Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determin ed that thi s opinio n should not * be publishe d an d is not precede nt except und er the limit ed circu mstance s set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE U NI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 10248

THE S OUTHERN COM PA NY P l ai n t i f f - A pp el l ee v. D A U B E N I N C , doi n g bu si n ess as T exas Inter n ati on al P ropert y A ssoc i ates D efen d a n t - A p p ell a n t

Appe alf

r o m t he U ni t e d St at e s D i s t r i c t Cour t f o r t he N or t her n D i st r i c t of

Texas , D al l as N o. 3: 07- C V

- 1690

B ef ore K IN G , ST E W A R T , an d S O U T H W IC K , C i rcui t Ju dg es . P E R C U R I A M: * D e fen d a n t–A p p e ll a n t D a u b e n In c. a p p e a ls th e d is trict co u rt’s en try of a prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on b arri n g t h e com pa n y f rom , am on g ot h er t h i n gs,

“ [ r ] e gi s t e r i ng, t r ans f

e r r i ng, t r af

f i c ki ng, us i ng, o rm ai nt ai n i n g” t h e dom ai n na m es sot h erncom pa n y. com an d sou t h erncopa n y .com . Plai n t i f f –A pp el l ee T h e Sou t h ern Co m p a n y , wh i c h h o l d s fe d e r a land s t a t e t r a d e m a r k s f o r “ S OUTHERN C O M P A N Y ” an d the dom ai n n am e southerncom pa n y. com , i n st i t u t ed thi s act i on aga i n stD au ben I n c. un der t h e A n t i cybersqu att i n g C o n sum er Protec t i on A ct United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April 15, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I ClerkA mark beco mes “incontestab le” when“such regi stered mark has beenin co ntinuou s 1 use for fivecon secutiveyears subsequent toth e date of such registration and is stillinu se in co mme rc e. ” 1 5U .S .C

. § 1 0 6 5 ; see a lso Am. Rice, In c. v. Pro ducers R ice Mill, I nc. , 51 8 F .3d 3 21, 330n .25 (5thC ir. 200 8). Anincontestab le mark “shallbeconclu siveevidence of th e v ali dity of th e regis ter ed m arkand of theregis tra tionof the m ark

. . . and of the regist rant ’s exclus ive ri ght tou seth e re gis te re d marki nc om me rc e. ” 1 5U .S .C

. § 1 1 1 5 (b). 2 ( “A C P A ” ) , 15 U
. S

. C

. § 1125 ( d). A t t h e outsetof t h e pro ce e di n gs, Sou t h ern C om pa n y f

i l ed a m ot i on f

or a prel i m in a ry inj u n ct i on , w h i ch the di st ri ctcourt gran t ed i n an O ct ober 22, 200 7 order. D au ben In c. n ow ch al l en ges t h e di st ri ct
cou rt’ s f i n d i n gs tha t ( 1 ) S ou th ern C om p a n y w a s l i k ely to su ccee d on th e m erits b eca u se D a u b en In c . registered the do m a i n n a m es w i th a b a d fa i th i n ten t t o p r o fit a n d ( 2 ) th e r e e x is te d a s u b s ta n tia l th r e a t t h a t S o u th e r n C o m p a n y w o u ld
s uf fe r i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y w i t ho ut the p r e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n. Bec aus e t he di st ri ctcourt condu ct ed an i n com pl et e an al ysi s i n i t s f i n di n gs of

a l i keli h ood of
s uc c e s s o n t he m e r i t s and a s ubs t ant i alt hr e atof i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y, w e c o nc l ude t h at t h e di st ri ctcourtabu sed i t s di scr et i on i n gran t i n g t h e pre li m i n ary i nj unc t i o n. I . F A CT UA L A ND P ROC E DUR A L B A CK GRO UND A. Fac t ual Bac kgr ound Th e Sout her n C om pan y ( “ Sout her n” ) i s a For t une 500 c om pany t hat provi des en ergy- rel ated ser vi ces t o con sum ers t h rough ou t t h e southern U n i t ed St at e s . I t ho l ds t he f

e de r al , i nc o nt e s t ab l e m ar k “ SO U TH ER N CO M PA N Y” a nd 1 i s t h e r e g i s t r a n t o f

t h e d o ma i n n a me s o u t h e r n c o mp a n y . c o m. D a u b e n I n c. ( “ D au ben ” ) , a T exas corporat i on , i s t h e l i st ed regi st ran t of
n earl y 63 5, 00 0 do m ai n na m e s . The t w o c hal l e nge d d o m ai n na m es, s o th e r n c o m p a n y .co m a n d s o u th e r n c o p a n y .co m , a r e lin k e d to a w e b s ite th a t o n ly p r o v id e s p a y -p e r -c lic k a d v e r tis in g
— w h e n a n I n te r n e t u s e r e n te r s e ith e r d o m a in3

n am e i n her brow ser, she i s di rect ed t o a w ebp age that l i st s l i n ks to t h e w ebsi t es of pay i n g ad vert i sers . If t h e u ser cl i cks on an y of t h ese l i n ks, t h en t h e adv ert i ser p a ys a fee to th e w eb site

. S ee Net Q u ot e, I n c. v. Byrd , No
. 0 7

- CV- 0 0 6 3 0

- DM EM EH , 2008 W L 25 52 87 1, a t * 13 ( D
. Col o . J une 1 7, 2 00 8) ( quo t i ng t he d e fen da n t ’ s descr i pti on of pay - per- cl i ck ad vert i si n g “ w h ereby ‘ t h e adv ert i ser pa ys ea ch t i m e a n inter n et u ser “ cl i cks” on the ad vert i ser’ s ad a n d i s taken to a pa ge o n t he a dv e r t i s e r ’ s w e bs i t e ’ ” )

. The a dv e r t i s i ng l i nks a r e r e l at e d t o , a m o ng ot h er t h i n gs, realest ate and em pl oym en t com pa n i es i n t h e southern U n i t ed St at e s . The o nl y c o nne c t i o n b e t w e e n t hi s w e bp ag e an d So ut he r n i s t hatt he
w ebp age con t ai n s an ad vert i sem en t l i n k to G eorgi a P ow er, a Sou th ern subs i di ar y. B. Pro c e dur al Bac kgr ound W h e n S o u th e r n le a r n e d o f D a u b e n ’ s u s e o f th e tw o co n te s te d d o m a in
n am es, i t fi l ed an a ct i on un der t h e U n i f orm D om ai n N am e D i spu t e R esol u t i on Po l i c y ( t h e “ UDRP” ) wi t h a W o r l d I n t e l l e c t u a lP r o p e r t y Or g a n i z a t i o n ( t he

“ W I PO” ) a r b i t r a t i o n p a ne lo n M a y 2 5 , 2 0 0 7
. On Au gust 24, 20 0 7 , t he W I PO p a n e l ru le d in fa v o r o f S o u th e r n a n d o r d e r e d D a u b e n to tr a n s fe r th e d o m a in
n a m e s to S o u th e r n . S ee S ou t h ern C o. v. T ex. I n t ’lP rop. A ssoc s. , C as e N o. D 2007- 0 7 7 3 (W I P O A u g . 2 4 , 2 0 0 7 ) , h tt p :// w w w .w ip o .in t/a m c /e n /d o m a i n s /d e c i s io n s /h tm l/2 0 0 7 /d 2 0 0 7 -0 7 7 3 .h tm l. B ef ore t h e W IPO pan eldi rect ed D au ben to transfer t h e dom ai n na m es, how ever, D au ben f

i l ed su i t against Sou t h ern i n a D al l as C ou n t y j u st i ce of the p eace court
on Ju l y 23, 2 007
. D oi n g so p revented t h e transfer of the dom ai n n am es because t he U D RP ’ s t e r m s pr o vi de t hat i f a l awsui t has b e e n c o m m e nc e d c o nc e r ni ng t he
ar bi t r at ed do m ai n nam es , t hen suc h a t r ansf erw i l lnotbe c om pl et ed unt i lt hatTyp o s qu at ti n g i s , ge n e r ally s p e akin g , th e “r e gi s t e ri n g [o f ] d o m ai n n a m e s tha t a re 2 inte ntio nalmisspellin gs of di stinctive o r fa mous n ames.” See Sh ields v. Zuccarin i , 254F .3d 4 7 6 , 4 8 3( 3 dC ir . 2 0 0 1 ); se e alsoGree nv . F orn ar io , 48 6 F .3d 1 00, 103n .5 (3 d C ir. 2 007) (d es cribing typos quatt ing as a “subgener a of c yb ers quatt ing” that“involves regis ter ing a domain na m e t hat is buta lette r ortwo off fro m a distinctive mark”); AndyJohnso n-L aird , Loo king F orward, Legislatin

g Back ward? , 4 J. S M ALL & E MER GI NG B US . L. 95 , 1 01 (20 00) (explainin g typo squattin g as th e “r egister [ing][of] mistyped variants of popular domainn ames toc atchth e el ectronicc ru mb s dro pp edb yc are le ss websurf er s”). I nitsr es po n set o So u th ern ’smotio n , Daub enar gu ed , am on goth erthin g s, th at it s u se 3 of th e do mainn ames fell withinth e de finitionof the fair use defen se totra demark infrin gem ent fo u n d in1 5U .S .C

. § 1 1 1 5 (b)( 4). 4 s u it h a s b e e n re s o lv e d

. S ee I n t ernet C o rp . f or A ssi gn ed N am es and N u m bers, U D R P ¶ 4( k) ( O c t
. 24, 1999) , ht t p: //w w w . i c ann. or g/ en / udrp/udrp- pol i c y24oct99. h t m . I n t h e st ate c ou rtact i on , a j u ry ret u rn e d a v e rdi cti n favor of D auben on O c t obe r 30, 2007. Bef o r e t he s t at e c o ur t j ur y r e t ur ne d i t s ve r di c t , So ut he r n f i l e d t he c ur r e nt cl ai m i n t h e U n i t ed S t ates D i st ri ctC ou rtforthe N ort h ern D i st ri ctof T exas on Oc t o b e r 5 , 2 0 0 7 , a l l e g i n gt h a t Da u b e n ’ s “ t y p o s q u a t t i n g ” v i o l a t e s ACP A. 2 S i m u l tan eo u sly, S ou th ern f i l ed a m oti on f

or p reli m i n a ry i nj u n cti on see k i n g to p r e v e n t D a u b e n ’s c o n t in u e d u s e o f t h e d o m a in n a m e s . O v e r D a u b e n ’s obj ec t i ons , t he di st r i c t c our t gr ant ed t he m ot i on i n an O c t obe r 22, 2007 or derby

3
c o nc l udi ng t hata l lf o ur pr e l i m i nar y i nj u n c t i o n pr e r e qui s i t e s e xi s t e d a nd t her ef or e e nj oi ned D auben f r om “ [ r ] egi st er i ng, t r ansf er r i ng, t r af

f i c ki ng, usi ng, or m a i n t a i n i n g t h e regi s t rat i o n of t h e dom a i n na m es, S O T H E R N C O M P A N Y
. C O M an d S O U T H E R N C O P A N Y .C O M , or an y ot h er d o m a in n a m e th a t is id e n t ic a l o r c o n fu s in g ly s im il a r to a n y o f P la in t if f’s S O U T H E R N C O M P A N Ym a r k s .” (O r d e r G r a n tin gP r e lim . Inj. 7 .)5

In r e s po ns e , D aub e n f i l e d a m o t i o n f

o r r e c o ns i de r at i o n. I n i t , D au ben
ar gued t hat i t s em pl oym ent of t he dom ai n nam es c ons t i t ut ed a fai r use by p o in tin gto A C P A ’ s s a fe h a r b o r p r o v is io n , w h ic h s ta te s : “B a d fa ith in te n t . .
. s hal l no t be f

o und i n any c as e i n w hi c h t he c o ur t de t e r m i ne s t hat t h e person b e l i e v e d a n d h a d r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e u s e o f t h e d o ma i n n a me w a s a fair us e or o th erw i se law ful. ” 1 5 U
. S

. C

. § 11 2 5 (d)( 1 )( B )(i i). A ccord i n g to D aub e n, i t s us e fe l lw i t hi n t hi s safe har bo r b e c aus e i t e m pl o ye d t he w o r ds

“ southern ” an d “c om pa n y” i n t h ei r descr i pti ve sense by p rovi di n g pa y- per- cl i ck l i n ks to com pa n i es l ocat ed i n t h e Sou t h , a use al l eged l y com pa rabl e t o a yel l ow p a ge s p h on e b oo k

. S eco n d , D a u b en av erre d tha t t h e d istri ct cou rt fa i l ed to
c o ns i der t he ni ne fac t o r s l i s t e d i n 1 5 U
. S. C. § 1 12 5( d) ( 1) ( B) ( i) t o de t e r m i ne w h et h er D au ben possess ed a ba d fai t h i n t en t t o prof i t f rom t h e dom ai n na m es and i ns t e ad i m pr o pe r l y r e l i e d o n t he W I PO ar bi t r at i o n pa ne l ’ s r e as o ni ng. And t hi r d, D aub en asser t ed that t h e di st ri ctcourti n corr ect l y presum ed the exi st en ce o f a t hr e ato f

i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y based on i t s f i ndi ng a l i ke l i ho o d o f c o nf us i o n, w h i ch i n t u rn w as i m perm i ssibl y based on the court’ s f i n di n g t h e dom ai n na m es c onf usi ngl y si m i l ar t o Sout her n’ s m ar k. For Sout her n’ s par t , i t c ount er ed t hat D au ben i s no t m ak i ng fai r us e o f c o m m o n o r de s c r i pt i ve w o r ds b e c aus e t he
m i sspel l ed “s ot h ern” and “ copan y” are not act u al w ords. Sou t h ern f u rt h er c l ai m e d t hata m aj o r i t y o f 15 U
. S. C. § 11 25 ( d) ( 1) ( B) ( i) ’ s fac t o r s s upp o r t a f i ndi ng o f b ad fai t h

. Fi nal l y, So ut he r n di d no t a ddr e s s D aub e n’ s a s s e r t i o n t hatt he d is tr ic t c o u r t in c o r r e c tly d e te r m in e d th a t a s u b s ta n tia l th r e a t o f ir r e p a r a b le i nj u ry exi st s. I n de nyi ng D aub e n’ s m o t i o n fo r re c o ns i de r at i o n o n Fe br uar y 14 , 2 00 8, t he di s t r i c t c o ur t r e buf

fe d a l lo f Da u b e n ’ s a r g u m e n t s . F i r s t , a l t ho ugh a c kno w l e dg i ng6

t h at D au ben rai sed t h e app l i cabi l i t y of A C P A ’ s s afe ha rb o r, th e di st ri ctcourt
n e g le c te d to a d d r e s s th is p r o v is io n a n y w h e r e in it s a n a l y s is

. S e c o n d , it d i sm i sse d D a u b en ’ s cl a i m tha t t h e cou rt fa i l ed to co n sider A C P A ’ s ba d fa i th fac t o r s b e c aus e “ [ t ] he m o s t i m po r t antg r o unds f o r f i ndi ng ba d fai t h ‘ ar e t he
u n i qu e ci rcum st an ces o f t h e case, w h i ch do n ot f i t nea t l y i n t o speci f

i c fact ors e n u m e r a te d b yC o n g re ss b u t m a yn e v e r t h e le s s b e c o n s id e r e d u n d e r th e s t a t u t e .’” (O r derD en. M ot
. f

orR ec ons . 4 ( quot i ng S p o rty ’ s Fa rm L .L .C

. v . S

p o rts m a n ’s Market , I

n c. , 202 F. 3d 489, 499 ( 2d C i r . 2000) )

. ) An d t hi r d, the c our t s t at ed t hat i t c o r rect l y c o nc l ude d t hatSo ut he r n woul d s uf fe r i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y w e r e t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n no t g r ant e d. Su bs equent l y, D auben f i l ed t hi s t i m el y appe al , and w hi l e t hi s appealw as p en d i n g, con sider a ti on of th e m erits con ti n u ed be l ow . O n A p ri l1 8 , 20 0 8 , bo th D au ben an d S ou t h ern f i l ed m ot i on s f

or su m m ary j u dg m en t
. T h e d i st ri ctcourt g r a nt e d s um m a r y j ud g m e nti n So ut he r n’ s fa vor on Aug us t1 1 , 2 0 0 8
. To st r uct ure t he appr opr i at e r em edy, t he di st r i c t c our t s ought s uppl em ent al br i e f i ng, w hi c h i t r e c e i ve d o n Septem ber 1 5, 2 00 8. Si nc e t he n, ho w e ve r , t he
cou rt ha s ye t t o issu e it s f i n a lju d gm en t a n d re m ed y. B a sed on the su cces s of i ts
m ot i on f o rsum m ary j u dg m en t , Sou t h ern f i l ed w i t h t h i s c ou rta m ot i on t o decl are t h e app eal m oot , w h i ch h as been carr i ed w i t h t h e case. I I . DI S CU S S I ON W e f i rstadd ress Sou t h ern’ s m o ti on t o decl are t h e app eal m oot
. A f t er den yi n g t h e m ot i on , w e t h en t u rn to t h e con si derati on of the d i st ri ctcourt ’ s or der gr ant i ng t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n. A . D auben’ s A ppeal I s N ot M oot7

D au ben ’ s app eal fr om the di st ri ctcou rt ’ s grant of a prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on i s not m oot b e ca u se , desp i t e t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s s u m m ary j u dg m en t i n favor of So ut he r n, t he co ur t ha s y e t t o i s s ue a f i nalj udg m e nt a nd p e r m ane nt i nj unc t i o n. A s S ou th ern r ec ogni ze s i n i t s m ot i on, “ ‘ [ o] nce an or dergr ant i ng a perm an en t i nj u n ct i on i s enter ed, t h e ord er granti n g t h e prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on i s m e r ge d wi t h i t , a nd a n a pp eal is p rope r o nl y f r o m t he o r de r g r ant i ng t he per m anent i nj unct i on. ’ ” (M ot
. t o D ec l ar e AppealM oo t 1 ( quot i ng L a . W o rld Expo s i t i o n, In c. v . Logue , 7 4 6 F .2 d 1 0 3 3 , 1 0 3 8 (5 th C ir . 1 9 8 4 )); s e e als o FTCv. A ssai l, I

n c. , 98 F. A pp’ x 316, 317 ( 5t h C i r . 2004) ( “ W hi l e [ appel l ant ] ’ s appealw as pen di n g, t h e di str ict court converted t h e prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on i n t o a pe r m ane nt i nj unc t i o n a nd e nt e r e d a f i nalj udg m e nt
. The di s t r i c t c o ur t ’ s g r ant
o f a pe r m ane nt i nj u n ct i o n r e nde r e d t hi s pa r t i c ul ara ppe al[ c o nc e r ni ng t he prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on ] m oot
. ” )

. ) H ere, how ever, t h e di st ri ctcourtha s not
e n te r e d a p e r m a n e n t inju n c tio n o r a f in a l ju d g m e n t d e s p ite h a v in gd e c id e d th is case’ s m eri t s. W h i l e t h e di st ri ct court f ou n d t h at “ i nj u n ct i ve rel i ef an d st atutor y da m ages are app ropri ate, ” i t al so s t ated t h at “ [ t ] h ose rem edi es w i l lbe i n cl u ded i n the f i n a lj u d gm en t w h en i ti ssues .” (O r d e rG r a n tin gS u m m . J . 1 5 (e m p h a s is ad ded )

. ) Th i s l an gu age m ak es clea r th at t h e court ’ s or der di d n ot i m pose a pe r m ane nt i nj unc t i o n a nd t hats uc h r e l i e f w i l lc o m e a l o ng ats o m e t i m e i n t he f u t u re. W e are not persua ded by S ou t h ern’ s c l ai m t h at t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s s t ated i nt ent i on t o g r ant a pe rm a n en t i nj unct i on i n t he f ut ure eq uat es t o t he ac t ual i ssuanc e o f

s uc h a r e m e dy

. Addi t i o nal l y, a s D aub e n c o nt e nds , t he exact l angu ag e o f

t he pe r m ane nt i nj unc t i o n i s unkn o w n a nd m ayv ar y f r o m t he l a n g u a g e o f

t h e p r e l i mi n a r y i nj u n c t i o n . Wi t h a p r o p e r c o n t r o v e r s y b e f o r e u s , we no w t ur n t o D aub e n’ s a pp e alf r o m t he o r de rg r ant i ng t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n.8

B . Th e Prel i m i nary I nj un ct i on Sh oul d B e Vacat ed W e c onc l ude t hat t he di st r i c t c our t abus ed i t s di sc r et i on by c onduct i ng an i nc o m pl e t e a nal ys i s o f So ut he r n’ s l i ke l i ho o d t o s uc c e e d o n t he m e r i t s and o f t he
e xi s t e nc e of a subs t ant i alt hr e ato f i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y t o So ut he r n a bs e nt t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n.

“A pr el i m i nary i nj unct i on i s an ext r aor di nary r em edy and should be gr a n ted on l y if

the m ov a n t ha s cl ea rly carr i ed the bu rd en of p ersu a sion w i th resp ect to allf

ou r fa ctors.” A l l i ed Mktg. G roup , In c. v. CD L Mktg. , I n c. , 878 F. 2d 806, 809 ( 5t h C i r . 1989)

. The r equi r ed f our fac tors a r e: “ ( 1) a s ubst ant i al lik e lih o o d o f s u c c e s s o n th e m e r its ; (2 ) a s u b s ta n tia l th r e a t t h a t p la in tiff w ill suff er i rreparabl e i nj u ry i f t h e i nj u n ct i on i s den i ed; ( 3) t h at t h e t h reat en ed inju ry ou tw e igh s a n y d a m a g e th a t t h e inju n ctio n m igh t ca u se [th e ] d e fen d a n t[];
a n d (4) th a t t h e inju n cti on w i l ln ot d i sse rv e th e p u b l i c i n teres t. ” S uga r B u st ers LLCv . Br e nnan , 17 7 F
. 3 d 25 8 , 2 6 5 ( 5 th C i r. 19 9 9 ). T h e u l ti m a te d ecisi on to gr anto r de ny a pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i on is r e vi e w e d f o r a n a bus e o f

di s c r e t i o n. Pauls s o n Geo

phy s i c alSe r v s . , I

nc . v . Sigm ar , 5 2 9 F .3d 3 0 3 , 3 0 6 (5t h C ir. 2 0 0 8 ); Hoover v. Moral es , 164 F
. 3d 221 , 224 (5 th C i r. 199 8) ( “ [ T ] h e ul t i m ate deci si on
w h et h er t o gran t or den y a prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on i s r evi ew ed onl y f or abu se of di scr et i on . . . . ” )

. A n abu se of di scr et i on occurs w h en a di st ri ctcourt“ ( 1) rel i es o n c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s fa c t u a lf i n d i n g s ; ( 2 ) r e l i e s o n e r r o n e o u s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w; or (3) m i sa p p l i es th e law to t h e facts. ” McC l u re v. A sh cr o ft , 335 F. 3d 404, 408 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ). H e r e , D a u b e n ’s fi r s t tw o a r g u m e n t s c e n t e r o n th e d is t r ic t c o u r t ’s
c o nc l us i o n t ha t So ut he r n i s l i ke l y t o s uc c e e d o n t he m e r i t s . Dau b en’ s f i nal
ar gum ent f

oc use s on t he c our t’ s det er m i nat i on t hat t her e e xi st s a s ubst ant i alDaube n’ s r eplybrief raise s arguments concerning th e re maining

two preli minary 4 inj unction requirements, but its initial brief only addressed the two factors de scribe d inth e text. Th erefo re, we do not address the arguments concerning the third and fourth factor s in th e pr elim in aryin

j u n ctio nan aly si s. See United States v. Jackson , 42 6 F .3d 3 01, 304n .2 (5 th C ir

. 2 0 0 5 ) (“Argu me ntsr ais edf orth e firs t ti mei nar ep lyb ri ef

. . . arewaived .”). S ection1 1 2 5 (d)( 1 )(

A ) provid es : 5 A personshall be liable in a civil action by the owner of amark

. . . if, without regard to the go ods orservices of th e parties, that per son (i) h as a ba d faithi nte nt top ro fit fromth at mark , inclu din gap er so n al n a me whichis protected a s a mark u nder this sectio n; and (ii) registers, traffics in , or uses adomain nameth at— (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at th e ti me of registrationof th e do mainn a me , isi de ntical orc onfu si n glysi milar toth at mark

. I n its r eplybrief, Daub en additionallych all enges th e district co urt’s conclusion that 6 Southern’s mark is entitled to protection ; acco rdin gly, Daub en has abandon ed this argu ment onapp eal b yf

ailin gt o rais e iti nth e initial b ri ef

. See Jackson , 42 6 F .3d at 3 04 n.2. 9 t h reat t h at Sou t h ern w i l lsuf fer i rreparabl e i nj u ry i f t h e prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on i s no t g r ant e d. W e a ddr e s s t he s e a r gum e nt s i n t ur n. 4 1 . L ik e li h o o d O f S u c c e ss O n T h e M e rits In order t o prevai lon the m eri t s of an A C P A cl ai m , Sou t h ern m u stshow t hat ( 1) i t s m ar k “i s a d i sti nct i ve orfam ous m ar k ent i t l ed t o pr ot ec t i on” ; ( 2) D a u b e n ’s “d o m a in n a m e s a r e ‘id e n t ic a l o r c o n fu s in g ly s im il a r to ’ [S o u t h e r n ]’s
m ar k” ; and ( 3) D aub e n “ r e gi s t e r e d t he dom ai n nam e s w i t h t he b ad fai t h i nt e nt t o pro f i t f r om t hem

. ” Se e Shi e l ds , 2 5 4 F
. 3 d a t 4 8 2 ( q u o t i n g1 5 U. S

. C. § 1125( d) ( 1) (A ) )

. D auben’ s ar gum ent s f oc us on t he di st r i c t c our t ’ s f i ndi ng of

bad 5 fai th i n ten t t o p rofi t. 6 T h e st a tu te sets f

orth a n on ex h a u sti ve l i st of n i n e factors for th e cou rt t o c o ns i de r i n de t e r m i ni ng w he t he r a de fe nda nt r e gi s t e r e d a do m ai n na m e w i t h aThese factor s are : 7 (I) the trade mark oroth er intellectu al property rights of th e pe rson, if any , in the domainn ame; (II) the extent to which the domain name consi sts of the legal name of the [defendant] or an ame that i s oth erwise commonly used to i dentify that [d ef en dant] ; (II I) the [defen dant]’s prior use, if any , of the domain nameinconnectionwith th e b on af

id e of fe rin go f a nygoo dso r se rvic es ; (IV ) th e [de fendant]’s bon a fide noncommerci al or fair use of the mark in asite acce ssibleu nder the domainn ame; (V) the [defen dant]’s intent to divert con sumers from th e mark owne r’s o nline locationto a site ac c es s ibl e u nder the domainn ame that co uld har m the go odwill represe nted by the mark, eitherfor commerci al gain or with the inte nt to t arnish or dispara geth e mark, bycreatin g a likelihoo d of confu sionas to the source , spon sorship, affiliation , or endo rsementof the site; (VI) th e [de fendant]’s offer to tran sfer, sell, o r otherwiseassi gnth e do main nameto the mark own er o r anythird party f orfin ancialgainwith out having used, or having

an intent to use, the domain nameinth e b onafideoffe rin g of anygoods o r services, or the [defen dant]’s prior c onduct indic atin g a patternof such conduct; (VI I) the [defen dant]’s provis io n of mate rialan d misle adin g false cont act in f or m ation when applying for the registrationof the domainn ame, the [defen dant]’s intention al failure to maintain accu r at e co ntact information , or the [defen dant]’s prior c onduct indic atin g a patternof such conduct; (VI II) th e [de fendant]’s registra t ionor acquisitionof multiple domainn ames whichth e [de fendant] knows ar e i dentical or c onfu singlysimil ar to marks of othe rs th at are distinctive at th e ti me of registrationof such domain name s, or dilutive of famou s marks of othe rs th at are famou s at the time of re gi stration of suchdom ain name s, with out re g ardt o th e goo dso r se rvic eso f th e partie s; and (IX) the extentto whichth e m ar ki nc orporated in the [defen dant]’s domain nameregistrationis or i s no t di stinctive and famou s w it hi n the meaning of subsection(c) of this sec tion

. 1 5U .S .C

. § 1 1 2 5 (d)( 1 )( B)(i)

. 10 b a d fa i th i n ten t t o p rofi t. S ee 15 U
. S. C. § 1 12 5( d) ( 1) ( B) ( i) ( “ I n de t e r m i ni ng 7
w h e th e r a [d e fen d a n t] h a s a b a d faith in te n t d e sc rib e d u n d e r s u b p a ra g ra p h (a), a court m ay con si der fact o rs such as, bu t not l i m i t ed to [ t h e ni n e l i st ed fa c to r s ] . .
. .”); Shi e l ds , 25 4 F. 3d at 48 4 ( “ Se c t i o n 11 25 ( d) ( 1) ( B) ( i) pr o vi de s a no ne x h a u stiv e list o f n in e fa cto rs . . . to c o n sid e r w h e n m a k in gth is d e te rm in a tion .”)

.11

A dd i t i on al l y, t h ere can be n o bad fai t h i n t en t w h ere A C P A ’ s fai r u se safe ha rbor ap pl i e s : “ Bad fai t h i nt e nt de s c r i be d un de rs ubp ar ag r ap h (A) s hal lno t b e f o und i n any c as e i n w hi c h t he cour t det er m i nes thatthe [ def endant ] bel i eve d and had
reasona bl e groun ds t o bel i eve t h at t h e u se of t h e dom ai n na m e w as a fai r use or o th e r w is e la w fu l.” 1 5 U .S .C . § 1 1 2 5 (d )(1 )(B )(ii); s e e al s o E
. & J. G al l o Wi ner y v . Spi de rW

e bs Lt d. , 28 6 F
. 3 d 27 0 , 27 5 ( 5 th C i r. 20 0 2 ). F a ir u s e i s d efi n ed as “a
us e , o t he r w i s e t han as a m ar k,

. . . o f a t e r m o r de vi c e w hi c h i s de s c r i pt i ve o f a nd
use d fai r l y and i n goo d fai t h onl y t o des c r i be t he goods or se r vi c es of s uch par t y, o r th e ir g e o g ra p h ic or igin .” 1 5 U .S .C

. § 1 1 1 5 (b )(4). I n f i ndi ng D aub e n’ s b ad fai t h i nt e nt , t he di s t r i c t c o ur t s t at e d: [ I ] t i s c l e a r t o t h e Co u r t t h a t [ Da u b e n ] a d o p t e d t h e SOUTHERN CO M PA N Y [ m ] ar k a nd d o m ai n na m e , s o a s t o di ve r t m i s t yp i ng Inter n et users l ooking f or [ S ou t h ern]’ s w ebsi t e to [D au ben ] ’ s s i t es, w h ere [ D aub e n] g e t s pa i d e ve r y t i m e a us e r c l i c ks o n a hy pe r l i nk. In ad di t i on , the C ou rtfi n ds t h e W IPO a rbi t rat i on p an el ’ s f i n di n g of bad fai t h i n t h i s c ase persua si ve. ( O rder G ran t i n g P rel i m . I nj

. 5. ) I n respon se to D au ben ’ s asser t i on t h at i t fai l ed t o a ppl y AC PA ’ s fac t o r s a nd t hati t e r r on eou sl y r e l i e d o n t he W I PO pa ne l , t he di s t r i c t c o ur t w r o t e : “ The m o s t i m po r t antgr o unds f o r f i ndi ng ba d fai t h ‘ ar e t he
u n i qu e ci rcum st an ces of t h e case, w h i ch do n ot f i t nea t l y i n t o t h e speci f i c fact ors e n u m e r a t e d b y C o n g re ss b u t m a yn e v e rth e les s b e c o n s id e r e d u n d e r th e s t a t u t e .’” ( O r derD en. M ot
. f

orR ec ons . 4 ( quot i ng S porty’ s Fa rm , 2 0 2 F .3 d a t 4 9 9 ).) In chall en gi n g t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s f i n di n g of

bad fai t h , D au ben f

i rstargu es th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u r t e r r e d b y fa ilin gto co n s id e ra ll o f A C P A ’s fa c to r s . W e d e c lin e to im p o s e s u c h a fo r m a lis tic re q u ir e m e n t. See Vi r t ualW or ks , I nc. v. V ol ksw ag en of

A m . , I n c. , 238 F. 3d 264, 269 ( 4t h C i r . 2001) ( “ W e ne ed not , h ow ever, m arch throug h t h e ni n e fact ors seri ati m becau se t h e A C P A i t sel f notesOur doin g so, howeve r, sho uld not be construed as an invitationto omit consi deration 8 of th e s e f

a c t o r s i n th e f

u t u r e , a n d we n o t e th at m a ny di s t ri c t c o u rt s c o n s i d e r th efac tors i n de ci din gwh eth ero r n otto grant ap re liminary in j u n ctio nu n de r A C PA

. See, e.g. , Du d le y v. H e a l th So urc eChi rop ra c ti c, I nc. , 5 8 5 F . Su pp. 2d 433 , 44 0–4 3 (E .D.N.Y. 200 8) (“Th e A CPA lists nin e factor s to assist courts in determinin g wheth er a person has a bad faith inte nt to profit fromth e u se of

a m ark .”(fo ot n ot e om itte d) ); E. Gluck Cor p. v. Rot hen haus , 58 5 F . Su pp. 2d 5 0 5 , 5 1 9( S. D.N .Y
. 2 0 0 8); Verizon Cal. In c. v. Navigat ion CatalystS ys., I nc. , 56 8 F . Su pp. 2d 1 0 8 8 , 1 0 9 5

– 9 7( C .D. C al. 2 0 0 8); F a i r b a n ksC

a p i t a lC o r p . v . K e n n ey , 30 3 F . Su pp. 2d 583 , 5 9 4

– 9 5(D. Md

. 2 0 0 3 ). 12 th a t us e of the l i sted cri teria is p erm i ssive.” ). “‘ T h e factors a re g i ve n to cou rts 8
as a gui de, n otas a subs t i t ut e f orc ar ef ul t hi nki ng aboutw het her t he c onductat i ssu e is m oti va ted by b a d faith in ten t t o p rofi t. ’ ” L a mp a re llo v

. F a lw ell , 420 F. 3d 309, 319–20 ( 4t h C i r . 2005) ( quot i ng Lu c as N urs e r y & Lan dsc api ng, I nc. v. G ross e , 3 59 F. 3d 8 06 , 8 11 ( 6t h Ci r . 2 00 4) )

. Rel at e dl y, D aub e n a r gue s t hatt he di st r i c t c ou rt er r ed byr el yi ng on t he W I PO ar bi t r at i on panel ’ s f i ndi ng of

bad fa ith a n d o n a re fe r e n c e to th e ca s e ’s u n s p e c ifie d “u n iq u e cir c u m s ta n c e s .” D au ben ’ s argum e nt s po i ntt o w hati s a n a bbreviat ed consi derati on by the di st ri ct
c o ur t o f t he c r i t e r i a f

o r f i ndi ng a ba d fai t h i nt e ntt o pr o f i t
. Fi r s t , w hi l e r e fe r r i ng t o a W I PO p a n e lmayn o t , i t s e l f, b e e r r o r , c o u r t s s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e UDRP st an da rds app l i ed by such a pan elof t en do n o t m i rrort h e st an da rds un der A C P A

. Se e Bar c e l o na. c o m , I nc . v . Exc e l e nt i si m o Ay unt am i e nt o D e Bar c e l o na , 330 F
. 3d 617 , 626 ( 4th C i r. 200 3) ( “ [ B ] ecau se a U D R P deci si on i s s u scept i bl e of b e i ngg r o un d e d o n p r i nc i p l e s f o r e i g n o r h os t i l e t o Am e r i c a n l a w, t he ACPA
au t h ori zes r eversi n g a[ n ] [ arbi t rat i on ] pan eldeci si on i f such a res u l t i s c al l ed f or b y a p p lic a tio n o f th e L a n h a m A c t.” ); S all en v. C ori n t h i an s Lic enc i am entos L T DA , 2 73 F. 3d 1 4, 28 ( 1s t C i r . 200 1) ( “ [A] fe de r alco ur t ’ s i nt e r pr e t at i o n o f t he A C P A sup pl an t s a W IPO pa n el ’ s i n t erpret ati on of t h e U D R P
. . . . ” )

. Secon d, j u st
as A C PA ’ s l i stof

fac t or s i s no s ubst i t ut e f orc ar ef ul t hi nki ng about w het her badDaubenint er s p erses its fair use arguments withassertion s that i ssuin g the 9 preli minary inj unction violates its First Amen dment rights. Southerncou nter s that Dauben fail ed toraise the First Amen dment arguments with the district court. Regardl ess of wheth er thesear gu ments were r aised bel ow, we n eed not consi der them separatelybe cau se, if Daub en’s conduct i s fou nd to involve aba d faith inte nt to profit and to not c onstitutea go od faith fa ir us e of

S outh ern ’smark , th ensuchc on du ctwilln otb e prot ecte d b yth e Fir st Ame n dm ent. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Purd y , 38 2 F .3d 7 74, 7 87 (8thC ir. 2 004) (“[T]he recor d supports the district court’s finding s that [defendant] registere d and used domainn ames that arei de ntical o r co nfu si n glysim il ar top laintiff s’mark s withab a d faithi nte nt top ro fit
. . . . This co n du ct wa s n ot prot ecte d b y th e Fir stAme n dm ent. ”) ; cf. Elvis Presley En te rs. v. Passpo rt Video , 34 9 F.3 d 622 , 626 (9th Cir. 200 3) (statin g in a copyright infringement suit that “if th e u se of th e all egedi nfrin geri s notf airu se , th er e aren o Fir stAme n dm ent prohib itio n s a g ain st grantin gap re li mi n aryi n j u n ctio n”)

. 13 fai t h e xi s t s , s o t o o i s a r e fe r e nc e t o a c as e ’ s uni que c i r c um s t anc e s w i t ho ut a ny expl anat i on o f

w hat t hos e c i r c um st ance s ar e, l etal one ho w theyev i denc e b ad fa ith

. A c o u r t w o u ld b e b e s t se r v e d b y c o n s id e r in g th e e x is te n c e o f b a d fa ith in l i ght o f ACPA’ s g ui d i ngfa c t o r s a nd b y d e s c r i b i ng , whe r e a p p l i c a b l e , what ad di t i o nalc i r c um s t anc e s de m o n s t r at e b ad fai t h, pa r t i c ul ar l y i n l i ghto f t he extr aordi n ary n ature of t h e prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on rem edy

. W h i l e t h e di st ri ct
cou rt he re fa i l ed to do tha t, i ts stated rea son i n g in con cl u d i n g th a t ba d fa i th
e x is ts is a r g u a b ly e n c o m p a s s e d in o n e o r m o r e o f A C P A ’ s fa c to r s ; th u s , w e w o u ld be h ard p ress ed to concl u de that t h e court a b u se d i t s di scr et i on based on l y on t hi s ar gum ent
. Bu t , D auben’ s nextc hal l enge to t he m et hod of t he c our t ’ s bad fai t h a nal ys i s po i nt s up a f ur t he r pr o bl e m i n t he di s t r i c t c o ur t ’ s c o nc l us i o n. D auben s ec ondl y ar gues t hat t he di st r i c t c our t abus ed i t s di sc r et i on by
om i t t i ng any c ons i der at i on o f A C PA ’ s fa i r use pr ovi si on, w hi c h af fec t s t he bad fai t h f i n di n g, an d w e agree. T h ou gh A C P A exp l i ci t l y provi des a fai r u se s a fe 9 h a rb or, th e d i stri ct cou rt m a d e n o refere n ce to t h i s p ortion of A C P A i n i ts
a n a lys is d e sp ite r e co g n izin gD a u b e n ’ s in v o ca tion s of th e d e fen se . A C P A ’ s s a fe h arbor provi des a n arrow bert h f or fai r use a rgum en t s, an d, on the m eri t s,Southern adds tothis co ntentionbyar guing th at Daub en’s use cannot constitutea 10 fair use because itd oe s n otoffe r anygood or se rvice and because the phra se “southern company” cannot be a good or se rvice. Th ese argu ments essenti ally conc ern the merits of Daub en’s fair use clai m an d ar e m or e appropriate lymadeto, and addressed by , th e di strict court. 14 D a u b e n ’ s c la im s m a y o r m a y n o t h o ld u p . S ee V i rt u al W

orks, I n c. , 238 F. 3d at 2 7 0 (“A d e fe n d a n t w h o a c ts e v e n p a r tia lly in b a d fa ith in re g is te r in ga d o m a in
n am e i s not, as a m att er of la w , e n titl ed to ben ef i t f rom t h e A ct ’ s s afe ha rbor pr o vi s i o n. ” )

. N o ne t he l e s s , w he r e o ne i s r ai s e d, a fai r us e de fe ns e b e ar s o n t he lik e lih o o d o f s u c c e s s o n t h e m e r its

. See , e . g. , N X IV M C o rp . v . R o ss In st. , 364 F .3 d 4 7 1 , 4 7 7 ( 2 d C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) (a ffir m in gt h e d e n ia l o f a p r e lim in a r y inju n c tio n in
a c o py r i ghti nf

r i nge m e nt a c t i o n b e c aus e “ t he doc t r i ne of fai r use st i l ldef

e at s a ny lik e lih o o d o f p la in tiffs ’s u c c e s s o n th e m e r its ”); E l vi s Presl ey E n t ers . , 349 F. 3d at 62 7 ( af f i r m i ng gr anto f

a pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n in a c o py r i ghti nf r i nge m e nt
a ctio n b e ca u se d e fen d a n t’ s fa ir u se a rg u m e n ts w e re u n a v a il in g ); eA cce l arati on Cor p. v . Tr e nd Mi c r o , In c. , 408 F. Supp. 2d 111 0, 1123 (W
. D
. W as h. 2006) ( de nyi ng pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n i n a t r ad e m ar k i nf r i nge m e nt s ui t b e c aus e t he pl ai n t i f f “ h as not m et i ts b u rd en of dem on st rat i n g t h at t h ere i s a l i keli h ood of
success on t h e m eri t s . . . p art i cul arl y gi ven the st rength of [defen da n t ] ’ s fai r use defense” )

. B y fai l i n g t o an al yze t h i s s egm en t of the l aw pert i n en t t o t h e parti es’
c l ai m s , t he di s t r i c t c o ur t a bus e d i t s di s c r e t i o n. S ou t h ern asserts th a t D au ben ’ s fai r use argum en t l acks m eri t becau se D aub e n o f

fe r e d no e vi de nc e o f

“ i t s bus i ne s s orabo ut i t s i nt e nt i n r e gi s t e r i ng” t he dom ai n na m es and becau se D au ben cann ot m ak e a fai r use of m i sspel l ed vari ati on s of

SO U T H E R N C O M P A N Y
. A s t o t h e f orm er a rg u m e n t , w e are 10 unpe r s uad e d b e c ause t he di s t r i c t c o ur t ha d b e f o r e i t e vi de nc e c o nc e r ni ng t heTh ou gh , mi ssp elle d wo rd s o nth e I nte rn etaref ar fromr are . See C hri st op h erRh oa ds , 11 WhatDid U $ @y? Online Lang uage Fi ndsIt sVoice , WALL S T . J., Aug. 23, 2007, at A1 (describ ing

“l eetspeak,” a form o f onlin e l anguage purposefullyutili zingmisspellin gs where “p wn” me a n s “ow n ,”“te h” me a n s “th e, ” a n d nu mb er s and sym b ol s r ep laceth e le tt er s of a wo rd). 15 con ten t of

the w eb s ite s to w h i ch D a u b en ’ s d om a i n n a m es li n k ed

. A s to So ut he r n’ s l at t e r ar gum e nt , D aub e n’ s us i ng m i s s pe l l e d v ar i at i o ns o f “ s o ut he r n”
a n d “ c om p a n y” (t h a t i s, “soth ern ” an d “cop a n y”) certain l y m a y w ea k en i ts fa ir
u s e a r g u m e n t , b u t th a t is a q u e s t io n to b e c o n s id e r e d in th e d is t r ic t c o u r t ’s 11 evaluati on of

t h e fact s and ci rcum st an ces surroun di n g t h e cl ai m — an eval u ati on t h at t h e courtbel ow fai l ed to u n dertake. 2. I rreparab l e I nj u ry D au ben nex t contends tha t t h e di st ri ctcourterr ed i n concl u di n g t h ere e xi s t s a s ubs t ant i alt hr e at t hat So ut he r n w i l l s uf fe r i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y w e r e t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n de ni e d. I n i t s o r de r gr ant i ng t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n, t he c o ur t r e as o ne d t h at thi s t hr e ate xi s t s b e c aus e “ [ e ] s t ab l i s hi ng a s t r o ng l i keli h ood of

conf u si on i n t h e consum er’ s m i n d ‘ al m osti n evi t ably es t abli shes i rreparabl e ha rm ’ ” an d becau se “ [ S ou t h ern]’ s evidence est abli shes t h e dan ger of
c o n fu s io n a n d lo s s o f [S o u th e r n ]’s g o o d w ill a s a r e s u lt of co n s u m e r co n fu s io n .” ( O r derG r an ti ng Prel i m . I nj

. 6 ( quot i ng C h u rch of S ci entology Int ’lv. E l m i ra Mi s s i on of

t he Ch urc h of

Sci e nt ology , 79 4 F. 2d 38 , 42 ( 2d Ci r . 1 98 6) )

. ) I n de nyi ng D au ben ’ s m ot i on f

or r econsi derati on , t h e di st ri ctcourtdescribed t h e evi den ce t hatl e d t o f

i ndi ng a s t r o ng l i ke l i ho o d o f c o nf us i o n: The Cour t has a l r e ad y de t e r m i ne d t hat[ D aub e n] ’ s ut i l i z at i o n o f t he sub j ectdom ai n na m es i s “i den t i calor confusi n gl y si m i l ar t o” [ S ou t h ern]’ s m ark i n sofar as the n am es are act u al l y i den t i cal , l et t er f o r l e t t e r , but f

o r t he s ubt r ac t i o n o f o ne l e t t e r i n e ac h do m ai n. The C our t doe s not f

i nd i t har d t o f

i nd t hat a c ons um erc oul d beThe likeliho od o f confusionstan dard in trade mark infringe ment clai ms invo lves 12 co n si de rationo f ei ght n on exh au stive fact or s: (1 ) th e typeo f markall egedlyi nfrin ged , (2 ) th e si milarity betwe enth e two marks, (3) the similarityof the products or services, (4) the identityof the retail outl ets and purch asers, (5) the identityof the advertisingm ed iau sed, (6) th e defen dant’s intent , an d (7) anyevidence of actual c onfu sion

. Peb ble Beac h Co. v. Tou r 1 8 I Ltd

. , 1 5 5F .3 d 5 2 6 , 5 4 3( 5 thC ir

. 1 9 9 8), abrogate d on ot her gro unds by T

raf Fix D e v i c es, I

nc. v. Mkt

g. Displays, I

nc. , 53 2 U .S. 23 , 32–33(20 01). “This Court has also added ‘[a]neighth factor , the degre e o f care e mployed b y consu mers.’” Pau lsson Geophys ical Servs. 529 F.3d at 310 (quoti ng Rolex Wat ch USA, In c. v. Meece , 15 8 F .3d 8 16, 830 (5 thC ir

. 1 9 9 8))

. 16 confused as t o t h e spon sors h i p of t h e D e fen da n t ’ s dom ai n na m es be c aus e o f

t he i r s t ar k s i m i l ar i t y t o [ So ut he r n] ’ s do m ai n na m e , t hus c a u s i n gi r r e p a r a b l e h a r m. ( O r de r D e n. M o t
. f

o r Rec o ns . 5
. ) To s um m ar i z e , t he di s t r i c t c ou r t f o und a l i kel i hood o f

c onf usi on bec ause D auben’ s dom ai n nam es ar e c onf usi ngl y s i m i l ar t o So ut he r n’ s m ar k a nd, a c c ordi ngl y, m ayc o nf us e a c o ns um e r a s t o t he
s p o n s o r s h ip o f th e w e b s ite s lin k e d to b y th e ch a lle n g e d d o m a in n a m e s . T h is
c o ns um e r c o nf

us i o n, i n t ur n, t hr e at e ns i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y t o So ut he r n. T h e court ’ s det erm i n ati on i s f l aw ed f or t w o reasons. F i rst , t h e l i keli h ood of conf us i o n t e s t i n t r ad e m ar k i nf r i nge m e nt l aw i s di f fe r e nt , a nd m ore c o m pr e he n s i v e , t h a n t h e t e s t f o r “ c o n f u s i n g l y s i m i l a r ” u n d e r ACP A. S e e N. 12 LightTe c h. , I

nc . v . N
. Light s Cl ub , 236 F. 3d 57, 66 n. 1 4 ( 1s t C i r . 2001) ( “ [ T] he l i kel i ho od of

c onf usi on t es t of

t r adem ar k i nf

r i ngem ent i s m or e c om pre hensi ve t h an the i de nt i c alo r c o nf us i ngl y s i m i l arr e qui r e m e nt o f AC PA , a s i t r e qui res c ons i der i ng fac t or s beyo nd t he fac i als i m i l a ri t y o f t he t w o m ar ks. ” ( i nt er nal q u o ta tio n m a r k s o m itt e d )); seeal so Coca- C ol a C o. , 382 F
. 3d at 783 ( “ T h e i n qu i ry u n der t h e A C P A i s t h u s narrow er t h an t h e t radi t i on al m u l t i fact or l i keli h ood of
c o n fu s io n te s t fo r tr a d e m a r k in fr in g e m e n t.” ); S porty’ s Fa rm , 202 F
. 3d at498Becaus e weconclu de tha t the co u r te r r e dby equat ing the mo re com pr ehens ive 13 like lih oo d of

c onfu si onst a n dardwithth e co nfu si n glysi milar st a n dard , wen ee d n ota ddre ss th e partie s’ co mp etin g cl aim s co n ce rnin g th e ef fe ct , if a ny , eBayv. Me rcExcha nge, L.L.C. , 54 7 U.S. 3 88 (20 08), mayhave on presumin g the existence of irreparablein jury from afin ding

of alike lih oo d of

c onfu si on . See Pau lssonGeoph ysical Servs

. , 529 F.3 d at 313(“Weh ave no n eed to de cide w he t he r acourt may presume irrep arablein jury uponfin ding

a likeliho od o f confu sionina trade mark ca se, a difficult que stion consi derin g the Supre me Court’s o pinion in eBay .”). 17 n. 11 ( “ W e no t e t hat‘ c o nf us i ngl y s i m i l ar ’i s a di f fe r e nt s t and ar d f

r o m t he

‘ li k e li h o o d of co n fu sio n ’sta n d a rd for tra d e m a rk in frin g e m e n t .
. . . ”). 13 Sec ond, t he c our t fai l ed t o des c r i be how D auben’ s c onf usi ngly si m i l ar d om a i n n a m es w ou l d i nj u re S o u th e r n , l et alon e d o so i rrep a ra b l y. C ou rts
m a k i n g t h i s fi n d i n g oft en d escr i b e ho w th e con ten t of a d efe n d a n t’s w eb sit e th r e a te n s inju r y to th e p la in tiff

. See , e . g. , A u d i A G v. D ’ A m a to , 469 F. 3d 534, 550 ( 6t h C i r . 2006) ( st at i ng t hat w i t h ou t a n i nj unct i on “A udiw oul d be ir r e p a r a b ly h a r m e d b y co n s u m e r s o n [d e fe n d a n t]’s s ite p u r c h a s in gco u n te r fe it ite m s , in s te a d o f th o s e th a t w e r e la w fu lly s o ld b y A u d i”); C oca- C ol a C o. , 382 F. 3d at 789 ( “ Th e di st r i c t c our t di d notc l ear l y e r r i n f i ndi ng t hatpl ai nt i f

fs w oul d be ir r e p a r a b ly h a r m e d b y [d e fe n d a n t]’s co n tin u e d

. . . u s e o f th e [c o n fu s in g ly
s i m i l ar ] do m ai n na m e s t o di s pl aypi c t ur e s o f di s m e m be r e d a bo r t e d f e t us e s a nd b y th e li n k s to fu n d ra isin ga p p e a ls th a t d id n o t o rig in a te fro m th e p la in tiffs.”); Shi e l ds , 254 F
. 3d a t 4 86 ( concl u di n g t h at t h e di st ri ctcourtproperl y determ i n ed th a t a li k e li h o o d of co n fu sio n th re a te n e d irre p a ra b le inju ry b e ca u se “[p la in tiff ] d o e s n o t w a n t h is a u d ie n c e tr a p p e d in [D e fe n d a n t ]’s s it e s ” b y d e fe n d a n t ’s practi ce of

“ m ou setrapp i n g”— t h e t rapp i n g of I n t ernet users i n a success i on of po p- up a dv e r t i s e m e nt s )

. H e r e , ho w e ve r , t he di s t r i c t c o ur t po i nt e d o nl y t o t he l i ke l i ho o d t hata c o ns um e r m i ghta c c i de nt al l y c o m e a c r o s s D aub e n’ s w e bs i t es
w he n s e e ki ng So ut he r n’ s w e bs i t e , b ut i t m ade n o fi n di ng be ar i ng o n h ow th is18

n avigat i on al m i scue m i gh t i nj u re Sou t h ern. Sou t h ern contend s t h at t h e court properl y determ i n ed t h at “ [ p]l ai n t i f f ’ s evi den ce es t abli shes .

. . a si gn i f i can t ri sk
o f ir r e p a r a b le inju r y .” H o w e v e r , t h e c o u r t m a d e c le a r t h a t th e o n ly e v id e n c e it
c o ns i de r e d was D aub e n’ s do m ai n na m e s a n d t h e i rs i m i l a r i t yt o So ut he r n’ s m ar k. The c o ur t m ad e no f i ndi ng be yo nd t he t e xto f t h e do m ai n na m e s — s uc h a s t he
c o n te n t o f D a u b e n ’ s w e b s ite s — th a t s u g g e s ts S o u th e r n m a y b e irr e p a r a b ly h a rm ed

. F o r t h e s e tw o rea son s, the distri ct cou rt ab u sed i ts discreti on i n i ts
ana l ys i s o f

w he t he r t he r e e xi s t s a t hr e ato f i r r e pa r ab l e i nj ur y t o So ut he r n. C . R em an d Is U n n ecess ary H a v in gco n c lu d e d th a t t h e d i s t r ic t c o u r t a b u s e d its d is c r e tio n in cond u ct i n g an i n com pl et e an al ysi s of Sou th ern’ s m ot i on f or prel i m i n ary i nj u n ct i on , w e vacate t h e court ’ s or der. W e do n ot rem an d t h e i ssue f or f u rt h er c ons i der at i on pr i m ar i l y be c ause t he di st r i c t c our t s i t s pri m ed t o iss ue a f i nal j u d gm en t an d rem ed y in this action

. T h e d i stri ct cou rt ha s d ecide d the m erits
o f t hi s cl ai m i n i t s or de r gr ant i ng So ut he r n’ s s um m ar y j udg m e nt , a nd i t ha s t he be ne f i t o f havi n g receive d a ddi t i o nalb r i e f i ng o n ho w b e s t t o s t r uc t ur e t he
r em edy i n t hi s c as e. At or alar gum ent , t he par t i es c onf i rm ed t hat al lt hat
r e m ai ns b e l o w i s f

o r t he di s t r i c t c o ur t t o i s s ue a f i nalj udg m e nt a nd r e m e dy

— t he l at t e r l i ke l y i n t he f o r m o f a pe r m ane nt i nj unc t i o n. B ecaus e a pe r m ane nt i nj unc t i o n wi l ls upe r c e de t he pr e l i m i n ary i nj unc t i o n, w e w i l lno t de l ayt he pr o c e e di ngs a ny f

ur t he r b y r e m and i ng t he m at t e r o f t he pr e l i m i nar y i nj unc t i o n. W e f u rt h er em ph asi ze t h at our r u l i n g t oda y i n no w ay i n t i m ates h ow t h i s c ou rt
m i gh t vi ew t h e m eri t s of Sou t h ern’ s c l ai m s.19 I I I . C ONC L US I ON F or t h e above reason s, t h e di st ri ctcourt ’ s or der gran t i n g t h e prel i m i n ary i nj u n c t i o n i s VAC AT ED
. P e n d i n gmo t i o n DE NI ED
.