2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

6-1-2005 

# B i a nchi T r i son C or p v

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P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ock e t N o . 04-2093

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2005 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

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. C a rl s on@l a

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w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/932PREC EDENTIAL
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E T H IRD C IR C U IT

No. 04-2093

BIANCHI

TRI SON CORPORATI ON, Petitioner

v. ELAI NE L . CH AO , SE CRE TA RY OF LAB OR , Respondent

On Petition for Review of a Final Or der of

the Occ upational Safe ty

and He alth Review Commission (OSHRC Docket Nos. 01- 1367 and 01-1368)

Argued Apr il 7, 2005
BEF ORE: BARRY, AMB RO, and GREENB ERG, Circuit J udg es

(F iled J une 1, 2005)
Robert G. Walsh (ar gued) 3819 Southpark Avenue P.O. Box 1909 Bla sdell, NY 14219-0109 Attorney

for Petitioner
Ho wa rd M. Ra dze ly Solicitor of L abor J oseph M. Woodward Associate Solicitor for Oc c up atio na l Sa fe ty

and He a lth Ronald J . Gottlieb (argued)B TC is a Ne w Yo rk State Cor po ratio n w ithits he a dq

ua rt e rs in 1 Sy rac use, Ne w York. 2 Susan Hutton Ann Rosenthal United States Depa

rtment of L abor Offic e of the Solicitor Room S -4004 2 0 0 Co n s ti tuti o nA v e nu e , N

. W. Washington, DC 20210 Attorney s for Responde nt

OPI NI ONOF TH E CO UR T

GREENB ERG, Circuit J udg e.

I . F AC TU AL

AN D PR OC ED UR

AL HI STO RY Th is m atte r i s b e fo re thi s c ourt on a pe tit ion fo r r e vie w i n which the pe titioner, Bianc hi Trison Corporation (he reina fter “ BTC” ), challeng es the disposition of administrative proce eding s instit uted by the Secr etar

y of L abor a

rising f rom safe ty

and hea lth problems that arose in the demolition, im plosion, and clea n-up of the T hree Rivers Stadium in P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In response to a complaint 1 alleg ing unsa fe c onditions at the site, the Occupational Safety and Hea lth Adminis tration (her einaf ter “ OSHA”) made se vera l inspections of the stadium which unc overe d conditions that caused the Secre tary to bringan enf

orce ment action ag ainst BTC under the Occ upational Safe ty

and He alth Act (he reina fter the “OSH Ac t”) setting f orth three citations alleg ing 45 violations of its standar ds and proposingsubstantial penalties. Afte r a he aring , an administrative law judge (her einaf

ter “ AL J ”) uphe ld 35 of the cha rg es. B TC then filed a petition for discre tionary

revie w with the Occ upational Safe ty and Hea lth Review Commis sion, but the Comm ission did notdirec t the case for r eview a

nd thus the decision of the A L J beca me the fina l order of the Commission on Februa ry 27, 2004. BTC ne x t filed a tim e ly pe tit ion fo r r e vie w o f t

he F e br ua ry 27 , 2 00 4 o rd e r w iththi s court, whic h has led to the proc eeding s culminating in this opinion.B TC v ice -pr e sid e nt D avid B ianc hi t e sti fi e d th at he tol d 2 O’Rourke president Timothy O’Rourke that BTC did not i n t end to do any torch c utting befo re t h e implosion, although it was possible that em p l o y ee s unexpectedly

would run into a pipe or struc tural steel that neede d to be torch c ut. Relyin g at least in par t on this i nformation, O’Rourke advised B ianchi that B TC could use the e x posure deter mination from an ea

rlier demoliti on projec t at a National Starch and Chemical Company

proper ty as its initi al exposure assessment f or the stadium. O’R o u rk e testified that he did not consider a potential lea d ha zar d p ri or

to t he i mp lo si on be c a

us e B TC t old

him it d id n ot p lan to torch c ut before then. 3 A. The D emolition of Three Rivers Stadium We set forth the fa ctual history of the matter

as deve loped at the he ari ngbe fo re the AL J. Th e City of Pitt sb ur g h, thr ou g h it s Sp or ts and Exhibi tion Authority (her einaf ter the “ SEA”), owne d the stadium. Th e SEA , in

Au gus t 20 00 , is su e d a

re qu e st f or bid s f or a c ontr a c t to demolish the stadium. BTC was the suc cessf ul bidder, and, acc ording ly , the SEA awa rded it the c ontrac t. The demolition project was broke n into three distinct phases: pre -implosion demolit ion, implosi on, and cle anup. In addition to eng ag ing B TC, the SEA utiliz ed AMEC Construction Manag ement (he reina fter “ AMEC”) a s projec t manag er f

or the de moliti on and Makin Eng ineer ing to ove rsee contra ct compliance . AMEC, in turn, hired Allegheny Asbestos Analy sis d/b/a Global Environmental Mana g ement to inspect the sta dium f or a sb e sto s and

ha zar do us ma

te ri a ls, oth e r t

ha n le a d. B TC, howeve r, re tained the r esponsibility for lea d abate ment. Finally , as mate ri a l in

the se pr oc e e din g s, B TC c ontr a c te d w ithO’ Rourk e , Inc . to provide full-time, on-site ove rsig ht of all safe ty and hea lth aspects of the projec t, including OSHA c ompliance.
BTC star ted its work at the stadium on January 2, 2001. The pre- implosi on aspec t of the contra ct re quired it to remove environmenta l hazards and pr epar e the stadium for implosi on. The SEAand AM EC p lann e d a

pu bli c a uc tio n o f t

he sta dium’ s se ats, fre ezers, and othe r stadium memorabilia duringthe pre -implosion demolition period. The dema nd for stadium seats was g reater than e xpe c te d, and

in o rd e r t o ma

ke se ats a va ila ble mor e qu ic kly

tha n it had thoug ht would be nec essar y , BTC dire cted labor ers to torc h the bolts off the seats. On J anuar y 15, 2001, the memora

bilia sale wa s 2 conducte d with the items sold to be picked up by J anuar y 19, 2001.Th e vio latio ns no w at iss ue ste mmi ng fr om the Sa fety Ca se 3 aro se fr om B TC’ s f

ail ur e to p ro te c t e mpl oye e s f ro m ha zar ds re late d to floor opening s and fa lling debr is. 4 Duri ngthe pr e -i mpl os ion ph a se of the de mol iti on

pr oje c t, worke rs complained to Rober t Staniz zo, a repre sentative of the Pitt sb ur g h B uil din gand

Con str uc tio n T ra de s Co un c il, a

bo ut s a fe ty issues. In response to these complaints, Stanizz o asked Rober t McCall, the Dire ctor of Saf ety for the Construc tion I ndustry Advanc ement Prog ram of Wester n Pennsylvania F und, to assess the safe ty situation at the stadium. McCall went to the stadium on J anuar y 29, 2001, and met with two local union re prese ntatives and examined the safe ty

protec tions, concludingthat they wer e insufficient. Af

ter a meetingat which Mc Call rece ived an unsatisfac tory

response from B TC’s projec t manag er, he and the union repre sentatives filed a complaint with OSHA’s Pitts burg h Are a Di re c tor , Ro be rt

Sy mans ki.
In response to the complaint, OSHA, on J anuar y 29, 2001, conducte d a saf

ety inspection of the pr emises. This inspection reve aled many

safe ty lapses and le d to the issuance of citations alleg ing nume rous violations of the OSH Act. The se citations have be e n r e fe rr e d to a s th e “ Sa fe ty Ca se ” in t

he se pr oc e e din g s. 3
The issuanc e of the safe ty citations, howeve r, did not stop the projec t and by

ear ly Fe bruar y , BTC ha d demolished most of the interior of the stadium. BTC throug h a subcontra ctor imploded the sta dium on

F e br ua ry 11 , 2 00 1, fo llo wi ngwh ic h f or a tw o- month period B TC proce ssed and r emoved the r emainingconcr ete a nd steel de br is. B TC a ssi g ne d te ams o f e mpl oye e s to tor c h c ut t he ste e l into s m a l l e r s i z e s i no r d e r

t o l o a d th e mo n t o th e tr

u c k s t o b e h a

u l e d aw ay. On Fe bruar

y 13, 2001, sever al OSHA employees vie wed a Pitt sburg h television eveningnews program whic h aire d footag e of a worke r torch c utting on a pa inted steel bea m. The footag e re veale d visible smoke fumes, and showe d that the worke rs wer e not wea ring respirators. Their view ing of the program led se vera l OSHA e mpl oye e s to e xpre ss c on c e rn ov e r t he po te nti a l f

or le a d e xpos ur e to the wo rk e rs . On Fe bruar

y 14, the OSHA assistant ar ea dir ector , Edwar d Selker, a ssigne d two industrial hyg ienists to ins pect the pr oject for health hazar ds. But the ne x t day when the two hy

g ienists went to theOSHA and B TC concur rently too k bulk paint samples at var ious 4 locations in the stadium on Febr uary 15. On Fe bruar

y 16, 2001, afte r OSHA obtaine d the inspection 5 war rant, the two hy

g ienists returned to the site. But due to rain, B TC’s safe ty consultant advised OSHA that BTC had shu t d o wn the burning work u n t i l further

notice. OSHA a

nd BTC then r eac hed an a g ree ment providingfor B TC to notify OSHA when it wa s resumingburning . On F e br ua ry 21 , B TC’ s p ro

je c t ma na g e r not if

ie d OSH A that it wa s r e a dy to return to torc h burningoperations. O’Rourke conce d ed t h at BTC did not have a wr itten lead 6 compliance plan bef

ore F ebrua

ry 16, 2001. 5 stadium to beg in their inspection, B TC denied them entr y . The hyg ienists were able to g ain entry to inspect the pre mises only afte r contac ting the SEA, which g rante d them permission to inspect the premises. B TC, however , informed the hy g ienists that all burning wo rk ha d b e e n s us pe nd e d th at da y and thu s th e y we re on ly

a ble to interview the union steward, who indicated that e mploy ees ha d perf ormed pre -implosion torch burningand cutting

. This reve lation 4 le d to OSH A s e rv ingbo th a n a dmi nis tr ativ e su

bp oe na on B TC t o secur e re cords r elated to the pr e-implosion activities and an inspec tion war rant to conduc t a full inspection. Be tween F ebrua ry 15 and 5 Fe bruar y 21, BTC implemented a

lead pr otection program at the stadium, its first formal lead program at the site. 6 OSHA made its full inspection on F ebrua ry 21, duringwhich its inspectors took bulk samples, did air monitoring, a nd conducte d interviews. B TC concur

rently perf ormed sampling . The re sults of both OSHA’s and B TC’s sampling r evea led that the leve l of exposure to lead at the site w as much greater than a llowed under the OSH Act. Consequently , the Secr etar y issued a citation ag ainst BTC alleg ing that there wer e 29 willful violations of the L ead- in-Construction Industry Standard (he reina fter “ the Standard” ) at the stadium (her einaf ter the “ Hea lth Case”).

B . T he Sa fe ty

Ca se Thoug h the Safe ty

Case involved two citations and nume rous inf ra c tio ns , th e on ly

iss ue s mate ri a l to the Sa fe ty Ca se in t he seThe c itations at issue relating t o the re moval of the e scalators 7 are : Citation Number 2, I tem 2a, instance (b):

an esc alator ha d been dr opped from leve l 5 to level 4, wit h only

caution tape used as a w arningof the drop. Citation Number 2, I tem 2a, instance (d): the fa i lure to provide ba rrica de and war ning signs when a

n eleva tor shaft wa s “cut.” The c itations at issue relatingto fall hazards a re: 8
Citation Number 2, I tem 2b, instance ( a): failure to cover

proper ly expansion joi nt openings i n the floor on the se cond and third level. Citation Number 2, I tem 2b, instance ( b): floor hole into which a n employ ee, Charles W al lace , fell without being

6 proce eding s relate to fall hazards a nd hazards re lating to f

alling debris. In this reg ard, the re w ere alleg ations stemming fr om falling debris fr om BTC’s de moliti on and re moval of the stadium’s e sc a lator s, wh ic h B TC r e mov e d b y burn inge a c h e sc a lator ’s top loo se from its supports. Sometim es, whe n the worke rs cut an e scalator loose, it would not fall, and in that circ umstance w orker s would use a machine to lowe r it the floor be low. After one of the first esca lators fell, the wor

k cre w, in conjunction with the union stewar ds, enclosed the ar eas be low the esc alators with tape , as a w arningnot to enter. 7
BTC c ontends that when a n esca lator did fall, it fell onto the concr ete leve l from which it had c ome and did not ca use a r isk dang er to its employ ees. Thr ee B TC employ ees, how ever , testified about the risk from the f

ailing de bris, and docume nted incidents in which dif fe re nt e sc a lator s f

e ll two and

fo ur le ve ls. The B TC worker s fac ed an a dditional risk during the preimplosi on period whe n they wer e exposed to floor holes cr eate d by uncover ed dra in-pipes and e x pansion joints. BTC e mploy ees 8seriously injured. Th e ho le was a bo ut 3 fee t by 3 fee t and was 15 to 20 feet above th e g r o un d

b e l o wan d

w a s c o v e r e d

b y a tin cover. Citation Number 2, I tem 2b, instance ( c): floor hole into which an employee , Da vid Rob e rt s , fe ll, and

wa s in jur e d s e ri ou sly with torn tendons and dee p bruises followed by s urg ery . At the time of the hear ing Robe rts still u s ed a ca ne. The hole was 30 to 40 fe et above the floor be low , c ov e re d b y

a pil e of c on c re te blocks. Certain of the char g es not upheld wer e duplicative or involved 9 conduct that wa s not willful. 7 te sti fi e d th at de sp ite inj ur ie s a nd re pe ate d n oti fi c atio ns to t he ir supervisors a

bout these dang ers, B TC did not rectify the violations.

C. The Hea lth Case: L ead E x posure Ac tiviti es The He alth Case alleg ations are divided into pre-implosion exposure and post-implosion ex posure violations. Ultimately , the AL J conclude d that the Secr etar y had esta blished that there w ere many OSH Ac t he a lthvio latio ns , a nd c on c lud e d th at B TC e ng a g e d in “willful violations includ[ ing] failure to make an a ppropriate initial deter mination of lead e x posure a nd to provide interim and other p r o t e c t i o n s f

r o me xc e s s i v e l e a d

e xp o s ur e . ” Ap p . at1 7

. T h e A L J, ho we ve r, did

no t up ho ld a ll o f t

he c ha rg e s. 9

1. Pre-Implosion Ex posure Th e pr e -i mpl os ion

e xpos ur e to u

na c c e pta ble le a d le ve ls ste mme d f

ro m tw o a c tiv iti e s. Th e fi rs t w a s th e tor c h c utt ingof bo lts from the stee l leg s of the stadium seats c oated with lea d based pa int. Approxim ately

four e mploy ees spe nt two to four eig ht-to-ten hour day s eng ag ed in this ty

pe of w ork.8 There was a

second pr e-implosion expos ure when B TC employ ees torc h cut “notch- cuts” on lea d-base d painted structur al ste e l be ams. Th e se c uts we re ne c e ssa ry to e ns ur e that th e re wa s a complete c ave- in at the time of the implosion. Approx imately four employ ees pe rfor

med this task in ten-hour shifts for va rying de g ree s of duration. Th e se a c tiv iti e s c a

us e d s e ve ra l e mpl oye e s to c omp la in t o th e ir supervisors a

bout the lack of

respirators; however , BTC did not su pp ly sa fe ty e qu ipm e nt. Con se qu e ntl y , s ome e mpl oye e s r e so rt e d to wea ringtheir own ha lf-mask re spirators, thoug h these de vices did not c omp or t w iththe re qu ir e me nts of the OSH Ac t.

2. Post-I mplosion Ex posure The post-implosion ex posure stemmed f rom the proc ess of cutting the rema ining stee l beams into smaller piec es in order to fit the debris into trucks. Althoug h mecha nical shea rs could be use d to cut most of the steel, a numbe r of the be ams wer e too larg e for the shea rs and ther efor e nee ded to be c ut with torches. This torch c utting beg an without protection from lea d exposure on Fe bruar y 13, 2001, and extended into the night shift of F ebrua ry 14, 2001.
On Fe bruar

y 21 and 22, OSHA a

nd BTC c oncurr ently

eng ag ed in air monitoring to a ssess the lead da ng er. Thr ee e mploy ees w ere monitored over the course of two day s, and, for the first time, wer e su pp lie d w itha ir

re sp ir ator s w ithfa c e sh ie lds . T he re su lts of bo th OSHA’s and B TC’s testing r evea led lead e x posure sig nificantly above the per missibl e leve ls. The “pe rmissible ex posure limit” is 50 : g /m 3 (ca lculated a s an 8-hour

time aver ag e), though the lead sta ndard define s the “a ction level” of exposure at 30 : g /m (ca lculated a s an 8- 3 hour time weighted ave rag e). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.62(b) a nd (c)

. Th e c on c ur

re nt s ampl ingre ve a le d th e fo llo wi nge xpos ur e le ve ls:

Date Em

plo y e e OSH A T ime

Weighted Av e ra g e (T ime Sampled) B TC T ime

Weighted Av er age (T ime Sampled)Shawn Cramer was a workingfore man who s er v ed as f ire 10 watch f or the e mploy ees e ng ag ed in burningtasks. Thoug h he wa s not ov e re xpos e d o n e ith e r d ay of the mon ito ri ng , h e did

no t e ng a g e in bur n in gw o r k ; h o w e v e r , h is s amp li n gr e s u lt s d id in d ic ate th at h e w as e xpos e d at mo re tha

n the a c tio n le ve l and

ha lf of the pe rm iss ibl e e xpos ur e lim it. 9 2/21/2001 Shawn Cramer 36 : g /m (321 3 min.) 36 : g /m (234 3 min.) 2/21/2001 Kevin Opf ar 259 : g /m (323 3 min.) 209 : g /m 3

(230 min.) 2/21/2001 Eric Yoc key 318.6 : g /m 3 (317 min.) 975 : g /m 3

2/22/2001 Shawn Cramer 37 : g /m (458 3 min.) 40 : g /m 3

2/22/2001 Kevin Opf ar 954.4 : g /m 3 (318 min.) 2158 : g /m 3

2/22/2001 Eric Yoc key 615.1 : g /m 3 (464 min.) 1453 : g /m 3

See app. a

t 69. I t was thus evident that B TC had bee n operating 10 with insufficient saf

ety prec autions g iven the sig nificant lea d exposure risk.

3. BTC’s Ef

forts To Comply

Wit h The L ead Standa

rd Th e c itatio ns in t

he He a lthCa se ste m f

ro m B TC’ s f

a ilure to c omp ly wi th t he Stand ard , s e e 29 C.F .R. § 1 92 6. 62 , whic h “ a pp lie s to a ll c on str uc tio n w or

k whe re an e mpl oye e may be oc c up atio na lly exposed to lead.” I d. Where e mploy ees ma y be exposed to lead, the e mpl oye r i s r e qu ir e d to pe rf or m an “ e xpos ur e a sse ssm e nt” to deter mine if any

employ ee is e x posed to lead “ at or a bove the a ction level.” Sec tion 1926.62(d)(1)( i). The a ction level is define d as “employee e x posure, without re g ard to the use of re spirators, to an a ir bo rn e c on c e ntr atio n o f l e a d o f 3 0 mi c ro g ra ms p e r c ub ic me te r o f a ir (30 : g /m ) ca lculated a s an 8-hour time-weighted ave rag e.” Sec tion 3 1926.62(b).T h e St an d ar d a ls o e s ta b li s h e s a r e b u tt a

b le p r e s ump ti o n that 11 cer tain tasks, including torch cutti ng materia ls with lead-ba sed paint or coating s, result i n exposures above the permissible ac tion level. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62(d)( 2)(i)( A). The re port also was labeled the “ Act re port” be cause BTC hire d 12 ACT Environmental Servic es, Inc. to perf orm the exposure assessment of the National Starch demolition project. We cal l it the “National Starc h r e po rt ” fo r c lari ty

purp os e s. 10 The e mploy er c alculate s an “e x posure a ssessment” through an

“ ini tia l de te rm inatio n” in whic h c ov e re d e mpl oye rs “ ini tia lly deter mine if any

employ ee ma

y be exposed at or a

bove the initial a c tio n le ve l.” Se c tio n 1 92 6. 62 (d )( 1)

. Se c tio n 1 92 6. 62 (d )( 3) se ts 11 forth the va

rious methods by

which an e mploy er c an per form an “initial determination.” Sec tion 1926.62(d)(3)( i) notes, with two exceptions, that “the employ er sha ll monit or employ ee e x posures a nd shall base initial deter

minations on the employ ee e x posure monitoring results. . . .” BTC, howe ver, did not monitor the potential exposure to lead at th e sta dium to pe rf

or m it s “ ini tia l de te rm inatio n. ” Rathe r, B TC, a ide d b y O’ Rourk e , r e lie d o n s e c tio n 1 92 6. 62 (d )( 3) (i ii) , c omm on ly ref err ed to as the “ historical data” method, which allows a n employ er to rely on monitoring re sults from a re cent pr oject involving “wor kplace conditions closely rese mbling the pr ocesse s, ty pe of materia l, control methods, work pra ctices, a nd environmenta l conditions used and pre vailing in the e mploy er’ s curr ent oper ations.” BTC utiliz ed a le ad asse ssment from its earlier National Starc h and Chemica l Company

demolition project (her einaf ter c alled the “National Starch re port”) as the “ historical data” for the sta dium 12 projec t, rea soning that the National Starc h projec t “closely rese mbled” the sta dium pr oje c t. T he Natio na l Sta rc h p ro je c t r e qu ir e d B TC t o demolish an old power house and dry ing f acility inside a cor

n starch fac tory complex in I ndianapolis, Indiana. The National Starc h repor t sh ow e d e xpos ur e s b e low

the a c tio n le ve l f

or wo rk e rs tor c h c utt ingin that projec t. BTC conc luded that it was not requir ed to per form initial monitoring (or

to take interim steps in lieu of monitoring ) at the stadium beca

use that projec t “closely

rese mbled” that at National Starch. Ac cording ly , BTC de emed it nec essar y onlyto provide handwashingfac iliti es as pr otection ag ainst lead e x posure. B TC does not claim that it provided any protec tion ag ainst lead e x posure f orTh e AL J note d th e de fi c ie nc ie s o f t he pla n: 13 Specifica lly , it lacked: (1) a desc ription of each activity

in which lead w as emitted; (2 ) a s p ec i fi c mea

ns to achieve co mp l i an ce ; (3 ) arep o rto f t h e t ec h n o l o gy c on sid e re d in

me e tin gthe [pe rm iss ibl e exposure limit ]; (4) air monitoring da ta; (5) a d et ai l ed s ch ed u l e for implementation of th e progr am; (6) a n administrative control sche dule; and (7) a descr iption of arraignments made among contra ctors to inform aff

ecte d employ ees of potential exposure to lead. App. at 96. 11 e mp l o ye e s w h o w e r e t o r c hc u t t i n gl e a d b a s e d p a i n tb e tw e e nJ anu ar

y 4 and, at lea st, Febr

uary 14. See petitioner’ s br. at 23; re spondent’s br. at 31.
BTC’s ma

nag ement first e x presse d conce rn over lead exposure on Fe bruar

y 13, and on F ebrua

ry 14, 2001, BTC provide d half-ma sk respirators but not air-supplied re spirators to af fec ted e mpl oye e s. I t w a s n ot u

nti l F e br ua ry 16 , a da y a ft e r B TC atte mpt e d to deny entry to the OSHA hyg ienists, that the first site specific le ad compliance prog ram wa s draf ted. The “ plan” state d that BTC used the National Starc h repor t to determine that e mploy ees w ould not be ex p o s edt o l ea d , an d

th atth er e w o u l d

b e a i r m o n i t o ri n g. 13
As we a lr e a dy

have no te d, the re su lts fr om m on ito ri ngby bo th OSH A a nd B TC r e ve a le d th at th e re we re le a d e xpos ur e le ve ls substantially

g reater than the action leve l allowed. On F ebrua ry 20, 2001, O’Rourke , in response to the sampling re sults, modi fied the compliance prog ram to re quire a dditional measures. The AL J noted that, “ [e]v e n th e fi na l r e vis e d p lan d id n ot p ro vid e su ff ic ie nt d e ta il conce rningthe eng ineer ing c ontrols to be used, tec hnology to be used, air monitoring , or a sc hedule f or complianc e.” A

pp. at 96.

I I . J URI SDI CTI ON12 A s w e h av e i n d i c at e d , th e p art i e s tr i e d th e c a s e b e f

o r e anA LJ who upheld most of the citations. B TC then filed a pe tition for discretionar

y revie w with the Occ upation Safety and He alth Review Commi ssion, which, on Fe bruar y 27, 2004, denied r eview a nd enter ed a fina l order. B TC then filed a pe tition for reviewwith this court on April 20, 2004. The Commission had jurisdiction t o adjudicate this matter p ur s u an t t o s e c ti o n1 0 ( c ) o f th e O SH A c t, 2 9 U

. S. C. § 6 5 9 ( c )

. We exercise jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to sec tion 11(a) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) , which g ives the cour t of appe als of the circ uit in which the violation occurr ed jurisdiction to hear an appe al from a f inal order of the Commission wit h respe ct to the violation. See E & R Erec tors, Inc. v. Sec’ y of L abor, 107 F .3d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1997).

I I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Standard of

Review We will affirm the Sec reta ry ’s interpre tation of OSHA s t an d ar d s i f

i ti s r e a s o n a

b l e . S e e M art i nv . O c c u

p at i o n a l S a f

e ty & Hea lth Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-52, 111 S.C t. 1171, 1176 (1991). We must uphold the Commi ssion’s fac tual finding s if they are supported by

substantial evidence in the rec ord as a whole. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); D. Ha

rris Masonry

Contracting , Inc. v. Dole, 876 F.2d 343, 344 ( 3d Cir. 1989). We may set aside leg al conc lusions only if they are “ar bitrary , capr icious, an abuse of discre tion, or otherwise not in ac corda

nce w ith law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A ); see Atlantic & Gulf Stevedore s v. Occ upational Safe ty & H ealth Review Comm’ n, 53 4 F .2 d 5 41 , 5 47 (3 d Ci r. 19 76 ). In a dd iti on , w e mus t defe r to an a g ency' s rea sonable interpr etation of a n ambiguous administrative statute. See Chevr on U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. De f. Council, I nc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-46, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-84 (1984).

B . T he He a lthCa se 1. B TC’ s U se of

“ Hi sto ri c a l D ata ” To Make an “ Init ia l Deter

mination”13 The fir st issue we addr ess is “whe ther it was a ppropriate for BTC to use ‘ historical data’ to make an ‘ initial determination’ that po te nti a l e mpl oye e e xpos ur e to l e a d w a s b e low the ‘a c tio n le ve l’ when torc h burningoperations occurr ed duringthe pre -implosion and post-implosi on phases of the demolition of the stadium.” Petitioner’s br. at 10. The AL J deter

mined that BTC’s use of the National Starch repor t’s “historical data” wa s not appropriate for making a n initial deter mination with respect to employee e x posure to lea d duringthe stadium demoliti on. The Standar d definingthe appr opriate pr ocedur es for pe rf or min gan “ ini tia l de te rm inatio n” re a ds , in re le va nt p art : (i) Except as provide d under pa ragraphs (d)( 3)(iii) and ( d)(3) (iv) of this sec tion the employ er sha ll monit or employ ee exposures and shall base initial deter minations on the employ ee exposure monitoring re sults. . . .

. . . . (i ii) Whe re the e mpl oye r h a s p re vio us ly monitored for le ad exposures, and the data we re obta ined within the past 12 months during wor

k operations conducte d under w orkplac e conditions closely rese mbling the pr ocesse s, ty pe of mater ial, control methods, work prac tices, and e nvironmental conditions u s edan d p re v ai l i n g i nth e e mp l o y er 's curr ent oper ations, the employ er ma y re ly on su c h e arl ie r m on ito ri ngre su lts to satisfy the re quirements of pa ra g ra ph s ( d) (3 )( i) and

(d )( 6) of thi s section if the sampling and a naly tical methods meet the a ccur acy and confide nce le vels of par ag raph ( d)(10) of this section. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62(d)( 3) (e mphasis added)

. The AL J first addre ssed the issue of whether the “historica lBoth p ro j ects re quired burningon structura l steel in the open 14 air. B o th

p r o je c ts inv o lv e d

c u tt in go r

b ur n in gle a d

p a inte d 15 structura l steel. Neither projec t required any

control methods, other tha n 16 “norma l [ persona l protective e quipmen t ], i ncluding[a] 3 foot Torc h.” App. at 74. Both proje cts requir ed notch c uts to be made on the stee l during 17 10 ho ur sh if ts. Bot h p ro je c ts r e qu ir e d p e rf

or min gthe wo rk

in t he op e n a ir 18 duringcold weather. 14 data” method repr esents an e x ception to monitoring, which is treate d as the pre fer

red me ans of makingan initial assessment, or, a s BTC contends, whe ther the “ historical data” method is another va lid, and equally acc epted, method that a

n employ er c an use to make the initial deter mination with respect to lea d exposure. The AL J reje cted BTC’s c ontention and conc luded that the “historica l data” me thod of makingan initial assessment was a n exception to the monitoring method. Be cause she dee med the use of “historical data” to be a

n “exception” to the pr efe rre d means to make an initial assessment, the AL J place d the burde n on BTC to prove that its use of the “historica l data ” wa s a

pp ro pr iate . In r e a c hin ghe r c on c lus ion , th e AL J note d th at,

“ [i]n g e ne ra l, e xce pti on s in re me dia l le g isl atio n, su c h a s th e OSH Ac t, must be narr owly

construed.” App. at 71. Th e AL J contin

ue d b y no tin gtha

t th e phra se “ c los e ly rese mbling,” c ontained within the “historica l data” e x ception, wa s not define d in the Standard. B TC offer ed a br oad interpr etation of the phrase which re lied on compar ing “ the proc esses,” “the ty pe of 14 materia l,” “the c ontrol methods,” “the wor k prac tices,” and “the 15 16 17 environmenta l conditions” involved in the two projec ts. I d. at 74. 18 In addition, BTC denie d that a compa rison of mater ials betwee n the two projec ts require d a g ather ing a nd testing of

bulk paint samples. The Sec reta

ry disag ree d with BTC’s broa d interpre tation of the phra se “c losely

rese mbling.” She note d that the “similarities sug g ested by

BTC [were ] t oo superf

icial to meet an e x ception to a standard intende d to protect e mploy ees g ener atingairborne lead.” I d.T h e A L J n o te d th at th e c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f le a d p a int c o u ld not 19 be assumed to be the same. 15 T h e S ec re t ary

al s o as s ert edth atBT C s i mp l y d i d n o th av e e n o u gh information to compar e the two pr ojects. In particula r, she obse rved that BTC ha d not taken bulk samples of the paint, nor made any other atte mpt s to se c ur e data

to m ake c omp ari so ns be tw e e n th e tw o s ite s. The AL J conclude d that the term “ closely rese mbling” w as ambiguous. Thus, she looked to the Standar d’s pre amble to g lean the Secre tary ’s intent for includingthe “historica l data” e x ception. The AL J found

that th e state d p ur

po se of the e xce pti on

wa s f or tho se situations where:

an e mpl oye r o n a

c on str uc tio n s ite conducte d exposure monitoring for previous job(s) a

nd the cur rent job wa s ‘substantially

simil ar’ to the old one(s), the pr e vio us ‘h ist or ic a l da ta ’ c ou ld substitut e for

new monitoring . So that the old data c ou ld b e ‘r e a so na

bly assumed’ to be repr esentative for lea d exposures on the new site, the historica l measure ments had to be obtaine d ‘under conditions which in all releva nt and signific ant re spects ar e esse ntially the same a s the curr ent projec t.’
I d. at 75 (quotingL ead E x posure in Construction, 58 Fe d. Reg . 26599 (1993) ( emphasis adde d by AL J )). The AL J held that, while the e x ception may not require an
“ a bs olute ide nti ty” be tw e e n p ro je c ts, a c a se -b y -c a se fa c tua l ana ly sis wa s n e c e ssa

ry . T he AL J con c lud e d th at, “ inf or me d b y the sy no ny ms for ‘ closely

rese mbling’ in the pr eamble a nd the stated purpose of the e xce pti on , it

is d e te rm ine d th at B TC’ s r e lia nc e on the his tor ic a l data was incor rec t.” I d. The AL J relied he avily on the fa ct that B TC had not attempted to deter

mine the lead c ontent of the stadium, and thus n e v e r b o th e r e d t o d i s c o v e r

“ o n e c o mp o n e n t

o f w h ati s n e c e s s ar i l y a tw o- pa rt c omp ari so n. ” I d. She the re fo re c on c lud e d th at, “ B TC c ou ld not know whether

the lead- containingmateria l at the two projec ts was ‘s ub sta nti a lly sim ila r’ or ‘e sse nti a lly

the same .’ ” I d. Whil e bu lk

19 sampl ingwo uld

no t a lw ay s b e ne c e ssa

ry , th e AL J det e rm ine d th at itThe AL J also noted that the methods, work prac tices, and 20 environmenta l fac tors differ ed to var ying de g ree s as well. 16 was in this case

. The AL J conclude d that BTC’s r eliance on the 20 historical data e x ception, ther efor e, wa s not reasona ble. BTC urg es that the AL J err oneously conclude d that the use of historical data to make an initial lead asse ssment constitutes an exception to monit oring , and ther eby incorre ctly

elevated monitoring to the pref

err ed method of pe rfor

ming a n initial determination. BTC c onte nd s th at th e us e of

his tor ic a l da

ta is n ot a n “ e xce pti on ,” but is another acc eptable, a

nd equally

viable method by

which the e mploy er may make the initial deter

mination. BTC continues by contending that this “err oneous leg al deter mination had signific ant neg ative c on se qu e nc e s f

or B TC b e c a

us e it p e rm itt e d th e AL J to e rr on e ou sly shift the burden of

proof on that issue f

rom the Secr etar

y to BTC.” Petitioner’s br. at 24. B TC also asserts that be cause the AL J deeme d the use of “ historical data” an exception to the monitoring require ment, she er

roneously narr owed the sc ope of what could be deeme d a per

missibl e compa

rison site. We rejec t BTC’s c ontentions. The Commiss ion and this court mus t a c c e pt t

he Se c re tary ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he Sta nd ard if it i s rea sonable. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 150-52, 111 S.Ct. at 1175-76 (1991). The Secre tary ’s interpre tation of the Standard, de emingthe historical data e x ception as just that, i.e. an e x ception to the monitoring mandate, clea rly is reasona

ble. Fir st, the plain languag e of the Stand ard

ide nti fi e s th e “ his tor ic a l da ta me tho d” a s a

n e xce pti on : “Except as provide d under pa ragraphs ( d)(3) (iii) . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62(d)( 3) (e mphasis added) ; see a lso 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62, Appendix B, I I(explaining that the “ initial determination require s [t he] employ er to monitor worke rs’ e x posure unless he or she ha s objective data which c an demonstrate conc lusively that no employ ee wi ll b e e xpos e d to le a d in e xce ss o f t

he a c tio n le ve l” ) ( e mph a sis added) . Second, Cong ress intende d in the OSH Act to protec t e mpl oye e s f

ro m th e dis a str ou s e ff

e c ts o f l e a d e xpos ur e . T he statut e and re gulations repeatedly demonstrate a

pref ere nce f or the prote ction of employ ees. See , e.g ., 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62(d)( 2) (e stablishing pr e sumpt ion

that c e rt a in t a sk s, inc lud ingtor c h c utt ingmate ri a ls w ith lead ba sed paint or c oating , results in exposures above the a ction le ve l) . It w a s c le arl y

re a so na ble fo r t he Se c re tary

to a pp ly the sta tut e and re gulations in a manner so that the acquisition of ac tual data on the potential exposure to lead through monitoring on the c urre nt17 pr oje c t, r athe r t

ha n r e lia nc e on data fr om a n e nti re ly se pa rate pr oje c t, c on sti tut e s th e pr e fe rr e d me tho d o f p e rf or min gan in iti a l a sse ssm e nt.
B e c a us e the us e of

his tor ic a l da

ta re pr e se nts an e xce pti on

to the monitoring r equire ment, and B TC relied on this exception, the AL J cor re c tly pla c e d th e burd e n o n B TC t o d e mon str ate tha t it proper ly utiliz ed the National Starch re port for making a n initial deter mination with respect to the stadium. Clear ly , the AL J also was corr ect in her

holding that B TC could not meet this burden and pr ove the appr opriatene ss of its reliance on the historical data . The workplac e conditions at the National Starch structure and the stadium we re so dis sim ila

r t hat th e y c ou ld n ot b e de e me d to “ c los e ly rese mble” one a

nother unde r any

meaning ful construc tion of that phrase . The AL J , at leng th, documented the dif fer ence s betwee n the tw o s ite s w ithre sp e c t to e nv ir onme nta l c on dit ion s a nd wo rk pr a c tic e s.

Whil e these differ ence s are important fac tors that show dissimi larities, the major f ocus must rest on a c omparison of potential lead e x posure. As the results of the sampling re veale d, there wer e wide inconsistencie s betwee n the conditions at the National Starch projec t and those at the stadium pre dicated on the differ ence s betwee n the ac tual level of le ad exposure at the sites. To highlight one g laring example, two bulk samples taken fr om the painted stee l beams at the National Starc h site reve aled 0.095 a nd 0.484 perc ent lead c ontent. At the stadium, the bulk samples of the se ats rang ed fr om 3.0 to 8.0 perc ent lead c ontent, and the stee l beams ra ng ed fr om 2.2 to 43 perc ent lead c ontent. I t is clear that conditions invol ving suc h diverg ent amounts of lea d cannot be deeme d to “closely rese mble” one anothe r under

any coher ent def

inition of that phrase. The AL J there fore corr ectly held that B TC’s use of the National Starc h repor

t as “historica l data” to make the “initial deter mination” that potential employ ee e x posure to lea d at the stadium was below the “ action leve l” was ina ppropriate

.

2

. T h e A L J ’ s D e t e r

m i n at i o nT h atB T C W i l l f u l l y Violated the Standar d The ne x t issue raised is whe ther ther e wa s substantial evidence in t he re c or d s up po rt ingthe AL J’s d e te rm inatio n th at B TC w ill fu lly18 violated the Standar d. The AL J conclude d that BTC’s violations wer e “willful” be cause “[t] he re cord e stablishe[d] that BTC ha d a heig htened a

war eness of

the cited r equire ments of the lea d standard y et chose to disreg ard the m.” App. at 108. She f ound that BTC ha d heig htened a

war eness of

the pre sence of lea d based on its experienc e with compara

ble projec ts in which it dealt with lead and its having held itself out to the public as an e x pert on lea d and applica ble OSHA standards. Mor eover , the AL J indicated that “ it is well known that torch burningand cuttingsteel ca n g ener ate hig h levels of a irborne lead.” I d. at 109-10.
In a dd iti on , th e AL J found that th e Se c re tary

ind e pe nd e ntl y a lso c ou ld h ave e sta

bli sh e d a wi llf ul v iol atio n b y

de mon str atin g“ pla in indiffer ence ” to employ ee sa fety . The AL J documented at leng th the ins tanc e s in

wh ic h B TC i g no re d o r d e fl e c te d q ue sti on s b y

its employ ees r elated to inquiries a bout lead, and note d sever al occ asions in which B TC denied its employ ees’ reque sts for safe ty equipment. App. at 111 (c iting F luor Danie l, Nos. 96-1729 and 96- 1730, 19 O.S.H. Cas. (B NA) 1529 ( 2001), 2001 WL1117965 (O.S.H.R.C.), a ff ’d su b n om. , F luo r D anie l v. Oc c up atio na l Sa fe ty & He a lth Comm’ n, 29 5 F .3 d 1 23 2 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 2) (e mpl oye r who c on sc iou sly chose to de prive e mploy ees of emer g ency

respirators committed willful violation)). The AL J additionally

reje cted B TC’s argument that it had a “re asonable relianc e” de fense to the alleg ations of “willfulness.” BTC asser ted that it could not have a cted “ willfully ” bec ause it mere ly was re lyingon

and fo llo wi ngthe a dv ic e that O ’R ou rk e , it s sa fe ty consultant, g ave it. The AL J conclude d that “[t] he fa ct that B TC hired the small saf

ety and hea lth consultant company does not relieve it of responsibility

for c onditions i t knew we re unsa fe. B TC’s attempt to d ist anc e its e lf

fr om t he le a d e xpe rt ise it c la ime d in oth e r c onte xts was unc onvincing .” App. at 110. “Althoug h the [OSH] Act does not de fine the te rm ‘willful,’ courts have unanimously

held that a willful violation of the [OSH] Act constitutes ‘a

n act done voluntarily

with either a

n intentional disreg ard of

, or plain indiffe renc e to, the [OSH] Act' s require ments.’” Ensign- Bic kford Co. v. Oc cupational Saf ety & H ealth Review Comm'n, 717 F .2d 1419, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quotingCedar Constr. Co. v. Occupational Saf ety & H ealth ReviewComm'n, 587 F.2d 1303, 1305 ( D.C. Cir.1978)); see a lso Ensign-B ickford, 717 F .2d at 1422 (c iting nine c ases f rom courts of a

ppeals e mbrac ing theBTC re lies heavi l y on Sasser Elec tric & Manufa cturingCo., 21 N o . 8 2

- 1 7 8 , 1 1 O

. S. H

. Ca s . ( B N A ) 2 1 1 3 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 1 9 8 4 WL 34886 (O.S.H.R.C.). In Sasser, a cra ne oper ator a ccide ntally

swungthe boom of the c rane into nearby

power lines. The Commissi on held that the g ener al contra ctor re asonably had re lied on the safe ty

eff orts of the c rane c omp any wi th wh ic h it su

bc ontr a c te d, be c a

us e : (1) the c ite d h a zar d d e a lt with the op er ati on of a c rane and fe ll within t he expertise of the subcontrac tor; (2) the subc ont ra ctor had exclusive control over the hazard; (3) the g ener al contra ctor ha d war ned the subc ontrac t o r o f the closene ss of the powe r lines; and (4) considering that the subcontra ctor 19 “ int e nti on a l di sr e g ard

or pla in i nd if

fe re nc e ” sta

nd ard ); Un ive rs a l Auto Radiator Mfg . Co. v. Marshall, 631 F.2d 20, 23 ( 3d Cir. 1980). Multipl e violations of the lea d standard c an be de emed willful whe re the employ er ma

nifested both intentional disreg ard f or the Standar d and plain indiffe renc e to employ ee sa fety . See Interstate L ead Co., Nos. 89-2088P and 89-3296, 15 O .S.H. Cas. (BN A) 1989 (1992) , 1992 WL277025, at *29-32 (O .S.H.R.C.A.L .J .). We will uphold the Commi ssion’s fac tual finding s if they are supported by

substantial e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d a s a

wh ole ; w he the r a

vio latio n w a s w ill fu l is a question of fa ct. See Unive rsal Auto, 631 F .3d at 23.
BTC a sserts that there is not subst antial evidenc e in the re cord to support the finding s that its viol ations were “willful.” B TC raises thr e e argume nts to l e nd

c re de nc e to i ts p ur

po rt e d la c k o f w ill fu lne ss: (1) it did not eng ag e in willful conduct be cause it reasona bly relied on O’ Rourk e ’s e xpe rt

a dv ic e pe rt a ini ngto l e a d h a zar d; ( 2) the AL J did not amply fac tor into her ana ly sis the confusion re ndere d by the Standard’s a

mbiguity and incompletene ss, resulting in a violation that wa s mo re a

mis un de rs tand ingtha

n a wi llf ul v iol atio n; a

nd (3 ) a ft e r i t discovere d that it errone ously had re lied on the National Starc h repor t it t oo k s te ps to r e me dy

the pr ob le m. BTC’s attempt to claim that its violations were not willful ar e unconvincing . First, the AL J corr ectly denied B TC’s attempt to shift responsibility

for the violations to O’Rourke . The Commission pr e vio us ly

ha d h e ld t

hat a c omp any c ann ot e va de its sa fe ty

and he a lth responsibilities to it s worker s simply by contra ctingawa

y the re sp on sib ili tie s ma

nd ate d und e r t

he OSH Ac t. S e e Wel l So lut ion s, In c . , N o . 9 1

- 3 4 0 , 1 7 O

. S. H

. Ca s . ( B N A ) 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 4 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , 1 9 9 5 WL 24 25 95 , at *3 (O .S. H. R.C .) (“ [T]he [OSH ] Ac t pl a c e s u lti mate responsibility

for c ompliance with its require ments on the employ er, who ca nnot contrac t away

those duties to another pa rty .”) As the 21had per formed the same work previously without incident, there w as no rea son for the g ener al contra ctor to ha ve fore seen that the cr ane ope rator w o u ld h av e s wun gth e b o o m i n to the p o w e r li n e s . Sa s s e r , 1 9 8 4 WL 34886, at *3. This case is pla in ly

d is tinguishable fr om Sasser. B TC is claiming that it contrac ted awa

y i t s responsibi lity

with respec t to OSHA re qu ir e me nts by

hir ingan envi ronm e nta l and sa fe ty c on su lti ngfi rm . But, unli k e the situation in Sasser, B TC’s employ ees still were perf ormingthe labor, a

nd BTC a s a compa

ny operated the eq u i p ment signific ant in the context of thi s case . This situation also is differ ent from that in S asser

beca use in that ca se the g ener al contra ctor, by rea son of its lac k of expertise, contra cted out a particula r task to a n independe nt contra ctor who w as expected to pe rfor m that discrete f

unction fully

. 20 AL J noted, B TC has experience in the undertaking of demolition projec ts involvi nglead ha zards. In the circ umstances, its claims of naivete a s to the dang ers of its course of c onduct, base d on the sug g estions of a small consultingfirm, ar e dubious at best. App. at 11 0. Con sid e ri ngthat O SHAe mpl oye e s a sc e rt a ine d B TC’ s sa fe ty failure s by

watchingthe local nig htly news, its claims of ig noranc e ar e unconvincing

. Fur thermore , BTC c ommitt ed pre -implosion viol ations befor e it ever “ relied” on O’Rourke ’s advice . Thoug h BTC c ould not pinpoint the ex act date of its decision to rely on the National Starc h repor t, Timothy

O’Rourke testified that the date was a round January 20, 2001. The AL J noted that “[t] hat date w ould have be en af ter employ ees bur

ned painted struc tural steel f or about 10 da

y s . . . .” I d. at 110 (e mphasis in origina l). Additionally , BTC infor med O’Rourke that it would not be doing pr e-implosion cutting. O’ Rourke conclude d, partially

on the basis of this information, that the National Starch re port would be a

valid basis for use of the “ historical data” exception. I n the circ umstances, we are satisfied that B TC cannot find a saf e har bor in an e rrone ous assessment of the le ad dang ers when its own incomplete infor mation and fa lse diag nosis led to the misuse of the historical data. BTC ne x t argues that its failing s were not “willful,” but rathe r stemmed from the a

mbiguity and incompletene ss in the regulations. In an attempt to demonstrate this point , BTC c ites 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62(d)( 3)(iii) (e mphasis added) :21 (i ii) Whe re the e mpl oye r h a s p re vio us ly monitored for le ad exposures, and the data we re obta ined within the past 12 months during wor

k operations conducte d under w orkplac e conditions closely rese mbling the pr ocesse s, ty pe of mater ial, control methods, work prac tices, and e nvironmental conditions u s edan d p re v ai l i n g i nth e e mp l o y er 's curr ent oper ations, the employ er ma y re ly on su c h e arl ie r m on ito ri ngre su lts to satisfy the re quirements of pa ra g ra ph s ( d) (3 )( i) and

(d )( 6) of thi s section if the sampling and a naly tical methods meet the a ccur acy and confide nce le vels of par ag raph ( d)(10) of this section.
B TC c onte nd s th at se c tio n 1 92 6. 62 (d )( 3) (i ii) is a mbi guo us be c a

us e subpara g raph ( d)(10) , to which the sec tion refe rs, does not exist. The AL J noted this draftingpecc adillo, and stated, “ [t ]he intended ref ere nce is to subpar ag raph ( d)(9) .” App. at 72 n.14. Subparagraph (d )( 9) re a ds : (9) Ac cura cy of mea surement. The employ er sha ll use a method of monitoring a

nd analy sis which has an acc urac y (to a c onfidenc e leve l of 95%) of not less than plus or minus 25 perc ent for a irborne c oncentr ations of lead e qual to or g reater than 30MUg/m3.
BTC a rgues that the AL J ’s findingof willfulness was e rr on e ou s b e c a

us e , “ no wh e re in h e r d e c isi on do e s sh e take int o acc ount the potential for mistake the ambiguity and incompletene ss of the standar d would cre ate f or a la y person.” Petitioner’s br. at 33. BTC c ontinues by

arguing that “willfulness should not be found wher e the standa

rd is complex and not perfe ctly clea r and a violation resulted in neg lige nce a

nd misunderstandingrathe r than intentional disreg ard or

plain indiffer ence .” I d. at 34. We rejec t BTC’s c ontention beca use it should have bee n22 obvious to itthat subpara g raph ( d)(10) could not relate to “ac cura cy and conf idence levels,” or

indeed a ny thing e lse, as the subpa

ragraph did not even exist. Thus, i t should have bee n evident that sec tion 1926.62(d)( 3)(iii) wa s ref err ing to the se quentially

numbere d subpara g raph ( d)(9) as it is labeled “A ccur acy of Mea surement.” BTC’s a rgument is essentially

that, upon rea chingthis draftingerr or, such “c onfusion” bef

ell on it that its decision not to provide su bs tanti ve sa fe ty

pr e c a uti on s to pr ote c t a g a ins t le a d e xpos ur e c ou ld not be dee med willful. But B TC is an experience d company , and we re je c t it s c onte nti on

that it s c on fu sio n o ve r a

mis pla c e d, tang e nti a lly re le va nt guid e lin e c an e xcu se it f ro m pe rf or min gits sa fe ty obligations. Thus, the AL J corr ectly reje cted this contention. Ad dit ion a lly , w e re

je c t B TC’ s atte mpt

to h old its e lf out a s a
“ lay pe rs on ” fa c e d w itha

c omp le x statut e it c ou ld n ot u nd e rs tand . Its own manag ement, includingfore men, had e x tensive experienc e navig atingOSHA re gulations and handlingdemolition invol ving le ad based pa int. BTC’s dec ision to i g nore the regulations beca use of a sense of “conf usion” is simpl y

not believable. Finally , BTC c laims that its vi olations were not willful, as witnessed by

the steps it undertook to alleviate exposure afte r the level of le ad wa s discovere d. The AL J corr ectly reje cted this claim as well. B TC, in fact, did not take steps to a lleviate the va lid concer ns of its employ ees dur ing the pre- implosi on phase of the demolition. Moreove r, the steps it took in response to the OSHA inspe ction wer e inadequate, and c ontinued to violate unambiguous standards of the applicable OSH Act provisions and re gulations. For e x ample, rather than suspend burningor prospe ctively comply with the OSH Act’s mandates, B TC ga

ve its employ ees ha lf-mask re spirators, not the re qu ir e d ma

nd ate d a ir -s up pli e d r e sp ir ator s. Ad dit ion a lly , B TC d id not (1) advise its employ ees in wr iting of its “ne g ative dete rmination”; (2 ) f a ile d to a dv ise e mpl oye e s o f t he ir blo od te st r e su lts ; ( 3) fa ile d to use known e ng ineer ing c ontrols to reduce exposures; and (4) f ailed e ve n to po st a

wa rn ingsign. Th e re c le arl y wa s su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e in the re c or d s up po rt ingthe AL J’s d e te rm inatio n th at B TC w ill fu lly vio late d O SHA ’s le a d s tand ard s.

C. T he Sa fe ty

Ca se 1. The “ Cutti ng ” of Esc alatorsBTC c ontends that “[t] here was no ‘sha ft’ whe re he avy 22 machiner y fell into. To the contra

ry , t he esc alator top, onc e unhing ed, mere ly dropped to the le vel wher e the f oot of the es calator reste d.” Petitioner’s br. at 49 ( emphasis adde d). 23 BT C n ex tas s ert s th atth e A L J erre d i nh o l d i n g th at“dro p p i n g” the esc alators without prope r saf ety measure s violated 29 C.F.R. § 19 26 .8 50 (h ). Th e vio latio n at is su e aro se wh e n B TC “ c ut” e sc a lator s, i.e ., “ wh e n th e top of

the e sc a lator

wa s r e le a se d, on

so me oc c a sio ns it would fall to the floor une x pecte dly .” Petitioner’s br. at 47. The re gulatio ns at is su e pr ov ide :

(h ) W h en d eb ri s i s dro p p edth ro u gh holes in the floor without the use of chutes, the a

rea onto which the mater ial is dropped shall be c ompletely enclose d with barric ades not less than 42 inc hes high a nd not less than 6 fee t back f rom the projec ted edg e of the openingabove. Signs, wa rningof the ha zard of fa lling materia ls, shall be posted at ea ch leve l. Re mov a l sh a ll n ot b e pe rm itt e d in thi s lower a rea until debris handling c ease s above. (i) All floor ope nings, not used a s materia l drops, shall be cove red ove r wi th m ate ri a l su

bs tanti a l e no ugh to support the weight of any load which may be imposed. Such mater ial shall be pr op e rl y se c ur e d to pr e ve nt i ts a c c ide nta l mo ve me nt. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.850 (h), ( i).
BTC a sserts that the AL J err ed in deter mining that subpara g raph ( h) wa s applicable to the esca lator drops, be cause the esca lators wer e not “de bris . . . dropped through holes in the floor without the use of chute s.” See pe titioner’s br. at 47. B TC’s argument is simpl y

that there wer e no “hole s,” bec ause de spite the potential cra shing of

esca lators to the surfa ces be low, it was the re mov a l of

the e sc a lator s th at “ c re ate d” the ho le s. 22We do no t d i s cuss s epar ately the elevator situation, but we 23 c on c lud e that th e AL J did n ot e rr in h e r f ind ing s w ithre sp e c t to it. 24 BTC’s c ontention that the AL J inappropriately applied the regulation to the fallingesca lators is simply err oneous. The A L J was c or re c t in he r a sse ssm e nt t

hat “ wh e the r o r n ot B TC s pe c if ic a lly c re ate d th e e sc a lator

and e le vator ho le s f or re mov a l of

de br is i s irrele vant. B TC specifica lly used the holes f

or re moval of debr is.” App. at 56 (e mphasis in origina l). I t clear ly is reasona

ble to interpre t 23 the re gulation so as to rec og nize that an esca lator fa lling only one floor, eve n throug h the hole in which it orig inally stood, creates the prec ise hazard a g ainst which the standa rd re quired B TC to protect. The fa ct that the hole wa s not “pree x isting” is immateria l. The Commi ssion’s and Secr etar y ’s interpre tation of section 1926.850(h) “sensibly confor ms to the words and purpose of the standa rd” a nd there fore we must uphold it. S ee Ma rtin, 499 U.S. at 151, 111 S.Ct . at 1176.

2

. T h e A L J ’ s D e t e r m i n at i o nT h atB T C W i l l f u l l y Vi olate d O SHASta nd ard s Re latin gTo F a ll Ha zar ds and the Ha zar ds Re latin gTo F a lli ngDe br is
BTC a lso contends that there is not subst antial evidenc e in the re c or d a s a

wh ole to s up po rt

the AL J’s d e te rm inatio n th at c e rt a in vio latio ns re latin gto f

a ll h a zar ds and

ha zar ds re latin gto f

a lli ngde br is wer e willful. The AL J conclude d that in light of B TC’s experience with and knowledg e of O SHA require ments, as well as e vidence demonstratingBTC’s know ledg e of the se hazards ( demonstrated by its own e mpl oye e s’ c omp la int s) , B TC a c te d w ill fu lly wi th r e sp e c t to both the fall hazards, a s well as the ha zards from fa lling debr is. BTC argues that the AL J ’s deter mination that these violations were willful was unfounde d. We will uphold t he Commissi on’s fa ctual finding s if they are supported by

substantial evidence in the rec ord as a whole; whethe r a violation was willful is a question of fac t. See Univer sal Auto, 631 F.3d at 23. Here there is substantial evidence in the rec ord de mon str atin gthat B TC w a s a wa re of the vio latio ns and

sa fe ty hazards, but chose not to rectify the problems thoug h the measur es mandated unde r the OSH Ac t. Thus, substantial evidence in the re c or d a s a

wh ole su pp or te d th e AL J’s c on c lus ion

tha t B TC w ill fu llyThe Sec reta ry contends that she w as not requir ed to abide by 24 the 90-da

y disclosure re quirement be cause the J an uary 28, 2002 sc he du lin gor de r s et th e “d isc ov e ry de a dli ne ” fo r t e n d ay s b e fo re tr ia l. Se e r e s p o n d e n t’ s b r . at 4 6

- 4 7

. T h e Se c r e ta r y ar gu e s th at the ten-day deadline r epre sents “other direc tions from the court” and the ref ore the 90-day period was inapplicable. BTC contends that “no such ar gument was a dvance d at trial and, a s such, wa s n o t preser ved for appea l.” 25 violated the OSH Ac t.

D. Expert Testimony The fina l issue BTC ra ises is that “[t] he AL J allowed the Secre tary to proffe r expert testimony in derog ation of Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil P roce dure.” Petitioner’s br. at 25. The OSH Act provides that the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a pply to actions befor e the Commission unl ess the Commissi on has adopte d an applicable proce dural rule . 29 U.S.C. § 661(g) ; 29 C.F.R. § 2200.2(b). While the Commiss ion has adopted pr ocedur al rules g overningdiscovery , these rule s do not address e x pert testimony specific ally . See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.51-2200.57.
On Janu ary 28 , 2 00 2, the AL J issu e d a n o rd e r s e tti ngthe date o f th e h e ar i n gf

o r M ar c h2 0 , 2 0 0 2

. D i s c o v e r y w a s s e tt o e n d

t e nd ays prior to the start of

that hear ing. D uringa F ebrua ry 5, 2002 teleconf ere nce, the AL J resc heduled the he aring for June 3, 2002. At that ti me the AL J dir e c te d th e pa rt ie s to c omp ly

wi th F e d. R. C iv. P. 26.
F e d. R. C iv. P. 2 6( a )( 2) re qu ir e s p art ie s to ide nti fy the ir pr op os e d e xpe rt s, and

mand ate s a dd iti on a l r e qu ir e me nts fo r e xpe rt s who ar e “r etained or

specia lly employ ed to provide e x pert testimony .” The rule require s that the party reta ining the e x pert, “ in the absenc e of other dire ctions from the c ourt or stipulation by the par ties,” provide a repor t prepa red by the expert explaining his proposed testimony and pr ov ide oth e r p e rs on a l ba c kgro un d in fo rm atio n. F e d. R. C iv. P. 26 (a)( 2) (B ). Th e de fa

ult tim e fo r t he se dis c los ur e s is 90 da

y s p ri or to the trial date . Fe d. R. Civ. P . 26(a) (2)( C).
I t is withoutdispute that the Secre tary did not comply

with the 90-day require ment. See petitioner’ s br. at 26; re spondent’s br. at

24Petitioner’s reply br. at 10. W e need not addre ss this point as B TC does not demonstrate how the proce dure pe rmitting the int roduction of the testimony at issue pre

judiced it. 26 47. On these grounds, B TC challeng es the AL J ’s dec ision to allow the te sti mony

of JohnCignatta , Ra

y mon d F e ldm an, Dr . Co rt ino vis , Compli ance Offic er Jan Oleszeweski, and A ssistant Area D irec tor Edwar d Selker.
BTC’s c laims, however , are without merit as it does not demonstrate that the AL J ’s dec ision to allow the testimony in question prejudice d it. Ci g natta and Cortinovis, the witnesses with whom that BTC take s the most umbrag e, testified on a number of points, none of which wa s in contention. BTC neve r disputed the fa ct that ov e re xpos ur e to l e a d p os e s a “ se ri ou s” ha zar d, no r w a s th e ir testimony essential to establish the violations at issue. Indeed, B TC’s own testingreve aled una cce ptably high le ad exposure at the sta dium and, ac cording ly , its errone ous relianc e on the National Starch re port as historical data. The Sec reta

ry offe red the testimony

of the other

witnesses B TC c ha lle ng e d to re but B TC’ s e xpe c te d c ha lle ng e s to the re lia bil ity of OSHA’s monitoringresults. This testimony could not have prejudice d BTC a s it never a rgued that we ather

or re calibration irregularities sig nificantly impacted OSHA’ s test results; and ag ain, BTC’s own testing pr ovided ample e vidence of the lea d exposure violations. Given BTC’s inability to demonstrate that e ither the proce dures pe rmitting the introduction of the testimony in question or the te sti mony

its e lf pr e jud ic e d it , w e re

je c t it s c onte nti on s r e latin gto e x p e rtt e s t i m o n y.

I V. CONCLUSI ON After a complete examination of this m atter w e ar e satisfied that th e po int s B TC h a s r a ise d la c k s uf fi c ie nt m e ri t and

thu s w e wi ll deny its petiti on for r eview of

the Fe bruar

y 27, 2004 order

.