United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-40290

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

David Armando Castaneda, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:17-CR-1618-1

Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

David Armando Castaneda was convicted of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and

924(e)(1), and was sentenced to 210 months in prison and a five-year term of 

supervised release. He contends that the district court erred by including 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 17, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-40290 Document: 00516096522 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2021
No. 20-40290

2

special conditions of supervised release in the written judgment that it failed 

to orally pronounce at sentencing. Castaneda seeks remand to permit the 

district court to reform the written judgment. Because he failed to object to 

the alleged discrepancy when given the opportunity during his sentencing 

hearing in the district court, our review is for plain error. See United States v. 

Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020).

A district court must orally pronounce a criminal defendant’s 

sentence, including any discretionary conditions of supervised release, at the 

sentencing hearing. United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(en banc). “If the in-court pronouncement differs from the [written]

judgment that later issues, what the judge said at sentencing controls.” Id. A 

“written judgment conflicts with [an] oral pronouncement” if it “impos[es]

a more burdensome requirement.” United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 383 

(5th Cir. 2006). “But oral pronouncement does not mean that the sentencing 

court must recite the conditions word-for-word.” Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352. 

The court may also “adopt[] the conditions by referenc[e].” Id. at 354. 

Here, the district court explained during Castaneda’s sentencing 

hearing that it was “ordering, in light of [Castaneda’s] history [of alcohol and 

substance abuse,] that [he] participate in drug and alcohol treatment” as “a 

condition of [his] term of supervised release.” The court did not read aloud 

the full text of the six drug- and alcohol-related special conditions that were 

included in its written judgment.1 But those six conditions were listed in their 

entirety in the presentence report (PSR) under the heading “Substance 

Abuse Treatment, Testing, and Abstinence.” Although the district court did 

not explicitly adopt the PSR at Castaneda’s sentencing hearing, it did 

1 These conditions were substantially identical to the six at issue in United States v. 

Lozano, 834 F. App’x 69, 71–72 (5th Cir. 2020).

Case: 20-40290 Document: 00516096522 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/17/2021
No. 20-40290

3

confirm at the outset that defense counsel had read the report and reviewed 

it with Castaneda. 

Under the circumstances, we find no true conflict between the district 

court’s written judgment and its oral pronouncement—and accordingly no 

error, let alone “plain” error, in Castaneda’s sentence. In context, the 

district court’s oral mention of “drug and alcohol treatment” is best 

understood as “a shorthand reference to the . . . portion of the PSR” in which 

the six special conditions were listed. Lozano, 834 F. App’x at 75. In a recent 

case, we held that a district court’s statement at a defendant’s sentencing 

hearing that “‘substance abuse testing and treatment will be ordered’ . . . . 

logically referred” to all of “the six paragraphs from the PSR” that were 

grouped under the heading, “‘Substance Abuse Treatment, Testing, and 

Abstinence.’” United States v. Rodriguez, 838 F. App’x 119, 120 (5th Cir. 

2021). We emphasized in that case that the defendant and his attorney had 

reviewed the PSR. See id. Here, too, the district court confirmed at the 

sentencing hearing that Castaneda and his attorney were familiar with the 

PSR, and the court’s subsequent oral mention of “drug and alcohol 

treatment” is just as clear a “logical[] refer[ence]” to the six paragraphs in 

the PSR captioned, “Substance Abuse Treatment, Testing, and Abstinence” 

as the sentencing judge’s remarks during the sentencing hearing in Rodriguez. 

We are therefore persuaded that the district court, in its remarks 

during Castaneda’s sentencing hearing, adopted by reference the six drugand alcohol-related special conditions listed in the PSR. After “reviewing . . .

the record,” it appears that the supposed “discrepancy between the oral 

pronouncement and the written judgment” was not a true “conflict,” but 

instead “merely an ambiguity,” United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 

(5th Cir. 2006), the meaning of which is readily cleared up by the PSR.

Thus, district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Case: 20-40290 Document: 00516096522 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/17/2021