Pag e 1 of 8 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0781n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 23, 2008 No. 05-1853 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT RA YM ON D H UR ST P etitioner -Appellant, v. ANDREW JAC KSON, W ARDE N Respondent-Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE E AST ERN D ISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEF OR E: KEITH , M ER RI TT, and G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. DA MO N J. KEITH , Circuit Judge. Pe ti ti o n e r Ra y mo n d H u r s t ( “ H u r s t” ) a

p p e a ls the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a wr it of habea s corpus. His appe al ra ises one issue for revie w: whether

a taint ana ly sis should have bee n used to de cide if his se lf-wr itten confe ssion was involuntary . This issue turns on whether Hurst’s self- written conf

ession fol lo w e d

a p r ior involuntary confe ssion. Bec ause it did not, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision to dismi ss Hurst’s petition. I. On Aug ust 7, 2000, Hurst was convic ted of shooting and killi n g Mace o Vanove r and of possessing a

firea rm during the commission of a fe lony , based in lar g e p ar t on a self- written confe ssion admitted into evidence dur ing tr ial. Hurst re ceive d a life se ntence plus two y ear s. ThePag e 2 of 8

Mic hig a n Cour

t of App e a ls af

fi rm e d Hur st’ s con vic tio n, a nd a mon g oth e r f

ind ing s, he ld t

hat H ur st did not suffer police coer cion such that his waive r of M iranda rig hts and dec ision to m ake a statement should be conside red void. Peo pl e v. H ur st , No. 230517, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Ct. App. April 12, 2002). The Mic higa n Supreme Court dec lined to reviewHurst’s appe al. Pe op le v . H ur st , 467 Mich. 913, 654 N.W.2d 333 (2002). Hurst then filed a pro se writ for ha beas c orpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996) in the United States District Court f or the Easter

n District of Michig an, which wa s denied on May 24, 2005, along with his request for a ce rtificate of appe alability and a

re qu e st f or le a ve to p ro c e e d o n a

pp e a l in f or ma pa up e ris

. Hurst v. Jac kson , No. 70863, slip op. at 1, 8 and 21 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2005). The dist rict court held t hat “[h]aving re viewed the rec ord, this Court i s convin c e d

that the state cour

t’s deter mination that Petit ioner’s c onfession wa s voluntary is neither contr ary

to United States Supreme C o u rt p re cedent nor an unr easona ble application of fede ral lawor the fa cts,” for the following rea sons: (1) Hurst fa iled to establish police coe rcion; (2) he wa s 2 5 y e a rs old wh e n he ma de his ha nd wr itt e n s ta te me nt, c ou ld r e a d a nd wr ite , a nd ha d a 10 th grade edu c a tio n; a

nd (3 ) h e wa s a dv ise d o f h is Miranda r i g h t s b y t h r e e d i f f e r e n tp o l i c e o f

f i c e rs , stated that he unde rstood those rig hts, and signe d a constitutional wa iver for m. Hu rst , No. 70863, slip op. at 11-12. The district cour t also found during the thirty or more hour s Hurst was in custody befor e he g ave his wr itten statement, that he ate at lea st one meal, slept for eig ht hours, and wa s not contin u o u s l y

questioned by

police off

icer s. Id. at 12. Ther e wa s also no evidenc e Hur st was phy sically

or mentally

impaired at the time he g ave his stateme nt. Id. Hurst filed a notice of appea l in this Court on June 20, 2005 that was denied on F ebrua ry 24, 2006. On April 28, 2006, a pa nel from t h i s Court issued a ce rtificate of appe alability on Hurst’s claim that his self-wr itten confe ssion was involuntary – the subject of the prese nt appea l.Pag e 3 of 8

During the cour se of police interrog ations, Hurst made thre e confessions (an or al conf ession to D e t r o i t P o l i c e I n v e s t i g a t o r A n dr e w S i m s , a h a n dw r i t t e n c o n f e s s i o n g i v e n t o I n v e s t i g a t o r Sims , and an or al confe ssion to Detroit Serg eant Nicholas Gia quinto). A pre- trial state cour t evidentiary hear ing w as held a

nd only the last of those thre e conf essions, his confession to Serg eant Gia quinto,

wa s d e e me d in vo lun tary . Th e re le va nt po lic e int e rr og a tio n be g a n on Janu a ry 24 , 20 00 a t 1:2 0 p .m. and ende d the next day at 10: 10 p.m. During this ti me, Hurst spoke w ith three pe ople (De troit Pol ice Of fi c e r L on ze R e y

no lds , Se rg e a nt Gi a qu int o, a nd I nv e sti g a tor Sims ), wa s a dv ise d of his Miranda

r i g h t s t h r e e t i m e s , a n d

w a i v e d h is Miranda rig hts three times. Hurst a lso ag ree d to underg o a po lyg ra phe xami n a

t i o n . It w a s d u r i nga po st- po lyg ra

phint e rr og a tio n c on du c te d b y I nv e sti g a tor

Sims that Hurst made his f

irst or al confe ssion. At I nvestig ator Sims ’ re quest, Hurst then wr ote on a piec e of paper : “I went in the apar tment building

. He br oke in my g irl’s apa rtment. He sa id he was g oing to kill m e and my g irl so I went out on the corne r and shot him. My g irl was g oing to have my baby so Ihad to protec t her.” Hu rst , No

. 70 86 3, sli p op . at 4. Se rg e a nt G ia qu int o, wh o w a s o bs e rv ingthi s interrog ation from anothe r room, ente red t h e ex amination room and re duced to wr iting an or al confe ssion that he asked H urst to narrate. I n the evidentiar

y hear ing dur ing s ta

te tria l c o u r t proce eding s, Hurst’s ora l statement, reduc ed to w r i t i n g b y

S e r g e a n tG i a qu i n t o , w a s d e e m e d i n v o l u n t a r

y . H o w e v e r , t h e t r i a l c o u rte xp l ic itl y denied the motion to suppress the state ment handwr itten by Hurst. II. As a thre shold matter, the Gove rnment asser ts H urst’s claim is unexhausted and, there fore , this Court l acks jurisdiction to hea r this appea l. Hurst, however, has fully and fairly prese nted the substance of

his arg ument, having prese nted it in the state courts a nd distri ct cour

t as a fe dera lPag e 4 of 8

constitu tional issue (a due proce ss violation, resulting fr om an involuntary confe ssion), under the same theor

y in which it is presented to this Court. Prather v. Re es , 822 F.2d 1418, 1421 ( 6th Cir. 1987) (noting that a “ha

beas pe titioner must present his cl ai m t o t he state c ourts as a f eder al

c on sti tut ion a l is su e ” ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Sowell v. Bradshaw , 3 7 2 F.3d 821, 829 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing betwee n a var iation in lega l theory , which ex h au sts a claim, from a differ ent leg al claim) (c itations omi tted). I n the state a ppellate co u rt , Hurst s pecif ically raised the argument prese nted her e. Hu rst , N o. 23 05 17 , s lip op . at 4- 7. Our c ourt , th e re fo re , h a s juri sd ic tio n to he a r t his

a pp e a l. Additionally , beca use the state appellate court and the district c ourt addre s s ed the

vo lun tari ne ss o f H ur st’ s c on fe ssi on s, thi s is su e wi ll be re vie we d und e r the de fe re nti a l A nti te rr or ism

a nd Ef fe c tiv e De a th P e na lty

Ac t of 19 96 , 2 8 U .S. C. § § 2 24 1- 22 55 (1 99 6) (“ AE DPA ” ) s tand a rd , in which the state court’s de cision will only be over turned if it “wa s contrar y to, or involve d an

unrea sonable application of” clear ly established federa l law or was an unrea sonable a pplication of th e facts. 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 (d )( 1) -( 2) ; see W illiams v. Taylor , 5 2 9 U

. S. 3 6 2 , 3 8 5

- 8 6 (2000) (d isc us sin g the de fe re nti a l st a nd a rd ); Miller v. Fe nton , 474 U.S. 104, 115-18 (1985) (discussing the “uniquely leg al dimension” of the voluntariness of a conf ession). Voluntarine ss is a mix ed question of law and fa ct t h at we re v iew de novo

. Coomer v. Yukins , 533 F.3d 477, 484 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (a rt ic ulatin g the sta

nd a rd fo r l e g a l qu e sti on s) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Van v. J ones , 475 F.3d 292, 293 (6th Cir. 2007) (a

rticulating the standar d for mixed questions of law and fa ct). III . Th e ult imate inq

uir y in de te rm ini ng wh e the r a co nf e ssi on is v olu

nta ry is w he the r i t c omp or

ts with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Proc ess Clause. Miller v. Fe nton , 474Pag e 5 of 8

U.S. 104, 110 ( 1985). This inquiry is based on an e x amination of the totality of the c ircumstance s and re quires a show ing of coer cive police activity

to find in v o luntariness. Jack son v. Mc kee , 525 F .3 d 4 30 , 4 33 -3 4 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 8) . In the pres ent a pp e a l, t he on ly ne w g ro un d r a ise d b y

Hurs t to

su pp or t his a rgume nt that his se lf -w ri tte n c on fe ssi on sh ou ld be de e me d in vo lun tary is h is c la im that, pursuant to Lyons v. Ok

lahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944), a taint analy sis should have bee n applied when c onsidering whether his statement was c ompelled. Under Lyons , when a prior statement has been c oerc ed, cour

ts are to c onsider “the fac t that t he ea rlier state ment was obtaine d from the prisoner by coer cion” as a factor “in appra ising the char acte r of the l ater confe ssion.” Id . In s ome

c a se s, “ the e ff

e c t of e a rl ie r a

bu se may be so c le a r a s to fo rb id a ny oth e r inf eren ce t han th at it dominated the mind of the a ccuse d to such an e x tent that the later confe ssion is i nvoluntary .” Id. Hurst’s argument rests on alleg ed statements h e m ad e t o S er gea n t Gi aq u i n t o b efor e he underw ent the poly g raph e x amination, statements he a sserted the state trial cou rt found to be involuntary . The e videntiary hear ing tr anscr ipt is ambig uous as to w hich statements wer e dee med inv ol u n t a r

y , b u ti ti s c l e a r

t h a tp r i o r

t o H u r s t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o u n d e r g o a p o l y g r a p h t e s t , t h e o nly statement s H u r s t m a d e to Se r g e a n t G ia qu in to w e r e e xc u lp a to r y . A d d it io n a ll y , th e s tate c o u rt excluded Hurst’s ora l confe ssion reduce d to writing by Serg eant Giaquinto based on the leng th of time that ha d passed from Hurst’s initial denia ls to his f inal oral confe ssion to Serg eant Gia quinto, stating that “[i] t was a longtime betwee n t h e t i m e – the de nials and then g oing ove r with the poly g raph e ven thoug h he told him – and then subsequently the statement that he wrote out a nd then afte r that he c aves in a ll the way . I t mig ht be considere d less than voluntary .” (J.A. at 631). There is no evidence in the rec ord to sup p o rt t h e co n clusion that any statements made pr ior to the po lyg ra phe xami natio n w e re inf e c te d b y the dura tio n o f i nte rr og a tio n. I n f a c t, t he op posit ePag e 6 of 8

conclusion is supported by the state c ourt’s finding that the handwr itten confe ssion, taken af ter the poly g raph ex am i n at i on, was not involuntary . The re cord, the ref ore, c ompels the conc lusion that Hurs t’ s se lf

-w ri tte n c on fe ssi on

did no t f oll owa pr ior inv olu nta ry c on fe ssi on

or state me nt. Th e state tr ia l court , the state a pp e llate c ourt

a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt , w e re the re fo re c or re c t in

e va luatin g Hurs t’ s h a nd

wr itt e n c on fe ssi on

wi tho ut a pp lyinga ta int a na ly sis . F ur

the rm or e , b e c a

us e this was the only

new ba sis asserted in Hur st’s appea l to demonstrate why his handwr itten confe ssion sh ou ld b e de e me d in vo lun tary , th e fi nd ingthat H ur st’ s se lf -w ri tte n c on fe ssi on

wa s vo lun tary

mus t be upheld. IV. For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the district cour t’ s o r der de ny ing H urst’s application fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s.28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( e )( 1) state s: * I n a proc eedinginstit uted by an application for a wr it of habea s c or pu s b y a pe rs on in c us tod y purs ua nt t o th e jud g me nt o f a

Sta te c ourt , a de te rm inatio n o f a

fa c tua l is su e ma de by

a Sta te c ourt

sh a ll be pre sumed to be cor

rec t. The applica

nt shall have the bur den of rebutting the pre sumption of corre ctness by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Pag e 7 of 8 ME RRI TT , Ci rc uit Judg e , co nc ur ri ng . Pe rh a

ps thi s con c ur

re nc e sh ou ld be a

dis se nt b e c a

us e it appear s to me that there w as no substantial evidenc e supporting conviction in this case other than the c on fe ssi on

a nd the c on fe ssi on

se e ms hig hly su sp e c t bec a us e it wa s obta ine d und e r q ue sti on a ble

c ir c ums tanc e s a c c or din g to t he re c or d. Th e pr ob le m he re is that th e fa c tua l r e c or d bef or e us is inc omp le te , but the An ti- Te rr or ism a nd Ef fe c tiv e De a th Pen a lty Ac t of 199 6 re qu ir e s us to up ho ld state cour t findings of

fac t unle ss w e are convince d they are in e rror . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

. What *

we do kn owis that pe tit ion e r w a s arr e ste d at 1:2 0 p.m. on Janu a ry 24 , 2 00 0. He wa s to ld h e c ou ld not use the telephone . Although pe titioner appar ently did not specifica lly as k fo r an attorney , he testified that he wishe d to call his mother to ask he r t o call his attorney . He wa s interrog ated f or

sever al hours that af

ternoon by

Offi ce r Gi aq uinto, and he re peate dly denied involvement in the

m u r d e r . H e w a s t h e n t r a n s f e r r e d t o a n o t h e r f

l o o r i n t h e j a i l t h a t w a s d i rt y, h a v i n g o n l y a n o p e n p r i v y, no shower a

nd no bunks for slee ping, only pallets on the floor. The jail a lso la cked food pre paration fa c ili tie s, a nd

the re c or d s e e ms t o in dic a te tha t pe tit ion e r w a s n ot g ive n a ny thi ng to e a t fr om the tim e he wa s arr e ste d unti l he a g re e d to take a po lyg ra phte st the fo llo wi nga ft e rn oo n at a bo ut 4 :00 p. m. — a per iod of over 24 hour s. He slept on the f loor that nig ht. He wa s not able to shower or conduct

an y o t h er fo rm s o f pe rs o n al h y gi en e. He wa s i n t erro gat edaga i n fo r s ev er al h o u rs t h e n ex tm o rn i n g. I t a p p e a r s th a t h e w a s o n ly g iv e n f o o d b e c a u s e h e a g r e e d to ta

k e th e p o ly

g r a p h te s t. T h e foodPag e 8 of 8

consisted of two sandw iches a nd a drink. A re vie w of the tr ia l c ourt tr a ns c ri pt fr om the sta te su pp re ssi on he a ri ngsh ow s th a t th e state court, in a c onclusory

fashion, suppre ssed as coer ced the oral statements made both bef ore a nd afte r the poly g raph te st but then admitted the short confe ssion wr itten by petitioner just after

the test and be fo re the mor e e xten de d o ra l conf e ssi on . I a m in do ub t be c a

us e Ihave tr ou

ble se e ingho w i t is possible logica lly

or empirica lly

for the shor

t written confe ssion to be vo l u n t ar y b u t all other statements to be coe rce d. No fa ctual finding s supporting e ither aspe ct of the r uling we re ma de by the trial court. I

n a situation where the fa ctual re cord is not clea r, AEDPA dire cts us to presume that the state c ourt’s fa ctual finding s are corr ect. We must indulge in a pre sumption of corre ctness and l ea v e t h e s t at e j u d gm en t al o n e u n l es s we ar e “c o n v i n ce d

. ” I n t h e ab s en ce o f “ cl ea r a n d co n v i n ci n g” evidenc e of c oerc ion, Ireluc tantly join in the majority ’s dec ision.