alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2018381EN.01002401.xml

| 22.10.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 381/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.10.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 381/24

---

Order of the General Court of 19 July 2018 — Front Polisario v Council

(Case T-180/14) (1)

((Action for annulment - Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco - Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities provided for in that agreement - Act concluding the agreement - Applicability of the agreement and protocol to the territory of Western Sahara and the waters adjacent thereto - Lack of standing to bring proceedings - Inadmissibility))

(2018/C 381/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia-el-Hamra et du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) (represented by: G. Devers, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Kyriakopoulou, A. de Elera-San Miguel Hurtado and A. Westerhof Löfflerová, acting as Agents)

Party intervening in support of the defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouquet, F. Castillo de la Torre and E. Paasivirta, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of, first, Council Decision 2013/785/EU of 16 December 2013 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (OJ 2013 L 349, p. 1) and, second, Commission Decision (EU) 2018/393 of 12 March 2018 approving, on behalf of the European Union, amendments to the Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (OJ 2018 L 69, p. 60).

Operative part of the order

The Court orders:

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | The Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia-el-Hanra et du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) shall pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by the Council of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia-el-Hanra et du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) shall pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by the Council of the European Union.

| 3. | The European Commission shall bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The European Commission shall bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 184, 6.6.2014.

---
38934.

#### DEICH *et al.*v. AMERICAN DISCOUNT COMPANY.

Decided September 5, 1961.

*309*Crawford, L&eb •& Calhoun, Ralph L. Crawford,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Kennedy & Sognier, John G. Kennedy, Jr.,*contra.

Nichols, Judge.

The defendant in error has made a motion to dismiss the writ of error because of numerous “changes” in the judge’s certificate on the bill of exceptions. These changes involve the date of tender as well as the date of certification. Each change was made in pen and ink, and under the decisions in the cases of *Crawford v. Cook,*48 Ga. App. 456 (1) (173 SE 187); and *Fairfax Loan &c. Co. v. Turner,*49 Ga. App. 300 (2) (175 SE 267), where the dates last shown were within the time provided for such tender and certification, the remedy of the defendant in error, if such changes were alterations made after the certificate by the trial court, is a suit in equity to set aside any adverse judgment obtained from this court by fraud. See *Wade v. Watson,*133 Ga. 608 (66 SE 922), and citations. Accordingly the motion to dismiss must be denied.

The original traverse was filed on July 19, 1960, and the motion to dismiss such traverse was filed February 21, 1961. Thereafter, on March 1, 1961, the amendment to the traverse was allowed “subject to objection” and on March 3, 1961, the first *310judgment sustaining the motion to dismiss and dismissing the traverse was entered. No renewal of the motion to dismiss appears in the record, and the amendment, being a material amendment, opened the traverse to renewed attack by general demurrer, or motion to dismiss in the nature of a general demurrer.

In *Hunter v. Ogletree,*212 Ga. 38 (89 SE2d 891), the Supreme Court said: “Where a general demurrer is filed to a petition, and subsequently material amendments to the petition are allowed and filed subject to objections, the questions raised by such demurrer become moot; and when the original general demurrer is not renewed to the petition as amended, nor any new demurrers filed to the petition as amended, it is error to sustain the original general demurrer and dismiss the petition as amended.” In that case the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language from *Head v. Lee,*203 Ga. 191, 197 (45 SE2d 666): “The demurrer, not having been renewed to the petition as amended, was no longer before the court, and therefore it was erroneous to render the judgment complained of.”

In *Stone v. Richardson,*76 Ga. 97, the. Supreme Court held that a traverse of a sheriff’s return is amendable at a time subsequent to the time at which it is filed.

Accordingly, the traverse was an amendable pleading, and when the material amendment was filed the motion to dismiss became moot and the judgment sustaining such motion was error.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
From: Lapcevic, Joseph P

To: Jordan, Ronald

Cc: Thomas Finseth; Schroeder, Cuc; Flanders, Phillip; Cannon, William E

Subject: RE: Available for a short call on Monday?

Date: Monday, June 02, 2014 10:21:48 AM

Ron,

I reviewed my original raw data download and in regards to question # 1 below, the

values on the 5/13/2014 spreadsheet are correct (12.2, 42.4, 14.4, & 17). My original download file had data in both ng/L and ug/L. I assume I made an error with the

conversion my first time through on these 4 samples.

Regarding question #3, the correct dates are 11/29/2012; 12/19/2012; & 12/21/2012.

It appears I moved the data for the three samples in those two columns (Hg 245.1 &

As 200.8) down an extra three rows, which misaligned the collection/sample dates.

I have no explanation for question # 2. I left a message for Randy Jones and will try to contact a few others that are still around that may have a recollection of what may

have been happening during that time frame (2/28/2012 through 4/3/2012, plus

6/5/2012).  Hopefully, I’ll have more to report during our 2:30pm call today.

Joe Lapcevic

Supervisor, Water Permitting

(724) 838 – 6099 work

(234) 678 – 2385 fax

FirstEnergy Corp.

800 Cabin Hill Drive

Greensburg, PA 15601-1689

From: Jordan, Ronald [mailto:Jordan.Ronald@epa.gov] 

Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2014 12:20 PM

To: Lapcevic, Joseph P

Cc: Thomas Finseth; Schroeder, Cuc; Flanders, Phillip

Subject: Available for a short call on Monday?

Joe,

Are you available for a short call on Monday? We have just a few more questions, including these

listed below:

1. Comparing the data you provided on 5/2/2014 and 5/13/2014, we observed apparent data

entry errors. Please specify which values for mercury Chem Precip Effluent are correct.

Date 5/2/2014 dataset

(Hg, ng/L)

5/13/2014 dataset

(Hg, ng/L)

12/20/2011 122 12.2

1/3/2012 424 42.4

2/2/2012 144 14.4

2/21/2012 170 17

2. What is the cause for elevated mercury concentrations for Chem Precip Effluent on the

following dates?

 
a. 2/28/2012 (1520 ng/L)

b. 3/13/2012 (1160 ng/L)

c. 3/20/2012 (1710 ng/L)

d. 3/27/2012 (1320 ng/L)

e. 4/3/2012 (3400 ng/L)

f. 6/5/2012 (830 ng/L)

3. We noticed dates for Method 245.1 (mercury) data and Method 200.8 (arsenic) data

changed between your original spreadsheet provided 2/20/2014 and the updated

spreadsheets provided 5/2/2014 and 5/13/2014. Specifically, the 2/20/2014 spreadsheet

shows the 245.1 and 200.8 data on 12/18/12, 1/4/13, and 1/8/13; the 5/2/2014

spreadsheet shows these data on 11/29/12, 12/19/12, and 12/21/12. Which dates are

correct?

The information contained in this message is intended only for the

personal and confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. If the

reader of this message is not the intended recipient or an agent

responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby

notified that you have received this document in error and that any

review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly

prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify

us immediately, and delete the original message.
##### 



Exhibit 10.1
 THE TIMBERLAND COMPANY
2008 EXECUTIVE LONG TERM INCENTIVE PROGRAM
 (effective 1/1/08)




---



##### 



1. Purpose
 2. Definitions
         1




---



##### 



3. Administration
 4. Participation.
 2




---



##### 



Schedule A
 5. Awards Schedule B
 6. Performance Measure and Goals Schedule C
 7. Award Payout Calculation
   3




---



##### 



8. Award Payment
  Approval of Payment
  Vesting
  11. Agreements
  12 Employment.
  4




---



##### 



THE TIMBERLAND COMPANYBy:
    /s/ JOHN P. PAZZANIIts Corporate Culture Officer 5




---



##### 



Schedule A  Participants




---



##### 



Schedule B  Awards
  Threshold
    
    
    
    
    
    Target
    
    MaximumParticipant
    
    80% of Budget
    
    Budget
    
    125% of Budget
    
    150% of BudgetJ. Swartz
    
    $
    625,000
    
    
    $
    1,250,000
    
    
    $
    2,500,000
    
    
    $
    3,750,000C. Welsh
    
    $
    187,500
    
    
    $
    375,000
    
    
    $
    750,000
    
    
    $
    1,125,000M. Harrison
    
    $
    187,500
    
    
    $
    375,000
    
    
    $
    750,000
    
    
    $
    1,125,000G. McCarthy
    
    $
    187,500
    
    
    $
    375,000
    
    
    $
    750,000
    
    
    $
    1,125,000J. Crimmins
    
    $
    62,500
    
    
    $
    125,000
    
    
    $
    250,000
    
    
    $
    375,000




---



##### 



Schedule C  Performance Measures and Goals
 PerformanceAward Period
    
    Measure
    
    Threshold
    
    Budget
    
    Target
    
    Maximum1/1/08 - 12/31/08
    
    Net Income
    
    80% of Budget
    
    Budget*
    
    125% of Budget
    
    150% of Budget
 
 *
    
    The dollar amounts representing Budget, 80% of Budget, 125% of Budget and 150% of Budget are
set forth in section 2, page 15, of the Executive Compensation materials provided to the
Committee for its March 4, 2008 meeting. 2
39222.

#### RIDDLE v. THE STATE.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

The defendant was convicted of having abandoned his minor child and thereafter his motion for new trial, as amended, was overruled. Error is now assigned on such judgment adverse to him.

1. The first special ground contends that a quoted charge should have been given even without request. Such charge, if it had been given, would have been tantamount to a directed verdict of not guilty for it would have instructed the jury to acquit the accused if the abandonment took place before or after the child was conceived. Such ground is without merit.

2. In the case of Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 596 (81 SC 756, 5 LE 783), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in *Ferguson v. State,*215 Ga. 117 (109 SE2d 44), and held: “We therefore hold that, in effectuating the provisions of § 38-415, Georgia, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment could not; in the context of § 38-416, deny appellant the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement. We decide no more than this.” Accordingly, the assignment of error in the second special ground of the amended *857motion for new trial, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant’s statement was not under oath and not subject to cross-examination is without merit, and is not, as contended by the defendant, controlled by the above decisión of the U. S. Supreme Court. See *Code*§§ 38-415, 38-416. No question as to the right of the accused to be questioned by his counsel is presented.

Decided November 16, 1961

Rehearing denied November 27,1961.

*Casey Thigpen,*for plaintiff in error.

*Thomas A. Hutcheson, Solicitor,*contra.

3. In the case of *Bailey v. State,*214 Ga. 409, 413 (105 SE2d 320), the Supreme Court held: “Under the act of 1956 (Ga. L. 1956, p. 800), and the rulings of this court in *Bull v. State,*80 Ga. 704, and *Brown v. State,*122 Ga. 568 . . . the father of an illegitimate child may abandon the mother and the child immediately after it is conceived. He cannot, however, be convicted of abandonment unless he shall fail to ‘furnish sufficient food and clothing for the needs of the child’ . after its birth.” The evidence in the present case authorized a finding that the accused was the father of the illegitimate child, that he had abandoned the child immediately after it was conceived and failed, after the birth of the child, to furnish sufficient food and clothing for the needs of the child. The conviction was authorized and the judgment overruling the motion for new trial was not error for any reason assigned.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*
#### Steven C. Lee *v.*Charles S. Marshall et al.

*George D. Constantikes*and *Stephen L. Fine,*in support of the petition for expeditious appeal.

Submitted October 21

decided October 28, 1969

The petition by the plaintiff for an expedited appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County, purportedly filed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, having been considered by this court pursuant to Practice Book § 762, as amended, is dismissed because it fails to disclose error which would constitute good cause for granting the petition.
# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 08, 2019 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A19A1352. DEVAUGHN PATRICK FOLEY v. THE STATE.

The appellant in this case failed to comply with the notice of docketing mailed by this Court and with Court of Appeals Rule 23 (a), regarding the filing of an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days after the appeal was docketed. See also Court of Appeals Rule 13. On February 22, 2019, this Court ordered the appellant to file an enumeration of errors and a brief no later than March 04, 2019. As of the date of this order, the appellant's enumeration of errors and brief still have not been filed. Accordingly, this appeal is deemed abandoned and is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7, 23 (a). Because procedural deficiencies have deprived the appellant of the right of appellate review, the appellant is hereby informed of the following in accordance with Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (452 SE2d 756) (1995): This Court has dismissed your appeal because an enumeration of errors and a brief have not been filed on your behalf as required. If this failure occurred while you were represented by legal counsel and was due to your appellate counsel's failure to perform the duties of appellate counsel, and if you still wish to appeal, you may file a motion in the trial court for permission to pursue an out-of-time appeal. If the trial court grants your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days from the filing date of the order granting your motion to file in the trial court a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. If the trial court denies your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days from the filing date of the order denying your motion to file in the trial court a notice of appeal from that order.Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 08, 2019. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the appellant as well as to the appellant's attorney of record, if any. The appellant's attorney is also directed to send a copy of this order to the appellant.
#### Patricia Coutu et al. *v.*The American Propane Corporation

*John R. FitzGerald,*and *William W. Sprague,*in support of the motion,

*Thomas J. Hagarty*and *Joseph T. Sweeney,*in opposition.

Submitted January 30

decided February 19, 1969

The motion by the third-party defendant to vacate the order of the Superior Court in New London County opening judgment is denied.
EXHIBIT 12

                            PSEG ENERGY HOLDINGS INC.
               Computation of Ratios of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                             (thousands of dollars)

                                                         For the Nine Months
                                                         Ended September 30,
                                                        2002             2001
                                                     ----------       ----------
Earnings as Defined in
  Regulation S--K (A):
Pre-tax income from Continuing
  Operations .................................       $(423,380)       $ 143,656
(Income)/Loss from equity investees
  net of distributions .......................         (33,943)         (42,098)
Fixed Charges ................................         177,876          136,566
Amortization of capitalized interest .........             718              355
Capitalized interest .........................         (10,271)         (13,637)
                                                     ---------        ---------
Earnings .....................................       $(289,000)       $ 224,842
                                                     =========        =========

Fixed Charges as Defined in
  Regulation S--K (B):
Total interest expensed
  and capitalized ............................         176,553          135,304
Interest in rental expense ...................           1,323            1,262
                                                     ---------        ---------
Total Fixed Charges ..........................       $ 177,876        $ 136,566
                                                     =========        =========
Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges ...........           (1.62)            1.65
                                                     =========        =========

(A)   The term  "earnings"  shall be defined as pre-tax  income from  continuing
      operations before adjustment for minority interests or income or loss from
      equity investees.  Add fixed charges adjusted to exclude (a) the amount of
      any  interest   capitalized   during  the  period,   (b)  amortization  of
      capitalized interest and (c) distributed income of equity investees.  From
      the total, subtract interest capitalized.

(B)   Fixed Charges represent (a) interest, whether expensed or capitalized, (b)
      amortization of debt discount, premium and expense, and (c) an estimate of
      interest implicit in rentals.
39024.

#### KINNEY v. BELL.

Eberhardt, Judge.

Service or a waiver or acknowledgment of service pursuant to *Code*§ 6-911, as amended (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 456) or *Code*§ 6-912 of a bill of exceptions within ten days after the same has been certified by the trial judge is essential to give this court jurisdiction of the writ of error. *Folsom v. Rountree Grocery Co.,*89 Ga. App. 662 (80 SE2d 492) and cases cited therein. Where, as here, *399it does not appear that the certified bill of exceptions has been served, or that there has been an acknowledgment or waiver of service, a motion to dismiss the writ of error will be sustained. *Folsom v. Rountree Grocery Co.,*supra.

Decided September 21, 1961.

*Wilbur B. Nall,*for plaintiff in error.

*Robert H. Herndon, James M. Watts,*contra.

*Writ of error dismissed.*

*Carlisle, P. J. and Nichols, J. concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7733 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7733

   To amend section 236A of the Immigration and Nationality Act with 
 respect to the requirement to cross reference the terrorist screening 
                               database.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 19, 2024

   Mr. Williams of Texas (for himself, Mr. Posey, Mr. Biggs, and Mr. 
   Johnson of South Dakota) introduced the following bill; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend section 236A of the Immigration and Nationality Act with 
 respect to the requirement to cross reference the terrorist screening 
                               database.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Identifying Potential Terrorist at 
the Border Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT TO REVIEW FEDERAL TERRORIST SCREENING DATABASE.

    Section 236A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1226A) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(3)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; or'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at 
                the end and insert ``; or''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(C) is on the terrorist screening database.''; 
                and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(d) Requirement To Review Federal Terrorist Screening Database.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commissioner of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection shall take into and maintain custody over 
an alien until the Commissioner cross references the name of such alien 
with the terrorist screening database and a result for such cross 
reference is received by the Commissioner.
    ``(e) Terrorist Screening Database Defined.--In this section, the 
term `terrorist screening database' shall have the meaning given such 
term in section 2101 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2014071EN.01002502.xml

| 8.3.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 71/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.3.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 71/25

---

Action brought on 7 January 2014 — Mogyi Kft. v OHIM

(Case T-9/14)

(2014/C 71/47)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant(s): Mogyi Kft. (Csávoly, Hungary) (represented by Zs. Klauber, lawyer)

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Form of order sought

| — | Order the publication of the trade mark application except as regards ‘bread, pastries, sugar’ (Class 30), and ‘agricultural products, seeds’ (Class 31). |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the publication of the trade mark application except as regards ‘bread, pastries, sugar’ (Class 30), and ‘agricultural products, seeds’ (Class 31).

Pleas in law and main arguments

Community trade mark concerned: the figurative mark containing the verbal elements ‘Just crunch it ...’ for goods and services in Classes 29, 30, 31 and 35 — Community trade mark application 10 716 711

Decision of the Examiner: Partial refusal to register

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Partial annulment of the contested decision by decision in Case R 1922/2012-1

Pleas in law: Breach of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009

---