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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7962 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7962

 To advance United States long-term trade competitiveness and economic 
                 leadership in the Indo-Pacific region.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 11, 2024

 Mrs. Miller of West Virginia (for herself, Mr. Panetta, Mr. Smith of 
Nebraska, Mr. Beyer, Mr. LaHood, and Mr. Bera) introduced the following 
      bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To advance United States long-term trade competitiveness and economic 
                 leadership in the Indo-Pacific region.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States Trade Leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The United States is an Indo-Pacific power.
            (2) The Indo-Pacific region, spanning from our Pacific 
        Coastline to the Indian Ocean, is home to over half the world's 
        people, including nearly 60 percent of youth, and is at the 
        center of the 21st-century global economy, accounting for 60 
        percent of global gross domestic product and two-thirds of the 
        world's economic growth in 2022.
            (3) The Indo-Pacific region also includes some of America's 
        closest military allies and partners, several of the world's 
        largest militaries, and 5 nations allied with the United States 
        through mutual defense treaties. The region also contains 
        strategic rivals with growing military capabilities, in 
        particular the People's Republic of China (PRC). Our partners 
        are critical for responding to potential threats in the region, 
        maintaining credible deterrence, and for fostering peace.
            (4) There is broad bipartisan agreement that the United 
        States must have a strong and durable economic strategy in the 
        Indo-Pacific to advance our commercial, geostrategic, and 
        national security interests and support our allies and partners 
        in the region.
            (5) This is especially true and increasingly urgent in the 
        face of heightened aggression and pressure from the PRC, which 
        seeks to expand its influence by actively pursuing trade 
        agreements with key partners in the Indo-Pacific that establish 
        preferential treatment for goods and services, deepen supply 
        chain integration, and establish rules based on the PRC's 
        state-led authoritarian economic model that undercut America's 
        workers, businesses, and economic security.
            (6) For decades, the United States has sought to persuade 
        the PRC to eliminate harmful trade practices and act 
        responsibly within the global rules-based trading system. 
        Unfortunately, the PRC has not substantially changed its 
        behavior and has instead used forced labor, subsidies and 
        overproduction, intellectual property theft and the forced 
        transfer of technology, authoritarian digital governance 
        policies, economic coercion, and other unfair practices to 
        advance an economic model that undermines human rights, 
        American industries and workers, and market-based economies 
        around the world.
            (7) The PRC is now actively seeking to increase trade ties 
        in the Indo-Pacific region as a means to increase its economic 
        influence and increase supply chain dependency on the PRC. One 
        of the most prominent examples of the PRC's growing economic 
        influence in the Indo-Pacific region is the Regional 
        Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into 
        force in January 2022. RCEP is now the largest trade agreement 
        in the world, encompassing 15 countries that account for 30 
        percent of the global economy. This agreement will increasingly 
        put the United States at a competitive disadvantage as the 
        economies of the PRC, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
        Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the 
        Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam grow more 
        integrated.
            (8) The PRC is also actively negotiating numerous other 
        regional and bilateral trade agreements throughout the region 
        and is attempting to accede to the Comprehensive and 
        Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) as 
        well as the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA).
            (9) The PRC's aggressive assertion of its economic 
        interests in the Indo-Pacific through the use of trade 
        agreements underscores the need for the United States to 
        provide a meaningful and credible alternative to achieve our 
        economic and national security goals.
            (10) American workers and businesses also face competitive 
        pressures as other countries in the region pursue regional 
        rules and preferential trade agreements without the 
        participation of the United States. There are now more than 200 
        preferential trade agreements in force with at least one party 
        from the region and over 100 more are under negotiation or 
        pending ratification.
            (11) Recognizing this void in American leadership, the 
        Biden administration launched negotiations with Australia, 
        Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
        New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam 
        (with Fiji joining shortly thereafter) on the Indo-Pacific 
        Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022, with the aim of deepening 
        trade ties, strengthening supply chain resiliency, accelerating 
        the development of climate infrastructure, and countering 
        corruption.
            (12) In November 2023, IPEF partners signed an agreement on 
        supply chain resiliency and announced the substantial 
        conclusion of negotiations on several additional agreements but 
        have not finalized an agreement that includes commitments on 
        trade. The Biden Administration has not sought to consult with 
        Congress on the IPEF pillars.
            (13) To inform future policymaking, Congress should work 
        with the administration in a bipartisan manner to examine 
        current United States economic policy toward the Indo-Pacific, 
        the impacts of regional trade agreements on American 
        competitiveness, and policies to advance United States 
        objectives in the region.
            (14) Through a more comprehensive trade and economic 
        strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region, the United States 
        could exert greater leverage to improve labor rights and help 
        level the playing field for American workers, enhance 
        environmental standards, counter non-market economies and 
        authoritarianism, construct more resilient supply chains, 
        better meet the needs of our allies and partners, and grow our 
        economy by addressing barriers to trade for American products.

SEC. 3. INVESTIGATION OF IMPACT OF INDO-PACIFIC REGIONAL AGREEMENTS ON 
              UNITED STATES COMPETITIVENESS.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the United States International Trade Commission shall conduct and 
conclude an investigation to examine--
            (1) how preferential market access provisions, including 
        tariffs, quotas, and services commitments, in existing Indo-
        Pacific regional trade agreements, including the Regional 
        Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement and the 
        Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
        Partnership (CPTPP), affect United States exports and growth 
        opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) how existing non-tariff barriers, including regulatory 
        practices, relatively lower labor and environmental standards, 
        different rules for sectors ranging from agriculture and the 
        digital economy, and standard-setting in these areas as part of 
        existing Indo-Pacific regional and bilateral trade agreements, 
        impact the competitiveness of American workers and businesses;
            (3) the impact of existing Indo-Pacific regional trade 
        agreements on United States supply chain resiliency and 
        connectivity, and in particular its impact on the People's 
        Republic of China's role in key global supply chains; and
            (4) differences between the United States-Mexico-Canada 
        Agreement (USMCA) and CPTPP, RCEP, or other regional trade 
        agreements in the Indo-Pacific that would likely have a 
        substantial impact on United States businesses and workers.

SEC. 4. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE STRATEGY COMMISSION.

    (a) Establishment.--
            (1) In general.--There is hereby established an independent 
        commission to be known as the ``Indo-Pacific Trade Strategy 
        Commission'' (in this section referred to as the 
        ``Commission''), to develop findings and recommendations for a 
        comprehensive trade strategy for the Indo-Pacific region for 
        purposes of--
                    (A) ensuring sustained United States economic and 
                geopolitical leadership in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) promoting United States innovation, exports, 
                and economic opportunities for workers and businesses;
                    (C) countering the People's Republic of China's 
                aggressive trade agenda;
                    (D) promoting United States values, norms, and 
                standards;
                    (E) strengthening the United States economy;
                    (F) bolstering United States economic and national 
                security, including by addressing the vulnerabilities 
                identified in the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic 
                Resilience and Economic Security of May 20, 2023; and
                    (G) promoting United States supply chain 
                resilience.
            (2) Effective date.--This subsection shall take effect on 
        the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
    (b) Membership.--
            (1) Number and appointment.--The Commission shall be 
        composed of 12 members appointed as follows:
                    (A) 6 members appointed by mutual agreement of the 
                Chair of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
                of Representatives and the Ranking Member of the 
                Committee on Finance of the Senate.
                    (B) 6 members appointed by mutual agreement of the 
                Chair of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the 
                Ranking Member of the Committee on Ways and Means of 
                the House of Representatives.
                    (C) None of the appointed members shall be a Member 
                of the House of Representatives or a Member of the 
                Senate.
            (2) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission shall be 
        individuals who have well-documented expertise, knowledge, or 
        experience in the Indo-Pacific region, and--
                    (A) international trade;
                    (B) economic and supply chain issues;
                    (C) labor matters; or
                    (D) environmental policy.
            (3) Meetings.--The Commission shall--
                    (A) hold public hearings and meetings;
                    (B) hold classified hearings or meetings, if 
                necessary to discuss classified material or 
                information;
                    (C) provide an opportunity for public comment, 
                including sharing of research and policy analysis, 
                through publication of a solicitation for public 
                comments during a period of not less than 45 days;
                    (D) consult quarterly with Congress, specifically 
                with members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
                House of Representatives and members of the Committee 
                on Finance of the Senate; and
                    (E) submit, not later than 18 months after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act, a final report to 
                Congress, specifically to the members of the Committee 
                on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and 
                members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
                                 <all>
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