Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2162 | March 25, 2020 Page 1 of 27

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Michael H. Michmerhuizen

Cathleen M. Shrader

Fort Wayne, Indiana

Shannon L. Robinson

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Justin Harrison

Bloomington, Indiana

Beth Friedman Kirk

Bloomington, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

K.F., et al.,

Appellants,

v. 

B.B., et al.,

Appellees.

Termination: 

Adoption Agency, 

Appellant, 

March 25, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-AD-2162 

Appeal from the Monroe Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Stephen R. Galvin, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos. 

53C07-1905-AD-50, 53C07-1906-

JT-316 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2162 | March 25, 2020 Page 2 of 27

v.

B.B., et al.,

Appellees.

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] This is a consolidated appeal of two cases that were tried together: the adoption 

of an infant born on June 1, 2019, and a sister case terminating the biological 

parents’ parental rights as to the child. The appellants, K.F. and R.H., 

(adoptive parents) appeal the trial court’s decision that invalidated B.B. (Father)

and J.A.P.’s (Mother) (collectively, birth parents) consents to their child’s 

adoption. The adoptive parents seek to set aside the judgment, claiming that

their attorney should have recused himself because he was a potential witness at 

trial and that the birth parents failed to demonstrate that their consents to the 

adoption were not knowing and voluntary. Heartland Adoption Agency 

(Heartland) asserts that the judgment must be reversed because the evidence 

established that the birth parents’ consents were knowing and voluntary as a 

matter of law and that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary 

judgment. 

[2] We affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] The birth parents began a romantic relationship with each other in March 2017. 

At the time, Father was sixteen years old and Mother was fourteen years old. 

Several months later, Mother became pregnant and told her mother 

(Grandmother) about it. Grandmother permitted Mother to withdraw from 

high school and continue online study. The couple’s son was born on February 

10, 2018, and Mother again became pregnant in August of 2018. 

[4] Mother contemplated adoption from the outset of the second pregnancy. She 

did not initially tell Grandmother of the pregnancy because she was concerned 

about her reaction. Father, however, informed his mother (Ruby) of the 

second pregnancy, and she suggested that the couple consider placing the child 

for adoption because of the couple’s financial hardships. 

[5] On May 16, 2019, Father contacted attorney and owner of Heartland, Don 

Francis, who was a close family friend, about a possible adoption. Francis had 

previously assisted Father’s family with various legal issues over the years. 

When the two met, Francis handed Father a packet of adoption-related 

materials and forms from Heartland that included an adoption plan and various 

forms for Mother to sign. They also discussed Mother’s emancipation 

possibilities. At that time, Father believed that Francis was working on the 

couple’s behalf. Although Mother had not met Francis, she signed and dated a 

one-page adoption plan and a “Mother’s Notice of Intent to Relinquish 

Parental Rights and Notice of Intent to Consent to Adoption” on May 16, 
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2019. Appellant’s Appendix at 82-84. Mother acknowledged in the plan 

document that she had arranged for the child’s adoption. 

[6] The birth parents met with Francis on May 21, 2019, to obtain additional 

information about the adoption process and Mother’s emancipation. Mother 

told Francis that she did not want Grandmother to know about the baby or the 

adoption because of concern over her reaction. Thereafter, Grandmother 

signed an emancipation document that Francis had prepared. Francis set up 

medical appointments for Mother throughout the pregnancy and he attended 

some of those appointments. Francis also continued to advise the birth parents 

about the emancipation process and Medicaid eligibility, and he offered to 

obtain counseling for Mother. Over a sixteen-day period, Francis had supplied 

the birth parents with nearly fifteen forms to complete and sign. 

[7] The adoptive parents were married on November 11, 2017, after dating for 

about six years. The couple had been pursuing adoption options for some time 

and were certified foster parents. The adoptive parents paid Francis a total of 

$41,000 to complete an adoption for them. 

[8] In late May 2019, Francis contacted them about meeting the birth parents. 

Because the adoptive father was working, the adoptive mother and her sister-inlaw travelled to Bloomington to meet the birth parents and their first child. The

birth parents told them that they wanted to place the baby for adoption because 

of financial issues and the difficulty they would have in supporting an 

additional family member. 
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[9] On the day after Memorial Day, the adoptive parents drove to Bloomington to 

attend a doctor’s appointment with Mother. Francis met them in the parking 

lot of the physician’s office, and he had prepared a form entitled “Father’s 

Consent to Termination of Parental Rights and Consent to Adoption” for 

Father to sign. Transcript Vol. V, Exhibit P. The adoptive father overheard 

Francis tell Father that the purpose of the document was to terminate the birth 

father’s rights as a father. Father signed the document and acknowledged in the 

consent form that he was not under “undue influence, duress, or improper 

pressure in signing the consent; he had “carefully considered” the reasons for 

adoption, he was aware that once he signed, he had “no legal claim” to the 

child, the document was irrevocable, and he understood that attorneys Francis 

and Michelle Domer represented the adoptive parents and not him, and that he 

had the right to consult with an attorney. Transcript Vol. I at 5, Exhibit P. 

Notwithstanding these terms, Francis told Father that “they could stop [the 

adoption] at any time.” Transcript Vol. III at 82-83. Francis did not advise 

Father about the consequences of signing the document; nor did he tell them 

that they could seek independent legal counsel. Father’s consent form was filed 

with the trial court on May 29, 2019, as an attachment to the adoption petition. 

[10] Mother gave birth to the child on June 1, 2019, with Father and the adoptive 

parents present at the hospital. Following the delivery, the adoptive mother

told Father that the baby was the birth parents’ and that if they were having 

second thoughts about the adoption it was fine, they would not be mad, but 

they needed to let them know. Father could not recall all of the conversation, 
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but he admitted that he would not have put the adoptive parents through the 

process had he not intended for the adoption to proceed. At the time, no one 

expressed any reservations or doubts about continuing with the adoption.

Several hours after the birth, however, Mother realized that it was “time to

hand [the baby] over but [she] didn’t want to.” Transcript Vol. II at 135. Mother 

said that the nurses were telling her she was doing a really nice thing, but she 

“wanted somebody to tell [her] I think you should . . . think about it more.” Id. 

at 136. 

[11] Father contacted Francis about signing additional paperwork so the baby could 

leave the hospital with the adoptive parents. Francis and Domer arrived at the 

hospital, and the birth parents executed a consent for the child’s immediate 

placement. Shortly thereafter, a clinical social worker, Kathryn Boeck, 

interviewed Mother and Father for about fifteen minutes regarding how they 

felt about proceeding with the adoption and whether they felt coerced. Boeck 

found Mother to be pleasant and alert, and Mother volunteered that she did not 

feel any pressure about moving forward with the adoption. 

[12] The couple volunteered to Boeck that “they did not have the means to support 

the child in order to give [the baby] a good life,” and Mother believed that the 

adoption was in the child’s best interests. Id. at 250. Mother told Boeck that 

she thought it was the best thing for the child and she wanted to help other 

people. Boeck’s notes recited that both birth parents “are in agreement with 

adoption and [the birth mother] does not feel coerced and is not under the 
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influence of medication that would impair her judgment.” Transcript Vol. III at 

2-3, 5.

[13] When Francis and Domer returned to the hospital room, Mother signed a 

“Relinquishment of Custody” and a “Consent to Termination of Parental 

Rights and Consent to Adoption.” Id. at 2-5, 27. Mother agreed in writing that 

she was not subject to undue influence, duress, or pressure from her family or 

friends; that “[she consented] to the adoption of [her] baby boy born June 1, 

2019;” and that she believed the adoption to be in the best interests of her baby 

and family; that she understood that upon execution she had no legal claim to 

the child and the consent was irrevocable; that the consent was permanent and 

could not be revoked; and that she understood Francis and Domer were not her 

attorneys and were attorneys for the adoptive couple. Transcript Vol. V, Exhibit 

1. Just above her signature was language stating, “[t]his termination of 

parental rights and consent to adoption was executed voluntarily and 

knowingly. I understand this document will be filed with the court and is 

irrevocable.” Id. 

[14] A hospital nurse authorized the baby’s discharge the following day. Prior to the 

release, Grandmother arrived at the hospital and realized that Mother had the 

baby and had authorized the adoption. Grandmother was very angry and 

emotional about Mother’s decision to allow the adoption. 

[15] The baby and the adoptive parents left the hospital together approximately 

thirty-seven hours after the birth. When the birth parents left the hospital, 
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Father attempted to contact Francis because he and Mother wanted the baby 

returned to them. Father believed that Francis could—and would—stop the 

adoption at any time. Moreover, Mother remembered Francis telling her that 

she had thirty days after she signed the forms to withdraw her consent, although 

it would be “hard and difficult.” Transcript Vol. II at 139-42. 

[16] On June 3, 2019, Father texted Francis stating, “hey don . . . we can’t do it don 

please fix this . . . do please call me. . . .” Transcript Vol. V at 239. That same 

day, the birth parents submitted a letter to the court, seeking to withdraw their 

consents. Francis texted Father on June 8, indicating that he was “not mad” 

and that he needed to know how Mother and Father wanted to proceed. Id. at 

241. Father responded that he wanted the adoption revoked “and custody

[returned] to us.” Id. Francis did not answer, and the trial court appointed 

counsel for the birth parents. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded 

temporary custody to the adoptive parents and set the matter for trial. 

[17] Thereafter, Heartland petitioned for termination of parental rights, and Mother 

contested the adoption and sought to withdraw her consent. Heartland filed a 

motion for summary judgment, seeking a determination that the birth parents’ 

consents were voluntary as a matter of law. Father filed an affidavit in 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment averring, among other things, 

that 

33. I executed the Consent on May 23, 2019, because [Francis] 

recommended that I do so, because I thought [Mother] wanted 
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the adoption, and because I was concerned about supporting two 

children financially based on my income. 

. . .

41. [Mother] and I immediately regretted that we let [the baby] 

leave the hospital without us. 

42. I realized that [Mother] and I were not communicating to 

each other how much we both wanted to avoid the adoption and 

raise [the baby] together. 

Transcript Vol. V, Exhibit N. The trial court denied Heartland’s motion for 

summary judgment and the adoption and termination matters were 

consolidated for a two-day trial that commenced on August 15, 2019. Francis 

and Domer represented the adoptive parents and Heartland throughout the 

proceedings.

[18] Before and during the hearing, all parties were aware that Francis could be a 

potential witness in the case. Nonetheless, the adoptive parents did not object 

to Francis’s representation. At one point during cross-examination, Francis 

challenged a statement that Mother made about what he had allegedly told her 

about the adoption process. There were other occasions where Francis sought 

to interject his comments into the record, yet the few objections regarding 

Francis’s comments were overruled and there was no further inquiry by the 

parties or the trial court about a potential conflict of interest with regard to 

Francis. 
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[19] Although Francis’s co-counsel was at the trial, she had not entered an 

appearance for the adoptive parents. Francis acknowledged to the trial court 

that his co-counsel would enter an appearance for the adoptive parents and 

“continue on” if he had “to get up as a witness.” Transcript Vol. II at 4. As 

Francis was never called as a witness, he continued his representation of the 

adoptive parents with no objection to that representation throughout the 

remainder of the trial. 

[20] Mother presented the testimony of Peter Finn, a professor in Indiana 

University’s Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences. Dr. Finn was 

qualified as an expert regarding an individual’s decision-making process from 

early adolescence through middle adulthood. Dr. Finn testified that 

adolescents are more impulsive than adults and are sensitive to “social 

evaluation” by others. Id. at 181-82. 

[21] Dr. Finn had interviewed Mother prior to trial and found the following factors 

germane to the issue of Mother’s consent: emancipation, ambivalence, and 

Mother’s belief that Francis was assisting her throughout her pregnancy and the 

adoption process. Dr. Finn also testified that Mother was likely pressured and 

was susceptible to undue influence from Grandmother concerning her placing 

the child for adoption. 

[22] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order on September 16, 2019, 

denying both the adoption and termination of parental rights petitions. The 
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trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law provided in relevant part 

that 

8. [The birth parents] were ignorant of the full import and 

consequences of signing the consents for adoption. They did not 

understand that the consents, once signed, were irrevocable and 

final. [The birth parents] both believed that Mr. Francis was 

their attorney. They believed he was acting on their behalf and 

protecting their interests. Based on statements by Mr. Francis, 

both believed at the time of signing that the adoption could be 

stopped prior to filing. . . .

9. [The birth parents] both testified that Mr. Francis created the 

impression that he was their attorney and was representing them 

in the adoption. Mr. Francis was a long time, trusted friend of

[Father’s] mother and father. He was the best man in [Father’s]

father’s wedding. [Father] had known him all his life. [Francis] 

drafted an Agreed Entry of Emancipation for [Mother]. He 

offered to guide [the birth parents] through the adoption process. 

Crucially, he never told them that he was not representing them 

and that he was representing the potential adoptive parents. 

10. Through his actions, Mr. Francis created and confirmed the 

false impression that he was acting as the attorney for [the birth

parents]. He failed to adequately disclose the fact that he was 

representing [the adoptive parents] to the [birth parents].

11. When [Father] handed his signed consent to Mr. Francis on 

May 23, 2019, he was under the impression that he was 

providing this document to his own attorney, not delivering an 

irrevocable Consent to adoption to opposing counsel. After 

[Father] signed the Consent, Mr. Francis told [Father] that if he 

wanted to withdraw his consent, he should let Mr. Francis know.
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12. [Mother] believed that Mr. Francis was her attorney until 

the day following the birth of the Baby. She first learned that he 

might not be her attorney when Mr. Francis was about to arrive 

at the hospital with the Consent for adoption. [Mother] heard a 

nurse say ‘the other people’s lawyer is going to be here soon.’ At 

that time, [Mother] had no opportunity to speak with counsel of 

her own choosing. Mr. Francis did not offer to help her obtain 

counsel.

l3. [I]n the circumstances presented in this case, it is clear that 

[Mother] should have been informed of her right to speak with an 

attorney representing her interests. Mr. Francis was aware that 

[Mother] was only 16 years of age. She was the victim of 

domestic violence. She had been effectively abandoned by her

mother. She quit school in her sophomore year. That she did 

not adequately read a four-page legal document without having 

that document explained to her is hardly surprising. Mr. Francis 

did not attempt to review the document with her or discuss its 

contents. Mr. Francis did not offer to aid [Mother] in obtaining 

an attorney. Indeed, he never told her that he was not 

representing her.

. . .

16. Mr. Francis was aware that [Father] saw him as a trusted 

family adviser. When Mr. Francis told [Father] that he could 

help them, it was reasonable for [the birth parents] to infer that 

he would be representing them in the adoption. Mr. Francis did 

not read or discuss the consent documents with [Father] or 

[Mother] prior to execution of the documents.

l7. Prior to [Mother] signing the Consent, Mr. Francis told 

[Mother] that she would have 30 days to think about it, but it 

would be hard to get the child back. [Mother] relied on this 

assertion in making her decision to sign the consent. She 
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believed that she had 30 days to consider her decision and to 

withdraw her consent. She also believed that if the paperwork 

was still in Mr. Francis’ possession, the adoption had not been 

completed. 

18. Mr. Francis’ statement was not an accurate reflection of the 

true burden that [Mother] would bear in attempting to withdraw 

her consent. . . . [T]he person seeking to withdraw the consent 

bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. IC 

31-19-10-0.5 and 1C 31-19-10-6. Withdrawal of consent is not 

simply ‘difficult.’ Withdrawal of consent would include a 

hearing at which [Mother] would be forced to prove by clear and

convincing evidence, the Baby should be returned to her. An 

attorney acting in [Mother’s] interests would not present this 

alternative to her as Mr. Francis presented it. 

l9. Considering her age, the circumstances, and Mr. Francis’ 

assertion that she had 30 days to withdraw her consent, it is not 

surprising that [Mother] did not read the document in full. 

20. On May 23, 2019, Mr. Francis handed the Consent to 

[Father] without explanation during [Mother’s] prenatal visit to 

the doctor. . . . Mr. Francis did not have the expectation that 

[Father] had fully read and understood the document he was 

signing. After [Father] had signed the document, and before the 

birth of the Baby, Mr. Francis told [Father] just to tell him if 

[Father] wanted to withdraw his consent.

21. Based on Mr. Francis’ statements, [Father] believed that Mr. 

Francis was his attorney and would not file the adoption if 

instructed not to do so. Beginning on the evening of June 2, 

2019, [Father] made frantic attempts to contact Mr. Francis to

prevent him from filing the adoption.

. . .
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24. Given the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that [the 

birth parents] did not make informed, voluntary decisions to 

consent to the adoption of their child. [The birth parents] have 

proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that their consents 

were not voluntary. Therefore, the Consents to adoption are 

invalid.

. . .

The consents executed by [Father] to the termination of the 

parent-child relationship with [the baby] are not voluntary and 

are invalid.

. . .

3. Mr. Francis told [Father] that if [Father] wished to withdraw 

his consent, he should just let Mr. Francis know. This statement 

was made after [Father] had signed the Consent to terminate his 

parental rights. IC 31-35-1-6(c)(4) provides that consent to the 

termination of the parent-child relationship is not required if the 

child’s biological father consents to the termination of the parentchild relationship before the birth of the child if the consent meets 

certain requirements. The statute further states that a child’s 

father who consents to the termination of the parent-child 

relationship under this section may not challenge or contest the 

child’s adoption or termination of the parent-child relationship. 

Mr. Francis’ statement to [Father] was not an accurate statement 

of the applicable law and was made when [Father] believed that 

Mr. Francis was his attorney. 

[23] Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 24-37. The trial court ordered the baby returned to 

Mother by late afternoon on September 23, 2019. The adoptive parents and 

Heartland filed notices of appeal, and on September 19, 2019, our motions 
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panel granted a stay of the trial court’s order requiring the adoptive parents to 

return the child to the birth parents. This appeal ensues. 

Discussion and Decision

I. The Adoptive Parents’ Contentions—Legal Representation

[24] The adoptive parents first contend that the judgment must be set aside because

the trial court erred in permitting Francis, who was a potential and material 

witness at trial, to continue to represent them as their attorney. The adoptive 

parents assert that the trial court was obligated to order a mistrial sua sponte. 

Thus, the adoptive parents claim that they did not receive a fair trial. 

[25] We initially observe that the adoptive parents did not object to Francis’s 

representation at any time before or during trial. Thus, the issue is waived. 

Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Gurtner, 27 N.E.3d 306, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015) (holding that the general rule is that an argument or issue presented for 

the first time on appeal is waived for the purposes of appellate review). 

[26] Waiver notwithstanding, we note that the adoptive parents’ argument is 

premised on Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.7, which provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the 

lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 

(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 

services rendered in the case; or 
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(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 

hardship on the client. 

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another 

lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness 

unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 

[27] In the circumstances here, Francis was never a witness, never sought to be 

called as a witness, and no one attempted to disqualify him as a witness. 

Moreover, five attorneys and the trial judge were aware of a potential concern 

regarding the need for Francis’s testimony months before the trial commenced. 

No objection was made regarding Francis’s continued representation of the 

adoptive parents. The trial court could not have determined whether any 

testimony that Francis might have provided related to an uncontested issue

under Prof. Cond. R. 3.7(a)(1), because none was ever offered. That said, the

importance of any testimony that Francis might have offered is unclear and 

only speculative. 

[28] Finally, we note that in family law matters, a fair trial generally requires 

“notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses.” 

See D.G. v. S.G., 82 N.E.3d 342, 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. 

Additionally, the trial court is afforded wide discretion in determining whether 

a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is so improper that a trial is 

rendered unfair. Jackson v. Russell, 498 N.E.2d 22, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), 

trans. denied. Contrary to the adoptive parents’ contention that they were 

denied a fair trial, it is clear that they were able to confront adverse witnesses, 
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present evidence, and advance arguments at trial. Francis indicated to the trial 

court that Heartland’s counsel would assume the representation of the adoptive 

parents if Francis needed to testify. Moreover, Heartland’s counsel vigorously 

cross-examined the birth parents and other witnesses. 

[29] The adoptive parents were not denied legal counsel of their choice, and they 

have failed to show that the absence of any testimony by Francis had any 

bearing on the fairness of their trial. In short, the adoptive parents have failed 

to show that Francis’s continued representation prejudiced them in any way. 

For all these reasons, the adoptive parents’ claim fails. 

III. Heartland’s Claim; Summary Judgment

[30] Heartland argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary 

judgment with regard to Father’s termination of parental rights. Heartland 

maintains that the designated evidence established as a matter of law that 

Father executed an irrevocable consent to the termination of the parent-child 

relationship, and that Father’s consent to the adoption “spoke for itself.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 28. 

[31] When reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we stand in the shoes 

of the trial court. Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 

2019). We ask whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and whether 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goodwin v. Yeakle’s 

Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). We consider only 

those materials properly designated pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 56 and construe 
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all factual inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. 

Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc. 24 N.E.3d 421, 424 (Ind. 2015). A trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the 

party who lost in the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that the grant 

of summary judgment was erroneous. Id. This court will affirm upon any 

theory or basis supported by the designated evidence. Poiry v. City of New Haven, 

113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). 

[32] In response to Heartland’s motion for summary judgment, Father averred in his 

affidavit that 

--[T]here were a number of instances where Francis served as a 

trusted advisor for Father and his family;

--Father did not seek assistance of independent counsel due to 

Francis’s influence;

--he was not aware of any potential conflicts of interest that 

Francis might have been subjected;

--he did not fully understand the consent forms he signed;

--he did not understand that when he signed the documents he 

was given by Francis, that there would be nothing he could do 

from that point forward to avoid the adoption;

--he signed the consent form because Francis recommended that 

he do so because he believed that Mother wanted him to do so, 

and because he was concerned about providing for two children.
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Transcript Vol. V at 15-18. 

[33] A facially valid consent to the termination of parental rights is not effective if 

the execution of the consent was not provided voluntarily. In re M.R., 728 

N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. In this case, while 

Heartland maintains that Father’s affidavit eliminates any questions of fact 

regarding his motivation for consenting to the termination of his parental rights, 

the averments reflect otherwise. Father’s affidavit creates genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether Father’s execution of the consent forms were 

voluntary or whether they were executed as a result of undue influence, 

misunderstandings regarding Francis’s role in the case, or mistakes of fact as to 

the effect of the alleged consent. When viewed in the light most favorable to 

Father, the designated evidence indicates that there were genuine issues of fact 

regarding the voluntariness of Father’s consent to the termination of his 

parental rights, as well as his consent to the adoption. As a result, the trial 

court properly denied Heartland’s motion for summary judgment. 

IV. The Birth Parents’ Consents and Termination of Parental Rights

[34] The adoptive parents and Heartland both argue that the trial court erred in 

determining that the birth parents’ consents and Father’s termination of 

parental rights were not voluntary and that its conclusion was not supported by 

the evidence presented at trial. 

[35] In general, when a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law 

pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) as it did here, we employ a two-tiered standard 
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of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and 

then we will determine whether the findings support the judgment. In re 

Adoption of H.N.P.G., 878 N.E.2d 900, 903-904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. 

denied. We will not set aside the findings or the judgment unless they are 

clearly erroneous. Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the record is 

devoid of any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them, while a 

judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and 

the conclusions relying on those findings. Id. Additionally, we will not reweigh 

the evidence but instead will examine the evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s decision together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to 

determine whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the decision. Id. 

[36] In addressing the appellants’ contentions, we note that the Adoption Code is 

construed strictly in favor of the rights of biological parents. In re Adoption of 

A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. That said, Ind. 

Code § 31-19-9-2(a) sets forth the requirements for the valid execution of a 

consent to adoption after the birth of a child. The statute provides that 

“consent to adoption may be executed at any time after the birth of the child, 

either in the presence of: (1) the court; (2) a notary public or other person 

authorized to take acknowledgements; or (3) an authorized agent of (A) the 

department; or (B) a licensed child placing agency.” Additionally, for consent 

to adoption to be valid, the consent must be a “voluntary consent to 

termination of all parental rights.” In re Adoption of M.P.S., 963 N.E.2d 625, 

629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). It must be “an act of the parent’s own volition, free 
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from duress, fraud, or other consent-vitiating factors,” consent must be made 

with “knowledge of the essential facts.” Bell v. A.R.H, 654 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1995). A consent to adoption may be withdrawn not later than thirty 

days after the consent to adoption is signed if: 1) the court finds, after notice 

and opportunity to be heard afforded to the petitioner for adoption, the person 

seeking the withdrawal is acting in the best interest of the person sought to be 

adopted; and 2) the court orders the withdrawal. I.C. § 31-19-10-3(a). The 

person seeking to withdraw the consent bears the burden of proof by clear and 

convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-19-10-0.5 and –6. We will not disturb the ruling 

in an adoption case unless the evidence leads to only one conclusion and the 

probate court reached an opposite conclusion. In re Adoption of H.N.P.G., 878 

N.E.2d at 903.

[37] A companion statute, Ind. Code § 31-35-1-6, sets forth the requirements for the 

valid execution of a consent to voluntary termination of parental rights: 

(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), the parents must give 

their consent in open court unless the court makes findings of fact 

upon the record that:

(1) the parents gave their consent in writing before a 

person authorized by law to take acknowledgments; and 

(2) the parents were: (A) advised in accordance with 

section 12 of this chapter; and (B) advised that if they 

choose to appear in open court, the only issue before the 

court is whether their consent was voluntary.

(b) If:
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(1) the court finds the conditions under subsection (a)(1) 

and (a)(2) have been met; and

(2) a parent appears in open court; a court may consider 

only the issue of whether the parent’s consent was 

voluntary. 

[38] In support of the claim that the birth parents executed valid and irrevocable 

consents, Heartland and the adoptive parents rely on Bell, where the mother 

petitioned to withdraw her consents to the adoption of her four children. 654 

N.E.2d at 31. The trial court denied the petition, and she appealed, claiming 

that her consent had not been voluntary. Id. at 32. A panel of this court 

affirmed, finding that the evidence did not lead unerringly to a conclusion 

opposite the one that the trial court had reached. The evidence revealed that 

the adoption case worker specifically informed the mother that her adoption 

consents would be final. Id. at 33. Moreover, the mother, who was twentyseven-years old waited nearly seven months to contest the adoption. Id. 

[39] Apart from the fact that the instant case is an appeal from an adverse judgment, 

the circumstances here differ substantially from those in Bell. The evidence in 

this case established that near the end of Mother’s pregnancy, Father consulted 

with his mother and informed her for the first time that Mother was pregnant. 

His mother directed him to talk with Francis, who was a long-time family 

friend who had provided a variety of legal services to Father’s family through 

the years. 
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[40] Francis offered assistance to the birth parents and immediately gave the birth 

parents various documents to sign that would begin the adoption process. 

Frances handed them nearly fifteen different documents to sign over a sixteenday period leading up to the child’s birth. When Francis presented Father with 

the consent form, Father believed that he could withdraw his consent in light of 

the assurances that Francis had given him. Although Father signed the consent 

form, Francis did not advise him of the consequences of executing that 

document.

[41] Francis consistently provided advice to the birth parents about the adoption 

procedure and offered to arrange for financial assistance for them. Francis

scheduled medical appointments for Mother, accompanied her to several of 

them, and instructed the birth parents about becoming eligible for Medicaid. 

Francis advised the birth parents about achieving emancipation for Mother, and 

he drafted an agreed entry of emancipation. Francis also arranged meetings 

between the adoptive and birth parents and instructed Father about how to act 

while he was in those meetings, including a text that stated “[d]on’t be afraid to 

let them take you to dinner or go play in the park.” Transcript Vol. V at 232. He 

encouraged Mother to invite K.F. to her medical appointments and offered to 

arrange counseling sessions for Mother. 

[42] Although Francis’s representation of the adoptive parents was stated on the 

consent forms, he did not provide any explanation of the consequences of that 

representation to the birth parents. Moreover, Francis never told the birth 

parents that they could or should consult with independent legal counsel. The 
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birth parents believed throughout the adoption process that Francis was 

representing them. 

[43] Francis also misadvised Father that if he “wanted to stop [the adoption] at any 

time, we could.” Transcript Vol. III at 83. Mother testified that Francis told her 

and Father that “we could get him back, but it would just be hard and difficult 

to get him back.” Transcript Vol. II at 139. The birth parents consistently relied 

on Francis to instruct them about what to do and how to proceed during the 

adoption proceedings. Rather than directing Father to an attorney who could 

advise Father about all available options, Francis steered the birth parents 

toward adoption. Francis’s relationship with Father’s family rendered him 

particularly influential. 

[44] The evidence further established that when Mother signed the consent forms

and other documents at the hospital, she “felt pressured and just wanted to stop 

feeling that way.” Id. at 142. Mother also felt that “everyone was . . . on the 

opposite side of [her].” Transcript Vol. III at 47. Additionally, Father’s actions 

after the child was born demonstrate that he did not understand the 

ramifications of his signatures on the forms because he believed that Francis 

could stop the adoption.

[45] Dr. Finn testified at trial that adolescents are more susceptible to undue 

influence by those who may be viewed as influential, powerful, or in a position 

of authority. The hospital nurses and attorneys were authority figures, and 
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Mother reasonably believed that they did not want her to disappoint the 

adoptive parents. 

[46] We also reject the adoptive parents’ reliance on Matter of Adoption of Hewitt, 396

N.E.2d 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), where we affirmed the trial court’s denial of 

an eighteen-year-old mother’s petition to withdraw her consent. The birth 

mother in Hewitt executed a consent two days after her baby was born and 

sought to withdraw that consent ten days later. Id. at 939. Mother claimed that 

her consent was involuntary because she had been shamed by her family and 

had received the wrong advice from her obstetrician about her ability to change 

her mind about the adoption. Id. at 942. 

[47] In affirming the trial court, we determined that the biological mother “failed in 

her burden to establish that the evidence at trial led to but one conclusion and 

the court reached the opposite conclusion,” noting the high burden that must be 

overcome on appeal. Id. Additionally, the biological mother did not claim that 

she was ignorant of the import and/or consequences of her execution of the 

consent. To the contrary, the evidence established that the biological mother 

was advised on two separate occasions of the consequences of the consent and 

the rights that she was relinquishing by consenting to the adoption. Id. Also, 

unlike the birth mother here, who was sixteen years with a limited education, 

the birth mother in Hewitt was an eighteen-year-old adult who graduated from 

high school with a “B” average. Moreover, there was no suggestion in Hewitt 

that the adoptive parents’ legal counsel had any pre-existing relationship with 
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the biological parents, or that there was any issue about who the attorney was 

representing. 

[48] Unlike Bell and Hewitt, we find this court’s opinion in In re Adoption of M.P.S., 

Jr., 963 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) instructive. In M.P.S., a panel of 

this court found that a birth mother’s signed consent to an adoption without 

knowledge of the essential facts was not voluntary. M.P.S. involved a mother 

who executed a consent under the mistaken belief that it could later be revoked. 

Id. at 629-30. Mother signed the consent in the presence of the adopting party’s 

attorney, who informed her that consent was “permanent in nature” but that 

the parents could “take them back within a certain period of time.” Id. at 629. 

The attorney also explained that “nothing was going to be final for a period of 

time” and “if there was any problems if anybody needs to change anything 

contact my office or we are going to get this filed quickly and so you can also 

contact the court.” Id.

[49] Based in part on these erroneous legal statements by counsel, the birth mother 

challenged the voluntariness of her consent. Id. at 626. The trial court denied 

her request. Id. We reversed the trial court, finding that the birth mother did 

not act “voluntarily” and her alleged consent to the adoption was invalid. Id. at 

632. We observed that “[e]ven if we assume that Mother’s execution of the 

consent was not a product of threats and coercion, her consent is nevertheless 

involuntary where she was assured it was revocable and she did not intend to 

relinquish contact with her child.” Id. 
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[50] Here, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the birth parents’ 

consents in this case were not voluntary, as they both lacked critical and 

necessary facts that pertained to the impending adoption. Moreover, the 

evidence of overreach is readily apparent in light of the birth parents’ ages, 

backgrounds, and financial difficulties. Given these circumstances, we cannot 

say that the evidence led unerringly to a conclusion opposite of what the trial 

court reached. Thus, we decline to disturb the trial court’s judgment. 

[51] Judgment affirmed.

Robb, J. and Bradford, C.J., concur.