doctrine in Operations Other Than War,” Airpower Journal (Winter 

1998); http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/

airchronicles/apj/apj98/apj98_images/hiln2.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/hillen.html&h=510&w=575&sz

=60&tbnid=Afh4Hq4o8fYnOM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=101&prev=/search%3Fq%3D

spectrum%2Bof%2Bconflict%26tbm%3Disch%26tbo%3Du&zoom=1&q=spectr

um+of+conflict&docid=wu9oMV2KncprnM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=fLhsT9f_FpKC

tgeBi9WPBg&sqi=2&ved=0CC4Q9QEwAA; accessed March 23, 2012. Hilton’s 

diagram is adapted from Army Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C. Headquarters, 

Department of Army, November 1996), 5.

21. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional, 63-68.

22. John B. Alexander, The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, 

2006), 1.

23. Ibid., 37.

24. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 2008), 3.

25. Ibid., vii, 8-12.

26. Ibid., 19-26.

27. Ibid., 63.

28. Ibid., ix-xi, 29-36.

29. Ibid., xii, 31-32.

30. There are a number of ways of articulating the elements and instruments of 

power. For a discussion of several see Yarger, Strategy and the National Security 

Professional, 68-67.

31. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: 

Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 19.

32. Ibid., iii-iv, 5-9.

33. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 

Century Defense (Washington, D.C.: January 2012), 4.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

34. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional, 68-77.

35. This paradox is commonly referred to in international relations studies as the 

“security dilemma.” For developed argument see Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, 

and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), Chapter 6.

36. Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), 160-161. Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, “U.S. 

Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, 4th Quarter: Issue 40, 38-43, page 40. David Barno and 

Travis Sharp, “SOF Power,” FP: Foreign Policy, February 14, 2012; available at 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/sof_power; accessed April 10, 

2012.

37. The use of the term “General Purpose Forces” has been replaced by “Conventional 

Forces.”

38. Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, at the time Commander of the 1st Special 

Operations Command, “Discussants,” in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and 

Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

National Defense University Press, 1984), 47.

39. Ibid.

40. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication I, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: June 

1979, Revised).

41. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters, “Special Operations and the Threats to 

United States Interests in the 1980s,” chapter in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, 

and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, 

D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 5.

42. DoD Dictionary of Military Terms; available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

dod_dictionary/; accessed 30 November 2011.

43. DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.

44. Spulak, 16-18. He uses elite in a non-pejorative sense, meaning selected for SOF 

desirable attributes and developed for SOF desirable competencies.

45. Kelly, xvi-xvii.

46. Ibid., xvii.

47. Developed from research and discussion with Joseph Celeski at the Joint Special Operations University SOF-Power Workshop, MacDill AFB, Florida, 22-23 

August 2011.

48. Edward Luttwak, et al., A Systemic Review of “Commando” (Special Operations 

1939-1980) (Potomac, MD; C&L Associates, 1982), S-1, quoted in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in US 

Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 34.

49. Some have suggested SOF operate in the “human domain.”

50. McRaven, 1.
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51. Ibid., 4-9. For a fuller explanation of the theory and how it works see McRaven, 

1-28, 381-391.

52. Ibid., 2-8.

53. Ibid., 8-23.

54. Ibid., 11.

55. Ibid., 9.

56. Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, USA (Ret.), Discussants, in Frank R. Barnett, 

B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 192-194.

57. Spulak, 41.

58. Edward Luttwak, 34.

59. Spulak, 5-7. Spulak references Michael J. Mazarr, “Extremism, Terror, and the 

Future of Conflict,” Policy Review, March 2006; available from www.policyreview.org; accessed November, 2006.

60. Ibid., 2.

61. Ibid., 10-14.

62. Ibid., 14-15.

63. Ibid., 21.

64. Ibid., 22-23.

65. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF 

are the way SOF are (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2011), 

7-11.

66. Ibid., 11.

67. Ibid., 2.

68. Ibid. 

69. Ibid., 1-3, 20-21, 27-28, 43-45.

70. Ibid., 55-56, 60-61, 65-67.

71. Ibid., 55-57, 59-62, 65-67.

72. Ibid., 66.

73. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go 

Mainstream (Tampa Joint Special Operations University Press, 2008) 2-3, 5-8, 

12-27.

74. Ibid., 8.

75. Sean D. Naylor, “Adm Olson adds “lost” 5th SOF Truth to doctrine,” Army Times, 

August 16, 2009,SOF Coast Blog, http://www.sofcoast.com/weblog/2009/09/

adm-olsen-adds-lost-5th-sof-truth-to-doctrine.html; accessed March 21, 2012. 

John M. Collins, U.S. and Soviet Special Operations, House Armed Services 

Committee (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress: Washington, 

D.C.1986).
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

76. USSOCOM Homepage, http://www.socom.mil/default.aspx; accessed January 

21, 2012.

77. Naylor.

78. U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “SOF Imperatives,” available at http://

www.soc.mil/USASOC%20Headquarters/SOF%20Imperatives.html; accessed 

March 21, 2012.

79. A simple goggle search by service and values will provide multiple explanations 

of what the service values are, what they mean, and why they are important.

80. Eric T. Olson, USSOCOM Commander, Letter included in Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 18 April 

2011), iii. Admiral Olson also notes the five other joint publications for which his 

command is responsible and the ongoing effort to codify “SOF-specific” doctrine 

similar to service doctrine.

81. Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, I-1.

82. Ibid., II-1.

83. Ibid., II-2.

84. Ibid., II-3.

85. Ibid., II-4—II-5.

86. Ibid., II-3.

87. The list is from Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, Functions of the 

Department of Defense and its Major Components, dated 21 December 2010 

with definitions from Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, dated 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 November 2012. Another version of the list is found in Joint Publication 3-05, Special 

Operations, dated April 2011, of which USSOCOM is the proponent and another 

version of the list, broken down into Core Activities and Core Operations, is 

provided in United States Operational Command, USSOCOM Publication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations, dated 9 August 2011. However, on 17 January 2013, 

the Force Management Directorate, USSOCOM, point of contact (Commander 

Adam Hudson) for drafting the new Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations 

indicated that the list of “Activities and Operations” in USSOCOM Publication 

1 was being consolidated into a single list of activities and highly recommended 

that this author use the list from the from DODD 5100.01.

88. For a concise unclassified discussion of combatant commands, see Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and 

Issues for Congress, July 17, 2012; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/

R42077.pdf; accessed October 3. 2012. USSOCOM is a Functional Combatant 

Command with primary responsibilities as a force provider to Geographic Combatant Commanders, but executes global operations when directed by President 

or Secretary of Defense.

89. USSOCOM Homepage.
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90. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War 

on Terrorism (New York: Routledge press, 2006), 113. Kiras’ monograph demonstrates how complex strategic performance is as well as how SOF contributes 

to it.

91. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, “Keynote Address,” in Frank R. Barnett, 

B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 20.

92. Developed from research and discussion with Joseph Celeski at the Joint Special Operations University SOF-Power Workshop, MacDill AFB, Florida, 22-23 

August 2011.

93. Since the premises are drawn from preceding chapters where the contribution 

was acknowledged and modified by this author, citations are limited.

94. President Ronald Reagan signed the Cohen-Nunn Act into law in November 

1986 as part of Public Laws 99-661. For a near contemporary analysis of the 

reasons for the legislation, see Henry L. T. Loren, Jr., “Congress Wades into 

Special Operations, Parameters (December 1988): 62-74.

95. William V. O’Brien, “Special Operations in the 1980s: American Moral, Legal, 

Political, and Cultural Constraints,” chapter in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, 

and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, 

D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 55-56.

96. For one perspective of how this might be done see O’Brien, 53-80.

97. Sam C. Sarkesian, “Organizational Strategy and Low-Intensity Conflicts,” chapter 

in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 

1984), 263. 

98. Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, USA (Ret.), Discussants, in Frank R. Barnett, 

B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 192.

99. Joseph Celeski, “A Theory of SOF,” Briefing at the Joint Special Operations University SOF-Power Workshop, MacDill AFB, Florida, 22-23 August 2011.

100. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups, 59-62, 

65-66.

101. Spulak, 17-18.

102. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups, 2-3.

103. Spulak, 10-13.

104. J.H. Huang, Sun Tzu: The New Translation (New York: Quill William Morrow, 

1993), 40-41, 45-46. This particular edition and the references illustrate this 

point well and include enemy and friendly examples.

105. Sarkesian, 265-266.

106. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go 

Mainstream.
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Yarger: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations

107. Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Schultz, eds., Special Operations 

in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 5.

108. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go 

Mainstream, 2-3, 12-19. See also Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: 

Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, Harvard Studies in International 

Affairs, No. 40 (Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, 1978) for 

conventional balance.

109. Ibid., 2-3, 12-19.

110. Ibid., 2-3, 12-19.

111. These principles are drawn, extrapolated, and synthesized from works acknowledged in preceding chapters and other mentors, consequently citations are limited to avoid confusion and save space.

112. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, “Appendix A: Principles of Joint Operations,” 11 August 2011, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf; accessed 

March 15, 2012. A-2. This is the latest statement of the principle of mass which 

de-emphasis forces in favor of combat effects.

113. McRaven, 1-8.

114. Ross S. Kelly in Special Operations and National Purpose, xvii-xviii, argues the 

principles are not substantially different, but the frames of reference, mission 

goals and constraints “require significantly different priorities in the application 

of the common operational principles.” Kelly’s point is valid, but the question is 

whether for SOF theory is it useful to articulate the principles in a more useful 

way that better informs.

115. Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues 

for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: March 23, 

2012). 

116. Marsh, 23.

117. Harry R. Yarger, Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community: Considerations and a Proposal (Hurlburt Field, Florida: The JSOU Press, January 

2007). See also Colonel (Ret) Joseph D. Celeski, “Special Operations & Strategic 

Art—Enhancing Force Application,” Unpublished Joint Special Operations University Staff Paper, 2011.

118. Joint Special Operations University Homepage, “[Joint SOF Leadership] Competency Model Explained,” available at https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Default.

aspx; accessed April 10, 2012.