DHS Tracking of Visa 

Overstays is Hindered by 

Insufficient Technology 

May 1, 2017

OIG-17-56 
 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS 

DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by

Insufficient Technology 

May 1, 2017 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

DHS has primary 

responsibility for 

identifying visa overstays 

and taking enforcement 

action to address security 

risks. We conducted this 

audit to determine the 

effectiveness of 

Immigration and Custom 

Enforcement’s (ICE) 

information technology 

(IT) systems to review, 

track, and share 

information associated 

with visas. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made three 

recommendations to the 

DHS CIO and two to the 

ICE CIO to improve 

information sharing, 

provide training and 

guidance, evaluate data 

reliability, and implement 

a biometric exit solution. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

Department of Homeland Security IT systems did not 

effectively support ICE visa tracking operations. ICE 

personnel responsible for investigating in-country 

visa overstays pieced together information from 

dozens of systems and databases, some of which 

were not integrated and did not electronically share 

information. Despite previous efforts to improve 

information sharing, the DHS Chief Information 

Officer (CIO) did not provide the oversight and 

centralized management needed to address these 

issues. Additionally, ICE did not ensure that its field 

personnel received the training and guidance needed 

to properly use the systems currently available to 

conduct visa overstay tracking. 

Further, the Department lacked a comprehensive 

biometric exit system at U.S. ports of departure to 

capture information on nonimmigrant visitors who 

exit the United States. Without a complete exit system, 

DHS relied on third-party departure data, such as 

commercial carrier passenger manifests, to confirm a 

visitor’s departure from the country. However, these 

commercial sources occasionally provided false 

departure or arrival status on visitors. 

Because of these systems and management 

limitations, DHS could not account for all visa 

overstays in data it annually reported to Congress. 

Manual checking across multiple systems used for 

visa tracking contributed to backlogs in casework 

and delays in investigating suspects who potentially 

posed public safety or homeland security risks. 

Management Response 

The DHS CIO and ICE CIO concurred with our 

recommendations. 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

May 1, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 The Honorable Richard Staropoli 

Chief Information Officer 

Department of Homeland Security 

Michael C. Brown 

Chief Information Officer 

Office of the Chief Information Officer 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Shonnie Lyon 

Director 

Office of Biometric Identity Management 

National Protection & Programs Directorate 

Donald W. Neufeld 

Associate Director 

Service Center Operations 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Phillip A. Landfried 

Assistant Commissioner 

Office of Information and Technology 

Uf'~ C1.~sff13order Protection 

FROM: ~raF.Mc~y Assistant Inspector General 

Office of Information Technology Audits 

SUBJECT: 	 DHS Tracking ofVisa Overstays is Hindered by 

Insufficient Technology 

Attached for your action is our final report, DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is 

Hindered by Insufficient Technology. We incorporated the formal comments 

from the Department in the final report. 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The report contains five recommendations aimed at improving the tracking of 

visa overstays by DHS. The Department concurred with all of our 

recommendations. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security 

Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for Office of Inspector General 

Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, 

please provide our office with a written response that includes your 

(1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target 

completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible 

parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about 

the current status of the recommendation. 

Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a 

formal closeout request to us within 30 days so that we may close the 

recommendations. The request should be accompanied by evidence of 

completion of agreed‐upon corrective actions. 

Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests 

OIGITAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. Until your response is received and 

evaluated, the recommendations will be considered open and unresolved. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with 

oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland 

Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kristen Bernard, 

Director, Information Technology Management, at (202) 254-0962. 

Attachment 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-17-56 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Background ......................................................................................................... 1
 

Results of Audit ................................................................................................... 7
 

Fragmented IT Systems Hindered Efficient and Effective Overstay Tracking....... 7
 

Recommendations ....................................................................................... 17
 

Lack of an Exit System Hampered DHS’ Ability to Capture Accurate Departure 

Data ............................................................................................................... 17 

Recommendations ....................................................................................... 21 

Unintegrated Systems and the Lack of an Exit System Resulted in Poor Overstay 

Reporting and Inefficient Tracking................................................................... 21 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology.......................................... 29 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report............................. 31 

Appendix C: IT Systems Used for Visa Tracking by ICE Headquarters and Field 

Personnel................................................................................35 

Appendix D: Office of IT Audits Major Contributors to This Report................ 38 

Appendix E: Report Distribution................................................................. 39 

Abbreviations 

ADIS Arrival and Departure Information System 

APIS Advance Passenger Information System 

ATS-P Automated Targeting System-Passenger 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CLAIMS Computer Linked Application Information Management System 

CTCEU Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

HSI Homeland Security Investigations 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System 

IT information technology 

OBIM Office of Biometric Identity Management 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

RAPS Refugees, Asylum and Parole System 

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

UPAX Unified Passenger 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

Each year, millions of foreign nationals come to the United States legally on a 

temporary basis with a nonimmigrant visa. According to the Department of 

State, more than10.8 million nonimmigrant visas were issued in fiscal year 

2015. The Department of State issues a visa as an endorsement on a passport, 

indicating that the holder is allowed to enter the country and remain for a 

specified period of time. 

Visa holders are required to depart from the United States on or before the 

designated admit until date, which ranges in time depending on the specific 

visa classification. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) designates the 

admit until date at the port of entry. If a foreign national wishes to remain in 

the country legally beyond an admission period, he or she must file a petition 

for extension or a change in status with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) before the admission period expires. Certain groups cannot 

apply for extensions, such as participants in the Visa Waiver Program and 

those who have violated their terms of admission.1 

When a nonimmigrant visitor is admitted to the country under a specific 

nonimmigrant category but exceeds the authorized period of admission, the 

visitor becomes an “overstay.” The visitor may be categorized as an in-country 

overstay (a foreign national whose admit until date had passed and who is 

suspected of still being physically present in the United States) or an out-ofcountry overstay (a foreign national who departed the United States after the 

admit until date had passed). Federal law establishes consequences for visitors 

who overstay their authorized periods of admission.2 According to Department 

of Homeland Security reports, only a small percentage of visa holders 

overstayed their admission periods in 2015; however, their impact on national 

security can be great. For example, two of the 19 hijackers on September 11, 

2001, were visa overstays. This prompted the 9/11 Commission to call for the 

government to ensure that all visitors to the United States are tracked on entry 

and exit. 

DHS has primary responsibility for identifying visa overstays and taking 

enforcement action to address security risks. ICE is the lead component in 

DHS responsible for immigration enforcement within the United States and 

holds primary responsibility for in-country nonimmigrant visa overstay 

tracking and enforcement. However, multiple components also play a role in 

1 Violations and prohibitions include the following: visa has expired at the time of petition for extension, 

petitioner committed a crime while on a visa, petitioner did not enter the United States legally, or 

petitioner’s passport will not be valid throughout the course of his or her stay in the United States. 

2 8 United States Code 1182(a)(9)(B); 1227(a)(1)(C)(i); 1202(g). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

tracking, investigating, apprehending, and deporting removable aliens, 

including visa overstays, as depicted in table 1. 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for Managing Overstays 

Agency Responsibility 

U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection 

(CBP) 

Collects biographic and biometric information to document arrival and 

departure information on individuals arriving in the United States at U.S. 

ports of entry. CBP officers also determine nonimmigrant admissibility 

into the United States and provide an “admit until date,” by which time 

the individual must leave the country to avoid overstaying. CBP publicly 

reports the number of visitors who overstayed their visa in a given year. 

U.S. Citizenship and Receives, processes, and maintains documentation pertaining to a visa 

Immigration holder’s immigration status, including the extension or change of status, 

Services (USCIS) and works with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to 

ensure proper adherence to U.S. immigration laws. 

National Protection Stores biometrics, such as fingerprints, in order to confirm an 

and Programs individual’s identity and determine whether the individual is on a watch 

Directorate’s Office list for terrorists, criminals, or immigration violators. OBIM is the lead 

of Biometric Identity entity within the Department for biometric identity services. 

Management (OBIM) 

U.S. Immigration Responsible for overstay enforcement operations.3 

and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE)  The Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) office investigates 

domestic and international activities arising from the illegal movement 

of people and goods into and out of the United States. Within HSI, the 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is 

responsible for investigating nonimmigrant overstays, including 

potential national security risks and violators of nonimmigrant visas. 

CTCEU assigns leads that warrant further investigation to agents 

located in one of the HSI domestic field offices. 

 The Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) office apprehends 

confirmed overstay aliens who are subject to removal from the United 

States, detains these individuals when necessary, and removes them 

from the country. ERO officers performed a total of 235,413 removals 

in FY 2015. 

Department of State Responsible for receiving, vetting, and processing applications for 

immigration and temporary admission to the United States from abroad. 

Overseas consular offices obtain documentation, conduct interviews with 

applicants, and issue immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to approved 

applicants. The Department of State collaborates with ICE HSI as part of 

the Visa Security Program to screen and vet visa applicants. 

Source: Office of the Inspector General (OIG)-generated based on DHS and Department of
 

State data 

3 DHS Delegation Number 7030.2, Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (November 13, 2004). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS Automated Process for Identifying Nonimmigrant Visa Holders 

The Department of State issues visas to immigrant and nonimmigrant 

applicants prior to their arrival to the United States. Once visa holders arrive to 

the United States and are admitted by CBP, they must depart within their 

lawful period of admission if they have not been granted an extension or 

change of status by USCIS. 

The Department has an electronic process for identifying nonimmigrant visa 

holders who may have remained in the country beyond the period of their 

admission. A suspected overstay is automatically flagged in DHS’ systems 

when there is no record of nonimmigrant departure and subsequent vetting 

shows no change in visitor status prior to the end of the authorized admission 

period. There are three primary DHS systems that support this automated 

overstay identification process. 

	 DHS identifies individuals as overstays primarily by electronically 

matching records of visitor entry to and exit from the United States in the 

Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS). 

	 DHS identifies student visa violators and exchange violators through 

data that universities input directly to ICE’s Student and Exchange 

Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which transmits data to ADIS. 

	 Leads identified in ADIS and SEVIS are vetted against national security 

vetting data in the Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P) as 

well as the National Counterterrorism Center. These leads are fed into 

CTCEU’s case management system, LeadTrac.4 

The overstay identification process is pictured in figure 1. 

4 LeadTrac is not an abbreviation. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 1: High Level Process to Identify and Investigate Overstay Leads 

National Security 

or Public Interest 

Threat? 

ICE ERO 

Field Offices 

No 

ICE HSI Field 

Offices 

Yes 

ICE CTCEU 

Vetting 

ICE CTCEU closes leads, 

continues to vet leads, or 

sends leads to the field for 

further investigation. 

ADIS/ ATS-P 

SEVIS 

Student Visa 

information 

from 

Universities 

CBP generates overstay 

leads from unmatched 

arrival records in ADIS. 

Universities monitor and 

provide student information 

via SEVIS. 

Out-of-status 

visas identified 

by CBP 

Leads are consolidated 

from all sources in 

LeadTrac

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

ICE’s Manual Process for Investigating Overstays 

Following this automated overstay identification process, CTCEU analysts 

conduct additional investigations as needed to determine whether an individual 

has actually overstayed his or her authorized admission period. Specifically, 

analysts conduct extensive research to gather foreign national biographic data 

— such as name, date of birth, and country of citizenship — as well as analyze 

any additional records relevant to each case. For example, CTCEU analysts 

may search for travel records on a suspected overstay, compare biometrics 

obtained before or during entry to the country against DHS’ biometric storage 

system, and search for applications in USCIS’ immigration processing systems. 

This type of cross-functional tracking and investigation helps ICE personnel to 

compile a complete picture, with evidence, to confirm whether a subject is a 

visa overstay. Conversely, this data may provide evidence that a subject 

departed the country on time or received an immigration benefit to extend a 

visa, and thus is no longer an overstay. 

This manual vetting process helps CTCEU analysts confirm the priority of each 

case already assigned by the automated lead generation process. In each case, 

CTCEU may close the lead, continue to monitor the lead, or determine where 

the lead should be sent for further investigation. Leads that are determined not 

to be national security or public safety threats are sent to ERO for additional 

review. Leads that cannot be resolved or closed by CTCEU, and that pose a 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

threat to national security or public safety, are sent to HSI agents located in 

field offices for review, investigation, and potential apprehension and arrest of 

subjects. 

In FY 2015, CTCEU received more than 970,000 leads on possible overstays. 

The continuous automated vetting process, pictured previously in figure 1, 

enabled ICE to remove more than 825,000 leads from priority lists. The 

145,001 remaining leads were considered valid national security leads and 

were processed by CTCEU in FY 2015, as pictured in table 2. 

Table 2: Nonimmigrant Visa Leads Processed by Automated Vetting in FY 2015 

Total leads that were sent to CTCEU in FY 2015 971,305 

Total leads that were removed by automated vetting 

(Individuals who had departed the U.S. or complied with immigration law) 

Total leads that were sent to ERO 

[141,344] 

[684,960] 

Total leads remaining that were processed by CTCEU in FY15 145,001 

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

Prior Audit Reports on Visa Overstays 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted three audits on 

DHS visa tracking operations since 2011. 

	 In 2011, GAO reported on DHS’ tracking and processing of visa overstays 

and concluded there was a backlog of 1.6 million un-reviewed, 

unmatched arrival records.5 Additionally, GAO found that DHS was 

unable to publish a report on annual overstay rates due to data integrity 

issues. Specifically, they found that a lack of a biometric exit system 

inhibited the reliability of departure information. GAO recommended that 

DHS create a timeline for improving overstay enforcement procedures 

and metrics, examine the feasibility of improving collection of departure 

forms, and broaden automated alerts for visa overstays. GAO closed 

these recommendations. 

	 In 2013, GAO reported on DHS’ efforts to resolve these issues and found 

continued problems hampering DHS’ attempts to reduce the unmatched 

5 Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but 

Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411, April 2011. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

arrival records backlog and efforts to shore up data reliability.6 At the 

time of the audit, the backlog totaled more than one million records. 

Chief among the problems was the continued lack of a biometric exit 

system at U.S. ports of entry and departure. Additionally, GAO found 

that DHS still did not have accurate reporting on departures at land 

border crossings. DHS stated that a report on annual overstay figures 

would be released in December 2013.7 GAO recommended that DHS 

review and resolve ongoing data integrity issues and establish milestones 

for implementing a biometric exit capability. GAO closed these 

recommendations. 

	 In 2017, GAO reported on DHS’ efforts to develop a biometric exit 

solution to collect biometric data and report on potential overstays.8 

Since 2013, CBP has conducted four pilot programs to further the 

development and implementation of a biometric exit system. The GAO 

found that CBP had made progress in testing biometric exit capabilities, 

but faced longstanding planning, infrastructure, and staffing challenges 

to develop and implement a biometric exit system. Additionally, GAO 

found that DHS had improved overstay reporting by, among other 

actions, enhancing the systems it used to process entry and exit 

biographic data for potential overstays. GAO did not issue 

recommendations with this report. 

In 2014, OIG reported on the effectiveness of DHS’ visa security program in 

preventing ineligible applicants from receiving visas.9 However, we determined 

that the issues disclosed did not specifically relate to the information systems 

DHS uses for visa tracking. 

6 Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS’s Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program, 

GAO-13-683, July 2013. 

7 DHS did not meet the 2013 target for releasing the overstay report. The first overstay report was 

published in January 2016. 

8 DHS Has Made Progress in Planning for a Biometric Exit System and Reporting Overstays, but Challenges 

Remain, GAO-17-170, February, 2017.
 9 The DHS Visa Security Program, DHS OIG-14-137, September 10, 2014.
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Audit 

DHS’ IT systems did not effectively support ICE visa tracking operations. ICE 

personnel responsible for investigating in-country visa overstays pieced 

together information from dozens of systems and databases, some of which 

were not integrated and did not electronically share information. Despite 

previous efforts to improve information sharing, the DHS Chief Information 

Officer (CIO) did not provide the oversight and centralized management needed 

to address these issues. Additionally, ICE did not ensure that its field 

personnel received the training and guidance needed to properly use the 

systems currently available to conduct visa overstay tracking. 

Further, the Department lacked a comprehensive biometric exit system at U.S. 

ports of departure to capture information on nonimmigrant visitors who exit 

the United States. Without a complete exit system, DHS relied on third-party 

departure data, such as commercial carrier passenger manifests, to confirm a 

visitor’s departure from the country. However, these commercial sources 

occasionally provided false departure or arrival status on visitors. 

Because of these systems and management limitations, DHS could not account 

for all visa overstays in data it annually reported to Congress. Manual checking 

across multiple systems used for visa tracking contributed to backlogs in 

casework and delays in investigating suspects who potentially posed public 

safety or homeland security risks. 

Fragmented IT Systems Hindered Efficient and Effective 

Overstay Tracking 

The myriad of information systems and databases used in DHS for visa 

tracking were not effective in identifying nonimmigrant overstays. Some of 

these systems and databases were “stove-piped” and did not electronically 

share information, resulting in numerous inefficiencies. Despite some recent 

system integration efforts, ICE personnel conducted cumbersome and manual 

searches across multiple systems for information on in-country overstays. ICE 

personnel periodically were unsure of which system to use and were hampered 

by multiple passwords required to maintain system access. Obtaining visa and 

immigration status on suspected overstays also was difficult due to the 

unstructured manner in which data were stored. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Numerous Unintegrated IT Systems Used for Visa Tracking 

Multiple legacy information systems and databases used in DHS for visa 

tracking did not fully support ICE’s efforts to identify nonimmigrant visitor 

overstays. Federal law requires the CIO of each department or agency to 

develop and maintain a sound IT environment to ensure integration across IT 

capabilities used for mission operations.10 However, DHS has not fully 

established a shared and integrated IT environment to promote collaboration 

across components, which hinders effective and efficient visa mission 

operations. 

Up to 27 distinct DHS information systems and databases were used to 

support the Department’s visa-related programs and operations, depending on 

location. The Department has worked to integrate some IT systems used for 

tracking arrivals and departures and for capturing derogatory information. 

However, ICE personnel still need to check multiple individual systems to 

accurately determine an individual’s overstay status. For example, CTCEU 

analysts at ICE headquarters relied on approximately 17 systems, including 13 

DHS and 4 external systems and databases, as depicted in figure 2. ICE 

personnel in the field used as many as 18 distinct DHS systems and 

databases, as well as approximately 5 external systems, to conduct their 

investigations. 

10 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–106 (1996). OMB 

Memorandum 15-14, Management and Oversight of Federal Information Technology, June 10, 

2015. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 2: DHS Visa IT Systems Used by CTCEU Analysts 11 

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

The external systems depicted are owned by other Federal agencies such as the 

Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, individual state 

agencies, and a private research entity (i.e., Thomson Reuters). In addition to 

ADIS and ATS-P, CBP manages TECS (not an acronym) for border screening. 

Apart from SEVIS, ICE has three case management systems: LeadTrac, TECS 

Investigative Case Management, and ENFORCE Alien Removal Module. USCIS’ 

immigrant benefits processing systems include the Computer-Linked 

Application Information Management System (versions 3 and 4), the Central 

Index System, and the Refugees, Asylum and Parole System (RAPS). National 

Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of Biometric Identity Management 

manages the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) used to store 

11 DHS systems used by CTCEU analysts include the Automated Biometric Identification 

System (IDENT); ADIS; Modernized TECS (not an acronym); Secondary Inspection Tool (SIT); 

ATS-P; ENFORCE Alien Removal Module; Investigative Case Management System/TECS; 

LeadTrac; SEVIS; Computer Linked Application Information Management System 3.0 and 4.0 

(CLAIMS 3 and 4); Refugees, Asylum and Parole System (RAPS); and the Central Index System. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-17-56 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

all of the Department’s biometric data such as fingerprints and the Secondary 

Inspection Tool for entry/exit screening. 

Some of these systems and databases are “stove-piped,” meaning they are 

maintained by separate components within the Department and typically were 

not designed or retrofitted to ensure integration or interoperability. DHS 

components have taken steps to integrate systems used for visa tracking. 

However, ICE personnel remain encumbered by having to search multiple 

systems to obtain information directly from each source. Having to access and 

search among numerous systems to carry out their overstay tracking 

responsibilities can be daunting for the individual systems’ users. For example, 

ICE agents at one field location reportedly relied on as many as 16 distinct 

systems and databases to investigate, classify, and locate visa overstays. A 

listing of IT systems used for visa tracking can be found in appendix C. 

The lack of complete integration and information sharing has produced 

numerous inefficiencies. Many systems were designed and built for a distinct 

purpose, these systems contain only the fields of information relevant for 

performing the functions necessary to support that purpose. In some cases, 

this information is not shared among the various systems, meaning that ICE 

agents and analysts pull information together from multiple IT systems to 

“connect the dots” when conducting investigation queries. For example, CTCEU 

analysts reported having to sometimes check data in up to17 different systems 

to conduct an initial investigation for each lead before making a determination 

on an overstay status. This includes searching across multiple DHS systems 

(CBP, USCIS, and ICE) and external systems to gather key data elements for 

each individual, such as country of origin, immigration status, and criminal 

history. In each case, CTCEU personnel must gather information to compile a 

case file before a lead can be confirmed and passed along to HSI agents in the 

field for investigation. 

Also, because each system has a different or unique purpose, HSI and ERO 

personnel in the field were not always sure which systems to use to perform 

their specific job functions. For example, an ICE agent with more than 20 years 

of experience that we interviewed was not aware of a system commonly used by 

other ICE personnel to search data on national security vetting results. 

Further, ICE personnel also were not always aware of the various USCIS 

systems that could be used for visa tracking. Personnel we met at multiple 

locations expressed concerns that they were unaware of all systems available to 

them across DHS components and agencies, potentially limiting their 

effectiveness in carrying out their visa tracking responsibilities. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The lack of integration also posed problems for users needing to access the 

various systems. For example, ICE personnel had to retain and use anywhere 

from 10 to 40 passwords, which was cumbersome as users may log into dozens 

of systems each week, all with separate passwords. Users at every location we 

visited stated that the repeated log-ins from system to system took time and 

was often frustrating. Also, passwords expire on different dates, requiring that 

users take time to manage them. The sheer number of passwords using 

different protocols (i.e., mix of numbers, symbols, and upper and lower case 

letters) made it difficult to remember the passwords. As a result, users write 

the passwords down for easy reference, which poses a security risk. 

Maintaining multiple passwords also increased the potential for denial of 

access and system lock-outs due to password expiration. In some cases, 

system lock-outs could be resolved with a 5-minute call to the system-specific 

helpdesk. Other circumstances required ICE agents and officers to wait hours 

before they were able to regain access, further slowing their searches. In one 

case, an ICE agent was locked out of a system for an entire day for his 

password to be reset; another agent estimated it could take 2 days to regain 

access to a system. In worst case scenarios, ICE agents stated that they had to 

avoid using systems they were locked out of and instead relied on coworkers to 

access these systems for them. 

Immigration Status Data Were Not Well-Structured or Easily Accessible 

ICE agents and officers faced challenges obtaining real-time access to 

information about the immigration status of potential overstays, which is 

critical to properly validate whether or not a subject is in the United States 

legally at the time of investigation. For instance, ICE needs to know when a 

foreign national under investigation files a petition or application to change his 

or her nonimmigrant status (extend the time allowed in the country). Foreign 

nationals may also be in the process of filing asylum applications, or obtain 

permission to remain in the country through permanent resident status, 

citizenship, or employment authorization. Having access to immigration status 

data for each individual under investigation is important for ICE to make the 

correct determination of overstay status. Timely and accurate data is especially 

critical given the high volume of immigration applications received each year. 

In FY 2015, USCIS received almost 84,000 asylum applications from more than 

117,000 foreign nationals seeking permission to remain in the United States. 

However, obtaining timely immigration status information has proven difficult 

due to the unstructured manner in which data are stored. Specifically, USCIS 

employs nearly a dozen unintegrated systems to manage its immigration 

benefits processing. Because USCIS systems are “forms-driven” rather than 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

“person-centric,” each system is designed to process a particular application 

rather than to support all transactions associated with a single applicant. 

Consequently, ICE personnel had to conduct searches in multiple USCIS 

systems to compile the complete history of an individual and determine his or 

her current immigration status. These inefficiencies were further magnified by 

the lack of notifications built into USCIS systems, meaning that ICE did not 

receive an automated alert when a subject under investigation filed an 

application or received a benefit. This lengthened the amount of time required 

to search each system — multiple times in some cases — to determine a 

potential overstay’s immigration status. Field personnel told us that searching 

across multiple USCIS systems was a long, cumbersome process that could 

take several hours, or several days, depending on the case. 

Obtaining immigration status was even more problematic when ICE personnel 

could not gain access to some USCIS systems. For example, several agents and 

officers we interviewed were unable to access the RAPS system or CLAIMS 4. 

USCIS management representatives stated that access to this system was 

provided on a need-to-know basis. When an ICE user could not access this 

system, or in the event that immigration files had not been scanned or 

digitized, the user had to request the required information from USCIS 

personnel via hard copy. ICE agents and officers complained that the wait time 

could sometimes stretch to weeks or more, which delayed each case from 

moving forward and potentially resulted in investigations of overstay subjects 

that USCIS has already approved for changes of status. Conversely, USCIS 

personnel stated that the time to deliver a hard copy immigration file typically 

ranged from 2 to 8 work days, depending on the priority of the requested file. 

Nonetheless, such manual data exchanges caused delays in closing cases and 

moving on to new investigations. 

Lastly, USCIS’ CLAIMS 3, used to store immigration benefit application data, 

was not updated in a timely manner. For example, USCIS did not typically 

update CLAIMS 3 data as paper applications were received. Instead, according 

to USCIS’ Office of Information Technology personnel, immigration benefit 

applications were sent to a vendor’s facility where contractors open, scan, and 

enter application data for processing. This process could take up to 3 days, 

followed by another 1- or 2-day lag before ICE had access to view this data. 

This resulted in ICE personnel having to check the system multiple times to 

obtain updated application status and thereby make a visa overstay 

determination. 

In 2006, USCIS created a consolidated search capability, the Person Centric 

Query Service, to provide a single search capability for immigration and 

naturalization applications and transactions. Although several ICE agents and 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

officers found the service beneficial and comprehensive, personnel at four field 

locations were unaware of it or lacked access to the system. Other ICE users 

questioned the reliability or completeness of the data returned when using this 

query service. Others said that it did not include all the details they needed for 

visa overstay tracking purposes. Therefore, ICE users felt compelled to double 

check the same data in legacy systems, such as CLAIMS 3 or the Central Index 

System, to confirm or look for more in-depth information. 

Unintegrated Systems Used for Visa Overstay Tracking Persist in the 

Decentralized IT Environment 

The stove-piped systems used for visa tracking were inherited from the former 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was abolished with the creation 

of DHS in 2003. Despite efforts to improve visa system integration and 

information sharing, the CIO has not provided the necessary oversight and the 

centralized management needed to overcome the fragmentation of its assets, as 

we have repeatedly reported.12 Additionally, the ICE CIO has not provided 

adequate training or guidance to personnel in the field on how to properly use 

these IT systems to carry out visa overstay tracking. 

DHS Legacy Systems Were Not Effectively Consolidated 

In general, DHS inherited its fragmented IT systems environment from the 

former Immigration and Naturalization Service. With the creation of DHS in 

2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was abolished and 

subsequently split into three separate components: CBP, ICE, and USCIS — 

each with distinct immigration and visa-related missions. Each component 

carried forward the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service systems it 

needed to accomplish its respective mission responsibilities and support 

specific logistical and security requirements. One exception was TECS, which 

came from the Department of Treasury, but this system also was tailored 

within CBP and ICE to meet the components’ specialized needs. Over time, 

distinct IT infrastructures evolved within each of the components, resulting in 

dozens of parallel and highly specialized visa-related IT systems. Figure 3 

depicts the number of systems used by each component for visa-related 

operations.13 

12 Improvements Needed to DHS’ Information Technology Management Structure, DHS OIG-04-30, July 

2004; Progress Made in Strengthening DHS Information Technology Management, But Challenges Remain, 

DHS OIG-08-91, September 4, 2008; DHS Information Technology Management Has Improved, But
 

Challenges Remain, DHS OIG-12-82, May 4, 2012. 

13 This does not include IDENT, which is owned by the National Protection and Program Directorate.
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 3: Visa Tracking Systems Owned By The Former Immigration and
 

Naturalization Service
 

DHS Visa IT systems split across DHS 

components
 

CBP - 7 

USCIS - 11 

ICE - 8 

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

Although DHS applications and networks resided on a common platform and in 

shared data centers, component IT systems lacked integration and were still 

maintained independently by each component CIO. Each component also 

independently managed its corresponding IT maintenance schedules, IT 

support services, contractors and vendors, software licenses, and user access 

policies. 

Over time, a number of these systems have been updated or modernized ‘inhouse’ within each component. In some cases, such as USCIS’ Person Centric 

Query Service, entirely new systems were designed, developed, and 

implemented. Coordination across DHS stakeholders to gather requirements or 

obtain input was not always done to ensure individual component systems 

could support external user needs. We asked multiple ICE field office 

representatives whether requirements input had been requested during system 

upgrade or system development efforts and found that only two of nearly a 

dozen locations had been offered this opportunity. As an exception, CBP had a 

visa overstay working group in place at the time of our audit. Established in 

2011, this working group was focused on enhancing the visa overstay vetting 

process and biographic exit capabilities. It also worked with ICE to reduce the 

time needed to identify and vet potential overstays by implementing upgrades 

to systems such as LeadTrac, SEVIS, and ADIS. 

In 2012, CBP began an effort to consolidate 34 disparate data sources into a 

single system, Unified Passenger (UPAX). This effort was meant to upgrade a 

CBP system currently used by ICE for overstay vetting, and further integrate 

the numerous systems owned by CBP, USCIS, ICE, and the Department of 

State and thereby reduce the time required to review data on visa applicants 

planning to travel to the United States. Many of the systems that shared 

information with UPAX were the same systems ICE personnel used for visa 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

tracking. However, at the time of our audit, CBP had not identified all potential 

users DHS-wide based on mission need. Consequently, the system was not 

accessible to ICE field users to support their overstay investigations. None of 

the HSI agents or ERO field officers we interviewed had access to UPAX; some 

were unaware of its existence. 

Centralized Oversight Was Lacking 

Greater oversight and centralized management were needed to address the 

fragmented and unstructured visa IT environment. DHS policy states that the 

DHS CIO will oversee, manage, and consolidate all Department IT 

systems.14 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also instructs CIOs to 

focus on eliminating duplication and to rationalize their agency IT investments, 

including mission and business IT systems.15 Based on these guidelines, each 

agency CIO holds a key position in overseeing and directing how IT can best 

support mission operations, and ensuring collaboration and information 

sharing across component organizations. 

The DHS CIO had several methods for ensuring consolidation of agency IT 

investments, but these had not yet been fully executed for visa IT systems. One 

such method is the Department’s enterprise architecture approach, which 

includes broad, department-wide reviews of all IT systems used in a specific 

mission area, known as a “segment architecture.”16 The reviews are meant to 

establish a baseline architecture, or a blueprint and inventory of all systems 

used to perform common functions or capabilities across all components. 

Although the DHS CIO had established nearly 21 segment architectures since 

2011, no segment architecture for visa IT capabilities had been created. 

The DHS CIO has worked in coordination with the Department’s components to 

improve information sharing among the various systems, such as SEVIS and 

ADIS, used for visa tracking. For example, in 2013, the DHS CIO was part of a 

department-wide task force that examined how the vetting and sharing of 

information associated with visa overstays could be improved. The task force 

focused on enhancing communication between components to reduce data 

redundancy and the need to conduct manual checks. The CIO reported that 

the work done on this task force increased information sharing between at 

least two systems that are used to identify overstays. 

14 DHS Management Directive 142-02-001, Information Technology Integration and Management, February 

6, 2014. 

15 OMB Memorandum 11-29, Chief Information Officer Authorities, August 8, 2011.
 16 Segment architecture is a standard term for a particular set of IT functions that are used for one
 

purpose.
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Guidance for Field Personnel Was Inadequate 

Because ICE personnel often use over a dozen systems, additional guidance 

was needed to support visa tracking in the field. ICE personnel we spoke with 

did not know how to use the tools and technology available for overstay 

tracking despite OMB direction that users of Federal IT resources have the 

skills, knowledge, and training needed to be effective.17 For example, ICE 

officials were not familiar with the distinct functions and capabilities offered 

within each system used for overstay tracking. Some ERO officers were unclear 

on how to use ATS-P, CBP’s automated passenger tracking system, to search 

for potential overstays or determine whether individuals had boarded flights to 

leave the country. ERO officers at a separate location did not know how to add 

information on an overstay case to the TECS law enforcement database, 

commonly used across CBP and ICE. As a result, DHS personnel did not have 

access to all the information available to make informed decisions. ICE 

personnel could not conduct efficient or effective visa tracking to the extent 

that they did not know how to fully utilize system functionality and capabilities 

as intended. 

Further, ICE personnel lacked policies or guidance on appropriate system use. 

All but one of the ICE personnel we interviewed in the field were unable to 

locate any agency-wide, official guidance or checklists on systems used for visa 

tracking. Additionally, ICE management had not provided field users with 

documented procedures on which systems should be used to perform various 

steps of the investigative process. A reference list of 76 systems was available 

on the internal ICE intranet and included systems used for day-to-day 

administrative operations and training, as well as visa tracking systems. 

However, this did not include instructions on the potential uses of each system 

to accomplish the various visa overstay tracking responsibilities. 

Lastly, additional training was needed for ICE field personnel to learn how to 

use systems for overstay tracking, as well as become familiar with the distinct 

search functions associated with each system. For example, field staff at one 

location explained that systems like TECS and CLAIMS contain specific 

functions or data fields that may provide additional information on an overstay 

lead. These were commonly known and understood by primary users within 

the component that owned the system, but were unfamiliar to external 

users. ICE field personnel expressed concerns that they might miss information 

due to a lack of training on system functionality and features. 

17 OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource, Section 5(c)(3) (July 28, 2016). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

We determined that ICE offered training for new hires through the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center; however, this training covered only a few IT 

systems owned or used by ICE for visa tracking. ICE field personnel also had 

access to training online or through informal coaching methods. Nevertheless, 

ICE personnel in the field did not consider this training sufficient because of 

the online “click through” format and the lack of hands-on learning 

opportunities. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the DHS CIO continue to work with 

components to further eliminate duplication, improve information sharing, and 

properly align system access, especially for system modernization efforts, 

across DHS according to visa tracking mission requirements. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the ICE CIO assess and address the 

visa IT training needs of ICE users, including coordinating with system owners 

in other components to ensure that ICE users have the opportunity to receive 

official, hands-on training on these components’ visa IT systems as well. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the ICE CIO compile an up-to-date 

inventory of all IT systems across the Department that ICE agents and officers 

can use for visa tracking and provide documented guidance on potential uses 

of each system to accomplish the various visa overstay tracking 

responsibilities. 

Lack of an Exit System Hampered DHS’ Ability to Capture 

Accurate Departure Data 

DHS lacked a completed exit system to capture biometric data on 

nonimmigrant visitor air and land departures from the country. DHS was 

required to implement a biometric air entry-exit system for tracking foreign 

nationals by 2009.18 However, to date, DHS has not completed this effort due 

to funding and infrastructure challenges. Without a complete exit system, 

including the ability to obtain biometrics from visitors departing the country, 

DHS relied on third-party biographic data, such as commercial carrier 

passenger manifests, to confirm an individual’s exit from the country. However, 

the effectiveness of this process depended on the accuracy of the third-party 

commercial carriers’ records, which sometimes provided false departure status 

on individuals. 

18 8 United States Code 1187 (8)(A)(i) 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Exit System Not Completed as Required 

The Department lacked a system at U.S. ports of departure to capture needed 

data on exiting foreigners. ICE field personnel we interviewed commonly cited 

this as the most significant gap in the Department’s ability to conduct visa 

overstay tracking. As CBP officials repeatedly testified before Congress, the 

component lacked the personnel, facilities, and technology needed to account 

for travelers leaving the country. For example, airports in the United States had 

no designated areas or checkpoints to collect biometric data for travelers 

departing the country. Likewise, biometric land departure information was not 

captured, as most travelers crossed the borders to Mexico on foot or using their 

own vehicles and typically were not stopped for inspection.19 Additionally, 

biographic information is not regularly captured on the southern border. By 

agreement, the Canadian Government captured biographic data on individuals 

crossing the northern border into Canada and shared this information with 

CBP Border Patrol; however, it excluded data on Canadian citizens traveling 

from the United States.20 

DHS was required to implement a biometric entry-exit system for tracking 

foreign nationals by 2009, but has not completed this effort.21 Specifically, 

Congressional mandates required the design and implementation of an 

integrated system that would provide foreign national arrival and departure 

biometrics for immigration control, enforcement, and reporting. To illustrate, 

such data were needed by entities such as CBP to determine visitor 

admissibility and departure, by Department of State consular offices 

responsible for visa processing, and by ICE for visa enforcement. DHS began a 

program to develop this entry and exit system in 2003.22 Despite multiple 

pilots, such as the US-VISIT pilot program for exit systems at airports in 2009, 

virtually no progress was made prior to 2013. Moreover, GAO reported that 

DHS struggled to implement the exit system due to ineffective technology 

program management, design, and implementation practices.23 

19 CBP is able to reconcile a portion of travelers who arrive through the borders with Canada and Mexico, 

because many of those are frequent travelers whose reentrance to the United States confirms their 

previous departure.
 20 United States-Canada Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic
 

Competitiveness, Action Plan, December 2011. 21 8 United States Code 1187 (8)(A)(i). 

22 The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program was established in 

2003 to develop a means for collecting biographic and biometric data on foreign nationals passing 

through U.S. ports of entry and departure. 

23 Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS’s Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program, 

GAO-13-683, July 2013; Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and 

Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13, November 2009; Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to 

Improve Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks, GAO-08-967, 

September 2008; Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program 

Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278, February 2007. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In 2013, because of the lack of progress, Congress transferred responsibility for 

research and development of the biometric exit system to CBP.24 Since that 

time, CBP has initiated several pilots to test different technologies and 

capabilities, such as facial recognition, iris scans, and mobile fingerprint 

collection devices. 

At the time of our audit, a biometric exit system pilot was underway at 

Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. For this pilot effort, CBP 

combined traveler and airline data with real time images of travelers departing 

the country to confirm departure. CBP reported that the confirmation rate was 

approximately 98 percent for travelers who had their picture taken at their 

departure date. CBP plans to begin implementing the biometric exit system in 

2018 at a number of airports with the highest volume of travelers. CBP officials 

anticipate that this system will provide more reliable data on departing 

travelers and a mechanism for complete and accurate matching of entry/exit 

records. 

Recent legislation increased oversight requirements for Department CIOs 

across the Federal Government.25 As a result, the DHS CIO is currently 

implementing additional oversight plans to monitor and provide feedback on 

major IT programs, such as the biometric exit system, before acquisition 

decisions are made. 

Reliance on Third-Party Data on Departing Visitors 

In the absence of a comprehensive biometric exit system at all U.S. ports of 

departure, DHS relied on third-party departure data, such as commercial 

carrier passenger manifests, to confirm an individual’s exit from the country.26 

Identifying overstays involved matching this third party exit data against 

biographic and biometric data collected at land, air, and sea ports of entry. 

Specifically, CBP collected biographic and biometric data such as fingerprints 

from travelers entering the United States, and recorded it in DHS systems, 

including ADIS, TECS, and/or IDENT.27 CBP receives commercial passenger 

and crew biographical data directly from air and sea carriers through the 

Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) prior to the passenger and 

crew’s arrival in or departure from the United States. APIS then shares the data 

24 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6 (2013). 

25 Public Law 113-291.
 26 Commercial carriers are required by law to submit passenger manifests to CBP, which are then
 

recorded as arrivals or departures from the United States.
 27 Biographic data is stored in ADIS or TECS, and biometric data is stored in IDENT.
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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with ADIS, which works as a central repository and automatically matches 

arrival and departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays. 

Both ADIS and APIS share information with ATS-P. ATS-P vets arrival and 

departure information and is used by ICE personnel to confirm a passenger’s 

onboard status. DHS’ process for capturing and checking exit data is depicted 

in figure 4. 

Figure 4: DHS Process to Compile Exit Data28 

Data sent to APIS 

Air & Sea 

Carriers confirm reservations 

and passengers onboard 

Forms processed and 

stored in TECS 

Land – Southern Border 

Travelers voluntarily return 

Arrival/Departure forms 

Data sent to ADIS and 

TECS 

Land – Northern Border 

Canada reports on thirdcountry nationals (non-US or 

non-Canadian) 

CBP 

Departure data 

matched & stored in 

ADIS and 

vetted in ATS-P 

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

The effectiveness of this process depended on the accuracy of records that DHS 

obtained from third-party commercial carriers, which occasionally provided 

incorrect departure or arrival status on individuals. Although CBP reported 

that ADIS had over a 90 percent match rate for individuals who entered the 

country by any given means and then departed by air, officials acknowledged 

data quality issues with specific commercial airline carriers. HSI agents and 

ERO officers also complained of multiple instances of false ADIS reporting on 

departures. For example, ADIS sometimes falsely reported (1) that individuals 

were still in the country after they had already departed, or (2) that individuals 

had left the country when they were still physically present in the United 

States. The latter occurred when airlines or other commercial carriers 

28 CBP uses other data collection and data sources to track departures from the United States. This 

includes CBP scanning documents of visitors departing the United States on the Northern and Southern 

borders during periodic “Pulse and Surge” operations which is tracked in TECS and shared with ADIS. 

Additionally, ICE provides CBP with information on individuals who have exited the country through 

deportation which is then stored in IDENT and ADIS. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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inadvertently reported that individuals were on board when they were not. CBP 

officials stated there is ongoing work to identify these issues and improve the 

match rate by monitoring and reviewing outbound flight data. 29 

ICE agents and officers were unable to tell us how often subjects of 

investigation were incorrectly recorded as having left the country. Such false 

departure information resulted in ERO officers closing visa overstay 

investigations of dangerous individuals, such as suspected criminals, who were 

actually still in the United States and could pose a threat to national security. 

For example, an ERO officer stated that a suspect under investigation was 

listed as having left the country, but had given his ticket to a family member 

and was still residing in the United States. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 4: We recommend the DHS CIO continue to assess current 

plans to expedite development and implementation of a biometric exit system 

and ensure continued progress through dedicated reviews, acquisition 

oversight, and corrective action plans, as appropriate. 

Recommendation 5: We recommend the DHS CIO continue its efforts to 

evaluate the extent to which the data used to develop overstay estimates are 

accurate and reliable, identify and document any remaining gaps and 

limitations, and identify how the data may be improved. 

Unintegrated Systems and the Lack of an Exit System Resulted 

in Poor Overstay Reporting and Inefficient Tracking 

Given the unintegrated systems and the lack of a biometric departure system, 

DHS could not account for all visa overstays in its reporting to Congress. 

Moreover, the use of inefficient systems in the visa tracking process 

contributed to case backlogs and diverted resources from locating actual 

overstays that could pose public safety or homeland security risks. 

Inability to Ensure Complete Overstay Reporting to Congress 

DHS could not ensure it accounted for the total number of overstays in the 

country in its annual report to Congress, known as the Entry/Exit Overstay 

Report. The report includes data, by country and by certain classes of 

admission, on overstays by foreign visitors to the United States who were 

29 CBP reported that APIS was over 94 percent accurate at matching flight manifests. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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expected to leave by a specified time. DHS completed its first and only overstay 

report in 2015 and at the time of our audit was working to compile the report 

for the subsequent year. The 2015 report had been sent to Congress for its 

oversight purposes and posted on the DHS website for viewing by the general 

public.30 

DHS recognized that the number of overstays listed in its 2015 report to 

Congress did not account for all visa holders who visited the United States. The 

report listed 527,127 nonimmigrant visitors as overstays, out of approximately 

45 million visitors in 2015. However, the report’s overstay figure did not 

include individuals who had traveled to the country on student visas or anyone 

who crossed the border by land from Canada or Mexico. Because of unreliable 

collection of departure data at these ports of entry, the Department could not 

account for these potential overstays. Therefore, the report was limited in that 

it only included individuals traveling to the United States by air or sea on 

business travel or tourism. 

Further, the Department could not provide assurance that all nonimmigrants 

who overstayed their period of admission had been caught. DHS’ inability to 

accurately confirm the departures of all nonimmigrants from the United States 

at the end of their authorized admission periods prohibited ICE agents and 

officers from fully accomplishing their immigration enforcement and removal 

responsibilities. To illustrate, ICE agents and officers arrested only 3,402, or 

less than 0.4 percent, of the people who potentially overstayed their visas in 

2015.31 In some cases, the individuals arrested had been reported in DHS 

systems as having already left the United States. Because this information was 

not recorded, ICE personnel were unable to provide an exact number when 

asked during our audit. 

30 Entry/Exit Overstay Report, Fiscal Year 2015, January 19, 2016. 

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15DHSEntryandExitOverstayReport.pdf 

31 Of the 971,305 leads sent to CTCEU that were not closed through automated vetting or manual 

closure, 3,402 arrests were made. Of the total 3,402 individuals arrested, 777 were cases sent to the field 

in previous fiscal years. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Inefficient Use of Time and Effort to Track Visa Overstays 

Given the inefficient systems and management processes, visa overstay 

tracking is a laborious process. It can take months for HSI personnel to make a 

determination on whether a subject legitimately overstayed a visa and send the 

case to the field for further investigation to conclude whether he or she was 

deemed a risk to public safety or national security. Although HSI agents 

utilized a triage approach to investigate highest priority cases first, the laborintensive process of researching and cross-checking numerous data sources 

slowed visa tracking operations. HSI field personnel stated they routinely spend 

a significant amount of time, several days in some instances, to manually 

extract and compile data to support a decision on whether to actively pursue a 

potential overstay. Working in this manner contributed to the inability of 

CTCEU to address and close a backlog of more than 1.2 million cases that were 

in continuous monitoring from previous fiscal years as well as FY 2015.32 

Amid the backlog, HSI agents in the field have experienced increases in their 

workloads as the number of overstay leads has increased by 65 percent over 

the last 3 years (see figure 5). Specifically, the number of leads that CTCEU 

sent to HSI agents in the field increased from 6,033 in FY 2013 to 9,968 in FY 

2015. Without better IT systems, ICE will continue to face inefficiencies and 

backlogs in overstay investigation cases that otherwise might have been 

avoided. 

Figure 5: Number of Overstay Leads Sent to HSI from FY 2013 to FY 2015 

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

FY 13 FY 14 FY 15

Number of Visa Overstay

Leads

Fiscal year

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

Furthermore, ICE personnel lost a significant amount of time investigating 

individuals who should not have been considered overstays. The diversion of 

32 CTCEU reportedly conducts continuous monitoring as part of its investigative work, which includes 

checking social media and doing manual reviews for individuals with incomplete information and 

juveniles. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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time and effort prohibited ICE personnel from locating actual overstays who 

potentially posed public safety or homeland security risks. To illustrate, 

CTCEU HSI analysts and agents spent significant time working on open cases 

during FY 2015. However, more than 40 percent of the cases sent to HSI 

agents in the field were closed because the individuals had departed the 

country or had applied for or received immigration benefits, such as a visa 

extension, to extend their time in the United States (see table 3). 

Table 3: Percentage of HSI Investigations that Were Not Overstays 

Potential Overstays Sent to HSI Agents in the Field Number Percent of 

total leads* 

Nonimmigrants who were not actual visa overstays 4,148 42%

 -- Those who had departed the country 1,649 17% 

 --Those who had applied for/received USCIS Benefits 2,499 25% 

Nonimmigrants who were actual visa overstays 5,820 58% 

Total vetted overstay suspects sent for investigation 9,968 100% 

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data 

As table 3 shows, approximately 17 percent, or 1,649 of 9,968 overstay leads 

sent to HSI field agents for investigation in FY 2015 were closed because the 

subjects had already departed the country. In one case, an HSI agent found 

that 9 of his 48 leads closed in FY 2015 were for investigating subjects who 

had already exited. The agent estimated these 9 leads consumed a total of 225 

investigative hours. In a second case, an HSI agent reportedly spent 2 months 

searching for an individual listed as still in the country, only to find that the 

subject had departed the prior year. In a third case, an HSI agent had ICE 

headquarters remove 73 leads from his caseload in FY 2015 after determining 

the suspects had departed the country; 15 of them had left the year before. 

Further, table 3 shows that 25 percent, or 2,499, of the overstay cases referred 

to HSI field agents for investigation in FY 2015 had applied for, or had been 

approved for, immigration benefits. In one case, an HSI agent had ICE 

headquarters remove 53 suspects from his caseload after determining that they 

had applied to USCIS for visa extensions or immigration benefits. In a second 

case, an ICE officer estimated that he spent more than 50 hours on a single 

suspect, only to find the individual had applied for a USCIS benefit and should 

not have been categorized as an overstay. In a third instance, an HSI agent 

spent 9 days checking databases, making site visits, and conducting interviews 

to search for an overstay suspect who had applied for permanent residence 

after marrying a U.S. citizen, which made the subject automatically eligible to 

stay in the country. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The time wasted on investigating false leads increased the risk that legitimate 

overstays were being overlooked. In some instances, overstay suspects 

committed crimes while ICE agents remained mired in the inefficient overstay 

tracking process. To illustrate, one ERO officer stated that a suspect committed 

crimes, including domestic abuse and drug-related offenses, while the officer 

waited for the suspect’s immigration files to arrive from USCIS. In another 

example, an HSI agent’s pursuit of an overstay suspected of narco-terrorism 

activities was delayed for at least 6 months while the agent waited for a file 

from USCIS. Further, ICE officials were concerned that while time was spent on 

individuals who had departed or lawfully remained in country, others who 

actually posed public safety or homeland security risks could go undetected or 

uninvestigated in a timely manner. 

OIG Analysis of Management Comments 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Director of the 

Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office. We have included a copy of the 

comments in their entirety in appendix B. 

In the comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and provided 

details on the Department’s progress in addressing potential security risks 

created by visitors who remain in the United States after their period of 

admission has expired. Specifically, DHS mentioned recent efforts to draft the 

FY 2016 overstay report, which will include more than 97 percent of all 

nonimmigrants admitted by air and sea to the United States during the fiscal 

year. DHS also included information on progress made toward implementing a 

biometric exit solution and highlighted its recent facial recognition pilot effort 

conducted during FY 2016. We reviewed these comments and have provided 

our evaluation below. 

Recommendation 1: We recommend the DHS CIO continue to work with 

components to further eliminate duplication, improve information sharing, and 

properly align system access, especially for system modernization efforts, 

across DHS according to visa tracking mission requirements. 

Management Comments 

In response to recommendation 1, the CIO concurred, stating that as systems 

are modernized the DHS Office of the CIO will help identify potential gaps in 

services resulting from changes to component programs. The Office of the CIO 

indicated that its involvement will help ensure system users are provided with 

the information they need across components as modernization efforts 

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continue. The CIO estimated that these actions would be completed by October 

31, 2017. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree that the DHS CIO’s continued involvement in system modernization 

efforts will help to identify gaps in service and ensure that appropriate access 

to necessary information is granted to ICE personnel. We look forward to 

receiving further updates on how these efforts may lead to improved system 

integration and access. This recommendation is open and resolved. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the ICE CIO assess and address the 

visa IT training needs of ICE users, including coordinating with system owners 

in other components to ensure that ICE users have the opportunity to receive 

official, hands-on training on these components’ visa IT systems as well. 

Management Comments 

Responding to recommendation 2, the ICE CIO concurred, and outlined a plan 

to identify and address training gaps for ICE personnel. The ICE CIO’s plan 

included collaborating with HSI and ERO to identify training gaps, working 

with internal and external DHS partners to identify training points of contact 

for systems used for overstay tracking, and outreach to ensure training options 

are available to system users. The ICE CIO anticipated that these actions 

would be completed by April 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree with the ICE CIO’s approach to develop a plan to identify and address 

training gaps for visa-related IT systems used by ICE personnel. We look 

forward to receiving further updates as this plan is implemented. This 

recommendation is open and resolved. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the ICE CIO compile an up-to-date 

inventory of all IT systems across the Department that ICE agents and officers 

can use for visa tracking and provide documented guidance on potential uses 

of each system to accomplish the various visa overstay tracking 

responsibilities. 

Management Comments 

The ICE CIO concurred with recommendation 3 and stated that the ICE Office 

of the CIO will complete a comprehensive list of all visa-related systems across 

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the Department, including system owners and training points of contact, and 

distribute the information to ICE system users. The CIO estimated that these 

actions will be completed by April 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree with the ICE Office of the CIO’s efforts to complete a comprehensive 

list of all visa related systems across the Department. We look forward to 

receiving updates as this list is developed and distributed to ICE system users. 

This recommendation is open and resolved. 

Recommendation 4: We recommend the DHS CIO continue to assess current 

plans to expedite development and implementation of a biometric exit system 

and ensure continued progress through dedicated reviews, acquisition 

oversight, and corrective action plans, as appropriate. 

Management Comments 

The DHS CIO concurred with recommendation 4, agreeing with the need for a 

biometric exit capability to be deployed in an expeditious manner. The CIO 

stated that the Office of the CIO will continue to provide governance and 

support to ensure the biometric exit program is prepared for the Acquisition 

Lifecycle Framework milestones, and anticipated approval of the biometric exit 

system’s acquisition lifecycle framework gate review by August 30, 2017. 

OIG Analysis 

We recognize the DHS CIO’s ongoing role in providing governance and support 

for the biometric exit program as part of the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. 

We look forward to learning more following the August 30, 2017, acquisition 

lifecycle framework gate review. This recommendation is open and resolved. 

Recommendation 5: We recommend the DHS CIO continue its efforts to 

evaluate the extent to which the data used to develop overstay estimates are 

accurate and reliable, identify and document any remaining gaps and 

limitations, and identify how the data may be improved. 

Management Comments 

Responding to recommendation 5, the DHS CIO concurred and indicated that 

the Office of the Chief Information Officer has partnered with Department 

components to help standardize overstay data. Further, data quality will 

improve as a result of biometric matching and the closing of information gaps 

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in land departure reporting. The DHS CIO stated that the Office of the CIO will 

continue to monitor the program for gaps in data quality, availability, and 

consistency. The CIO estimated that these actions will be complete by 

September 30, 2017. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree with the actions described by the DHS CIO to partner with DHS 

components to help standardize overstay data and continue to monitor the 

biometric program for gaps in data quality, availability, and consistency. We 

look forward to receiving updates once these actions are completed. This 

recommendation is open and resolved. 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special 

reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

As part of our ongoing responsibilities to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, 

and economy of Departmental programs and operations, we conducted an 

audit to determine the effectiveness of IT systems to support ICE’s ability to 

review, track, and share information associated with visas. 

We researched and reviewed Federal laws, management directives, and agency 

plans and strategies related to IT systems, management, and governance. We 

obtained published reports, documents, and news articles regarding ICE’s 

management and use of IT. Additionally, we reviewed recent GAO and DHS OIG 

reports to identify prior findings and recommendations. We used this 

information to establish a data collection approach that consisted of focused 

information-gathering meetings, documentation analysis, site visits, and 

system demonstrations to accomplish our audit objective. 

We held meetings and teleconferences with ICE staff at headquarters and field 

offices. Collectively, we conducted more than 50 interviews, including meetings 

with headquarters officials, field office staff, and system users, to learn about 

ICE IT functions, processes, and capabilities. At headquarters, we met with ICE 

CTCEU and Office of the CIO representatives, SEVIS program management, 

OBIM, CBP’s Office of Field Operations, National Targeting Center staff, and 

USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate personnel. We 

interviewed ICE Office of the CIO and CBP Office of Information and Technology 

officials including division directors and program managers to discuss their 

roles and responsibilities related to ICE IT management. In addition, we met 

with DHS Office of the CIO staff. 

We visited ICE HSI and ERO field locations including New York, NY; Boston, 

MA; Los Angeles and San Francisco, CA; Houston, TX; and Miami, FL. At ICE 

field locations, we met with field office directors, HSI agents, ERO officers, task 

force attachés from the Department of State and USCIS, and other system 

users to understand IT development practices, user requirements, and system 

use in the field. We discussed the existing IT environment, the extent to which 

it supported mission needs, and user involvement and communication with 

headquarters. We collected supporting documents about the ICE IT 

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environment, IT systems, and other current initiatives and technology related 

improvement initiatives. 

We conducted this performance audit between May 2016 and September 2016 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

IT Systems Used for Visa Tracking by ICE Headquarters and 

Field Personnel 

System Owner Description 

Advance Passenger 

Information System 

(APIS) 

CBP Receives passenger and crew biographic data from 

commercial air and sea carriers prior to arrival or 

departure from the United States for screening 

purposes. 

Analytical Framework 

for Intelligence 

CBP Aggregates and indexes data from a variety of DHS 

source systems to facilitate intelligence gathering and 

assists users in building intelligence profiles. 

Arrival and Departure 

Information System 

(ADIS) 

CBP Stores biographic information of travelers entering and 

departing ports of entry and is the primary means of 

identifying visa overstays. 

Automated Targeting 

System-Passenger 

(ATS-P) 

CBP Supports CBP border screening and DOS visa 

adjudication by providing users with national security 

vetting results and recommendations for individuals 

seeking entry to the United States. 

TECS Modernization CBP Used to perform border screening of people and goods 

seeking entrance to the United States. 

Unified Passenger 

(UPAX) 

CBP Aggregates data in a consolidated, automated interface 

to provide continuous vetting of foreign nationals from 

application through the duration of their visa. 

GangNet (Cal/Gang ®) Commercial 

(CSRA) 

Stores profiles of suspected gang members and allows 

law enforcement to collaborate and share data on gang 

activities, their members, and affiliates. 

Consolidated Lead 

Evaluation and 

Reporting 

Commercial 

(Thomson 

Reuters) 

Maintains data on individuals and companies in a 

searchable database from a variety of public and 

private sources. 

Consular Consolidated 

Database Indices 

DOS Maintains current and archived data from all 

international U.S. consular posts, including immigrant 

and nonimmigrant visa applications, U.S. passport 

information, and outside information from the Social 

Security Administration. 

National Crime 

Information Center 

FBI Houses the FBI's criminal data, such as suspected 

terrorists lists and criminal histories, and can be 

queried by law enforcement agencies nationwide. 

Enforcement 

Integrated Database 

for Law Enforcement 

ICE Serves as booking application system for ERO agents to 

enter subject details when making an arrest. 

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System Owner Description 

ENFORCE Alien 

Removal Module 

ICE Maintains information on deportation and removal 

records that is used for case management purposes by 

ICE ERO personnel. 

Enforce Integrated 

Database 

ICE Provides a centralized platform of law enforcement 

systems that can search across multiple data sources 

and case management modules. 

FALCON Search and 

Analysis System 

(ICE implementation 

of Palantir) 

ICE Aggregates and analyzes historical data from DHS 

systems and databases on individuals previously 

encountered during DHS investigations. 

LeadTrac ICE Receives visa overstay leads for national security or 

public safety threats and gathers information on the 

subjects in a case management system. 

Pre-Adjudicated 

Threat Recognition 

Intelligence 

Operations Team 

ICE Receives and vets visa applications from State 

Department consular posts for admissibility against 

derogatory information from a variety of law 

enforcement databases. 

Student And 

Exchange Visitor 

Information System 

(SEVIS) 

ICE Receives, tracks, and shares biographic and 

immigration data on approved educational institutions, 

exchange visitor programs, and nonimmigrant students 

and visitors to monitor and report on visa holders' 

status and compliance. 

Investigative Case 

Management (ICE 

TECS Modernization) 

ICE Aggregates information from law enforcement 

databases, facilitates sharing among various 

Government agencies, and serves as a case 

management tool for HSI personnel. 

Automated Biometric 

Identification System 

(IDENT) 

NPPD - 

OBIM 

Receives, matches, stores and shares biometric data in 

an interface used by DHS components to correlate 

identifying biometric data with associated biographic 

data. 

Secondary Inspection 

Tool 

NPPD-OBIM Supplements entry/exit screening by cross-referencing 

an individual's biometric information with the 

biographic and biometric information previously 

captured during the immigration or visa process. 

National Law 

Enforcement 

Telecommunications 

System 

State-owned 

and 

operated 

Transmits law enforcement information and notices in 

a messaging system to facilitate information sharing 

among state and local law enforcement agencies. 

Alien Change of 

Address Request 

Database 

USCIS Maintains records of foreign nationals' petitions for 

change of address in a database. 

Central Index System USCIS Houses historical data on individuals applying for 

immigrant and nonimmigrant benefits and status, 

including violators of immigration law. 

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System Owner Description 

Computer Linked 

Application 

Information 

Management System 

3.0 (CLAIMS 3) 

USCIS Maintains data and supports the end-to-end 

adjudication process for applications and petitions 

related to immigration. 

Computer Linked 

Application 

Information 

Management System 

4.0 (CLAIMS 4) 

USCIS Maintains data and supports the end-to-end 

adjudication process for applications for naturalization. 

Customer Profile 

Management System 

USCIS Is a repository of USCIS biometric and biographic data 

on applicants for immigration benefits. 

Enterprise Document 

Management System 

USCIS Contains records of digitized paper A-File that can be 

searched by law enforcement. 

Fraud Detection and 

National Security Data 

System 

USCIS Records, tracks, and shares information associated 

with immigration-related fraud or national security 

cases, and is the primary case management tool for 

USCIS' Fraud Detection and National Security 

directorate. 

National Appointment 

Scheduling 

System/InfoPass 

USCIS Records and tracks appointments across USCIS, 

including individuals applying for immigration benefits. 

National File Tracking 

System 

USCIS Maintains record of the physical location of an A-File. 

Person Centric Query 

Service 

USCIS Queries multiple USCIS data systems and returns 

aggregated results. 

Refugees, Asylum And 

Parole System (RAPS) 

USCIS Maintains and tracks refugee and asylum data, 

including applications and interview appointments; 

administers benefits; and generates data used for 

reporting purposes and national security referral cases 

from a single database. 

Source: OIG-generated from DHS data 

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Appendix D 

Office of IT Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Kristen Bernard, Division Director 

Craig Adelman, Audit Manager 

Anna Hamlin, Senior Program Analyst 

Theresa Lowell, Program Analyst 

David Bunning, Referencer 

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Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Acting Director, Office of Biometric Identity Management, National Protection 

and Programs Directorate 

Acting Director, Service Center Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services 

Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Information Technology, Customs and 

Border Protection 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Audit Liaison 

National Protection and Programs Directorate Audit Liaison 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Audit Liaison 

Customs and Border Protection Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs 

at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click on the red 

"Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at (800) 323-8603, fax our 

hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305