Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1711 | January 30, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Paul J. Podlejski

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Qashaun Thomas,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1711

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable David A. Happe, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C04-1807-F3-1918

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1711 | January 30, 2020 Page 2 of 8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Qashaun Thomas (Thomas), appeals the sanction 

imposed by the trial court following the revocation of his commitment to work 

release.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Thomas presents the court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the 

trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Thomas to execute four years of 

his sentence with the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) following the 

revocation of his work release commitment. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On July 26, 2018, and October 30, 2018, the State filed an Information, 

charging Thomas with Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug (heroin); Level 

4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon; Level 5 

felony possession of a narcotic drug (heroin), and Class A misdemeanor 

carrying a handgun without a license. On July 26, 2018, the State also filed a 

notice of its intention to file a habitual offender enhancement against Thomas. 

On February 12, 2019, Thomas pleaded guilty to the Level 3 felony dealing in a 

narcotic drug charge. On February 13, 2019, Thomas was allowed to begin 

work release pending sentencing. The pre-sentence investigation report filed 

prior to sentencing revealed that on December 8, 2015, Thomas had been 

sentenced to two years in the Michigan Department of Corrections following 
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his guilty plea to delivery/manufacture of marijuana and possession of cocaine 

charges. The pre-sentence investigation also revealed that on May 12, 2016, 

Thomas had been sentenced to two years in the Michigan Department of 

Corrections following his guilty plea to a felony firearm charge. 

[5] On March 26, 2019, the trial court conducted Thomas’ sentencing hearing. The 

trial court acknowledged Thomas’ good conduct since being granted presentencing work release, rejected the State’s request for a sentence fully 

executed with the DOC, and sentenced Thomas to seven years, four of which 

were to be served on work release, with three years suspended to probation. 

The trial court advised Thomas that it was putting him on what it called “a 

short leash,” meaning that violation of his work release conditions that would 

be considered less significant for other offenders would be treated more 

seriously for him because of his criminal record. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 20). 

The trial court noted that the State had made compelling arguments against a 

work release placement but that “sometimes people get chances that they really 

don’t deserve because we want to help them to make some changes in their 

life.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21). As part of his work release commitment, Thomas 

received a copy of, and agreed to abide by, the Madison County work release 

facility’s policies and rules.

[6] On May 7, 2019, Thomas was informed by his employer, Bridges of Hope, that 

he was being laid off. Thomas did not inform his work release case manager, 

Rose Horvath (Horvath), that he had been terminated. On May 8, 2019, at 

7:44 a.m., Thomas was released for work as usual and did not return to work 
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release until 9:19 p.m. Although Thomas stopped by Bridges of Hope that day 

around 8:30 a.m. to return his work shirts and retrieve a document, he was not 

at Bridges of Hope the remainder of the day. Thomas did not have permission 

to be anywhere but Bridges of Hope on May 8, 2019. 

[7] On May 9, 2019, Thomas turned in his weekly pass showing his schedule and 

whereabouts. Due to having no confirmation signatures for time spent at Band 

of Brothers on May 1, 2019, the Anderson Center on May 7, 2019, and his job 

search time on May 9, 2019, Thomas had eight hours of unaccounted-for time 

that week. On May 10, 2019, due to Thomas’ accumulation of unaccountedfor time, Horvath instructed Thomas that he could attend the one-hour Jump 

Start program at Man4Man Ministries but that he could not stay at Man4Man

afterwards because she wanted him to be at a location where he was required to 

clock in and out, something that was not consistently available at Man4Man. 

On May 14, 2019, Thomas was released to attend Jump Start and should have 

returned to work release by 9:30 a.m., but he did not return until 5:03 p.m. 

When Horvath discussed with Thomas the fact that he had not followed her 

order, he acknowledged that he knew that he was not supposed to be away 

from the facility. 

[8] On May 16, 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate Thomas’ work release 

commitment in which it alleged that Thomas had violated the terms of work 

release on May 8, 2019, by having twelve hours and forty-nine minutes of 

unaccounted-for time; on May 8, 2019, by committing the new offense of 

failure to return to lawful detention; on May 9, 2019, for having accumulated 
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eight hours of unaccounted-for time; on May 14, 2019, by failing to obey a 

direct order; and by owing $290.44 to work release. On June 25, 2019, the trial 

court held an evidentiary hearing on the State’s petition at which Horvath 

testified about the allegations and Thomas testified regarding his version of 

events. The trial court found that the State had proven by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Thomas had violated the terms of his work release as alleged. 

[9] The trial court proceeded to hear argument regarding what sanction to impose 

following the revocation of Thomas’ work release placement. The trial court 

found that, in spite of his criminal record, Thomas had been given an 

opportunity to stay in the community through his work release commitment, 

Thomas had been given specific rules to follow so that all of his time would be 

accounted for, but that Thomas had not followed those rules. The trial court 

ordered Thomas to serve the four years with the DOC that had previously been 

his commitment to work release. 

[10] Thomas now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[11] Thomas challenges the sanction imposed by the trial court following the 

revocation of his placement on work release. As part of its sentencing decision, 

a trial court may suspend a defendant’s sentence and order him to be placed in 

a community corrections program as an alternative to a commitment to the 

DOC. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-3(a). A defendant is not entitled to serve a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1711 | January 30, 2020 Page 6 of 8

sentence in a community corrections program. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 

549 (Ind. 1999). Such a placement is a matter of grace on the part of the trial 

court that is a favor and not a right. Id. If a trial court determines that a 

defendant has violated the terms of his community corrections placement, it 

may “revoke the placement and commit the person to the . . . [DOC] for the 

remainder of the person’s sentence.” See I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5(4). We review a 

trial court’s decision on what sanction to impose following revocation for an 

abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse 

of the trial court’s discretion occurs when its decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. 

II. Sanction

[12] Upon revoking Thomas’ work release commitment, the trial court ordered 

Thomas to execute the four years of his sentence that it had previously ordered 

him to serve on work release. The trial court found that Thomas had been 

shown leniency at sentencing for the underlying Level 3 felony dealing in a 

narcotic drug conviction, that he had been given specific rules and regulations 

to follow by the work release facility, but that he had failed to abide by those 

rules. Given the seriousness of the underlying conviction, the tremendous 

opportunity to avoid the DOC that Thomas had been afforded given his 

previous criminal record, the fact that Thomas had only been on work release 

for approximately three months before he started violating the terms of his 

conditional freedom, and the number of violations he incurred, we do not find 

any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ordering Thomas to 
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execute his sentence with the DOC. This is particularly true in light of the trial 

court’s advisement at sentencing that Thomas was on a “short leash” and that 

violations of work release conditions that would have been treated more 

leniently if incurred by another offender would be treated more seriously for 

him. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 20). 

[13] Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion because his violations 

were in furtherance of the goals of work release because most of his 

unaccounted-for time was spent attending programs and looking for work. 

Thomas also argues that this was the first notice of violation filed against him 

by the State, the violations were merely technical, and that he had otherwise 

performed well on work release. We do not find these arguments to be 

persuasive because the whole purpose of work release is to allow offenders to 

work while being closely monitored in the community. The trial court was 

under no obligation to credit Thomas’ explanations that he was looking for 

work and attending programs at the times the State alleged he had 

unaccounted-for time. The fact remains that he did not have the latitude to set 

his own schedule, no matter what he was doing. Finding no abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion, we affirm its order that Thomas execute four years of his 

sentence with the DOC. See Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. 

CONCLUSION

[14] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it ordered Thomas to serve four years with the DOC following 

the revocation of his work release commitment. 
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[15] Affirmed. 

[16] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur