Filed 5/27/15 In re Jesse R. CA2/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

In re JESSE R., JR., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B255650 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. DK00355) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JESSE R., SR., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Carlos E. 

Vasquez, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, 

and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION 

 Jesse R., father of Jesse R., Jr. (age 14), J.R. (age 12), and Jimmy R. (age 8), 

appeals from the orders of the juvenile court removing the children from his custody 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c))1

 and transferring the case to Kern County, 

California. (§ 375.) We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 1. The family

 When this dependency was initiated, the children lived with father and his wife, 

Beverly R., and their children Gloria R. and Kai R.2

 The children’s mother, Angelica R., 

was living in Kern County. 

 2. Father’s history with Child Protective Services

 Father has extensive involvement with child welfare services. In 2008, the Kern 

County Juvenile Court declared the three children dependents because father physically 

abused them. The reunification plan required father to complete anger management and 

domestic violence classes, substance abuse counseling, and to undergo drug testing. 

Mother failed to reunify but the children were returned to father in December 2010. 

 Less than a year later, child protective services in Kern County again detained the 

children from father, this time because he was smoking “posh,” aka, “spice.” The 

National Institute on Drug Abuse has designated five active chemicals most frequently 

found in “posh” or “spice” as Schedule I controlled substances, and so selling, buying, or 

possessing them is illegal.3

 The drug causes seizures, increased blood pressure, vomiting, 

and disorientation. Father was giving the drug to Jesse and J.R. The court also found 

father was still physically disciplining the children by spanking them, hitting them on the 

 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

2

 Beverly R., Gloria R., and Kai R. are not at issue in this appeal. 

3

 See <http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/spice-syntheticmarijuana> [as of Apr. 2, 2015]. 
3

head, and using a spiked belt on them. Father’s reunification services were terminated in 

that dependency in September 2011. The court placed the children with mother and 

terminated jurisdiction with a family law order granting mother physical custody. 

 Apart from father’s three older children at issue in this case, Gloria R., father’s 

child with Beverly, was the subject of two petitions filed in 2010 and 2011, alleging the 

child was at risk because of father’s drug abuse and domestic violence. Also, Beverly 

had bruised arms and father hit her in the head several times, choked, and sexually 

assaulted her. Gloria R. was detained from father and placed with Beverly. 

The children were returned to father’s custody in December 2012, after mother 

was arrested. Father resumed physically disciplining the children with a belt. 

 Father also has a criminal history. He was convicted twice of domestic violence. 

His first drug-related arrest was in 1997, and he was convicted of possession of 

methamphetamine in Oklahoma in 2007. He was also convicted of assault with a deadly 

weapon in 1998, possession of a dangerous weapon, and violation of a domestic violence 

restraining order in 2009. 

 3. The current dependency 

 The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(the Department) received a domestic violence referral in July 2013. Father assaulted 

Beverly who obtained a temporary restraining order against him. Father disclosed that he 

had been using drugs for many years, was a recovering addict, and had just relapsed after 

a two-year period of sobriety. He tested positive for amphetamines and 

methamphetamines in July 2013. 

The Department filed a petition. The juvenile court detained the children from 

father and granted him monitored visits. After father pled no-contest, the court declared 

the children dependents based on father’s history of substance abuse, his recent positive 

test for methamphetamine and amphetamine, and his inappropriate physical discipline of 

Jimmy by hitting the child with a belt causing bruising (§ 300, subd. (b) [neglect]). 
4

 Meanwhile, at the end of July 2013, father began a six-month substance abuse 

program and produced nine negative test results between August 2013 and February 

2014. He missed one test in October 2013. 

 By the disposition hearing, father had completed his drug treatment program along 

with a 12-week parenting education course. Father’s unmonitored visits went well. 

Although father claimed he had completed individual counseling that addressed anger 

management and domestic violence issues, he never provided a certificate of completion 

or any progress reports. 

 4. The disposition order 

 Father, joined by the children, requested the court release the children to his 

custody. Although the juvenile court commended father for his efforts at drug treatment, 

it did not “believe” that releasing the children to his custody “would be prudent at this 

point given the lengthy history” including the sustained allegations in this and the prior 

dependencies. The juvenile court removed the children from father’s custody (§ 361, 

subd. (c)) and ordered him to undergo reunification services but credited him for the 

programs he had completed. The court granted father unmonitored overnight visits. 

 The Department requested that the juvenile court transfer the case to Kern County. 

The Department reasoned that it had found no prospective adoptive parents in 

Los Angeles County and a move to Kern County would bring the children closer to their 

parents to ensure visitation. Father objected to the transfer even though he was living in 

Kern County. Father explained that the case concerning the children’s half-sibling 

Gloria R. remained in Los Angeles County, and father did not want to interrupt the 

children’s schooling or the services they were receiving from the Department. Mother 

wanted the case transferred to Kern County because she lacked the means to travel to 

Los Angeles to visit the children. The juvenile court ordered the case transferred to Kern 

County. Father appealed. 
5

 5. Kern County

 We granted the Department’s request to take judicial notice of minute orders from 

the Kern County Juvenile Court entered after father filed his appeal. Those minute orders 

show that the Kern County Juvenile Court accepted transfer of this case. In June 2014, a 

social worker in Kern County Department of Human Services placed the children in 

foster care in Ridgecrest where father lives, and began providing them with child welfare 

services. In June 2014, the Kern County Juvenile Court ordered that father’s visits again 

be supervised. 

CONTENTIONS 

 Father contends the juvenile court’s removal order was not supported by the 

evidence and its transfer order was error. 

DISCUSSION 

 1. The juvenile court had sufficient evidence to justify removing the children from 

father’s custody at the disposition hearing. 

 Section 361, subdivision (c) directs, “[b]efore the court may order a child 

physically removed from his or her parent, it must find, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and that 

there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal. 

[Citations.]” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917, citing § 361, subd. (c)(1).) 

 When “ ‘determining the appropriate disposition, the court shall receive in 

evidence the social study of the minor made by the probation officer, any study or 

evaluation made by a child advocate appointed by the court, and such other relevant and 

material evidence as may be offered.’ [Citation.] This statutory command envisions that 

the juvenile court will be provided with a broad spectrum of evidence shedding light on 

the circumstances of the minor and his or her family. [Citation.] Of necessity, in 

virtually every case, the court will have before it conduct or circumstances of family 

members not pleaded in the petition.” (In re Rodger H. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174, 

1183, quoting from § 358, subd. (b).) “In this regard, the court may consider the parent’s 

past conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]” (In re Cole C., supra, 
6

174 Cal.App.4th at p. 917, italics added.) Furthermore, the “parent need not be 

dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be 

appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.]” 

(Ibid.) “The court’s principal concern is a disposition consistent with the best interests of 

the minor.” (In re Rodger H., supra, at p. 1183.) 

 While the juvenile court must make its finding under section 361, subdivision (c) 

by clear and convincing evidence, on appeal, we review the order for substantial 

evidence. (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216, fn. 4.) 

 Father contends that the order removing the children from his custody was not 

supported by substantial evidence because by the time of the disposition hearing, he had 

completed a six-month substance abuse program, a parenting program, individual 

counseling, and only missed one drug test. He adds that he had unmonitored visits, 

which had just been liberalized to overnight visits. He claimed to be able to refrain from 

using physical discipline, and observed that as the children were in school, they were in 

contact with mandated reporters in case he hits the children again. Father notes that the 

Department changed its original proposal to deny him reunification services, ultimately 

recommending services be provided. He points out that the children’s counsel joined 

father in his request for return of the children. The contention is unavailing. 

 The record here fully supports the juvenile court’s removal order. The court 

properly considered the conduct and circumstances of the family not pleaded in the 

petition, such as father’s extensive history with child protective services in both 

Los Angeles and Kern Counties -- which include not only the children in this case but 

also Gloria’s two dependencies -- and father’s failure to benefit from prior case plans. 

Reunification services clearly did not work. The problems that led to the children’s 

removal this time are the same ones that have reoccurred since 2008: substance abuse 

and violence. Father has undergone reunification services that include anger 

management, domestic violence, and substance abuse counseling. Yet, each time the 

children were returned to his custody, they were re-detained for the same allegations. 

The purpose of the statute is to prevent harm to the children. Given father’s extensive 
7

and unremediated history of substance abuse and violent behavior with both his children 

and his wife, the court could reasonably conclude there was a substantial danger to the 

children’s emotional and physical health and safety if they were not removed from 

father’s custody.4

 We reject father’s assertion that removal was improper because he had completed 

so much of his case plan before the disposition hearing was held. First, father’s claim to 

have completed individual counseling is not supported by the record which contains no 

certificate of completion or progress report. Father has been abusing drugs for at least 

two decades and has relapsed, and so the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that 

this most recent course of drug treatment, lasting only six months, was an insufficient 

amount of time. (See In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9 [“It is the 

nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period than 120 days to 

show real reform.”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [sobriety for 

seven months is not enough].) Father’s promise to refrain from hitting the children is 

likewise insufficient, as the purpose of section 361, subdivision (c) is to prevent harm 

before it occurs. Finally, although the juvenile court in Los Angeles liberalized father’s 

visits, we take judicial notice of the fact that the visits are once again monitored in Kern 

County. 

 We likewise reject father’s contention that there were reasonable means to protect 

the children without removal from his custody. Father’s extensive, unsuccessful history 

with child protective services is evidence that less restrictive means short of removal 

would not have protected the children. Although the Department initially advocated 

against providing services to father (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10) [the court may deny 

reunification services for a parent who failed to reunify and has not made reasonable 

effort to treat the problems that led to removal of sibling]), its decision instead to request 

 

4

 As this family has a history with child protective services, father’s reliance on 

In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139 is unavailing. The family in that case had no 

prior involvement with child welfare services. (Id. at p. 143.) 
8

services is not an acknowledgment that the children would be safe in his care. The 

Department continued to recommend removal, signifying its opinion that a longer term of 

sobriety, individual counseling, and more successful visits were necessary before the 

children could be safely returned to father’s custody.5

 Sufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial risk 

to the children’s physical or emotional well-being if they were returned to father’s care. 

(§ 361, subd. (c).) 

 2. The juvenile court did not err in transferring the case to Kern County. 

 Father contends that the juvenile court erred in transferring the case to Kern 

County, notwithstanding father and mother both reside there. His argument focuses on 

the failure of the court to state on the record its finding that transfer would promote the 

children’s best interest. 

 Section 375 allows a juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction to the county of 

residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of the child were it 

not for the dependency. (§ 375, subd. (a).)6

 California Rules of Court, rule 5.610 defines 

the child’s residence as “the residence of the person who has the legal right to physical 

 

5

 Father’s proposed protections for the children short of removal, i.e., unannounced 

visits and in-home services are not reasonable as they would not avert harm. The 

services father received in the past did not prevent drug-abuse relapse, or stop the 

physical or domestic violence. Father admitted relapsing in July 2013 simply because the 

Department was investigating him. 

6 Section 375, subdivision (a) reads in relevant part, “Whenever a petition is filed in 

the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition, 

or whenever, subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county 

where that minor resides, the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the 

custody of the minor were it not for the existence of a court order issued pursuant to this 

chapter is changed to another county, the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile 

court of the county where that person then resides at any time after the court has made a 

finding of the facts upon which it has exercised its jurisdiction over the minor, and the 

juvenile court of the county where that person then resides shall take jurisdiction of the 

case upon the receipt and filing of the finding of the facts upon which the court exercised 

its jurisdiction and an order transferring the case.” 
9

custody of the child according to prior court order . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.610(a)(1).) 

After the juvenile court declares the child a dependent, and after it “determines the 

identity and residence of the child’s custodian, the court must consider whether transfer 

of the case would be in the child’s best interest. The court may not transfer the case 

unless it determines that the transfer will protect or further the child’s best interest.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(e), italics added.) 

Although the juvenile court must consider whether an inter-county transfer would 

be in the children’s best interest, nothing in section 375 or the Rules of Court mandate 

that such a finding be made on the record, father’s contention to the contrary 

notwithstanding. In contrast are section 366.21, subdivisions (e) and (f) which mandate 

that the court “specify the factual basis for its conclusion . . . .” and section 361, 

subdivision (d), which requires the court to “state the facts on which the decision to 

remove the minor [from a parent’s custody] is based.” The Legislature knows how to 

compel courts to make findings on the record but did not include that requirement in 

section 375. (See Southern California Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2014) 

227 Cal.App.4th 172, 189.) Where section 375 does not explicitly command the court to 

make findings on the record, we will presume that the juvenile court properly understood 

and followed established law (Evid. Code, § 664) and in the absence of contrary evidence 

to rebut that presumption, we infer the necessary findings. Accordingly, we review the 

implied findings that the children’s best interest would be served in the Kern County 

Juvenile Court for abuse of discretion. (In re J. C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 993.) 

The record here contains no evidence showing that the juvenile court failed to 

consider the children’s best interest. The court specified it was adopting the 

Department’s recommendation. That recommendation explained that by transferring the 

case to Kern County, the court could assure that the children could visit both parents. 

The court knew that the children’s legal residence is Kern County where their mother 

lives and that the most recent court order had given mother custody. (Cal. Rules of 
10

Court, rule 5.610(a).) Indeed, father acknowledges that his legal residence is also 

Kern County. 

Father finally argues that transfer to Kern County would not be in the children’s 

best interest because it would disrupt their schooling and the services they were 

receiving. The children’s interest in reunification outweighs their interest in staying in 

any particular school. Moreover, the children have lived in Kern County before, and so 

logically their Los Angeles schooling was likewise new to them. Nor has father 

demonstrated how the services the children are receiving in Kern County are qualitatively 

different than those they would get in Los Angeles County. The juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion in transferring the case to Kern County where both parents reside. 

DISPOSITION 

 The orders are affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 ALDRICH, J. 

We concur: 

 EDMON, P. J. 

 KITCHING, J.