NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

FRANK JARVIS ATWOOD,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, 

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0298 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2019-095666

The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Frank Jarvis Atwood, Florence

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Michael E. Gottfried

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 2-9-2021
ATWOOD v. RYAN

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2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Frank Jarvis Atwood appeals from a court order declining 

jurisdiction over his petition for special action ("Petition"). Because Atwood 

has shown no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Atwood is an inmate at the Arizona Department of

Corrections ("ADOC"). On June 1, 2019, Atwood received a visit from his 

wife and a private investigator. During the visit, a corrections officer 

overheard Atwood describe the details of the route ADOC takes to 

transport Atwood to reoccurring physical therapy appointments in Tucson. 

The corrections officer placed Atwood on disciplinary report for conspiracy 

to attempt a prison escape. ADOC classifies "escaping, or attempting to 

escape" as a Class A disciplinary violation. Arizona Department of 

Corrections Department Order ("ADOC Order") 803, No. 08A. Conspiring 

to escape is also classified as a Class A offense. See ADOC Order 803, No. 

07A (defining conspiracy to commit a Class A offense as a Class A offense). 

¶3 On June 3, ADOC filed a formal disciplinary report charging 

Atwood with "Conspiracy to Commit a Class A Offense." Atwood pled not 

guilty. After a hearing on June 19, a disciplinary hearing officer ("DHO") 

found Atwood guilty of the charged offense. Atwood received a penalty of 

90-days parole class III, 30-hours extra duty, 30-days loss of privileges, 30-

days loss of visitation, and forfeiture of 120 earned-release credits. On June

19, ADOC provided Atwood a copy of the "Result of Disciplinary Hearing"

form. The form listed the DHO's finding and indicated the DHO relied on

information reports and the disciplinary report. No witness statements

were used or denied during the disciplinary hearing.

¶4 Atwood appealed to the warden. The warden upheld the 

disciplinary decision, noting the information presented showed that 

Atwood was "heard and observed giving information to [his] visitor about 

the route taken, traffic and construction issues on the way to a reoccurring 
ATWOOD v. RYAN

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off site medical appointments [sic] and was observed tracing the route 

taken to the appointment on the visitor[']s leg." 

¶5 Subsequently, Atwood was "referred for a Classification 

Review and Hearing to determine whether [he] should be placed at 

maximum custody institution . . . , due to resent [sic] disciplinary violation 

where . . . Atwood was found guilty of conspiracy to commit a class A 

felony[,]" and discipline for "disrespect to staff" after the Class A violation.

On July 21, Atwood wrote a letter to "Central Office Classification" 

appealing his classification to maximum custody. The record is silent as to

the outcome of the appeal. 

¶6 Atwood filed his Petition with the superior court asserting 

"atypical and significant hardships" from prison conditions, insufficient 

evidence to support the June 19 disciplinary decision, and due process 

violations by ADOC. Atwood requested expungement of the disciplinary 

report and reclassification from maximum-custody to close-custody status 

"with all previously enjoyed privileges." Alternatively, Atwood requested 

an evidentiary hearing and a jury trial to review whether ADOC violated 

his due process rights. 

¶7 Former ADOC Director Charles Ryan urged the superior 

court to decline jurisdiction over Atwood's Petition, arguing Atwood's 

claims did not warrant special-action relief. Alternatively, Ryan argued the 

court should dismiss the Petition because ADOC did not violate Atwood's 

constitutional rights. 

¶8 The superior court issued a minute entry declining specialaction jurisdiction and ordering the dismissal of Atwood's Petition. The 

superior court denied Atwood's motion for reconsideration and entered 

judgment for Ryan. 

¶9 Atwood timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over the 

appeal under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

¶10 Because the superior court did not accept jurisdiction of the 

Petition, our review is limited to whether the court abused its discretion in 

declining jurisdiction. Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 (App. 1979). 

An abuse of discretion is "discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised 

on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." Quigley v. City Ct. of City 
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of Tucson, 132 Ariz. 35, 37 (App. 1982). When reviewing for an abuse of 

discretion, we "only intervene where no evidence exists to support the 

decision." Bishop v. Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council, 119 Ariz. 417, 421 (App. 

1978). 

¶11 Courts generally accept jurisdiction over a special-action 

petition "where the issues raised in the petition are such that justice cannot 

be satisfactorily obtained by other means," King v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 

147, 149 (1983), or where "no 'equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 

by appeal' exists," Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 219 Ariz. 374, 

381, ¶ 32 (App. 2008) (quoting Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a)). "The denial of 

special action relief is a discretionary decision for the superior court which 

will be upheld for any valid reason disclosed by the record." State ex rel. 

Dean v. City Ct. of City of Tucson, 123 Ariz. 189, 192 (App. 1979).

II. Sufficiency of Evidence.

¶12 Atwood asserts that the superior court should have accepted 

jurisdiction over his Petition because there was no evidence supporting 

ADOC's disciplinary decision. We disagree.

¶13 In prison disciplinary proceedings, the revocation of earnedrelease credits satisfies the requirements of due process "if some evidence 

supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board . . . ." Superintendent, 

Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). "Ascertaining whether this 

standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, 

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the 

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in 

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 

board." Id. at 455-56. 

¶14 Atwood admits that he spoke with visitors about construction 

"bringing traffic to a crawl . . . which caused tardiness to the [physical 

therapy] appointment on May 30." Atwood also admits he told visitors "the 

fact of construction and/or traffic on a prior medical transport," but argues 

that "[t]he mention of where traffic/construction on one transport occurred 

cannot tip off anyone . . . what route a future transport may take." 

¶15 Atwood's admission, along with the disciplinary report, 

constitute "some evidence" supporting the disciplinary decision. See Cook 

v. Ryan, 249 Ariz. 272, 277, ¶ 21 (App. 2020) (finding a correctional officer's

disciplinary report was sufficient evidence to support disciplinary

decision); see also McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999)

(finding disciplinary report provides some evidence for disciplinary
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decision). Even if a different interpretation could have been drawn from 

Atwood's conversation, because some evidence supports the decision, he 

has not established that the superior court abused its discretion in declining

special-action jurisdiction. See Quigley, 132 Ariz. at 37 ("A difference in 

judicial opinion is not synonymous with 'abuse of discretion.'").

III. Due Process.

¶16 Atwood argues the superior court should have accepted 

jurisdiction over his Petition because ADOC deprived him of due process. 

Although our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by declining to accept jurisdiction over Atwood's Petition, 

determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred requires us to briefly 

consider the merits of Atwood's due process claims. 

¶17 Because Atwood's disciplinary hearing resulted in the 

forfeiture of earned-release credits, Atwood was entitled to receive: "(1) 

advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when 

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses 

and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written 

statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 

disciplinary action." See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. To show reversible error, 

Atwood must demonstrate prejudice. See Cook, 249 Ariz. at 275-76, ¶ 10.

¶18 Atwood appears to challenge the adequacy of the written 

notice of the disciplinary charges, arguing that ADOC's failure to allow him 

to review evidence prior to the hearing prevented him from being able to 

"know/understand the evidence at issue and to construct a defense[] . . . ."

However, ADOC served Atwood with a copy of the "Inmate Disciplinary 

Report" on June 3, as acknowledged by Atwood's signature. The 

disciplinary report informed Atwood of the circumstances of the alleged 

violation, stating that "[o]n 06/01/2019 at approximately 0930 hours as [the 

sergeant] observed [Atwood's] contact visit with Rachel Atwood and John 

Ryan, heard [inmate] Atwood give details of the route that transportation 

takes when he is transported to Tucson." Providing Atwood with the 

disciplinary report on June 3—more than two weeks before the disciplinary 

hearing scheduled for June 19—satisfied due process. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 

454; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) ("At least a brief 

period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to 

the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the Adjustment 

Committee"). 
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¶19 Atwood also challenges the adequacy of the written statement 

explaining the disciplinary decision. On June 19, ADOC provided Atwood 

with the "Result of Disciplinary Hearing" form, which indicated that the 

DHO relied on "Information Reports" and the "Disciplinary Report" in 

finding Atwood guilty of a Class A offense. Atwood argues the form was 

insufficient. We disagree. ADOC provided Atwood with "a written 

statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 

disciplinary action." See Hill, 472 U.S. at 554. The "Result of Disciplinary 

Hearing" form clearly indicated the evidence the DHO relied upon and

listed "07A" as the charge against Atwood. A more detailed explanation 

was not required. See Montgomery v. Whidbee, 446 F.Supp.3d 306, 318 (M.D. 

Tenn. 2020) (finding prisoner's allegation that he was not provided a

"detailed" explanation for prison's disciplinary action fell short of stating a 

plausible due process claim because he did not allege that he "was deprived 

of a written explanation altogether").

¶20 Atwood further claims that ADOC denied him due process 

by refusing to call witnesses on his behalf and not allowing him access to 

the information reports and a video recording of the incident. The "Results 

of Disciplinary Hearing" form did not indicate that any video was used as 

evidence against Atwood. And it is unclear from the record whether 

Atwood requested access to the information reports and video recording 

prior to the disciplinary hearing. Moreover, the record is also mixed as to

whether Atwood actually submitted witness-request forms prior to the 

disciplinary hearing. Atwood claims he submitted three witness-request 

forms, but the alleged forms are not found in the record, and the "Result of 

Disciplinary Hearing" form indicates that no witness statements were used 

or denied. 

¶21 Regardless, Atwood fails to show how any of the allegedly 

excluded evidence would have had a tendency to exonerate him. See State 

v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, 150, ¶ 9 (2014) ("To show that evidence had a

'tendency to exonerate,' the defendant must do more than simply speculate

about how the evidence might have been helpful."). Atwood does not

dispute that he described details of his travel route, including traffic and

construction information, to his visitors. Thus, neither the video recording

of the visit, the information reports, nor witness testimony would

materially change the facts found by the DHO. Instead, Atwood speculates

that they could have changed the DHO's conclusion drawn from those facts.

Such speculation is insufficient, id., and any hypothetical error is harmless,

see Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting alleged due

process violation based on harmless-error analysis because inmate failed to
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explain how excluded testimony would have aided in his defense against 

disciplinary charges). 

IV. Miscellaneous Claims.

A. Alleged Falsification and Retaliation.

¶22 Atwood alleges that ADOC falsified the disciplinary charge

against him in retaliation for pursuing post-conviction relief, litigating a 

civil-rights complaint against ADOC, and contravening ADOC's policy 

regarding the manner of storing his criminal case file. Atwood attempts to 

reveal a pattern of retaliation by making various allegations of misconduct

on the part of ADOC. However, Atwood admits that he commented on 

traffic and construction details encountered on his transportation route.1 

Thus, Atwood fails to show that ADOC falsified the disciplinary charges 

against him or that he was disciplined for improper reasons. 

B. Atypical and Significant Hardships.

¶23 Atwood argues that his classification to maximum-custody

status and housing in a cell without handicap bars imposed an "atypical 

and significant hardship" relative to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 37 (2002) ("[C]hallenged prison 

conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless those 

conditions constitute 'atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The superior court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining jurisdiction because these claims can be resolved in a standard 

civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 2003)

(concluding that inmate's challenge of his segregated confinement as a 

potential atypical and significant hardship was cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). Therefore, Atwood had access to a "plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy at law" to seek redress for his claims. See Neary v. Frantz, 141 Ariz.

171, 178, (App. 1984) (finding special-action petition was "an inappropriate

vehicle" for First Amendment claims where appellant had cause of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

1 Atwood also admits that he pursued "an alternative" method of 

storing his criminal case file materials, despite warnings that such conduct

would result in discipline. 
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CONCLUSION

¶24 Because of (i) the existence of some evidence to support the 

disciplinary decision; (ii) the lack of merit to Atwood's due process claims; 

and (iii) the availability of an adequate alternative remedy for Atwood's 

claims concerning his prison conditions, the superior court did not abuse 

its discretion in declining special-action jurisdiction. We affirm the superior 

court's order.