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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

PREPARING FOR WAR? MOSCOW FACING 

AN ARC OF CRISIS

Andrew Monaghan

December 2016

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vi

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ISBN 1-58487-743-X
vii

FOREWORD

Russia is once again at the front and center of the 

security agenda of the United States. With many now 

seeing Russia as one of the most important threats, if 

not the number one threat to the United States and 

its allies, there is much debate about how to counter 

possible threats, where Russia might strike next, and 

how to deter Russian aggression. The war in Ukraine 

and Russia’s intervention in Syria, combined with its 

extensive program of exercising for war, lends policy 

urgency to this debate. 

In this Letort Paper, Dr. Andrew Monaghan, a British academic and long-term scholar of Russia based at 

Chatham House in London, reflects on the view from 

Moscow. In so doing, he illustrates the increasingly 

obvious gulf in how security is perceived in Western 

capitals and in Moscow. Importantly, he emphasizes 

that the Russian leadership faces numerous doubts 

and difficulties—to include doubting that, in Clausewitzian terms, Russia is able to withstand the test of 

war. This is both the root of the emergency measures 

that the Russian leadership is implementing across the 

system, from the economy to the political system and 

the military, and the root of the major investment program to modernize the military that was under way 

even before the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014 and led 

to a sharp deterioration in Russia’s relations with the 

United States and the West more broadly.

This Letort Paper also serves to complement and 

even supersede the debate in the West about Russian 

“hybrid” war by looking at Russian actions through 

the lens of state mobilization, drawing attention to 

important features of Russia’s evolving conventional 

warfighting capacity.
viii

This Letort Paper has been completed at a time 

when Russia’s mobilization process is still incomplete. 

However, it both reminds us to look beyond the urgent 

headlines of the day, such as the conflicts in Ukraine 

and Syria, and to look further to the strategic context 

and Russia’s evolution over the next 3 to 5 years. Given 

the likelihood of continuing, and perhaps even deepening, competition between the United States and its 

allies and Russia for the foreseeable future, the Strategic Studies Institute recommends this Letort Paper 

about Russian mobilization to all policymakers who 

have the task of adapting to the challenges of EuroAtlantic security in the 21st century.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ANDREW MONAGHAN is a Senior Research Fellow 

in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham 

House, where his work is supported by the Gerda 

Henkel Foundation. Dr. Monaghan is also a Visiting 

Fellow at the Changing Character of War Programme 

at Pembroke College, Oxford.

Additionally, he is the founder and director of the 

Russia Research Network, an independent organization for the generation of information and expertise on 

Russian politics, security, and economic issues based 

in London. 

Until late-2012, he led Russian-related research in 

the Research Division of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College (NDC) in Rome. 

In this role, he was also the NDC’s senior researcher 

on energy security matters. He has also been an academic visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford (2013-

2015), and a senior research associate at the Advanced 

Research and Assessment Group (ARAG), part of the 

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom (2005-2009). 

He has also served as an expert witness to several parliamentary committees including: the UK’s National 

Security Strategy Committee; the House of Commons 

Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees; and 

NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly.

He is widely published and is the author of: The 

New Politics of Russia—Interpreting Change, published 

by Manchester University Press in 2016; and The Elements of Impact. Making Your Point in Public Speaking and Writing, published by the Conflict Studies 

Research Centre in 2015.

He received his Ph.D. in Russian foreign policy 

(Russian perspectives of Russia-European Union 
security relations) from the Department of War Studies, King’s College, where he also obtained an M.A. 

in war studies, graduating with the Simon O’Dwyer 

Russell Prize for academic distinction.

x
xi

SUMMARY

This Letort Paper explores Russian state mobilization. It first frames how Moscow sees the world 

and then turns to explore the range of measures that 

the Russian leadership is implementing to address a 

series of threats, both real and perceived, as well as 

numerous internal challenges. These are emergency 

measures, tantamount to putting the country onto a 

war footing.

It has been plain for some time that the world is 

seen very differently by policymakers in Washington, D.C. and Moscow. However, the differences are 

becoming evermore stark as the United States—and 

many of its allies—and Moscow increasingly draw 

different conclusions from the same bodies of evidence. This is true whether the topic is Euro-Atlantic 

security issues, such as NATO enlargement, missile 

defense, or—most notably—Ukraine, or whether the 

security questions are further afield, such as the wars 

in Libya and Syria. The Russian view contains a multiplicity of challenges, from the potential for war to 

erupt, to instability in the aftermath of U.S.-led wars 

of regime change. Many in the Russian leadership are 

particularly concerned about the possibility of such 

a regime change campaign being conducted against 

Russia itself. Russian President Vladimir Putin and 

others in the leadership circle have been explicit that 

they see events in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine in this 

light, and that Russia must learn lessons from these 

developments.

The Russian leadership has a Clausewitzian-style 

understanding of war, essentially meaning that it is 

a test of society. Their view is that despite Russia’s 

actions during the war in Ukraine, and its intervention in Syria, Russia is not yet ready for such a test. 
xii

This is because the Russian system, although in some 

respects powerful, is often dysfunctional. The leadership faces numerous problems, not only from Russia’s 

Soviet inheritance including a limited and decrepit 

infrastructure, but also from post-Soviet problems, 

including corruption and passive opposition from 

the bureaucracy. The military has also endured many 

years of underfunding and neglect. At the same time, 

there are other important pressures, such as longerterm economic stagnation that has developed into a 

sharper contraction over the last 2 years. This Letort 

Paper thus emphasizes the point that not only is Russian strategy not made in a vacuum, but also that the 

process of forming this strategy is itself a complex and 

arduous task.

This mobilization has been underway for some 

time and is best understood as a process of consolidation and preparation. Consolidation is reflected in a 

series of measures to strengthen the political system, 

both in terms of ensuring the implementation of orders (including the establishment of para-institutional 

organizations to conduct oversight of the bureaucracy and the firing of ineffective officials) and also 

ensuring resilience against potential civil disobedience and threats posed by extremism and terrorism. 

The Interior Ministry has conducted large exercises to 

prepare to respond to “Maidan-Style” developments 

in Russia, to seal the borders, and to deal with civil 

disobedience.

At the same time, the leadership is also conducting a major effort to modernize the military, including 

a major investment program, enhancements to command and control, and frequent no-notice exercises 

to test readiness and responsiveness. A spending program initiated in 2010 envisaged spending 20 trillion 

rubles—some $640 billion at the time—on moderniz-
xiii

ing the Russian military and their military-industrial 

complex over a decade, including not only much improved service conditions, but also replacing Sovietera equipment and increasing the share of “modern” 

armaments and technologies to 70 percent by 2020. 

This includes much of the heavy equipment designed 

for conventional warfighting.

At the same time, the leadership has sought to improve command and control, and combat readiness. 

A new National Defense Center was opened in late2014, a federal level organization that provides a single point of coordination for information and control. 

In the case of war, the National Defense Center would 

assume control of the country, coordinating all the 

ministries and agencies. In addition, the military has 

conducted hundreds of no-notice exercises from the 

tactical to strategic levels to test readiness, responsiveness, and coordination between the military, federal, 

and regional authorities. 

There are ongoing problems, and despite the attempts to enhance the responsiveness of the system, 

orders are still implemented tardily, if at all. Furthermore, procurement is being postponed, and there is a 

continued resistance to some reforms in the military. 

Nevertheless, progress has been made toward the 

transformation of the security sector and the armed 

forces in particular.

1

PREPARING FOR WAR? MOSCOW FACING 

AN ARC OF CRISIS

INTRODUCTION

For many in the West, the war in Ukraine has become one of the defining features of the post-Cold War 

era. Although Russia’s relations with the West had 

been deteriorating since 2012, including the failure of 

the U.S.-Russia “reset” in 2013, the outbreak of war in 

2014 precipitated a dramatic worsening. Russia, which 

for much of the post-Cold War era was absent from 

the Western political radar, made a dramatic return to 

the forefront of the strategic agenda. Prominent Western officials have suggested that through its actions in 

the war, Russia had created a “new strategic reality in 

Europe.”1 Others, such as the former North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Philip Breedlove, have 

suggested that Russia is “revanchist” and “aggressive,” and poses a challenge to the international order 

that is “global, not regional, and enduring not temporary.”2 The National Military Strategy of the United States 

of America: 2015 described Russian military actions as 

“undermining regional security directly and through 

proxy forces,” and several senior U.S. military officials 

(including Generals Joseph Dunford and Paul Selva) 

have suggested that Russia is the greatest threat to the 

United States.3

Russian actions have generated a series of questions in the Euro-Atlantic community about what it 

is that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants and 

what he will do next—accompanied by assertions that 

Putin has established an authoritarian, expansionist 
2

state, and even concerns that an aggressive and belligerent Russia could launch an attack on NATO itself. 

Similarly, there has been much discussion of Russia’s 

resurgence and its “militarization,” and the substantial increase in Russian defense investment (and consequent significantly improved military capability) is 

often highlighted. At NATO’s Wales Summit, for instance, senior officials reiterated their concerns about 

increased Russian defense spending, noting that while 

NATO member states have decreased their defense 

investment on average by as much as 20 percent over 

the last 5 years, Russia has increased it by 50 percent.4

Russia, therefore, forms an important part of what former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called an “arc of crisis” around the alliance,5

 an arc 

that also includes serious challenges such as Islamic 

fundamentalist terrorism, particularly in the form of 

the Islamic State, migration across the Mediterranean, 

and instability and civil wars in Libya and Syria.

Beyond the obvious disagreements over the nature 

and causes of the war in Ukraine and the causes of 

the deterioration in relations between the West and 

Russia, the picture of international affairs might appear, in some respects, similar in Moscow. Official 

documents and speeches point to an increasingly unstable, threatening international environment; indeed, 

it may be said that Russia also faces an “arc of crisis” 

around it.

However, there are important differences. Russian 

officials, for instance, have stated their concerns about 

Western attempts to inspire a “color revolution” in 

Russia and its neighborhood. Moreover, rather than 

having confidence in a system that works, it appears 

that the Russian leadership is implementing emergency measures on the basis that Russia is not ready 
3

to face these external and internal challenges—in effect, demonstrating an understanding that war is 

a test of society, one for which Russia is not ready. 

Rather than “militarizing” aggressively, therefore, 

Russian officials appear to be “mobilizing” Russia—

a more defensive preparation in the case of war. In 

different ways, Russian observers and officials alike 

have referred to these emergency measures in terms 

of “mobilization”—“mobilizing society,” a “mobilization budget,” and reshaping and refitting the military.

This Letort Paper examines this sense of “mobilization.” It illustrates both the increasingly obvious 

gulf in how security is perceived in the West and in 

Russia, and the evolution of Russian state capacity 

and its ability to create and deliver power at a time of 

perceived emergency. First, it sketches out this Russian “arc of crisis” and the contours of international 

instability as they are seen from Moscow. It then turns 

to reflect on Russian strategy making and the emergency measures being implemented by the Russian 

leadership. It suggests that the sense of urgency inherent in mobilization is due not only to what is seen 

to be an increasingly threatening and competitive 

international environment, but also to the numerous 

domestic problems and limitations in the Russian system, which means that the system is not yet prepared 

to cope with the tests that this environment poses. 

In other words, although Russia has formulated numerous strategies, concepts, doctrines, and plans, the 

leadership has numerous problems in implementing 

these plans—which means that Russian strategy, understood as the ability to create power, is limited to 

certain areas.
4

THE ARC OF CRISIS AROUND RUSSIA

Given the sharp deterioration in Russia’s relations 

with the West, there is much debate in Russia about 

the emergence of a “Cold War 2.0” and a new confrontation between Russia and the West. However, 

at the same time, there is also much discussion of the 

possibility of wider instability leading to the outbreak 

of a major war. Members of the conservative Izborsky 

Club, for instance, posit four scenarios, three of which 

are depicted as either negative or very negative (“very 

bloody”), and only one of which is more positive, with 

a way out of the crisis with “much less blood spilt.”6

Other observers have also pointed to the dramatic 

deterioration in the international environment in the 

last 18 months. Ruslan Pukhov, a prominent analyst 

specializing in the Russian defense industry, noted 

that 4 years ago, Russian concerns were about potential Islamic insurgency in the south, or a re-ignition of 

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and 

Azerbaijan, or even a second war with Georgia—while 

at the same time being cautious about China. Recently, however, added to this list of challenges, there is 

concern about potential conflict in the Arctic; and, in 

Ukraine, there is an already open conflict on Russia’s 

Western borders, which has led to hostile relations 

with NATO. Thus there are threats “all round Russia’s borders,” and the Chief of General Staff “should 

be having nightmares,” since it is not easy to prepare 

defenses for such circumstances.7

Official documents and statements suggest that 

such concerns are shared by the leadership, indeed 

that they reflect longer-term perceptions that predate 

the war in Ukraine. They have in fact been present 

throughout the prolonged overhaul of Moscow’s stra-
5

tegic planning conducted since the mid-2000s, and 

feature prominently in the cascade of strategies, concepts, doctrines, and programs that have been published since, as well as major international speeches 

(such as Putin’s well known speech at the Munich 

Security Conference in February 2007) and initiatives, 

such as the proposal to debate a new European security treaty.8

 This overhaul reflected two important 

points. First, it demonstrated the perceived need in 

Moscow for a more systemic approach to strategic 

planning, and served to frame and give official sanction to a series of assumptions and views about how 

Russia saw the world, its priorities, and its concerns.

Second, it illustrated the emergence of the Russian 

Security Council as the “chief interagency coordinator” of decisions on the main tasks in domestic and 

foreign policy. Established in 1992, the Russian Security Council can be said to have emerged as an important body under Putin’s leadership. This has been 

particularly clear since 2008 when close ally of Putin 

and former director of the security service Nikolai 

Patrushev was appointed as the council’s Secretary. 

The council has since become the formal representation of the Russian leadership, bringing together as it 

does ministerial resources, experience, and authority 

stretching across the executive branch and out into the 

regions. The Security Council has a two-tier structure. 

Its core consists of the “permanent members,” who 

are largely drawn from the security services, with 

only Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev representing 

the socio-economic agenda. The wider second tier also 

includes the finance minister and a number of presidential plenipotentiaries and regional governors. The 

organization has become the central locus for forging 

and then disseminating consensus, amending where 
6

necessary, coordinating, and implementing strategic 

planning documents (strategies, concepts, doctrines, 

and programs).9

In terms of security and for the focus of this Letort 

Paper, the National Security Strategy to 2020 (published 

in 2009) is the central piece of this strategic overhaul. It 

depicts an enduring series of concerns that relate to increasing competition over values and energy resources that may lead to the use of military force.10 This has 

subsequently been reiterated by senior Russian military figures: Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov 

suggested in 2013, for example, that “Russia may become drawn into military conflicts as world powers 

begin to vie for energy resources,” many of which are 

in Russia or in Russia’s immediate neighborhood. By 

2030, he suggested that the “level of existing and potential threats will significantly increase,” as “powers 

. . . struggle for fuel, energy and labor resources, as 

well as new markets in which to sell their goods.” In 

such a context, “some powers will actively use their 

military potential,” he stated.11

The revised Military Doctrine, published in December 2014, echoes important aspects of this. It notes that 

the international environment is characterized by the 

strengthening of global competition, tensions in interstate and interregional interaction, rivalry in terms 

of values and models of development, and an evolution in international influence, with the growth of 

influence of different states. Furthermore, it notes the 

continuation of unresolved conflicts and the tendency 

to resolve them by the use of armed force, including 

on Russia’s borders. Thus, although the likelihood of 

a major war being directly unleashed on Russia becomes less likely, “in a number of areas, the military 

risks faced by Russia are increasing,” and one of the 
7

“main military threats” is a dramatic deterioration in 

military-political conditions and the consequent creation of conditions for using military force.12

Putin himself has elaborated on these themes. 

Speaking in 2014, he stated that “new hotspots” were 

appearing across the world, and that there is a “deficit of security in Europe, the Middle East, South East 

Asia, the Asia Pacific region and in Africa,” combined 

with an increasing intensity of conflict and competition—military and economic, political and informational—throughout the world. 

The potential for conflict in the world is growing, old 

contradictions are growing ever more acute and new 

ones are being provoked. . . . international law is not 

working, the most basic norms of decency are not being complied with and the principle of all-permissiveness is gaining the upper hand.13

Later that year, he stated that the lessons of history 

suggest that:

changes in the world order, and what we’re seeing 

today are events on this scale, have usually been accompanied if not by global war and conflict, then by 

chains of intensive low level conflicts. . . . [and] today 

we see a sharp increase in the likelihood of a whole set 

of violent conflicts with either direct or indirect participation by the world’s major powers.14

There appears to be a sense, therefore, shared by 

observers and officials alike, of a combination of immediate international instability that poses a threat to 

Russia and its interests; and also the looming prospect 

of possible strikes on Russia in a longer-term international environment increasingly given to competition, conflict, and, perhaps, war. These would be 
8

traditional multinational conflicts between states for 

regional dominance and conflicts of internal instability in states, particularly when they are located at the 

intersections of geopolitical interest. These latter conflicts of internal instability pose dual problems, both 

in terms of the fighting itself, and because terrorism 

and criminality thrive in the consequent loss of law 

and order, and spread to other areas.15

This instability is particularly dangerous because 

of the wider international context. First, in Moscow’s 

view there are important shifts in global power, and 

while Western and particularly Anglo-Saxon influence 

is seen to be in a long-term decline, other power centers in the world are rising and vying for resources—

in other words, a multi-polar world is by its nature 

more competitive. Second, at this time of increased 

competition, Moscow sees an arms race taking place 

as the major powers are investing in modernizing 

their armed forces, including developing precision 

weapons that have a similar strategic impact as weapons of mass destruction.

Third, this is all taking place at a time when the 

traditional strategic balance of power no longer 

works. If the Military Doctrine stated that the existing 

international security system “does not ensure equal 

security for all,” again Putin embellished the picture, 

stating that there is “no reliable safety net” in place to 

mitigate these looming threats. “There is no guarantee 

and no certainty that the current system of global and 

regional security is able to protect us from upheavals. This system has become seriously weakened, 

fragmented and deformed,” he stated, before noting 

that the international and regional political, economic, 

and cultural cooperation organizations are enduring 

difficult times.16
9

At the same time, there are often-stated and wellknown concerns about the destabilizing role of the 

West, particularly the United States, both in international affairs more broadly and also more directly 

regarding Russia. Notably, some depict the growing 

encirclement of Russia, emphasized by NATO enlargement and by U.S. deployments around the world. On 

one hand, the West is seen in Moscow to be causing 

an imbalance in Euro-Atlantic security through the 

expansion of exclusive organizations such as NATO 

(and the European Union [EU]), a process that both 

emphasizes divisions in European security while failing to resolve old problems, while also bringing the 

military infrastructure of NATO member states closer 

to Russia’s borders.17 On the other hand, the U.S.-led 

West is seen in Moscow as intervening in the internal 

affairs of states, exacerbating instability by engendering “color revolutions” in states that resist U.S. hegemony, and financing and supplying weapons to rebel 

groups and mercenaries.18

Thus, the Russian Security Council summed up 

Moscow’s view of the threats that the United States 

and its allies pose to Russia in its reply to the U.S. National Military Strategy. Asserting the attempt by the 

United States to establish wider global dominance 

and push for the political and economic isolation of 

Russia, it noted both the important role of military 

strength in the protection of U.S. interests and also the 

ongoing likelihood of the United States continuing to 

use “color revolutions” against states that oppose it.19

Indeed, senior figures in the Russian leadership, including Putin himself, have often pointed to the threat 

posed by “color revolutions.” Again, this is not a new 

development in the context of the war in Ukraine. 

In December 2012, Nikolai Patrushev noted his con-
10

cern about regime change through a color revolution. 

“Events are in motion in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 

Ukraine, we are dealing with it every day. Are they 

a danger for us? Yes,” he suggested.20 Similarly, the 

revised Foreign Policy Concept, published in 2013 in the 

context of the so-called “Arab Spring” and civil war in 

Syria, pointed to the “illegal use” of “soft power” and 

human rights concepts to put pressure on sovereign 

states, intervene in their internal affairs, and destabilize them by manipulating public opinion.21

Subsequently, Putin himself on several occasions 

has pointed to the lessons that should be learned from 

“color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space and stated 

that all appropriate measures should be implemented 

to prevent one from taking place in Russia. In March 

2015, speaking to a session of the expanded Interior 

Ministry board, he stated that:

we see attempts to use so-called color revolution 

technology, ranging from organizing unlawful public 

protests to open propaganda of hatred and enmity in 

social networks. The aim is obvious—to provoke civil 

conflict and strike a blow at our country’s constitutional foundations and even at our sovereignty.22

Therefore, the war in Ukraine is seen from Moscow in many ways as just one part of a wider arc of 

crisis, one that has been evolving for some time—since 

the late-1990s. But at the same time, it has served to 

confirm and accelerate concerns about wider negative 

international trends. While Western observers and officials might suggest that Moscow overlooks its own 

role in causing international instability, three important points stand out. First, while many in the West are 

concerned about Russian expansionism and aggression, the view from Moscow appears very different—
11

and there seems to be a concern about an accelerated 

threat from the West that looks like Western mobilization. Speaking in 2014, for instance, Putin noted slogans in the West such as “the homeland is in danger,” 

“the free world is under threat,” and “democracy is in 

jeopardy,” and so everyone needs to mobilize. “This 

is what a real mobilization policy looks like,” he suggested.23 The new Military Doctrine, also, points to:

the intensification of the activities of the armed forces 

of states or groups of states involving partial or full 

mobilization and shifting the governance and military 

command bodies of these states to functioning as in 

wartime conditions.24

If Moscow appears to be shaping a mobilization policy, therefore, it appears to be a consequence of its 

concerns about similar activities being conducted by 

other states and organizations. 

Second, Moscow’s concerns about international instability are rational. Tensions and conflicts abound, 

from the civil war in Libya to the conflict in Yemen, 

from the uneasy ceasefire in Ukraine to ongoing (and 

possibly increasing) instability in Afghanistan and 

Central Asia more broadly, the tensions in the South 

China Sea, and between North and South Korea. Seen 

from Moscow, these form both a series of concentric 

circles around Russia’s borders and offer the potential 

for the risks and threats to be imported into Russia 

(such as those Russians who have fought in Iraq and 

Syria returning to Russia). Because Russia is a ubiquitous state that stretches across many regions, it is 

unlikely to be able to avoid the ramifications of one 

of these conflicts erupting into a major war, possibly 

being drawn into it. 
12

Third, the nature and range of possible conflicts 

has evolved significantly, and Moscow sees the need 

to meet a variety of potential challenges: from a major 

war erupting between states, to the outbreak of lowlevel conflict near Russia, to the possibility of (externally fomented) unrest in one of Russia’s neighbors or 

even within Russia. As Gerasimov has noted, though 

the modernization of Russia’s strategic deterrent and 

the possession of state-of-the-art weaponry is a priority, warfare is evolving such that combat is moving 

away from “traditional battlegrounds” such as land 

and sea “towards aerospace and information,” as illustrated by conflicts in North Africa and the Middle 

East.25 The use of nonstate international organizations 

and the role of non-military instruments are also increasing, he suggested, noting the emergence of information wars and secret operations, as illustrated 

by developments in Syria, Ukraine, the activities of 

Greenpeace in the Arctic, and the “protest potential 

of a population.” This means, he suggested, that the 

time for reaction to the transition from political-diplomatic means to the introduction of military force has 

severely shortened.26

The perception of threats merging and evolving is 

also visible in Moscow’s official statements. The Military Doctrine points, for instance, to the combination 

of state military power, irregular military formations, 

private military companies with “soft power,” and the 

employment of political forces and public associations 

financed and guided from abroad—the combined 

threat of state forces and subversive information activities particularly against younger members of the 

population to undermine historical, spiritual, and 

patriotic traditions of the defense of the motherland. 

Again, this has official sanction and is reflected in the 
13

military doctrine, with concerns not just about the 

advance of military forces toward Russia’s frontier, 

but also the establishment of hostile regimes (even by 

overthrowing legitimate state bodies) along Russia’s 

borders, and activity aimed at destabilizing the sociopolitical situation in Russia and disrupting the functioning of state bodies.27

THE DIFFICULTIES OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY 

MAKING

If the Russian leadership views the international 

environment with concern, it also faces numerous 

problems at home, and the Russian leadership appears 

to recognize that Russia is not ready to meet these 

challenges. The military, after many years of very 

limited investment and incomplete reforms, requires 

considerable modernization, both in terms of new 

materiel and reform. One astute Russian observer has 

suggested that for much of the post-Cold War period, 

the Russian military was “shaped by military thinking 

that dated back, at the very latest, to the 1980s. In fact, 

some of its aspects had changed little since World War 

II.” From 1992 to 2008, Mikhail Barabanov suggested 

that the Russian army was a “shrinking iteration” of 

its Soviet predecessor and was increasingly ill-suited 

to Russia’s new military-political objectives. In the autumn of 2008, and in the wake of a poor performance in 

the Russo-Georgia war of that year, the Russian leadership launched major reforms to remodel the armed 

forces, and the leadership has sought to significantly 

increase both defense and security investment. Despite these reforms, some of which have had positive 

results, Barabanov notes that the Russian armed forces are still “burdened by major structural problems.” 
14

The reorganization of the armed forces has failed to 

implement some of the structural elements required 

by the plans, the reserve system remains problematic, 

and the mechanisms of maintaining and mobilizing 

the military reserve look “vague and haphazard,” including how the reformed brigades are supposed to 

be reinforced during limited conflicts. In other words, 

while there are some strengths, there are still major 

weaknesses.28

At the same time, there are a number of economic 

and socio-political problems, which hamper reforms 

and hinder the implementation of plans. The economy 

is stagnating as a result of structural problems, the 

more recent fall in oil prices from mid-2014, and, to 

an extent, the impact of Western sanctions. This has 

meant that the coordination of resources in support 

of the Russian government’s “May decrees” signed 

in May 2012, and other strategic plans, have become 

increasingly difficult. While the scale of resources 

required to implement these plans is enormous, the 

economic stagnation has meant that, even in the context of Russia’s large financial reserves, the leadership 

faces problems. A large gap has opened up between 

the anticipated annual gross domestic product (GDP) 

growth of 4-5 percent, on which the plans in the 2012 

May decrees were originally based, and the serious 

decline in that GDP growth that began in 2013 (before 

the Ukraine crisis and sanctions) before slowing to 

stagnation in late-2014, and entering recession in 2015. 

Combined with high levels of capital flight in 2013 

and 2014, there has been substantial pressure on the 

federal budget and the economic self-sustainability of 

regional budgets. There is also considerable inefficiency in state expenditure and the burden of widespread 

corruption that Putin has acknowledged is a threat to 

national development prospects.29
15

Furthermore, the chain of command—the socalled “vertical of power”—does not work effectively, 

such that the plans and instructions of the leadership 

are not effectively implemented, and responses even 

to crises and security threats can be slow and incomplete.30 In part, this is because the Russian system does 

not work harmoniously: Putin has noted that ministries and agencies tend to focus on their own problems 

rather than working to an understanding of the wider 

strategic effort and do not work well together. Friction and disagreement emerge as the result of blurred 

lines of responsibility for federal programs, competition for resources, and because of differences in priorities. There are also problems coordinating federal, 

regional, and local level authorities.

Indeed, the leadership has long faced serious problems in terms of the failings of the system of power, 

including in security and law enforcement. This has 

been exemplified on several occasions, such as the 

terrorist attacks on the Domodedovo Airport in January 2011, the responses to the summer fires in 2010 

(one of the results of which was the burning down 

of a military barracks), and the Kushchovskaya mass 

murder case in which law enforcement agencies appeared powerless to stop organized crime. Similarly, 

the leadership faces problems in having its plans and 

instructions implemented except through the direct 

and personal intervention of the most senior leaders 

themselves. Indeed, some Russian politicians and 

observers have stated that bureaucrats are ignoring 

the May decrees, using terms such as “systemic sabotage.” Some parliamentarians have suggested that the 

May decrees have not been implemented at all31 and 

have thus been proposing instigating legislation to enforce legal responsibility for the failure to implement 

presidential instructions.
16

TOWARD MOBILIZATION? 

As a result of the combination of this “arc of crisis” and problems in the system of power, there are 

increasing indications that Russia appears to be implementing emergency measures, effectively preparing to mobilize. For some, this has been a question of 

the exploitation of a “besieged fortress” or “foreign 

threat” narrative to mobilize popular opinion to maintain longer-term support for Putin. This is a “patriotic 

mobilization,” essentially, to sustain high levels of 

popular support for Putin through to the presidential 

elections scheduled for 2018, though some have suggested that the peak of this has been reached and that 

it will be difficult to sustain given economic trends, 

which might lead to the growth of social or even 

political protest against the leadership.32

But there are other important aspects to this mobilization in terms of institutional developments. 

These include economic and financial measures, as 

the government has sought to optimize budget efficiency and reduce waste as a means of addressing 

the shortfall between planning forecasts and declining GDP growth. Thus, the broadsheet newspaper Vedomosti reported in September 2014 that the Ministry 

of Finance had prepared a “mobilization” budget for 

2015-2017, to attempt to balance the budget or have a 

budget deficit no larger than 0.6 percent of GDP under 

the conditions of declining oil prices and an economic 

slowdown that is causing budget shortfalls. This includes drawing on reserve funds (spending up to 14 

percent of the fund) and exchanging foreign debt for 

internal debt where possible, raising the required levels of contributions to the Medical Insurance Fund, 
17

freezing pension allowances for military veterans, a 

ban on indexing the salaries of federal employees, and 

the possibility of invoking the right to use money generated by the prison system.33 At the same time, there 

has been a shift to increased prioritization of defense 

expenditure and investment in the military-industrial 

complex as an engine for the economy, and a reorientation of planning toward program-based budgets. 

Similarly, pressure is being brought to bear on budget 

excesses, as official figures estimated that a failure to 

comply with budgetary laws cost 300 billion rubles in 

2012 alone (apart from the impact of corruption). In 

late-2013, nearly 30,000 officials were being investigated and sanctioned for such violations.34

Concurrently, there are a number of practical measures being conducted by the leadership to strengthen 

and consolidate the political system and ensure that 

the May decrees are implemented. Again, Vedomosti

has suggested that the leadership was increasing pressure on the government and civil service, even demanding a “mobilization” speed of fulfillment of its 

instructions—that 100 percent of instructions had to be 

implemented on time. It is noteworthy that since 2012, 

several ministers have been fired—or have had their 

resignations quickly accepted—as a result of Putin’s 

unhappiness with their performance in implementing the May decrees. The leadership has sought to 

improve direct and indirect manual control—the micromanagement of the implementation of tasks. This 

has been reflected in Putin chairing a regular series 

of expanded government meetings to monitor implementation. At the same time, the leadership has conducted an ongoing rotation of personnel to strengthen 

the vertical of power to provide a better alignment of 

power. In strategically important regions, there is now 
18

an alignment of presidential plenipotentiaries, ministers, and regional governors—in effect, a triple vertical of power.

The leadership has also established a number of 

“para-institutional” bodies such as the All-Russian 

Popular Front (ONF) to create a direct link between 

the authorities and society. Created in May 2011 as a 

civil volunteer organization in support of Vladimir 

Putin, the ONF appears to have gained strength and 

its role has considerably evolved; it was relaunched 

as a movement in June 2013. Its goal is to promote 

unity, civil solidarity, and Russia’s development as a 

free, strong, and sovereign state. It enjoys the explicit 

support of Putin, is directed from the Kremlin, and 

now stretches across the country with senior members 

occupying important roles—such as Alexander Galushka, who was appointed Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East in September 2013. The 

practical elements of ONF’s remit have considerably 

broadened. It contributes to the formulation of plans 

and monitors their implementation, often putting 

pressure on regional governors, even taking a leading 

role in petitioning Putin for their removal if they fail to 

implement instructions. It is also responsible for conducting an anti-corruption campaign with oversight 

of municipal and state property privatization. The 

ONF has also played a noteworthy role in the “patriotic mobilization” since 2014, for instance organizing 

the “We’re Together” demonstrations at the time of 

the annexation of Crimea.

There are also preparatory measures being implemented in the military and security spheres. Expenditure on defense and security has been significantly 

increased since 2011, and targets set in the May decrees indicate the scale of investment that is neces-
19

sary. Two of the May decrees are focused on the 

military—one addressing necessary improvements 

to military service, the other on implementing plans 

for developing the armed forces and modernizing the 

military-industrial complex. The former decree seeks 

to provide improved conditions for service members, 

raise the prestige and appeal of service, and create a 

national reserve “in line with the concept of creating 

a new system of training and accumulating mobilization resources for the armed forces.”35

The latter decree announces a major plan to modernize military equipment and conditions, replacing 

Soviet-era weapons and the defense industry. The 

spending program envisaged, for instance, increasing 

the share of modern armaments, military, and special 

technologies to 70 percent by 2020, with further development to 2025 envisaged. Strategic nuclear forces for 

deterrence remain the main priority, and the nuclear 

arsenal is to receive new Topol-M and RS24 Yars missiles, new submarines, and modernized Tu-160 and 

Tu-195MS bombers.36 (Though the May decrees emphasized these aims, it is important to note that an 

increase in arms procurement had begun in earnest in 

2010, and in 2011, a state arms program had framed 

the re-armament of the armed forces by 2020.)

There is an extensive and ambitious “shopping 

list,” including procurement for sea, land, air and 

space, communications, intelligence and control systems, electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicle systems, robotic strike systems, modern transit aviation, 

precision weapons, and the means to fight them and 

individual soldier defense systems.37 The list includes 

400 Intercontinental and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBM and SSBM), eight nuclear-powered 

ballistic missile submarines, 20 multipurpose subma-
20

rines and 50 major surface vessels, 100 military satellites, 600 fixed-wing aircraft, 1000 helicopters, 2,300 

tanks, 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems, 7,000 military vehicles, 56 S-400 air defense battalions, and 10 

Iskander-M tactical missiles brigades. Some have noted that these plans are “too optimistic, assuming no 

delays, technical or design problems or bottlenecks,” 

and are tantamount to a “wish list,” and that what is 

stated as “is being purchased” or “will be delivered” is 

“not necessarily what will definitively be acquired.”38

To be sure, Western sanctions, economic stagnation, ongoing high levels of corruption, and limited 

capacity in the defense industry have combined to 

cause delays, and there are clearly a range of ongoing problems as suggested by the collapse of the army 

barracks at a paratrooper training camp (killing 23 

soldiers) and the crashes of nine military aircraft (so 

far) in 2015. Nevertheless, as noted above, Gerasimov 

has suggested that given the challenges Russia faces, 

possession of state of the art weaponry is a “vital condition for the country’s existence,” and despite a slow 

start, progress is being made in procurement. Russia 

is also seeking alternatives to Western technological 

supply, particularly from Asia to compensate for or 

mitigate the effects of the sanctions. Thus, at the end 

of 2014, official statements suggested that 30 percent 

of the armed forces inventory had been modernized—

roughly in line with Gerasimov’s statement of early 

2013.39

While defense and security investment is an important element of modernization and preparation to face 

the arc of crisis, the Russian leadership has also sought 

to test and improve the system through an extensive 

series of exercises. Measures are being prepared to 

ensure the Interior Ministry’s readiness to deal with 
21

internal threats, including testing through large-scale 

exercises. In April 2015, there was a strategic level 

exercise (“Zaslon-2015”) of police, Interior Ministry 

troops, and other paramilitary forces to prepare in 

case of a deterioration of the situation in the Russian 

regions and to cope with new threats to Russian internal security. The 8-day exercises were held under 

the command of Colonel-General Viktor Zolotov, 

first deputy minister of the interior and head of Interior Ministry troops,40 in the North-Western, Central, 

Volga, North Caucasus, Southern, and Crimean Federal Districts, and included joint operations to seal the 

borders and ensure law and order, territorial defense, 

counter terrorism, and the protection of strategic sites. 

A particular focus was to address civil disobedience 

and an attempted “color revolution.” Indeed, Interior 

Ministry spokesman Vasiliy Panchenkov stated that 

the exercises were “based on events that took place 

in the recent past in a neighboring country” and included “all the attributes of those events.”41

Mobilization measures are also visible in the military. According to Gerasimov, for instance, in January 

2014, the Russian General Staff received additional 

powers for the coordination of federal organs and, 

“just in case,” a range of measures have been developed to “prepare the country for the transition to conditions of war.”42 The Security Council and the Ministry of Defense have turned to think about responding 

to “color revolutions,” including conducting research 

studying the technologies of their spread, the methods 

of counteracting them, and framing proposals to offer 

military training courses in opposing political revolts 

to university students.
22

At the same time, a new National Defense Center 

had been built. Opened in December 2014, the center 

is a new federal level organization that is a major upgrade of the Central Command of the General Staff 

and provides a single point of coordination for information and control. It is meant to monitor military 

assets, including arms procurement and communications, and threats to national security in peacetime. It 

also has assumed monitoring control of major exercises.43 In case of war, it would become a communication 

hub and assume control of the country, which would 

involve providing reports to the military command 

and orders for all ministries, agencies, state companies, and other organizations. Lieutenant General 

Mikhail Mizintsev, who commands the Center, stated 

that its construction was one of the most important 

recent military projects. The closest analogy in recent 

times to describe its functions, he suggested, was the 

Commander-in-Chief Headquarters during the Second World War, which “centralized all controls of the 

military machine and the economy of the nation in the 

interests of the war.”44

The military itself has also been put through numerous no-notice exercises from the tactical to strategic level to test readiness and responsiveness, and coordination between the military, federal, and regional 

authorities. Noteworthy have been the Vostok-2013 

and Vostok-2014 exercises, the largest exercises for 

many years, which practiced combat training and 

long-distance deployments, marches with heavy 

weapons and regrouping, and the use of long-range 

precision weapons. The exercises have also sought to 

emphasize combined and joint operations.45

Exercises in the West have also taken place on a 

strategic scale: shortly before the Zaslon-2015 exer-
23

cises, major no-notice exercises were launched to test 

the battle-readiness of the northern fleet and its reinforcement from other military districts. The exercise 

appears to have been intended to send a message to 

NATO that Russia is ready for war and can counter the limited deployment of U.S. and other NATO 

forces to the Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.46 Indeed, though the exercises focused on the 

northern fleet, they also effectively covered most of 

Russia, drawing in forces from the Central, Southern, 

Western, and Eastern military districts, and involved 

the deployment of long-range aircraft and military 

transport aviation, strategic rocket forces, airborne 

forces, and marines. They were led by Gerasimov himself and Deputy Minister of Defense General Dmitry 

Bulgakov, with a special operational staff.47

CONCLUSIONS 

In a meeting of the expanded Security Council in 

July 2015, Putin stated that:

it is clear today that attempts to split and divide our 

society, play on our problems and seek out our vulnerable spots and weak links have not produced the 

results hoped for by those who imposed these restrictive measures on our country. 

He also noted, however, that:

recent events show that we cannot hope that some of 

our geopolitical opponents will change their hostile 

course any time in the foreseeable future. . . . We must 

respond accordingly to this situation of course and 

take additional systemic measures in all key areas. 
24

Thus, he proposed a rapid analysis and, based on this, 

adjusted the National Security Strategy and other strategic planning documents:

Our direct responsibility is to ensure reliable protection of Russia’s security in all areas and preserve 

our country’s social, political and economic stability. 

Much here will depend on consolidating the efforts of 

our state institutions and civil society and concentrating resources in priority areas.48

This statement illustrates and draws together many 

of the themes of this Letort Paper: in Moscow’s view, 

Russia is under pressure from external and internal 

risks and threats, and the Russian leadership is responding with a review of its strategic documentation 

and an attempt to consolidate society and concentrate 

resources. Moscow’s military campaign in Syria is in 

many ways the practical demonstration of Russia’s 

posture. It represents a continuation of the competition, even confrontation, with the West that erupted in 

Ukraine and Russia’s attempts to create a military capacity that is deployable across the world, both to prevent what Moscow sees as undesirable developments, 

such as a Western-led campaign of regime change in 

Syria, and to defend Russian interests. Indeed, the 

Syrian conflict is the first substantial demonstration of 

both Russia’s willingness and ability to conduct expeditionary warfare to another geographical region and 

of the improvements made in its air force and navy. 

The reasons for Russia’s involvement in Syria include 

the protection and stabilization of President Bashar 

al-Assad’s regime (from both Islamic fundamentalist 

terrorism and external attempts to weaken him) and 

to begin to address the problem of the Islamic State, 

which has not only stated its hostility to Russia, but 
25

has begun to increase its activity further afield, including in Eurasia. Russian observers also point to 

the attempt to create opportunities in relations with 

Western powers, not only France, but also the United 

States.49 Undoubtedly, there are risks for Moscow in 

this complex and fluid situation, most recently demonstrated by the shooting down of a Russian Su-24M 

by Turkey and the resultant dispute. At the same time, 

the campaign illustrates graphically the situation that 

Moscow finds itself in: an unstable international environment, in which military force will play an important role. 

Two main themes emerge. First, there is an increasingly obvious gulf in how security is perceived 

in the West and in Russia. Although some threat perceptions are roughly similar, Moscow draws different 

conclusions from its assessment of the current international environment: what the problems are and what 

causes them. Developments in Syria are only the most 

recent example. In some cases, this is the diametric opposite to those of Washington or Brussels, the result 

of different conclusions having been drawn from developments and different analyses influencing threat 

perceptions. In others, it is the result of Moscow’s geographical position altering priorities.

Furthermore, it is important to note that although 

many in the West date the “Russian threat” and Russian aggression to 2014 and the war in Ukraine, many 

of the Russian leadership’s concerns have roots that 

date back a decade or more, and are the consequence 

of Western adventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Libya, and Syria. This also throws important light on 

what has become known in the West as a “new Russian way of war”—often misleadingly called “hybrid 

war”—as deployed in Ukraine. As seen from Moscow, 
26

this is, in effect, the result of what they have learned 

about the changing nature of war as deployed by the 

United States and NATO. The difference in views is 

made stark: first, by the suggestions of the Russian 

leadership that the West itself is mobilizing; and second, by the idea that while the West anticipates expansive Russian aggression, the opposite is the case in 

Moscow, which appears to be preparing for a war that 

the Russian leadership thinks will be foisted upon it.

The second main theme concerns the recognition 

in Moscow that the Russian system does not effectively work. Although it is true that Moscow can deliver 

considerable political, economic, and military power, 

it is also the case that there are important limits to this 

power, such that the Russian leadership has concerns 

that the Russian system is not ready to face the test 

of war—a modern war that will test not only Russian 

military capability and sustainability, but also sociopolitical stability and cohesion. The Russian leadership thus faces numerous doubts and difficulties as it 

faces this arc of crisis around it and is well aware of 

the weaknesses of the Russian system. The economic 

stagnation so often remarked upon in the West is but 

one part of this; equally important are the problems of 

the generation of political power. Although Putin enjoys very high popularity ratings and has few realistic 

political competitors, he and his leadership team are 

very aware of the flaws in political structure within 

the state that impose limits on the ability to implement 

plans and respond to crises. 

It is in this dual environment of an external arc of 

crisis with concentric circles of instability, risk and 

threat, and domestic limitations that the leadership has 

begun to exert pressure on the system. This pressure 

is tantamount to a form of mobilization: a defensive 
27

state of emergency. It is important to note, however, 

that although it shares some common features, such as 

prioritizing economic planning, this is a new, 21st-century form of mobilization—it is not based on the mass 

mobilization of the population, since this is no longer 

either politically possible or militarily desirable given 

the nature of conflict. Instead, it focuses on attempts to 

consolidate the state and society, particularly through 

the establishment of movements such as the ONF, and 

to prepare the military to be able to face a range of 

21st-century threats, including through a major rearmament program. Some progress has undoubtedly 

been made, particularly in terms of modernizing the 

military and rehearsing its combat readiness. Perhaps 

the most important aspect of this, however, is the attempt to consolidate coordination between ministries 

and agencies, and the increasing prominence of organizations such as the Security Council, and establishment of others such as the National Defense Center. 

The further development of the National Defense 

Center and the publication in due course of the new 

National Security Strategy will shed important light on 

how the mobilization process is evolving.

Nevertheless, significant domestic problems remain. These, in part, are due to the ongoing heavy 

burden of Russia’s Soviet inheritance—both in terms 

of physical problems, such as an ageing infrastructure and the difficulties inherent in modernizing it, 

and also conceptual problems, such as resistance to 

reform from some parts of the armed forces to shifting away from the structures and methods of the 20th 

century (though this resistance appears increasingly 

to be coming from retired servicemen). Furthermore, 

given the economic situation, the pressure on the budget and competition for resources is high, which has 
28

meant that some spending plans, including in military procurement, have had to be postponed and the 

sustainability of military operations remains open to 

some question. Therefore, if Russia is better placed 

to address some of the concerns of the leadership, an 

array of problems remain.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The military and security implications of Russian 

mobilization processes for the United States are numerous and increasingly urgent, given that the tensions between the United States and Russia are likely 

to remain serious for the foreseeable future, and possibly deteriorate as other disputes (such as that over the 

U.S. ballistic missile program) compound it over the 

medium term. The war in Ukraine has ensured that 

some of the ramifications are obvious and are already 

under consideration in the U.S. Army, in the U.S. intelligence community, and more broadly across the body 

politic. Senior U.S. military figures have pointed to the 

potential threat Russia poses to the United States, its 

interests, and allies. But as noted above, it becomes 

increasingly important that this potential threat is understood in more granular terms so that it does not 

become a self-fulfilling security dilemma; that moves 

to deter further Russian aggression do not become 

provocative, resulting in a further escalation of tensions that the United States does not seek or for which 

the United States is not prepared.

The sensitivity and difficulty of accurately judging 

this is made clear by the suggestion noted above that 

the Russian leadership has concerns (publicly stated 

at the highest levels) about a Western mobilization, 

and the consequent need to protect the homeland and 
29

democracy. It is particularly important to ensure that 

Russia does not misinterpret signals from the United 

States and NATO—but to do so, clear and explicit 

signals will need to be sent to Moscow. Indeed, the 

United States will need to conduct a nuanced and sophisticated form of deterrence, one that is appropriate 

to the 21st-century environment. Nevertheless, while 

in theory this need for sending clear and unambiguous signals to Moscow about U.S. intentions is a basis for deterrence, it has been harder to generate and 

transmit such signals in practice. While senior figures 

in defense and the military point to Russia as a serious threat, others, including in the State Department, 

have disagreed: in July, John Kerry explicitly countered General Dunford’s assessment. Instead, according to a State Department official, Russia is a major 

power with whom the U.S. engages and cooperates 

on a number of issues despite disagreements.50 These 

mixed signals are likely to be confusing for a Russian 

audience.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has sought to 

frame an approach to Russia that is “strong and balanced”: strong because the United States is making investments in a military capability specifically intended 

to deter Russian forces and balanced in that he seeks 

to work with Russia on issues where geostrategic interests “as Putin perceives them” are “compatible.” 

He also suggested that the U.S. is: 

continuing to hold the door open in case Putin or his 

successors decide to go in the direction where I believe Russia’s long-term future lies, a future in which 

there are economic and political opportunities for the 

people there.51

However, success in such an approach will involve 

relearning some old skills about deciphering Russian 
30

political and military life, broadening and deepening 

the understanding about how Russia works beyond 

the focus on Putin and a few senior figures. This will 

mean reversing 2 decades of neglect of important areas of study such as the Russian military and security establishment and Russian political culture, and 

reinvesting resources in longer-term capabilities both 

in the intelligence (and counter-intelligence) community and in relevant parts of U.S. regionally aligned 

forces. The need for this has been emphasized by 

General Breedlove who noted, in April 2015, that his 

pool of experts on Russia had shrunk considerably 

since the Cold War. Thus, “critical gaps” had emerged 

in information gathering and analysis, meaning 

that Russian intentions and capabilities were poorly 

understood and had caught NATO by surprise.52

It also means that developing a more detailed understanding of how Moscow sees the world, of Russian threat perceptions, and of how and why they have 

evolved, is essential. This necessity was recently emphasized by Evelyn Farkas who stated that the United 

States needs to do a “better job of really understanding of what Russia and the Kremlin’s interests are.”53

Dr. Farkas, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense responsible for Russia, is widely described as 

having resigned in early November 2015 out of frustration with the failure of U.S. policy to adapt to the reality of relations with Russia. Much of the U.S. post-Cold 

War diplomacy with Russia has been conducted on 

the assumption that Russia is a potential partner, even 

on a longer-term trajectory toward joining the West, 

and that there are many interests in common between 

the United States and Russia. Yet, on many subjects, 

even those that appear to be “common,” the worldview is so different in Moscow that it may be difficult 

for Western politicians to believe that such views—
31

that the United States encircles Russia, for instance—

are sincerely held by many in the Russian leadership 

and security establishment. These perceptions and the 

disagreements, particularly in Euro-Atlantic security, 

are real. This is likely to become even more prominent 

in 2016, and NATO’s Warsaw summit is likely to be a 

testing time as the Alliance announces potential further enlargement and agreements on NATO’s missile 

defense program. Furthermore, this will develop an 

awareness of how signals will be interpreted in Russia 

as the United States seeks to enhance deterrence. The 

provision of economic and political support to states 

on Russia’s border to enhance their deterrence against 

a potential Russian threat is likely to be interpreted in 

Russia as threatening, or preparing the ground for a 

color revolution. 

A further necessity is weaving together analysis 

and policy across disciplines. The Russian military 

and security establishment will be the main focus for 

the U.S. military establishment, and it is important 

to conduct more detailed analysis of the evolution of 

military theory to correct misinterpretation of “new 

Russian hybrid war” and to understand the ongoing 

practical problems, doubts, and difficulties the Russian military leadership faces. This will also allow for a 

more sophisticated understanding of how the Russian 

military will evolve in the medium term, facilitating 

a policy response that can be based on anticipation, 

not just reaction to Russian moves. At the same time, 

further examination is required of how the military 

works in coordination with other elements of Russian power structures, including the interior ministry 

and other organizations such as the ONF, which are 

becoming increasingly important as the Russian state 

attempts to consolidate and develop resilience.
In brief, as the United States begins to respond to 

Russia in Europe by prepositioning equipment in Eastern Europe and by conducting increased exercises in 

the region financed by the European Reassurance Initiative, it should be aware of the escalatory possibilities inherent in the Russian view of the international 

environment. While the United States sees Russia posing a largely local or regional threat to Euro-Atlantic 

security, Moscow sees and is responding to a different 

world in which the United States poses an existential 

threat to the Russian leadership. 

ENDNOTES

1. “NATO and Russia: A New Strategic Reality: Remarks by 

Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow at the conference 

on ‘NATO after the Wales Summit,’ Cardiff University,” North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization website, Speeches and Transcripts, 

September 2, 2014, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112406.htm?selectedLocale=en.

2. Cheryl Pellerin, “Breedlove: Russia, Violent Extremism 

Challenge Europe,” DoD News, February 25, 2015, available from 

www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/604173.

3. General Martin E. Dempsey, The National Military Strategy 

of the United States of America: 2015, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 2015, p. 2; Paul Mcleary, “More Pentagon Generals 

Line Up to Proclaim Russia’s ‘Existential’ Threat to U.S.,” Foreign 

Policy, July 14, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/

more-pentagon-generals-line-up-to-proclaim-russia-existential-threatto-u-s/.

4. “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Anders 

Fogh Rasmussen following the second meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government during the NATO Wales Summit,” September 5, 2014, North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization website, Speeches and Transcripts, available 

from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112891.htm.

32
33

5. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “America, Europe and the Pacific,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 

at the Marines’ Memorial Club Hotel in San Francisco, July 10, 

2014, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_111659.

htm.

6. Mikhail Delyagin, Sergei Glaz’ev, and Andrei Fursov, 

Strategiya “bolshovo ryvka” (Strategy of a “Major Breakthrough”), 

Moscow: Algoritm, 2013. pp. 6-7; see also Alexander Prokhanov, 

Sergei Glaz’ev et al, Kholodnaya voina 2.0. Strategiya Russkoi pobediy

(Cold War 2.0. Strategy For Russian Victory), Moscow: Knizhni mir, 

2015.

7. Matthew Bodner, “Analyst: Russian Industry Faces Challenges Unique to ‘Putin’s Russia’,” Defense News, August 9, 2015, 

available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/

leaders/interviews/2015/08/09/interview-ruslan-pukhov-cast-russiadefense-industry-analyst/31105299/.

8. In the West, the proposals are often called the “Medvedev 

proposals,” because they were first noticed by Western observers 

when Medvedev gave his first major speech abroad as president 

in June 2008, and subsequently a draft treaty was published and 

circulated to other nations in the Euro-Atlantic security area in 

2009. The substance of the proposals, however, drew on ideas already publicly stated by both Putin and Sergei Ivanov, then the 

Defense Minister, before Medvedev’s presidency began.

9. “Intervyu Secretarya Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii N.P. Patrusheva” (“Interview with Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation N. P. Patrushev”), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 27, 2013, available from www.scrf.gov.ru/

news/809.html.

10. Dmitri Medvedev, Strategiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda (Strategy of National Security of the 

Russian Federation to 2020), Russian Federation, May 12, 2009, 

available from www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/99.html; for a review 

of the document, see Keir Giles, Russia’s National Security Strategy 

to 2020, NATO Defense College Review, June 2009, available from 

www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=6.
11. Cited in “Russia May be Drawn into Resource Wars in 

Future—Army Chief,” Russia Today, February 14, 2013, available 

from www.rt.com/politics/military-conflict-gerasimov-threat-196/.

12. Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), No. Pr.-2976, December 25, 2015, available 

from www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html.

13. “Soveshaniye poslov i postoyannikh predstavitelei Rossii” (“Conference of Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives”), July 1, 2015, available from kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46131.

14. “Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnovo Diskussionnovo Kluba 

‘Valdai’” (“Meeting of the International Discussion club ‘Valdai’”), October 24, 2014, available from kremlin.ru/events/president/

news/46860.

15. Terrorism remains a particular concern for the Russian 

leadership, as both an internal and external risk to Russia through 

the possibility of terrorist organizations and individuals undermining Russian sovereignty, and the growing threat of global 

terrorism, and its new manifestations under the conditions of insufficiently effective international cooperation. Voennaya doktrina 

Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), No. 

Pr.-2976.

16. “Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnovo Diskussionnovo Kluba ‘Valdai’” (“Meeting of the International Discussion Club 

‘Valdai’”).

17. Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), No. Pr.-2976.

18. “Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnovo Diskussionnovo Kluba ‘Valdai’” (“Meeting of the International Discussion club 

‘Valdai’”).

19. “O strategii natsionalnoi bezopasnosti SSHA” (“About the 

National Security Strategy of the USA”), Security Council, March 

23, 2015, available from www.scrf.gov.ru/news/865.html.

34
35

20. “Putin’s Ally Warns of ‘Color Revolutions’,” Sputnik, December 9, 2012, available from sputniknews.com/politics/20121209/178026189.html.

21. For an English language version, see “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” February 12, 2013, available from archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B

2E0039B16D. The concept does not explicitly mention either the 

“Arab Spring” or “color revolutions,” but the implication is clear.

22. “Rasshirennoe zasedanie kollegii MVD” (“Meeting of the 

expanded board of the Ministry of the Interior”), March 4, 2015, 

available from kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47776.

23. “Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnovo Diskussionnovo Kluba ‘Valdai’” (“Meeting of the International Discussion club

 ‘Valdai’”).

24. Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), No. Pr.-2976.

25. Cited in “Russia May be Drawn into Resource Wars in 

Future—Army Chief,” Russia Today.

26. “Genshtab poluchil dopolnitel’nie polnomochiya, podgotovil plan perekhoda RF na usloviya voennovo vremeni” (“The 

General Staff has Received Additional Powers, Prepared Plan for 

the Russian Federation’s Transition to Conditions of Wartime”), 

Newsru, January 25, 2014, available from www.newsru.com/arch/

russia/25jan2014/genshtab.html.

27. Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), No. Pr.-2976.

28. Mikhail Barabanov, “Russian Military Reform up to the 

Georgian Conflict” and “Changing the Force and Moving Forward After Georgia,” in Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, 

eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, 

Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2014. pp. 88-9, 119-121. 
36

29. “Poslanie prezidenta Federalnomy Sobraniyu” (“Presidential address to the Federal Assembly”), December 12, 2012, 

available from kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118.

30. For an overview, see Andrew Monaghan, Defibrillating the 

Vertikal: Putin and Russian Grand Strategy, Chatham House, London, UK, Research Paper, October 7, 2014, available from https://

www.chathamhouse.org/publication/defibrillating-vertikal-putin-andrussian-grand-strategy.

31. “Ni odin iz maiskikh ukazov prezidenta ne vypolnen” 

(“Not One of the President’s May Decrees Has Been Fulfilled”), 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 3, 2014. A year later, others who were 

monitoring the orders were reporting that most of the instructions 

were only implemented on paper, in effect boxes were ticked 

rather than producing any practical results. “ONF: 80 protsentov maiskikh ukazov Vladimira Putina vypolneni lish formalno” 

(“ONF: 80 percent of Vladimir Putin’s May Decrees are Fulfilled 

Only on Paper”), OTR-Online, May 13, 2015, available from www.

otr-online.ru/news/onf--protsentov-43921.html.

32. “Reiting Putina upersya v protestniy elektorat” (“Putin’s 

Rating has Come up Against A Protest Electorate”), Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, April 1, 2015.

33. “Minfin vnes v pravitel’stvo mobilizatsionniy byudzhet” 

(“The Ministry of Finance has Brought a Mobilization Budget to 

the Government”), Vedomosti, September 17, 2014.

34. “Zasedaniye gosudarstvennovo soveta” (“Meeting of the 

State Council”), October 4, 2013, available from www.kremlin.ru/

news/19359.

35. “O dalneishem sovershenstvovanii voennoi sluzhby v 

Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (“About the Further Improvement of Military Service in the Russian Federation”), Ukaz No.604, May 7, 

2012, available from gubernator96.ru/article/show/id/108.

36. “O realizatsii planov (programm) stroitelstvo i razvitiya 

Vooruzhonnikh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, drugikh voisk, voinskikh 

formirovanii i organov i modernizatsii oboronno-promyshlennovo komplexa” (“About the Realization of Plans (Programs) of 
37

Construction and Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Forces, Military Formations and Organs, 

and the Modernisation of the Defense-Industry Complex”), Ukaz 

No. 603, May 7, 2012, available from gubernator96.ru/article/show/

id/108; cited in “Russia May be Drawn into Resource Wars in Future—Army Chief,” Russia Today.

37. “O realizatsii planov (programm) stroitelstvo i razvitiya 

Vooruzhonnikh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, drugikh voisk, voinskikh formirovanii i organov i modernizatsii oboronno-promyshlennovo komplexa” (“About the Realization of Plans (Programs) of Construction and Development of the Armed Forces 

of the Russian Federation, Other Forces, Military Formations and 

Organs, and the Modernisation of the Defense-Industry Complex”), Ukaz No. 603.

38. Stephen Gilbert, rapporteur, Russian Military Modernization, Draft General Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee, No. 064 STC 15 E, 

March 24, 2015, pp. 2-3, available from www.nato-pa.int/Default.

asp?SHORTCUT=3706#STC.

39. Cited in “Russia May be Drawn into Resource Wars in 

Future—Army Chief,” Russia Today.

40. Viktor Zolotov was head of Putin’s personal security service from 1999 to 2013.

41. Panchenkov cited in Tom Parfitt, “Russian troops practise 

quelling Ukrainian-style revolution,” The Telegraph, April 9, 2015. 

42. “Genshtab poluchil dopolnitel’nie polnomochiya, podgotovil plan perekhoda RF na usloviya voennovo vremeni” (“The 

General Staff has Received Additional Powers, Prepared Plan for 

the Russian Federation’s Transition to Conditions of Wartime”), 

Newsru.

43. “Prikaz postupit iz Tsentra” (“The Order will Come from 

the Center”), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 27, 2014. 

44. “Russia Launches ‘Wartime Government’ HQ in Major 

Military upgrade,” Russia Today, December 1, 2014, available from 

www.rt.com/news/210307-russia-national-defence-center/.
38

45. “Russian Eastern Military District Getting Ready for Strategic Exercise,” Sputnik News, April 20, 2014, available from sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014_04_20/Russian-Eastern-Military-District-getting-ready-for-strategic-exercise-3484/.

46. “Novoe strategicheskoe komandovanie na base severnovo 

flota podverglos vnezapnoi proverke” (“The New Strategy Command at the Northern Fleet’s Base Underwent a Snap Exercise”), 

Vedomosti, March 17, 2015.

47. “Ministr oboroni Rossii general armii Sergei Shoigu 

provyol zaslushivaniye o khode vnezapnoi proverki boegotovnosti” (“Russian Minister of Defence Army General Sergei 

Shoigu Conducted a Hearing about the Progress of Snap Exercises for Military Readiness”), March 18, 2015, available from function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12010701@egNews.

48. “Zasedaniye soveta bezopasnosti” (“Meeting of the Security Council”), July 3, 2015, available from kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49862.

49. Ruslan Pukhov, “The Russian Military Campaign in Syria: 

The Balance of Forces and Possible Risks,” Valdai Discussion Club 

website, October 14, 2015, available from valdaiclub.com/news/therussian-military-campaign-in-syria-the-balance-of-forces-and-possiblerisks/.

50. David Brunnstrom, “Kerry doesn’t view Russia as existential threat: State Department,” Reuters, July 10, 2015, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/10/us-usa-defense-dunford-state-id

USKCN0PK27120150710#iICmBY8ZmkwwpumU.97.

51. “The Scholar as Secretary: A Conversation With Ashton 

Carter,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5, September-October 2015, 

pp. 75-6.

52. Joe Gould, “Breedlove: Russia Intel Gaps ‘Critical’,” Defense News, April 30, 2015, available from securityassistance.org/

content/breedlove-russia-intel-gaps-critical.

53. Austin Wright, “Pentagon’s top Russia expert pushed 

tougher policy,” Politico, November 4, 2015, available from www.

politico.com/story/2015/11/evelyn-farkas-russia-pentagon-215517.
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