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22–716 PDF 2017

S. Hrg. 114–592 

FRONTLINE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IN 

AMERICA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 2, 2016 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Staff Director 

BROOKE N. ERICSON, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

COLLEEN E. BERNY, Research Assistant 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

BRIAN B. TURBYFILL, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

ROBERT H. BRADLEY II, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BENJAMIN C. GRAZDA, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Baldwin ............................................................................................... 3 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 4 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 5 

Senator Booker ................................................................................................. 27 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 30 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 33 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 39 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 41 

WITNESS 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2016 

Wally Sparks, Chief of Police, Everest Metro Police Department, Weston, 

Wisconsin .............................................................................................................. 6 

Hon. William J. Bratton, Police Commissioner, New York City Police Department, New York, New York ................................................................................ 8 

Rhoda Mae Kerr, President and Chair of the Board, International Association 

of Fire Chiefs, Austin, Texas ............................................................................... 10 

Edward F. Davis III, Chief Executive Officer, Edward Davis, LLC, and 

Former Commissioner of the Boston Police Department, Boston, Massachusetts ....................................................................................................................... 13

Mark S. Ghilarducci, Director, California Office of Emergency Services, and 

the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor, Mather, California ..................... 15 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bratton, Hon. William J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

Davis III, Edward F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement with attachment ............................................................. 62 

Ghilarducci, Mark S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 98 

Kerr, Rhoda Mae: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Sparks, Wally: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

APPENDIX 

The BENS Report .................................................................................................... 64 

Statement submitted for the Record from Chief Gregg A. Cleveland ................. 110 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Sparks ........................................................................................................ 114 

Mr. Bratton ....................................................................................................... 122 

Ms. Kerr ............................................................................................................ 126 
Page

IV 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from—Continued 

Mr. Davis ........................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Ghilarducci ................................................................................................. 163 
(1) 

FRONTLINE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IN 

AMERICA 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. This hearing will come to order. I want to 

welcome all of our witnesses. 

The issues that we deal with in this Committee, I think, speak 

right to our mission statement: to enhance the economic and national security of America. And what we have here today is a hearing that is really going to be talking about what happens at the 

ground level—the men and women who really spend their lives trying to protect the rest of us, and the very difficult issues that they 

are grappling with. 

We have Chief Wally Sparks from Wisconsin here. I met him at 

one of our listening sessions as I traveled through Wisconsin talking about national security issues. And the way that this hearing, 

from my standpoint, is designed is that we want to listen to Chief 

Sparks, who is trying to prepare for what the rest of you have actually had to deal with, and what he is trying to grapple with. And 

then, as we move on down the list in terms of the testimony, you 

can start filling in, at that moment, whether you had an active 

shooter or whether it was an act of terrorism that you were having 

to deal with. Tell us what worked, what did not work, and what 

we have to really improve. 

I know that, for Senator Baldwin and I, this hits pretty close to 

home because on August 5, 2012, there was an active shooter at 

the Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. And when you look at 

the webcam from Lieutenant Brian Murphy’s patrol car, you see 

the bravery of the men and women who first respond, who rush 

into danger. 

Now, fortunately, Lieutenant Brian Murphy is alive today, but 

he was shot 15 times by the perpetrator of that heinous crime. And 

then Officer Sam Lenda also came on. You can see, again, in the 

video, the bravery of the men and women. 
2 

So I think that it is the responsibility of this Committee to make 

sure that the men and women who capably and courageously protect our security have the tools and the resources to perform that 

task. That is really what this hearing is about. What tools and resources are required from a Federal Government standpoint? How 

do we prioritize that spending? The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has about $1.6 billion appropriated for grants and the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

has appropriated about half a billion dollars. That is about $2 billion that we allocate for grants to help folks like you. It sounds like 

a lot of money, but in a Federal budget that is starting to approach 

almost four thousand billion dollars—it is about $3.7 trillion right 

now—that is about 0.05 percent of our Federal budget. 

Now, I think that the defense of this Nation, the defense of our 

homeland, is a top priority of the Federal Government. I think that 

we need to prioritize that spending and put that at the top of the 

list. 

So, with that, I will turn this over to Senator Carper, and then 

we also have Senator Heitkamp and Senator Baldwin who would 

like to make some brief opening statements as well. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I want to say thank you to Senator Baldwin and 

Senator Heitkamp for proposing this in the first place and also 

thank you to all of you who came here to make it real for us. 

Thank you for what you do with your lives and for your service to 

your communities and to our country. 

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Federal Government has 

worked hard to ensure that those on the front lines in this country—our police officers, our firefighters, and our emergency medical 

personnel—are better prepared to help prevent and respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. For example, we have helped 

local officials develop response plans for mass casualty events. We 

have also helped train thousands of law enforcement officers. And 

we have helped build a network of fusion centers, as you know, to 

deliver more timely information to our first responders. 

Of course, we have also provided, as the Chairman has alluded 

to, grant funding for equipment, for personnel, for training, and for 

other needs. I am pleased that the spending bill that we just 

passed in December, signed by the President, contains over $1 billion in grant funding to help States and localities prepare for and 

respond to terrorist attacks and other disasters. 

The recent tragedies in Paris, Boston, Chattanooga, and San 

Bernardino, however, are a stark reminder that we must remain 

vigilant and ensure as best we can that our first responders are 

ready for anything that might come their way. 

That is why we will be paying close attention next week to the 

President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 budget request. We need to make 

sure that it provides the selfless men and women who keep us safe 

with the resources that they need to save lives and stay ahead of 

the threats that we face as a Nation. 

Today’s terrorist threats are very different from those that we experienced on 9/11. 
3 

Today, we unfortunately know that one or two people with an assault weapon or a homemade bomb can create unimaginable havoc 

and throw a whole city into chaos and turmoil. Cities like New 

York, Boston, and Washington, D.C. have been dealing with terrorist threats for quite some time. We know that, with the help of 

online radicalization, a terrorist attack can happen anytime, anywhere. 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today about 

how Congress can further help communities, both large and small, 

to be better prepared for the type of terrorist attacks that we are 

witnessing today, such as active shooter events. 

I also want to hear about what else we could be doing to stop 

homegrown terrorism and, extremism—something that I know all 

of our witnesses are familiar with. 

Last December, I introduced legislation to strengthen the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to work with community 

leaders in identifying and preventing homegrown terrorist threats. 

It is my hope that we can move this legislation soon, so that the 

Department is better equipped to counter the hateful messages put 

out by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist 

groups. 

Again, we thank you all for joining us and a special thank you 

to Senators Heitkamp and Baldwin. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Baldwin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

you and Ranking Member Carper for so quickly responding to Senator Heitkamp’s and my request to hold this important hearing. 

Like many of my colleagues, I hear from constituents frequently 

about their very real fears of being attacked in their own communities—and these concerns are not unwarranted. 

Just last week, in my home State of Wisconsin, a terrorist attack 

was thwarted. A 23-year-old man had a vicious plan to kill, he said, 

at least 30 people at a Masonic temple in downtown Milwaukee. In 

my initial conversations with the Federal Bureau of Investigations 

(FBI), officials indicated that the fusion centers and the FBI databases, such as eGuardian, which allows law enforcement to share 

intelligence, were very useful in thwarting this planned attack. 

In my view, we need to find ways to expand the use of these 

tools, while certainly also guarding the privacy of our citizens. 

We were fortunate in this case, as we have been in others, in 

preventing the attack. However, there will be undoubtedly more attempts to disrupt our way of life. We have to remain vigilant and 

ensure that our first responders have what they need to prevent attacks and respond to them if they do occur. 

One of the things that we have been taught in recent years is 

that we must be able to prepare for the unthinkable. If you think 

about 9/11, up until that point, security for commercial flights was 

not designed to address the methods that were used by those 

attackers. 

I am working to address a similar blind spot by improving the 

safety and security of trains that transport hazardous materials. 

Often more than a mile long, these trains carry volatile crude oil 
4 

and other materials past the back yards of my constituents and 

through our downtowns, which are densely populated urban areas. 

And while I am proud to have made some headway in including 

two provisions in our recently passed highway bill to improve first 

responder access to information in advance about these trains, I 

feel that there is still a significant safety concern for our citizens. 

So, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today 

about what we can do. I hope that we have some take-homes after 

this hearing and that we have specific actions that the Federal 

Government can continue to take to address and assist first responders in their tireless efforts to respond to emergencies and 

keep Americans safe. 

Thank you for all that you do, and thank you for being here. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. 

I have had other requests, so let us keep this short, OK? Senator 

Heitkamp, 2 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Chairman Johnson and Senator 

Carper for agreeing to hold today’s hearing. 

As Senator Baldwin has said, once Paris happened, the first response that I had was: What if I were North Dakota’s Attorney 

General (AG) responsible for the Bureau of Criminal Investigation? 

And how well would we perform, compared to the people in San 

Bernardino? How well prepared would we be? And you add that on 

top of these horrific attacks. No part of our country is immune. No 

part of our country is somehow exempt from this happening. It is 

not the left coast or the right coast. It can happen right in the 

heartland, and we found that out when, in 2015, the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) declared the Minot Air Base, which 

is responsible for intercontinental ballistic missiles, a terrorist target. 

And so, I am curious about where we go from here. Do you get 

enough information from the Federal Government? Are they sharing information? Are there turf protections? Are we, in fact, training our first responders to, first off, keep themselves safe and not 

do things that put themselves at unnecessary risk, but also to contain the event? What are the challenges that you have, as people 

who think about this, immediately after this event? What are you 

doing today? And how can we help? How can we help change outcomes? How can we be better partners with those men and women 

who will always be our first responders: the State and local people 

who are on the front lines? 

So thank you for everything that you do. Thank you for appearing today. And I look forward to hearing more, learning more, and 

helping to build a stronger Federal-State-local partnership to protect all of the citizens of this country. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

flexibility. I want to thank you, the Ranking Member, and Senator 

Baldwin and Heitkamp for this hearing. I want to thank the panel 

members here today. I appreciate the work that you do. It keeps 
5 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

this country safe and, quite frankly, we need to defeat ISIS, but we 

also need to protect our civil liberties. And I think that you guys 

know that, as we move forward. And we protect civil liberties by 

employing best practices and making sure that the Federal Government gives you the resources that you need to be successful. 

It was about a year ago that we had some in this body who 

turned funding for DHS into a political football. That is unacceptable. Quite frankly, you need consistency, you need continuity, and 

you need predictability. As first responders and emergency personnel at the State and local level, you are on the front lines of 

fighting terrorism in this country. 

So, as this hearing is going to demonstrate, we need to be serious 

about this issue—not play political games with it—and give you 

guys the resources that you need, so that you can do your jobs and 

so that we can hold you accountable for those jobs. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Senator Carper for holding this hearing. We appreciate you all for being here. 

I just was in Ohio meeting with some of our folks who are local 

law enforcement in central Ohio, the Columbus area, who are part 

of the fusion center. These are county officials and city law enforcement officials. And my question to them was the same thing that 

I always ask our local law enforcement: Are these fusion centers 

working as a two-way communication? 

Usually this panel is populated by Federal law enforcement 

officials, and that is good. And we bring them up, and we talk to 

them about what they are doing. We have three fusion centers in 

Ohio—one in Columbus, one in Cleveland, and one in Cincinnati. 

I also met, by the way, with the FBI last week. Our regional office 

covers half of Ohio. And my concern is that, from what I am hearing from local law enforcement, it is sometimes a one-way street. 

In other words, local law enforcement is providing information, 

which is important, but often they have a difficult time getting that 

information back. 

So what I am interested in hearing today, particularly, Mr. 

Chairman, is what kind of information flow do you see coming from 

the Federal Government back to you? That is where I think that 

we can be the most helpful to you in ensuring that the citizens that 

we represent are safe. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Portman. 

I ask that my written statement be entered in the record, without objection.1

Senator Baldwin mentioned the attack that was thwarted on the 

Masonic temple in Milwaukee. I just wanted to very briefly read 

quotes from the foiled perpetrator, Samy Mohamed Hamzeh. These 

are excerpts of quotes that he gave to an FBI informant. 

‘‘I am telling you, if this hit is executed, it will be known all over 

the world. The people will be scared, and the operations will in-
6 

1The prepared statement of Chief Sparks appears in the Appendix on page 43. 

crease. This way we will be igniting it. I mean, we are marching 

at the front of the war, and we will eliminate everyone.’’ 

That is what this hearing is about. That is the enemy that we 

face. That is the mindset of these people who want to slaughter 

Americans in our own homeland. 

So, again, thank you all for your testimony and for your service 

to your communities, to your States, and to this Nation. 

And with that, it is the tradition of this Committee to swear in 

witnesses, so if you will all stand and raise your right hand. Do you 

swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee will 

be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

you, God? 

Chief SPARKS. I do. 

Commissioner BRATTON. I do. 

Chief KERR. I do. 

Mr. DAVIS. I do. 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is Chief Wally Sparks. Chief Sparks is the chief 

of police of the Everest Metro Police Department (PD) in Wausau, 

Wisconsin. The department serves three communities with a total 

of 18,000 residents. He has 30 years of experience in law enforcement and currently serves as president of the North Central Chiefs 

of Police Association. Chief Sparks. 

TESTIMONY OF WALLY SPARKS,1 CHIEF OF POLICE, EVEREST 

METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT, WESTON, WISCONSIN 

Chief SPARKS. Good morning. I would like to thank all of you for 

this invitation. I am truly honored to be able to speak before this 

Committee today. When I was advised of who I was testifying with, 

and especially who I was testifying in front of, I was quite surprised that a local police chief from Wisconsin was included in this 

group. 

But then, as I looked at the subject matter of the hearing and 

realized how the topic of terrorism in America impacts each and 

every single law enforcement officer in this country, I finally understood why it was important for me, or somebody like me, to be 

here. 

I am sure that nobody on this Committee has ever heard of the 

Everest Metro Police Department before, yet when it comes to my 

distinguished colleagues, just the abbreviation of the New York Police Department (NYPD) is all that is needed, and everyone knows 

exactly what we are talking about. 

But as I began to put that into perspective, I realized that there 

is only one NYPD—and only one Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD) or Chicago PD, for that matter. They essentially have no 

peers in this country. Everest Metro PD, on the other hand, probably mirrors similarly-sized departments and communities in each 

and every State. When I look at the States that each of you serve 

and represent, I imagine that every one of you has your version of 

an Everest Metro PD or a Marathon County. 
7 

And here are just a few statistics that underscore that point: 84 

percent of all sworn officers in the United States belong to local police and sheriff’s departments. When it comes to local police departments, 86.2 percent have less than 50 officers and 72.8 percent 

have less than 25 officers. For sheriff’s departments, 77 percent 

have less than 50 deputies and 58.3 percent have less than 25 deputies. Perhaps the most telling statistic is that 49 percent, or almost half, of all law enforcement agencies employ fewer than 10 

full-time officers. 

I provide these statistics because I feel that it is important for 

this Committee to understand that, while the events in larger metropolitan areas tend to dominate the headlines, the majority of policing efforts occur in smaller communities. The size of a law enforcement agency can have a significant impact on the delivery of 

policing services in a community, particularly when discussing 

threats like terrorism. 

So while I speak for our particular department, I am probably 

echoing the voices of thousands of other local police chiefs and 

sheriffs across this Nation who face the same concerns and challenges that I do. 

Even though our department is staffed very lean with 25 officers, 

we are still able to provide a relatively high level of training, which 

you will find included in my written testimony. This is likely not 

the case for those 49 percent of departments with less than 10 officers, however. 

We also understand that terrorists typically look for soft targets, 

and they are learning and adjusting to how we, as law enforcement, respond to threats. I think that there has been a false perception in many communities, people think, ‘‘It would never happen 

here.’’ But that reality is changing, with law enforcement leaders 

across the country now remarking, ‘‘It may very well happen here, 

and if it does, are we prepared?’’ 

So the first emphasis should be on making sure that all of our 

law enforcement officers are given the proper training and equipment needed to respond to such an event. There is no Federal blueprint on what every law enforcement officer should be trained in 

nor on the necessary equipment needed for a response. 

There should be more of a coordinated effort between the Federal, State, and local agencies to make sure that local agencies are 

properly trained and equipped. Failure to address this will result 

in greater loss of life when these incidents occur and will likely 

spur more attacks on smaller communities as terrorists realize that 

they offer relatively soft targets. 

The other key piece lies in effectively engaging and utilizing all 

law enforcement officers in the effort to prevent attacks. In the 

wake of the San Bernardino incident, there has been a significant 

focus on the ‘‘If you see something, say something’’ campaign. 

These calls will likely come into local PDs as suspicious activity 

complaints. If the local law enforcement agencies are not aware of 

critical information pertaining to subjects in their community who 

are on the State or FBI’s radar, then we are missing a key piece 

of the preventative puzzle. 

In my 30-plus years in law enforcement, dialogue with the Federal agencies has generally been a one-way street. This has im-
8 

1The prepared statement of Commissioner Bratton appears in the Appendix on page 52. 

proved with increased efforts to expand information sharing 

through the creation of fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces (JTTFs). However, the information gap still exists. 

We need law enforcement leaders that will break down parochial 

boundaries and cut through bureaucratic policies and red tape. We 

must build closer relationships at every level and push critical information down to our frontline officers, if we are going to successfully thwart attacks. Our officers need information in real time so 

that they can properly assess potential threats and respond accordingly. 

I want to thank each of you for your valuable time today, and 

I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Chief Sparks. 

I originally mentioned the dashboard camera from the Oak Creek 

incident, but with our next witness I also have to mention the 

iconic pictures of the brave men and women of the NYPD, the New 

York Fire Department (FDNY), and the Port Authority of New 

York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), as they walked up the stairs of 

the World Trade Center (WTC), walking into danger. That is really, 

again, why we are so appreciative of your efforts. 

Our next witness represents those fine men and women. Commissioner William Bratton is the 42nd police commissioner of the 

city of New York, the second time he has held the post. Mr. 

Bratton served as the Los Angeles police chief from 2002 to 2009, 

making him the only person ever to lead the police agencies of the 

two largest cities. Commissioner Bratton. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. BRATTON,1 POLICE COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Commissioner BRATTON. Good morning. My thanks to the Committee for the opportunity to speak with you today. 

The issue before us, the frontline response to terrorism in America, is more pressing than at any time since 9/11. We believe that 

New York City, where I am the police commissioner, remains the 

top target for terrorists in the United States. Since the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, New York City has been 

the target or nexus for at least 20 terrorist plots—more than any 

other American city. There have been four major cases in just the 

past 2 years. 

Since 9/11, the NYPD has spent hundreds of millions of dollars 

in Federal funding, city and State monies, and private grants to 

counter that threat. My predecessor as police commissioner, Raymond Kelly, oversaw the creation of a sophisticated intelligence 

and counterterrorism capability. It was highly capable, but it was 

limited by significant head count restrictions, even though it was 

staffed with more than 1,000 personnel. Over the past 2 years, 

Mayor Bill de Blasio, whom I work with, has addressed that by 

providing the largest personnel and equipment allocations in the 

NYPD’s history. Because of these allocations, we are evolving in 

order to face the increasingly diffused and complex threat picture. 
9 

That picture now includes ISIS and lone-wolf actors—threats 

that barely existed 2 years ago and certainly did not exist on 9/11. 

These entities—ISIL and others—attempt to attract recruits 

through promises of valor, belonging, and empowerment. While we 

are always on guard for the spectacular al-Qaeda-style attack, with 

ISIS, we have seen a shift toward low-tech, low-cost, and high-impact attacks, oftentimes inspired and not directed by ISIS. November’s Paris attacks left 130 people dead. In San Bernardino, 14 

were killed. In New York City, this past spring, we saw three separate plots—all influenced by ISIS—to either behead people, bomb 

public events, or attack police, specifically. 

But we cannot address these threats without partners. Two years 

ago, I directed John Miller, my deputy commissioner for intelligence and counterterrorism, to execute a ‘‘collaborative reset’’ 

with our closest allies: the FBI, the Secret Service, DHS, FDNY, 

and PANYNJ. Today we believe that we have seamless relationships with all of these agencies. By way of example, the FBI sits 

in on the NYPD’s intelligence case meetings, and we sit in on their 

meetings. We have also worked to improve the NYPD’s intelligence 

capabilities. 

For more than a decade, with the help of the New York City Police Foundation, we have placed NYPD liaison officers overseas, 

where they work with and learn from local law enforcement agencies. We currently have 11 stations and have recently added one in 

Australia, as well as seconding an officer to Europol. By getting 

real-time, on-the-ground insight into overseas terrorist attacks—in 

Tunisia, France, Australia, and Canada—the liaison program has 

helped us redesign our tactical posture in New York City. 

Given the nature of the threat, however, intelligence must be accompanied by improved response and prevention capabilities. Our 

primary asset in this regard has been our Emergency Service Unit 

(ESU), the best trained police officers in the world. But ESU is 

small, fewer than 600 officers, and needs to be mobile. So for years, 

critical sites in New York were instead guarded by patrol officers 

who were borrowed each day from routine precinct assignments. 

These officers were neither trained nor equipped to counter the 

type of threats that they were deployed against. With the help of 

Mayor de Blasio and the New York City Council, we created the 

Critical Response Command (CRC). This new unit, CRC, is a dedicated team of over 500 specially-trained officers with special weapons and enhanced body armor and vehicles. They are briefed on the 

latest intelligence, deployed daily to potential terrorist targets, and 

prepared to mobilize for active shooter or terrorist events. 

We have also revamped our citywide task force, the 800-member 

Strategic Response Command, which is primarily used for crime response and disorder control. They, too, have been trained and 

equipped for the new threat picture—all of them are equipped with 

long guns, for example. 

Today, we have 1,800 officers who are capable of being deployed 

with special weapons across the city. That capability is unmatched 

by any other city. 

Despite this, it remains likely that the first officers on the scene 

of any event will be patrol officers. Accordingly, we have already 

trained over 3,500 of our officers in active shooter tactics in a 2- 
10 

1The prepared statement of Chief Kerr appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

day training. We will eventually be training all 35,000 officers. In 

the training, officers learn how to form small ‘‘contact teams’’ and 

move toward the threat, with the aim of reducing the gunmen’s 

‘‘time on target’’ and saving lives. We will continue the training 

until all of our patrol officers have been trained. 

And through our 16,000-member Shield Program, a public-private partnership, we have already trained 20,000 civilians in what 

to do—run, hide, or fight—if they find themselves in such a situation. But, again, these threats cannot truly be addressed without 

partners. For example, we have worked with the New York City 

Fire Department to develop ways to get to the victims of a Parisstyle or Mumbai-style attack as quickly as possible. The Rescue 

Task Force uses the new tactical teams that we have developed to 

provide force protection for paramedics in ‘‘warm zones’’ where 

shooting has ended, while other teams—primarily ESU officers—go 

after the terrorists or gunmen simultaneously in ‘‘hot zones.’’ 

Our efforts go far beyond these particulars, but being mindful of 

time, my descriptions of a small number of others will be very 

brief. 

We have expanded the number of our bomb detection K–9 dogs, known as ‘‘vapor wake dogs.’’ We have added almost $160 

million of technology, including the issuance and development of 

smartphones to all 36,000 officers. The apps on these devices have 

been paid for, in many instances, by Department of Homeland Security grants. It is technology unrivaled by any police organization 

in the world. 

We also conduct many multi-agency tabletop exercises, which we 

have had the good fortune to have the Secretary of Homeland Security recently attend in New York. 

And under the leadership of FBI Assistant Director Diego 

Rodriguez, the 35-year partnership in our Joint Terrorism Task 

Force—the first one in America—continues. One hundred of my detectives are assigned to that unit. 

New York City faces threats like no other and has invested like 

no other, in terms of dollars, personnel, and partnerships. 

I, along with my colleagues, would be happy to answer your 

questions relative to this testimony and any other issues that you 

might have interest in. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Commissioner Bratton. 

Our next witness is Rhoda Mae Kerr. Ms. Kerr is a fourth generation firefighter and currently serves as the fire chief of the Austin Fire Department. She is also president of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the vice president of the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Association. Ms. Kerr. 

TESTIMONY OF RHODA MAE KERR,1 PRESIDENT AND CHAIR 

OF THE BOARD, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE 

CHIEFS, AUSTIN, TEXAS 

Chief KERR. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Senator Carper, and Members of the Committee. I thank you for allowing me to testify here today. I am honored that I get to be the lone 

representative of the fire service in this great country. 
11 

The International Association of Fire Chiefs represents more 

than 11,000 members and leaders of the Nation’s fire, rescue, and 

emergency medical services (EMS). It is important to recognize 

that the terrorist threat is evolving. The attacks on 9/11 were carried out by a foreign terrorist group using a coordinated strategy. 

The attacks were designed to generate media attention and public 

fear. 

As you mentioned, over the past years, we are seeing a different 

terrorist threat. The incidents in Boston, Paris, Garland, Chattanooga, and San Bernardino used a variety of tactics. They were 

carried out by lone wolves or smaller groups of individuals. They 

used tactics like gunfire and explosives. In some cases, they may 

have communicated with overseas actors. But in all cases, the planning for these attacks was hard to detect. 

The Nation’s fire and emergency service is adapting to respond 

to both large-scale and localized threats. For example, we worked 

with our law enforcement partners and other stakeholders to remove silos that were common prior to 9/11. Also, the IAFC and 

other organizations are educating our members and developing resources to help prepare for the wide variety of threats. We look forward to partnering with Federal, State, tribal, and local agencies, 

as well as other stakeholders, to protect our communities. 

In order to prepare for this new threat environment, local fire departments require accurate information about threats to our jurisdictions. Federal agencies like DHS and FBI can educate us about 

the new tactics, techniques, and procedures that terrorists use. Because many fire chiefs do not have security clearances, this information should be transmitted at the For Official Use Only (FOUO) 

or unclassified level. We need to be aware of what the terrorists’ 

plans are, not the sources or the methods used to obtain them. 

Like many major fire departments across the country, I have 

firefighters stationed at my local fusion center. However, there still 

needs to be greater fire and EMS involvement in fusion centers. 

Also, the IAFC recommends that fire chiefs reach out to local FBI 

Joint Terrorism Task Force offices and local law enforcement agencies to stay informed. 

We also support the National Counterterrorism Center’s 

(NCTC’s), Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, which invites 

first responders to work with Federal intelligence analysts. 

Fire departments can be partners in the information-sharing system. The IAFC encourages fire departments to take part in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. Much like evidence of domestic abuse, firefighters can report evidence of suspicious activity, such as caches of explosives or civilians asking for 

details about emergency response procedures. 

Fire and EMS departments also can educate law enforcement 

agencies about evidence of the use of fire or hazardous materials 

as weapons. Local fire and EMS departments also need to plan and 

exercise for the response to a major terrorist attack. They must develop capabilities to provide rapid on-scene care, triage, and transport to patients. They must also plan an exercise with local law enforcement officers, emergency management personnel, and public 

health officials for these events. 
12 

Command and coordination are important aspects of an effective 

response. The IAFC supports the implementation of the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS implementation requires constant use and preparedness exercises to ensure its adoption by all emergency and support functions. 

Many fire and EMS departments also have mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions. These agreements support 

localized and regionalized planning and interoperability. For example, specialized response capabilities, like a Hazardous Materials 

(Hazmat) Team, can be shared in a region. 

An interoperable communications system is also a vital component of an effective response, and we thank Congress for its leadership in allocating that 20 megahertz (MHz) in the 700 MHz band 

and for its $7 billion to help build a nationwide broadband network. The First Responder Network (FirstNet) is expected to focus 

on data communication first, and then, to develop voice communications capability in the future. 

In the meantime, local jurisdictions must rely upon the land mobile radios, and there are several large cities, Boston included, that 

still rely upon the T-band for interoperable communications. We 

encourage you to look at the statutory requirements that are going 

to require them to sell that T-band network. 

I am aware of the time here, so I am going to try to wrap up 

my remarks very quickly. 

In order to respond to the wide variety of terrorist threats, the 

Federal Government provides grants like the Urban Areas Security 

Initiative (UASI) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program 

for specialized equipment, training, and exercises. Local fire and 

EMS departments use this funding to build and sustain mass casualty and hazmat response capabilities. In addition, these funds 

are used to staff fusion centers, and the grants also provide a vital 

incentive for stakeholders to collaborate on terrorism response 

planning. 

Again, as mentioned, it is important to note that the public can 

play a vital role in terror response. The Stop the Bleed campaign 

is working to educate the public about how to provide hemorrhage 

control with the use of tourniquets during a terrorist attack or an 

active shooter event. Local fire and EMS departments can build 

upon public education programs like Austin’s ‘‘Do Your Part’’ program to provide the training. 

I would like to thank Congress for its focus on homeland security 

preparedness for first responders, and I am going to thank you all. 

I am going to close out because I am over my time. I am going to 

thank the Committee for the ability to represent the fire and emergency service today. The terrorist threat has evolved, and the Nation’s fire and EMS systems and departments are adapting to meet 

this threat. In order to be prepared, it will require a partnership 

of Federal, State, and local agencies, along with the private sector 

and the American public. And I look forward to working with you 

all on these efforts. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Chief Kerr. 

Our next witness is Ed Davis. Mr. Davis is the president and 

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Edward Davis, LLC, a security 
13 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the Appendix on page 62. 

and business strategy firm. Mr. Davis served as the police commissioner of the city of Boston from December 2006 until October 2013 

and he led the local response to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. Mr. Davis. 

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD F. DAVIS III,1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, EDWARD DAVIS, LLC, AND FORMER COMMISSIONER 

OF THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. DAVIS. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

Carper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you 

for inviting me to participate in the ‘‘Frontline Response to Terrorism in America’’ hearing. This is a critically important topic that 

touches each and every one of us and is in the forefront of the daily 

news across the country and throughout the world. It may be the 

active shooter incident in a conference room that devastated a community in San Bernardino or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 

at the Boston Marathon finish line that destroyed the lives of many 

of my fellow Bostonians. The terrorists who commit these heinous 

acts are radicalized here and abroad, but the theme and the intent 

is the same: chaos and the destruction of civilian populations, offering no quarter to women or children. We must stop it, and we must 

do so in an urgent and coordinated fashion. 

Today, Commissioner Evans and Mayor Walsh admirably protect 

the city of Boston and do a great job in dealing with terrorism. But 

in 2014, I testified before this Committee on what worked and 

what did not work during the Boston Marathon bombing response. 

At that time, I recognized the deceased. Again today, I shall do the 

same: 8-year-old Martin Richard, Krystle Campbell, Lingzi Lu, and 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Police Officer Sean 

Collier. I also recognize every other victim in the United States, 

and those abroad, whose lives have been senselessly taken by terrorists. We can never forget them. 

Progress has been made since we dealt with the Boston tragedy. 

We are seeing improvements in the quality of intelligence, coordination of agencies, sharing of information, training, and equipment. 

Game-changing technologies have been developed at a rapid rate, 

and first responders, including the medical community and fire departments, are receiving life-saving training and equipment, like 

the tourniquets issued to all Boston police officers after the incident. 

Recent terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, Chattanooga, and 

Garland, Texas demand a coordinated, common-sense response. 

Community policing plays a very important role in the prevention of these incidents. My former colleagues have long recognized 

the effectiveness of community policing and are laser focused on 

building community relationships, transparency, and accountability. This becomes most effective when reaching out to community members that are sometimes in the shadows, those that do not 

attend community meetings or religious services, and those activist 

groups that never sit down with law enforcement officials. We need 

to move beyond our comfort zone if we really want change and the 
14 

important information needed to prevent these attacks. Community 

policing efforts need to be continuously and properly funded and 

trained up. They should also be audited. 

Intelligence gathering and sharing is another critical prevention 

tool utilized by Federal, State, and local agencies to fight terrorism. 

Fusion centers across the country provide crucial information every 

day, in real time, to multiple agencies as well as forward redacted 

information to the private sector. Their value for prevention and 

crisis response management has been proven time and time again. 

Fusion centers should continue to meet annually to discuss issues, 

needs, concerns, and trends—what is working and what is not. 

Funding needs to be increased in order to attract talented analysts 

and grow properly managed and effective fusion centers that coordinate intelligence from all levels of government. 

Since 2013, intelligence sharing among agencies continues to improve. Impediments have been removed. Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement need to continue working together as equal members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country and in fusion centers, with unrestricted access to information that could 

identify terrorists in their early stages and prevent catastrophic 

events. However, separate systems are ripe for dysfunction. Any 

deterrent to this seamless coordination needs to be extinguished. 

Intelligence gathering occurs in this country, domestically, every 

day. For 35 years, I have been a police officer working on drug 

cases and organized crime cases. We collect intelligence. We cannot 

be afraid to recognize that fact and to manage it properly with the 

proper Federal oversight. We need to look at what is happening, 

pay attention to it, and make sure, as Senator Tester said, that it 

is done constitutionally—but it does happen and it needs to be coordinated at the top level of government. 

I am a member of and work closely with the Business Executives 

for National Security (BENS) organization. I have included their 

recommendations, which I think are very well thought out and on 

point, as to what can work to streamline our intelligence-gathering 

services here in the United States. 

In addition to that, there are other things that worked really 

well during the Boston Marathon. Police officers respond the way 

that they are trained. DHS provided us money through the Urban 

Area Security Initiative (UASI) system to do that training, and we 

responded the way that we prepared. That made all of the difference in the world. And if you do not train, you do not respond 

properly. 

Social media is extremely important in ‘‘establishing a dialogue 

with people. You cannot establish a relationship in a crisis. But social media allows police agencies, fire agencies, and other public 

service entities in a city to connect with people, to communicate 

with them, and to establish a dialogue. 

And, finally, equipment is extremely important. The ability to be 

able to respond, as Commissioner Bratton said, with specialized 

equipment—not to be on display when it is not needed, but to be 

immediately available when the balloon goes up, as they say, is extremely important. 

Finally, in closing, what I learned, in my role during the terrorist 

attack in Boston, is that there is no panacea. The reality is that 
15 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ghilarducci appears in the Appendix on page 98. 

such a challenge requires informed and trusting community members who are not afraid to speak out, coordinated intelligence gathering and sharing among all equal partners who strive to prevent 

attacks, highly trained and well-equipped law enforcement, fire, 

and EMS departments that respond in unison, and, finally, all of 

you to continue to legislatively and financially support these important efforts. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Davis. 

Our final witness is Mr. Mark Ghilarducci. I think that I got that 

right. Mr. Ghilarducci serves as the director of the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and previously served as the 

Secretary of the California Emergency Management Agency. He 

also serves as the Governor’s homeland security advisor (HSA), 

where he oversees Statewide public safety, emergency management, emergency communications, counterterrorism efforts, and the 

State Threat Assessment System (STAS). Mr. Ghilarducci. 

Senator CARPER. First thing, would you just pronounce your 

name for us? 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. Ghilarducci. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I was pretty close. 

Senator CARPER. That was great. 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. Pretty close, yes. 

Senator CARPER. I am sure that we have butchered it in worse 

ways than that. 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. No. Very good. Thanks. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK S. GHILARDUCCI,1 DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND THE GOVERNOR’S HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR, MATHER, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. Well, good morning everyone, and, particularly, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and ladies and 

gentlemen of the Committee. Thank you so much for the invitation 

to address you on this important topic. It is really an honor to represent California and the National Governors Association (NGA) 

today to and to discuss the work that we are engaged in from both 

a homeland security and an emergency management perspective. 

As California’s director of the Governor’s Office of Emergency 

Services and homeland security advisor to Governor Brown, my 

portfolio and responsibilities straddle both homeland security and 

emergency management. As a result, I bring a unique and nuanced 

perspective to bear today as my ‘‘aperture,’’ so to speak, for viewing 

and working on many diverse and complex disasters and emergencies—whether man-made or the result of natural circumstances—is wide open. 

The State’s and the Governor’s homeland security advisor plays 

a critical role in ensuring that objectives, priorities, and collaborative operational actions remain coordinated within States and 

with local governments. The chief executive of a State is ultimately 

responsibile for public safety and must be kept informed and en-
16 

gaged. The homeland security advisor, who is the Governor’s point 

person on statewide security, must be a focal point for FederalState-local coordination and collaboration to ensure a coordinated 

and proactive posture in support of local government and the State 

infrastructure. Anything other than this undermines the larger 

unity of effort and the common operating platform necessary to detect, deter, prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from a potential act of terrorism. 

As seen with the San Bernardino case, we continue to experience 

challenges in obtaining pieces of intelligence, in our ability to connect the dots, and in the lead-up to a possible act of terrorism. 

There were a number of signs associated with the suspects’ actions 

and the related engagement with co-conspirators that we, as an enterprise, were unable to acquire. 

Some of this is due to the use of encryption technology by the 

bad guys. Some is due to legal provisions in place for gaining access to or initiating the tracking of suspected homegrown violent 

extremists (HVE). But some aspects of this challenge can be still 

attributed to gaps in information sharing and communication 

across all levels. 

In recent years, homegrown violent extremism and cybersecurity 

threats have evolved in fundamental ways and, in many ways, we 

are still reactive rather than proactive in terms of countering these 

evolving threats. This needs to change. Built into our homeland security enterprise must be nimbleness and proactiveness, so that we 

can get out and remain out in front of these threats. This needs 

to have its foundation in empowerment at the local and State levels, and it should start with information sharing. 

Currently, there exist many organizations engaged in this intelligence arena, including the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State (DOS), State law enforcement, local 

law enforcement, the fusion centers, and the international intelligence community. 

There remain information and intelligence stovepipes and organizational protocols protecting designated proprietary information 

that needs to be shared. Plots and terrorist actions are carried out 

in communities at the local level and within States. The impacts 

of such events, of course, are felt nationally and internationally. 

This effort must be approached as one team, fighting one fight, so 

that we can, together, remain coordinated and lean forward as legally as possible, leveraging all levels of government capabilities so 

that we can all be on the same page in the effort to detect, deter, 

and protect lives and property. 

Currently, we as a Nation—local, State, and Federal—are not optimally suited, in my humble opinion, to proactively prevent evolving HVE-style threats. DHS remains a good partner, but needs continual evaluation in order to be consistent with current threat 

streams. Its coordination and communications could be improved. 

Funding, training, and information sharing can be inconsistent and 

there needs to be more robust coordination with the homeland security advisors, Governors, and State top-level homeland security 

officials when engaging with locals and/or private entities within 

States. 
17 

With respect to fusion centers, there are 6 centers in California, 

with some 72 across the country, and they are all essentially frontline components to our Nation’s homeland security. Over the last 

several years, we have been forced to evolve into all-hazard, allcrime centers in order to justify existence. This has spread these 

centers thin at times, with regard to their mission focus, and forced 

them to become distracted at times from their core mission of 

counterterrorism. 

In California, our fusion centers are closely coordinated by our 

STAS and oversight is provided by the homeland security advisor. 

These centers, facilitated by local governance boards, have incredibly strong public-private partnerships that are leveraged to facilitate intelligence and information sharing as well as to prepare for 

and respond to emergencies. This is all coordinated at the regional 

and State levels. Building on these best practices and looking at 

what works in a State the size of California is important. 

What worked best in San Bernardino was this exact system. The 

response was very well executed in the overall context, where the 

local authority led the immediate response and was supported in 

a unified command through mutual aid coordinated by the region 

and the State. This included personnel, specialized equipment, intelligence and information, situational awareness, authorities and 

clearances of regulations, victim services, and recovery assistance. 

Outside of the FBI, which is the lead Federal agency supported 

by components of DHS, there were a few other Federal agencies 

that provided direct services, incident funding, or mutual aid assistance in a coordinated way, as did California’s mutual aid and 

standardized emergency management system. This should be highlighted as a best practice and used as a performance metric in 

modeling a strong unity of effort. The team in San Bernardino was 

a unified team of local, State, and Federal agencies working together with wrap-around and integrated incident objectives. The 

incident required the combined efforts of multiple organizations beyond law enforcement, to include fire and EMS, public health, 

emergency management, telecommunications, and faith-based nongovernmental organizations, just to name a few. 

I am proud to say that the relationship between local, State, and 

Federal agencies in California is very strong, and this was evidenced by the actions of city, county, State, and Federal responders 

who came together in San Bernardino with the common objectives 

of saving lives, protecting further loss of life, and neutralizing a 

moving threat. This very dynamic and dangerous situation demanded close coordination and communications, and its success can 

be attributed to excellent relationships, good training, appropriate 

equipment and supplies, and robust coordination at all levels. 

Nevertheless, San Bernardino did present lessons to be learned, 

with gaps and challenges, particularly, with information and intelligence sharing at all levels still being a challenge and not at the 

level or quality that needs to be in place to fully safeguard this 

country. 

As an HSA, I require timely and regular intelligence updates 

during an event of San Bernardino’s magnitude to keep the Governor informed, to engage with my local and Federal counterparts, 
18 

and to coordinate the statewide homeland security and mutual aid 

mission that I spoke of previously. 

When an event like San Bernardino occurs, we must be careful 

not to revert back to not wanting to share ‘‘proprietary’’ information. The FBI in the San Bernardino case received strong support 

from the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), located in Norwalk, California. But along the way, it became a one-way information-sharing relationship between the FBI and that fusion center. 

This impacted the fusion center’s communications responsibilities 

to the State. This presented challenges and resulted in gaps in relevant information getting to senior leaders and decisionmakers, 

who needed to be kept informed, particularly, when the news was 

reporting the ‘‘proprietary’’ information through open-source media. 

This required the development of a time consuming work-around to 

obtain necessary information at a number of critical junctions at 

the information-sharing stage. 

This must be one team, fighting one fight. With all of the money 

and infrastructure established since 9/11 to safeguard this country, 

we need to move past ‘‘proprietary’’ if we are truly going to function 

in a manner that allows us to protect the American people and 

maximize our total unity of effort. 

In closing, let me reinforce that it is critical that we, as an enterprise, understand that the threat landscape continues to shift toward a more diffuse, amorphous threat that focuses on homegrown 

radicalization and lone-wolf actors, who are inspired by foreign terrorist organization’s propaganda and extreme ideologies, and are 

leveraged to act in any way possible in all of our communities— 

large and small. This is a new norm, just as deadly and much 

harder to counter. We must remain vigilant, but also nimble and 

proactive enough to address this evolving threat. 

Enhanced training, adequate funding, the maintenance of equipment and resources, and that collective unity of effort are all absolutely necessary in order to meet these requirements. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Ghilarducci. 

I really appreciate the attendance of my colleagues here. There 

are two choices: either limit the questions to 5 minutes or limit 

them to 7 minutes, but I am going to use the gavel. So we will keep 

it at 7, but I do not want answers going beyond 7 either. So let us 

discipline ourselves to be respectful of everybody’s time. 

Chief Sparks, I want to start with you. I get a feeling Senator 

Portman is going to be talking about information coming down the 

chain. I really want to talk about the grant programs that actually 

work, the coordination—we have heard that term a number of 

times—with other departments, both big and small. Can you just 

speak to which grant programs are essential, which ones work, and 

hopefully which ones could be improved upon? 

Chief SPARKS. Well, the problem is, especially for smaller agencies, it is really difficult to get some of those grant funds down to 

the local level so that we can utilize them for some of the training 

and equipment that we need. We particularly like the Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant. We applied for a COPS 

grant, and typically what we saw was that, in Wisconsin, they 
19 

went to the large cities. They went to Milwaukee and Madison, and 

very little filtered down to the local level. 

But, as you heard from some of the other people on the panel, 

it is critical—that training is critical. Like Mr. Bratton said, in 

New York they have special teams that are specifically trained 

with the equipment that they need. But, in rural communities and 

in smaller departments, that response is going to be from frontline 

patrol officers. So, whatever equipment they have in their squads 

is going to be used to respond. And, in smaller communities, you 

may have only one or two officers, so you are going to have people 

coming from multiple departments trying to go in there. So, we 

need to be able to have grants that can be designed, not only for 

the smaller communities, but presented in a fashion that encourages the communities to work together and to train together. 

In the county that I work in, we have nine law enforcement 

agencies, excluding State and Federal. And only three of those have 

probably the frontline training that they need to respond to active 

shooters and provide emergency medical treatment through Tactical Emergency Medical Specialists (TEMS) and provided equipment—and each of our officers carry that equipment. 

The other six agencies really have no level of training, and if we 

have an incident, we are going to be working with them. So it is 

important that you can funnel funds through your grant programs 

that are designed to—maybe on the ‘‘train-the-trainer’’ programs 

through the local municipalities, start funneling grant funds 

through a technical college system, where you can put them out regionally through the State and encourage—or maybe even tie into 

that funding—the idea that, at the county level, you will train the 

trainers, but the caveat is that you have to reach out to the other 

municipalities that provide that training. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, it takes just a lot of time and resources 

to write a grant, correct? 

Chief SPARKS. Exactly. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, I think that potentially one of the solutions, from an overall Federal standpoint, is determining how we 

can help the smaller communities, so that you can spend the time 

training rather than grant writing. And I think that we are all 

mindful of that. Let us face it. The thwarted plot was in Milwaukee, but no community is safe. So I think that we really need 

to be mindful of that. 

Commissioner Davis, you talked about the need for intelligencegathering capability explained and how we are gathering it, but 

then we always hear about stovepipes. Can you speak to the problems that we are still running into and what needs to be done to 

continue to lower those stovepipes, so that we actually do have 

what I consider to be the first line of defense against these terrorist 

acts, an effective intelligence-gathering capability, while being 

mindful of our civil liberties? 

Mr. DAVIS. Certainly, Senator. So, in being mindful of civil liberties and in understanding that intelligence gathering does occur, 

coordination of the various agencies is really important. And one of 

the problems that I see is that, if you pick one agency to be in 

charge of it all, then the same kind of problem occurs with some 

focus on that particular agency. 
20 

If this goes up to the level of the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI) Office, then the control is happening—or the oversight, the 

auditing, and the sort of direction of best practices is occurring at 

the highest levels of government, and it is not vested in the one 

agency or the two agencies that are picked out among equal players. And I really think that that is important. Anytime that you 

have silos, you have the possibility of missing something. And it 

has happened over and over again, and based upon my colleague’s 

testimony in the San Bernardino case, it seems to have happened 

again there. And I think that it will continue to happen until there 

is a coach, somebody that is in charge of the whole thing that says 

that you have to play together properly. It is like a sports team. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Talking about playing together, kind of 

going back to Chief Sparks’ problem in a smaller community, 

again, being mindful of the fact that in New York or in Boston— 

maybe talk to Mr. Ghilarducci here—how do we get those funds allocated in an efficient way? How do we provide the training, so 

that, not only are we covered in the large cities—where, let us face 

it, those are very severe threats. But how do we get the training, 

the dollars, and the grant money down to the smaller communities 

in an efficient manner? I will start with you, Commissioner 

Bratton. And do you feel some kind of responsibility to help that 

process? Because, obviously, I know that you are fighting for the 

funds, but what can we do to help? 

Commissioner BRATTON. I am coming at it from a different perspective than some of my colleagues, having been in charge of Los 

Angeles (L.A.) and New York, the two largest cities in the country. 

The issue of how to get it down to the smaller agencies is not one 

that I have had to grapple with, but how to get funds is certainly 

one that we have grappled with. Early on in the DHS process, as 

it was being created, the issue of control was centered at State government levels, where the money would come down through the 

State and the State would take a certain percentage as their fee, 

if you will. We have had great problems with that, both in L.A., 

and, in some respects, even now in New York. 

So I do not have a solution for you on that issue, other than to 

reinforce the importance of those grants—and in no city have they 

been more important than in New York, where we have received, 

since 9/11, about $1.4 billion from the Federal Government through 

various grants, all of which have been part of the wide range of activities that we engage in in New York. This is similarly the case 

in Los Angeles, which received hundreds of millions of dollars during this time. 

One of the great strengths of democracy, is the way that we operate in this country, with all of these thousands of communities— 

18,000 police departments—but it is also one of our greatest weaknesses: trying to get them coordinated and trying to get them collaborative. And that still remains a very significant weakness. How 

do we get all of these silos, at some point in time, to come together? 

Chairman JOHNSON. I will be respectful of my time as well. That 

will probably be a question for the record—any suggestions on 

what we can do, Mr. Ghilarducci, in terms of California. Again, I 

do not want to take more time because I am out it, but I would 

really like to see your recommendations for how we can effectively 
21 

and efficiently allocate those resources, even to the smaller communities as well. 

Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Thank you very much, everyone. 

Chief Kerr, just give us one really good example of how the Federal Government can better support fire and emergency service 

providers. Just give us one good example. 

Chief KERR. I think that the way that we can help support our 

first responders and the fire and emergency medical service is 

through continued grant funding and the sharing—and this is the 

key, critical thing that we have heard here today—of intelligence 

and information. The fire service does not have State or Federal 

backup or reinforcements. The local fire service is it when it comes 

to responding to terrorist events. 

So it is really important that every entity, whether they are in 

a small, local community or in a large, major urban city, has access 

to the intelligence and the information, so that they know what 

they are going into. 

So I think that it is really important that we can somehow fund 

or prepare people to be part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force offices. I am very fortunate in Austin. I have a firefighter in the Austin Regional Intelligence Center. I have a firefighter that sits on— 

or is part of—the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. And I have another firefighter that is destined to the National Counterterrorism 

Center in that regard as well. But that is not the case for firefighters around the country, and that is something that we definitely have to improve. 

Senator CARPER. Great. Thank you so much. 

Commissioner Bratton, I think that you may have mentioned in 

your testimony—did you hold up a smartphone? I think that you 

indicated that these smartphones were being provided for, I think 

that you said, 36,000 police officers. Here is my question, and I will 

make you a guided missile. Here we go. I remember when we wired 

every public school classroom in Delaware with access to the Internet. We provided a lot of computers in the school classrooms and 

I went, as Governor, to visit the schools to see how the teachers 

were using them—and they were using all of the technology for 

their emails. And I said, ‘‘I do not think that is what we had in 

mind.’’ And we had to train them. We had to train them. It was 

a combination of using our technical community college to train 

them and, frankly, using younger teachers to teach the older teachers how to use the technology. 

What advice would you have for other police departments—or 

fire departments, for that matter—across the country that are 

using this kind of technology, buying the phones and all of these 

apps, to make sure that they actually get their money’s worth? 

Commissioner BRATTON. It is a new field, in the sense of how police agencies—and I will speak to my agency—are using these devices. I think that I would be correct if I were to indicate that what 

we are doing in New York is probably unparalleled anywhere else 

in the country at the moment. We have been fortunate, through 

Federal grant funds as well as asset-forfeiture funds, to have been 

given hundreds of millions of dollars so that we have been able to 

develop technology that we will be seeking to share with my col-
22 

leagues across law enforcement and the fire services—lessons 

learned, as you will, as we move forward with this technology. 

But it is essential that we get this technology into the hands of 

our police officers, so that if I am looking for a terrorist on a terrorist alert, I can send out his information, his photo, to 36,000 officers instantly. If I am looking for a lost child with autism, I can 

send out that photo. My officers instantly, through their various 

apps, can access just about everything that we have, in the way of 

intelligence, on an issue. 

So it is 21st Century technology that has come, fortunately very 

early in the 21st Century, and it is going to be essential going forward. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. My question was about 

the training. We are not going to pursue this any—— 

Commissioner BRATTON. Training is absolutely essential in the 

job, but where we are with the training is that we are learning 

every day. The creativity of our officers and how they use these devices, we are keeping a running journal on how they are using the 

devices to creatively use the information, solve crime, and connect 

with the community. The connection with the community is one of 

the principal benefits. So the training that we give initially is, we 

are training them—— 

Senator CARPER. That is good. 

Commissioner BRATTON. We are learning from them also. 

Senator CARPER. That is good. You mentioned connections to the 

community—and I only have a limited amount of time, so I apologize for interrupting you. Secretary Johnson just hosted for breakfast the leadership of the homeland security authorizers in the 

House and the Senate, as well as the appropriators. One of the 

things that we talked a bit about was the Department’s interest— 

they are very much interested—in our passing legislation that authorizes something called ‘‘Community Partnerships and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).’’ And the idea there is to go to the 

root causes. And it is all well and good that we degrade and destroy ISIS—I think that that is critically important. It is important 

that we do a very good job of vetting the people that are trying to 

come here, either as refugees, through the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP), or through any other kind of program. But it is also important that we figure out how to reach out into the community. It 

could be to faith-based groups, it could be to nonprofit organizations, or it could be to others. And what the Department is trying 

to do—and we have given them some money to create the entity, 

have the leadership, and get the grants—to have $50 million for 

grants. 

Would you just respond to this approach? Is this a valuable approach for us to pursue. Mark, do you want to go first? That way 

I do not have to say your last name. Ghilarducci? 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. You guys will get it. 

Senator CARPER. It is coming to me. Go ahead. Just be very brief. 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. Yes. Let me just say that there is nothing linear about any of these homeland security and counterterrorism efforts. It has to be a whole-of-community approach. If we are really 

going to counter this, it has to involve all of these entities—nongovernmental all the way down to school kids. 
23 

1The statement from Chief Cleveland appears in the Appendix on page 110. 

This dynamic is changing our country and we need to be informing and empowering people to, not only recognize what is happening, but to be a part of the solution. 

Now, that can be done while protecting civil liberties and our 

constitutional rights. But, much like we have seen in history in the 

past, there are certain things—certain threats—whether they are 

natural or man-made, where we want to empower folks to be able 

to make themselves a part of the solution. 

So this effort that the Secretary is talking about is a good one 

because it does actually begin that process of countering and—— 

Senator CARPER. I am going to ask you to hold it right there. 

Thank you very much. 

Raise your hand if you think that what the Department of Homeland Security is pursuing is a smart idea. 

Let the record show that four to one say that it is a smart idea. 

Commissioner Bratton, we will talk with you about it later. Thank 

you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Baldwin. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you. I appreciate all of your testimony. 

I want to start where the conversation is right now. We are talking 

about communication. We have been talking about communication 

at the local, State, and national level, talking about communication 

among peer agencies—and how we can do a better job if we have 

a ‘‘coach’’ rather than silos, and talking about public and private 

conversations as well as conversations within governmental agencies. 

Chief Kerr, you talked a little bit about interoperability in your 

testimony, especially regarding real-time response to an emergency—whether that emergency is man-made or naturally occurring. I want to just use a quick example. Mr. Chairman, I have 

some testimony from Chief Gregg A. Cleveland, the fire chief from 

La Crosse, which I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter 

into the record.1

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Senator BALDWIN. Great. 

The reason that I raise this relates back to some of the concerns 

that I expressed about the movement of hazardous materials—obviously subject to an accident if it is by train or even if it is by truck, 

but also subject to nefarious terrorist activity. 

In La Crosse, Wisconsin, where Chief Cleveland works, they have 

invested huge amounts of money into upgrading their communications equipment to respond to a real-time emergency. La Crosse is 

on the Mississippi River. La Crosse has a rail line running through 

it along the Mississippi. On the other side—the Minnesota side— 

there is also a rail. Both transport hazardous materials on a daily 

basis. Their upgraded communication system could not operate 

with the Minnesota side—even though they had just invested a 

very significant amount of local resources with that upgrade. 

What is your sense of the status right now, in terms of interoperability? And I would certainly be interested in all of you—hearing 

your perspective briefly on where we are right now with those investments as well as how you would be able to communicate in real 
24 

time during an emergency—natural or man-made—with the agencies that you need to coordinate with. Let us start with you, Chief 

Kerr. 

Chief KERR. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. The FirstNet, which I 

mentioned, is the federally designated network and it is an independent entity within the U.S. Department of Commerce. They are 

the ones that have been charged with completing and working out 

the 20 megahertz band that was designated for interoperability. 

The first part of that is going to be for sharing data only and 

then the voice transmission will come second. So the land-to-mobile 

radio system, which Chief Cleveland was talking about, has its limitations when it is built out only to communicate within its own entity. That is a critical part of being able to communicate and share 

information ‘‘across the river’’, so to speak, which you are not able 

to do. 

The answer eventually will be FirstNet, but it is not going to 

come in the next year or two. 

Senator BALDWIN. Let us go down the panel. Chief Sparks, can 

you talk about your reality on the ground in Everest? 

Chief SPARKS. Actually, countywide in a scenario, we do have 

interoperability. So, police, fire, and EMS, we are going to be coordinated, as far as our communication goes. 

Commissioner BRATTON. Where we are is certainly not where we 

need to be. We are making progress all of the time. Recently, Congress—yourselves—voted to increase the spectrum available to us— 

dedicated spectrum—which is critical to interoperability. But every 

community is still wrestling with it. In my city, by the end of this 

year, finally, my subway cops—the cops who work below ground 

and then the others who work above ground—will be able to use 

radios below or above ground without having to go through a whole 

series of connections to try and talk with each other. And, similarly, we are continually improving our relationship communications with our fire colleagues. 

But we still have a long way to go in this country. It is going 

to cost a great deal of money to do it. It can be done, but the devil 

is in the details—and the devil is in the budget. 

Senator BALDWIN. Is that your most significant gap, the one you 

pointed out with the subway police? 

Commissioner BRATTON. It is a significant concern, certainly in 

an active-shooter issue and in a disaster issue. The interoperability 

capabilities that we have seen time and again in every one of these 

instances is the inability to communicate in real time. 

Senator BALDWIN. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. We have cobbled together a system of interoperability 

in Boston that works effectively. It is not pretty, but it gets the job 

done. But that interoperability is based upon the T-band that the 

chief mentioned earlier. And the FirstNet legislation removes that 

T-band from us at a particular point in time. And with the slow 

progress of FirstNet, we need to address that issue because if we 

lose the T-band, then we lose our interoperability in Boston. 

Senator BALDWIN. Mr. Ghilarducci. 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. I would just say that there is no silver bullet 

with interoperable communications. And I think that initially after 

9/11, when we were talking about interoperable communications, 
25 

there was the thought that you could lay down an overarching system nationwide—and I think that this is the concept behind 

FirstNet, which we have been engaged with. 

But in the absence of that—and leading up to that—we have 

dealt with a lot of regional interoperable capabilities. California, 

specifically, has a very robust mutual-aid system. We move resources up and down the State for disasters all of the time, and so 

that precipitates the need to have multiple agencies talking to each 

other in different jurisdictions. A lot of that is done via mobile 

interoperable communications capabilities, which have to be put in 

place. It is backed up through a redundant system to the Statewide 

Microwave Network that can support that. And we have had some 

regional projects, like the L.A. Regional Interoperable Committee 

(LA–RICS) and the Bay Area Regional Interoperable Communications Systems Authority (BayRICS). There has been a lot of engagement by the private sector into that, which has complicated 

the matter a little bit. I am sure that you do know, in the Bay 

Area, that really was a large factor that actually caused that 

BayRICS project to end. 

So I would say again, like the other panelists have said, we have 

further to go on the interoperability. But, there are pockets of development that have been put in place in California that have 

worked pretty well. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. 

Again, I want everybody to be mindful of the clock and of wrapping things up so that we stay on time. Senator Heitkamp. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to discuss making sure that we are all taking a ‘‘one 

team, one fight’’ approach and sharing information, because if there 

is one thing that I hear over and over again when talking with my 

first responders, it is that, once an incident happens, we are all in 

it—and then, there is that immediate response of collaboration and 

cooperation—but that starts eroding, in terms of what we know, 

what we can find out, who is talking to who, and where we can go 

from here. And I think, Director, you spent a lot of time in your 

written testimony on this issue. We had certainly hoped that after 

9/11, when we talked about these communication gaps, we would 

be further along in making sure that there was a fair amount of 

Federal to State and local respect for the need for data, for information, and for intel. 

You raised a lot of these concerns in your testimony. You did not 

offer us a whole lot in the way of solutions—other than a ‘‘let us 

do better’’ kind of systemic structure that we could be looking at 

which could be helpful as we deal with your Federal partners. So 

could you offer some concrete examples of how we could do better 

in terms of information sharing? 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. Well, let me just start out by saying that the 

overarching information sharing structure and our collaborative efforts have improved exponentially since 9/11, to use that as a baseline. That does not mean that we do not need to do more, and as 

we have these events that occur, like Boston, San Bernardino, or 

Chattanooga, we learn little bits each time about what has worked 

and what still needs to be improved. 
26 

I think that generally there is a sense in the organizational cultures that exist to want to keep information sort of inside their organization. This is not just at the Federal level. It is also at the 

local level and at the State level. And so, we need to build into our 

training programs right from the beginning—in our academies and 

in any of the training programs that we are doing on terrorism— 

curriculum expressing the importance of sharing information. Really one of the cornerstones of being able to counter terrorism is 

sharing critical information amongst all of the players. It does not 

matter that I am wearing a State patch and he is wearing a Federal patch and she is wearing a local patch. When it comes to 

this—that is the concept of ‘‘one team, one fight’’—and we should 

be able—we all have clearances. We should be able to all get that 

information appropriately. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I understand what you are saying, Director, 

but what you are talking about is changing the culture—not systemic changes. And I am interested in any other comments from 

any of the other panelists in terms of how we institutionalize cultural changes, not just say, ‘‘Let us do better, let us work together 

better’’. So maybe, Mr. Bratton, you can help me here. 

Commissioner BRATTON. I think that at this particular time, I 

could point to my city as a model of what you are trying to get to. 

For many years in New York, the collaboration was not all that it 

could have been. We were dealing with a combination of personalities, skill sets, and intelligence handlers not trained to the same 

level. The BENS Report that both Commissioner Davis and I would 

recommend to the Committee speaks to a lot of these issues: the 

importance of leadership, the importance of the collaboration of 

that leadership, which pushes down into the organization, but also 

the creation of systems that ensure the sustainability that you are 

talking about, and also the training of personnel. A major gap in 

our situation is our intelligence handlers. Many of them come into 

the organization and within a couple of years they leave because 

there is no upward mobility—and the quality of training is not consistent across the agencies. 

Senator HEITKAMP. One of our roles here is to hold Federal agencies accountable, is to have that oversight—that kind of accountability. In order to do that, we need something more concrete than 

‘‘You need to change your culture’’ or ‘‘You need to be more communicative.’’ We need to have benchmarks or measurements that can, 

in fact, be enforced and will, in fact, build a better culture because 

there will be a known list of expectations. 

I am curious about—and I will look at—the BENS Report and 

take a look at those secondary sources. But you are all here right 

now—and we have training needs and we have equipment needs— 

I recognize all of that. We are working hard to make sure that we 

are using everything as efficiently as we can. But I think that it 

is more elucidating to get to this problem of information sharing, 

which I think is critical for the protection of the citizens of this 

country. And so, where are the benchmarks so that we can say, 

‘‘Look, this is what our expectation is. How are you communicating 

beyond the fusion centers? Are these fusion centers simply boxchecking or are they actually doing what we expect them to do? ’’ 
27 

Mr. Sparks, you and I come from the same small-town universe—actually, you are from a very large town in my universe. 

And it needs to filter down, not only to the major cities and not 

only to the major States, but we also need to have that trust level 

with States like North Dakota and Wisconsin. So what would you 

offer in terms of our ability to look at holding Federal agencies 

more accountable? 

Chief SPARKS. Well, let me give you a classic example. I talked 

to one of the chiefs in our area. He retired just a couple of years 

ago as a Federal Supervisory Police Officer. He did not want me 

to state the specific organization. But he said that he was frustrated because he had a lot of information that would come to 

him—terrorist-related information—and he would have specific information, but he had local contacts who he was not allowed to 

share anything with. 

Now, I understand the need for secrecy on an active investigation, but some of this was general information: ‘‘This person is 

going to your community. He is meeting up with this person.’’ And 

he said that he was frustrated because he could not share that information with local law enforcement. And, as he moved up the 

chain of command and asked why, he said that it was because 

those local law enforcement officers did not have security clearances. 

So, to touch on some of the other comments here, you have to be 

able to eliminate some of that. And, even if you cannot trust local 

law enforcement with information, we are shooting ourselves in the 

foot. We are not going to be able to prevent a lot of this stuff. You 

are missing 80 percent of law enforcement agencies across this 

country. You have to break down some of the policies that are inhibiting that. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I think that there are a lot of us here who 

go into the secret, hidden room and hear things, only to walk out 

and see them on the front page of the New York Times. We share 

your pain in terms of overclassification and the overprotection of 

data. And that is something that we need to be talking about, because you cannot get the expertise of the men and women who are 

the eyes and ears—who are on the street every day and could say, 

‘‘Oh, that is what they are talking about. We have seen that.’’ In 

fact, doing so builds on that intelligence. We have to get through 

this issue. 

And so, thank you, we look forward to any additional suggestions 

that you have going forward. My time is up. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Heitkamp. That might 

be a good subject for a hearing, the overclassification of material, 

because I think that it is certainly within our Committee’s jurisdiction on oversight, but it potentially even falls under legislative jurisdiction. Senator Booker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER 

Senator BOOKER. First of all, I just want to thank the panel. 

Your leadership is extraordinary. Having been a mayor and having 

had to deal with the challenges of an urban police department, I 

am aware that every single day we have officers out there who are 

doing heroic things that never make the papers or never make the 
28 

news, but ultimately that are saving American lives and securing 

property. So I am grateful for your service and your commitment 

is just something that is worthy of respect. 

I would like to first talk really quickly about the idea of dual 

usage. It has come up a few times. The reality is that we do all 

of this work to prepare for counterterrorism, but our first responders, when gunshots go off, they are responding to a situation. 

Now, there have been at least 80 mass shootings, as defined by 

four fatalities or more, since the Columbine massacre of 1999. Nine 

of those mass shootings were at schools. Less than 10 of these incidents have been described as a product of homegrown extremism. 

And when I am talking about that, I am talking about mass shootings, not bomb threats or other plots. 

Many capabilities which support terrorism preparedness simultaneously—obviously—support preparedness for these other hazards, 

which are becoming incredibly frequent in our Nation. 

And so, what I would like to understand is, as we are funding 

a lot of these things—really two sides of this—one is: Can you discuss sort of the dual use, why this is helpful in that effort? But 

then also, Mr. Ghilarducci—— 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. You guys are going to be perfect at pronouncing it when we are all done. [Laughter.] 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you very much. ‘‘Booker’’ is a hard one, 

too, so I feel your pain. But you talked about how it might be 

straining some of these resources because there are multiple usages for them. So I would just like to understand—and perhaps 

starting with Commissioner Bratton, who I owe a lot of gratitude. 

We share a metropolitan region. The work that you and your department do benefits everybody in the New York City region. I like 

to think of it as the Newark region. But I want to thank you for 

your leadership. I would love to get your thoughts about this. 

Commissioner BRATTON. Actually, you raise a great point, because one of the good things, if you will, about the issues of terrorism—and particularly the form of terrorism that we are most 

concerned with in this country at this time: the lone wolf—is in 

many respects—other than motivation—not different than what we 

are dealing with with the active shooters, with all of their various 

motivations. The response is very similar. We learned after Columbine that we have to get in there and get the shooter. We 

learned through the various terrorist acts committed around the 

world that we have to get in there and get the shooter. And we are 

constantly learning about how to deal with the shooter, while at 

the same time preparing to deal with the victims who are in the 

same location while we go in. 

So the duality is a strength that we can build on because we can 

train our officers to deal with the current terrorist threat—and the 

most significant one currently is an ISIS-inspired or ISIS-directed 

assailant—and at the same time, in a country that has as many 

guns as we do, where mass killings have become a very commonplace circumstance and one that our officers—all 800,000—and our 

firefighters increasingly are drawn into, we can prepare them for 

all active shooters. So training for one is effectively training for the 

other. 

Senator BOOKER. Yes, please, Chief. 
29 

Chief KERR. I would just like to comment on the dual threat and 

the dual use. I am proud to say that in Austin we have worked extensively with our law enforcement partners and have a developed, 

strategic operating plan that we use and have drilled and exercised 

on. And I think that the importance here—how you all can help— 

is first of all by providing those opportunities and, second, by providing the funding that will allow us to continue to hold those 

large-scale exercises and drills so that we are practicing what we 

need to do and sharing standard operating procedures. This way, 

we are skilled at getting into the ‘‘warm zone,’’ applying those tourniquets, and pulling people out that are savable and then allowing 

law enforcement to protect us and go after the shooter. Let the fire 

service or the EMS service get in there, get the people out, and get 

them into the cool zone where they then can be transported for 

treatment. 

Senator BOOKER. Great. Would somebody else like to comment? 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Senator. The issue of dual use is extremely important in the city of Boston. We leverage the funding 

that we have been using for the fusion center to work on crime 

analysis across the board. The intelligence streams are all the 

same. We are looking at different crimes that are occurring and deriving an incredible benefit, reducing common crime and violent 

crime in the city by centralizing those functions into one group. 

They are specially trained. They become very good at the numbers—at predicting where crime is going to occur—so that our deployments are much more effective. It works very well for us in 

Boston. 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you. Mr. ‘‘G’’? 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. Actually, I think that what you saw in San 

Bernardino was the execution of how dual-use training and policies 

and procedures came together. Those officers, those firefighters, 

and the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) medic program were 

all trained. In fact, at the time of the San Bernardino shooting— 

that exact time—we had a multiagency active shooter training 

going on. I do not know if you knew this or not, but, in fact, many 

of the people in the class thought that the actual event at the 

health center was part of the exercise—until they realized that it 

was not. 

One of the things that I have been able to do in my role as HSA 

is drive funding—and put requirements on that funding—so that 

fire service, law enforcement, and EMS, which are going to develop 

a training program in these kinds of things, have to come together 

around the table and development common sense operational constructs and build that into everything across the board, from school 

safety to hospital safety. And that really has been a benefit to all 

of—— 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you, Mr. Ghilarducci. 

A last question in 30 seconds, Commissioner. So you have heard 

a lot here. If you were a U.S. Senator—we are having issues with 

interoperability, with critical investments being made so that we 

can do the training. There have been some concerns about funding 

programs. You are obviously a big-city leader, but you see States 

like mine that have lots of small towns—not necessarily the experience that you have—working together. Could you give like three 
30 

things that you would do and that you would focus on if you were 

a U.S. Senator? 

Commissioner BRATTON. Funding is absolutely critical. The development of standards, as the Senator spoke to, is also critical. 

And, third, in this day and age, the issue of communications is absolutely critical across the line, up and down—and that also requires funding. So I would suggest your role in the U.S. Senate— 

as well as your colleagues’ role in the House—is to ensure that 

funding is available for hometown security, because hometown security is what homeland security is all about. 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank all of 

you for being here today. 

Commissioner Davis, I wanted to follow up regarding the Boston 

bombing terrorist attack—I really appreciate your leadership on 

that. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. You came before this Committee, and you and 

I talked about issues with the JTTF. I raised these issues with Director Comey of the FBI, and as I look at the background we received on this hearing today and what happened in Garland, 

Texas—in that situation you also had the FBI tracking one of the 

individuals involved. The FBI sent a memo to the Garland police 

and to the North Texas JTTF hours before the attack, but that information never got to the actual patrol officers who were there. As 

we talked about what happened post-Boston and the things that 

needed to be communicated at the local level—something that 

Chief Sparks raised as well—the question is: is how do we stop 

that? The reality is that it is a patrol officer who is likely to come 

upon one of these situations. The FBI is not out roaming the 

streets in the way that the patrol officers are. Where are we now 

with the JTTFs in terms of disseminating that critical information 

to the officers? And have we improved that? How do we get at this 

fundamental issue? 

I was very interested that you brought up the concept of a 

‘‘coach’’. Who should that ‘‘coach’’ be? Because you talked about 

DNI. Right now, as I look at this system, it seems like the FBI is 

the ‘‘coach’’, but we still have instances where—whether it is a security issue or , whether it is a need-to-know issue—the information is not getting to the front lines. We would love to get your impression, Commissioner Davis, on that. And we would love to get 

your impression as well, Commissioner Bratton, Chief, and anyone 

else who wants to jump in. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that, and I had a 

great team in Boston. It was a real team effort there. 

Prior to the Boston incident, we had two special agents in charge 

in Boston, Warren Bamford and Rick DesLauriers. Both of those 

men were incredible partners and opened up the place to us. We 

worked very closely with them. Director Comey and I have spoken 

since I stepped down. I believe that the FBI wants to do the right 

thing. 
31 

However, there are silos and bureaucracies involved, and when 

that happens, things start to break down. And despite the best intentions of everyone involved, it really is important that someone 

is auditing the functions. Every year, the FBI comes into the Boston Police Department and audits our motor vehicle checks to make 

sure that they are all legitimate. But who is auditing for larger 

issues? Who is looking at the transfer of information—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Is anyone doing that right now within the Federal Government? 

Mr. DAVIS. No, absolutely not. And so, that really needs to happen. And I mentioned the DNI. I just think that if all partners are 

equal, then the ‘‘coach’’ cannot be one of the partners. I think that 

it needs to be somebody—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Agreed. It has to be someone who is not directly 

in the line of command—that is what you are saying. 

Mr. DAVIS. Right, because then you have the same problem of 

being protective of your information and it goes back to the old 

issue of police wanting to make the busts themselves. Everybody 

wants their own information, because if you give it to somebody 

else, then you might lose the arrest. 

But the other issue that you brought up, the technology side of 

things, is extremely important, Senator. Going back to the NYPD, 

when those two officers were killed, Baltimore had information 

that was faxed—pictures were faxed from the Baltimore police to 

the NYPD. The state of communication among police agencies is 

really reprehensible in this day and age and the use of these devices that Commissioner Bratton has shown will help with that. 

But it needs to be a nationwide initiative. It cannot just be department by department, because when you set up individual protocols, 

you have other communication problems. 

So there are two levels that you talked about which are extremely important, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Commissioner Bratton, I wanted to get your impression. 

Commissioner BRATTON. Prior to your arrival, I had displayed a 

smartphone device that the department has customized and will, 

by March, be in the hands of every one of the 36,000 New York 

City police officers. It is a model and a device that can be shared 

with American law enforcement—and it was developed very specifically after the murder of our two officers—because the messaging— 

the traditional messaging—the length of time that it took to get information out to the field was too long. And in any event, even as 

the information arrived in New York, it would have been too late 

to save the lives of those two officers. 

With this instant messaging now, I can instantly send out an 

alert to 36,000 officers. I can override everything else that they are 

doing and indicate that this is a terrorist alert or that there is a 

‘‘threat on your life’’ alert, and the capability can effectively be expanded nationwide with the coordination and collaboration of capabilities. So we are moving in this direction thanks to technology. 

On the issues of collaboration and leadership, we are very fortunate with the leadership of Director Comey, who Commissioner 

Davis and I have had extensive involvement with. He is going to 

be around for about 8 years, and that is essential, because in our 
32 

1The BENS Report referenced by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 64. 

world, people come and go very quickly. He is committed to this. 

He is trusted by us. He is committed to the idea of information 

sharing, and the relationship that we have in New York City with 

our FBI is a direct result of his leadership, indicating that the FBI 

will get along with the NYPD. And the commitment on my end is 

that the NYPD will get along with the FBI. And this is essential. 

So the benefit that we have at this time is that the technology 

is becoming available—and I think that I would argue that the 

leadership’s support of collaborative relationships is also available 

and will be around for a while. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. And, I think that as you think 

about resources, this would be worthy of a national investment. 

Commissioner BRATTON. I think so. 

Senator AYOTTE If you think about both the terrorism and law 

enforcement contexts, this would be a huge protection measure for 

the country. 

I wanted to follow up. You mentioned forfeiture briefly, Commissioner Bratton. Recently, in the end-of-the-year budget deal, one of 

the things that was grabbed was over $1 billion in forfeiture 

money. 

Commissioner BRATTON. Which is a major mistake and something that we resent tremendously. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes, so that is why I am asking you about it. 

As I look at what my police officers are doing and what my law enforcement in New Hampshire is doing with the forfeiture money, 

it is obvious that we did some really important things—increasing 

funding for first responders and funding to combat the heroin epidemic facing my State. On the other hand, I think that people 

around here are not understanding the value of forfeiture resources 

and the consequences of taking the forfeiture resources that help 

address the problems for our first responders. 

So I just wanted to put that on the record and make sure that 

people understand here. We have to turn this around. We should 

not do this again. These resources are critical to first responders. 

Commissioner BRATTON. These smartphone devices could not 

have been bought without $160 million of forfeiture money from my 

local district attorney’s asset forfeiture fund. It did not come from 

the Federal Government, fortunately, because it is no longer there. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Two points. I do not think that anybody has asked to have the 

BENS Report entered into the record.1 I will do so, without objection. 

I actually circled your comment about auditing, and I would really like to work with you, Commissioner Davis, to develop a way to 

audit so that it is a positive thing as opposed to being viewed negatively. But I would encourage any colleague to work with me on 

that. I turned around to my staff and said that that is a piece of 

legislation that we should work on as a result of this hearing. Senator McCaskill. 
33 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. It is an honor to be here in front 

of all of you. I am still in uniform withdrawal from my days as a 

prosecutor. So it is terrific to be with all of you, and one of my specializations, Ms. Kerr, was arson prosecution. So I spent a lot of 

time with fire chiefs also. 

A few months ago, I introduced a bill—and I want to emphasize 

this—that would not end any Federal programs for local law enforcement and would not cut any funding for local law enforcement. 

One of the things that Mr. Davis touched on in his testimony which 

is profoundly important is that a discussion over whether law enforcement is too militarized or does not have enough resources is 

really irrelevant if you do not have the trust of your community. 

I do not need to lecture you guys on how important it is, in terms 

of the rule of law in this country, that people have trust that law 

enforcement is, in fact, going to be fair, trained, and competent. 

So, one of the things that we did in carefully drafting this bill 

was to make sure that we did not cut it—we did not eliminate programs—but we talked a lot to the National Tactical Officers National Association (NTOA) and worked with them on the language 

of the bill. Then, basically, the bill requires States to establish certain minimum training requirements for any officer with decisionmaking authority on the deployment of SWAT—necessitating that 

SWAT members attend some kind of training. 

I believe that most States are already in compliance with this. 

Most States do require some kind of SWAT training. But I would 

ask you all to comment on whether you think—in light of the $1 

billion in Federal resources that are going to State and local law 

enforcement—that requiring some kind of minimal training, 

through language that was helped to be drafted by the National 

Tactical Officers Association, is a reasonable thing for the Federal 

Government to do. Mr. Bratton? 

Commissioner BRATTON. I can speak to that and speak strongly 

in support of it. Training is absolutely essential for SWAT entities 

or for any police officer function. And the trust that you are talking 

about, let us face it, we have a crisis of confidence in the American 

criminal justice system at the moment. It is not just police any 

longer. That has been the focus for most of the last 30 years. It 

now goes to grand juries, it now goes to prosecutors, and it now 

goes to judges. Every element of the criminal justice system is now 

under attack because there has been a diminution of trust. We can 

get it back, but it is going to require standards and it is going to 

require training. Training is the heart and soul of it all—for SWAT 

teams in particular. It cannot be just an odd assortment of people 

coming together equipped with heavy weaponry. They need to constantly train together and they need to basically adhere to standards. The organization that you referred to has very significant 

standards for what they would want their members to be capable 

of achieving. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Does anybody have a problem with the Federal Government establishing some kind of minimal standards of 

training for the deployment of SWAT resources that have been 

given to State and local governments by the Federal Government? 

OK. 
34 

Commissioner BRATTON. I think that you are talking about two 

different issues. One issue is the equipment that has been given to 

them relative to the standards set for them—because the equipment issue is one that is the subject of great debate at the moment, 

as you know—the type of equipment given, how it is being utilized, 

and the lack of standards as to how it should be utilized. So there 

are several different issues. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is what this bill would do. This bill 

would say that, if you are going to get this type of equipment from 

the Federal Government, you would be required—— 

Commissioner BRATTON. As to how it should be utilized, how it 

should be—— 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. To have a program in place 

that would require training. The notion is that we would no 

longer—because what we discovered—we discovered a number of 

things after Ferguson in a hearing that we had in this Committee. 

One was that of the three programs—the DHS program, the Byrne 

grant program, and the 1033 program of the Department of Defense (DOD)—the leaders of those three programs sat in your 

chairs and they had never met each other before. They had never 

met each other before that day, which was jaw-dropping to me. We 

also learned that there was a proportionality issue, where we had 

little-bitty, tiny departments getting Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) that had been in a shed for years. We had 

little-bitty, tiny departments getting way more military weapons 

than there were even sworn officers in their departments. There 

did not seem to be any rhyme or rationale regarding need and 

whether or not those communities were equipped to handle that 

equipment. Yes, Mr. Sparks? 

Chief SPARKS. I guess that I want to touch on this in two respects. Being a smaller community, we have a couple of members 

of our department that are on a countywide SWAT team. But our 

officers—we do not have the luxury that some of the larger cities 

have. We do not have regional SWAT teams. So if we respond to 

an active shooter incident, it is going to be patrol officers responding. And when you are talking about the equipment needed, they 

need at least long guns—they need tactical rifles. They need, obviously, their ballistic vests. But it would be nice to have ballistic 

shields and helmets—not that they are worn, but that they are in 

those squad cars, because, by the time a SWAT team arrives, that 

incident is over. And, the quicker that we can get the appropriate 

equipment to our patrol officers, the better—because they will be 

the ones there. It is not going to be a SWAT team. And it is going 

to be a significant amount of time before we actually get people 

who are SWAT trained or people who have the tactical equipment 

there to respond. So, if we are not equipping our frontline officers— 

all of our officers on SWAT team are trained. In fact, we have 

seven officers in our department that are SWAT trained. And we 

also do a lot of additional training as far as active shooter incidents. But they are not all SWAT team members. And across 

America, the majority are going to be patrol officers who need that 

equipment. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. Well, that is why I want to make 

sure—I mean, I think that one of the reasons we wanted to do this 
35 

is to make sure that your department gets that equipment that you 

need and not five Ballistic Engineered Armored Response Counter 

Attack Trucks (BearCats) or five MRAPs that were not even ever 

designed to run on city streets in the first place. I guess that that 

is the argument that I am making, getting your department, Mr. 

Sparks, what you need in light of who your personnel are and what 

your demands are. None of that was going on with these Federal 

programs. There was nobody checking, there was no reporting 

back, and there was no—they could not even tell me if the equipment was being used in the various communities that were getting 

it—especially the DOD. Once it was out the door, they were done. 

I have been a little disappointed that there has not been more 

robust support for the bill because I think that law enforcement is 

in a little bit of a defensive crouch, and there was a sense that 

well, if you open this up, then maybe somebody will take the programs away. I am not going to let anybody—I do not want anybody 

to take the programs away. I have seen how they work. I know 

that they are important. I do think that a little bit of tweaking in 

terms of proportionality and training is probably the order of the 

day—and I would certainly appreciate you all taking a look at the 

legislation and seeing your way through to let us know if there are 

any problems that you see with it that we need to fix, which we 

are willing to do. On the other hand, it would be helpful if we could 

get more folks—I think that people are just afraid of doing anything and worried that it is going to take something away. I would 

like to see us get beyond that, if possible. 

Thank you all very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

We really could go on and on. There are so many questions. But 

what I would like to do is give everybody an opportunity to just 

make a final comment—please keep it somewhat brief—before we 

close out the hearing. We will go in reverse order. Mr. Ghilarducci. 

Mr. GHILARDUCCI. All right. Well, great. Again, thank you very 

much for the opportunity to speak with you. 

This has been a fascinating discussion, and I think that it just 

presented the challenges that we continue to face. The threat continues to change. Your support, the support of the Federal Government to State and local governments, is absolutely critical. And you 

started off, Senator, saying the percentage of funding that is really 

made available is minuscule compared to what the need is. California, since 2008, has lost $150 million in homeland security 

funds. We need to reverse that trend and we need to put resources 

into our communities to get us to where we need to be. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We need to prioritize spending. Commissioner Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, thank you for your attention to this issue, Senator. I just truly believe that this threat has created a theater of 

war, domestically—and we need to address it like that—the geographic distribution of these pieces of equipment, not to each individual small town, but geographically, so that they can be called 

in, if necessary. 

But the bottom line is—and it goes to the last question that was 

asked—that the balance between the militarization of policing and 
36 

the community policing that we all want in our communities requires strong leadership on the part of Chief Sparks, Commissioner 

Bratton, and other people who are in those positions across the Nation. They have to keep pushing not to allow that military mentality to take over, remembering that we are there to keep the 

peace—not just to arrest people. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Chief Kerr. 

Chief KERR. Thank you, and I appreciate the invitation. I just 

want to remind all of you that the title of this hearing is ‘‘Frontline 

Response to Terrorism in America.’’ I encourage you not to forget 

about the part and the role that is played by the fire service and 

EMS. We realize that there is funding needed to help our law enforcement partners, but I encourage you all to make sure that we 

do not forget and ignore the fire service and EMS. 

Just one comment on what Commissioner Bratton talked about 

regarding his device right here that he keeps holding up and the 

information that they can get from that. Imagine the information 

that can go to every first responder in America through a 

smartphone or a smart device—and that really is part of what 

FirstNet is about—transmitting data to make sure that a first responder who goes into a house to help somebody that has a seizure 

where the man sits up and shoots the first responder in the chest, 

that if that first responder had information, that this person had 

behavioral issues prior to going into that house, then the first responder may still be alive today. 

So, it is important that we are really taking care of our first responders who are taking care of our community—whether they are 

law enforcement, fire, or EMS. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Commissioner Bratton. 

Commissioner BRATTON. Thank you. Well, the issue of concern 

here is terrorism on the front lines, and I will go to Senator Booker’s comment about duality. It is quite clear that we are losing 

more lives through traditional crime in this country, and at the 

same time, we are very concerned about the potential for losing 

more lives to terrorism. 

The benefit that we have is the duality, the idea that while combating one, we can combat the other. So, the technology that we 

have referenced and the collaboration that we have referenced, that 

means that you—who have to make the funding decisions as it relates to this issue, terrorism and crime—can get double the bang 

for the buck. That smartphone that I held up works for terrorism 

notifications, as well as fire coordination notifications, as well as 

for crime prevention. 

Similarly, so much of what we have talked about, in terms of 

interoperability, the device that works for conveying data for terrorism works for conveying data about a fire or a life-saving emergency. So we do benefit, at this particular time, that there is the 

duality of concern about crime, which takes more lives, and the 

growing potential of more lives being taken by terrorism. Actually 

by solving one, we can solve the other. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Chief Sparks. 
37 

Chief SPARKS. I just want to touch on—when it comes to priority 

and the funding, we need to make sure that all of the departments 

out there at least have the basic level of training for active shooter 

response. It is critical. There are a lot of small communities that 

still do not have that. So, if we can funnel that through on criteria 

that gets it out to those local agencies, then that would be great. 

And then, we can encourage the cooperation among these small 

agencies, because they are not going to be responding on their own, 

so that means getting people within counties to actually work together and train together. 

And then, regarding the information sharing, we have to break 

down some of those silos—and some of the policies are inhibiting 

that free flow of information. 

And the last point that I really want to talk about—and you 

talked about law enforcement in general as taking a hit—in my 

community, since a lot of these incidents have occurred, it is just 

the opposite. The outpouring of support has been phenomenal and 

the community trusts the department. And I think that it is important for you to recognize that these high-profile incidents do not define who law enforcement is. We have people on the front line that 

are willing to put their lives on the line—and do not lose sight of 

that, because it is that local police officer, in whatever community 

it is, who is going to be the one charging in there when an incident 

occurs—and they deserve a little more respect. 

Senator CARPER. Can I say something? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. 

Senator CARPER. Before we close, I just want to thank Senator 

Heitkamp and Senator Baldwin, again, not just for suggesting this 

as a topic for a hearing, but also for you and your staffs, and for 

our staffs, who collaborated in inviting all of you to come. And you 

were a terrific panel—and I said this to the Chairman. And we 

generally have very good panels—but you guys are terrific, and we 

are grateful, not only for your service, but also for what you have 

done here in conveying this information in very helpful ways. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Carper, I mentioned this earlier. Go 

to the YouTube page and look at the dashcam video from those 

first responders responding to the Sikh temple shooting. Take a 

look at the pictures of those first responders walking up the stairs 

of the World Trade Center. We see the service and the sacrifice. 

I want to thank all of you for your time, for putting together this 

very thoughtful testimony, for your answers to our questions, but 

really thank you for your service to your communities, to your 

States, and to this Nation. Truly, I think everybody on this panel 

would certainly agree with that and approve that message. Correct? 

Senator CARPER. I am Tom Carper, and I approve this message. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, with that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days—and, by the way, I think that you can probably expect some questions for the record, and we would appreciate 

your responses to those. 

The record will be held open until February 17th at 5 p.m. for 

the submission of statements and questions for the record. 
38 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
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