* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### DEC 8 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IRENE M. DEASY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. NATIONS BANK; MERRILL LYNCH; NEPTUNE SOCIETY,

Defendants-Appellees, and DAVID DIXON,

Defendant.
STANFORD E. ANDRESS,

Applicant in Intervention-Appellant. No. 98-1129 (D.C. No. 97-D-941) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , BALDOCK , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.1 On appeal, appellants do not challenge the districtcourt’s decision

declining to enter a default judgment against defen dant David Dixon. -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellants appeal from the district court’s order 1 ) granting defendant Neptune Society summary judgment on plaintiff’s bre ach of contract claim; and 2) dismissing her claims against defendants Nations Bank and Merrill Lynch for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo,

see Vice v. Conoco, Inc. , 150 F.3d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1998) (summary judgment); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Narvaez , 149 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) (subject matter jurisdiction), we affirm

. Appellants allege that the Neptune Society breached its contract with plaintiff by distributing her former husband’s ashe s to his personal representative instead of her. Plaintiff and her former husband e ntered into a “preneed burial contract” with the Neptune Society in 1993. The co uple divorced later that year. Although the contract does indicate that the decede nt wished his remains returned to his next of kin, and identified plainti ff as that next of kin, the contract-3-

also reserved to the Society “the right to consult with individuals having a legal right to control the final disposition of the [dece dent]. The [Society] shall not be liable to anyone for its decisions taken in good fa ith pursuant to consultation with any person.” R. attachment to doc. 19. In additio n, Florida law, which governs this contract, provides that “[t]he fact that cremation occurred pursuant to a provision of . . . any written contract signed by t he decedent in which he or she expressed the intent that his . . . body be cremate d is a complete defense to a cause of action against the personal representative or person providing the services.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.804. Summary jud gment for the Neptune Society, therefore, was proper. Appellants’ claims against defendants Merrill Lynch and Nations Bank essentially seek review of Florida state court deci sions. Federal courts, however, other than the United States Supreme Court, do not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions, see, e.g. , District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Facio v. Jones , 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991), or matters cognizable only in state probate proceedings, see, e.g. , Beren v. Ropfogel , 24 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994). “[A] party lo sing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate r eview of the state court judgment in a United States district court, based o n the losing party’s claim that the state court judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” See Johnson v.-4-

De Grandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). This includes, notonly the issues actually litigated in state court, but also any con stitutional claims which are inextricably intertwined with the issues actually litigated. See Facio , 929 F.2d at 543. The district court, therefore, properly dismi ssed appellants’ claims against these defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdi ction. Appellants’ remaining arguments lack merit. Appell ants’ requests to submit evidence are granted only to the extent thatthese materials were previously submitted to the district court. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman , 27 F.3d 500, 506 (10th Cir. 1994). The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge