LITTORAL COMBAT 

SHIP AND FRIGATE

Delaying Planned 

Frigate Acquisition 

Would Enable BetterInformed Decisions

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2017

GAO-17-323

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-323, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2017

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP AND FRIGATE

Delaying Planned Frigate Acquisition Would Enable 

Better-Informed Decisions

What GAO Found

The Navy’s current acquisition approach for its new frigate—a ship based on a 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design with minor modifications—requires Congress 

to make significant program decisions and commitments in 2017 without key

cost, design, and capability knowledge. In particular, the Navy plans to request 

authority from Congress in 2017 to pursue what the Navy calls a block buy of 12 

planned frigates and funding for the lead ship, which the Navy intends to award 

in 2018. Approval of these plans would effectively represent the final decision for 

the entire planned buy of 40 LCS and frigates. According to the Navy’s approved 

acquisition strategy, the frigates would still require annual appropriations, so

Congress would maintain its oversight through its annual appropriation 

decisions; however, any decision to reduce or delay the program, should that 

become warranted, could nevertheless be more difficult as the Navy may point to 

losses in favorable block buy prices, as has been done previously with LCS. 

The Navy’s impending request presents a key opportunity for Congress to affect 

the way forward for the frigate program by ensuring the Navy possesses 

sufficient knowledge on cost, design, and capability before authorizing an 

investment of a potential $9 billion for a program that

• has no current formal cost estimate—independent or otherwise,

• will not begin key detail design activities until late fiscal year 2018,

• has significant unknowns in regards to operational performance of the 

ship upon which its design will be based, and 

• based on the existing and planned shipyard workloads, has no industrial 

base imperative to begin construction in the Navy’s planned time frame.

The Navy’s previous frigate acquisition plans included achieving a higher degree 

of ship design knowledge before awarding the lead ship in fiscal year 2019, as 

the plans included significant detail design activities prior to contract award. As 

GAO has previously found, such an approach—which has been supported by 

shipbuilders—offers greater confidence in the understanding of design changes 

and how they will affect ship construction costs. Further, as GAO’s work on best 

practices for program cost estimates suggests, the Navy’s prior plans for frigate 

design efforts and an award in fiscal year 2019 would have provided more 

information on which to base a decision, including a better understanding of risks 

and costs. The previous plans also better aligned with LCS test plans to improve 

the department’s understanding of the operational capability and limitations for 

each ship variant. This knowledge could then be used to inform the Navy’s

decision on which LCS-based design for the frigate it will pursue. In addition to 

the valuable knowledge to be gained by not pursuing the frigate in the planned 

2018 time frame, the existing and planned LCS construction workload for both 

shipyards is another important factor to consider. Specifically, each shipyard has 

LCS construction demands that extend into 2021, suggesting no imperative for

the Navy to award the frigate in 2018. Delaying the frigate award until at least 

fiscal year 2019—when more is known about cost, design, and capabilities—

would enable better-informed decisions and oversight for this potential $9 billion 

taxpayer investment.

View GAO-17-323. For more information, 

contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or 

mackinm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy envisioned a revolutionary 

approach for the LCS program: dual 

ship designs with interchangeable 

mission packages intended to provide 

mission flexibility. This approach has 

fallen short, with significant cost 

increases, schedule delays, and

reduced capabilities—some of which 

have yet to be demonstrated. The LCS 

acquisition approach has changed

several times. The latest change led to

the frigate—a ship that involves minor 

modifications to an LCS design. 

The House report 114-537 for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision 

for GAO to examine the Navy’s plans 

for the frigate. This report examines 

the Navy’s plans for the frigate 

acquisition as well as remaining 

opportunities for oversight. To conduct 

this work, GAO reviewed 

documentation and interviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD) officials, 

and leveraged prior GAO reports on 

shipbuilding and acquisition best 

practices.

What GAO Recommends

Congress should consider not enacting 

authority pursuant to the Navy’s 

request for a block buy of 12 frigates in 

fiscal year 2018 and delaying funding 

of the lead frigate until at least fiscal 

year 2019, when more information is

available on the ship’s cost, design,

and capabilities. GAO also 

recommends that DOD delay its 

procurement plans until sufficient 

knowledge is attained. DOD partially 

concurred with the recommendation 

but is not planning to delay frigate 

procurement. GAO continues to 

believe the recommendation is valid.
Page i GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Letter 1

Background 2

Planned Frigate Capabilities Provide Improvements over LCS, but 

Will Likely Carry Forward Some LCS Design Limitations 5

Accelerated Frigate Acquisition Plans Require Significant 

Procurement Commitments Without Key Cost, Design, and 

Capability Knowledge 9

Conclusions 19

Matter for Congressional Consideration 20

Recommendation for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix II Selected GAO Recommendations for the Littoral Combat Ship and 

Frigate Programs 26

Appendix III Related GAO Products

27

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 29

Tables

Table 1: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Frigate 

Production as of January 2017 3

Table 2: Planned Frigate Capability Changes 7

Table 3: Changes in Frigate Acquisition Plans and Number of 

Ships, 2015-2016 12

Table 4: Assessment of Information Deficiencies in 2017 

Indicating That Planned Request for Congressional 

Decisions on Frigate Acquisition Is Premature 16

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Table 5: Selected GAO Recommendations for Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) and Frigate Programs and Department of 

Defense (DOD) Responses, 2005-2016 26

Figures

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Acquisition Strategy 

Evolution 4

Figure 2: Navy Block Buy Option Contract Modification Process 

for Frigate Procurement 11

Figure 3: Construction Demands for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Shipyards 18

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

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Page 1 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 18, 2017

Congressional Committees

The Navy initially envisioned a revolutionary approach to the Littoral 

Combat Ship (LCS) program. Unlike other surface combatant programs, 

LCS consists of two different ship design variants (called seaframes) built 

by two separate shipyards. The ships have interchangeable mission 

packages carrying equipment for three mission areas—surface warfare, 

anti-submarine warfare, and mine countermeasures. To execute the 

program, the Navy deviated from traditional shipbuilding acquisition in 

hopes of rapidly delivering ships to the fleet. The consequences of this 

approach are well known today—costs to construct the ships have more 

than doubled from initial expectations, with promised levels of capability 

unfulfilled and deliveries significantly delayed. Since 2014, two 

Secretaries of Defense have stepped in to address concerns with the 

combat capability of LCS. First, Secretary Chuck Hagel questioned the 

appropriate capability and quantity of the LCS in February 2014 and 

directed the Navy to re-evaluate its small surface combatant capability 

needs. Acknowledging capability and affordability concerns, the Navy—

with the Secretary of Defense’s approval—then changed course in late 

2014 to pursue an LCS with minor modifications, now called a frigate.1

Second, in December 2015 Secretary Ashton Carter, expressing concern 

that the Navy had prioritized ship quantities over delivering combat 

capability, directed the Navy to reduce the total purchase of LCS and 

frigates from 52 to 40 ships.

Today, with 28 LCS delivered, under contract, or funded, the Navy plans 

to wind down the LCS program—with the last contract awards expected 

in 2017—and pivot to acquisition of the frigate. In 2018, the Navy plans to 

select one of the two LCS shipbuilders—referred to as a downselect—to 

construct the frigate, and will ask Congress this year to authorize 

acquisition plans for 12 frigates and funding for construction of the lead 

ship. The House Armed Services Committee report on a bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a 

 1

The term “frigate” can be applied to ships of different sizes and capability. The nowretired Oliver Hazzard Perry-class frigate (FFG 7) was the last U.S. Navy frigate. 

Frigates—including the FFG 7—have been identified as typically being open-ocean, multirole ships capable of performing surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

provision for us to examine the Navy’s plans for the frigate.2 This report 

assesses (1) the extent to which the frigate’s planned capabilities offer 

improvements, if any, over the LCS; and (2) the Navy’s plans for the 

frigate acquisition as well as remaining opportunities for oversight.3

To conduct our work, we reviewed documentation from and interviewed 

Navy and other Department of Defense (DOD) officials responsible for 

overseeing LCS and frigate program management, design, development, 

acquisition, and testing. This included assessment of plans and activities 

related to LCS and the frigate. In addition, we leveraged from past GAO 

reports on the LCS program from 2005 through 2016, as well as from our 

broader work on Navy shipbuilding and acquisition reform initiatives. 

Details on prior recommendations related to LCS and the frigate that we 

made in previously issued reports are included in appendix II. 

Additionally, more details on the objectives, scope, and methodology for 

our past work can be found in the issued reports, which are cited in 

appendix III.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Under the current LCS program, two shipyards are building an equal 

number of two different versions of the LCS seaframe: Lockheed Martin 

builds the Freedom variant at Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette, 

Wisconsin, and Austal USA builds the Independence variant in Mobile, 

 2

H.R. Rep. No. 114-537, at 21 (2016).

3

In addition to this report, we also contributed to two Congressional hearings in December 

2016 on LCS and the frigate. GAO’s testimony statements are referenced in appendix III.

Background
Page 3 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Alabama.4 Table 1 shows the status of LCS seaframe acquisition, 

including the LCS with minor modifications, referred to as a frigate.

Table 1: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Frigate Production as of January 2017

Hull Status

LCS 1-8, 10 Delivered.

LCS 9, 11-26 Under contract and in various phases of construction or nearing construction; funded in 

fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

LCS 27-28 Congress authorized funding; contract awards planned in fiscal year 2017.

Frigate (formerly LCS 29-40) Navy currently intends to seek authority for what it refers to as a block buy approach to 

buy 12 frigates and plans to award the lead frigate in fiscal year 2018, with subsequent 

awards of one or two ships planned each year through fiscal year 2025.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy programmatic and budgetary data. | GAO-17-323

When the Navy first conceived of the LCS in the early 2000s, the concept 

was that two shipbuilders would build prototypes based on commercial 

designs. The Navy planned to experiment with these ships to determine 

its preferred design variant. This experimentation strategy was 

subsequently abandoned. The Navy determined that, based on cost 

considerations, it would be impractical to have the two competing 

shipyards build only one or two ships and then wait for the Navy to 

complete the period of experimentation before awarding additional 

contracts. Instead, the Navy opted to continue funding additional 

seaframes without having completed the planned period of discovery and 

learning. The Navy has made several other revisions to the LCS 

acquisition strategy over time, some in response to direction from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. These have included changes over 

time regarding whether the Navy would downselect to one seaframe 

design. Although it might be expected that a new acquisition concept 

would require some adjustments over time, the LCS program has evolved 

significantly since it began, as shown in figure 1.

 4

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for LCS 1 and the odd-numbered seaframes. For 

LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works was the prime contractor for the 

Austal USA-built ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming 

arrangement in 2010. Austal USA is the prime contractor for the remaining evennumbered seaframes. 
Page 4 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Acquisition Strategy Evolution

As figure 1 indicates, the Navy now plans to buy LCS with minor 

modifications, which it refers to as frigates. This change to the acquisition 
Page 5 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

strategy followed an analysis in 2014 by a Navy task force (known as the 

Small Surface Combatant Task Force) that was completed in response to 

direction from the then Secretary of Defense to identify options for a more 

capable small surface combatant.5

In seeking a frigate concept that would improve upon the capabilities 

provided by LCS, the Navy selected an LCS concept—referred to as a 

minor modified LCS. This concept, which Navy leadership believed would 

offer cost, schedule, and shipbuilding advantages, also was assessed as 

the least capable option considered for the LCS successor. The Navy has 

noted that the selected design provides some improvements, such as 

multi-mission and over-the-horizon missile capabilities, at a relatively 

lower cost than other options by leveraging the existing LCS shipyards 

and vendors. However, the Navy’s chosen frigate design will presumably 

carry forward some limitations inherent to its LCS origins, such as space 

limitations and equipment that has posed maintenance and logistics 

challenges.

The Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force charged with exploring 

alternatives to the LCS presented Navy leadership with a number of 

options, from which the Navy chose the option of a minor modified LCS 

based on cost, schedule, and industrial base stability factors. As we found 

in June 2016, the task force concluded that the Navy’s desired capability 

requirements could not be met without major modifications to an LCS 

design or utilizing other non-LCS designs.6 When presented with this 

conclusion, senior Navy leadership directed the task force to explore what 

capabilities might be more feasible on a minor modified LCS. In response 

to this direction, the task force created two additional LCS options with 

minor modifications. These options provided a multi-mission capability 

instead of the single-mission capability of LCS and retained the modular 

mission package characteristic of the LCS program (i.e., ability to more 

readily swap mission systems in and out). In developing these 

alternatives, the task force also found that it was feasible to permanently 

install an over-the-horizon missile to offer longer range surface warfare 

capability, plus a lightweight towed torpedo countermeasure and multi-

 5

GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and 

Frigate Acquisition Strategies, GAO-16-356 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016).

6

GAO-16-356.

Planned Frigate 

Capabilities Provide 

Improvements over 

LCS, but Will Likely 

Carry Forward Some 

LCS Design 

Limitations

Affordability and LCS 

Shipbuilding 

Considerations Were 

Prevailing Factors in 

Selecting Minor Modified 

LCS Design
Page 6 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

function towed array sonar to offer some anti-submarine warfare 

capability.7 However, these improvements would still need to be 

augmented by an LCS surface warfare or anti-submarine warfare mission 

package to provide the full suite of LCS capability. The task force found 

that it was not technically feasible to include additional vulnerability 

capabilities (i.e., capabilities to improve the ship’s ability to sustain battle 

damage and still perform its mission) beyond adding armor protection to 

some vital spaces. Task force documentation also stated that in 

developing these alternative LCS options with minor modifications, some 

capabilities, like speed, had to be traded.

Ultimately, the Navy chose—and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

approved—a frigate concept based on a minor modified LCS, despite the 

task force’s findings that it was the least capable small surface combatant 

option considered. Navy leadership indicated this decision was based on 

LCS’s relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as well as the ability 

to upgrade remaining LCS and maintain stability in the LCS industrial 

base and vendor supply chain.

In selecting the minor modified LCS concept, the Navy has made tradeoffs in refining the capabilities of the frigate, prioritizing lethality and 

survivability improvements. The Navy noted that as part of the refinement 

process, the frigate program office identified additional capacity in the 

LCS designs that has enabled improvements to the ship’s planned 

capabilities. In particular, the Navy stated that the program office 

determined that full surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare 

capabilities could be included in baseline frigate plans, as opposed to the 

partial capabilities that were found to be possible by the Small Surface 

Combatant Task Force analysis. Table 2 presents an overview of 

capability changes the Navy has planned for the frigate, as compared to 

LCS, and the expected effect of those changes.

 7

The lightweight towed torpedo countermeasure is a towed decoy that emits signals to 

draw a torpedo away from its intended target. The multi-function towed array sonar is a 

towed receive array sonar with a deployment and retrieval cable that is used to detect 

acoustic energy from ships and submarines. Both these systems are planned for the LCS 

anti-submarine warfare mission package.

Frigate Will Have 

Improved Capabilities over 

LCS, but Is Constrained 

by Its Design Concept
Page 7 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Table 2: Planned Frigate Capability Changes

Proposed change Description Significance

Switch from single to 

multi-mission capability

Unlike the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the frigate 

will permanently mount surface and antisubmarine warfare mission packages equipment

instead of just a single mission package. The 

Navy does not plan for the frigate to perform 

mine countermeasures.

A multi-mission capability was recognized in Navy 

analysis as a key characteristic of a frigate. A frigate will 

be able to engage different types of threats at all times, 

unlike LCS which depends on the mission package 

embarked.

Improve air warfare 

systems

Frigate will be equipped with an improved air 

search radar and defensive countermeasures.

This reduces susceptibility to attacks from air-based 

threats (e.g. aircraft or missiles). The Navy also is 

considering these improvements for LCS.

Add armor to vital 

spaces and magazines. 

Improve shock 

hardening in anti-air 

missile system

Armor reduces vulnerability; intended to lessen 

risk of magazine detonation.

Shock hardening reduces vulnerability of missile 

system.

LCS already has some armor in these areas; shock 

hardening is limited to anti-air missile system and its 

support services. The Navy believes adjusting the 

concept of operations for the frigate is more cost-effective 

and feasible than a further increase in armor and shock 

hardening.

Add over-the-horizon 

missile system

Frigate will have the ability to carry a minimum of

eight over-the-horizon missiles to support surface 

warfare capability needs.

The capability reduces susceptibility (the degree to which 

a ship can be targeted and engaged by threat weapons) 

and increases lethality, giving the frigate the ability to 

strike surface targets further from the ship than is 

possible on LCS. Navy has considered equipping later 

LCS ships with this type of capability, but no decision has 

been made and the change is not funded.

Upgrade electronic 

warfare

Frigate electronic warfare projected to reduce 

susceptibility by improving defensive alert 

capabilities.

Electronic warfare improvements are necessary in order 

to pace the evolving threats and are consistent with the 

Navy’s prioritization of increased survivability for the 

frigate.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-17-323

However, we found in June 2016 that the Navy’s planned frigate 

upgrades will not include significant improvements in certain survivability 

areas.8 Further, the Navy sacrificed capabilities that were prioritized by 

fleet operators. For example, when asked in engagement sessions by the 

Small Surface Combatant Task Force, fleet operators consistently 

prioritized a range of 4,000 nautical miles, but the selected LCS concept 

with minor modifications was noted to have a minimum range requirement 

of 3,000 nautical miles. The Navy asserted that it is working with the 

prospective frigate shipbuilders to achieve a range more consistent with 

the priorities of fleet operators.

 8

GAO-16-356. 
Page 8 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has noted that 

the Navy’s proposed frigate design is not substantially different from LCS 

and does not add much more redundancy or greater separation of critical 

equipment or additional compartmentation, making the frigate likely to be 

less survivable than the Navy’s previous frigate class. Additionally, the 

Navy plans to make some similar capability improvements to existing and 

future LCS, narrowing the difference between LCS and the frigate. As we 

found in June 2016, the proposed frigate will utilize the offensive antisubmarine or surface warfare capabilities that are already part of the LCS 

mission packages, so while the frigate will have multi-mission capability 

that LCS lacks, the capabilities of the individual mission packages will be 

consistent with what is available for LCS.9 Though specific details are 

classified, there are only a few areas where there are differences in 

frigate warfighting capability compared to the LCS.

Since the frigate will be based on an LCS design, it will likely carry 

forward some LCS design limitations. For example, LCS is configured to 

support up to 98 personnel, including core and mission package crew and

an aviation detachment. Navy officials have stated that the frigate is being

designed for a crew of 130. However, given the space limitations on LCS 

and the fact that the frigate will be based on one of the two LCS designs, 

achieving this significant increase in crew size could prove challenging. 

Additionally, barring Navy-directed changes to key mechanical systems, 

the frigate will carry some of the more failure-prone LCS equipment, such 

as some propulsion equipment, and will likely carry some of the LCSunique equipment that has challenged the Navy’s support and logistics 

chain.

 9

GAO-16-356. 
Page 9 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Current acquisition plans for the frigate require Congress and the Navy to 

make significant decisions and potential future commitments of about $9 

billion—based on early budget estimates—without key program 

knowledge. The Navy plans to request authority from Congress in 2017 to 

use what the Navy refers to as a block buy approach for all 12 planned 

frigates and request funding for the lead frigate as part of the fiscal year 

2018 budget request.10 Because of recent changes to the acquisition 

approach that hastened the frigate award, the decisions that Congress 

will be asked to make in 2017 will not be informed by realistic cost 

estimates or frigate-specific detail design knowledge that helps solidify 

cost and construction expectations. Further, Congress will not possess 

critical information on LCS performance in testing that would increase 

understanding of the operational capability of LCS, which provides the 

design foundation for the frigate. The Navy’s award decision planned for 

2018 will be informed by formal cost estimate information, but like 

Congress, the Navy will lack detail design knowledge and have more 

limited information on LCS’s operational capability than would have been 

available for the previously planned fiscal year 2019 frigate award. And 

finally, the current and planned LCS construction demands at both LCS 

shipyards that extend into 2021 suggest no schedule imperative exists 

that would require the Navy to request or to receive authority in 2017 for 

the frigate or to award the lead ship in 2018 as currently planned.

The frigate acquisition plan has undergone notable changes since late 

2015, for various reasons. As it now stands, an accelerated schedule 

effectively prevents the Navy from being able to provide Congress with a 

current, formal cost estimate for the frigate—independently completed or 

otherwise—before Congress is asked to make significant commitments to 

the program. Navy officials previously stated that the frigate is expected 

to cost no more than 20 percent—approximately $100 million—more per 

ship than the average LCS seaframes, though this was an initial estimate. 

 10The Navy plans to request authority to use what it calls a block buy contract to purchase 

the frigate—the same contracting approach used for LCS—and funding in the fiscal year 

2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Our past analysis of the LCS contracts found that 

a block buy approach could affect Congress’s funding flexibility. For example, the LCS 

block buy contracts provide that a failure to fully fund a purchase in a given year would 

make the contract subject to renegotiation, which provides a disincentive to the Navy or 

Congress to take any action that might disrupt the program because of the potential for 

the government to have to pay more for ships. If similar terms are included in the frigate 

contract, the same potential effect may apply.

Accelerated Frigate 

Acquisition Plans 

Require Significant 

Procurement 

Commitments 

Without Key Cost, 

Design, and 

Capability Knowledge

Cost Uncertainty and a 

Compressed Schedule 

Impose Risk to Frigate 

Program
Page 10 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

However, our recent work has shown that LCS under construction have 

exceeded contract cost targets, with the government responsible for 

paying for a portion of the cost growth.11 Regarding expected costs for the 

frigate, prior LCS context is important to consider. When faced with the 

prospect of a downselect to one LCS variant in 2010, the two shipbuilders 

provided competitive pricing that propelled the Navy to continue 

production at both shipyards. Those prices have not yet been achievable.

According to frigate program officials, under the current acquisition 

approach, the Navy will award contracts in fiscal year 2017 to each of the 

current LCS contractors to construct one LCS with a block buy option for 

12 additional LCS—not frigates. Then, the Navy plans to obtain proposals 

for frigate-specific design changes and modifications from both LCS 

contractors in late 2017 that will be used to upgrade the LCS options to 

frigates. The Navy intends to evaluate pricing and technical factors for the 

proposed frigate upgrade packages and award frigate construction to one 

contractor based on a best value determination. This frigate downselect 

to one of the LCS shipyards is planned to occur in summer 2018. Figure 2 

illustrates how the Navy plans to modify the fiscal year 2017 LCS contract 

to convert the ships in the block buy options to frigates.

 11GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Need to Document Rationale for the Use of Fixed-Price 

Incentive Contracts and Study Effectiveness of Added Incentives, GAO-17-211, 

(Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2017).
Page 11 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Figure 2: Navy Block Buy Option Contract Modification Process for Frigate Procurement

Navy officials explained that the frigate acquisition plan changed 

substantially in response to a Secretary of Defense memorandum issued 

in December 2015 that directed the Navy to revise its LCS and frigate 

acquisition plans. This included direction to reduce the total number of 

LCS and frigates from 52 to 40, downselect to one ship design, and 

award the frigate in fiscal year 2019. The Navy subsequently revised its 

plans to include a downselect decision, but also decided to accelerate the 

award of the lead frigate from fiscal year 2019 to 2018 as a replacement 

for awarding a single LCS in 2018. Table 3 shows the changes that have 

occurred since that memorandum.
Page 12 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Table 3: Changes in Frigate Acquisition Plans and Number of Ships, 2015-2016

Previous plan (December 2015) Current plan (October 2016)

Dual contract award in fiscal year 2019 Downselect award to one shipbuilder in summer 2018

20 frigates (10 per shipbuilder) 12 frigates

Government-led, prescribed design Contractor-driven design process based on build specifications; 

increased government furnished equipment

Multiple frigate upgrade packages, with a fiscal year 2019 bid to 

mature frigate design

Single frigate upgrade package expected from each contractor in 

fiscal year 2018

Detail design in fiscal year 2018 to increase design knowledge 

prior to contract award

Detail design begins in late fiscal year 2018 after downselect award

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-17-323

A consequence of the Navy’s accelerated frigate schedule is increased 

risk to the government because it refigures a commitment to buy ships in 

advance of adequate knowledge—a continuation of premature 

commitments by the LCS program.

The Navy plans to award frigate construction to one shipyard before detail 

design activities specific to the frigate begin, which—as we previously 

have found—can result in increased ship prices and reduced 

understanding of how design changes will affect ship construction costs.12

Detail design enables the shipbuilders to visualize spaces and test the 

design as the granularity of the design for individual units, or zones, of the 

ship comes into focus. The Navy had plans in 2015 to have each LCS 

shipyard conduct frigate detail design activities in fiscal year 2018. This 

improved understanding of the frigate design was then going to be 

available to support the Navy’s construction contracts to both shipyards 

for frigates in fiscal year 2019. However, as we noted above, the Navy 

changed course in response to direction from the Secretary of Defense 

and currently plans for a downselect award in 2018. The reduced contract 

award timeline led the Navy to abandon its plans to conduct detail design 

activities before contract award; the current plan is to begin detail design 

after the frigate downselect award and complete design activities before 

beginning construction.

 12GAO-16-356, Arleigh Burke Destroyers: Delaying Procurement of DDG 51 Flight III 

Ships Would Allow Time to Increase Design Knowledge, GAO-16-613 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 4, 2016), and Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help 

Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 28, 2005).

Limited Detail Design 

Knowledge Available to 

Inform Frigate Award 

Decision Increases Risk of 

Cost and Schedule 

Growth as Design Matures
Page 13 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

The Navy has noted that LCS’s design is already complete and many 

areas of the frigate will be common to LCS—greater than 60 percent 

according to the frigate program office. However, with no detail design 

activities specific to the frigate upgrades planned until after the frigate 

shipbuilder is chosen by the Navy, the procurement activities—including 

shipbuilder proposal development, the Navy’s completion of a 

construction cost estimate, and finalization of the target cost for 

constructing the lead frigate—will not be informed by a more complete 

understanding of the frigate-specific design. Our work on best practices 

for program cost estimates has found that over time, cost estimates 

become more certain as a program progresses—as costs are better 

understood and program risks identified.13 Further, we found in August 

2016 that even Navy shipbuilders acknowledged the benefits of having 

detail design knowledge available to inform decisions.14 Specifically, the 

two shipbuilders for the Navy’s newest configuration of the Arleigh Burke 

class destroyers—DDG 51 Flight III—agreed that allowing more time for 

the design to mature, via detail design, would provide greater confidence 

in their understanding of the Flight III-specific design changes and how 

the changes will affect ship construction costs. By completing more detail 

design activities prior to procuring a ship, the Navy—and shipbuilders—

are better positioned for procurement and construction.

We also found in June 2016 and February 2005 that awarding a contract 

before detail design is completed—though common in Navy ship 

acquisitions—has resulted in increased ship prices.15 For example, the 

Navy negotiated target prices for construction of the lead San Antonio 

class ship (LPD 17) and the first two follow-on ships (LPD 18 and LPD 

19) before detail design even began, preventing the Navy from leveraging 

information that would be gained during detail design when negotiating 

target prices for these three ships. In contrast, the Navy’s Virginia class 

and Columbia class submarine programs had or planned to have a high 

level of design complete prior to the award of the lead ship construction 

contract, thus enabling the government to benefit from the knowledge 

gained from detail design in negotiating prices for construction.

 13GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: 

March 2, 2009). 

14GAO-16-613.

15GAO-16-356 and GAO-05-183. 
Page 14 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Along with a shift away from detail design activities prior to the frigate 

award and a shortened time frame before the award, the Navy moved 

away from its planned government-driven design process to a less 

prescriptive contractor-driven design process, adding potential risk. This 

approach is similar to what the Navy used for the original LCS program, 

whereby the shipyards were given performance specifications and 

requirements and systems that would be provided by the government, but 

then selected the design and systems that they determined were best 

suited to fit their designs in a producible manner. Program officials told us 

that this new approach should yield efficiencies; however, history from 

LCS raises concern that this approach for the frigate similarly could lead 

to the ships having some non-standard equipment, with less commonality 

with LCS and the rest of the Navy’s ships.

In addition to the prevailing cost and design unknowns that pose risk to 

the Navy’s accelerated frigate acquisition plans, uncertainties remain 

regarding the operational capabilities of LCS that are relevant to the 

frigate. Some testing of operational capability already has been 

performed for LCS seaframes and the surface warfare mission package; 

however, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate operational capability in 

initial operational test and evaluation for the final surface warfare mission 

package until 2018 or demonstrate operational capability through initial 

operational test and evaluation for the anti-submarine warfare mission 

package until 2019. Additionally, the Navy has not demonstrated that LCS 

will achieve its survivability requirements—the LCS program office is 

planning for the final survivability assessment report to be completed in 

fiscal year 2018.

While preliminary results from full ship shock trials in 2016—live fire 

testing of the survivability of LCS and its subsystems against underwater 

shocks (i.e., explosions)—suggest some positive findings, DOT&E 

continues to have questions about LCS’s survivability against more 

significant underwater shocks. Comprehensive reporting on the results of 

shock testing is not expected until later in 2017, which should provide a 

better understanding of any issues with the seaframes’ response to 

underwater shock that have implications for the frigate design.

In addition to shock trials, both LCS variants sustained some damage in 

trials completed in rough sea conditions. Although the Navy indicated that 

the results of these trials have been incorporated into the structural 

design of both prospective frigate variants, the Navy has not completed 

its analytical reports of these events. Results from air defense testing also 

Significant LCS Testing 

Remains to Demonstrate 

Operational Capability 

Relevant to the Frigate
Page 15 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

indicate capability concerns, and both seaframe variants were found to 

have significant reliability and maintainability issues during several tests 

and trials. Further, DOT&E has expressed concern that LCS 

effectiveness with its mission packages remains undemonstrated, which 

means questions persist about the LCS’s ability to perform many of its 

missions. These unknowns, in turn, will be carried over to the frigate 

program until the mission package capabilities that will also be employed 

by the frigate are fully demonstrated on the LCS.

DOD has made some progress with the frigate acquisition approach over 

the last year that is consistent with a recommendation we made in June 

2016.16 Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

require that before a downselect decision is made for the frigate, the 

program must submit appropriate milestone documentation, such as an 

independent cost estimate and a plan to incorporate the frigate into 

DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports that are provided to Congress. The 

frigate’s requirements have been finalized, with Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council approval received for its capabilities development 

document in 2016, and the Navy is in the process of establishing a 

service cost position. DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation also plans to complete an independent cost estimate in fiscal 

year 2018.

Still, if current acquisition plans hold, the Navy will ask Congress to 

consider authorizing what the Navy calls a block buy of 12 frigates and 

funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 2018 budget is proposed. 

This authorization decision involves potential future commitments of 

about $9 billion based on early budget estimates. As indicated in table 4, 

the Navy’s request for authority from Congress appears premature, since 

significant uncertainties will remain for the cost and design changes 

needed to turn an LCS into a frigate, and relevant questions regarding 

LCS operational capability will remain unresolved. For example, under the 

Navy’s current plans, no formal cost estimate is expected to be completed 

before Congress is asked to make such a decision. Our prior work on 

best practices in weapon system acquisition has emphasized the 

 16GAO-16-356. 

The Navy’s Planned Block 

Buy Approach Requires 

Early Commitment and 

Could Reduce Flexibility
Page 16 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

importance of attaining key knowledge regarding cost, design, and 

capability expectations before making major commitments.17

Table 4: Assessment of Information Deficiencies in 2017 Indicating That Planned Request for Congressional Decisions on 

Frigate Acquisition Is Premature

Key information Description GAO assessment of 

information available in 

April 2017

Realistic cost estimates Navy service cost position is expected in May 2017; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense plans to complete an independent cost estimate in fiscal year 

2018.

○

Well-defined design Approval of build specifications is planned for July 2017; frigate-specific 

detail design will not begin until after construction award in summer 2018, 

with completion by the end of 2019. 

○

Littoral combat ship 

(LCS) operational 

capability

Some testing of operational capability has been performed for LCS 

seaframes and surface warfare mission package. However, initial 

operational test and evaluation of seaframes and the final surface warfare 

mission package is not planned to begin until 2018, and initial operational 

test and evaluation of seaframes and the anti-submarine warfare mission 

package is not planned to begin until 2019. Also, the LCS program office 

does not expect the final survivability assessment report to be completed 

until fiscal year 2018.

◑

Legend: ○Information not available ◑ Some information available

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense documentation. | GAO-17-323

While a block buy contracting approach may provide cost savings and 

other benefits for an acquisition program, it also may present challenges, 

such as reduced funding flexibility.18 For example, the LCS block buy 

contracts provide that a failure to fully fund the purchase of a ship in a 

given year would make the contract subject to renegotiation. DOD has 

pointed to this as a risk that the contractors would demand higher prices if 

DOD deviated from the agreed to block buy plan. Thus, once the frigate 

block buy contract is authorized and funded, DOD and Congress may 

once again have a notable disincentive to take any action that might delay 

procurement. This has been the case with LCS, even when it became 

apparent that the program was underperforming.

 17GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves 

Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002) and Defense 

Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-16-329SP (Washington, 

D.C.: March 31, 2016).

18GAO, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Continued Oversight Needed as Program Plans to Begin 

Development of New Capabilities, GAO-16-390 (Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2016).
Page 17 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

The existing and planned LCS construction workloads at both shipyards 

suggest that a request in 2017 to authorize the frigate (with the fiscal year 

2018 budget request) may not only be premature, but also unnecessary. 

Although the Navy has argued that pausing LCS production would result 

in loss of production work and start-up delays to the frigate program, 

current schedule delays for LCS under construction and the projected 

schedules for the yet-to-be-awarded LCS show that both shipyards have 

substantial workloads remaining that could offset the need to award the 

frigate in 2018 as planned. The Navy’s concern about shipyard workload 

also does not account for the possibility of continued delays in the 

delivery of LCS.

Deliveries of almost all LCS under contract at both shipyards (LCS 5-26) 

have been delayed by several months, and, in some cases, close to a 

year or longer. Despite having had 5 years of LCS construction to help 

stabilize ship delivery expectations, the program did not deliver four LCS 

in fiscal year 2016 as planned. As figure 3 depicts, delays that have 

occurred for previously funded ships have resulted in a construction 

workload that extends into fiscal year 2020. This prolonged workload, 

when combined with the two LCS awarded in 2016 and two more LCS 

that have been authorized by congressional conferees and the Navy 

plans to award in fiscal year 2017, takes construction at both shipyards 

into 2021.

Existing and Planned 

Shipyard Construction 

Workloads for LCS 

Suggest No Schedule 

Imperative to Begin 

Frigate Acquisition in 2018
Page 18 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Figure 3: Construction Demands for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Shipyards

a

The delivery dates for LCS 25 and 26—awarded in March 2016—have not been modified.

b

The Navy has not awarded contracts for construction of LCS 27 or 28, so start and delivery dates 

represent current plans.

With 13 LCS in various phases of construction (LCS 9, 11-22) and 3 more 

(LCS 23, 24, and 26) set to begin construction later in fiscal year 2017, 

delaying a decision on the frigate until fiscal year 2019 would enable the 
Page 19 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Navy and the shipbuilders to improve knowledge on cost, design, and 

operational capability of LCS that relates directly to the frigate. This, in 

turn, would offer Congress an opportunity to be better informed on the 

expectations for the frigate before committing substantial taxpayer funds 

to this program.

The Navy’s impending fiscal year 2018 budget request presents a key 

opportunity for Congress to affect the way forward for the frigate program 

by ensuring the Navy possesses sufficient knowledge on cost, design, 

and capability before authorizing an investment of a potential $9 billion for 

a program that

• has no current formal cost estimate—independent or otherwise,

• will not have begun key detail design activities,

• has significant unknowns in regards to operational performance of the 

ship upon which it will be based, and

• based on the existing and planned shipyard workloads, has no 

industrial base imperative to begin construction in the Navy’s planned 

time frame.

The block buy pricing the Navy expects to receive from LCS contractors 

in 2017 will be for the basic LCS seaframes that the Navy has 

acknowledged do not meet its needs. As we stated above, the two LCS 

shipbuilders—when faced with the prospect of a downselect in 2010—

provided competitive pricing that propelled the Navy to continue 

production at both shipyards. Those prices have not been shown to be

achievable. Even if LCS prices offered once again appear favorable, the 

ships ultimately are intended to be frigates, and the upgrade cost—to be 

proposed by the shipyards later—is a significant unknown.

A decision by Congress to authorize the block buy of 12 frigates is 

effectively the final decision for the entire planned buy of 40 LCS and 

frigates. According to the Navy’s approved acquisition strategy, the 

frigates would still require annual appropriations and Congress could thus 

conduct oversight of the program through that process; however, it will 

likely be more difficult to make decisions to reduce or delay the program 

should that become warranted, as the Navy may point to losses in 

favorable block buy prices, as has been done previously with LCS.

We recognize that the Navy had to revise its frigate acquisition plans 

based on the Secretary of Defense’s direction to reduce quantities and 

Conclusions
Page 20 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

select a single ship design. However, the direction did not necessitate an 

acceleration of the frigate procurement and the corresponding shift away 

from a planned approach that would have provided substantially improved 

cost, design, and capability information to inform the frigate acquisition 

decisions. Reverting back to a frigate award in fiscal year 2019 would 

provide time to complete realistic cost estimates, build detail design 

knowledge, and make significant progress in understanding the 

operational capability and limitations of LCS, upon which the frigate 

design will be based.

To ensure sound frigate procurement decisions, Congress should 

consider not enacting authority pursuant to the Navy’s request for a block 

buy of 12 frigates in the fiscal year 2018 budget and consider delaying 

funding of the lead frigate until at least fiscal year 2019 when sufficient 

cost, design, and capability knowledge is expected to be available to 

inform decisions.

To ensure the department and the shipbuilders have sufficient knowledge 

of the frigate’s anticipated cost and design during the procurement 

process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy 

to delay frigate procurement plans and the award of the lead frigate 

contract until at least fiscal year 2019 when cost estimates will be 

completed, detail design could be underway, and significant progress will

have been made in demonstrating through testing the operational 

capabilities of LCS that are relevant to the frigate.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. Its 

written comments are reprinted in appendix I of this report. DOD partially 

concurred with our recommendation to delay procurement plans and the 

award of the lead frigate contract until sufficient cost, design, and 

capability knowledge is available to inform decisions.

In its response, DOD acknowledged that the Navy’s final contract 

decision includes risks, but stated that it believes the current plan offers 

an acceptable tradeoff between technical and affordability risks. DOD 

highlighted two actions that it believes will allow the department to assess 

program risk before moving forward: (1) annual frigate program review 

activities in 2017 intended to ensure risks are understood prior to the 

release of the formal frigate request for proposals, and (2) the planned 

completion of an independent cost estimate in fiscal year 2018 by the 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 21 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, which is expected to 

inform a 2018 annual program review prior to a contract award. 

While these are positive oversight actions, the assessments of design risk 

and maturity for these reviews will lack any frigate-specific detail design 

information, which leads us to maintain that waiting until at least fiscal 

year 2019 to procure the first ship and to make decisions on future frigate 

procurements would provide DOD and Congressional decision-makers 

with a more comprehensive understanding of frigate cost, design, and 

capability expectations before making substantial commitments to the 

program. This lack of knowledge, coupled with the ongoing and planned 

LCS construction workload at both shipyards, present, in our view, a 

compelling rationale for delaying a frigate decision. 

DOD also separately provided technical comments on our draft report. 

We incorporated the comments as appropriate, such as to provide 

additional context in the report. In doing so, we found that the findings 

and message of our report remained the same. In some cases, the 

department’s suggestions or deletions were not supported by the 

preponderance of evidence or were based on a difference of opinion, 

rather than fact. In those instances, we did not make the suggested 

changes.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and 

other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge 

on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Michele Mackin

Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 22 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 23 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Page 24 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition
Page 25 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition
Page 26 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Table 5: Selected GAO Recommendations for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Frigate Programs and Department of Defense 

(DOD) Responses, 2005-2016 

Year GAO Recommendation DOD Response

2005 • Revise LCS acquisition strategy to ensure that the 

Navy has sufficiently experimented with both ship 

designs, captured lessons learned, and mitigated 

operational and technology risks before award of a 

detail design and construction contract.

• DOD partially agreed with this recommendation, stating 

that it would review the acquisition strategy before award 

of contracts for additional ships. DOD noted, however, 

that the LCS program entailed risk by design, and that 

DOD seeks to balance the program’s acquisition risks 

with the risk of delaying closure of the warfighting gaps 

that LCS will fill.

2010 • Update the LCS acquisition strategy to account for 

operational testing delays in the program and resequence planned purchases of ships and mission 

packages, as appropriate.

• DOD agreed with this recommendation; however, the 

Navy subsequently altered its acquisition strategy

significantly, resulting in the award of block buy contracts 

in 2010 without demonstrating knowledge related to, 

among other things, operational testing of at least one of 

the mission packages on each variant.

2013 • Procure the minimum quantity and rate of ships 

required to preserve the mobilization of the production 

base until the successful completion of the full-rate 

production decision review.

• Report to Congress on the relative advantages of 

each seaframe variant for each of the three mission 

areas.

• DOD did not agree with our recommendation regarding 

the quantity and rate of ships to be purchased, stating 

that it would unnecessarily decrease production and 

result in higher pricing for individual seaframes with no 

value added to the program.

• DOD agreed with this recommendation, and Congress 

directed the Navy to provide additional information on 

some of the risk areas we identified, but the Navy 

essentially suggested that since the two variants are built 

to the same requirements, they perform the same way. 

2014 • Before approving the release of the request for 

proposals for future contracts for either seaframe 

variant, require both variants to, among other things, 

deploy to a forward overseas location and complete 

rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability 

testing.

• DOD partially agreed with this recommendation, stating 

its intention to complete as many of the tests and 

demonstrations as possible before releasing the request 

for proposals. The department, however, maintained that 

the release of the request for proposals should not hinge 

on these actions.

2015 • Ensure that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the 

modified LCS does not place industrial base concerns 

ahead of demonstrating the ship’s lethality, 

survivability, and affordability.

• DOD agreed with this recommendation, stating that the 

Secretary will ensure that industrial base concerns are 

balanced against cost, schedule, and fleet requirements. 

In March 2016, however, the department approved the 

Navy’s strategy to acquire an LCS with minor 

modifications, or frigate—a ship concept it had previously 

recommended to the department based in large part on 

industrial base considerations.

2016 • Before a downselect decision for the frigate, require 

the program to submit milestone documentation, 

which could include an independent cost estimate, an 

acquisition program baseline, and a plan to 

incorporate the frigate into DOD’s Selected 

Acquisition Reports to Congress.

• DOD partially agreed, stating that the Navy views the 

LCS transition to the frigate as an incremental upgrade. 

DOD stated that the program would be required to 

provide key documentation, including an independent 

cost estimate and an updated acquisition program 

baseline. The response did not address our concerns 

about transparency in the Selected Acquisition Reports.

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports and DOD actions taken or planned. | GAO-17-323

Appendix II: Selected GAO 

Recommendations for the Littoral Combat 

Ship and Frigate Programs
Page 27 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Slowing Planned Frigate Acquisition 

Would Enable Better-Informed Decisions. GAO-17-279T. Washington, 

D.C.: December 8, 2016.

Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Congress Faced with Critical 

Acquisition Decisions. GAO-17-262T. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 

2016.

Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS 

and Frigate Acquisition Strategies. GAO-16-356. Washington, D.C.: June 

9, 2016.

Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions. GAO-16-201. 

Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2015.

Littoral Combat Ship: Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two 

Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery. GAO-14-827. 

Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2014.

Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight 

Management Needed Prior to Further Investments. GAO-14-749. 

Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2014.

Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs. GAO-14-447. 

Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2014.

Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting 

Quality. GAO-14-122. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2013.

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.

GAO-13-738T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013.

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost.

GAO-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013.

Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat 

Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of 

Risks. GAO-11-277T. Washington, D.C.: December 14, 2010.

Appendix III: Related GAO Products
Page 28 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

National Defense: Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for 

the Littoral Combat Ship Program. GAO-11-249R. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 

Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GAO-10-523. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2010.

Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost 

Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.

GAO-10-257. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2010.

Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate 

Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. GAO-09-322. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on 

Mine Countermeasures Capabilities. GAO-08-13. Washington, D.C.: 

October 12, 2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate 

Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GAO-05-255. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2005.
Page 29 GAO-17-323 Frigate Acquisition

Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact above, Diana Moldafsky, Assistant Director; 

Pete Anderson; Jacob Leon Beier; Laurier Fish; Kristine Hassinger; C. 

James Madar; Sean Merrill; LeAnna Parkey; Anne Stevens; and Robin 

Wilson made key contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(101078)
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