This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 33,400 4 ELI MUNGIA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY 7 Gary L. Clingman, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 B. Douglas Wood III, Assi stant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 ZAMORA, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant appeals from his convictions for aggravated fleeing and felon in 1 possession of a firearm. This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. 2 Defendant has filed a memo randum in opposition to this Court’s notice of proposed 3 disposition. Having given due considerati on to Defendant’s arguments, we remain 4 unpersuaded and affirm. 5 Aggravated Fleeing 6 {2} Defendant maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support his 7 conviction for aggravated fleeing. Specifically, Defendant argues that the State failed 8 to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was aware of law enforcement 9 signals to stop or that he had placed a person’s life in danger. [MIO 5] Defendant’s 10 argument is unpersuasive. 11 {3} Defendant contends that, while there wa s testimony that he ran a red light while 12 cross-traffic was approaching the same in tersection, there was no testimony regarding 13 how close the vehicles were and no expert testimony regarding the likelihood of a 14 collision. [MIO 5] There was, however, testimony by Defendant’s passenger that she 15 was scared that they were going to wreck and testimony by the officer that Defendant 16 ran multiple stop signs and almost hit a parked car. [MIO 2] This evidence is 17 sufficient to support the jury’s conclusi on that Defendant “drove willfully and 18 carelessly in a manner that endangered the life of another person.” [RP 57] 193 {4} With respect to Defendant’s argument th at there was insuffi cient evidence that 1 he knew the officer had give n him a visual or audible signal to stop, this Court 2 proposed to hold that the officer activating his lights and siren, in combination with 3 Defendant’s high speed erratic driving and subsequent flight on foot were sufficient 4 to support a reasonable inference that De fendant knew officers were pursuing him. 5 While Defendant argues that more direct evidence should have been presented, the 6 correlations between the offi cer’s engagement of his li ghts and siren and Defendant’s 7 subsequent acts constitute sufficient evidence to support his conviction. See State v. 8 Allen , 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 65, 128 N.M. 482, 994 P.2d 728 (stating that, “[b]ecause 9 an individual’s intent is seldom subject to proof by direct evidence, intent may be 10 proved by circumstantial evidence”); see also State v. Dowling , 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 11 22, 150 N.M. 110, 257 P.3d 930 (recognizing that , when proving intent or knowledge, 12 “it is often the jury’s task to glean subj ective knowledge from the circumstances of the 13 defendant’s act”). 14 Felon in Possession of Firearm 15 {5} Defendant continues to argue that there was insufficient evidence to support his 16 conviction for felon in possession of a firearm. In this Court’s calendar notice, we 17 noted that there was testimony that Defe ndant knew the gun was in the car and that 18 Defendant had handled the gun earlier in the day; therefore, we proposed to conclude 194 that this was sufficient evidence to establish possession. [CN 7] Defendant does not 1 dispute these facts in his memorandum inopposition. [MIO 8-9] Rather, Defendant 2 contends that there was testimony presented at trial that he was not the owner of the 3 gun, and, therefore, the owner must have been the one to exercise control over the 4 firearm. [MIO 8-9] Defendant’s argument is unavailing. The jury was instructed that 5 two people can be in possession of the firearm at the same time [CN 6; RP 59], and 6 Defendant has made no challengeto that instruction. [MIO 8-9] Accordingly, even if 7 the owner exercised control over the firearm, this would not prevent the jury from 8 determining—consistent with its instructi on—that Defendant also exercised control 9 over the firearm. 10 {6} To the degree Defendant argues thattrial counsel’s and Defendant’s 11 recollection of the testimony at trial are di fferent and that, as a result, this matter 12 should be placed on the general calendar, we disagree. Defe ndant contends that trial 13 counsel recalls the police officer testifying that the firearm was found in the driver14 side door, while Defendant remembers the officer’s testimony as placing the firearm 15 near the passenger-side door. [MIO 7] However, Defendant does not contest that there 16 was testimony presented that he handled th e gun earlier in the day. Thus, regardless 17 of where the gun was located in the vehicle, we conclude that there was sufficient 18 evidence to support Defendant’s conviction. 195 Cruel and Unusual Punishment 1 {7} Defendant continues to argue that hi s sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 2 punishment. In this Court’s calendar notice, we proposed to hold that Defendant had 3 not demonstrated an Eighth Amendment viol ation because the sentence was within the 4 statutory limits set by our Legislature, and Defendant did not argue that the statutory 5 limits themselves were uncons titutional, either before th is Court or below. [CN 7-9] 6 Defendant concedes these points in hi s memorandum in opposition. To the degree 7 Defendant continues to argue that the lack of corroboration or substantiation of the 8 testimony renders the sentence of the districtcourt cruel and unusual, Defendant cites 9 no authority for this argument. See Pickett Ranch, LLC v. Curry , 2006-NMCA-082, 10 ¶ 45, 140 N.M. 49, 139 P.3d 209 (stating that where no supporting authority for a 11 proposition is cited, this C ourt may assume that no applicable or analogous authority 12 exists). We therefore conclude that Defendant has not demonstrated that his sentence 13 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See 14 Hennessy v. Duryea , 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our 15 courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party 16 opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”). 17 18 {8} Consequently, for the reasons stated above and in this Court’s notice of 196 proposed disposition, we affi rm Defendant’s convictions. 1

{9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 2

_______________________________ 3 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 4 WE CONCUR: 5

__________________________________ 6 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 7

__________________________________ 8 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 9