[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-16270

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20468-JAL-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KEVIN TRAMAINE CHAVOUS, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(October 21, 2013)

Before WILSON, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kevin Chavous appeals his 120-month sentence imposed after pleading 

guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 1 of 7 
2

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He asserts that the district court: (1) improperly 

imposed a two-level guidelines enhancement for possession of a firearm; (2) 

erroneously concluded that he was ineligible for relief under the guidelines’ safetyvalve provision; and (3) improperly denied a guidelines reduction based on his 

minor role in the offense. After careful review, we affirm.

Chavous and his co-defendants, Steven Cook, Michael Chavous (hereafter, 

Michael), and Christopher Henderson, drove from Georgia to Miami with $65,000 

in cash to purchase cocaine from a seller who was working with the FBI. Upon 

arriving in Miami, Cook and Michael went to purchase the drugs and were 

arrested. A search of the vehicle they drove to the drug buy revealed a loaded 

firearm. After their arrest, Cook and Michael told FBI agents that they had 

travelled to Miami with Henderson and Chavous, who were supposed to transport 

the drugs back to Georgia. At the agents’ request, Cook called Henderson and told 

him and Chavous to meet him at the site of the drug buy. Chavous and Henderson 

arrived and were arrested. A search of their vehicle revealed a firearm under the 

driver’s seat, and Henderson admitted to putting it there. Chavous stated after his 

arrest that he had travelled to Miami at Michael’s request and did not know the 

purpose of the trip. 

Chavous pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 

distribute. Prior to sentencing, the probation officer prepared a presentence 

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 2 of 7 
3

investigation report (PSI) that set his base offense level at 32. The PSI increased 

Chavous’s guidelines level by two for possession of a firearm. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). After other adjustments, Chavous’s total offense level became 31 

and, with a criminal history category of I, his resulting guidelines range was 108 to 

135 months’ imprisonment. Chavous was subject to a 120-month statutory 

mandatory minimum, however, which changed his guidelines range to 120 to 135 

months’ imprisonment. See id. § 5G1.1(c)(2). The district court imposed a 120-

month sentence. This is Chavous’s appeal.

Chavous first asserts that the district court improperly imposed a two-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm. “We 

review the district court’s findings of fact under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear 

error, and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo.” 

United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Even if the defendant did not physically possess a firearm, the 

enhancement is still appropriate if:

the government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 

(1) the possessor of the firearm was a co-conspirator, (2) the 

possession was in furtherance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was 

a member of the conspiracy at the time of possession, and (4) the coconspirator possession was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if the firearm was present at the 

place of the crime, the enhancement applies “unless it is clearly improbable that 

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 3 of 7 
4

the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. (n.11(A)). 

The defendant bears the burden of showing “that a connection between the firearm 

and the offense is clearly improbable.” United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th 

Cir. 1995). 

Chavous contends Henderson’s firearm was wholly unrelated to the 

conspiracy to purchase drugs because Henderson brought it for personal 

protection.

1

 But Chavous cannot establish that the firearm’s connection to the 

offense was “clearly improbable.” We have recognized that “guns are a tool of the 

drug trade” and “[t]here is a frequent and overpowering connection between the 

use of firearms and narcotics traffic.” Pham, 463 F.3d at 1246 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). And had the purchase been successful, Chavous and Henderson 

would have been tasked with transporting five kilograms of cocaine from Florida 

to Georgia, for which a firearm could have been used to protect the drugs. 

Chavous therefore cannot show that the § 2D1.1 enhancement was improper. See

United States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 1496, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that it 

was reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would possess a firearm when 

transporting a large amount of cocaine).

 1 Chavous also contends that he had no knowledge of either of the firearms in the vehicles at the 

scene, but we have stated knowledge of a co-conspirator’s possession of a firearm is not required 

to support the enhancement. See United States v. Clavijo, 165 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) 

(“Although Clavijo had no knowledge of the firearm, he had nonetheless possessed a firearm 

under the broad language of section 2D1.1(b)(1).”).

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 4 of 7 
5

Chavous next argues the district court should have granted him relief under 

the guidelines’ safety-valve provision. We review a district court’s factual 

findings about a denial of safety-valve relief for clear error and its interpretation of 

the safety-valve statutes and guidelines de novo. United States v. Poyato, 454 F.3d 

1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006). To qualify for safety-valve relief, a defendant must 

“truthfully provide[] to the Government all information and evidence [he] has 

concerning the offense . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). The district court found that 

Chavous had not truthfully told the government everything he knew about the 

offense because he stated he did not learn that the purpose of the trip was to 

purchase drugs until he arrived in Miami. Chavous contends he told the truth. 

But at sentencing, Chavous submitted into evidence a report summarizing an 

interview between Cook and federal agents indicating Cook met with Chavous 

before the trip to discuss the logistics of the drug buy. The district court’s decision 

to credit this report over Chavous’s explanation is not clearly erroneous. See 

United States v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Where there 

are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them 

cannot be clearly erroneous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the 

district court did not err in finding Chavous ineligible for safety-valve relief.

Finally, Chavous contends the district court should have awarded him a 

minor-role reduction because he did not know about the drug transaction until he 

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 5 of 7 
6

arrived in Miami, was not involved in the negotiations, and provided no money 

towards the purchase of the cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). “We review for 

clear error a district court’s determination of a defendant’s qualification for a role 

reduction.” United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006). 

“The defendant has the burden of establishing his role in the offense by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. To determine whether a defendant had a 

minor role in the offense, the district court “must measure the defendant’s role 

against the relevant conduct for which [he] was held accountable at sentencing and 

may also measure the defendant’s role against the other participants in that relevant 

conduct.” United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2002) (alterations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Chavous has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred in 

declining to award him a minor-role reduction. He was held accountable only for 

the amount of cocaine he conspired to transport, and the transportation of the 

cocaine was an integral part of the conspiracy. See Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d at 

1343-44 (holding that a refusal to grant a minor-role reduction was not clearly 

erroneous where the defendant was entrusted with transporting drugs and was held 

responsible only for the amount of drugs that he agreed to transport).

For the above reasons, the district court did not err in imposing Chavous’s 

sentence.

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 6 of 7 
7

AFFIRMED.

Case: 12-16270 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 Page: 7 of 7