NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOUIS A. RANDOLPH, AKA Clyde Lewis, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BRIAN WILLIAMS, Sr.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-15385 

D.C. No. 

3:17-cv-00085-MMD-CLB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 13, 2023

**

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Louis Randolph appeals pro se from the district court’s order adopting the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

novo the district court’s summary judgment. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 17 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Randolph alleges that while he was an inmate at the Southern Desert 

Correctional Center: Defendant Reyes withheld food and served spoiled food in 

retaliation (Count I); Defendants Harris, Ledingham, Dreesen, and Williams denied 

Randolph’s right to freely exercise his religion by not allowing him to attend the Eid 

Feast as is tradition in his Muslim faith (Count II); and Defendants violated 

Randolph’s rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

(RLUIPA) and the First Amendment to freely exercise his religion, and 

discriminated against him based on religion and race in violation of the Equal 

Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not affording him the same 

religious dietary accommodations that inmates of other faiths receive (Count III). 

Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin issued a report pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) 

and Nevada district court Local Rule IB 1-4 recommending summary judgment in 

favor of Defendants on all counts. After considering Randolph’s timely filed 

objection, the district court accepted the report in part, granting summary judgment 

to Defendants on Counts II and III, but allowing Count I to go to a jury trial, which

returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Randolph timely appealed, alleging that 

the decisions should be vacated because the law clerk did not notify Randolph that 

he could consent to a magistrate judge administering his case, and that he was not 

served notice of consent as per Local Rule 26. He also alleges that he was prejudiced 
3 

and denied due process by having a magistrate judge make a recommendation on 

Counts II and III rather than a jury.

While we construe a pro se litigant’s filings liberally, a brief must contain 

specific and distinct allegations as to how defendants violated the law. Fed. R. App. 

P. 28; Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). Although Randolph’s

allegations, if true, are concerning, he fails to provide specific, distinct support for 

his contentions that he never received notice, that did he did not consent to the 

magistrate judge, that the magistrate judge was biased in favor of Defendants, and 

that he was denied due process. In addition, Randolph raised these issues for the 

first time on this appeal, which generally bars them from our consideration, and no 

exception applies here—nor does Randolph argue that one should. United States v. 

Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Even if we could consider his arguments, Randolph has not demonstrated that 

he was prejudiced and that therefore the district court’s decision should be reversed. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule IB 3-2(b), a magistrate judge has 

the authority to oversee proceedings and submit to a district court judge proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of a motion for summary 

judgment. Just that occurred here: the district court adopted the submitted report in 

part. Though Randolph argues that he did not consent to the magistrate’s ability to 

oversee the proceedings, and though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(2) allows
4 

any party to withhold consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, Randolph at no 

point in the proceedings—including in his objection to the report—up until this 

appeal argue that he did not consent to the magistrate judge. Nor does Randolph 

offer a reason for any of these objections aside from the bald contention that the 

magistrate judge was biased. 

Similarly, Randolph’s claim that he was prejudiced because a judge, rather 

than a jury, heard Counts II and III fails because Randolph did not prove that the 

district court erred in accepting the magistrate’s findings to grant summary 

judgment. A summary judgment proceeding does not deprive a losing party of the 

right to a jury trial. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2008); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (there is no right to a jury trial where 

the evidence is “so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”).

This appeal also appears to be the first time that Randolph argues that he was 

not notified or served notice that he could consent to a magistrate judge. Though we

must consider as evidence a pro se plaintiff’s contentions offered in their pleadings 

where such contentions are based on personal knowledge, Randolph offers no 

support for these contentions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Meanwhile, we can infer from the trial court docket that Randolph was indeed 

provided with the magistrate judge consent form as per local rules—and, in any case, 
5 

Randolph did not appear to contest the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction any time in 

the proceedings thereafter until this appeal. 

Lastly, Randolph also offers no evidence or explanation to support his 

conclusory contention that Judge Baldwin was biased. “A showing of judicial bias 

requires facts sufficient to create actual impropriety or an appearance of 

impropriety,” none of which Randolph demonstrated. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 

F.3d 790, 806 (9th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.