IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

GLENN H. and SONIA H., Petitioners,

v.

THE HONORABLE NICOLAS B. HOSKINS, Commissioner of the 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County 

of MARICOPA; and BANNER CARDON CHILDREN’S MEDICAL 

CENTER, Respondents,

CODY H., Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 17-0303

FILED 4-3-2018

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD34913

The Honorable Nicolas B. Hoskins, Judge Pro Tempore

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Janelle A. McEachern, Attorney at Law, Chandler

By Janelle A. McEachern

Counsel for Petitioners

Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix

By Andrew S. Gordon, Karen Carter Owens

Counsel for Respondent Banner Cardon Children’s Medical Center
2

Arizona Law Practice, LLC

By Amie S. Clarke

Guardian Ad Litem for Real Party in Interest

Anthony R. Montoya, Attorney at Law, Glendale

By Anthony R. Montoya

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New

York, Inc.

Keturah A. Dunne, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 

Patterson, New York

By Keturah A. Dunne, Pro Hac Vice

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New

York, Inc.

OPINION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the Opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 This special action addresses a single issue: whether the 

superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant a hospital’s

employees’ oral requests, made via an emergency telephone line, to 

authorize medical procedures for a minor patient whose parents did not

consent. Because the hospital did not create an action through the filing of 

a complaint, and the court’s conduct was not otherwise statutorily 

authorized, we hold the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider 

the requests. Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction and vacate the orders 

authorizing medical treatment for the non-consenting minor.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2017, Cody H., the fourteen-year-old son of 

Petitioners, Glenn and Sonia H., was diagnosed with bone cancer. 

Thereafter, Cody sought treatment, including chemotherapy, known to 

suppress the production of red blood cells, and surgery at Banner Cardon 

Children’s Medical Center (the Hospital). Cody and his parents are 

practicing Jehovah’s Witnesses, and objected to the use of blood 

transfusions upon religious grounds. The sincerity of Cody’s and 
GLENN H/SONIA H v. HON HOSKINS/BANNER

Opinion of the Court

3

Petitioners’ religious beliefs is undisputed. Cody’s medical team 

developed a treatment plan using alternative therapies designed to avoid 

the need for blood transfusions.

¶3 On October 12, 13, and 16, and December 4, 2017, one or more 

Hospital employees called the superior court via an “emergency hotline.” 

The employees sought orders authorizing blood transfusions over Cody’s 

and Petitioners’ objections. Although Petitioners were never given formal 

notice of the proceedings and learned of the employees’ first request only 

when advised it had been denied, and the second by overhearing 

conversations in the Hospital’s corridors, they were present and 

represented by counsel at all but the first proceeding. At each stage, 

Petitioners argued first that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 

requests, and second that the Hospital had failed to prove Cody’s medical 

condition constituted an emergency warranting a blood transfusion. 

Although various medical personnel presented evidence and argument to 

support the requests, the Hospital itself did not appear through counsel.

1

¶4 In the course of addressing the Hospital’s requests, the court 

explained the emergency hotline was the “standard practice in the county” 

for these types of requests, and it did not expect the Hospital would be filing 

a complaint or dependency petition, “particularly when [Cody] does not 

meet the definition of a dependent child.” As far as the record reveals, this 

emergency hotline is assigned to Maricopa County Superior Court judges 

on a rotating basis and available after business hours. The record does not 

reflect when the court established the emergency hotline, the type of relief 

generally sought by individuals using the hotline, or how the Hospital 

employees became aware of the hotline. It is also not clear from the record 

what the prescribed process is for accepting the calls, whether any 

restrictions exist on who is authorized to call, or what record is kept of the 

contents of the calls. Indeed, it is unclear whether the callers here were 

doctors, administrators, or staff, as the identification and credentials of the 

caller were apparently not part of the information required to be provided. 

However, it is undisputed that the Hospital never filed a complaint or 

petition to initiate the proceedings.

 

1 “A corporation cannot appear in superior court except through 

counsel. Until a corporation appears in court by counsel, its appearance is 

defective.” State v. Eazy Bail Bonds, 224 Ariz. 227, 229, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) 

(citing Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Lane & Bird Advert., Inc., 102 Ariz. 127, 128 (1967), 

and then Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co., 193 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 12 (1998)).
GLENN H/SONIA H v. HON HOSKINS/BANNER

Opinion of the Court

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¶5 The superior court ultimately granted three of five requests

for authorization to administer blood transfusions. Petitioners filed this 

special action in November but did not request a stay of the court’s orders. 

Thereafter, the Hospital administered blood transfusions to Cody on 

December 1 and 5.

¶6 While the petition for special action was pending, the superior 

court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem for Cody. At this 

Court’s urging, the Hospital entered an appearance and answered the 

petition. Additionally, the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New 

York, Inc. was granted leave to file an amicus brief in support of Petitioners.

The Arizona Attorney General “decline[d] the invitation” to submit an 

amicus brief on behalf of the superior court. Shortly thereafter, the Hospital

notified Petitioners that they needed to seek alternative care for Cody. As 

of January 2018, Cody was being treated at a facility in Portland, Oregon.

DISCUSSION

I. Special Action Jurisdiction

¶7 Special action jurisdiction is proper when a party has no 

“equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal.” Ariz. R.P. Spec.

Act. 1(a). This Court has discretion to accept special action jurisdiction and 

appropriately exercises that discretion in cases “involving a matter of first 

impression, statewide significance, or pure questions of law.” State ex rel. 

Pennartz v. Olcavage, 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 8 (App. 2001) (citations omitted).

Special action jurisdiction is also appropriate to prevent the superior court 

from acting without jurisdiction. See Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 

170 (1966) (citation omitted). 

¶8 The Hospital argues the superior court’s orders are moot 

because they have expired and Cody is no longer a Hospital patient. While

the Hospital is correct, we may consider moot issues “if there is either an 

issue of great public importance or an issue capable of repetition yet 

evading review.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. De Meo, 227 Ariz. 192, 194, ¶ 8 (App. 

2011) (quoting Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Molera, 200 Ariz. 457, 460, ¶ 12 (App. 

2001), and citing Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 2 v. Phx. Emp. Relations Bd., 

133 Ariz. 126, 127 (1982)); see also Coconino Cty. No. MH 1425, 181 Ariz. 290, 

292 (1995) (considering an otherwise moot issue because a decision 

addressing a common practice would have “a significant impact on the 

mechanics of involuntary commitment hearings”).

¶9 Whether the superior court has jurisdiction to authorize 

medical treatment via the emergency hotline presents a matter of first 
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Opinion of the Court

5

impression, of significant statewide importance, and that may be resolved 

as a pure question of law. Moreover, because of the emergency nature of 

the hotline, the issue is likely to evade review in future cases. Accordingly, 

we accept special action jurisdiction.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

¶10 “On every writ of error or appeal the first and fundamental 

question is that of jurisdiction.” Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 

379, 382 (1884). Here, the superior court identified Arizona Revised 

Statutes (A.R.S.) § 8-245(A)2 as the source of its jurisdiction. That section 

states: 

When a child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court

appears to be in need of medical or surgical care, the juvenile 

court may order the parent, guardian or custodian to provide 

treatment for the child in a hospital or otherwise.

This provision does not confer jurisdiction but instead permits the court to 

order medical treatment only when a child is already under the jurisdiction 

of the court.3

 

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.

3 Notably, the superior court’s orders do not order Petitioners to 

obtain, nor the Hospital to provide, treatment as contemplated within 

A.R.S. § 8-245(A). Instead, the orders provide a contingent authorization 

for the use of blood transfusions. For example, the November 14 order 

states:

IT IS ORDERED that if [Cody’s surgeon], or [an]other 

appropriate treating physician at [the Hospital], concludes 

during the Surgery that there exists a medical emergency 

necessitating the use of a blood transfusion to avoid serious 

injury or death, [Cody’s surgeon] and the treatment team . . . 

are authorized to provide such transfusions as appear 

medically necessary for Cody. This Order is not intended to 

authorize transfusion treatment solely to alleviate Cody’s 

discomfort over Cody’s objection.
GLENN H/SONIA H v. HON HOSKINS/BANNER

Opinion of the Court

6

¶11 Subject matter jurisdiction attaches to the superior court when 

a complaint or petition is filed. McCulloch v. W. Land & Cattle Co., 27 Ariz. 

154, 156 (1924); see also Bryant v. Bloch Cos., 166 Ariz. 46, 48 (App. 1990); Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 

court.”). Moreover, complaints or petitions that fail to comply with rules of 

civil procedure or other statutory requirements do not confer jurisdiction 

on the court. See Pima Cty. Juv. Action Nos. B-8272 and J-65774, 126 Ariz. 374, 

375 (1980) (citing Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. J-46735, 25 Ariz. App. 424, 426 

(1976)). No complaint or petition was filed in this case. 

¶12 We are aware of only two exceptions to this general rule, 

whereby the legislature has authorized oral, ex parte requests for relief: 

telephonic search warrants and emergency orders of protection. See A.R.S. 

§§ 13-3914(C), -3915(A) (authorizing a court to issue a search warrant after 

an officer makes a recorded, sworn statement via telephone); 13-3624(A)

(authorizing judges to issue emergency orders of protection by telephone). 

Both telephonic search warrants and emergency orders of protection, 

however, are regulated by statutes and rules of procedure that protect the 

due process rights of opposing parties and ensure the orderly 

administration of justice. See generally A.R.S. § 13-3911 to -3925 (regulating 

the procurement, execution, and return of search warrants); Ariz. R. 

Protective Order P. 24 (regulating the issuance, scope, and service of 

emergency protective orders). Our review of Arizona statutes and rules of 

procedure reveals no provision either authorizing the superior court to 

maintain an emergency hotline for the purpose of ordering medical 

 

Similar language providing a contingent authorization appears in the 

October 13 and December 4 orders. Moreover, the efficacy of these orders 

is unclear given that A.R.S. § 36-2271 already permits a healthcare provider 

“to save the life of the [minor] patient,” notwithstanding the parent’s 

consent, when a physician determines that “an emergency exists and that it 

is necessary to perform such surgical procedures.”
GLENN H/SONIA H v. HON HOSKINS/BANNER

Opinion of the Court

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treatment for a non-consenting minor,4 or guaranteeing the participation or 

protection of the persons likely to be affected by such an order.

5

¶13 However well-intended the emergency hotline may be, the 

superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain ex parte oral 

requests in the absence of specific statutory authorization. See Redewill v. 

Superior Court, 43 Ariz. 68, 81 (1934) (“A court cannot do something not 

authorized by law, because it may think it is ‘just as good,’ or even better 

than the thing which the law does sanction.”); see also San Joaquin Cty. 

Human Servs. Agency v. Marcus W., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 232, 240 (Ct. App. 2010) 

(reversing a court order compelling a minor to undergo periodic blood 

transfusions obtained through an analogous process, finding that 

“although well intended, the ‘system’ created in San Joaquin County does 

not comply with the statutory scheme and results in a juvenile court acting 

without subject matter jurisdiction”). Therefore, the court’s orders 

authorizing treatment are void.

 

4 Although not raised by Petitioners, we note that the ex parte nature 

of the emergency hotline may run afoul of the Arizona Code of Judicial 

Conduct, which prohibits judges from permitting or considering an ex parte 

communication unless, among other narrow exceptions, “expressly 

authorized by law to do so.” See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 81, Canon 2.9(A).

5 Petitioners also argue the procedures associated with the emergency 

hotline violate their due process rights. Although the trajectory of this case 

raises substantial concerns, we need not address the due process arguments 

given the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See infra ¶ 13.
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Opinion of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶14 The superior court lacked jurisdiction to grant ex parte oral 

requests, made via the emergency hotline, for authorization to perform 

medical procedures without the consent of a minor patient or his parents. 

No written complaint or petition supports the requests, and the procedure, 

while entertained by the court, is not specifically authorized by statute or

rule. Accordingly, the court’s orders are void.