IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-70022

KWAME A. ROCKWELL, 

 Petitioner–Appellant,

versus

LORIE DAVIS, Director, 

 Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,

 Respondent–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Kwame Rockwell seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge

the denial of habeas corpus relief. Because reasonable jurists would not debate 

that the district court acted properly in denying Rockwell’s claims, we deny his 

application for a COA.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 10, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

A Texas jury convicted Rockwell of murdering a gas-station clerk, Daniel 

Rojas, in the course of a robbery. The jury sentenced Rockwell to death. The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence.1 

Rockwell filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.2 

He filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied.3

“A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by 

a federal district court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal. Federal law 

requires that he first obtain a COA from a circuit justice or judge.” Buck v. 

Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)). “A COA may 

issue ‘only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). “Until the prisoner 

secures a COA, the Court of Appeals may not rule on the merits of his case.” 

Id. (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). 

“The COA inquiry . . . is not coextensive with a merits analysis. At the 

COA stage, the only question is whether the applicant has shown that ‘jurists 

of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional 

claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Id. (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. 

at 327). Federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if a claim was adjudicated 

on the merits in state court unless the state-court decision “was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

 

1 That court’s opinion includes a thorough discussion of the facts. See Rockwell v. 

State, No. AP-76,737 slip op., 2013 WL 6529575 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2013) (not designated for publication), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014).

2 See Ex Parte Rockwell, No. WR-80,232–01 slip op. (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2014) 

(per curiam) (not designated for publication), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015).

3 See Rockwell v. Davis, 4:14-CV-1055-O, 2016 WL 4398378 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2016).

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).4

Rockwell claims that reasonable jurists would debate (1) whether his 

trial counsel’s decision not to present evidence that he suffers from schizophrenia constitutes ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”), (2) whether 

his trial counsel’s decision not to present evidence of his steroid use constitutes 

IATC, (3) whether he is eligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 

536 U.S. 304 (2002), in light of his purported mental illness, and (4) whether 

Texas’s death-penalty statute unconstitutionally forbids juries from considering mitigating evidence. The state habeas court and the district court rejected 

each of these claims.5

II.

A.

Rockwell first brings two IATC claims, on which he must show “both that 

counsel performed deficiently and that counsel’s deficient performance caused 

 

4 In deciding whether to grant a COA, we engage in “an overview of the claims in the 

habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits,” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, but

“without ‘full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.’” 

Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 773 (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336).

5 Rockwell also asserts that the state habeas court’s failure to adhere to Texas criminal 

procedural laws deprived him of due process. But “[i]t is well-settled that ‘infirmities in state 

habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief.’” Henderson v. Cockrell, 333 F.3d 592, 606 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Duff-Smith v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1175, 1182 

(5th Cir. 1992)).

Rockwell additionally claims that the alleged procedural deficiencies deprive the state 

habeas court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law of the deference due under Section 2254. 

But because our precedent does not require a full and fair hearing, see Valdez v. Cockrell, 

274 F.3d 941, 951 (5th Cir. 2001), and because the record reflects that Rockwell had ample 

opportunity to “develop his claims” before the state habeas court, see Tercero v. Stephens, 

738 F.3d 141, 148 (5th Cir. 2013), reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district 

court properly applied Section 2254 deference in its review of the state habeas court’s findings 

of fact and conclusions of law.

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him prejudice.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Strickland’s first prong sets a high bar.” Id.6 Trial 

counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made 

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In federal habeas proceedings, a petitioner must also show 

that “the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

1.

Rockwell’s first claim is that his lawyers were ineffective because they 

failed adequately to investigate his purported schizophrenia and present evidence of it to the jury. Rockwell began exhibiting symptoms of mental illness 

shortly after his incarceration. Jail medical staff examined him and monitored 

his symptoms. Ultimately, Rockwell was diagnosed with schizophrenia and 

was prescribed Haloperidol, an anti-psychotic drug. 

Trial counsel chose not to highlight those facts at sentencing but, 

instead, focused on Rockwell’s character.7 Jurists of reason could not debate 

that that decision met the standard for effective representation. 

Over the course of the litigation, trial counsel retained several mentalhealth professionals to examine Rockwell.8 Those experts either found evidence that Rockwell was exaggerating his symptoms, or they failed to find 

 

6 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (“Surmounting Strickland’s high 

bar is never an easy task.”).

7 Trial counsel called 52 witnesses to testify on Rockwell’s behalf during the sentencing phase.

8 See Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 676–77 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other 

grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004) (“Counsel should be permitted to rely upon 

the objectively reasonable evaluations and opinions of expert witnesses without worrying 

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evidence that he suffered from schizophrenia.9 Their findings comported with 

the evidence trial counsel gathered from interviewing Rockwell and his family 

members, friends, and acquaintances. 

Even the two mental-health experts whom Rockwell cites favorably, psychologist Dr. Holly Miller and psychiatrist Dr. Michael Fuller, found evidence 

that Rockwell was malingering. If trial counsel had portrayed Rockwell as 

mentally ill, the prosecution would have presented evidence of such apparent 

malingering. Moreover, Rockwell’s suggested approach would have made damaging information discoverable, including information about his past violent 

acts.10 

The state habeas court rejected the claim of failure to investigate and 

present evidence of schizophrenia. No reasonable jurist would find the district 

court’s assessment of this claim debatable or wrong.11

 

that a reviewing court will substitute its own judgment, with the inevitable hindsight that a 

bad outcome creates, and rule that his performance was substandard for doing so.”).

9 Trial counsel retained a psychologist, Dr. Kelly Goodness, who reported that “[a]ll 

mental health professionals worth anything have identified Rockwell as malingering [mental 

illness]. It would only be more hurtful than helpful to have mental health testimony.” Trial 

counsel retained a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist, Dr. Michael Chafetz, who 

found some indications of psychosis but also reported that “this does not fit the usual symptomology, and there is some mild evidence of over-reporting.” At the urging of the state trial 

court, psychologist Dr. Antoinette McGarrahan also examined Rockwell and reported that

his supposed hallucinations “were all highly suspect.” Jail psychiatrist Dr. Xiaoyan Wu examined him as well and reached the same conclusion.

That said, not all of the mental-health professionals who examined Rockwell found 

evidence that he was over-reporting his symptoms. Trial counsel retained a forensic psychologist, Dr. Barry Norman, to determine whether Rockwell was competent to stand trial. Dr. 

Norman did not find evidence of over-reporting. He also determined that though Rockwell

“displayed no evidence of a disorder which would significantly impair his current understanding of reality,” he may have been suffering from adjustment disorder.

10 For example, the prosecution could have learned that Rockwell once choked a 

woman until she lost consciousness.

11 As noted above, Rockwell must show that trial counsel’s representation was not only 

deficient but also prejudiced Rockwell’s defense—and that the state trial court’s rulings on 

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2.

Rockwell’s second claim is that his lawyers were ineffective because they 

did not adequately investigate his steroid use or present evidence of it to the 

jury. Trial counsel retained Dr. Dwain Fuller, a forensic toxicologist, for advice 

on whether to present evidence of steroid use. Fuller advised against it, explaining that steroids do not cause people to commit the sorts of crimes that 

Rockwell committed. That advice, combined with concerns that Rockwell’s 

suggested witnesses would be subject to devastating cross-examination and 

that information about his use of illegal steroids would undermine the 

defense’s character arguments, convinced counsel not to pursue the steroid 

theory.

Counsel could have retained a more supportive expert but was not required to do so.12 Nor was counsel required to call witnesses to testify about 

the effect steroids may have had on Rockwell’s behavior. Accordingly, jurists 

of reason could not debate the district court’s decision to defer to the state 

habeas court’s ruling on this claim.13

B.

Rockwell’s third claim is that Atkins bars states from executing mentally 

ill persons. The state habeas court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable. In 

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21, the Court held that executing “mentally retarded” 

persons violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual”

 

these matters were unreasonable. Because we find that the state habeas court reasonably

held that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue the mental-illness theory did not constitute 

deficient representation, we do not need to reach the prejudice prong of the Washington test.

12 See Perry v. Quarterman, 314 F. App’x 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that trial 

counsel is not required to “shop for an expert”).

13 Because the state habeas court reasonably held that trial counsel’s decision not to 

pursue the steroid theory was not deficient representation, we do not need to reach the prejudice prong of the Washington test.

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punishment. Nothing in Atkins, however, bars states from executing those 

who are mentally ill, and “Fifth Circuit precedent . . . forecloses” the notion 

“that the Eighth Amendment prohibits . . . execution [of the] mentally ill.” 

Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014).14 The state habeas court 

did not misapply Supreme Court precedent by refusing to extend Atkins to 

Rockwell’s case, nor did it violate any other clearly established federal law. No 

reasonable jurist would debate this conclusion.

C.

Finally, Rockwell claims that a Texas statute unconstitutionally bars 

juries from considering mitigating evidence that does not reduce a defendant’s

“moral blameworthiness.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 37.071, § 2(f)(4). We 

have rejected similar arguments multiple times.15 The statute does not unconstitutionally restrict the mitigating evidence that Texas juries are allowed to 

consider. In fact, the jury instructions required the jury to “consider all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the punishment stage,” a 

line that comes directly from the statute. See id. § 2(d)(1). No reasonable jurist 

would debate the district court’s ruling on this claim.

The application for a COA is DENIED.

 

14 Execution of the mentally ill is carefully distinguished from execution of the insane. 

Mays, 757 F.3d at 219 n.24.

15 See, e.g., Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 665–66 (5th Cir. 2011); Beazley v. Johnson, 

242 F.3d 248, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).

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