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CLASSIFICATIONS AND REDACTIONS IN FBI’S 

INVESTIGATIVE FILE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2016 

Serial No. 114–123 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

JENNIFER HEMINGWAY, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

LIAM MCKENNA, Counsel 

LAURA RUSH, Chief Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 12, 2016 ..................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. Peter Kadzik, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 9 

Mr. Jason Herring, Acting Assistant Director for Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 9 

Ms. Deirdre Walsh, Assistant Director for Legislative Affairs, Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 10 

Mr. Neal Higgins, Director of Congressional Affairs, Central Intelligence 

Agency 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

The Hon. Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35 

Mr. James Samuel, Jr., Chief of Congressional Affairs, National GeorspatialIntelligence Agency 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Mr. Trumbull Soule, Director of Legislative Affairs Office, National Security 

Agency/Central Security Service 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

APPENDIX 

CRS Report from October 3, 2007, submitted by Mr. Chaffetz ........................... 52 

Letter from Chairman Waxman to Attorney General Mukasey dated December 3, 2007, submitted by Mr. Chaffetz .............................................................. 113 

Letter from Chairman Conyers to Attorney General Gonzales dated September 10, 2007, submitted by Mr. Chaffetz ..................................................... 118 

Witness invitation letters, submitted by Mr. Cummings ..................................... 123 

Letter from Chairman Chaffetz to Chairman Nunes-HPSCI dated August 

24, 2016, submitted by Ms. Maloney .................................................................. 131 

Vote to close hearing ............................................................................................... 132 


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CLASSIFICATIONS AND REDACTIONS IN FBI’S 

INVESTIGATIVE FILE 

Monday, September 12, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 5:00 p.m., in Room 2154, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Turner, Duncan, Jordan, Walberg, Amash, Gosar, Gowdy, Farenthold, Lummis, Massie, 

Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Blum, Hice, Russell, Carter, 

Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Clay, Lynch, 

Connolly, Cartwright, Kelly, Lieu, Watson Coleman, DeSaulnier, 

and Welch. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. We have an important hearing 

today. I appreciate all being here. I got to tell you, though, I wish 

I didn’t have to compel you all to be here. We asked you as legislative liaisons to come participate with us and which you refused. 

So the Committee on Oversight will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

We have a couple of goals for the hearing and our investigation, 

and I need to do our constitutional duty. One, the FBI needs to 

produce its full investigative file to the United States Congress. 

And I mean the full file, not just the parts the FBI deemed relevant. Right now, we only have the 302s handpicked by the FBI. 

We decide what’s relevant, not the Department of Justice, not the 

FBI. We’re entitled to the full file. 

Two, all unclassified portions of the file should be released to the 

public as quickly as possible. It has been more than 20 days since, 

I’m sure, the very first FOIA request was put out there and, by 

law, that should be out there. I want to commend the FBI for already releasing its investigative summary report and Secretary 

Clinton’s 302 interview summary to the public. We do appreciate 

that, and it’s duly noted. But there are still a number of 302s left 

for the FBI to release. We were surprised to learn that the 302s, 

the so-called investigative files provided to the United States Congress, at least to the security officer, were only a portion of them, 

not all of them. 

And three, all Members of Congress should be able to review the 

entire file right now, unless you’re part of the Intel Committee, 

Oversight Committee, the Judiciary Committee, and the Appropriations Committee, these are—if you’re a member, you have to be on 


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those committees in order to view what is currently in the SCIF. 

It’s unclear to me how the FBI can prevent a Member of Congress 

from seeing what we’re already allowed to see by law, yet here they 

have done so. Even the unclassified information. That’s what’s 

mystifying to me. Even unclassified information you’re preventing 

Members of Congress from seeing. 

But we do believe we should be able to see the file and the whole 

file, and it’s disappointing that we are here today. We have a number of questions about the redactions, the classifications. I thought 

a number of those things would just be entered in a briefing. You 

know, Elijah Cummings, my—the ranking member here, has made 

a point on several occasions that rather than just going right into 

a hearing, let’s go to a briefing. 

We had legitimate questions. We did have this planned for last 

week. We did have more than 12 Members of the Congress show 

up to have that briefing, and none of you showed up. That’s inexcusable. You’re the congressional affairs officers. It’s your job to 

talk to Congress. And for some of you, I had to threaten to send 

a subpoena just to get you to appear today. 

We did some—did some math. We’ve got seven of you sitting 

here. Between your compensation and your benefits package, you 

make more than $1 million from taxpayers. The taxpayers are paying you seven more than $1 million, and you won’t even come talk 

to Congress. What do you do all day if you don’t talk to Congress? 

That’s your job. 

So we’re going to do that today. And the irony here is we’re trying to protect the classified information. I didn’t create this mess. 

Hillary Clinton created this mess. There are years of Federal 

records. Some of it so classified, none of us in this room should 

probably see them. Most of it’s unclassified. But we have a duty 

and an obligation to protect that information. 

I believe that’s probably the same goal that you have, but we’re 

going to have to have a reality check here. She’s the one that took 

the records from the State Department, gave access to people who 

don’t have security clearances. The case is closed. There’s no consequences, nobody being held accountable. But we also had an FBI 

director come and testify that he never looked at her testimony 

under oath, and somehow we have a classified system and we have 

a nonclassified system, and somehow information was going from 

the classified system into a nonclassified system. 

So it’s ironic that you don’t want to appear before this committee 

out of a concern for protecting classified information when Hillary 

Clinton walked around with a Blackberry full of classified information and gave access to sensitive Federal records to folks without 

security clearances at all. 

I want to understand from each of you what it is you think that 

Congress should not see. See, I believe passionately in the role of 

Congress. I believe passionately in the Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee. We were founded in 1814. Every expenditure, 

everything we do in this Congress—or everything we do in this Nation is supposed to be overseen by us. We can investigate anything 

at any time. That’s what’s different about the United States of 

America. We’re different because we are self-critical, we do go look 

under the hood, we do hold people accountable. That’s why when 


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Abraham Lincoln joined the United States Congress, he was on 

this committee, and he peppered the President because he didn’t 

believe that the Mexican-American War started as the President 

said it was. And there has been a rich history of that throughout 

generations. 

We can’t do that when each of the agencies that you all represent 

decide that, well, we’re just going to show you the relevant information. We’re not even going to answer your questions. You can’t 

see those documents. That’s the way a banana republic acts. It’s 

not the way the United States of America acts. So we expect better 

and we expect you to be responsive, and I don’t expect to have to 

issue a subpoena to see unclassified information. 

While we can’t be certain what is under each of the redactions 

within the documents, as far as we can tell, the redactions are covering information commonly given to Congress, such as names of 

key fact witnesses, titles and positions of government employees at 

the State Department, and Gmail accounts. There’s nothing classified about that information. 

While I understand there’s an argument to withhold information 

under the Privacy Act or the Freedom of Information Act, neither 

of those apply to Congress or any other committees. As I understand it, the FBI is not withholding any information based on the 

Privacy Act. Instead, they just don’t want to give us the information. So there’s really no legal basis for these redactions. 

The FBI also chose to redact any information in the report classified above secret. This also makes no sense. As a Member of Congress, we routinely receive documents and briefings from the intelligence community at the highest levels of classification, with the 

exception of sources, methods, with the exception of the SAP material. So any redactions have to be based on classification, have to 

be removed. We have to be able to see that information. 

We also have questions on what the FBI file contains. Oddly 

enough, the copies of the file provided to us by the FBI are different. We are very grateful that they provided the first set on a 

Tuesday. I believe it was August 16th. The next day we got a second set. The problem is the second set had 27 emails more than 

the other one, which we are grateful for. It was an improving file. 

Only to have the FBI try to come back and recover those, not because it was SAP material, because it’s embarrassing. That’s why. 

It was embarrassing. But we should have had it in the first round. 

We should have had it at the very beginning. 

I also want to put this request in context because it’s far from 

the first time Congress or even this committee has requested an investigative file from the FBI or the Department of Justice. Congressional committees are routinely provided investigative materials by the Department of Justice and the FBI. 

I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the 2007 CRS 

report. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. This was done when things were going on 

with the dismissal of the U.S. attorneys. I’m going to read, it’s a 

little bit long, but this is as good a summary as to why Congress 

should be able to see this as anything, and I have got to read a 

few sentences here. 


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From the CRS. A review of the historical experience and legal 

rulings pertinent to congressional access to information regarding 

the law enforcement activities of the Department of Justice indicates in the last 85 years, Congress has consistently sought and obtained deliberative prosecutorial memoranda and the testimony of 

line attorneys, FBI field agents, and other subordinate agency employees regarding the conduct of open and closed cases in the 

course of enumerable investigations of the Department of Justice 

activities. 

These investigations have encompassed virtually every component of the Department of Justice and its officials, employees, from 

the Attorney General down to the subordinate level personnel. It 

appears that the fact that an agency, such as the Justice Department, has determined for its own internal purposes that a particular item should not be disclosed or that the information sought 

should come from one of the committees or subcommittees or does 

not prevent either the House of Congress or its committees or subcommittees from obtaining or publishing information it considers 

essential for the proper performance of its constitutional functions. 

There appears to be no court precedent that impresses the 

threshold burden on committees to demonstrate, for example, 

quote, ‘‘a substantial reason to believe wrongdoing occurred,’’ end 

quote, before a jurisdictional committee may seek disclosure with 

respect to the conduct of specific open and closed criminal and civil 

cases. 

Indeed, the case law is quite the contrary. An inquiring committee need only show that the information sought is within the 

broad spectrum of the matter of its authorized jurisdiction, is in aid 

of a legitimate legislative function, and is pertinent to the area of 

concern. 

And it goes on for page after page after page of precedent here. 

Basically, there is no legal reason why you should withhold any of 

this information from the United States Congress. This goes back 

from the Teapot Dome bribery scandal, to Valerie Plame, to what 

was done by Chairman Waxman when he requested the FBI 302s 

for President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Karl Rove, and several 

other senior advisors. 

I have two other things that I’d like to enter into the record. I 

ask unanimous consent to enter into this—to enter the CRS report 

as well as the December 3, 2007, letter from Chairman Waxman 

to Attorney General Mukasey in the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’d also ask unanimous consent to enter the 

September 10, 2007, letter from Chairman Conyers to Attorney 

General Gonzales into the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And finally, I want to commend the FBI for 

making its summary report and 302 of Secretary Clinton public. I 

do appreciate that. It’s a good start. It’s a good start. But it’s time 

we be candid and honest with the American people, you allow Congress to do its job. I didn’t pick this timeline. Hillary Clinton picked 

this timeline. 

I don’t care about the election, what time it is, we’re going to 

keep going at this full speed ahead. It is far, far too important. 


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With that, I will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. 

Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To the witnesses, I hope that as you listened to the chairman, 

if you think that the cases that he has cited, previous cases involving, for example, the U.S. attorneys are distinguishable from 

what’s happening here today, I’d just like to know. I think he 

makes a very good point. Other than the fact that in, I guess in 

some of those cases, at least, the Justice Department was accused 

of doing something wrong, but I would like to know exactly where 

you all stand on that, because I think he makes a very good point. 

Well, here we are again, another day in the Oversight Committee, another emergency hearing about Hillary Clinton. Today is 

the second hearing about Secretary Clinton we have held in three 

business days, and tomorrow we will have a third. 

For the record, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you. And I want 

the American public to know that you have agreed to schedule a 

hearing on EpiPen, which affects so many of our constituents because that too is an emergency situation for the constituents of 

every member who sits here in this chamber right now. 

As far as I can tell, the only emergency is that the election is less 

than 2 months away. The real reason for today’s hearing is that 

FBI Director James Comey refused to be summoned before this 

committee yet again. He refused. Director Comey has already bent 

over backwards, departed from longstanding law enforcement 

precedent, and provided our committee with an unmatched level of 

transparency about his internal decisionmaking regarding this investigation. 

First, he announced the results of his investigation publicly. Normally, the FBI does not discuss its internal decisionmaking, but Director Comey did so in this case. 

Second, he agreed to testify in an emergency hearing before our 

committee 48 hours after his announcement. This is the FBI director. He sat right there in the witness chair and he testified about 

the evidence they obtained, the law they applied, and the decisionmaking process they employed. He described how, quote, ‘‘an allstar team,’’ unquote, of career FBI investigators came to the unanimous conclusion and how it wasn’t even close. 

But the Republicans did not like the answers Director Comey 

gave, so they demanded copies of the FBI’s internal investigative 

files. Again, in sharp break from past precedent, the FBI director 

agreed to share documents from the investigation in an effort to 

put this question to rest. 

But again, that was not enough for the Republicans, so they demanded the public release of these documents. Yet again, Director 

Comey broke from precedent. He released the FBI’s internal investigative memo and the notes from their interview with Secretary 

Clinton. 

Let me state the obvious here. No matter what Director Comey 

does, it will never be enough for the Republicans. They are demanding that he bring criminal charges against Secretary Clinton, 

despite the fact that the evidence simply is not there. And that is 

something nobody, with integrity, would ever do. 


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We sat here and we listened to Director Comey. Stated there 

were two things that matter most to him in his life. He said his 

family and his reputation. 

Last week, the Republicans wanted Director Comey to come up 

here one more time. But this time he said: Enough is enough. He 

spoke with Chairman Chaffetz personally and he told him enough 

is enough. In response, the chairman rushed to call today’s emergency hearing. He dashed out letters as late as Thursday night, 

threatening even more subpoenas. 

The problem is that he invited the wrong people. The witnesses 

here today are the legislative affairs staffers from the FBI and 

other agencies. They did not make the decisions the chairman is 

upset about. Those decisions were made by none other than Director Comey. 

If the chairman has a problem with Director Comey, he should 

take it up with him, not beat up on legislative affairs staffers because the FBI director wants no part of any partisan charade. The 

FBI’s legislative affairs staffer has been in his job for just a few 

weeks, Mr. Herring, and is currently serving in an acting capacity. 

He has been very responsive with our committee, and it makes no 

sense to hammer him just because he’s following the directives of 

his boss, Director Comey. 

The whole hearing is a bait and switch. I have the invitation letters right here. And the chairman says that this hearing will be 

held in a classified session. I ask unanimous consent to put them 

in the record, your letters about this hearing. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So that is what these witnesses prepared for. I 

don’t know whether they spent their weekends preparing for a classified hearing or not, but I assume they did. They did not prepare 

to answer questions in open session. So what are we doing here? 

At the last minute, the chairman decided to hold this hearing in 

open session to try to generate more headlines rather than obtain 

the classified information he claims to seek. It is fundamentally unfair and irresponsible to force these witnesses to answer questions 

about this issue in open session. As we have all heard, the classification level of these documents have changed repeatedly, and dozens of highly trained diplomats did not think many of them were 

classified. 

These witnesses should not be forced to make surprise or on-thespot determinations about what they can and cannot say in an 

open session. After all, we’ve had debates for the last several 

months about what’s classified and what isn’t classified. So not 

only is this unfair, but it risks the inadvertent disclosure of classified information. 

We should hold this hearing in a closed session, like the chairman said he would in his letter, rather than gather the information 

and then review the written transcript to determine what can be 

released publicly and what cannot. That is how a responsible approach would look, but that is not what is happening here. 

I guess this is what happens when you try to schedule a public 

attack against Hillary Clinton for every day of the week. You get 

frantic and you swap substantive discussions or set up hearings 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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and cheap press hits. Democrats who are in this committee have 

serious questions—and by the way, Republicans have serious questions. It is not just the Democrats. —about our broken classification system. Even the chairman agreed with me last week that the 

system is broken and we need to work together to do something 

about it. 

And we all have, I think, have concerns about why so many of 

these documents were retroactively classified long after they were 

sent. But the only way to have that productive, substantive discussion is to go into closed session as the chairman’s letter stated. The 

only reason for the hearing today is—open is because the Republicans know a closed hearing won’t be on camera. 

And so with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. And with some indulgence, the ranking member knows it is a requirement in House 

rules to go into a nonclassified setting to an open session prior to 

going into a classified setting. We have set up in the House visitor 

center the classified room that will be closed to the public and the 

press. We are prepared to go into that setting, but we’re required 

by House rules to first come into this open session first. It does require a vote of the committee. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the chairman yield? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I guess what—it would have been 

helpful if you had laid that out from the beginning, because as I 

said to you up here at the dais and yesterday on the floor of the 

House, one of my concerns was that I don’t want—I mean, if we’re 

going to—we need to know what the ground rules are. Because 

when I look at it, if we’re going to be discussing documents that 

were classified, trying to—I don’t know how far we can even get in 

an open session without, you know, crossing that line. And I’m not 

trying to—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. —play any tricks. I just want to make sure that 

we don’t create another situation where people are accusing us of 

violating the law. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And with—as the gentleman knows, there 

is a lot of classified information in Hillary Clinton’s emails that 

should never ever see the light of day. That’s why there is so much 

concern. That’s why we’re prepared to go into classified setting. 

That’s why we believe we have the right witnesses here. 

And also, to clarify the record, I never had a conversation with 

Director Comey where I asked him to come again and he refused. 

That just never happened. I asked him some specific questions in 

a personal phone call that I had with him, if we had all the 302s. 

I was surprised to learn that we hadn’t. I asked him a couple of 

other questions. He didn’t know the answer and that we should 

work with his staff. 

The staff that the FBI has provided to us to work with is the legislative liaison. That’s how we work with each of the agencies, is 

primarily with the legislative liaison. That’s why we’re here. And 

when we ask them to come to a briefing in the SCIF on—in closed 

doors, it is an embarrassment to this Congress that they wouldn’t 

show up and answer those questions. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. So how will we proceed today, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So we will allow them to give opening 

statements. We will ask questions on this dais in the unclassified. 

If we want to get into the heart of what is under a certain—certain 

thing, and we want to get—and it’s classified, then we’ll have to 

do that in the classified portion. But we’re going to do the unclassified first, then we’ll excuse and we’ll go to the House visitor center 

and ask things in a secure facility. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. It is highly recommended, it is 

part of our committee rules that you are to submit testimony 24 

hours prior. You are the legislative liaisons. You know this. You’re 

supposed to know this. None of you have provided testimony, but 

I’m happy to recognize each of you, and—along the way. But let me 

do this. 

We will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any member who would like to submit a written statement. We’ll recognize 

our panel of witnesses. If any of you have opening statements, 

we’re happy to hear those. We’ll ask the unclassified questions, and 

then we will go into the classified setting. Fair enough? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. 

We’re pleased to welcome the Honorable Peter Kadzik, Assistant 

Attorney General for Legislative Affairs at the United States Department of Justice; the Honorable Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Legislative Affairs at the United States Department of State; Mr. Jason Herring, Acting Assistant Director for 

Congressional Affairs at the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Ms. 

Deirdre Walsh, Assistant Director for Legislative Affairs at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Mr. Neal Higgins, the 

Director of Congressional Affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. James Samuel, Jr., Chief of Congressional Affairs at the 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 

And help me with your last name, Mr.—— 

Mr. SOULE. Soule. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. —Soule. Mr. Trumbull Soule is Director of 

Legislative Affairs at the Office of the National Security Agency/ 

Central Security Service. 

We thank you for being here. Pursuant to committee rules, all 

witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. 

If you’ll please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you’re about 

to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth? 

Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate it if 

you would limit your questions—or your comments to 5 minutes. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
9 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF PETER KADZIK 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’m not sure who has an opening statement 

and who doesn’t. We haven’t been submitted anything. 

Mr. Kadzik, do you have any opening comments? 

Mr. KADZIK. No, I do not have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman, but I would note for the record that I was not compelled to 

be here today. I came here voluntarily. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Let the record reflect that none of them ultimately accepted service in terms of accepting the subpoena. I’m 

just saying, in general, it did require us to get to the point where 

I signed subpoenas and presented those subpoenas, but all of the 

witnesses here today ultimately came here voluntarily. And I appreciate you highlighting that. 

Mr. KADZIK. I’m not sure that those subpoenas were produced 

too, but they weren’t—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And Mr. Kadzik was not one of those people. Let’s be clear here. 

Yes, Ms. Frifield. 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I don’t have a formal opening statement, but I did 

want to clarify, sir, that I did not refuse to come up. We asked 

clarifications on what exactly you were looking for because it 

seemed uncertain to us what you asked the State Department 

about these documents that were produced by the FBI. So we—I’m 

happy to be here and try to answer your questions as best I can. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Herring. 

Mr. HERRING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a few opening remarks to make. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. You’re now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF JASON HERRING 

Mr. HERRING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You can move that microphone just 

straight up right in there. Yeah, there you go. 

Mr. HERRING. Better. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, members of the committee for the opportunity to discuss our production of documents 

in this highly unusual case with intense public interest. I am Special Agent Jason Herring, the Acting Assistant Director for the 

FBI’s Office of Congressional Affairs. 

In early July, Director Comey appeared before this committee 

and answered questions for almost 5 hours to explain the FBI’s investigation and conclusions regarding the email matter. At that 

hearing, and at every opportunity since then, Director Comey has 

promised that the FBI would be as transparent and forthcoming in 

this investigation as we could responsibly be. 

To that end, on August the 16, the FBI provided to our congressional oversight committees a number of investigative documents 

to the investigation. It included an investigative summary of the 

factual information uncovered during the course of our investigation, the relevant FBI interview reports, sometimes known as 302s, 

and the emails that were determined to contain classified information. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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We produced these documents to satisfy the committee’s immediate oversight interest in the FBI’s conduct in this investigation. 

This was an unprecedented production and one made with extraordinary speed. We did this because we believe it’s important for 

oversight committees to understand how the FBI reached our conclusion in light of intense public interest in this case. 

I am not here today to discuss the merits of the investigation, 

but rather to discuss and answer process-related questions with the 

production of our investigative case materials to this committee 

and our other oversight committees. From my conversations with 

committee staff late last week, I believe I have an understanding 

of some of the committee’s questions and would like to address 

those issues head on and up front as best I can. 

In order to do that, I do need to be in a closed classified setting. 

I’ll reserve the remainder of my opening remarks for when we go 

to the closed classified setting. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Ms. Walsh. 

STATEMENT OF DEIRDRE WALSH 

Ms. WALSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll—I have a brief opening statement on behalf of my intelligence community colleagues in 

the interest of brevity. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the 

committee, my name is Deirdre Walsh, and I serve as Director of 

Legislative Affairs for the Director of National Intelligence, James 

Clapper. I’m here in response to the committee’s request to answer 

questions about the recent document production by the FBI to Congress related to former Secretary of State Clinton’s email. 

While I understand the Intelligence Community Inspector General, or ICIG as we refer to him, may have interacted with the 

inner agency with regard to these documents, by statute, the ICIG 

maintains its own interactions with the Congress separate from my 

office. Accordingly, I cannot speak on behalf of the ICIG. 

With regard to the documents produced by the FBI and the subject of this hearing, ODNI was not involved with this document 

production. I will, however, do my best to answer any of the questions that you may have. 

Additionally, I’m joined by my colleagues from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and 

the National Security Agency in response to the committee’s request. Given the classification of the underlying material, we look 

forward to discussing sensitive matters in the closed portion of the 

hearing. Thank you for the opportunity. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

It’s my understanding Mr. Higgins, Mr. Samuel, and Mr. Soule, 

that Ms. Walsh’s statements reflect the—I see. Okay. 

We’ll now recognize myself for the first set of questions. 

Mr. Herring, what information do you believe that Congress does 

not have the right to see? 

Mr. HERRING. So we believe it’s important for oversight committees to understand how the FBI reached our conclusion. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
11 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no, no, no, no. Wait, wait, wait. I’m 

asking you a philosophical question here. What does Congress not 

have the right to see? 

Mr. HERRING. So I don’t know if I can answer that in a way 

that—you know, I think there’s more to it than a simple answer. 

I think that each case is sort of specific to its own set of facts. I 

think we try to be—I think Director Comey tried to be as transparent as he could with this committee and with other—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you think he could be—okay. 

Mr. HERRING. —other committees as he responsibly can be. So I 

think when he spoke and he answered his questions—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Wait, wait. What is it that I as a Member 

of Congress, or any Member on this Congress, either side of the 

aisle, what is it that you believe we don’t have the right to see? 

See, this is the way our government works. We get to do oversight. That’s why, since 1814, this committee has been doing that. 

There’s executive—let me help you. There’s executive privilege. Has 

the President invoked executive privilege in this case? 

Mr. HERRING. No. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The answer is no. Good. That’s right. The 

answer is no. 

Is there any other situation? 

Mr. HERRING. Look, when it comes to classified information and 

the classification that deals in the executive order, you know, not 

all the information that we have in our files belongs to us. We 

defer to other agencies when it comes to access to their classified 

information. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you are the ones that put redactions 

on personal identifiable information, correct? 

Mr. HERRING. We did on the personal identifiable information, 

that’s correct. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Where in the Constitution does it say that 

I can’t see that? 

Mr. HERRING. It doesn’t address it specifically in the Constitution. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So can you cite any legal case, any precedent that says that Congress can’t look at personal identifiable information? 

Mr. HERRING. I cannot cite any legal case. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Did—are you aware that Congress is exempt from the Privacy Act? 

Mr. HERRING. I am. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does the FBI treat congressional document 

requests as FOIA requests? 

Mr. HERRING. No. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the FBI provide Congress all of the 

302s? 

Mr. HERRING. All of the 302s? We have one set that you’ve been 

provided already. The rest of them are coming through the FOIA 

process. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Wait, wait, wait. We’re not—FOIA process. 

You mean I got to fill out a FOIA request? 

Mr. HERRING. You can. Not necessary. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. When—here’s the problem. You handpicked 

the 302s to give to us. My understanding, your discussion with 

staff. And I appreciate your accessibility with the staff, you’ve been 

good, and you’re new. For your first time hearing, this is a tough 

one, but the reality is, you should give us all the 302s. 

Mr. HERRING. So let me say this. I think that—I think the director made principle decisions about what to say to Congress when 

he was here and also what to provide to Congress. As far as the 

redactions and—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Wait. Where do I find that? 

Mr. HERRING. —personally identifiable—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do we just let everybody in government decide that they’re based on their own individual principles, that’s 

what Congress—see, it’s trust but verify is how it works. You don’t 

get to decide what I get to see. I get to see it all. 

I was elected by some 800,000 people to come to Congress and 

see classified information. I was elected by my colleagues here to 

be the chairman of this committee. That’s the way our Constitution 

works. 

Will the FBI provide to Congress the full file with no redactions 

of personal identifiable information? 

Mr. HERRING. I cannot make that commitment sitting here today. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Then I’m going to issue a subpoena and I’m 

going to do it right now. So let’s go—I’ve signed this subpoena. We 

want all the 302s, and we would like the full file. 

You can accept service on behalf of the FBI? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You are hereby served. 

We have a duty and a responsibility. You can cite no precedent, 

nothing in the Constitution, no legal precedent. You know this is 

important to us. You now have your subpoena. We would all like 

to see this information. 

I’ve gone past my time. I’m coming up on going past my time. 

I’ll now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You’ve been at your job 4 weeks? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I can’t hear you. 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you were—you used to work for one of our 

distinguished colleagues, Mr. Goodlatte. Is that right? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. A Republican. 

So I’m going to—so you’re familiar with Congress then? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’m going to save most of my questions for the 

classified session, but I do want to address the redaction issue 

briefly. 

When the FBI produced these materials to Congress, their cover 

letter stated, and I quote, ‘‘the FBI has redacted personal—personally identifiable information as appropriate,’’ end of quote. Chairman Chaffetz publicly announced he wanted the FBI to lift these 

redactions. He stated, and I quote, ‘‘we are going to call on the FBI 

next week—this week—to give a version where there is nonclassiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:20 Apr 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\24913.TXT APRIL

KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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fied—the unclassified material and the classified material redacted 

so that it could be out there in the public,’’ end of quote. 

The problem is that there is no legitimate basis for the demand. 

Director Comey has already provided us with an unprecedented 

level of transparency into the FBI’s investigation and internal decisionmaking. 

Now, I’m going to stop there for a moment. And you said yourself, I think at least twice, that there has been unprecedented discovery here. I mean, what did you mean by that? And I don’t want 

to take the words out of your mouth. 

Mr. HERRING. No, I mean—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Correct me if I’m wrong. 

Mr. HERRING. I think in this particular case, you know, we don’t 

typically make our case files available. They’re sort of internal 

work product. There’s a lot of sensitive information in there. Even 

the unclassified stuff is sensitive to a great deal. I think that we 

made a principle decision with redacting the PII only for those individuals who are not already in the public domain. 

You sort of asked why did you do that? Well, from my perspective, as an agent, you know, any investigation, including a highprofile investigation like this one, or any other investigation really, 

it’s critical for us as FBI agents to obtain cooperation from members of the public. As we go out and we talk to members of the public in any case, we need them to be willing to participate in the judicial process. 

A lot of times people, their initial reaction is, you know what, I 

don’t want to get involved. As an agent, you talk with somebody, 

you try to protect them as best you can. Sometimes you have to call 

them as a witness at trial, sometimes you don’t. But witnesses who 

speak with us need to have confidence that they can talk to the 

FBI without risk of undue exposure. 

In this case, we were concerned about lifting the PII redactions 

for individuals who are not already in the public domain. It might 

have a chilling effect on the willingness of other members of the 

public in the future to cooperate with us, particularly in an investigation like this. 

And so I think that Director Comey’s—or what we as an agency 

tried to do was to satisfy the needs of the Oversight Committee by 

letting you all see exactly what we did in our investigation, the investigative steps we took, and how we came to that conclusion. I 

think he did it in the form of taking questions for more than 4 

hours, but also making our files available, and that’s not something 

that we typically do. 

We did make a principle decision as far as how are we going to 

effect this, how are we going to give that visibility to our oversight 

committees. We made a very thoughtful, I think, response in redacting only limited PII for the people that are not already in the 

public. And really, from my perspective as an agent, this is Jason 

talking—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How long have you been an agent? 

Mr. HERRING. 17 years. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Mr. HERRING. And so from my perspective as an agent, I think 

we have to protect the integrity of our investigations, and I don’t 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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want there to be a chilling effect—or I wouldn’t want there to be 

a chilling effect for other people cooperating in similar cases like 

this going forward. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, one of the things that I asked Director 

Comey about was this whole process, when you’ve got the Congress 

getting more and more information from the FBI, and whether it 

would have a chilling effect. Do we place ourselves in a position 

where if the Congress does not like a decision made by the agency, 

then—and then they dig—I mean, how much—you know, how often 

will that be happening? 

In other words, so that chilling effect—and then I—you know, 

and then—you know, I wonder, well, other people, if a decision— 

somebody in Congress doesn’t like the decision, do we set more and 

more precedents so that people can come in behind? And Director 

Comey said he had an all-star group of agents and they had a 

unanimous decision. And I just, you know—but you were talking 

about the chilling effect. 

So you—do you think that—first of all, who made the decision 

with regard to the redactions, since that’s what we’re supposed to 

be here about? I mean, I’m just curious, who makes those decisions? 

Mr. HERRING. I think that was made at the highest levels in the 

Bureau. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And does that mean Director Comey? 

Mr. HERRING. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Mr. HERRING. If I can say just sort of—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Please do. I have—I thought I had some time, 

but go ahead. 

Mr. HERRING. I mean—I mean, I do think it’s reasonable to think 

there would be a chilling effect. This is a very public case. Everybody out there is watching it. And we start lifting personally identifiable information, I think there—I think that potentially could 

have some impact going forward. 

I do think, though, that, you know, we’re not trying to play hidethe-ball with Congress. We want Congress to be able to do its job, 

this particular Oversight Committee do its job, and to understand 

really, you know, what we did in the investigation, how we came 

to that conclusion. And we did that in part by, you know, releasing 

the investigative summary and the 302s. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HERRING. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Some of the 302s. And when you don’t 

show up at a meeting that we request behind closed doors, kind of 

lose that opportunity. 

Mr. HERRING. If I could—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No. We’re going to recognize the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy. 

Mr. GOWDY. Agent Herring, did the FBI interview the sender of 

all emails that contained classified information? 

Mr. HERRING. You know, I don’t know the answer to that question, only because I’m a leg affairs guys. I wasn’t on the investigative team. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
15 

Mr. GOWDY. Can you find? You would agree with me it’d be important. You’d want to interview the person who sent the classified 

information, right? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Mr. GOWDY. Because the recipient thought the ‘‘C’’ was just the 

third letter in the alphabet. You might be curious whether or not 

the sender also was clueless in the way he or she viewed classified 

information, would you not? 

Mr. HERRING. That would be a logical investigative step. 

Mr. GOWDY. Can you find out whether or not you interviewed the 

sender of all emails that contained classified information? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Mr. GOWDY. Do you know if the sender of any of the classified 

emails knew that the information was classified at the time? 

Mr. HERRING. I don’t personally know that. I wasn’t part of the 

investigative team. I’m sure that—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Can you find out? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Mr. GOWDY. Can you find out for me? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOWDY. There are folks wondering how information gets 

from a classified source into an email. Did your investigation shed 

any light on how classified information could get from a classified 

system into an unclassified email to even be sent? I’m not even 

talking about the receiving of it. I’m talking about the sending of 

it. 

Mr. HERRING. I’m sure they did look at that. That would be sort 

of a logical question you would ask as an investigator in a case like 

this. 

Mr. GOWDY. That’s what I thought. 

Mr. HERRING. But in my legislative sort of affairs capacity, I just 

don’t have that kind of—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, don’t sell yourself short. You used to be an 

agent, right? You’re still an agent, right? So you know what you’re 

doing. 

Did the FBI grant immunity to anyone during the course of its 

investigation? 

Mr. HERRING. For immunity questions, I’d have to defer to the 

Department of Justice for that. It wouldn’t be an agent who would 

grant that kind of thing. That would—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Did the Bureau recommend the granting of immunity? 

Mr. HERRING. I do not know. 

Mr. GOWDY. Do you know—do you know whether the Department of Justice granted immunity to any witnesses? 

Mr. HERRING. I know I saw—I saw some articles last week, but 

that’s the extent of my—— 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, surely you have better sources than he media 

for that, don’t you? You can ask the guy sitting two people down 

from you. 

Mr. HERRING. I would have to defer to the Department of Justice, 

sir. 

Mr. GOWDY. Do you know whether any witnesses asserted any 

privileges while they were being interviewed? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
16 

Mr. HERRING. I don’t know. 

Mr. GOWDY. But the Bureau would know that, right, because 

they would have asserted the privilege while you were in there? 

Mr. HERRING. I’m sorry? 

Mr. GOWDY. The Bureau would know that, right, because that 

privilege would have been asserted perhaps while you were in 

there conducting the interview? 

Mr. HERRING. What kind of privilege are you talking about? Like 

attorney/client privilege or what privilege are you talking about? 

Mr. GOWDY. Oh, there are a bunch of privileges. There’s priestpenitent. I’m guessing that one didn’t come up. There’s doctor-patient. I’m guessing that one didn’t come up. There’s the Fifth 

Amendment privilege against incrimination. That one might have 

come up. Attorney-client privilege. Again, there have been media 

reports that that one came up. 

Mr. HERRING. Sir, I just don’t know the answer to those questions. 

Mr. GOWDY. Have you ever heard the—had the attorney-client 

privilege come up during any of your investigations? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Mr. GOWDY. Who does the privilege belong to? 

Mr. HERRING. The client. 

Mr. GOWDY. So the client can waive it, right? 

Mr. HERRING. Can. 

Mr. GOWDY. You understand why Congress might want to know 

whether or not the attorney-client privilege was waived and who 

the client was? 

Mr. HERRING. I can certainly imagine. 

Mr. GOWDY. Yeah, me, too. That’s why we want to see the file, 

Agent. I mean, you say it’s unprecedented. Mr. Cummings used to 

be a criminal defense attorney. He got to see all your 302s. Ken 

Buck used to be an Assistant United States Attorney. He got to see 

all of your 302s. Probation officers get to see all your 302s. 

Why can’t Congress? 

Mr. HERRING. Sir, I think we have tried to provide the information in a way that is understandable. I think the investigative summary tells kind of the story, and I do think that the 302s that we 

provided are the important ones. 

Mr. GOWDY. Let me ask you this. If those summaries were all 

anyone ever needed, why don’t you just introduce those in trial? 

Why actually call the witness? 

Mr. HERRING. Well, certainly we were—we actually were trying 

to make your life a little bit easier in the light of the Oversight 

Committee. 

Mr. GOWDY. But, see, I don’t want my life being made easier. I 

don’t want that. I want to know what was said in the 302s. Because the 302 is itself a summary of an interview, right? It’s not 

a verbatim transcript. 

Mr. HERRING. That’s correct. 

Mr. GOWDY. So you have given me the summary of a summary 

of an interview. And I’m not asking for a verbatim transcript because you don’t have one. 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
17 

Mr. GOWDY. I’m just asking for the 302 so I don’t have to read 

your summary. I may read the 302 differently from the way you 

read it. So why not? 

Mr. HERRING. So I think we’ve given you the relevant ones as we 

find it. 

Mr. GOWDY. Relevant according to whom? I am telling you I don’t 

think you’ve given me all the relevant 302s. 

Mr. HERRING. Well, the remainder of the 302s will come out 

through the FOIA process. 

Mr. GOWDY. But since when did Congress have to go through 

FOIA—— 

Mr. HERRING. Correct. 

Mr. GOWDY. —to obtain 302s from an investigation that’s not 

even resulting in any prosecutions that your boss has already said 

is over? Since when did we have to go through FOIA? 

Mr. HERRING. So I think that the 302s we have provided, I think 

that we made a principle decision about what to provide. It was 

certainly made at the highest levels of my agency. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. I’m out of time. That’s what that knocking 

sounds. I’m just going to say, with all due respect, you didn’t get 

to decide what we think is relevant, and I do say that respectfully. 

The defense attorneys get it all. I think Congress ought to get it 

all. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. Maloney, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’m going 

to reserve my questions to the closed session, but I would like to 

clear up some misconceptions. 

I would say that the campaign season is upon us, and the accusations and the charges and the attacks are almost out of control. I 

just spent—I won’t get into it, but anyway. 

For several weeks the chairman has been appearing on national 

television saying that the reason that he cannot see these emails 

is because the FBI produced to Congress is because they are such 

a highly sensitive, classified, high level. And for example, he stated 

that these materials were—and I would like to put his quote in the 

record—‘‘so secure and sensitive that even I, as the chairman of the 

Oversight Committee, did not have the proper clearance to see it.’’ 

But in fact, as I understand it, Mr. Herring, Chairman Chaffetz 

has not been able to view these documents. The reason he hasn’t 

been able to see them is because the Republican chairman of the 

Intelligence Committee has not allowed him to do so. The documents were produced and given to the Intelligence Committee, and 

the Intelligence Committee has a process by which they release the 

documents to people, and he has the same clearance as any other 

Member of Congress who’s not on the Intelligence Committee. And 

so the reason he hasn’t been able to get them is because his own 

party’s leadership has not voted to give him this clearance. 

Now, a—as I understand it, the FBI produced a small subset of 

these emails only to the Intelligence Committee. And according to 

House rules, the Intelligence Committee has the jurisdiction over 

certain agencies, and these agencies report to the Intelligence Committee. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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So it has a process in place. And for any member who’s not on 

the Intelligence Committee, to see these documents, and they need 

to send a letter to the committee, which Chairman Chaffetz did, 

and I have his letter from September 2, and I request unanimous 

consent to place it into the record. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. So he sent this letter saying he’d like to 

see them and asked permission, and the Intelligence Committee 

needs to take a vote. Now, as I understand it, the chairman of the 

committee has not scheduled a vote that would allow the chairman 

to see these documents. 

Now, I—I just feel that a lot of this is just pure plain politics as 

usual, stirring up a hornet’s nest over documents he can’t see, 

which are being withheld by his own party. And it seems that they 

do not want to open up the Intelligence Committee’s jurisdiction at 

this point. I don’t know why they’re not taking the vote that would 

allow him to see these documents. 

But what our committee’s engaged in is nothing—in my opinion, 

nothing more than a partisan election bashing exercise stating that 

these emails can’t be seen when they can be seen if his own party 

votes to let him see it. So I just say that it’s politics as usual, and 

I’m disturbed about it. 

There is a problem with the classification system. We all saw 

that in the last hearing. Let’s work together to correct it. But this 

whole charade is just that, a charade. These documents are not 

being withheld from the chairman because of anything any of these 

witnesses have done. They are being withheld by the Republican 

chairman of the Intelligence Committee. 

So I respectfully suggest to my chairman that we bring in the 

chairman of the Intelligence Committee and ask him why he 

doesn’t have a vote and release the documents to you. It is not the 

FBI but the House Select Committee on Intelligence who’s withholding these documents. So—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the gentlewoman yield? 

Mrs. MALONEY. I most certainly will. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Any one of the four people from the Intelligence community here can help answer this. Have you made 

redactions on personal identifiable information to the Intel Committee? 

Mr. Higgins, how about you? 

Mr. HIGGINS. No, we have not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. There’s no redactions. 

Ms. Walsh? 

Ms. WALSH. Not to my knowledge. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Samuel? 

Mr. SAMUEL. No, Mr. Chairman, not to my knowledge. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Soule? 

Mr. SOULE. No, Mr. Chairman, not to my knowledge. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you release these emails into the public, and if so, what would happen? 

Mr. Higgins, what happens if we release these emails that are— 

that Hillary—on Hillary Clinton’s unsecured server, what happens? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, I can confirm that CIA participated 

in the classification review process, and I’d be happy to talk about 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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that process in closed session. Needless to say, some of the materials do include classified information that we do not believe is appropriate for public release. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And do these—are some of these materials 

include sources and methods? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, I’d prefer to discuss any further 

matters relating to classification in closed session. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentlewoman’s time is expired, but 

thank you so much for yielding to me. I do appreciate it. 

Mrs. MALONEY. But reclaiming my time. I get to close in my 

time. You took all my time. I thought the chairman could—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It was pretty good, wasn’t it? 

Mrs. MALONEY. I think the chairman can have all the time he 

wants. 

I’d just like to conclude by saying, and I’d just ask for a second, 

just a second, what our committee is engaged in is nothing but a 

partisan attack on Secretary Clinton with an effort to harm or undermine her presidential campaign. That’s all it is. 

Get the chairman of the Intelligence Committee to release the 

documents to you. No one is withholding it. The Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over agencies, including the FBI. They release their information. They have a process. You have appealed to 

that process. Let’s wait for that process. Ask him why he’s not taking a vote to give you access to these documents. 

You’re making it look like there’s some conspiracy or some terrible thing happening when it’s really nothing but a partisan attack on Secretary Clinton. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman, and I guess some 

indulgence. Where I have a problem is when they redact information that is deemed unclassified. I don’t understand that. It makes 

no sense, and it’s—classification is one issue, but when they redact 

information that has already been designated as unclassified, I believe that Congress should be able to see that. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, may I respond? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure, yeah. 

Mrs. MALONEY. In the hearings that we’ve had, the witnesses 

have testified that that personal information that has been redacted has been to protect the privacy of people and personal information. That’s on record. But in the classified section, we can have 

more of this clarified. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And I appreciate the dialogue 

back and forth. 

Now let’s recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Herring, let me just follow up where the chairman was. So did the FBI make the redactions dealing with personal identifiable information? 

Mr. HERRING. We did, yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. You did. That’s what I figured. Okay. Mr. Herring, 

you’ve said we don’t have all the 302s, we don’t have the whole file, 

and what you did give us, as you just pointed out, had lots of 

redactions. 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. JORDAN. And the chairman invited you to a briefing last 

week in a classified setting which you said, in your opening remarks, where you’d like to discuss this information. So who told 

you not to come to the briefing? Because the chairman was there, 

I was there. In fact, every single Republican member was sitting 

there waiting anxiously for you to come do what you just said in 

your opening statement you wanted to do. So why didn’t you show 

up? 

Mr. HERRING. So let me say a couple of things here, if I could, 

just to sort of be clear. As far as the 302s and what we provided 

and what we haven’t provided, there are a lot of 302s or dozens of 

them, and we prioritized up front what we thought were the most 

important ones. And so those are the ones we gave—— 

Mr. JORDAN. But you got them all, don’t you? 

Mr. HERRING. —a couple of weeks—we do have—and we’re working on the others. 

Mr. JORDAN. So you can get the paper, you can give it to us, or 

frankly, you could have told us what you just told us right there, 

you could have told us that last Wednesday but you didn’t come. 

Why didn’t you come? 

Mr. HERRING. So I actually want to address it in a classified setting, if I could. There were certainly some conversations—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Someone tell you not to come, Mr. Herring? 

Mr. HERRING. —conversations—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Someone tell you—— 

Mr. HERRING. There were some conversations between me and 

some of the committee staff about what the briefing was going to 

be about. 

Mr. JORDAN. No, no, no. I’m asking, did someone tell you not to 

come? You were invited. We were all waiting. We don’t have all the 

302s. We don’t have the whole file. You’ve told us you made all the 

redactions. We were going to ask you about that. We were going 

to do it in a classified setting, which is what you preferred and 

what you want, what you’ve told us today you want, and someone 

told you not to come. Who told you not to come? 

Mr. HERRING. It was my decision, but I’d like to explain it away 

in a classified setting. 

Mr. JORDAN. Wait, wait, wait. You decided on your own? You 

didn’t consult with anyone else? 

Mr. HERRING. I certainly consulted with the director’s office. 

Mr. JORDAN. And the director said: It’s up to you, Mr. Herring. 

I’m not going to decide. You’re going to decide. Really? 

Mr. HERRING. So a lot of it has to do with what the discussion 

was going to be in the classified briefing, and I think there was 

some confusion, at least on my part, about what the expectations 

were and some of my conversations with committee staff last week. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did you have any other discussion? Just you and 

Director Comey talked about this? You talk to anyone else? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. We have our general counsel’s office, 

you know, the Department of Justice. There are a number of people 

that were—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Herring, was this case different? You said 

you’ve been around the FBI 17 years. You’re now the acting director for Legislative Affairs. Was this case different? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HERRING. I believe this case is different in a lot of ways. 

Mr. JORDAN. Lot of ways. 

Mr. HERRING. I do. 

Mr. JORDAN. Can you tell us, can you give me some—why? 

Mr. JORDAN. I know it’s different in a lot of ways. How about this 

difference. Have you ever had a case in your 17 years where the 

subject of your investigation’s husband meets with the Attorney 

General just a couple days before you’re going to interview that individual in your investigation? You ever had that happen in your 

17 years? 

Mr. HERRING. No, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. That’s certainly different. Isn’t it? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yeah. You ever have a case, in your 17 years—and 

we appreciate your service—you ever have a case where the Attorney General announces publicly that she’s going to follow the recommendations of the FBI, even though she has no idea what those 

recommendations are going to be based on—you ever have that 

happen in your 17 years? 

Mr. HERRING. Not in one of the cases I was assigned. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yeah. Well, I don’t think it’s ever happened because 

the Attorney General told me she’s never done that until this time. 

Have you ever had—in your 17 years, you ever have a director of 

the FBI, you ever have them do a big press conference, walk 

through all the wrongdoings of the person under investigation? You 

ever have that happen? A big press conference before and then 

make this big announcement? Or normally the FBI just kind of announces whether they’re going to prosecute or not. Right? You ever 

seen that before? 

Mr. HERRING. I mean, certainly we have press conferences. Not 

quite like that one. 

Mr. JORDAN. Not quite like that one. That’s exactly right. And 

then have you ever had this. Now, maybe this happens, but Mr. 

Cummings said in his opening statement Republicans didn’t like 

the answers Mr. Comey gave. Well, that may be true. But based 

on what Mr. Comey did last week where he sent a memo to you 

and all your colleagues, looks to me like a lot of former FBI agents 

and maybe some even current ones didn’t like some of the answers 

they got from this investigation. You ever seen that before? 

Mr. Comey says in this letter, ‘‘I explained to our alums, I’m 

okay if folks have a different view of this investigation.’’ So there’s 

obviously some folks who used to work in the Justice Department 

didn’t like the outcome either. Now, they may be Republicans like 

Mr. Comey says. They may not be. So I’ve never seen that before 

either. Have you, Mr. Herring? 

Mr. HERRING. Frequently we get messages from the director on 

a variety of things. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yeah. 

Mr. HERRING. I think in this case—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Two months after he makes the announcements he 

thinks it’s important to send a memo out 2 months later to all his 

employees and saying: Hey, I better fill you in on some things here, 

why we did what we did. You ever have that happen 2 months 

after the fact? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HERRING. I think oftentimes he wants the employees to understand what’s going on and full level of transparency both outside the Bureau and inside the Bureau. We’re a big agency—— 

Mr. JORDAN. So 2 months later you got a memo. 

Mr. HERRING. —36,000 or so employees—— 

Mr. JORDAN. This case was different. But here’s the problem, Mr. 

Herring. It’s not supposed to be. It’s not supposed to be different. 

Everyone is supposed to be treated equally under the law. And I 

know deep down you know that. You’re a 17-year servant in our 

government. And you know that. Don’t you? It’s all—everyone’s 

supposed to be treated the same. And in this case, this individual 

was treated different. And everyone in this country knows it. And 

that’s why we’re having this hearing. And that’s why we’d have 

liked you there last week to give us the information a little sooner 

than later tonight when we go into a classified setting. 

Mr. HERRING. Sir, can I answer that? I mean, I think it’s important for us as an agency to be apolitical, to follow the facts in any 

case where it takes us. And I do believe that we followed the facts 

in this particular case. And Director Comey certainly made a very 

difficult decision. But ultimately, at the Department of Justice, he 

makes the determination of prosecution. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no, no. 

Mr. JORDAN. Real quick. Not in this situation because she said 

she was going to take his recommendation. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. JORDAN. It is a false statement. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’re not going to recognize the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to 

thank you for your service. And then regrettably, second of all, I 

need to apologize for the way that you’re being treated here today. 

I know that we’ve worked with a number of you in the past and 

appreciate your service to the country. And unlike some folks here, 

I recognize there’s a separation of powers. 

While I do agree that Congress has a very wide jurisdiction for 

investigation, I also know that we are not a law enforcement agency. We are not a trial agency. And under the separation of powers 

in this country, it’s not consistent with the constitution for the legislative branch to overturn a decision, especially on an investigation and a potentially criminal investigation and you’ve decided not 

to prosecute. It is completely out of bounds for Congress to overturn a decision of a court on one specific case. 

And I want to go back right to the beginning. The notice of this 

hearing, which was supposed to be closed, and so I apologize that 

you’re being lambasted and denigrated in public when you were 

asked here to come here to a closed hearing, and all this is happening out of bounds and totally inconsistent with the chairman’s 

letter that this would be a closed hearing. 

There is a relevant case law, and, Mr. Herring, I would say that 

there is constitutional language that would prohibit what’s going 

on here today in requiring you to divulge the names of individuals 

that have been redacted during your investigation, and that that 

constitutional language is in the Bill of Rights. And particularly 

the Fifth Amendment. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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And I want to go back to a case called Watkins versus the United 

States. This was a matter brought forward by Senator Joe McCarthy in the House Committee on Un-American Activities. And Watkins was brought forward to—he was subpoenaed to testify before 

the House Committee on Un-American Activities. And Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the court in that case. And he 

said, There’s no general authority to expose the private affairs of 

individuals without justifications in terms of the functions of Congress. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These 

are the functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself. It must be related to and 

in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. And investigations 

conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those investigated are indefensible. 

Now, the notice for this hearing says that, number one, the purpose is to review the redactions that were made by the FBI during 

their investigation and—excuse me—to review the redactions, 

omissions, and circumstances surrounding your investigation. 

Now, as you said before, Mr. Herring, in bringing witnesses forward to get them to cooperate with the FBI—well, look at it this 

way. If the law is correct the way the chairman and my Republican 

colleagues are looking at this, here’s what we could do. This committee could identify somebody—we could refer somebody for investigation by you, our secret police, the FBI. You could go out and 

investigate all these people, and then we would have the ability to 

publicly embarrass them by removing any redactions that you put 

in place. That’s the world that we could create here. And what is 

the one instance when this exercise, this overreach of power is 

being administered? It’s when we’re investigating the Democratic 

nominee for President a couple of months before the election. 

That’s when this is going on. This is terrible. This is absolutely terrible. This is a miscarriage of justice. 

And the right of people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right of the witnesses that you investigate—and I understand this was a 12-month investigation. Earlier in your testimony 

you said that it took—you did 3 years of work in about 12 months 

and pulled in all these people. So if anybody at all is mentioned 

in any of these by a witness who mentions another person, that 

person will suffer the glare and their lives will be turned upside 

down because of what this committee wants to do. And that is a 

violation of our constitution and the individual rights of those individuals, just from having been mentioned or being approached in 

an FBI investigation. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is going in the totally wrong direction. This is a sad day in the history of this committee, I have 

to tell you. This is a sad goddamn day that we’re doing this. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. I think 

that last comment was a bit inappropriate. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herring, we do have an important responsibility as members 

of this committee. Unlike any other committee in Congress, we’re 

the investigations and oversight committee. The chairman went 

through the history of the committee and some of the investigaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:20 Apr 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\24913.TXT APRIL

KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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tions. This particular case we’re talking to dealing with Secretary 

Clinton’s emails, the case was declared closed by the director. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. And that came after—and I pointed this out the day 

he was here, just an unprecedented series of events. And Mr. Jordan, I think, relayed some of the timetable. On Friday, July 1, the 

Attorney General said she would take whatever recommendations 

the FBI came up with. On Saturday, the 2nd of July, the vans pull 

up and they interviewed the witness for, what, 4 hours was it? 

Mr. HERRING. Something like that. I don’t really recall. 

Mr. MICA. Yeah, something like that. And I asked the questions 

if it was recorded, and it was no. Did he participate in it, the director? No. Then we found out that there were the 302s that were 

taken. Is that correct? Summaries were taken. 

Mr. HERRING. A 302 from Ms. Clinton? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. HERRING. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. And then on July 5th, the 4th was a Monday, 

it was announced by the director there would be no prosecution or 

case closed by, basically, the Attorney General the next day. That’s 

pretty much the sequence. Isn’t it? 

Mr. HERRING. I think he made that recommendation, yes. 

Mr. MICA. Yeah. And the case is closed. Now, I’ve been on the 

committee longer than anyone here. I can never remember an instance—and the chairman went back to before the Teapot Dome 

scandal—when even during some of these investigations we have 

always had access to information. And that has been the case, 

hasn’t it, that we’ve always had access, unfettered access, the committee? Again, the chairman cited time after time—— 

Mr. HERRING. I don’t know about unfettered access. It’s before 

my time—— 

Mr. MICA. But we’ve gotten the information. Again, he has that— 

and I’d like it made part of the record, Mr. Chairman, the report 

that you have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MICA. And we do know that the Secretary used a private 

server which had emails that contained classified information. Is 

that not right, Ms. Walsh? Or all of this community would agree 

on that? 

Ms. WALSH. About her use of a private server, sir? 

Mr. MICA. The Secretary used a private server, and on it—and 

going through the server was classified information. I mean, everybody, unless you’re on another planet, knows that, including 

these—they’re all shaking their head affirmatively. 

The director, when he was here, said that he didn’t know if— 

there was a possibility that it could have been hacked. That information could have been made public. That’s really a national security issue here too, that Congress in its responsibility to investigate 

is now being denied the information about what really took place. 

You’re participating in keeping that information from us, Mr. Herring. 

Mr. HERRING. If I could just say a couple of things. You know, 

one, on the personally identifiable information, obviously I have a 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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subpoena here for that now. I engaged Mr. Chaffetz’s staff earlier 

today about a compromise that’s—— 

Mr. MICA. Well, we’re going to get the 302s one way or another. 

But you have not given us all the 302s. Right? 

Mr. HERRING. Not yet. We did prioritize them and we did the 

most—— 

Mr. MICA. That’s not a question. You don’t get to prioritize, never 

in the history of investigations that I’ve participated in. We want 

the information. We are entitled to the information. We are the investigative branch. Collectively we represent the American people. 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. I think—— 

Mr. MICA. And you have denied that. Now, we’ve had to file with 

you, Mr. Kadzik, a referral. How long before you act on the referral? You have the referrals? 

Mr. KADZIK. We have the letter from the chairman and Chairman Goodlatte as well, yes. 

Mr. MICA. What’s the timetable? I mean—— 

Mr. KADZIK. I can’t give you a timetable. We’ve referred it. It’s 

being reviewed. And I can’t give you a timetable for an investigation. 

Mr. MICA. You are again withholding information that this committee legitimately requested. The director is, and he promised 

that he would provide us. That’s not acceptable. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Chairman? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes, the ranking member? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. If the gentleman would just yield for just one 

second. Mr. Mica asked a question that just sparked my interest. 

You said you were having discussions with the Republican staff. Is 

my staff involved in those discussions? I’m just curious. 

Mr. HERRING. Not as of today, no, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Not as of today? 

Mr. HERRING. Well, I had a conversation with Mr. Chaffetz’s staff 

earlier today. But your staff was not a part of it, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is that—I mean, is that your normal course of 

doing things? We do represent 700,000 people each over here. 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you are from the Congress. You worked for 

Goodlatte. Is that right? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, Mr. Chairman, there’s an article that appeared today 

in Newsweek on emails, in Newsweek magazine, and I would ask 

that the article be entered into the record. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, let me just read a little bit from this article. It says, ‘‘Clinton’s email habits look positively transparent 

when compared with the subpoena-dodging, email-hiding, privateserver-using George W. Bush administration. Between 2003 and 

2009, the Bush White House lost 22 million emails.’’ Twenty-two 

million. ‘‘This correspondence included millions of emails written 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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during the darkest period of America’s recent history when the 

Bush administration was ginning up support for what turned out 

to be a disastrous war in Iraq with false claims that the country 

possessed weapons of mass destruction, and later, when it was firing U.S. attorneys for political reasons. Like Clinton, the Bush 

White House used a private email server. It was owned by the Republican National Committee. And the Bush administration failed 

to store its emails, as required by law, and then refused to comply 

with a Congressional subpoena seeking some of those emails.’’ I 

guess the past is prolonged. 

The chairman mentioned that Abraham Lincoln was a member 

of this committee. Abraham Lincoln—maybe that wasn’t auspicious, Mr. Chairman, because he only served one term and couldn’t 

get elected back home. He was a Whig at the time. And he spent 

his time worried about things like the Wilmot Proviso, trying to 

end the slave traffic in Washington, D.C., the Nation’s capital, and 

fighting the slavocracy and trying to move this country to limit and 

ultimately abolish a very evil institution. That’s what he spent his 

time doing. 

We’re spending our time trying to pillory somebody about how 

she managed/handled her emails, while she was traveling the 

world on behalf of this country to 111 countries trying to restore 

the U.S. Credibility and foreign policy after the incredible damage 

done in 8 years of the previous administration. I guess if I were 

in my friend’s situation, I’d grasp at this straw too. 

Mr. Herring, my friend Mr. Jordan tried to suggest that you, the 

FBI, have handled this case very differently than the normal 

course of justice to an American citizen. I guess because of the high 

profile nature, you handled it very carefully. Is that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, it is. And—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So it was different in that sense. But we had Director Comey, who was a, by the way, registered Republican until 

very recently, we had him before our committee. And I asked him 

under oath: Did the witness involved, the primary witness here involving these emails, did she lie? No. Did she deceive? No. Did she 

evade? No. Did she obfuscate? No. Did she deliberately keep or 

withhold relevant information requested from the FBI? No. Is that 

your understanding as well? 

Mr. HERRING. I would defer to Director Comey’s comments. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Mica says, or somebody said, you know, the 

case is closed. And you affirm that? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why? Why is the case closed? What’s your understanding of that, Mr. Herring? 

Mr. HERRING. Decision made at the highest level. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And the decision was, according, you said you 

read the newspapers, the director of the FBI says it wasn’t even 

a close call. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. HERRING. Correct. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Correct. No special treatment here. It wasn’t 

even a close call. This is political theatre. 

302s. Could you tell us what 302s are? My friend Mr. Gowdy 

knows what they are, but not all of us do. We’re not all lawyers. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HERRING. So 302 for us is a term of art. It’s simply a form 

that which we summarize an interview. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And how often do you provide 302s to Congress? 

Mr. HERRING. Rarely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Rarely? Why? 

Mr. HERRING. Usually, we don’t share the investigative files outside of—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So our request is unusual. Is that correct? You 

said you don’t do it very often. 

Mr. HERRING. Correct. Yes. In some sense it is. We don’t get that 

request very often and we certainly don’t provide them very often. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And to protect people—— 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. —from raw interviews. Is that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. From—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Or the summaries of those interviews. 

Mr. HERRING. To protect people from—I’m sorry. I missed 

the—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. From raw material from an interview. 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Redactions. How unusual are redactions? 

This is unique to this case. Is that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. No, no. We do redactions from time to time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why? 

Mr. HERRING. Really as far as, you know, people do have privacy 

interests. Anytime we release documents outside of the FBI, if it’s 

in FOIA, if it’s another avenue, have to review those and apply—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chairman will indulge me one more question, and then I’ll cease and desist. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Gladly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Herring, were 

you told at any time before this hearing or at any other time during this process that this is highly political and you should cover 

up, obfuscate, evade, deceive, or not provide information to protect 

somebody from our scrutiny? 

Mr. HERRING. No, not at all. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Has anybody at this table—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We have votes on the floor that are 10 minutes away, and we have 

members who still haven’t asked questions. Plus, we need to do a 

recorded vote. So we’re going to have to—we’re going to have to 

leave it here. 

And I now recognize—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I appreciate the chairman’s indulgence. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. —the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herring, would you say that the FBI’s investigation and the 

delivery of documents have been very systematic in principle? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes. As far as delivery of—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So there’s no haphazard method of delivering documents? 

Mr. HERRING. The documents we provided to Congress, sir? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HERRING. No, I think it’s been thoughtful and deliberative 

and—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Can you tell me why you didn’t deliver the 

documents that the chairman asked for on July 11th to the committee? You didn’t deliver them to the committee. You actually delivered them to another entity. Did you not? 

Mr. HERRING. That’s correct. We delivered them—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Why did you not deliver it to the committee? 

Mr. HERRING. Well, because those documents contain classified 

and other sensitive materials. We need to make sure they’re handled appropriately. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So are you willing to deliver all the unclassified documents to this committee? 

Mr. HERRING. So I think that—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no. Because you can’t have the first statement without the second statement. If the reason you sent it there 

was because it was classified, are you willing to give all the unclassified documents to this committee? 

Mr. HERRING. So the documents that we—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no. 

Mr. HERRING. We will give—so we’ve given certain documents to 

the committee already. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no. It’s a real simple question. Will you 

give all the unclassified documents to this committee, since the reason that you gave them to somebody else was that there was classified documents? 

Mr. HERRING. So the documents—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no. 

Mr. HERRING. The documents have restrictions on them and—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes or no. Why would they have—who placed the 

restrictions? You? 

Mr. HERRING. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. FBI? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So the answer is you placed restrictions, so you’re 

not going to give the unclassified documents to this committee. 

Mr. HERRING. So we’ve given this committee access to all the documents through—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. That’s not the question. It’s a great answer to a 

question I didn’t ask. 

Are you willing to give the unclassified documents to this committee? 

Mr. HERRING. All I can do is tell you that I’ll take it back. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So let me ask you another question. Because you said that it was systematic. I went to the classified room, 

and there’s two big binders there. One binder had some documents. 

The second binder that we got from the FBI had more documents 

than the first binder, and yet they were supposed to be identical. 

Would you say that was—— 

Mr. HERRING. Sir, I would like to address this in the classified 

setting, if I could. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Was that an oversight? 

Mr. HERRING. I think the details are important of what the differences are. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. MEADOWS. But we just asked for a second copy. So would 

that not be haphazard? It didn’t seem too methodical. Because 

when we went page for page, they didn’t match up. So who made 

the decision to give us a different set? 

Mr. HERRING. I’d like to address that in the closed session, 

please. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, let me just say this. There was 27 new 

emails. There was a number of different types of information that 

didn’t seem to go. And I don’t want to share anything classified. So 

you admit that the first set and the second set were not identical? 

Mr. HERRING. They were not identical. There were some differences. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So what were the nonclassification agency 

equities that prevented the initial disclosure of the 27 emails that 

we got in the second batch? 

Mr. HERRING. Again, in the classified session I’d prefer to—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Were all of those from one agency? 

Mr. HERRING. I prefer to address it outside of this setting. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. I understand that all of those were from 

one agency. Is that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. Look, the whole issue is sort of the handling of 

classified information. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So what was the agency? 

Mr. HERRING. I don’t want to get into that here in this setting. 

I’m happy to answer your question. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I have one of the emails that was withheld 

that said that it was later marked ‘‘unclassified/CIA use only.’’ So 

was that your justification for withholding it? 

Mr. HERRING. I’m sorry. I’m not sure I understand. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, it said ‘‘unclassified/CIA only.’’ So, Mr. Higgins, let me come to you. Did you read those emails that were in 

the second batch? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Sir, I’d prefer to answer any questions about the 

classification review in a closed setting. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So no reason why they were withheld? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I’d prefer to answer any questions about the classification review in a closed setting. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So I understand you’re asking for those 

documents back. Is that correct? That’s not classified. Are you asking for them back? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Sir, I’d prefer in a closed session to answer any 

questions about the classification review. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Did Director Brennan talk to you about 

that, Mr. Higgins? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Again, sir, I’d prefer to answer those questions—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. I can see where this is leading. So let 

me finish this by saying, you have finished all the redaction, is that 

correct, Mr. Herring, on what you gave us on the unclassified documents? 

Mr. HERRING. What do you mean, finished? 

Mr. MEADOWS. The redaction. The copies that we got to see on 

those unclassified documents, are the redactions done? 

Mr. HERRING. For the ones that you all have, yes. They’re—— 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So will you comply with the Federal law 

to release those in 20 days according to FOIA law? 

I’ll yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’m sorry, what was the gentleman’s answer? What was your answer to that question? 

Mr. HERRING. The redactions are completed for the ones that are 

here with Congress, the ones we released. We’re working on the 

other—the remaining 302s. The PII redactions for the remaining 

302s are in process. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, what I believe Mr. Meadows is asking 

is that under FOIA, there is a 20-day requirement to respond to 

a FOIA request. Now that we know that they’re all done, will you 

release those within the 20-day timeframe? 

Mr. HERRING. So I’m not a FOIA guy. They’re not all completed 

for the other 302s, the remainder—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Are there any that are completed? 

Mr. HERRING. I’m sorry. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Are there any that are completed? 

Mr. HERRING. I don’t know the status. I don’t know the status 

of all—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll go into that tomorrow. We’ve gone 

past our time. 

Let’s now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herring, I want to give you a better chance to answer some 

of my colleague Mr. Meadows’ questions. First of all, your title is 

you are the acting assistant director for Congressional Affairs of 

the FBI. Is that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. That’s correct. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And you’re in that post for how long? 

Mr. HERRING. About a month. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Did you say you used to work for Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. HERRING. I did a detail to the Hill, to Judiciary, for about 

15 months. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Oh, okay. And was that reporting to Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly did. I was actually technically assigned 

to the Crime Subcommittee and Sensenbrenner was the chair of 

that. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And the Goodlatte we’re talking about is the 

Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Okay. Now, you just were hammered with all 

of these yes or no questions, and I could see you having trouble 

with them. The trouble you were having, Mr. Herring, did not stem 

from your lifelong ambition to protect Secretary Clinton. Did it? 

Mr. HERRING. No, sir. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. In fact, the pointed question that my 

good friend Mr. Meadows was going over and over about was will 

you turn over certain documents, yes or no. You’re unable to say 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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yes or no because that’s not your call. You have to take it back to 

the office and take it up the chain of instruction. Don’t you? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. That’s why you couldn’t answer yes or no. 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Well, how fair was it for anybody to hit you 

with that kind of yes or no question when you couldn’t give a yes 

or no answer? How fair was that? 

Mr. HERRING. I’m here to answer the questions as best I can. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Yeah. And I wonder how fair it is to secondguess the FBI officers who are sworn to uphold, defend, and protect 

our constitution, and not caring where the political chips may fall. 

When Director Comey came in and testified, up until the time he 

decided not to prosecute, he was universally applauded on both 

sides of the aisle, particularly on the Republican side of the aisle, 

for his judgment, for his service, for his patriotism in this Nation. 

And then when it was his recommendation, which he now says was 

not even close, not to prosecute Secretary Clinton for the way she 

handled her email, all of a sudden he is reviled and all of his decisions up and down are being second-guessed by the Republicans on 

this committee. And I agree with my colleagues this is nothing but 

a show trial, it is nothing but political theater. And the only reason, the exceptional reason that this is happening, is in a couple 

of months from now people are going to have to decide whether to 

vote for Secretary Clinton for President. 

Now, Ms. Frifield, I’m sorry that you and the other witnesses are 

being put in this awkward position today. The chairman invited 

you to a classified hearing, but he is now springing this on you. I 

will withhold most of my questions to the classified bit of this. But 

we have to talk about the marking of classified documents. 

I mean, it’s being bandied about that documents can’t be produced because they’re highly classified. Well, to be classified, it— 

according to the manual which follows Executive Order 13526, a 

document has to have something that identifies who originally classified it. It has to identify the agency and office of origin of the 

classification. It must identify the reason for the classification. It 

must identify the date of the classification. And they typically also 

have a banner both across the top and the bottom stating the level 

of classification: Top secret, confidential, eyes only, whatever it is. 

Ambassador Kennedy testified that none of the emails provided 

to Congress had any of these indicators. And at our hearing, we 

asked Ambassador Kennedy about three documents, three out of 

30,000, that included a small C in parentheses. Even though the 

documents didn’t have any of these other indicators for classified 

documents, the State Department spokesman John Kirby said the 

markings on those emails were in error, and they were not, quote, 

‘‘necessary or appropriate at the time they were sent as an actual 

email,’’ and Ambassador Kennedy agreed. 

We asked him about one of those emails dated August 2, 2012, 

and he confirmed that the C in parentheses in that email was a 

mistake. He also confirmed that every paragraph in that email was 

also marked sensitive but unclassified. And we asked Ambassador 

Kennedy whether the FBI consulted with the State Department 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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about the classification status of this particular email, and he said 

he’d get back to us. 

My question to you is: Do you know the status of that request, 

Ms. Frifield? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I believe he’s going to get you the answer in the 

next day or so. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

It is the intention of the chair to exhaust the questioning appropriate for an opening session. But pursuant to House rule XI, 

clause 2(g)(2), I move that part of the remainder of the hearing will 

be closed to all persons other than the Members of the House, staff 

of the committee with appropriate security clearances, the official 

reporter and the witnesses and their counsels with appropriate security clearances, because the expected testimony received may include material designated as classified. I remind members that this 

is not a debatable motion. Pursuant to the House rules, the motion 

must be approved by a recorded vote. 

The question is on closing part of the remainder of the hearing 

to the public. And, again, it’s the intention of the chair to allow 

members to ask further questions in the unclassified setting and 

then go into the classified setting. 

So the clerk on the question, the question is on closing part of 

the remainder of the hearing to the public. The clerk will call the 

roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chaffetz? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chaffetz votes yes. 

Mr. Mica? 

Mr. MICA. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Mica votes yes. 

Mr. Turner? 

Mr. TURNER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Turner votes yes. 

Mr. Duncan? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Jordan? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Walberg? 

Mr. WALBERG. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Walberg votes yes. 

Mr. Amash? 

Mr. AMASH. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Amash votes yes. 

Mr. Gosar? 

Mr. GOSAR. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gosar votes yes. 

Mr. DesJarlais? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Gowdy? 

Mr. GOWDY. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gowdy votes yes. 

Mr. Farenthold? 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Yes. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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The CLERK. Mr. Farenthold votes yes. 

Mrs. Lummis? 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Lummis votes yes. 

Mr. Massie? 

Mr. MASSIE. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Massie votes yes. 

Mr. Meadows? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meadows votes yes. 

Mr. DeSantis? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. DeSantis votes yes. 

Mr. Mulvaney? 

Mr. MULVANEY. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Mulvaney votes yes. 

Mr. Buck? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Walker? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Blum? 

Mr. BLUM. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Blum votes yes. 

Mr. Hice? 

Mr. HICE. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hice votes yes. 

Mr. Russell? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Russell votes yes. 

Mr. Carter? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Grothman? 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Grothman votes yes. 

Mr. Hurd? 

Mr. HURD. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hurd votes yes. 

Mr. Palmer? 

Mr. PALMER. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Palmer votes yes. 

Mr. Cummings? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cummings votes yes. 

Mrs. Maloney? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Norton? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Clay? 

Mr. CLAY. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Clay votes yes. 

Mr. Lynch? 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lynch votes yes. 

Mr. Cooper? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Connolly votes yes. 

Mr. Cartwright? 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cartwright votes yes. 

Ms. Duckworth? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Kelly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mrs. Lawrence? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Lieu? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mrs. Watson Coleman? 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Yes. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Watson Coleman votes yes. 

Ms. Plaskett? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Desaulnier? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boyle? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Welch? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Lujan Grisham? 

[No response.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The clerk will report the tally. 

The CLERK. On this vote, there are 25 yeas and zero nays. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The motion is adopted. 

It is the intention of the chair to reconvene here 7:30, and then 

we will close out the remaining of the unclassified questions. We 

will then, at the appropriate time, depart for HVC–210, the Capitol 

Visitor Center, as it’s been prepared for a closed hearing of the 

committee. Only members of the committee, designated committee 

staff, the official reporter, the witnesses and their counsel may be 

present. The clerk is directed to allow only these persons to enter 

at that appropriate time. We stand in recess until 7:30. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will resume. We’re going to come back into order. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herring, it seems that the State Department initially requested the (b)(5) exemption. Is that correct? 

Mr. HERRING. Sir, I’m actually—I wasn’t in position at the time 

they were doing all of that. So I’m not—— 

Mr. HICE. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. HERRING. I’m not sure which exemptions they claim. Are you 

talking about the redactions? 

Mr. HICE. Right. 

Mr. HERRING. I’m not sure what the State Department asked for. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HICE. Okay. And it is my understanding that the FBI overruled that. Do you have any awareness of that decision? 

Mr. HERRING. We don’t typically—we’re the investigative agency. 

So when it comes to matters of classification, we typically defer to 

the owners of the information. So—— 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Well, Ms. Frifield, let me go to you, then. Why 

was State trying to use this extremely broad exemption? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I’m not responsible for FOIA redactions. So I—the 

FOIA process at all. So I’m afraid I don’t have an answer to that 

question. 

Mr. HICE. So you’re not familiar with the (b)(5) exemption? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I know what it is, but I don’t—I’m not actively involved in the FOIA process and making redactions or anything, any 

aspect—— 

Mr. HICE. So you don’t have any idea who made that decision? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. FOIA’s mostly done through our administrative 

bureau. So I would assume it would be someone in that bureau 

that would do it, as the normal course of action of the FOIA process. 

Mr. HICE. As a normal course of action given that exemption, 

would anyone outside of State Department have been consulted? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. We normally do consult in some cases if there’s 

interagency equities. And then they try to reach an agreement on 

what the classification level or redaction should be. 

Mr. HICE. So it would be your assumption, then, that probably 

there was some consultation? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I don’t know—— 

Mr. HICE. You don’t know that, but that would not be uncommon. It would somewhat from your understanding be something—— 

Ms. FRIFIELD. From my limited understanding of the way a FOIA 

process works. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. That particular exemption is basically, among 

at least many people, known as a withhold because you want to 

withhold exemption. Have you heard that expression before? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. No, I have not. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. It’s very, very broad. And it gives every appearance, at least, that there’s a reason to try to hide information. And 

that’s the frustrating point of all this. 

Let me ask this: What criteria is used, do you have any idea, 

when it comes to redacting information? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. For FOIA? 

Mr. HICE. Well, I would like to draw a distinction between FOIA 

and a request from Congress. 

Ms. FRIFIELD. FOIA is done by—through the FOIA process, as I 

just said, in the—through the administrative bureau. And they 

have a series of very formal redactions which they make under the 

FOIA. 

Mr. HICE. So how does that differ from a request from Congress? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. We don’t do that kind of redaction at all when it 

comes to Congress. 

Mr. HICE. Well, we’re filled with redactions with what we have. 

Mr. Kadzik, let me ask you the same question. 

Mr. KADZIK. I’m sorry? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HICE. What is the difference between making decisions of 

redactions from a FOIA request versus Congress? 

Mr. KADZIK. Well, I’m not an expert on FOIA requests and 

redactions with respect to FOIA. But we don’t use the FOIA standard when we produce information to Congress. Typically, we provide more information, but we still, you know, protect our law enforcement/prosecutorial equities when we make information available, and we do it consistent with the constitution and statutes 

that apply. 

Mr. HICE. All right. Let me go back to Mr. Herring. Because it 

seems to me like we’re just going around in circles with all of this. 

The chairman asked you earlier what you believe Congress 

should not be allowed to see or have information, and basically you 

said it varies from case to case. That’s a pretty broad difference. 

Does it vary depending on, some cases, a high-profile individual? 

Mr. HERRING. No, sir. Let me try to answer it this way, if I could. 

When the Bureau provided records to Congress, really, we think 

that the redactions were very light. We redacted primarily the personally identifiable information for some of the folks. And, honestly, we do usually strive to protect information of a purely personal nature. And so as far as—— 

Mr. HICE. Excuse me. I’ve just got 20 seconds left. But there’s a 

whole lot more than that that’s been redacted. I mean, on page 48, 

for example, you redact Ms. Clinton’s birth date. The very next sentence, four attorneys of hers are mentioned by name, a fifth one is 

redacted. That’s not personal information. There are hundreds and 

hundreds of examples like this. 

Mr. HERRING. Certainly. I mean, I think a number of the folks 

mentioned in those documents are out there in the public in some 

form or fashion, and I don’t think that there’s any reason to—well, 

they’re—— 

Mr. HICE. If they’re in the public, then why didn’t we get it? 

Mr. HERRING. The ones that are in the public you did get. The 

ones that are not in the public are the ones that were redacted, sir. 

Mr. HICE. So is the standard for Congress based upon what you 

would give the public? 

Mr. HERRING. No, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Well, then we should receive that and much more information. 

I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to continuing this. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I recognize now the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herring, you had said that the case involving Hillary Clinton 

is closed. Did you mean that that also includes the perjury referral 

that the Congress has sent to the FBI? Has that case been disposed 

of? 

Mr. HERRING. No, I’m not aware of—I know there have been referrals. I have to defer to the Department of Justice for where that 

is in the process. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But you can’t say that it’s been disposed of, correct? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HERRING. No, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. Let me bring you in, Mr. Higgins, about 

kind of the nature of the information. Do you work or have you 

worked in your career at the CIA in what is called the SCIF? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. What is that? 

Mr. HIGGINS. The SCIF is a sensitive compartmented information facility. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And what’s the purpose of it? 

Mr. HIGGINS. It is a secure facility in which one can handle sensitive compartmented information. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So if I have that type of information, TS/SCI, am 

I allowed to store it in my office if my office isn’t certified as a 

SCIF? 

Mr. HIGGINS. There are rules for handling classified information. 

I wouldn’t want to misstate those rules. But as a general principle, 

compartmented material should be stored in a SCIF. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And so could I bring it home, even if I lock my 

door at night, put it in my nightstand, if I lock my bedroom door, 

would that meet the qualifications of having SCI information if it 

wasn’t certified as a SCIF? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Unless you have a SCIF in your home, generally 

no. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. And we have a SCIF underneath the Capitol here. We have briefings here for Members of Congress. And 

when you are going into the SCIF, there are certain protocols that 

you have got to follow. Correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. All the files have to be locked up at the end of 

the night. Correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. That’s correct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And when the SCIF is unoccupied, the door has 

got to be locked. You can’t just leave it open. Right? 

Mr. HIGGINS. That’s correct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And you’re not allowed to bring phones or electronic recording devices in the SCIF. Correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. That is correct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So if I want to sit there and listen to the briefing 

about payments to Iran, if that’s classified and we’re down in the 

SCIF, if I want to bring my iPhone to check my email or to check 

news clips, I just can’t do that, right? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I would hope not. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. Now, has it happened, at the CIA or any 

of the other agencies, where employees have brought that type of 

electronic media into a SCIF? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I’m sure that people do on occasion accidentally 

bring electronic devices in. There’s protocol for them reporting that 

to your security officers and removing it from the building as soon 

as you discover that you have it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I would say that there’s probably been instances where SCIFs have been unlocked overnight or been unattended and been unlocked, and there’s also procedures for reporting 

that, correct? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HIGGINS. Yeah. I have no immediate personal knowledge, but 

I’d assume that there are such cases. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. And why do you have to immediately report it? I mean, mistakes happen. 

Mr. HIGGINS. To assess whether there were any consequences of 

a SCIF, for example, of having been unlocked, or an electronic device having been brought into a SCIF. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Which—and the consequences could mean that 

that information is exposed to hostile actors? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Potentially exposed one way or another. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. And if that happens, what happens at the 

CIA if somebody has not shown themselves to be able to handle 

this in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations? Is 

that something that employees have faced consequences for? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Sir, I’d prefer not to speculate or answer a hypothetical. It’s a case-by-case basis depending on the—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. It’s not a hypothetical. I’m saying have people 

been—have there been consequences for employees who have not 

followed the proper protocol in the past? 

Mr. HIGGINS. If people fail to follow security protocols, there are 

consequences ranging from a conversation with a security officer to 

administrative action and up from there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. And administrative action could mean loss 

of security clearance? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Depending—again, it all very much depends on the 

facts of the case at hand. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Now, there’s an issue about whether classified information is marked or not. Does the fact that it has markings, if 

something is not marked, does that mean it’s not classified? 

Mr. HIGGINS. If information is classified, it should be marked as 

classified, both portion markings and headers and footers on the 

beginning and end of the document. But the lack of a classification 

marking does not mean that the material in question is not necessarily classified. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And if you have, you know—we have people that 

are forward and, you know, you have things like signals intelligence and human intelligence, you can get that in forms before 

it ends up getting reduced to a document, correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, one could. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And the fact that if I got that, I could not then 

go to an email system or an unclassified area and reduce that to 

writing if it’s not properly protected, correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. When classified information is reduced to writing 

or put on an electronic system, it should be put on a system that 

is appropriately secure for that level of classification. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. I’m out of time. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you 

for your lengthy and continued service to our country. It is appreciated. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
39 

If none of the documents had a classification mark, as what has 

been asserted by many, then how would top secret/special access 

information find its way into an unclassified email’s content? Anyone can take that. 

Mr. Herring? 

Mr. HERRING. I do think this is something we should talk about 

in the next closed setting. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. We will. 

If a sender of information knows that they are sending information that came from a classified source, then, I guess, would that 

be a breach of law? If they’re sending it unclassified or if they are 

providing the details of that information in some form in an— 

would that be a breach of law? 

Mr. HERRING. I think from my perspective, you know, I don’t 

want to speculate what the investigative team did here. I mean—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. We’re not talking intent. We’re just talking 

about—— 

Mr. HERRING. Well, I mean, I think there is intent. Those things 

you look at in those kind of cases. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. 

Mr. HERRING. It’s very fact specific. But, you know, we’re not 

really for the investigative team. I mean, I hesitate to—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. So if they willfully know that they’re taking it from 

a classified source to an unclassified source, is that a breach of 

law? 

Mr. Kadzik? Department of Justice. 

Mr. KADZIK. It’s hard to answer a hypothetical and—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, this is pretty straightforward. 

Mr. KADZIK. No case is straightforward until you look at the particular facts. 

Mr. RUSSELL. So I guess, then, if they didn’t know, is it appropriate to have an unqualified person handle that information? 

Mr. KADZIK. I don’t know what you mean by ‘‘unqualified.’’ 

Mr. RUSSELL. Not cleared to handle that level of information, top 

secret/sensitive access program information 

Mr. KADZIK. Well, there are restrictions on access and one has 

to have appropriate clearances—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Absolutely. 

Mr. KADZIK. —in order to handle—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. And yet we see that we did have top secret/special 

access program information. Is that correct? 

Mr. KADZIK. I don’t know that for a fact. I have not looked at 

this. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Herring? 

Mr. HERRING. That really is something that’s for the next—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Comey said in an open source here in this 

hearing room that it was so. And so I guess if you allow unqualified 

handlers to access that, then another question would be, if a leader, director, or secretary directed their staff to handle secret or sensitive information in an unauthorized manner, have they breached 

the law? 

Mr. HERRING. Sir, we’re here to talk about the process of getting 

the documents to Congress, not the authorized—— 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. RUSSELL. But it’s very important because I have heard your 

testimony, Mr. Herring, and others that the FBI clearly was able 

to deduce what was sensitive access information, what was sensitive information, what was classified information, so much so that 

in order to guard it, they were able to prohibit even Congress from 

maybe seeing some of that because of its sensitivity. And we also 

know Department of State had those same concerns, that this was 

so sensitive that the skilled people that are trained at the FBI and 

are long-serving members of the Department of State, serve from 

administration to administration, they were able to deduce what 

classified information was and what sensitive information was. 

And yet we’re to believe somehow that Mrs. Clinton, a former 

first lady, a former United States Senator, cleared at the highest 

levels when she was in that capacity, and a former Secretary of 

State, when she was in that capacity, would not be able to really 

deduce that. 

How is that, Mr. Herring, how do you think that that could be, 

that you and all of your professionals in the FBI, and Ms. Frifield 

and all of the professionals that are in the Department of State and 

that we have all of our intelligence community, they’re able to deduce what that is? And when I had a top secret/SCI clearance in 

my more than two decades in the military, I mean, I understood 

what top secret information was. 

How is it that all of us could figure that out, and yet we’re to 

believe that, oh, there’s no marking on it. Oh, gosh, I’m not sure. 

I don’t know. Would you care to answer that, please? 

Mr. HERRING. Director Comey addressed this specifically in his 

testimony before this committee, and I would refer to his record for 

those types of questions. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, and that’s why I asked the first questions, 

that how could people even gain access? How can you take it from 

a cleared one—we just talked about SCIF with Mr. DeSantis’ question. How is it that you can take it from one place to a private server? How is it that you can take information from one secure area 

to an unsecure area? Cut and paste? Willful rewrite? Unqualified 

handler? These are questions that the American public has a reasonable expectation to answer, and that’s why we have oversight. 

And I yield back my time. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to echo the sentiments of several members here 

about our appreciation for your service. We don’t take this lightly. 

But Mr. Herring, you have mentioned Director Comey’s testimony several times. And one of the reasons that I have the concerns that I have about how things have been handled is because 

of his testimony in which he referred to the handling of classified 

information by former Secretary Clinton as extremely careless. I 

don’t recall—I don’t ever recall those two words being used to describe the actions of anyone who has ever served as Secretary of 

State, extremely careless in handling classified information. 


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I even—I think Director Comey even expressed some concerns 

that her account, email account or server may have been hacked. 

So I think you need—I think all of you should appreciate the fact 

that as members of the Oversight Committee, we have a responsibility to look out for the interest of the whole country. This—you 

know, some folks who try to make this about politics. It really isn’t. 

I think there’s some legitimate concerns here about national security. I think there’s legitimate concerns about the safety and wellbeing of our officers in the field. 

I just want to ask you, what would happen—you know, Mr. Russell just brought this up about the handling of national security information, cutting and pasting. What would happen if an employee 

or a contractor moved classified national security information to an 

unclassified system or took it outside the SCIF? Would it be taken 

lightly? What would be the consequences? I mean, would there be 

a writeup? Would there be a reprimand? I mean, would you investigate it? 

Mr. HERRING. I mean, certainly as a legislative affairs person, 

that’s not really my—— 

Mr. PALMER. I’m not asking you. I’m asking you—take a general—answer in the context the FBI would, would that be a problem? Would that be problem for any of you? 

Mr. HERRING. Sure, it would. I think it would be—I think it 

would be reported to the security division. I think they would take 

a look at all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 

Mr. PALMER. Let’s just do a little hypothetical here. Let’s just 

say—— 

Mr. HERRING. I prefer not to do any hypotheticals. 

Mr. PALMER. Okay. Then I will. I will assume that if you were 

the director of any part of our national intelligence agencies or the 

director of the FBI, and you had an employee who repeatedly did— 

handled classified information with extreme carelessness, I would 

assume, based on your service, that there would be some pretty severe action taken. Is that a valid assumption? 

Mr. HERRING. Yes. I think they’re—— 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you. 

Mr. HERRING. —they’re very serious sort of—— 

Mr. PALMER. Do you know of anyone who has been reprimanded 

for violating security procedures? 

Mr. HERRING. Not immediately—not that immediately comes to 

mind. 

Mr. PALMER. Have you ever copied classified information to an 

unclassified system or accidentally walked out of a classified storage space with a classified document you weren’t supposed to remove? 

Have you, Mr. Kadzik? 

Mr. KADZIK. No, sir. 

Mr. PALMER. How about you, Ms. Frifield? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. No. 

Mr. PALMER. Ms. Walsh? 

Ms. WALSH. No, sir. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Higgins? 


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Mr. HIGGINS. I can think of one occasion on which I have accidentally removed material from a SCIF, realized it immediately, 

and returned to the SCIF with that material. 

Mr. PALMER. You didn’t take it home with you? 

Mr. HIGGINS. No. 

Mr. PALMER. That’s good to know. 

Mr. Samuel? 

Mr. SAMUEL. No, sir, I have not. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Soule? 

Mr. SOULE. Sir, I can think of one. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Microphone, please. 

Mr. PALMER. Microphone, please. 

Mr. SOULE. Sir, I can think of one instance that I made a mistake. I reported it to my staff security officer. The document was 

destroyed. 

Mr. PALMER. So in the two instances where you accidentally did 

something, you showed due diligence, you took care of the situation, you did what you should have done, and you reported it, in 

your case, Mr. Soule, to your superior. 

That’s not what happened here. So my problem with this is, is 

that—again, I think this committee has a responsibility, I think the 

chairman’s articulated that quite well, to exercise the oversight the 

Constitution invests us with, and that we need to look into the possibilities of how a Secretary of State acting—handling classified information with extreme carelessness may have compromised agents 

in the field, possibly our national security. 

There’s a number of issues here. And it begs the question, if 

that’s not the issue, then why are you withholding 302s? And why 

is so much of this stuff redacted? 

Mr. HERRING. I mean, as far as the 302s go, obviously, we provided some. There’s a lot of them. The rest of them are in process. 

And to the extent that, you know, I can take back and see what 

we can do as far as getting you the access that you need, I do think 

that the personally identifiable information is something where I 

think individuals do have a privacy interest, and we generally do 

try to protect that type of information. 

Obviously, one question that obviously we would consider is, you 

know, how does it relate to the oversight interest of the committee 

at hand. 

Mr. PALMER. But you have to let us do our job. We want you to 

do your job, but you have to let us do our job. 

My time has expired. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from Wyoming, Mrs. Lummis, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When we’re home in our districts, we meet with our constituents. 

And while I was home in my State of Wyoming over the August 

work period, among the things people asked me was have you ever 

read classified documents in the SCIF. And I explained that I had 

on two occasions. In fact, three, visited a SCIF by myself where I 

had to surrender my electronic devices, where I was watched while 

I sat there and read classified documents by people who were ensuring that I would not write anything down, that I would not use 


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my cell phone to take photographs of classified documents and take 

them out of the room. 

For some of us, it’s a little intimidating to just sit there and read 

while people are staring at you while you’re reading, and it’s really 

quiet. So the SCIF experience for—that I have had as a Member 

of Congress and that I have related to my constituents in Wyoming 

is very different from the kind of thing we’re hearing today, where 

we have heard, at least on television, that Secretary Clinton had 

maybe as many as 11 or more devices that she used to communicate with, that she had a private server, that there were—there’s 

a classified server and an unclassified server, and that if someone 

takes something classified and sort of restates it without noting 

that it’s classified, that it can be discovered by people who are 

hacking an unclassified server in the basement of, say, a Secretary 

of State’s house. 

This is the kind of thing that concerns my constituents. So that’s 

why we’re having this hearing. It’s not because we’re trying to 

make your lives miserable or our lives miserable by meeting late 

some Monday night. It’s because our constituents are worried that 

classified information was compromised in ways that might allow 

hackers to refer that information to people who want to do harm 

to America and its allies. 

My question is this. Have any of you that are on this panel separated or begun to separate the classified information that is in the 

SCIF from the unclassified information or from the sensitive access 

information? Anyone? 

Mr. Herring, would you—yes or no, have you begun to separate 

that information? 

Mr. HERRING. I’m not exactly sure what you’re talking about, but 

generally, the information in a classified document is portion 

marked, and that document stays together and it stays in the 

SCIF. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. So there is some way—if I could go down 

to the SCIF right now and see those documents that hopefully, and 

we’re going to be talking about in a little bit, would I know whether I was viewing something that was classified, something that was 

sensitive, something that was unclassified? 

Mr. HERRING. The information should be properly portion 

marked. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. 

Mr. HERRING. Should be able to tell if—— 

Mrs. LUMMIS. So you could separate classified from unclassified 

from sensitive, based on information available to you in documents 

that are currently in the SCIF, right? 

Mr. HERRING. If it is properly marked, you can certainly distinguish the classified from the unclassified. I do think, though, in our 

production to Congress, which is what we’re really here to talk 

about—— 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Uh-huh. 

Mr. HERRING. —there are other sensitivities in the unclassified 

information that’s sort of nonpublic information. It’s not—certainly 

not suitable for public release. 


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Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Why have we, as Members of Congress, not 

been provided access to the nonclassified, nonsensitive information 

that is in the SCIF? 

Mr. HERRING. Ma’am, I think you’ve—I think you’ve been given 

access or certainly the members of this Oversight Committee and 

appropriately cleared staff have been given access to all the information that’s in the SCIF, ma’am. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of 

my time to you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Herring, the problem that we have is that the redactions 

that you’ve given us don’t allow us to look at the full and complete 

file. That’s part of the challenge. 

Mr. HERRING. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Let’s start with Mr. Soule there. The NSA, 

do you have an understanding of the total universe of the compromised classified material that was found in the universe? 

Mr. SOULE. Absolutely not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What—explain that to me. She had—Hillary Clinton took 4 years of communication outside of a secure communication. Do you or do you not have an understanding of the 

universe of that breach? 

Mr. SOULE. If by universe, sir, you mean the importance of it, I 

certainly understand the importance of it, but I don’t have personal 

knowledge of everything that is said to have been released. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Does your agency? Does the NSA understand the universe of the breached material? 

Mr. SOULE. My understanding is that every document that was 

referred to us—but I will want to talk more in closed session, sir— 

we had the opportunity to review, and I can give you the results 

of that in closed session. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But do you have an accounting that shows 

that you have all of the—there were untold tens of thousands of 

things that were destroyed. We heard testimony from Under Secretary Kennedy just last week that they now have 14,900 additional emails, plus tens of thousands that have been given to them 

in the last 30 days. 

So I’m asking if the NSA understands how much classified information from NSA has been compromised in a nonsecure setting. 

Mr. SOULE. Sir, I’d have to speculate. I do not know that, and 

I don’t know that we do know that, but I could take that back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And you’ll get that to me by? 

Mr. SOULE. Sir, I’ll look. I don’t know. A week. Is that acceptable? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That’s fair. That’s fair. 

Mr. Samuel, same question. 

Mr. SAMUEL. Sir, while I prefer to discuss this in the closed session, yes, NGA is aware of and has reported back to Congress the 

extent of our equities found in those emails. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you give us a general sense, though, 

of—what percentage of the compromise do you believe you’re aware 

of? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Sir, again, I prefer to discuss that in a closed session. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Samuel, when did you first become 

aware that there could have been a compromise of this data? 

Mr. SAMUEL. Sir, our agency started receiving requests last fall 

to get this information in earnest, and that’s when I first became 

aware of it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Soule, when did the NSA first become 

aware that there might have been a breach of this classified information? 

Mr. SOULE. Sir, like my NGA colleague, I believe it was last fall, 

but I don’t have that information in front of me. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. Just so the members know, this 

criminal referral started because the Inspector General got word 

that there was classified information in a nonsecure setting, they 

confirmed that it was in a nonsecure setting, and that’s when they 

gave the criminal referral to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Part of what we need to understand is when did ODNI, CIA, 

NGA, when did they all understand, has all that information been 

recovered? Are we—it’s—we need to know whether or not ODNI 

understands the scope of what was potentially sent in those emails. 

Do you feel, Ms. Walsh, that ODNI knows 100 percent of what 

was compromised? 

Ms. WALSH. Given that that’s outside my role in Legislative Affairs, I’d have to take that back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Can you get that to me? Is a week fine? Is 

that—to ask that question? 

Ms. WALSH. We’ll do our best. It’s the best I’m going to say. We’ll 

do our best. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. A week? Is that fair? 

Ms. WALSH. Sure. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

All right. The gentleman—the gentlewoman yields back. 

Do any other members have any other questions appropriate for 

an unclassified setting? 

Mr. Gosar is now recognized. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Higgins, CIA collects a great deal of human intelligence. 

That is, it collects information from foreign individuals often at the 

risk of that individual’s life. Is that true? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Are you aware that the State Department released 

some unclassified emails from Secretary Clinton with a FOIA redaction that said, quote, B3CIApersons/org? Are you aware of that? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I will admit, I do not remember every classification 

marking on each of the emails that were released pursuant to the 

FOIA request. 

Mr. GOSAR. So let me get this straight. So CIApersons/org means 

information redacted with sensitive information about an individual organization affiliated with the CIA, correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I will take your word for it. I don’t have the FOIA 

manual in front of me, I’m afraid. 

Mr. GOSAR. Okay. So if information from a single or small group 

of CIA officers or agents makes it to our adversaries, that could 

present a huge risk for their safety, right? 


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Mr. HIGGINS. Sir, I wouldn’t want to speculate without knowing 

what information we are discussing, and I’d prefer to—— 

Mr. GOSAR. But potentially. I mean, given that circumstance, it 

could potentially have some serious ramifications for those people. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Again, it would all depend on the information in 

question, and I’d prefer to discuss the classification review and any 

classified material in a closed setting. 

Mr. GOSAR. Oh, but that’s hardly—I mean, a classification that 

we can’t talk about right here, is it? 

Mr. HIGGINS. If information relating to CIA sources of methods 

were disclosed to a foreign adversary, yes, that could have adverse 

consequences. 

Mr. GOSAR. So to some degree, protection of classified information is life or death? 

Mr. HIGGINS. It can be, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Okay. And even a few sentences from a source could 

reveal the—could expose that source, true? 

Mr. HIGGINS. It would all depend on those few sentences. 

Mr. GOSAR. But it could? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Potentially, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Okay. So would you say that someone who treats information with our spies abroad exceptionally carelessly should be 

trusted with a security clearance? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Sir, I think that is well outside my realm at—— 

Mr. GOSAR. Well, I just—I watched the chairman ask each one 

of you gentlemen and ladies, going back over classified, did you remove any information out of a SCIF or any documentation. And 

those that said yes, said, hey, you went back. There were some seriousness to it, right? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I believe people with access to classified information treat that responsibility seriously, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Say that one more time. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I said I believe people with access to classified information treat that responsibility seriously, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Really? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I do. 

Mr. GOSAR. So why are we here? 

Mr. HIGGINS. I would defer to the chairman. 

Mr. GOSAR. No, no, no, no. So why are we here? Because we have 

a Secretary of State that had a whole server that was offline. Kind 

of unusual, wouldn’t you say? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Again, sir, I am here and ready to answer classified—— 

Mr. GOSAR. That’s fine. 

Mr. Soule—— 

Mr. HIGGINS. —in a closed situation 

Mr. GOSAR. —NSA is tasked with collecting intelligence electronically through signals. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOULE. Yes, sir, it’s correct. 

Mr. GOSAR. Would leaking signals intelligence damage national 

security? 

Mr. SOULE. Yes, sir, it would. 


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Mr. GOSAR. What if the person looking at the intelligence 

thought the information in question wasn’t important? Is that a 

valid excuse for leaking signals intelligence? 

Mr. SOULE. No, sir. 

Mr. GOSAR. Leaking any signals intelligence can reveal our signals intelligence capabilities so that even if information collected by 

NSA seem innocuous. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOULE. Generally, I agree, sir. It would depend on the facts. 

Mr. GOSAR. It still should be treated as classified, true? 

Mr. SOULE. If it was indeed classified and properly classified, it 

should be treated as classified. 

Mr. GOSAR. Has the NSA ever lost an important intelligence collection tool—been burned is the quote—because classified information about that method made it into the wrong hands? 

Mr. SOULE. Yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Would you say that someone who treats NSA signals 

intelligence exceptionally carelessly should be trusted with a security clearance? 

Mr. SOULE. Generally, I would agree with you, sir, but I would 

have to understand the facts. But in the general premise, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Does anybody have questions for an unclassified setting? Otherwise, it’s the intention of the chair to recess and reconvene in a 

classified setting. 

Let’s go to Mr. Grothman of Wisconsin. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Sorry. I just have a couple of questions for Ms. 

Frifield. 

She didn’t submit her email records to the State Department, 

right, until December of 2014, almost 2 years after she left the 

State Department, correct? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I don’t have the dates, but I think—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. About. 

Ms. FRIFIELD. —that’s in the range is my understanding. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. Was that 2-year delay in turning over 

Federal records in compliance with your policy? What’s your general policy in how quickly the record should be turned over? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I believe the rule is that when you leave, you 

should—your records should be turned over, but I don’t know that 

there’s a time. I don’t know if there’s a time lag that you—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Maybe a couple of months, not 2 years. Do you 

know of anybody else who took 2 years to turn over their records? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I’m not aware of any. I’m not aware of that. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. And even then, her submission rate eventually turned out to be incomplete. The FBI submitted thousands 

of emails to the State Department that uncovered, in the course of 

their investigation, correct, thousands of emails that she didn’t 

turn over? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I would defer to—I don’t know how many she 

didn’t turn over. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Sure. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy testified there were 14,900 additional emails and 

tens of thousands that he received in the last 30 days. Was he accurate or inaccurate? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I assume he’s accurate, but I do legislative affairs, 

so—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. There we go. 

Go ahead, Mr. Grothman. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. 

Ms. FRIFIELD. —that’s not my specialty. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It’s a huge point for us. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Right. Was her failure to turn over these emails 

in compliance with State Department policy? Do you know anybody 

else since you’ve been there who hasn’t turned over that huge number of emails upon leaving? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I don’t—I’m not aware of any, but I don’t know. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Anybody not turning over any emails since 

you’ve been in your position, that you’re aware of? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I don’t monitor that, but I think we’re each responsible for our own emails, and we file them and save them, and they 

give you—through a process to do that. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. You ever hear of anything like this happening 

since you’ve been involved in the State, anybody not turning over 

emails? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I haven’t really been involved in the records retention issue, but I know we’re working hard to improve our records 

retention system. We have new processes, new people who are involved in helping us all to understand how it’s done. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Secretary Clinton’s IT contractor deleted 

an email archive from their servers after they were made aware of 

a preservation order from the Benghazi Committee. Okay. So after 

they were told to preserve it, they deleted it. 

Was the deletion of that email—of those email archives in compliance with State Department policy? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I think the policy is you’re not supposed to delete 

emails. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Delete them, right. And these are particularly 

severe because she particularly wasn’t supposed to delete these. So 

that would be—what would happen to a regular garden variety employee of the State Department if they had done this sort of thing? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I don’t know. But I think usually you save your 

emails and pass them on as records you’re—— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. I know that’s what you’re supposed to do. Everybody does it. If another employee, just put somebody in your mind, 

another employee had deleted emails like this, what do you think 

would—what would the State have done about it? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I honestly don’t know. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. They never think about it, never occurred it 

would happen. Okay. 

Will she or any of her aides that helped participate in this face 

any punishment or negative consequences for her actions in doing 

this? 

Ms. FRIFIELD. I can’t speak to specifics, but in general, when 

there’s any kind of a violation or an issue or infraction, it’s reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:20 Apr 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\24913.TXT APRIL

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viewed through administrative procedure out of the Diplomatic Security Office. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I’ll yield the remaining of my time to the 

chair. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Our first round—this round of the unclassified questions has concluded. The committee will take a short recess, reconvene in the 

House Visitor Center, room 210 of the Capitol Visitor Center to 

conduct the closed portion of the hearing. We will start—we will 

give you 15 minutes, and try to reconvene at 8:25. 

Committee stands in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 8:10 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene in closed session.] 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 5:00 p.m., in Room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Gosar, Meadows, Palmer, and 

Norton. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. 

This is a continuation and the conclusion of our September 12 

hearing on classifications and redactions in the FBI’s investigative 

file. We are going to encourage members to go to a classified briefing on this topic. But for now, without objection, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed session.] 


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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 64 here 24913.064
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 65 here 24913.065
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 66 here 24913.066
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 67 here 24913.067
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 68 here 24913.068
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 69 here 24913.069
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 72 here 24913.072
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 82 here 24913.082
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 84 here 24913.084
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KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 86 here 24913.086
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Æ 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 87 here 24913.087