U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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S. HRG. 115–603 

SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 

IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 13, 2017 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/ 
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

CHARLES GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama 

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

JAMES A. GLUECK, JR., MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

DANITA M. MURRAY, MAJORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

JESSICA L. WILLIAMS, CHIEF CLERK

JOSEPH A. SHULTZ, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

HEARING(S): 

Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World ................................. 1 

Wednesday, December 13, 2017 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY SENATORS 

Roberts, Hon. Pat, U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry ................................................. 1 

Stabenow, Hon. Debbie, U.S. Senator from the State of Michigan ..................... 2 

Witnesses 

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., Co-Chair, Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 5 

Myers, Gen. Richard B., President, Kansas State University, Manhattan, 

Kansas ................................................................................................................... 9 

Hammerschmidt, Raymond, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Plant, Soil, and 

Microbial Sciences, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan ....... 13 

Meckes, R.D., D.V.M., State Veterinarian, North Carolina Department of 

Agriculture and Consumer Services, Raleigh, North Carolina ........................ 16 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hammerschmidt, Raymond ............................................................................. 32 

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I. ............................................................................... 41 

Meckes, R.D. ..................................................................................................... 47 

Myers, Gen. Richard B. .................................................................................... 59 

DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Roberts, Hon. Pat: 

‘‘Defense of Animal Agriculture’’, Blue Ribbon Study Panel ......................... 72 

Stabenow, Hon. Debbie: 

Prepared Statement Submitted for the Record from Hon. Claire McCaskill .................................................................................................................. 134 

QUESTION AND ANSWER: 

Hammerschmidt, Raymond: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Pat Roberts .................................. 136 

Written response to questions from Hon. Debbie Stabenow ......................... 138 

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Pat Roberts .................................. 144 

Written response to questions from Hon. Debbie Stabenow ......................... 146 

Written response to questions from Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................... 147 

Meckes, R.D.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Pat Roberts .................................. 149 

Written response to questions from Hon. Debbie Stabenow ......................... 155 

Written response to questions from Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................... 156 

Myers, Gen. Richard B.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Pat Roberts .................................. 158 

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SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 

IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 

Wednesday, December 13, 2017 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, Washington, DC 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in 328A, 

Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat Roberts, Chairman of the 

Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Roberts, Boozman, Ernst, Grassley, Daines, 

Stabenow, Brown, Bennet, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Heitkamp, Casey, 

and Van Hollen. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF KANSAS, CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

Chairman ROBERTS. Good morning. I call this meeting of the 

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry to order. 

I welcome my colleagues and the witnesses before us today as we 

hear about an issue I have long felt is of the utmost importance 

not only to farmers, ranchers, and the agriculture value chain, but 

also to consumers, the American economy, and the safety of our 

country. 

Agriculture security is a broad-reaching issue. It involves many 

Government agencies beyond the Department of Agriculture. In 

1999, as Chairman of the newly formed Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I became 

aware of the threat our Nation faced against intentionally introduced pathogens to be weaponized and aimed at destroying plant 

and animal populations. 

I was invited to Obelinsk, one of Russia’s secret cities, back when 

we had access to secret cities under the Nunn-Lugar Program, 

where I saw warehouses of anthrax, foot-and-mouth, Newcastle disease, and African swine fever. Over the next several years, with a 

great deal of leadership from then K–State president, Dr. Jon 

Wefald, the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF, 

began to become a reality. This facility in Manhattan, Kansas, will 

be a critical part of keeping U.S. agriculture, our food supply, the 

economy, and, most importantly, our people safe. 

Biological threats, whether naturally occurring like the avian influenza outbreak of 2015 or intentionally introduced, could pose 

great harm to our food supply and the economy. The 2015 avian 

influenza outbreak was unprecedented, and while the USDA managed through the situation as well as can be expected, it illumi-
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nated just how vulnerable the agriculture sector is to such an event 

and it has made everyone involved begin to think about ways in 

which we can improve. Whether that be communication or coordination or preparedness or response, there is always room to gather 

feedback, reassess, and consider if our current approach is the best 

approach. Further, today’s hearing is an opportunity to take stock 

of where we have come since the early 2000s when the issue of agriculture security was first visited and discuss where we need to 

go from here. 

The Agriculture Committee last held a hearing on this subject 

over a decade ago, but since that time, the significance of this issue 

has only grown. Today we will commit to the record updated information regarding agriculture security. We will begin to examine 

any needed changes in this arena and continue to work on these 

evolving challenges. 

There are several key questions for us to explore: What does risk 

management look like in this sector? Where are resources most appropriately directed? How should a multi-jurisdictional system best 

function? 

Before us today is an esteemed panel of experts and public servants who have dedicated much of their careers to protecting agriculture and the country from biological threats. In October, the 

Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense released a bipartisan report, ‘‘Defense of Animal Agriculture,’’ which assesses many of the 

issues we will hear about today. I ask unanimous consent to enter 

that report into the record. Without objection. 

[The report can be found on page 72 in the appendix.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. I am very much looking forward to our witnesses’ testimony and the discussion today, and I now recognize my 

colleague, Senator Stabenow, for any opening remarks that she 

may have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBBIE STABENOW, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Senator STABENOW. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and we are so pleased to have everyone with us today, including 

our former Senate colleague, Senator Lieberman. It is always wonderful to see you. 

Before my comments, Mr. Chairman, at the request of Senator 

McCaskill, I ask that her statement supporting these issues be put 

in the record. I know you are working with her on these important 

issues, and she wanted it to be a part of the record today. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Without objection. 

Senator STABENOW. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill can be found on 

page 134 in the appendix.] 

Senator STABENOW. I know, Mr. Chairman, you have long been 

a champion for a strong agrodefense system, and we are all grateful for your vigilance and for the hearing today. 

I have always said that food security is national security. Everyone in this room knows just how important food and agriculture 

are to the well-being of our Nation. We certainly understand that 

in Michigan, where agriculture is our second largest industry, supporting one of every four jobs. I am so pleased that we have Dr. 
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Hammerschmidt with us today speaking on behalf of these issues 

from Michigan and Michigan State. 

Threats to our agriculture industry would not only decimate our 

economy, but also change, frankly, our way of life. Our country is 

blessed to have a rich and diverse agriculture sector. However, it 

also means that agriculture faces a multitude of threats, both accidental and intentional. We cannot allow our food system to be 

weaponized against us, which is why I am glad, Mr. Chairman, 

that you have been working on these issues in a bipartisan manner. 

I would like to also recognize again the important work that you 

are doing with Senator McCaskill, who serves as the Ranking 

Member of the Homeland Security Committee. Yet some of the 

gravest threats to our food system can occur without malicious intent. 

In 2015, we witnessed one of the worst outbreaks of animal disease in our history. Avian influenza devastated poultry farmers 

across the country, claiming nearly 50 million birds and increasing 

egg prices for consumers. While our producers experienced unimaginable losses during the crisis, USDA and scientists across the 

country responded quickly to put a stop to the damage. Now we are 

more prepared than ever for the next outbreak. 

In Michigan, we have experienced similar scares in our fruit and vegetable industry. Michigan’s $72 million cherry industry was almost wiped out by an insect smaller than a dime. An exotic pest 

called the spotted wing drosophila has become a cherry grower’s 

worst nightmare. Yet thanks to rapid response research investments, scientists at universities like Michigan State University are 

developing tools and techniques to keep this destructive pest at 

bay. 

We need preparation, coordination, and research so we can protect our farms and crops from not only pests and disease but from 

the emerging threats of climate change. From hurricanes and 

floods to wildfires and droughts, we have seen how extreme weather can cause mass devastation to agriculture in the blink of an eye. 

Earlier this year, the GAO released a report that estimated climate change would result in crop losses that could cost up to $53 

billion a year by the end of the century. This would also have grave 

consequences for food security in the global fight against hunger. 

It is time for us to acknowledge that the changing climate is a contributing factor to the unprecedented natural disasters that we are 

seeing. It is time for us to take action together to curb the damage 

that has already been done and will be done on agriculture. 

That is why we need real resources to detect threats and pests 

to keep our food and farms safe—in addition to meaningful risk 

management tools like crop insurance, which I know the Chairman 

knows a little bit about. 

Mr. Chairman, in the last farm bill, you and I worked together 

to create the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research, to 

match public investments with private funds for innovative agricultural research. As a result, the world-class researchers at both 

Michigan State and K–State are participating in foundation-funded 

projects to address emergent threats to agriculture. This is an example of a practical investment we need to continue and to 
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strengthen in the next farm bill if we want to keep our food and 

our farms safe. 

As this Committee considers the 2018 farm bill in the near future, I look forward to working together to keep our commitments 

to protect our farmers and our food system. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROBERTS. I thank the Senator. 

We want to issue a welcome to our panel of witnesses before the 

Committee this morning. 

First, to my left and everybody else in the audience’s right, the 

distinguished Senator Joe Lieberman, who served in the United 

States Senate representing the State of Connecticut for 24 years. 

During his time in the Senate, he was the Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee where he introduced legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. 

Senator Lieberman is now senior counsel at the law firm of 

Kasowitz, Benson & Torres in New York. He currently serves as 

co-chair of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, along with 

our former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge. 

Now, Joe, welcome back to the Senate, and I look forward to your 

testimony. The reason I paused is that the Senator and I had a 

rather unusual sense of humor that sort of fitted together. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Which we truly enjoy, and so we are going 

to look forward to your testimony, but let me get on with the rest 

of the —— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, if I may, I do not want to interrupt, 

but I just want to say, ‘‘Good morning, Mr. Benny.’’ 

Chairman ROBERTS. ‘‘Now, Joe, cut that out.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. How many times did we say that on the subway? About a hundred, I think. 

Our next witness is General Richard Myers or, as he is known 

at Kansas State University, ‘‘Mr. President.’’ General Myers, always nice to know a president you can get along with. Mr. President or, pardon me, General Myers is a native son of Kansas—you 

might want to strike that. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS.—born in Merriam and a graduate of Kansas 

State with a degree in mechanical engineering. He served in the 

United States Air Force beginning in K–State’s ROTC program and 

retiring as a four-star general. When General Myers was the 15th 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 2001 and 2005, I 

had the privilege of working very closely with him in my capacity 

as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He is indeed a 

great friend and an expert on the matters we are discussing today. 

I am so proud to welcome General Myers and look forward to hearing his testimony. 

I now turn to Senator Stabenow to introduce our next distinguished witness. 

Senator STABENOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I, 

too, want to welcome General Myers. It was great to be at K–State 

with you and Senator Roberts. I was wearing purple in Kansas, 
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and when Senator Roberts came to Michigan State, he was wearing 

green. So that is a good thing. 

General MYERS. Well, Senator Stabenow, we appreciated having 

you there. Thanks for making the effort to be there. 

Senator STABENOW. Absolutely. I am very pleased to introduce 

Dr. Raymond Hammerschmidt, a plant pathology professor at 

Michigan State University’s Department of Plant, Soil, and Microbial Sciences. Dr. Hammerschmidt serves as director of the North 

Central Plant Diagnostic Network and faculty coordinator of MSU 

Diagnostic Services. His research and professional activities have 

generated over 200 publications, including a U.S. patent for a 

method of protecting plants from a variety of pathogens. Dr. Hammerschmidt is a native of Illinois. He received his Bachelor’s and 

Master’s in Science from Purdue University and his Ph.D. from the 

University of Kentucky. 

We are so appreciative that you are here, and it is always wonderful for me to welcome a fellow Spartan. 

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Thank you, Senator. Pleased to be here. 

Chairman ROBERTS. It is nice to have you, Doctor. 

Our next witness is Dr. Douglas Meckes, who is the State veterinarian in North Carolina, serving as the lead subject matter expert 

on all animal health issues since 2014. Prior to his time as State 

veterinarian, Dr. Meckes was the Chief of the Food, Agriculture, 

and Veterinary Defense Branch at the Department of Homeland 

Security, where he oversaw implementation of Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-9. Dr. Meckes began his career as a veterinarian in Apex, North Carolina, and worked for the American Veterinary Medical Association as a congressional fellow for Senator 

Chuck Hagel and then as the Assistant Director of Government Relations. Dr. Meckes, we welcome you and we look forward to your 

testimony. 

We will start with Senator Lieberman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CO–CHAIR, BLUE 

RIBBON STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Stabenow, and members of the Committee. It is a great 

pleasure to be back in the Senate. It is a great pleasure to be before this Committee. I thank you for focusing on this subject, and 

I thank you for inviting me to be here on behalf of the bipartisan 

Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, which I am privileged to 

co-chair with Tom Ridge. Tom has had some health problems, as 

I am sure you have heard, but actually he is on his way home 

today, and he is really recovering very well. So we are all thrilled 

to say that. 

This is a panel that operates out of the Hudson Institute, small 

but high quality. Besides Tom and me, it is former Secretary of 

Health and Human Services Donna Shalala, former Congressman 

Jim Greenwood, former Homeland Security Adviser Ken Wainstein, 

and most especially former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, 

who, as you know, Mr. Chairman, traveled out to Manhattan, Kansas, on a cold January day earlier this year to convene some of the 

best minds on this topic at Kansas State University, and his work 

that day really informs my testimony this morning. 
6 

This Panel was formed in 2014. A year later we issued our first 

report about the general state of our biodefenses, which we found 

were lacking leadership, focus, and adequate funding. After that we 

decided to take segments and dig deeper into them, and the first 

we have done is the security of our agriculture sector. We did that, 

one, because of its importance to our country. As both of you said, 

agriculture accounts for at least 5.5 percent of our gross domestic 

product. More than 11 percent of workers in America are involved 

in agriculture. Second, some people say, ‘‘Is this really a problem, 

the security of our agriculture?’’ Well, it is. The most visible, tangible examples we have had are the avian flu outbreak, which you 

both talked about, which was dramatic and cost the economy—obviously, killed a lot of birds, but also cost the economy, by the best 

estimates I have seen, well over $3 billion. That all started, as far 

as we can tell, with migration of wild birds that basically conveyed 

this influenza to poultry in the U.S. and then it spread. 

The great fear is that this will happen and it will spread from 

the birds to people, which is actually what is happening with a 

strain of avian influenza now in China called ‘‘H7N9,’’ which has 

caused a disproportionate number of deaths there and is of concern. So this is a real problem. 

The other thing to say, as you know, is that in 2002, when the 

SEAL team made its way into a cave in Afghanistan where Osama 

bin Laden had been hanging out, they found among the various 

documents a list of pathogens that were clearly focused on biological terrorism. Ten targeted agriculture, six, livestock and poultry, 

and four, crops. So this is a real problem, and that is why we have 

focused on it. 

The biological connection between people, animals, their environments, and the pathogens that can infect them has unfortunately 

not meant the kind of focused leadership response and adequate 

policy connections at the Federal, State, and local level that we 

need. I really appreciate the fact that as you begin to work on a 

new Farm Bill, this is a moment of opportunity to really build on 

what the previous Farm Bill did when it comes to agricultural security. 

Inadequate attention and funding is more severe in the animal 

health sector than in public health generally. In Fiscal Year 2017, 

according to OMB, the agriculture protection function represented 

about 0.76 percent of the total governmentwide homeland security 

budget request. 

So our panel set out over the last year resulting in a report that 

came out a short while ago to identify what the challenges were in 

agricultural security and proposes some responses. Let me briefly 

give you three primary findings of the report and three recommendations. 

The first was there was an insufficient mission ownership by any 

department of the Federal Government, inadequate leadership. Because agrodefense is so broad and complex a mission space, significant involvement of most Federal departments and agencies, or a 

lot of them, is required. White House-level leadership is critical to 

minimize the inevitable overlap, to identify mission gaps, and coordinate interagency cooperation. 
7 

Many departments undertake agro and food defense activities of 

some kind, especially the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Department of Agriculture, obviously, and the Food and Drug Administration. Some of these are clearly effective programs, but 

overall, we have found that there is a real absence of the kind of 

leadership to coordinate them and get our money’s worth out of 

what we are investing. 

Second, support given to some of the most important agrodefense 

programs in areas such as biosurveillance and medical countermeasures is just not enough to meet the threat. In fact, the Department of Homeland Security requested no budget for agrodefense research and development for Fiscal Year 2018. 

Our panel heard understandable concerns about where the 

money to actually do the research in the billion dollar National Bio 

and Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF, will come from, and we share 

those concerns as a panel and hope this Committee can lead the 

way on making sure that this remarkable and really critically 

needed facility being built in Manhattan, Kansas, is adequate funded to do what we want it to do. 

Third, there is insufficient promotion of innovation in 

agrodefense. The technological status quo cannot really be tolerated 

anywhere because of the enormous technological advances occurring in our world today, and it is certainly inadequate to protect 

the food and agriculture sector from a major outbreak. The Nation 

needs new ideas, and scientific solutions to drive agrodefense approaches beyond their current borders. 

Now three responses that we recommended. One, the Panel really focused on the White House here and urges the White House to 

exert leadership across departments beginning with the promulgation of a National Biodefense Strategy, which was called for in our 

report and also mandated by the National Defense Authorization 

Act last year that will meaningfully address threats to food and agriculture. 

OMB should incorporate detailed agrodefense expenditures into 

a cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Stabenow, I will tell you that one of the unsettling facts that the 

committee learned when we did our first report is that nobody in 

the Government could actually tell us how much we were spending 

on biodefense. We actually got an estimate from the University of 

Pittsburgh, which has a great center of study in this area. But nobody could tell us how much is being spent, and you cannot figure 

out if you are spending it wisely if you do not know what you are 

spending. 

Second, we can and should mitigate threats to livestock when 

they appear with effective medical countermeasures. Despite some 

gains, the availability of adequate medical countermeasures for 

animals lags way behind what is needed and does not meet the 

Government’s own requirement to deploy sufficient high-consequence animal disease medical countermeasures within 24 hours 

of an outbreak. If Congress were to formally authorize something 

that exists now, the National Veterinary Stockpile, that would send 

a strong message that this is a necessary national asset. 

Third, we recommended the establishment of a prevention fund 

for animal health, much like that created in the 2008 Farm Bill for 
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plant health because we think that would create a real legislative 

basis for prevention activity. Such a fund could encompass programs like the National Wildlife Disease Surveillance Program, 

which operates really on a shoestring. When you think about the 

fact that the avian flu outbreak started with migrating wild birds, 

I think you can get the significance of that. 

Okay. I am going to come quickly to a close and close with a little 

bit of good news, which is that our panel has really been encouraged by the way in which Tom Bossert, who is the Homeland Security Adviser in charge of this area at the National Security Council 

at the White House, has taken this mandate for a National Biodefense Strategy quite seriously and is working very hard on delivering a strategy soon. He has got many other departments around 

the table drafting it with him, including the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture. We hope that the White House will maintain the momentum generated by this process and lead the relevant agencies 

to a new level of planning and operating with respect to agricultural security, and then the obvious and necessary and really important follow-on is what this Committee does in the Farm Bill. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for focusing on the problem, for giving me a chance to testify on behalf of this panel, and, 

of course, I look forward to answering any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman can be found on 

page 41 in the appendix.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator, I cannot emphasize enough how 

much we appreciate your leadership and taking time from your 

busy schedule to serve on this Blue Ribbon Panel and to provide 

the leadership, along with Tom Ridge, who is a great friend. I used 

to try to set blind side picks on Tom when I made the mistake of 

trying to play basketball over in the House. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Not smart. 

Chairman ROBERTS. That is not a good idea. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Not smart, right. 

Chairman ROBERTS. It is just not. But thank you, two good 

friends on the Panel. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I will tell him you said that. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Yeah, you can give that message. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Thank you for a very comprehensive statement and specifically outlining what I think that this Committee 

should consider. I would just say that taking part in several exercises—and I think we should have more—back in the day, and 

going to Obelinsk and seeing those warehouses full of pathogens 

that were meant to basically destroy a country’s capability to feed 

their people, that was quite an eye-opener. I wonder where the 

pathogens are now. I do not know if they have the capability to dispose of them in a safe way, and I do know that is an opportunity 

for several rogue states to latch onto those. So it is a real matter 

of national security. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, perhaps you saw 

over the weekend in the Washington Post there was an article 

about the evidence that the North Koreans, Kim Jong-un has an 

active pathogen development program. So there is another contemporary source of worry, to say the obvious. 
9 

Chairman ROBERTS. I appreciate that very much, and thank you 

for bringing it up. 

Mr. President, General Myers. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, PRESIDENT, 

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, MANHATTAN, KANSAS 

General MYERS. Chairman Roberts and Ranking Member Stabenow and distinguished members of the Committee, I am absolutely 

honored to appear before you today on behalf of Kansas State University for this hearing that is entitled, ‘‘Safeguarding American 

Agriculture in a Globalized World.’’ 

You know, life has interesting twists and turns, and I never 

thought when I was still in uniform that I would be sitting at a 

witness table with Senator Lieberman. We had a much different relationship, although I would say a very professional and pleasant 

relationship—at least my memory is such. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is my memory, and it is good to be sitting at a witness table that is not in a criminal proceeding. 

[Laughter.] 

General MYERS. We could be thankful for that. So thank you. It 

is an honor and a privilege to be with all of you. 

Food insecurity is an ever increasing global problem as delineated in a 2015 assessment by our intelligence community, and as 

people say, hungry people are not happy people. America still feeds 

the world, so there is an urgent need to protect America’s food 

crops, food animals, and food supply from naturally occurring and 

intentionally developed and delivered biological threats. Either 

could be devastating, either economically or to our health. 

As Senator Lieberman mentioned, one of those early discoveries 

going into Afghanistan in 2002 was that list of 16 pathogens that 

al Qaeda was planning to use as bioweapons. I think it is worth 

noting that only six of them were targeted against people. Another 

six were pathogens of livestock and poultry, and four were crop 

pathogens. So al Qaeda was not just planning to attack people with 

biological weapons; they were going after agriculture and food as 

well. So that idea is out there. 

I would say also when al Qaeda was driven—some of them were 

driven from Afghanistan, a few of them pooled up in northeast 

Iraq, and we saw them conducting experiments on animals, dogs 

and I think there were some sheep or goats as well. What we could 

tell from the intelligence at the time was that they were trying 

some of these bioweapons on these animals. So this goes on. Al 

Qaeda may be down, but they are not out, and that notion of hurting us economically is one that is pretty prevalent among those 

that want to cause us harm. Natural outbreaks, of course, can have 

the same impact. 

If you consider the UN Food and Agriculture Organization assessment that ‘‘just 15 crop plants provide 90 percent of the world’s 

food energy intake, with three—wheat, rice, and maize—making up 

two-thirds of this,’’ 90 percent makes the protection of food crops 

rather significant. 

If wheat, rice, or corn are targeted successfully by bioterrorists 

or if there is a natural disease outbreak that devastates the global 
10 

supply of any one of the three, the world will be in big trouble. 

Kansas, the Wheat State, takes such matters very seriously. 

The U.S. must worry about innumerable foreign animal disease 

threats today. The top-line concerns are those currently projected 

to be worked on at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 

$1.25 billion National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, hereafter 

called ‘‘NBAF,’’ under construction on the K–State campus. These 

include the livestock-only threats—African swine fever, classical 

swine fever, and foot-and-mouth disease—along with zoonotic diseases—Rift Valley fever, Japanese encephalitis, Nipah virus and 

Ebola virus. Any of these and innumerable other foreign animal 

diseases could ravage America’s agricultural infrastructure, the 

food supply, and economy if they hit the U.S. Zoonotic diseases 

could devastate public health as well. 

There have been some foundational efforts to try to address that. 

I know the Committee is fully aware of the Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive/HSPD–9, a national policy to defend the agriculture and food systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. As a result, I will not go through the 

parameters detailed in my written testimony. Nonetheless, I would 

note that all six of the key requirements in HSPD–9 are essential 

to safeguarding American agriculture in a globalized world. 

Just to remind, number one is awareness and warning; number 

two is vulnerability assessments; number three is mitigation strategies; number four is response planning and recovery; five is outreach and professional development; and six, research and development. When I go through my path forward here in just a minute, 

I will come back to those. 

As the Committee knows, protecting U.S. agriculture is a mission 

of America’s land-grant universities, among others, a mission that 

began in 1862 when President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act. As 

someone relatively new to land-grant administration, but someone 

with a lifelong commitment to national defense, I am convinced 

that the Nation’s land-grant universities can and should play a significant role in U.S. bio/agrodefense. These institutions participate 

in protecting agriculture and food in their States and region each 

and every day. I would say not only in their States but around the 

world, and I am sure that is true for Michigan State. I know it is 

true for Kansas State that when something happens in the world, 

some of our research specialists, they are on the road being called 

out to try to help. 

Thus, we would encourage the Committee to integrate the landgrant universities into whatever solutions are developed. K–State 

stands ready to participate on the national team and lead when applicable. Protecting America’s agriculture and food infrastructure is 

too important not to be a part of it. 

For K–State, this is not a new realm. Back in 1999, with encouragement from the Chairman of this Committee, K–State developed 

a 100-page ‘‘Homeland Defense Food Safety, Security, and Emergency Preparedness Program.’’ We called this the ‘‘Big Purple 

Book’’ because, A, that is our color, so it is purple, and it is relatively big, actually. That was put together in March or published 

in March of 1999 before there was a lot of attention on some of 

this, especially the bioterror piece of it. It still pertains today. What 
11 

is in the book is still pertinent. But it documented the need for a 

biocontainment facility capable of conducting research and development on biothreats to food crops, food animals, and the food supply. 

Post 9/11/2001, funding was obtained for such a facility, and the 

Biosecurity Research Institute, the BRI, at Pat Roberts Hall at K– 

State became a reality. The BRI at Pat Roberts—— 

[Laughter.] 

General MYERS. I did not hear the comment. Was there applause 

for that one? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. That was back in the day where we had constitutionally driven subjects. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. Note all these comments are coming from 

the minority side. 

Senator HEITKAMP. That is the only side that is here. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. I was going to say I appreciate that very 

much. 

General MYERS. I think I am sorry I paused, actually. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Right. I should say, ‘‘Now, Heidi, cut that 

out.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. We just did that with Joe, so it is all right. 

Please proceed, General. 

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The BRI at Pat Roberts Hall is located immediately adjacent to 

the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility site, and it includes five 

BSL–3Ag rooms that can be configured for research with cattle, 

pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry. 

K–State has jump-started NBAF research in the BRI on Rift Valley fever, Japanese encephalitis, classical swine fever, and African 

swine fever. We were able to do so because the State of Kansas 

agreed to fund $35 million for NBAF research in the BRI at Pat 

Roberts Hall as part of our ‘‘best and final offer’’ in trying to attract 

NBAF to Manhattan, Kansas. 

R&D continues on all four of these foreign animal diseases today, 

but the Kansas funding commitment will end in 2019 when the last 

$5 million is appropriated by the State legislature. The majority of 

the research is conducted at the BRI by the K–State faculty, staff, 

and students, but collaborators from the USDA’s Center for Grain 

and Animal Health Research in Manhattan participate on some of 

the NBAF-related foreign animal disease projects. Moreover, this 

Center for Grain and Animal Health USDA Center conducts other 

USDA BSL–3/3Ag biocontainment research in the BRI as well. 

Going forward, Federal support is needed for research and development on Rift Valley fever, Japanese encephalitis, classical swine 

fever, and African swine fever to help mitigate these threats to animal health and to public health. 

So a proposed path going forward and the things that I would 

focus on: K–State believes that statutory authorization of the key 

provisions of HSPD–9 with clearly delineated and enforceable accountability, along with the appropriation of funds to support the 

key provisions, is required to safeguard American agriculture in a 
12 

globalized world. I will only touch on the first 5 of the 13 recommendations that are in my written testimony. 

Number 1 is, and consistent with the HSPD, enhance intelligence 

operations and analysis capabilities, awareness and warning are 

essential. But today there are insufficient numbers of bio/ 

agrodefense subject matter experts, veterinarians, animal scientists, crop scientists, plant pathologists, et cetera, with security 

clearances to assess classified intelligence. It is vital to increase the 

number of food crop, food animal, food safety subject matter experts with high-level security clearances—TS–SCI—to monitor 

global threats. 

Also increase the number of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs, with secure communications that have agriculture/food subject matter expert analysts and/or cleared SME 

advisers with top secret SCI clearances. 

Also important to increase the number of USDA’s subject matter 

experts with security clearances. Discussions in 2016 with USDA’s 

chief scientist and a USDA intelligence analyst confirmed their 

frustrations with an inability to convey critical classified information within USDA to make it actionable. 

Then it is also important, I think, to increase State Intelligence 

Fusion Centers with agricultural and food subject matter experts 

with clearances, with security clearances. The Kansas Intelligence 

Fusion Center appears to be the only fusion center of over 70 nationwide that has a biothreat team with TS–SCI-cleared subject 

matter experts capable of assessing the full range of biohazards to 

food crops, food animals, the food supply, and people. These include 

a doctor of veterinary medicine, three Ph.D. scientists and researchers from Kansas State, medical doctors from the University 

of Kansas Medical Center, and subject matter experts from multiple State agencies. This permits the Kansas Fusion Center to assess global intelligence for the purpose of preventing bioterrorism 

and preparing for natural infectious disease events that are emerging globally and coming to the United States. 

So what the Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center really focuses on 

is ‘‘left of the event.’’ We like to prevent the event, not just react. 

We are always going to have to be able to react, but they really 

work on preventing. 

So if you have that intelligence, if you have the right intelligence, 

then you can do vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, 

and response planning and recovery. Without it, you cannot take 

those steps that are outlined in the HSPD. 

Under emerging foreign animal diseases, exploit ‘‘awareness and 

warning’’ intelligence regarding newly emerging biothreats to establish mitigation strategies at USDA’s Center for Grain and Animal Health Research and K–State prior to NBAF becoming operational and fund R&D to confront these threats. We cannot wait 

for the NBAF to come online with its funding to do that. 

Under zoonotic animal disease research, establish zoonotic foreign animal disease mitigation strategies at the USDA’s Center for 

Grain and Animal Health Research and for Rift Valley fever and 

Japanese encephalitis, and fund Rift Valley fever and Japanese encephalitis R&D in the BRI at Pat Roberts Hall. That funding, 

again, goes away in Fiscal Year 2019, and there is a big gap be-
13 

tween that time and when NBAF will come online, which is, I 

think, programmed to be or planned to be now somewhere 2022 to 

2023. 

For the non-zoonotic foreign animal disease research, expedite 

threat mitigation strategies for these foreign animal diseases by 

moving the research portfolios for African swine fever and classical 

swine fever from Plum Island to USDA’s Center for Grain and Animal Health Research and funding African swine fever and classical 

swine fever R&D in the BRI/Pat Roberts Hall until NBAF becomes 

operational. So if we do not do this, there will be a gap in that research, and some, of course, will probably lose ground in those 

areas. 

Then private sector outreach, another part of HSPD–9. Enhance 

outreach and professional development by leveraging the Nation’s 

land-grant universities that interact routinely with private sector 

agriculture producers and food processors, and by funding education and training programs. 

So those are 5 of the 13 points, and I thought I would mention 

them here in my oral statement. 

To sum up, I think HSPD–9 was very well conceived, but it has 

not gotten the job done since it was written. Key components of 

American critical infrastructure—agriculture and food—and, by the 

way, I think agriculture and food are critical components of our infrastructure and often not looked at that way. We focus on other 

components of the infrastructure, but agriculture and food clearly 

are right up there in my estimation—are vulnerable to terrorist attacks with bioweapons and undeliberate infectious disease outbreaks, and I think the U.S. is unprepared to confront these 

threats. So my recommendation is that Congress enact enforceable 

statutes before it becomes too late. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Gen. Richard B. Myers can be found 

on page 59 in the appendix.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Hammerschmidt, before I recognize you, I would be remiss 

if I did not indicate that over General Myers’ right shoulder or 

right behind his shoulder, where he usually is, is Dr. Ron Trewyn, 

who knows as much or more about this entire topic than anybody. 

I thank him for his advice and counsel and friendship down 

through the years. To Dr. Trewyn’s right is Dr. Sue Peterson, who 

is in charge of everything good that is happening at Kansas State 

University. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. Dr. Hammerschmidt. 

General MYERS. Absolutely right. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND HAMMERSCHMIDT, PH.D., PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF PLANT, SOIL, AND MICROBIAL 

SCIENCES, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, EAST LANSING, 

MICHIGAN 

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you 

for this opportunity to speak with you today not only on behalf of 
14 

Michigan State University, but also all the very hard working plant 

and disease pest diagnosticians across the land-grant system. 

As a plant pathologist and also Director of the USDA-NIFA-supported North Central Plant Diagnostic Network, and former Executive Director of the entire network, I have become very familiar 

with the threats that plant agriculture in particular faces from 

both introduced and endemic pests and pathogens. 

I would like to start essentially by saying I think we are relatively ill prepared to combat many of these pathogens and pests, 

both in our food supply and plant agriculture. There is a set of 

plant pathogens that are on the select agent list, and we must be 

on guard for these, but there are many other pests and pathogens 

that threaten plant agriculture and plant production. 

Pathogens and pests do not recognize borders or regulations and 

this should give us pause in this global economy. In some plant 

systems, we are now seeing increased potential for pathogens and 

pests to jump from one host species to another, and the effects of 

climate change cannot be discounted in some of the changes we are 

seeing in these pest outbreaks. 

Although not a food crop, pathogens and pests also threaten 

greenhouse and nursery industries. In Michigan alone, there are 

over 700 greenhouses producing $472 million worth of ornamentals. 

I bring this up in part because of the economic value, but also in 

2003, a select agent, Ralstonia solanacearum, which is a devastating disease on potato and tomato, was accidentally introduced 

in geraniums. This was devastating to the Michigan geranium industry, the greenhouse industry, but we were able to stop this before it became a threat. But, again, pathogens can come in all sorts 

of interesting ways. 

There is also a potential impact on our forests. Plant pathogens 

and pests also pose threats to the livestock industry because of the 

feed that is produced through plants, and some plant pathogens 

produce mycotoxins that can contaminate grain. 

There are three major factors that we think about when considering whether an endemic or a deliberately introduced pathogen 

can cause significant damage: one is obviously the pathogen; second is the susceptibility of the host plant; and, third, whether or 

not we have an environment that is conducive to disease. 

Probably the most classic example of how these three factors 

work together was the late blight potato epidemic in Northern Europe and Ireland in the 1840s where the crop was literally wiped 

out, causing both social and economic problems for that part of the 

world, as well as large immigrations out of Europe. 

Resistance was eventually bred into the potato, but pathogens, 

being rather clever, were able to overcome this resistance shortly 

after the resistance was introduced. We have fungicides that are effective, but not unlike the situations we see in animal and human 

health, these pathogens overcome these chemistries rapidly as well. 

So we have scenarios like this which, unfortunately, are being replicated with many plant diseases and also plant pests. 

Early and rapid detection and diagnostics, therefore, are vital. 

The MSU Plant Diagnostics Laboratory is one of the major contributors to early detection and accurate diagnoses. We have specialists 

that cover all four pest types, and we conduct tests in samples rep-
15 

resenting over 100 plant species each year. We continue, as we do 

across the country, to try to introduce new diagnostic tools and 

serve not only the general public but also work with agencies in 

protecting plant agriculture. 

The MSU Lab is one of the land-grant laboratories that collectively form the National Plant Diagnostic Network. This network 

is involved in rapidly detecting and diagnosing plant pathogens 

and pests. We are also involved in recording this information at the 

appropriate entities, whether it is back to the grower or to regulatory agencies, so we can have mitigation. 

The NPDN has five hub labs: Michigan State, Kansas State University, University of Florida, Cornell University, and the University of California-Davis. As I mentioned, it is supported by NIFA 

through the Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative, which also 

supports the National Animal Health Lab Network and the Extension Disaster Education Network. 

We work closely with APHIS PPQ to complement their regulatory roles by serving as triage for pathogens of regulatory concern 

and assisting in surge diagnostics. All the labs in the land-grant 

system and the NPDN can really be thought of as sentinels and, 

thus, a first line of defense for diseases and pests of plants. 

Even with the ongoing local and national efforts, there is still a 

need for research to develop better detection and diagnostic tools. 

More sophisticated surveillance is needed to survey large acreage 

crops and natural resources. 

We also must continue to educate and prepare what we call ‘‘first 

detectors.’’ These are individuals who are trained to detect unusual 

events and know how to take a sample and ship samples in for diagnosis. Extension educators and crop consultants are two of the 

audiences for this type of education, and through the NPDN we 

have developed programming for this type of activity. 

Equally important is raising public awareness of these issues, 

both on the animal and plant side. This is something which, as I 

think has been mentioned already, sort of flies under the radar. 

Most folks do not understand where their food comes from and the 

importance of managing these pests and diseases. 

There is an added pressure of climate change, and the probability of potentially devastating pathogens and/or pest infestations 

has become much more complex by this change. Temperature and 

weather play a key role in determining the ability of diseases to 

spread and even survive, and we are seeing pathogens in Michigan 

which used to be unable to overwinter, but now are able to survive 

through the winter months. 

Disease and pests can also cause significant economic losses 

across the agricultural spectrum. In Michigan, we have all kinds of 

examples of new and even reemerging pathogens, from cucumber 

downy mildew, soybean sudden death, fire blight of apple, spotted 

wing drosophila that Senator Stabenow mentioned, stink bugs, 

stripe rust, oak wilt, and the list goes on and on. I guess the curse 

and the blessing of having many, many commodities is you get 

many, many pests and pathogens. In many of these cases, unfortunately, disease resistance may not be available, and this is confounded by the development of resistance to effective pesticides. 

There is also a risk for pathogens and pests to make their way to 
16 

Michigan via the busy port of Detroit Metro Airport and the port 

of Detroit. 

To summarize, pathogens and pests of plants will continue to 

evolve in ways to overcome host resistance and the chemical control tools making introduced, endemic, and reemerging pests more 

dangerous. Some of these may even find new hosts or expand their 

host ranges. Environmental stresses on plants can also lead to 

more extensive pathogen and pest damage. 

Because of global trade, we are at risk of introducing new pests 

and pathogens as well as variants of endemic species, which make 

them more difficult to detect against the background noise. Thus, 

the threat to plant systems can come from many different directions, and the need for proactive detection, diagnostic technologies, 

and enhanced coordinated preparedness at all levels is more important than ever before. 

As I have told many groups that I have spoken to about this 

topic, we know that it is not whether one of these major events 

occur but when it is coming and what we need to do to become better prepared. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammerschmidt can be found on 

page 32 in the appendix.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. We thank you for your testimony. 

Dr. Meckes, please. 

STATEMENT OF R.D. MECKES, D.V.M., STATE VETERINARIAN, 

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND 

CONSUMER SERVICES, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA 

Mr. MECKES. Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow, 

and distinguished members, I am Dr. Doug Meckes. I serve as the 

State veterinarian and the director of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture’s Veterinary Division. The division includes 

150 employees that serve our poultry and livestock industries and 

manage and operate our four diagnostic laboratories. Thank you for 

the opportunity today to speak about matters of concern in North 

Carolina’s ongoing efforts to prepare for and respond to agricultural emergencies. 

North Carolina enjoys a robust agribusiness industry which contributes nearly $84 billion on an annual basis to North Carolina’s 

economy. That is 17 percent of the State’s gross domestic product 

and 17 percent of our State employees. North Carolina’s animal agriculture industry, livestock, dairy, and poultry, accounts for 68 

percent of farm cash receipts, and North Carolina ranks second in 

hog production and third in poultry production in the Nation. 

As was mentioned, prior to accepting this position, I spent 7 

years in the Department of Homeland Security as the Branch Chief 

of the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Branch where we 

were charged with implementing the Department’s responsibilities 

in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9. That document 

served as the foundation for all of the efforts that were undertaken 

by our branch. 

Today, as we consider our topic, safeguarding American agriculture in a globalized world, a revisit of HSPD–9 is worth the effort. The directive’s 18 line items provided guidance in 2004 to ad-
17 

dress then-identified gaps in the Nation’s ability to defend agriculture and food. Thirteen years later, progress has been made in 

addressing some of the gaps, not the least of which as I referred 

to as a ‘‘star in the crown,’’ the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas, which brings to reality Line Item 24, 

‘‘a safe, secure, state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratory.’’ This achievement notwithstanding, other gaps in HSPD–9 

have not been sufficiently addressed. Allow me to speak to three 

of those quickly, which are of concern not only to North Carolina 

but to my colleagues and State animal health officials all around 

the country. 

First is the absence of needed vaccines for the use in the introduction of a foreign animal disease, certainly a worry in North 

Carolina with 9 million pigs east of I–95. 

Line Item 18 called for a National Veterinary Stockpile containing sufficient vaccines to respond to the most damaging animal 

diseases capable of deployment within 24 hours. We have not 

achieved this goal. 

Particularly concerning is foot-and-mouth disease. In the event of 

a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the U.S., the North American 

Vaccine Bank would be triggered, and vaccine produced from that 

bank would be shared by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The bank 

contains types or subtypes of virus that are a threat to the U.S., 

but the quantities of antigen available would produce only enough 

vaccine for a small, confined outbreak, 2.5 million doses for each 

of the stored antigens’ types and subtypes. 

An FMD outbreak in a livestock-dense area of the U.S. cannot 

be controlled without immediate access to millions of doses of vaccines, and in the absence of sufficient vaccine, the economic losses 

associated with an uncontrolled outbreak would cost the Nation 

$200 billion over 10 years. 

Next, Line Item 14 of HSPD–9 directs participating departments 

and agencies to ensure that the combined Federal, State, and local 

response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, a major disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting our food and ag sector. We are fortunate in North 

Carolina, for even before HSPD–9, members of the North Carolina 

Department of Ag recognized the need for such a capability. In 

2002, the Emergency Programs Division within the department 

was created. Its mission: to reduce the vulnerability and minimize 

the impact from any natural or man-made disaster, disease outbreak, or terrorist attack for the department, for the people of 

North Carolina, and the agriculture interests of the State. 

The continued refinement of preparedness and response capabilities over the years has resulted in a team of agricultural and emergency management personnel ready to respond to any incident, 

fully engaged at the Federal, the State, and the local level. 

Today the EP Division has reached maturity, and its sphere of 

influence is considered All-Hazards. The development of that capability has been funded by the State and through various Federal 

grants, some $7.3 million in Federal money, $18 million in State 

money. A relatively small investment over the years has brought 

the vision of HSPD–9’s Line Item 14 fully to fruition in North 
18 

Carolina. With additional funding targeted for such programs, 

similar capability could be developed in other States. 

Finally, I will address the veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity in North Carolina and across the Nation. Line Item 8 of HSPD– 

9 speaks to the need to develop nationwide networks that integrate 

existing Federal and State laboratory resources. The National Animal Health Lab Network, the NAHLN, was developed as a result 

of this directive and is now part of a nationwide strategy to coordinate the work of all organizations providing animal disease surveillance and testing. As one of the 12 original NAHLN labs, North 

Carolina’s Rollins Veterinary Diagnostic Lab in Raleigh receives 

significant infrastructure support from USDA. That funding enables Rollins and other NAHLN laboratories to be fully committed 

to the NAHLN mission and able to respond to domestic or foreign 

animal disease emergencies on a 24/7 basis. In addition, the North 

Carolina laboratories receive State-appropriated funds for salaries 

and expenses, operations, and maintenance. 

In closing, let me say that while I have addressed only three of 

the line items in HSPD–9, several others are worthy of another 

look. But in speaking with my State animal health official colleagues, particularly those in animal-dense states, I believe the 

issues addressed above to be of immediate concern and worthy of 

attention. As I am certain you all are aware, numerous animal agriculture groups, animal science organizations, and veterinarians 

support a new Animal Disease and Disaster Prevention Program 

for inclusion in the 2018 Farm Bill. This program speaks specifically to ensuring fully trained, appropriately equipped, responseready teams at the State level—not unlike the Emergency Programs Division here in North Carolina—and increased support for 

the NAHLN laboratory system to enhance the Nation’s animal disease prevention efforts. Additionally, a proposal for establishing 

and funding a robust U.S. Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank 

for inclusion in the Farm Bill is considered a top priority by many 

in the animal agriculture industry. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of North 

Carolina and my colleagues around the country about issues concerning agriculture and food. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meckes can be found on page 47 

in the appendix.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. I thank you, Doctor. 

Senator Stabenow? 

Senator STABENOW. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank all of you for coming and for this very important testimony. 

I am attempting to be two places at once and am going to have to 

step away, and so I want to thank the Chairman again. 

I do have questions, but I will follow up with all of you regarding 

that. I am hopeful that there will be some discussion on one of the 

additional threats, which is our changing climate, which I know for 

us in Michigan with all of our diversity of crops is certainly an additional challenge as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Heitkamp. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I think 

about this, and I think that we have so narrowly defined our na-
19 

tional security interests that this is such important testimony and 

such an important topic that we really should have a roomful of 

people listening to the concerns that you are expressing and some 

of the planning. 

One of the challenges—and I think this is to Senator Lieberman. 

One of the challenges I think we are experiencing is the sense of 

complacency, and you see it in a Presidential budget that basically 

zeroes out research, zeroes out coordination, ignores, in my opinion, 

the land-grant colleges where we have had this incredible history 

of flexibility and response. I am wondering, how can we do a better 

job to educate the rest of the public, Senator, on what this threat 

is and how we need to be better prepared? You all have outlined 

some great preparations. I still do not walk away from here with 

a sense of comfort that we are as prepared as what we should be. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks for the question, Senator Heitkamp. 

I totally agree with you. This is a real—agrodefense is a real national security problem, not only the material that was talked 

about before that was found in al Qaeda’s possession and now the 

latest stories about Kim Jong-un having an active pathogen development program. 

If you were an enemy of the United States and wanted to strike 

us, we talk about cybersecurity—nuclear weapons always get the 

most attention because they are so terrifying to everybody. But 

when you think about the damage that could be done to our economy, to our country, to our people, create real terror, a sense of terror, if somebody successfully attacked with a pathogen our agriculture sector, and when you think about the fact that it is relatively easier to do than to launch a nuclear attack, thank God, 

against our country. 

So how do you get attention for it? Unfortunately, it is very hard, 

particularly in the context of everything happening in our political 

system, the media focus on the day-to-day ups and downs of what 

is happening in the White House and what people respond to. 

The media has a responsibility here—but that is up to them 

under the First Amendment still—to focus on this, and to the extent we can encourage them and sort of give them material to do 

it, that is why I thought the article—I think it was Joby Warrick 

who wrote it—in the Washington Post over the weekend about the 

North Korean pathogen program was so important. 

But it is also a role for congressional leadership, and I do not expect this hearing to make the evening news, but it should. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Yeah. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So there is a really important leadership 

role for Congress here and, of course, the executive branch, but it 

may be one of those things that—I remember people would say this 

to me, my senior colleagues when I was here, ‘‘You know, you are 

going to do some things here that will be probably the most important things you do for the country, and very few people will know 

you did them.’’ This may be one of those, so I appreciate the leadership that the Committee is showing, because this really is a threat 

to our country. That is part of why the various things that have 

come my way since I left the Senate, that I grabbed onto this one 

because I feel it is something that, working with Tom Ridge, we 

can make a difference on. 
20 

Senator HEITKAMP. I think when we look, Mr. Chairman, at people, if an event happens, people say, ‘‘Well, who could have anticipated that?’’ Most of this is anticipate-able. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator HEITKAMP. But there needs to be a coordinated response, 

and I have many more questions, but I want to thank the Chairman for bringing this very important national security issue to this 

Committee. I think it has not gotten the attention that it should. 

When you look at kind of long term what should terrify us, with 

all the horrors out there, pandemics and this kind of pathogen invasion—and that is the way we should think about it—and what 

is our resilience, what is our resistance, and what is our plan, and 

how are we funding it, and it should be right up there with all of 

the other threats that we are talking about. So I applaud the 

Chairman for bringing this issue. I think it is something that we 

should be talking about in your former Committee, which I also 

serve on, Homeland Security, and I promise to raise that issue with 

the Committee as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is really important, Senator. I am 

sorry. I will yield to you in a minute, General. But just to say very 

briefly I served on Armed Services and on Homeland Security, was 

privileged to be the Chair of Homeland Security, and it is not natural—this topic of agro-security is not naturally the first topic to 

come up, certainly not in the Armed Services Committee, where it 

should, and also in Homeland Security. But this is the Agriculture 

Committee, and I think the Farm Bill for next year really can play 

an important leadership role here. 

Excuse me, General. 

General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, could I make a remark? 

Chairman ROBERTS. Yes, sir. 

General MYERS. Senator, I totally agree, and it struck me when 

I got to Kansas State a year and a half ago and became familiar 

with some of these issues that I was familiar with from a different 

perspective when I was still in uniform. I think part of it is just 

the intelligence piece, and that is why I mentioned the intelligence 

piece. If we do not know there is a threat out there, then we tend 

to dismiss it. But there is no threat, so what are we worried about? 

I do not think we are—some of the things that we discover at the 

Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center are things that the national intelligence folks say, ‘‘Ah, look, that is really good stuff. We did not 

see that.’’ That has happened more than once. We have had the 

former Secretary of Homeland Security out there who was sort of 

amazed by what you can do with a relatively small group of national or subject matter experts, scientists, researchers, that when 

they put their minds to it and they look at all the intelligence at 

the top-secret level, SCI level, they can find things there that others, if they are not looking for them, will never find. So I think that 

is one. I think the intelligence has to be there, and then you get 

people’s attention. 

Two, not to put too fine a point on it, but the Washington Post 

article on the North Korean work with pathogens, if you are uninformed—everybody in this room would understand it, but if you are 

uninformed, you would say, ‘‘Well, that is North Korea. That is not 

a worry.’’ Well, it is a worry because they proliferate. They pro-
21 

liferated fissile material. They can proliferate a lot of things and 

missile technology and that sort of thing. So pathogens, if they can 

get some hard cash for that or get some return, they will proliferate that. That is not good for us to have somebody that is 

working that. 

So these are important issues that we need to—but I think it all 

starts with the intelligence, frankly. We have got to do a better job 

there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, in terms of public attention, next year will be the 100th anniversary of the influenza outbreak of 1918. They estimate that at least 50 million and 

maybe as many as 100 million people died from that flu in 1 year 

globally. That was before we were traveling as much as we are now 

and before commerce was moving worldwide. So as you go along in 

this area, it may be that there will be more public attention on this 

threat because people will go back and look at what happened 100 

years ago. 

Chairman ROBERTS. I thank the Senator. 

Senator Casey, if you will permit me to just reflect on this just 

a moment, I think it is extremely important to note the intelligence 

component here, and I have been to the fusion center on several 

occasions, as I know you do on a regular basis, General, and I appreciate that. If you asked the CIA, ‘‘What keeps you up at 

night?’’—which I regularly did when I was Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, but also you can do it as Chairman of the Agriculture Committee and, for that matter, the Ranking Member as 

well, and we would certainly work together on that—agroterrorism 

does not make the top ten. But if you look and you have an exercise, which we did some years back, even before the Department 

of Homeland Security was credited, and you look at what happens 

if you have a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak from South Dakota 

down to Texas—that was the primary entry point—every Governor 

stopped the movement of livestock, but it was too late, and we lost 

thousands and thousands of head of cattle. 

Now, that is bad enough, and it is very difficult to try to terminate all of those animals. But all of our exports stopped, boom, just 

like that. About the mad cow situation and any other frightful 

thing that would happen to a nation’s food supply. People panicked. 

They finally understood that our food does not come from grocery 

stores. But they were in the grocery stores, and, boy, everybody 

bought up everything they possibly could. 

This did not last just 1 year. This was about a 3-year shot to 

even get back to the basics. You basically see a situation where you 

are destroying the Nation’s food supply, and the utter chaos that 

happens as a result with regards to our entire economic picture. 

So I think probably another exercise like that just to alert people 

as to what is going on would be very helpful, and thank you for 

trying to focus on this. It has been a big-time concern for me, obviously, for many, many years, and, Senator Lieberman, I do want 

to thank you for alerting me to the Blue Ribbon Panel. Basically 

you said, ‘‘Will you have a hearing?’’ I said, ‘‘You bet.’’ So I appreciate that very much. 

Senator Casey? 
22 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much for having the 

hearing and for this great panel. I apologize. We are juggling between hearings. I am on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. We are doing a hearing today on the broader 

issue of mental health, and a lot to work on there as well. So I am 

sorry I missed some of your testimony. 

I wanted to start with an analogy or comparison between the 

subject of this hearing and the great work that each of you have 

done and continue to do for your country, and the work that another part of the HELP Committee has been focused on for a number of years. Senator Burr and I have been working on the socalled PAHPA reauthorization, Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness, so all of the issues that encompass the focus on the security 

to human health with regard to chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear threats. As each of the panelists in one way or another 

today have said, this HELP legislation we are working on and the 

pandemic hazards fits under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, which is technically separate from the defense of agriculture, which is the Presidential Directive 9. But as your report 

says, the Blue Ribbon report details, so many of the threats to humans are so-called zoonotic, meaning they can move between animals and humans, so it is appropriate that the Committee is looking at agrodefense. 

I want to direct this question to both Senator Lieberman as well 

as Dr. Meckes about both the authorization and funding of the socalled National Veterinary Stockpile, NVS. As I mentioned, the 

work we are doing in the pandemic legislation with Senator Burr, 

that particular legislation authorizes the Strategic National Stockpile, so-called SNS, as opposed to the National Veterinary Stockpile, NVS. 

As you might know, the Strategic Stockpile is the human counterpart to the National Veterinary Stockpile, and I guess the first 

thing I wanted to ask both you, Doctor, as well as Senator Lieberman, and certainly, General and Dr. Hammerschmidt, you can 

weigh in on this. Can you compare the two? I guess in particular, 

I would present this question: If you had a threat to avian influenza emerging in the U.S. today, just by way of a hypothetical example, that threatened both animals as well as humans, how 

would the various sectors that deal with these issues, but especially these stockpiles, work together to mitigate that threat? I 

know it is kind of a broad question, but do you have any sense of 

that? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Dr. Meckes, go ahead. Why don’t you start? 

Mr. MECKES. Yes. Well, obviously the most keen distinction between the Strategic National Stockpile and—the greatest distinction between the two stockpiles, National Veterinary Stockpile and 

Strategic National Stockpile, is funding: billions of dollars for the 

Strategic National Stockpile, less than $5 million typically for the 

National Veterinary Stockpile. Currently, most of those resources 

are committed to protective equipment for response, materials to 

mobilize teams to go to farms and do whatever is needed, whether 

it is depopulation in the event of an avian influenza or other activities. 
23 

But there has been some effort over the years to integrate the 

activities of the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Veterinary Stockpile, but their missions are so totally different that, 

frankly, it has not been very successful. 

Then the other piece, as we mentioned, of the foot-and-mouth 

disease vaccine, we have that antigen stored for 12 or 13 different 

types and subtypes. As I mentioned, it is shared between Mexico, 

Canada, and the U.S. in that North American bank. So, again, a 

very small investment in vaccine for foot-and-mouth disease. I 

mentioned 9 million pigs east of I–95, millions of cattle in Kansas 

and throughout the Midwest, sheep and goats, dairy cows in California. How will the decision be made to distribute 2.5 million 

doses of vaccine when we have got 90 million head of cattle and 

60 million swine in the country? Difficult proposition. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator, I will just add that we think this 

is an important area because the National Veterinary Stockpile 

was created pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

9, and it has never been funded. Actually, that directive created 

some, I think, important requirements, which can never be fulfilled 

because it has not been funded, which is that within 24 hours of 

an event, the outbreak of something, which hopefully we would find 

out about because we have adequate intelligence, surveillance, reporting, we have to be prepared to act to get medical countermeasures out there and vaccines, and there is no way—I mean, 

this gets us, as Dr. Meckes said, just a little over $4 million a year. 

You just cannot do it. 

So it would be a real sign of a recognition that something is 

needed here—and, again, avian influenza, the foot-and-mouth is 

separate, has some funding. It would show that this is not fantasy, 

that this is real. But at least for Congress to take the step of authorizing the Veterinary Stockpile, to put it in a law is a first step. 

I understand all the competition for funding and the rest, but however high, once it is authorized, before it can go, it should be easy 

to put more than $4 million in, because when there is an outbreak, 

boy, people are going to be screaming for vaccines or other medical 

countermeasures to stop the spread. There is nothing there right 

now. It is empty, effectively. So, please, make it real and fill it up. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

General or Doctor? I know I am over. 

General MYERS. I have just got two short comments. 

One is when you have two HSPDs, 9 and 10, one for people and 

one for threats to agriculture, right there you have problems because they both concern living things, whether plant, animals, or 

people. I think because we have two and because some protect 

things better than the other one might in agriculture, we do not 

have a good focus in the executive side of Government. From a policy standpoint, I think that is problematic. 

Then, second, I was reminded by Dr. Trewyn that pandemic 

threats essentially are all zoonotic. They usually start in animals. 

So focusing on an effort to stop the disease in animals is the way 

you stop from losing 50 to 100 million or who knows how many 

today, and there is little effort to do that. So they are not separate. 

They are together. 
24 

Senator CASEY. Just one comment. Appropriations are always, as 

Senator Lieberman said, an area of—I am putting words in his 

mouth, but it is a lot of competition for dollars, obviously. 

Chairman Roberts is focused on this issue, and his standing as 

a Chairman means that he will have on most days more persuasive 

powers than some of the rest of us. I might even argue, though, 

that this panel might have even greater persuasive powers with 

the appropriators, even greater powers than Senator Roberts. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. I just got myself in real trouble. But I would just 

urge you to keep making that point because we can write letters 

to the appropriators, we can buttonhole them and talk to them 

about it, and all that is discharging our duty. But your voices on 

this will be more powerful, and it should not just be a few million. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Daines? 

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow. Thank you to this very distinguished panel today. 

Thanks for spending the time here with us. 

Everyone knows that protecting the integrity and security of our 

food and ag infrastructure is of the utmost importance. It is important to a guy like me from a State like Montana, where it is our 

number one industry. 

As we look at the face of threats to agriculture and human 

health, I applaud your insights, your testimony, and the ability to 

discuss this. Assets towards this end across the Federal Government, including the Rocky Mountain Research Lab, a little-known 

research lab perhaps nationally but well known within those who 

engage in this fight every day—it is a state-of-the-art facility, a biomedical research facility in Hamilton, Montana, just south of Missoula. In fact, a fascinating history dating back to 1928 when research went out looking for the cause of the Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and that was the genesis of this laboratory. They have 

played a critical role in protecting our Nation from fighting 

zoonotic diseases to conducting essential research on the Ebola vaccine as well. 

I know the Chairman asked a really great question: What keeps 

you up at night? That is always a good question for a panel like 

this. To build on that, I will start with General Myers. First, I 

want to thank you for your service to our Nation. In your view, 

what do you see as the greatest threats and the vulnerabilities to 

our ag infrastructure and food systems that terrorists or bad actors 

might exploit? 

General MYERS. I think when it comes to our critical agriculture 

infrastructure, it is exactly that. If somebody wanted to—it is bad 

enough dealing with the naturally occurring pathogens. It is another thing if it were to be deliberate. What is interesting to me, 

dealing with groups like al Qaeda and ISIS and others when I was 

still in uniform, is that here you could wreak havoc on our agriculture infrastructure, and you could be continents away before the 

consequences were known or felt. So an ease with which it is the 

ability to infect with pathogens either plants or animals. 
25 

Wheat blast was introduced in Bangladesh I think last year and 

the year before, 2 years in a row—maybe it was this year—it was 

2017, I guess—through a shipping container, inadvertently I think 

people think. So that is a fungus, as I understand, that you could 

transmit other ways. There is no—you could probably easily bring 

it into any country and infect crops. Once it gets started, it goes 

pretty fast. 

Foot-and-mouth disease, which we all fear for many reasons, is 

easy to transport. It is not detectable necessarily, and the pathogen 

can last for a long time without any special care. Then you just 

drive around any of our big ag States and look at our ag infrastructure and production facilities, they are not well protected. So it is 

easy to introduce. 

So I guess what keeps me up at night is somebody seizing on 

some of this and trying to hurt our economy. In the State of Kansas, agriculture is over 40 percent of the economy. That is just the 

ag piece. That is not the retail and the restaurants and all the rest 

of the food chain. it is just pure ag. Some of the other States, in 

Montana it is obviously pretty a serious business. 

Senator DAINES. Yeah, number one. 

General MYERS. Number one, so this is important stuff. If you 

take the economy down, you create—agroterrorism, bioagroterrorism would do the same thing that terrorists today try to 

do, which is create fear in people’s minds, which gives them less 

confidence in their government and their political processes. It 

could have devastating effects. You could just go right down the list 

of things that we worried about right after 9/11. 

Senator DAINES. So what mechanism or tool, General, a followup question, is the USDA or the Federal Government most lacking 

in order to be able to effectively gather intelligence or mitigate the 

risk of potential foreign animal diseases in advance of the new biodefense facility that is coming online in Kansas? 

General MYERS. Well, there are several. I think first is just the 

intelligence piece of it, knowing what is out there, knowing what 

is likely to come this way, having people focused on that that have 

the knowledge about these pathogens, about agriculture, that they 

can identify the threat before it gets there. We would like to stop 

these threats before they come inside our boundaries, and our 

friends’ and allies’ as well. So like I have mentioned earlier, I think 

it all starts with intelligence. We do not have the number of subject 

matter experts with the right clearances at the right places to focus 

on this. But as the Chairman said, the intel agencies, this is not 

something that keeps them up at night. I think if we had the right 

number of analysts with the expertise like my two colleagues here 

have, properly cleared, that they could identify these well before 

they came to the United States, or at least get us ready for that 

particular threat. So I think it starts there. So that is kind of left 

of the event. 

Right of the event, we have got to have the things that were 

talked about here, which is the research that is going on to try to 

find vaccines or other ways to deal with the pathogens, and that 

is kind of a sporadic effort, as we have heard, I think. Maybe ‘‘sporadic’’ is too—no, that is about right—a sporadic effort to deal with 

those. So it is across the board. I think HSPD–9 is a pretty good 
26 

road map, but there are not statutes that back it up, and I would 

opine and offer that it is my belief we need statutes to back up 

HSPD–9 and then hold people accountable when you give them 

funding for certain things, hold them accountable for the output. 

Senator DAINES. Thank you. I am out of time here, but I will just 

conclude with one statement. We are looking at the possible—the 

risk here to the food supply and the safety of it and what that 

might mean to our Nation. But, arguably, even a very small incident could have just significant implications for the global food supply chain directly affecting our farmers and ranchers. We date back 

to one mad cow disease hit, most likely from outside our country, 

but we were associated with it and it banned beef exports for 14 

years in China as an example. So, again, it is the economic risk to 

the ag industry in this country that concerns so many of us for 

what was a very, very small incident. 

General MYERS. Senator, I would say my two colleagues here to 

the left, maybe it is not the correct analogy, but we have got our 

finger in the dike. As things break out, we deal with them. Up to 

now most of them I think we think are naturally occurring, although some of them have been suspicious, but naturally occurring. 

They have stayed ahead of it thanks to their research, thanks to 

their medical knowledge, and their work in this field. It is thanks 

to people like that, that have kept it where it is. But intentional 

would be a whole different ball game. You would have to assume 

that would be a much more dangerous game. 

Senator DAINES. Thank you. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Boozman. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for 

being late. We had an Air Force fellow that graduated today, and 

so we were over celebrating that very quickly, and just—— 

Chairman ROBERTS. I know General Myers will be most appreciative of that. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Well, I think all of us are most appreciative. 

That is a big deal for this young lady. 

So I thank all of you all for being here. We really do appreciate 

your insight. Certainly, the security of our food and fiber is so very 

important. 

I know that many of you have expressed concern regarding proposed funding reductions for the research activities. I want to let 

you know that as DHS Appropriations Subcommittee Chair, we 

fully funded all of these line items in Fiscal Year 2018. Now, we 

are going to work hard to keep that together, but right now they 

are in the Senate bill as we go forward. So, again, we do appreciate 

the fact, though, that you are concerned about it and have voiced 

the importance of it. That helps us in securing those funds. So 

thank you very much for that. 

Dr. Meckes, North Carolina has led the way with the creation of 

the Emergency Programs Division within the State’s Agriculture 

Department to safeguard our food and fiber supply. It really will 

take an all-of-the-above approach, Federal, State, local, private levels. In your opinion, what role can States play in this very important mission? Additionally, how do you think DHS and other Federal agencies could best coordinate across State lines to work with 

State agencies such as yours in North Carolina? 
27 

Mr. MECKES. Well, I will say that in the early days of the creation of the Emergency Programs Division, DHS was integral to 

the funding of that effort, and I mentioned $7 million of DHS funds 

from USDA grants actually helped us create that program. As it 

has come to fruition, it is recognized at the Federal level we have 

got a close working relationship with USDA not only at the State 

level with our assistant district directors but at the national level 

as well. 

In 2015, when Minnesota broke with avian influenza in the largest turkey farm in the world, they picked up the phone and called 

North Carolina and asked us to come and help them depopulate 

birds. This is certainly not anything that I have done. This all precedes me. But it is a remarkable asset for a State. 

We deployed to Texas. After the hurricanes, we deployed to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the last 3 months to assist 

them in animal agriculture. We worked closely with FEMA in anticipation of Hurricane Matthew’s arrival to the State of North 

Carolina in 2016, and for the first time ever, we were able to secure funds to purchase carbon source to compost all of the birds 

that died during the flooding in North Carolina. 

So the marks on the wall by our Emergency Programs Division, 

we are well recognized and respected throughout our State colleagues and by the feds, and that success brings more success, and 

that is where we are with this effort. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Good story to tell. 

Mr. MECKES. Yes, it is. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Senator Lieberman, it is so good to have you 

around. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Boozman. 

Senator BOOZMAN. We miss you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Great to see you. 

Senator BOOZMAN. As you noted in your testimony, much of the 

critical infrastructure in ag is privately owned. Could you elaborate 

on some of the challenges that presents? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I would be happy to. I have thought about 

that in the question that Senator Daines asked General Myers. 

Part of the problem there has been—and this goes to early warning and intelligence—how do you stop an outbreak, of either a bioterrorist attack or naturally occurring, from spreading, and there 

is a natural tendency—it is not just in agriculture, of course. It is 

in other areas of human activity—for the private sector—this happened particularly in cybersecurity over the years—where a company, an agricultural company, a farm, an individual farm, do not 

want to report the problem because they fear creating a panic that 

will affect business. That is just—you cannot do that because they 

have got to report early, and that is the way to stop it and really 

secure the agricultural sector of our economy. So that is one thing 

I think of. 

I think the reality of this threat to agricultural security has quite 

naturally now hit the people in the industry more than people outside, and I think there is a growing cooperation going on, so that 

is good news. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Very good. 
28 

General Myers and Dr. Hammerschmidt, in your testimony you 

both line out roles that you think the land-grant universities could 

play in ensuring food security. Could you elaborate on this? Specifically, how can the Federal Government better partner with the agricultural universities? 

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. I think I will start, being the only sort of 

non-animal person up here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Although I think humans are still animals. 

One of the things which obviously the Federal Government has 

been helping us with are the diagnostic networks funded through 

the USDA, NIFA, FADI line, and this has been, from the plant 

side, one of the best investments that has been made in plant disease and pest diagnostics over the last 15 years. 

Like many other things, the funding has declined dramatically, 

so in my region, as in other region such as the region directed by 

Dr. Jim Stack that General Myers’ university heads up, we are 

down to little more than half a million a year per region to support 

the States around us. But having this kind of support still enables 

us to enhance our detection and diagnostic techniques. We also 

have invested in the past and we would like to do more training 

of what we call ‘‘first detectors.’’ These are individuals, whether 

they are extension agents, crop consultants, master gardeners, the 

general public, anyone who comes into contact with plants would 

be able to recognize when something unusual is happening and 

know where to send a sample. We are not looking broadly enough 

for pest and pathogens, and this shows a need for awareness training. This is part, I think, of the issues that we have of the public 

not really being very appreciative of some of these problems that 

we face. These are programs which can generate a great deal of 

benefit in early detection of pests and diseases. 

When I think about acreages of wheat, for example, in Kansas, 

which is far more extensive than in Michigan, although we do have 

a little bit, scouting or surveillance of those fields is very difficult 

by an individual. But we have better potential technologies now. 

Can we use drones, for example? Can we use volatile organic chemistries which are emitted by certain pest-plant pathogen interactions to detect these events It does not remove the need for people to get out there to take samples, but it could enable us to find 

these diseases or pests much more quickly. 

The other area which really I am quite concerned about--and this 

really is an issue that faces both animal and human health—is the 

occurrence and development of more and more resistance to the 

chemistries we rely on for plant pathogen and insect control. As the 

chemicals have become much more specific and much more environmentally safe, they are actually much more readily, easily overcome by the pathogens by mutations. Couple that with what I 

think is not speedy enough breeding for host resistance to both 

pests and pathogens, we have sort of this double-edged sword 

working at us. 

General Myers mentioned the outbreak of wheat blast in Bangladesh, and part of that in part may be due to the fact that the 

wheat lines there were not resistant to this pathogen. 
29 

I would contend that because of the openness of our research, 

both in the United States and other parts of the world, that folks 

know what varieties of crops are being planted, what their 

vulnerabilities are, what they are resistant to, what they are susceptible to, and, equally importantly, what pesticides they are resistant to. With the knowledge of which genes are being mutated 

to confer disease resistance and the ability to actually genetically 

modify microbes quite easily, you can envision a scenario that if 

you wanted to introduce a pathogen into a crop, you would first determine what varieties are being grown to know what the susceptibility is, what fungicides are being used and modify your organism 

to basically come in there and defeat the tools that are readily 

available for crop control, things you would not expect. 

So detection involves not only finding it, but also determining 

genotypes of the pathogens. So partnering with programs to ensure 

we have the right kind of chemistries coming down the pipeline, 

that we have disease and pest resistance being incorporated into 

our most important—or all of our crops is very, very important. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, Senator Boozman, 

I apologize. There is one more thing I want to add for the 

record—— 

Senator BOOZMAN. You always may. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. My answer to your question 

about private industry, the agricultural industry. The Department 

of Agriculture I gather is in the final stages and close to issuing 

a rule on reportable animal disease, and that hopefully will clarify 

the responsibility of the private sector here to report quickly to 

avoid the spread of disease among animals and to create a certain 

incentive to do that because that information is critically important. 

Thank you. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you. 

General MYERS. Could I add a comment? 

Chairman ROBERTS. Sure. 

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree completely 

that I think the land-grant universities are particularly well positioned with their research and extension efforts to help with the 

private sector outreach that you covered so well, so I will not go 

into that. But that is part of what they do, and sometimes it comes 

down to funding, of course. That is something to consider. 

Plus as I mentioned in my testimony, we are going to have a gap 

with certain diseases that are going to be covered eventually by the 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, but in the meantime are 

being handled by the BRI/Pat Roberts Hall there at K–State, that 

State funding runs out in 2019, so we are going to have a 3-or 4- 

or 5-year gap before that picks up at NBAF. Somebody ought to be 

doing that, or we are going to have a gap in research. 

Then, third, just to answer your question, it is research that is 

the key here, and so the work that Dr. Hammerschmidt does, the 

work that is done at many of our land-grant institutions is really 

critical to this, and I think we could target funding for specific research that would really move us forward. 

Senator BOOZMAN. Very good. Thank you, sir. 
30 

General MYERS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROBERTS. Thank you, Senator. Thank you to all of the 

witnesses. In making notes here, I would note the resistance on the 

part of Senators and Members of Congress to fully appreciate what 

we are facing here with the lack of awareness. 

This is a difficult issue because if you really come out and say 

what is on your mind, you scare the dickens out of people. I remember when I first became interested in this by the circumstance 

of that trip to Russia, and then the follow-up with President 

Wefald at K–State, I kept telling our various farm organizations 

and our commodity groups we have got to step up on this, our veterinarians, everybody else. They said, ‘‘Will, you quit talking about 

this because nobody wants to talk about this. It is affecting prices 

if the Chairman of the Ag Committee comes out and says we are 

about to face something very dreadful.’’ Mainly because a former 

Senator and a dear friend of mine came and said that Kim Jongun has pathogens now, so look out. Well, we should look out. 

So I can promise you that every member of this Committee is 

aware of this threat, and it is true that with regards to—I just 

made notes: lack of vaccines, lack of coordination, lack of response 

capability, obviously lack of funding, and lack of awareness and 

lack of intelligence capability, and lack of building out HSPD–9 to 

where the full intent was. Other than that, we are in pretty good 

shape. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROBERTS. We do have awareness, these things are set 

in place. They were not set in place 10, 15 years ago. We have good 

people working on them, and I want to thank everybody, especially 

the Panel, for being certainly on point—quite a few times, as a 

matter of fact, as I recall here, with regards to the timing. 

So thank you for your testimony, and to my fellow members, we 

would ask that any additional questions you may have for the 

record be submitted to the Committee clerk 5 business days from 

today or by 5:00 p.m. next Wednesday, December 20th. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(31) 

A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 13, 2017 
32 

College of Agriculture 

and Natural Resources 

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 

Raymond Hammerschmidt, PhD, Professor 

Department of Plant, Soil and Microbial Sciences 

Michigan State University 

Testimony before the United State Senate 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry 

"Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World" 

December 13,2017 

Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow, and distinguished members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. 

I am Ray Hammerschmidt, a professor of plant pathology at Michigan State University (MSU) 

for the past 37 years. I am also the founding and current director of the North Central Plant 

Diagnostic Network, (NCPDN, one of the regions of the USDA National Institute for Food and 

Agriculture-supported National Plant Diagnostic Network, or NPDNI,2) faculty coordinator of 

MSU Diagnostic Services, and have served twice as executive director ofthe NPDN. Through 

these activities, I have become very interested in looking at the current and potential threat 

situations, and how we need to be proactive in safeguarding plant agriculture and natural 

resources from pathogens and pests. 

I'll start by saying that we are ill-prepared to combat pathogens and pests that threaten our food 

supply and many other important economic drivers. There is a defined set of plant pathogen 

select agents for which we must be on guard, but there are many other pests and pathogens that 

can threaten our plant production. There appears to be a lack of urgency across many different 

levels to address this critical issue, even as it impacts our global food system. Pathogens and 

pests do not recognize state or intercontinental borders and regulations, and this should give us 

pause. In some plant systems we are seeing increasing potential for plant pathogens and pests to 

1 Stack, JS, Bostock RM, Hammerschmidt R, Jones JB, Luke E. 2014. The National Plant Diagnostic Network: 

Partnering to protect plant systems. Plant Disease 98: 708-715. 

2 The National Plant Diagnostics Network, https://www.npdn.org/home. This site has several fact sheets on 

the impact of the NPDN and links to all labs associated with the NPDN. 
33 

jump from one host species to another, as well as the effects of a changing climate. We need to 

pay more attention and raise public awareness of these important plant disease and pest issues. 

Pathogens and pests pose harm not only to plant and animal agriculture, but they also threaten 

non-edible industries such as the greenhouse and nursery industries. In Michigan alone, there are 

over 700 greenhouses producing $472 million worth of ornamental and vegetable crops that are 

susceptible to various threats. 

There are also implications on the natural resources side, such as impacts on forestry- including 

the logging industry- and our planet in general. Movement of a pathogen from one woody host 

species to another has recently been identified in Michigan. In fact, some pathogens may have a 

host range that is broader than one or two plant species, resulting in possible introductions to 

other plants. 

Furthermore, pathogens and pests also pose secondary threats to the livestock industry since 

many crops serve as forage for cattle and other animal agriculture industries and some pathogens 

produce mycotoxins that contaminate grain and thus harm both livestock and human health. 

We know that it is not whether a major event will occur, but when. It's coming and we need to 

do more to be better prepared to defend our food supply, our economic vitality and our planet. 

Before discussing this issue, a little background might be useful. 

Development of plant diseases and pests 

The most important factors to determine whether an endemic pathogen or one deliberately 

introduced will cause significant damage are: 

• Presence of a pathogen 

• Susceptibility of the plant 

• Environment conducive to disease 

A classic example of how these three factors work together is late blight disease of potato the 

cause of major potato losses in Ireland and Northern Europe in the 1840s and one we still battle 

to this day. This pathogen likely originated in what is now central Mexico and was transported 

via plants to Europe. The pathogen was severe and spread very quickly because of a favorable 

environment and lack of resistance in the potato plant. 

Resistance was eventually bred into the potato, but this was quickly overcome through mutation 

and selection of the pathogen. Simultaneously, specific fungicides have lost efficacy as the 

pathogen, through mutation, has developed resistance to these chemicals. 

This scenario has been replicated with many plant diseases, representing risks even with 

pathogens we have dealt with for years. 
34 

Pathogens can also evolve greater virulence or aggressiveness. As early as the 1970s, the U.S. 

saw a major loss in corn production due to the presence of a newly-evolved strain of the southern 

corn leaf blight epidemic. In another example, the breeding for rust resistance in oats led to 

varieties that are very susceptible to what has been a very minor pathogen. Thus, changes in 

pathogen genotypes can lead to the development of new strains that are even more destructive 

that the original strain. 

Diagnostics laboratories 

Early and rapid detection and diagnostics are vital, and preparedness is paramount. 

The MSU Plant Diagnostics Laboratory is a major contributor to early detection and accurate 

diagnoses. The lab conducts tests on about 8,000 samples annually, representing over l 00 plant 

species. The lab has introduced new diagnostic tools for many important diseases. While samples 

come mostly from agriculture organizations, industry groups and growers, the general public is 

also served by the lab. On an annual basis, samples from almost every county in Michigan are 

analyzed, as are samples from several other states. 

A one-stop diagnostic destination, MSU Diagnostic Services formed in 1999 when Project 

GREEEN (Generating Research and Extension to meet Economic and Environmental Needs) 

united the Arthropod/Insect Diagnostic Lab, the Nematode Diagnostic Service Lab and the Plant 

Disease Clinic under one roof. This is truly a unique multi-disciplinary lab. 

Diagnosticians address insect, nematode, plant pathogen, herbicide/weed problems and 

combinations of those issues. This is critically important as most plants are susceptible to more 

than one of these issues. This integrated approach has resulted in greater efficiency and the 

ability to investigate several thousand more samples per year than similar programs around the 

country. 

With four diagnosticians, each of whom specialize in one of the four major plant pest groups, 

and two technical support staff members, the lab is one of the largest among the Land Grant 

University laboratories that collectively form the National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN). 

NPDN laboratories immediately report their findings to appropriate clients, responders and 

decision makers, resulting in rapid detection, diagnostics, and information needed for mitigation. 

The NPDN also provide training through education and outreach, and enhanced communication 

among public agencies and stakeholders responsible for responding to and mitigating new 

outbreaks. 

The NPDN has five hub labs (MSU, Kansas State University, University of Florida, Cornell 

University and the University of California-Davis) and is financially supported by NIF A through 

the Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative or FAD I. The sister networks supported by FADI are 

NAHLN (National Animal Health Laboratory Network) and Extension Disaster Education 
35 

Network. The NPDN labs work closely with USDA APHIS PPQ to complement their regulatory 

roles in activities by serving as triage for pathogens of regulatory concern, snch as those that 

cause plum pox and ramorum blight, and assisting in surge diagnostics. Along those lines, all of 

the labs in the NPDN can be thought of as sentinels, and thus a first line of defense for new and 

emerging diseases and pests 

Accreditation for specific high-consequence pathogens comes through the National Plant 

Pathogen Laboratory Accreditation Program and is administered through USDA's Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)- which only a few labs, including MSU, have. 

Because it is unlikely that we could ever prevent all pathogens or pests from entering the U.S., 

and similarly unlikely that we can prevent all new outbreaks of endemic pathogens, we must be 

prepared at many levels to stop these threats before they become an epidemic. First, we must be 

able to detect new and potentially destructive pathogens and pests. Because of the distributed 

nature of agricultural and forestry systems, detecting new pathogen development can be difficult. 

However, this can be assisted through a cadre of"first detectors" who are trained to identify 

when something new or unusual has occurred. 

The MSU diagnostic lab and many others have tools to quickly determine the type of pathogen 

and then use this information to identify the specific organism by one of several means. Because 

of the NPDN, we can rapidly and securely communicate about new, emerging and re-emerging 

pathogens with other laboratories at both the state and federal levels. We need to be prepared to 

detect all new pests and pathogens rapidly and accurately so that small problems do not escalate 

into large, devastating problems. 

MSU continues to adopt new diagnostic tools and capabilities to ensure that samples can be 

quickly and accurately diagnosed. A few of the new molecular diagnostic tools to diagnose some 

of the more devastating diseases such as soybean sudden death, oak wilt, and a new disease -

potato soft rot caused by the bacterium Dickeya - have been implemented in the lab. In addition, 

the capacity to screen for unknowns has also increased so that potential pathogens - even those 

that are new - can be identified more rapidly. 

The NPDN has benefitted from diagnostic trainings on pathogens of regulatory concern that are 

provided by USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ). In addition, MSU- as the 

hub lab for the North Central region- and other NPDN hubs have coordinated and hosted 

diagnostics trainings and provided support for implementing new approaches. The NPDN has 

also provided a mechanism to support cominunication among diagnosticians at land-grant 

universities, State Departments of Agriculture and USDA. The MSU lab also coordinates closely 

with the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development lab in diagnostics and 

exchange of information. Together, they stepped in to rapidly examine around 70,000 samples 

when Plum Pox was first detected in Michigan. 
36 

Needs in Michigan and beyond 

Even with ongoing local and national efforts, there is still a need for better detection tools. More 

sophisticated surveillance equipment, such as drones and detecting other early warning signs of 

disease and pests such as volatile organic compounds, are needed to survey large acreage crops 

and natnral resource. 

We also need to continue to educate and prepare first detectors individuals who are trained to 

detect an unusual event and know how to sample and ship samples for diagnosis. Providing this 

information to outreach programs, Extension educators and crop consultants needs to expand. 

We also need to arm more members of the general public with educational materials from the 

NDPN. 

Better diagnostic tools and improved diagnostic infrastructure are high on our want list. We will 

also continue to partner with researchers at the land-grant universities as well as those at USDA 

APHIS PPQ and USDA ARS to help develop new tools. 

Equally important is the need to raise the public awareness about the importance of this issue. 

This becomes even more complex as we face the challenge of having to double our food supply 

by 2050, with fewer natural resources and the same amount of land. We need to be more 

proactive when it comes to both endemic and introduced pathogens and pests. Early detection 

and diagnosis is critical to reducing the risk. Working with Extension to deliver training and 

education to first detectors and the general public is one of several strategies that can be used. 

Resistance is a constant challenge 

Resistance to pest management chemicals is a battle we continue to wage. Research efforts must 

also focus on developing new varieties that have durable host resistance. 

On the herbicide, fungicide and insecticide front, we are working to address decreased efficiency 

due to resistance. This is only complicated by the fact that the pipeline of new chemistries is 

drying up. Programs like IR-4 (Interregional Research Project No. 4- which ensures that 

pesticides are registered for use on crops) are becoming much more important as we address 

risks of endemic and re-emerging pathogens and pest. 

There is a continual need to develop new and more rapid diagnostic tools for pesticide resistance. 

With advances in molecular biology and more information available on the genomes of 

pathogens and other pests, this type of development is occurring. Early detection of pesticide 

resistance is critical when deploying disease management approaches. 
37 

There is also a need to work toward the development of plant varieties that have durable 

resistance to diseases and pests and find new ways of preventing the onset of pathogen and pest 

resistance to fungicides, antibiotics, insecticide and herbicides. Changes in host genotypes in 

relation to pathogen virulence and potential for development of resistance to chemical controls 

must be taken into account as broader plant protection plans are developed for the future. 

The added pressure of climate change 

The situation of potentially devastating pathogen and/or pest infestations has become even more 

complicated by climate change. Temperature and weather play a key role in determining the 

susceptibility for certain diseases to spread and survive throughout winters, even those in 

Michigan. 

The change in climate may also impact the expression of disease in a positive or negative way. 

Drier or even wetter conditions may increase the threat of some disease, but these stresses may 

render them more susceptible. Changing climate may also change cropping systems and with it, 

growing plants that have different disease susceptibilities. Some pathogens that are less cold 

tolerant may have expanded northern ranges as overwintering temperatures warm. 

In Michigan, potato growers are provided with early season risk assessments for late blight by 

informing them of the likelihood of tubers left in the field surviving the winter. The blight 

pathogen can only survive in living tubers, and over the last few years the risk of tuber survival 

in the field has increased and thus the risk of late blight as well. 

At MSU, plant breeders and plant pathologists have teamed up to examine how potatoes will 

respond to the climate of the future. Using historical weather data dating back to 1980 and 

climate change projections from the North American Regional Climate Change Assessment 

Program, they've developed three potential climate models- each for Michigan between the 

years 2040 and 2070. This range was selected because the models would retain a high degree of 

accuracy and would give enough time to develop entirely new potato cultivars. 

It takes between 10 and 15 years to create a new potato variety from start to finish, so we need to 

be proactive about identifYing the challenges the future could bring. Farmers can't simply change 

their varieties year-to-year to react to last season's issues. They must look ahead as best they can. 

The impact of climate change also varies depending on the potato cultivar. Most potatoes 

harvested in Michigan are ultimately moved into long-term storage, where they can be preserved 

for months and provide processors and retailers with product nearly year-round. Examining the 

impact of climate change on the potatoes' ability to retain their quality in storage is of 

importance as well. 

The climate models and experiments are telling us that we're going to see new stresses on 

potatoes, and that means we need to develop new varieties that can withstand that type of 
38 

environment. And this goes beyond Michigan- it's going to affect all potato-growing states 

across the northern U.S., which together feed a lot of our country. 

Few crops are as important to Michigan as the potato, the top vegetable crop. Michigan farmers 

have 50,000 acres of potato production, which, along with processing and marketing, generates 

over $1.24 billion annually and contributes more than 3,200 jobs to the state's workforce. 

Climate change is also impacting the apple industry, as apple trees break dormancy earlier every 

year, running the risk of damage from frost. Higher temperatures and wetter conditions 

exacerbate major diseases like fire blight and apple scab. For example, a fire blight epidemic in 

2000 wiped out nearly 400,000 apple trees in southwestern Michigan and caused over $42 

million in losses. To combat rising instances of both diseases, new cultural practices and 

monitoring for fungicide and antibiotic resistance in the pathogens are being provided to growers 

for removing fire blight cankers and hastening the decomposition of dead leaves (in which the 

apple scab fungus overwinters) with fertilizers. 

Some Additional Michigan threats 

Disease and pests can cause significant economic losses. In Michigan, there are many examples 

of the spread of new and even re-emerging pathogens. Examples include downy mildew of 

cucumber, Phytophthora fruit and vine rot of cucurbits, sudden death of soybean, fire blight of 

apple, spotted wing drosophila, stripe rust of wheat and oak wilt. In many of these cases, disease 

resistance may not be available and this is confounded by the development of resistance to 

effective pesticides by the pathogens. There is also a risk for pathogens and pests to make their 

way to Michigan via the busy port of Detroit and Metro Detroit Airport. 

To address these issues, forward thinking applied and fundamental research on these and other 

problems is ongoing at MSU to find sustainable solutions. 

Downy mildew: Michigan is the No. I producer of pickling cucumbers in the 

nation. Pseudoperonospora cubensis is a fungal-like organism that causes downy mildew disease 

and can infect a variety of cucurbit crops including cantaloupe, cucumber, gourd, honeydew, 

muskmelon, pumpkin, squash, watermelon and zucchini. Downy mildew reemerged as a 

problem on cucumbers in Michigan in August 2005 when the disease spread across the eastern 

region of the United States and has recuned every year since then. 

Spotted Wing Drosophila: This tiny invasive fly has caused fruit growers, including cherries, 

raspberries and bluebenies, great concern. While researchers are feverishly studying this insect, 

they have yet to find any good controls other than spraying, but we lack the chemicals to treat the 

pest. Females can deposit up to I 00 eggs per day by puncturing the soft skin of the fruit. It 

anived from Asia in 2008. 
39 

Leaf spot: h12017, sugar beet growers were on heightened alert for the increased risk for leaf 

spot. Fungicide resistance has developed in some fungicides and is increasing in the other 

chemistries. Until new leaf spot-tolerant varieties enter the market, the majority of the highest 

yield potential varieties are fairly susceptible to leaf spot disease. With sugar prices relatively 

low and nitrogen cost fairly high, economics will change the most cost-effective rates. 

Brown marmorated stink bug: First detected in the United States in 1998, this invasive pest 

has now spread to 43 states and fonr Canadian provinces. It is known to prey on over 300 

different host plants, including over 100 agricultnral crops and ornamental plants. h1 20 I 0 alone, 

the brown marmorated stink bug is estimated to have caused over $37 million in damage to the 

apple industry across the mid- Atlantic, with some growers losing up to 60 percent of their crop. 

Cnrrent efforts to control the pest include developing an online reporting system to track the 

population and introducing natural predator wasps from its native range. 

Removing pathogens from greenhouse water: a new approach to disease management 

Addressing these issues takes a multidisciplinary approach and that research is underway at 

MSU. Consider this example: a soil physicist has teamed up with a plant pathologist to better 

understand and prevent the transportation of plant pathogens in greenhouse systems. They are 

focused on removing Phytophthora and Pythium, water molds that wreak havoc on a wide range 

of crops, from nnrsery and greenhouse waste water so it can be reused. Spores from these molds 

called zoospores can travel through water and infect neighboring plants, a chain reaction that can 

quickly devastate a grower's operation. 

They focused on methods to retain Phytophthora zoospores in the filtration process, analyzing 

the retention ability of porous media such as iron-oxide-coated sand and uncoated sand in a 

range of solutions at different pH levels. The filters function similarly to household units 

attached to faucets, but the media in those filters is typically activated carbon. The group found 

that the iron-oxide-coated sand retained zoospores at a greater rate in higher-pH solutions. Both 

the coated and uncoated sand performed well in low-pH solutions. 

These findings indicate that filtering the pathogen can be effective and is optimized when the 

environment is better controlled - an encouraging sign for greenhouse systems. The team has 

most recently constructed a water-recycling unit using the same filters. In trials with squash and 

poinsettias, iron-oxide-coated sand filtration again proved effective, outperforming both 

activated carbon and a fungicide treatment with no filter. The results bode well for implementing 

recycled-water systems, which require less water, fungicides and pesticides. 
40 

In summary 

Pathogens and pests will continue to evolve in ways that overcome host resistance and chemical 

control tools thus making endemic and re-emerging pests more dangerous. Some may even find 

new hosts. Environmental stresses on plant growth can also lead to more extensive damage 

caused by pests and pathogens. Because of global trade, we are at risk of introducing new pests 

and pathogens as well as variants of endemic species. Thus, the threat to plant systems can come 

from many different directions, and the need for proactive detection and diagnostic technologies, 

and enhanced preparedness at all levels is more important than ever before. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today and I look forward to addressing 

your questions. 
41 

Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chair, Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense 

Former Senator, Connecticut 

Senior Counsel, Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP 

December 13,2017 

Hearing of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

"Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World" 

Statement for the Record 

Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow, and Members of the Committee: Thank 

you very much for inviting me here to provide my perspective on safeguarding animal 

agriculture, which I offer you on behalf of the bipartisan Blue Ribbon Study Panel on 

Biodefense, an initiative I co-chair with former Governor Tom Ridge. We spent the last 

year evaluating challenges in agrodefense and developing recommendations, and I am 

glad to bring those to you today. 

I would like to thank all of the Study Panel Members whose input into the report 

informed this testimony: Governor Ridge, former Secretary of Health and Human 

Services Donna Shalala, former Representative Jim Greenwood, former Homeland 

Security Advisor Ken Wainstein, and most especially former Senate Majority Leader 

Tom Daschle, who led the Panel to take up this important issue. Senator Daschle trekked 

out to Manhattan, Kansas on a cold January day earlier this year to convene many of the 

brightest minds on this topic at Kansas State University. That visit informed much of the 

Panel's work that followed. 

Animal agriculture is central to the health and well-being of the American people and the 

U.S. economy. Our Panel wanted to better understand the continued risks at the nexus 

between animal agriculture and national security. We looked at both direct threats to 

agriculture and indirect threats to human health. Zoonoses - those pathogens that can 

infect both animals and people - comprise the vast majority of emerging infectious 

disease threats faced by humans. They are also the pathogens our intelligence community 

is most concerned about terrorists acquiring. The increasing rate of emerging and 

reemerging animal diseases, along with threats and attempts by those with the intent to 

attack food and agriculture, mean there is an urgent need to reduce the biological risk to 

America's food and agricultural sector. 
42 

The federal government's proud history in protecting American agriculture goes back a 

long way. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) was established in 1862 in the days 

preceding post-industrial scientific advances we now take for granted. In 1884, it led a 

successful effort to eradicate contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, in just eight years. It 

also worked to understand, control, and eradicate Texas cattle fever, a major pest of early 

American livestock operations. Through these and many other efforts, the USDA 

protected American farmers' livelihood, their animals, and the domestic and international 

commerce that depended on them. 

These roots are important. They demonstrate the government's proper place in the 

protection oflivestock, as well as human and economic health. They also remind us that, 

given the complex layering of public and private systems today, agricultural protection is 

a complicated project that requires significant cross-sectoral coordination and a 

commitment to public-private partnerships. Like many critical infrastructure sectors, 

agriculture is primarily privately owned. In 2015, it contributed to 5.5% of our gross 

domestic product. 

A century-and-a-half after the early trials and successes in livestock disease management, 

the December 2014 emergence of a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza in the 

United States resulted in the largest animal health disaster ever experienced on U.S. soil. 

The total cost to the U.S. economy was estimated as high as $3.3 billion. Experts are 

extremely concerned about the potential for a mutated avian influenza virus to race 

through the human population, a view echoed by the White House Senior Director for 

Global Health Security and Biothreats, Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer, before the Study Panel 

just last month.1 

Yet this close biological connection between people, animals, their environments, and the 

pathogens that can infect them has not always meant close policy connections. Policy 

approaches to biodefense (see Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, HSPD -10) 

and agricultural security (see HSPD-9) have often been described as separated from one 

another. Despite the enormity of agriculture as a component of our economy, and despite 

the realistic concern of zoonoses arising, inadequate attention and funding is more severe 

in the animal and environmental health sectors than in public health. In FY 2017, the 

agriculture protection function represented a mere 0.76% of the total federal homeland 

security budget request.2 

1 Comments of Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer before the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, November 2, 

2017. Public meeting, "National Biodefense Strategy: Implementation and Implications." Video archive 

available at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLr5tklHf6CeNa7H9-UxSX61Re9NuCdmdx 2 Office of Management and Budget. (20 17) Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the U.S. Government, 

Fiscal Year 2017. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
43 

Our Panel believes that agricultural defense, while it has unique elements, should not be 

walled off from other biodefense efforts: agriculture is a critical element of our biological 

existence and threats to it must be viewed through the same lens as threats to or from 

other biological entities. In recognition of the critical nexus between human and animal 

health, we evaluated this matter over the last year, and discuss our detailed findings and 

recommendations in our 2017 report, Defense of Animal Agriculture. 

We found both significant achievements and serious gaps in our capacity and capability 

to defend against major biological events. The key challenges we identified are: 

1. Lack of policy and fiScal ownership. Agricultural defense is a broad and 

complex mission space that necessitates the significant involvement of most 

federal departments and agencies. The reality of the immediate ownership of food 

and agriculture assets by the private sector, and the sector's significant 

contribution to territorial, tribal, local, state, and federal economies, necessitates 

substantial federal collaboration with non-federal stakeholders. White House-level 

leadership is, therefore, critical to minimize overlap, identify mission gaps, and 

coordinate effort. Department-levelleadershlp is also necessary. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) investments in the development of the National Bioand Agrodefense Facility (NBAF), and USDA commitment to funding response 

activities, demonstrate their acknowledgement of the threat. However, current 

funding levels in areas such as biosurveillance and medical countermeasures 

(MCM) are insufficient to address mission needs. Experts have expressed concern 

to us that the NBAF itself may not receive sufficient operational support once it is 

open for business. Agrodefense appears to be an orphan, with long-view funding 

and policy priority finding a home in neither DHS nor USDA. 

2. Insufficient fiscal support for key programs. Aside from the notable (and 

expensive) NBAF construction effort, agriculture security is a tiny portion of the 

federal budget. Indeed, the President's Budget Request for FY 2018 would 

eliminate agriculture research and development from the DHS budget entirely. 

Although Congress and the Administration have supported a variety of programs 

designed to prevent and respond to outbreaks of animal diseases, the level of 

support has not always been commensurate with the threat or risk. Suboptimal 

investment in MCM, diagnosis, and integrated biosurveillance means we are less 

prepared than we ought to be. Further, the worse the outbreak, the less prepared 

we are for it. Detection and surveillance have been hampered by insufficient focus 

on rapid pen-side diagnostics, and insufficient investment to develop new wildlife 

disease detection technologies and validate existing tests. Although improving, 

federally integrated biosurvei!lance remains perpetually challenged by 
44 

information sharing problems. Some areas of potential risk, particularly with 

respect to companion and urban animals, are minimally addressed at all. 

3. Insufficient promotion of innovation. On balance, the status quo is inadequate 

to protect the food and agriculture sector from a major attack or outbreak. The 

nation needs new ideas and scientific solutions to drive agrodefense approaches 

beyond their current limitations. The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) has 

essentially become a minimally-funded vehicle for MCM distribution, rather than 

an end-use driver for federal identification, procurement, and stockpiling of 

priority MCM. To meet the requirements of HSPD-9, far greater investments in 

advanced research and development are also necessary. Focused investment in 

pen-side, innovative diagnostic technology, and in better laboratory-based 

technology to enable rapid assessment for state, local, tribal, and territorial animal 

health officials, will enable earlier decision-making. 

Our Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense developed a series of proposals that, if 

implemented, would help manage these challenges. I refer the Committee to our full 

report, Defense of Animal Agriculture, for our complete proposed solutions. Here I 

highlight three areas of focus for the·Committee's consideration: 

1. Leadership, management, and budgeting. High-level leadership is needed to 

drive federal activity toward a level commensurate with the threat. The first way 

the White House can exert this leadership is by ensuring that the National 

Biodefense Strategy meaningfully addresses threats to food and agriculture. The 

second way is to ensure that detailed agrodefense expenditures are incorporated 

into a cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis. Congressional oversight would 

benefit significantly from a detailed budgetary cross-cut that outlines how much 

each agency is spending toward agrodefense and for what projects, programs, and 

activities. The Panel has previously stated that, due to myriad departments and 

agencies involved in biodefense, a far more integrated approach to budgeting their 

activities is needed. Agrodefense should be part of this reformed approach, which 

ultimately should take the form of a comprehensive biodefense budget request 

summary that collates and justifies all individual department and agency requests 

in the context of the overall national strategy. In their annual requests, 

departments and agencies should provide outcome-based evidence of program 

effectiveness in meeting requirements, and propose requirement areas that would 

benefit from new investment. For major projects, the White House and Congress 

should require departments and agencies to develop business plans, which should 

emphasize interagency coordination and public-private partnerships; the National 

Bio- and Agrodefense Facility should have such a plan. 
45 

2. The national veterinary medical countermeasure posture. We can, in part, 

mitigate the threat to livestock with MCM. Despite gains, the availability of 

MCM for animals lags far behind what is needed, and does not meet the 

requirement from HSPD-9 to deploy sufficient high-consequence animal disease 

MCM within 24 hours. The NVS $4 million annual budget appears based on 

historical precedent, rather than present-day risk-informed resource allocation. 

While the NVS does maintain supplies like personal protective equipment and 

depopulation equipment, which have been distributed and used successfully in 

recent outbreaks, from an MCM standpoint it is entirely inadequate. A 

commitment by Congress to authorize the NVS would send a strong message that 

the Stockpile is a necessary national asset. Of course, any stockpile is only as 

strong as its inventory. We echo the evaluations of many experts who have 

testified here and before other committees that we must establish a foot-andmouth disease (FMD) antigen bank, one tied to a vaccine usage policy that would 

rescue the United States in an FMD emergency. We must also ensure that any 

stockpile is well equipped with diagnostics. The NVS should maintain diagnostic 

test kits for all diseases for which vaccines are stockpiled, with an emphasis on 

point-of-use diagnostics. 

3. The state of animal-based biosurveillance. Improving capacity for rapid 

detection of dispersed or circulating biological agents is pivotal. Biosurveillance 

and biodetection enable prevention. The establishment of a prevention fund for 

animal health, much as was created by the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 

2008 for plant health, would create a legislative basis for prevention activities. 

Such a fund could encompass programs like the National Wildlife Disease 

Surveillance Program, which operates on a shoestring. The Committee should 

evaluate and determine the full need and funding requirements for a sustained 

capability to detect, validate, and warn of threats impacting and transmitting 

through wildlife within the United States. Finite funding may necessitate a riskbased approach, but this is far preferable to a reactionary approach. The National 

Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory Network (NAHLN) can help support such 

an effort. The NAHLN works to detect biological threats to food animals. The 

Committee should assess whether authorized levels of funding are sufficient to 

accomplish its mission on a daily basis, and to meet diagnostic surge demand in 

the event of an outbreak. Finally, although USDA has published an interim rule 

establishing a National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD), it has yet 

to be finalized. The Committee should consider language expressing the 

Committee's support for the NLRAD Framework, urging its finalization, and 

encouraging swift efforts to execute a corresponding reporting regimen. 
46 

I also wish to recognize the growing partnership between the agriculture and law 

enforcement sectors, both locally and at the federal level. This is evidenced, for instance, 

by the long-term joint development by the USDA, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and 

Food and Drug Administration of the Criminal Investigation Handbook for 

Agroterrorism, and through a more recent process to update the Food and Agriculture 

Incident Annex in a manner that recognizes that agriculture can be the target of terrorism. 

We hope to see more of this kind of coordination among federal departments and 

agencies. 

One last element I wish to emphasize is that while animal agriculture is a major 

consideration for the Committee as it considers the Farm Bill, we cannot attain complete 

situational awareness or prevention and response capacity if we ignore wildlife (rural and 

urban) or companion animals. The latter in particular are embedded into our lives and 

culture, but associated zoonotic disease risk is not well considered. We lack sufficient 

biosurveillance efforts to detect spillover events, and have not developed guidance for 

localities on how to manage such an event if it were to happen. 

The good news is that the White House is now completing the National Biodefense 

Strategy, and the USDA and many other departments are seated at the table in drafting it. 

We have reason to believe that the drafters comprehend that human, animal, and 

environmental health are inextricably linked, and that the Strategy and its implementation 

plan will be grounded in that understanding. The White House should seize the 

momentum generated by this process and lead all relevant agencies to a new level of 

planning and operating with respect to biodefense that treats animal, human, and 

environmental health efforts as mutual contributors to our national, economic, and health 

security. 

In closing, I would like to thank the numerous organizations that support the Study 

Panel's work through their generous financial donations. I would further like to state my 

gratitude to Hudson Institute for serving as the Panel's fiscal sponsor. 
47 

TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO 

THE US SENATE 

United States Senate Committee on 

Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

Washington, DC 

Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World 

Promoting Agrosecurity and Ensuring Preparedness and Response 

Capability to Animal Disease at the State and Local Level 

Submitted By 

R. D. Meckes, D.V.M. 

State Veterinarian 

North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 

Raleigh, North Carolina 

Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow, and Members of the 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, I am Dr. Doug 

Meckes, and I serve as the State Veterinarian and the Director of the 

North Carolina's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services' 

(NCDA&CS) Veterinary Division. The division includes 150 employees 

that serve the poultry livestock industries, manage and operate the 

state's four veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and are charged with 

implementation of the Animal Welfare Act in kennels and shelters 

caring for companion animals in North Carolina. Thank you for the 

opportunity to speak about matters of concern in North Carolina's 

ongoing efforts to prepare for, respond to, and communicate with 

stakeholders during agricultural emergencies. 
48 

North Carolina enjoys a robust agriculture and agribusiness industry 

which contributes nearly $84 billion annually to North Carolina's 

economy, more than 17% of the state's gross domestic product, and 

accounts for 17% ofthe state's employees. North Carolina's 

agriculture/agribusiness industry is part of the greater Food and 

Agriculture Sector (FA Sector), designated a critical infrastructure sector 

in 2003 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) thus 

recognizing its significant contribution to national security and the 

economy. This sector is composed of complex production, processing, 

and delivery systems, and has the capacity to feed people and animals 

both within and beyond the boundaries of the United States. These 

food and agriculture systems are almost entirely under private 

ownership, operate in highly competitive global markets, strive to 

operate in harmony with the environment, and provide economic 

opportunities and an improved quality of life for American citizens and 

others worldwide. The FA Sector accounts for roughly one-fifth of the 

nation's economic activity. 

North Carolina's animal agriculture industry, comprised of livestock, 

dairy, and poultry, accounts for 68% of farm cash receipts. North 

Carolina ranks second in hog production and third in overall poultry 

production in the nation. Maintaining production at these levels is 

dependent upon ongoing access to export markets. In any given year 

the pork industry exports 26-28% of product, the poultry industry 

exports 18%, the beef industry 14-16%, and the dairy industry 14% of 

production. Raising healthy animals, free of disease, ensures 

competitiveness of North Carolina's animal agriculture products in the 

international marketplace. The Veterinary Division stands in support of 

efforts by the animal agriculture industry to achieve that end through 

the implementation of appropriate agrosecurity and ongoing efforts to 

prepare for and respond to animal disease. 
49 

Prior to accepting this position in North Carolina in 2014, I spent seven 

years in Washington, DC, with the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) within 

DHS. For five and a half of those years, I was fortunate to serve as 

Branch Chief of the Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense Branch. 

The Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs served as the designated DHS 

official accountable for implementation of the department's 

responsibilities for veterinary, food, and agriculture security and also 

coordinated the department's responsibilities outlined in Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), Defense of United States 

Agriculture and Food. Both tasks fell to the Food, Agriculture and 

Veterinary Defense Branch. 

Today, as we consider our topic, Safeguarding American Agriculture in a 

Globalized World, a revisit of HSPD-9 is surely worth the effort. 

Released in January 2004, HSPD-9 "established a national policy to 

defend the agriculture system against terrorist attack, major disasters 

and other emergencies." Included in HSPD-9 were 18 "line items" which 

provide guidance to address then-identified gaps in the nation's ability 

to defend agriculture and food. Thirteen years later, progress has been 

made in addressing some of the gaps, including a star in the crown of 

agriculture and food defense. Line Item 24 in HSPD-9 called for the 

design and initiation of construction for "safe, secure, and state-of-theart agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop 

diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases," which 

has become the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, 

Kansas. The success of this project is testament to the dedication and 

determination of the Office of National Laboratories (ONL) in the 

Science and Technology Directorate (S& T) of DHS, and their colleagues 

at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). This 

achievement notwithstanding, other gaps in HSPD-9 have not been 

sufficiently addressed. 
50 

Of greatest concern to state animal health officials is the absence of 

vaccine for use in response to the introduction of a foreign animal 

disease. That is certainly the case in North Carolina, home to nine 

million pigs east of 1-95. HSPD-9 Line Item 18(a) called for "a National 

Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal 

vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to 

the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the 

economy and that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours." We 

have not yet achieved this goal. Our animal agriculture industry remains 

as vulnerable to foreign animal diseases today as it was 13 years ago; 

particularly concerning is Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD). In the event 

of an FMD outbreak in the US, the North American Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease Vaccine Bank would be "triggered." The vaccine bank is a 

shared resource among the US, Canada, and Mexico, containing those 

types or subtypes of virus thought to be a threat to the US. However, 

the quantities of antigen available would yield only enough vaccine (2.5 

million doses of any type/subtype) to respond to a small, confined 

outbreak. 

The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement that is inherent 

to the nation's livestock industry will present unprecedented challenges 

in the event of an FMD outbreak. No country with a livestock industry 

comparable to that of the US has had to deal with an outbreak of FMD, 

and the impact would extend far beyond animal agriculture. On any 

given day, approximately 400,000 cattle, one million swine, and 25 

million poultry are on the road, in movements to other stages of 

production or processing. Of particular concern to North Carolina are 

requirements, in modern swine production, for extensive animal 

movement. The identification of FMD in the United States would bring 

about an immediate stop-movement of all animals until the extent of 

the outbreak is better understood. Such a stop-movement could 

necessitate the euthanasia of animals for welfare reasons because 

facilities which house animals would quickly become overcrowded. 
51 

An FMD outbreak in a livestock-dense area of the US cannot be 

controlled without immediate access to millions of doses of FMD 

vaccine. Currently, availability of that amount of vaccine would require 

weeks to months to produce, depending on type/subtype of virus. The 

trade implications of such an event are staggering. Trading partners of 

the US would cease the import of beet dairy products, and pork the 

day the virus is identified in the US. In 2011, Dr. Dermot Hayes and 

colleagues at Iowa State University published "Economy Wide Impacts 

of a Foreign Animal Disease in the United States." Hayes' group 

estimated that over 10 years, the cumulative loss due to an 

uncontrolled FMD outbreak in the United States would be $199.8 

billion. It is time to move forward with the development of a more 

robust US FMD vaccine bank. 

line Item 14 of HSPD-9 directs the participating departments/agencies 

to ensure "that the combined Federal, State, and local response 

capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a 

terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting the 

national agriculture or food infrastructure." We are fortunate in North 

Carolina, for even before HSPD-9, members of the NCDA&CS 

recognized the need for such a capability in response to several local, 

nationat and international events. In September 1999, Hurricane Floyd 

made landfall in North Carolina. The hurricane, and associated weather 

conditions before and after, resulted in the most severe flooding and 

devastation in North Carolina's history. That flooding resulted in an 

estimated $813 million in agricultural losses affecting 32,000 farmers. 

In addition to crop losses, livestock losses- almost three million 

poultry, 28,000 swine, and 600 cattle- created problems associated 

with disposal of the carcasses of the animals. 

At the national level, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent 2001 

anthrax attacks, also known as Amerithrax, brought new concerns of 

attacks to the United States' agricultural economy. The likelihood of 
52 

"agroterrorism," the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant 

disease for the purpose of generating fear, causing economic losses, or 

undermining social stability, took on new meaning. 

And finally, an international example of the vulnerability of our 

agricultural economy was the February 2001 outbreak of FMD in the 

United Kingdom. This caused a crisis in British agriculture and tourism. 

Over 10 million sheep and cattle were depopulated in an eventually 

successful attempt to halt the disease, but at an incredible cost to the 

UK agricultural community and overall economy. By the time the 

disease was controlled, in October 2001, the crisis was estimated to 

have cost the United Kingdom $16 billion (US$). 

In the midst of these events, between 1999 and 2002, NCDA&CS took 

on the task of developing capabilities to better protect North Carolina's 

animal health and to formulate a plan to meet the challenges of 

agriculture and food in the 2Pt century. The sum of those efforts was 

the creation of the Emergency Programs Division (EP Division) within 

the department. The mission of the division is to "reduce the 

vulnerability and minimize the impact from any natural or man-made 

disaster, disease outbreak, or terrorist attack for the department, the 

people and the agricultural interests of the state and to facilitate a 

rapid return to normalcy." The Emergency Programs Division, which is 

a unique operating entity in North Carolina (few other states have 

copied this model), is a vital partner to the Veterinary Division in 

preparing for and responding to agricultural disasters throughout the 

State of North Carolina. Additionally, because of its unique mission, 

NCDA&CS's Emergency Programs Division is fully integrated into the 

State Emergency Management Division's operational structure (when 

response at the state level involves agriculture issues). That integration 

ensures engagement at the local level during incidents as well. At the 

federal level, North Carolina preparedness and response capabilities 

are well recognized, and during catastrophic events North Carolina and 
53 

our federal emergency response colleagues seamlessly engage to 

manage incidents of great consequence. 

The continued refinement of preparedness and response capabilities 

over the years has resulted in a team of agricultural and emergency 

management personnel ready to respond to any incident, fully engaged 

at the federal, state, and local level. In years past, the EP Division has 

participated in response to animal disease, food illness outbreaks, 

wildfires, and, of course, hurricanes. Today's response capabilities 

stand in sharp contrast to the department's abilities prior to 2002. In 

October 2016, Hurricane Matthew made land-fall in Eastern North 

Carolina with flooding greater than what occurred during Hurricane 

Floyd, and with more livestock on the ground than 1999. However, as a 

result of the EP and Veterinary divisions' preparedness efforts, the 

losses were significantly less: 2,800 pigs, 1.9 million poultry, and only a 

few cattle. All carcasses were properly managed, facilitated by $3 

million in Public Assistance Grants from FEMA for the purchase of 

carbon source for use in composting. This was the first time FEMA 

supported such an effort in a mass animal mortality incident, and there 

were no environmental consequences or public health concerns 

associated with agricultural impacts of the storm. Additionally, 

members of the EP and Veterinary divisions have deployed in a variety 

of other incidents around the country to assist our state agriculture 

colleagues. In the most recent of such activities, depopulation teams 

went to Minnesota and Iowa during the 2015 Avian Influenza outbreak, 

emergency planning teams were sent to Texas to assist in Hurricane 

Harvey response, and emergency planning teams were deployed to 

Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands to assist in Hurricanes Irma and 

Maria response. 

Today, the EP Division has reached maturity and its sphere of operation 

is considered All-Hazards in nature, and as such, the division is actively 

engaged in the support of other divisions within the department. EP 
54 

collaborates and coordinates with other departments and agencies 

across local, state, and federal government, as well as with industry and 

academia. The development of that capability has been funded by the 

state and through various federal grants- some $7.3 million in federal 

money and $18 million in state money. This relatively small investment 

over the years has brought the vision of HSPD-9's Line Item 14 fully to 

fruition in North Carolina. With additional funding targeted for such 

programs, similar capability could be developed in other states. 

Finally, I will address the issue of veterinary diagnostic laboratory 

capacity in North Carolina and across the nation. Line Item 8 of HSPD-9 

states: 

"the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human 

Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

Agency, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments 

and agencies shall build upon and expand current monitoring and 

surveillance programs to: 

(c) develop nationwide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, 

plant health, and water quality that integrate existing Federal and 

State laboratory resources, are interconnected, and utilize 

standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures." 

The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) was 

developed as a result of this directive and is now part of a nationwide 

strategy to coordinate the work of all organizations providing animal 

disease surveillance and testing services. NAHLN is an early warning 

system for emerging and foreign animal diseases and provides surge 

capacity for the necessary testing during disease outbreaks and during 

the recovery phase. This surveillance and emergency response system 

provides critical and ongoing resources for lab testing, information 

management, quality assurance, and the development and validation of 

new tests. During the recovery phase, testing is necessary to establish a 
55 

"disease-free status" which also assures international trading partners 

of that status. 

NAHLN's importance was amply demonstrated during the highlypathogenic avian influenza outbreaks when thousands of samples were 

tested within hours to ensure depopulation of infected flocks. NAHLN 

performed surveillance in surrounding areas to halt disease spread, to 

test premises to determine freedom of disease before repopulation 

could occur, and to allow resumption of international trade. 

As one of the 12 original NAHLN laboratories, North Carolina's Rollins 

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory in Raleigh is designated as a core 

laboratory. A core member laboratory receives significant 

infrastructure support from USDA- USDA-National Institute of Food 

and Agriculture's (NIFA) Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative, and 

USDA-Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)- and 

conducts fee-for-service testing for USDA. Their funding level enables 

these laboratories to be fully committed to the NAHLN mission and able 

to respond to domestic or foreign animal disease emergencies on a 

24/7 basis. In addition, the Rollins Laboratory receives stateappropriated funds for salaries and expenses, operations, and 

maintenance. 

Safeguarding American agriculture in a globalized world remains as 

much a concern now as it was in 2004 with the release of HSPD-9. I 

have spoken here today of three HSPD-9 Line Items that are of 

importance to North Carolina. The first, Line Item 14 of HSPD-9, directs 

the participating departments/agencies to ensure "that the combined 

Federal, State, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond 

quickly and effectively ... " I trust this testimony allows you to appreciate 

the wisdom of those in North Carolina who had the foresight to 

develop the capability that has enabled the state to respond to the 

myriad events that have transpired over the intervening years. Through 

floods, fires, animal disease, human disease, food contamination, 
56 

drought, and hurricanes, our Emergency Programs Division has been on 

the forefront of them all, and we have been well-served by their 

efforts. This asset was created for a relatively small investment over the 

years. Going forward, continued state and federal funding will be 

necessary to maintain current capability, develop new capability, train 

and exercise, and replace equipment as needed. Unfortunately, funding 

for this program continues to decline and places the state's 

preparedness and response capability at risk. 

Of greatest concern for North Carolina is the matter of Line Item 18(a) 

which speaks to the necessity of developing a National Veterinary 

Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine, 

antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to animal 

diseases, of which FMD stands alone as the most consequential. The 

pork industry, the economy, communities, businesses, and families in 

North Carolina would be devastated by an FMD outbreak. Recovery, if a 

recovery is even possible, would be years in the making. A cooperative, 

collaborative effort, which includes all stakeholders- industry, federal, 

state, and academic partners- must be initiated in short order to 

develop and implement a plan for establishing the US Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease Vaccine Bank to protect American animal agriculture. 

Finally, line Item 8(c) of HSPD-9 directs the responsible departments 

and agencies "to develop nationwide laboratory networks for food, 

veterinary, plant health, and water quality that integrate existing 

federal and state laboratory resources, are interconnected, and utilize 

standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures." North Carolina's 

Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory System, as a part of the NAHLN, 

effectively surveilles for and diagnoses animal and zoonotic diseases. 

However, state and federal support of, and full funding for, the nation's 

NAHLN laboratory system are necessary to optimize service to 

stakeholders and the nation. The absence of full funding was recently 

noted in the BIPARTISAN REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON STUDY PANEL 

ON BIODEFENSE. The report states: 
57 

"The National Animal Health laboratory Network (NAHlN), an 

effort to detect biological threats to the nation's food animals, is 

necessary for effective biosurveillance. The NAHlN is a publicprivate cooperative effort between the USDA, the American 

Association of Veterinary laboratory Diagnosticians, and publicly 

funded state veterinary diagnostic laboratories. The collective and 

integrated work of its members allows for improved detection of 

emerging and zoonotic diseases, which helps protect animal 

health, public health, and the food supply. The veterinary 

diagnostic labs that are members are quite literally on the front 

lines of disease detection. Established in 2002, the NAHlN is 

funded through a combination of grants, fee-for-testing services, 

and administrative support from USDA. It has struggled to 

maintain even $10 million worth of annual funding, its 

appropriations cut over the years to pay for other programs. As a 

result, the laboratories are unable to meet the threat and have at 

times eliminated positions and testing capacity for foreign animal 

diseases. Ten million dollars is a very small price to pay to protect 

one of America's major industries and portals for disease 

emergence. After the NAHlN struggled for years to obtain 

sufficient funding, in 2014 Congress authorized a specific funding 

line at $15 million per year. NAHlN must be funded to this 

authorized level in order to meet the need." 

In closing, let me say that while I have addressed only three line Items 

of HSPD-9, several others are worthy of another look. But in speaking 

with many of my state animal health official colleagues, particularly 

those in animal agriculture-dense states, I believe the issues addressed 

above to be of immediate concern and worthy of our attention. As I am 

certain you all are aware, numerous animal agriculture groups, animal 

science organizations, and veterinarians support a new Animal Disease 

and Disaster Prevention Program for inclusion in the 2018 Farm Bill. 

This program, which speaks specifically to ensuring fully-trained, 
58 

appropriately-equipped, response-ready teams at the state level (not 

unlike the Emergency Programs Division that exists here in North 

Carolina), and increased support for the NAHLN laboratory system to 

enhance the nation's animal disease prevention efforts. Additionally, a 

proposal for establishing and funding a robust US Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease Vaccine Bank for inclusion in the 2018 Farm Bill is considered a 

top priority by many in the animal agriculture industry. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today, on behalf of North 

Carolina, about issues of concern related to the defense of agriculture 

and food. 
59 

Hearing of the United States Senate Agriculture Committee 

December 13, 2017 

Statement for the Record 

Richard B. Myersl 

President 

Kansas State University 

Chairman Roberts, Ranking Member Stabenow, and distinguished members of the Committee, I 

am honored to appear before you today on behalf of Kansas State University (K-State) for this 

hearing entitled, "Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World." 

THREATS AND CONSEQUENCES 

Food insecurity is an ever increasing global problem as delineated in a 2015 assessment by the 

intelligence community.2 Hungry people are not happy people. America still feeds the world, so 

there is an urgent need to protect America's food crops, food animals, and food supply from 

naturally occurring and intentionally delivered biological threats. Either could be devastating. 

One of the early discoveries when our troops went into Afghanistan in 2002 was a list of 16 

pathogens ai-Qaeda was planning to use as bioweapons. Only 6 of them targeted people. 

Another 6 were pathogens of livestock and poultry and 4 were crop pathogens. So, ai-Qaeda 

wasn't just planning to attack people with biological weapons; they were going after agriculture 

and food as well. 

ai-Qaeda has always had a goal of destroying the U.S. economy, so bioweapons targeting crops, 

livestock and poultry is consistent with that objective. Moreover, natural infectious disease 

outbreaks could lead to the same outcome. 

Consider the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) assessment that "just 

15 crop plants provide 90 percent of the world's food energy intake, with three -wheat, rice, 

and maize- making up two-thirds of this."3 Ninety percent makes the protection of food crops 

rather significant. 

If wheat, rice, or corn are targeted successfully by a/ Qdeda or other bioterrorists or if there's a 

natural disease outbreak that devastates the global supply of any one of the three, the world will 

be in big trouble. The Wheat State takes such matters seriously. 

Although it didn't turn out to be a global disaster, the pathogen Wheat Blast hitting Bangladesh 

in 2016 certainly wreaked havoc there. Wheat Blast can kill 100% of crops, and it likely got to 

Bangladesh in a shipment of grain from South America where it's endemic. The outcomes were 

devastating in areas of the country where it occurred, and even though infected fields were 

1 U.S. Air Force General (Ret.); 15'" Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; October 01, 2001- September 30, 2005 2 Intelligence Community Assessment: Global Food Security, ICA 2015-04; September 2015 

'See United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization: http://www.fao.org/docrep/u8480e/u8480e07.htm 
60 

burned, there was a recurrence in 2017; the new outbreak spread to India too. The U.S. should 

consider restricting grain shipments here from South America to avoid a similar outcome. 

With livestock, the Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv) foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak 

in the U.S. in 2013 highlighted biosecurity problems here that must be addressed. It resulted in 

over 8 million baby pigs dying, and significant financial losses incurred by producers drove up the 

cost of pork markedly. It's suspected PEDv came to the U.S. in feed products from China, but the 

FBI still hasn't confirmed whether the virus got here by accident or intentionally. There are 

reasons to suspect the latter. Either way, the impacts were substantial, and PEDv is now an 

enduring endemic problem to deal with in the U.S., not a FAD threat. 

There are innumerable FAD threats that the U.S. must worry about today, and the top-line FAD 

concerns are those currently projected to be worked on in the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security's (DHS's) $1.25 billion National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF) under construction 

on the K-State campus. These include the livestock-only threats, African Swine Fever (ASF), 

Classical Swine Fever (CSF), and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), along with the zoonotic threats, 

Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Japanese Encephalitis (JE), Nipah virus, and Ebola virus. Any of these and 

innumerable other FADs could ravage America's agricultural infrastructure, food supply, and 

economy if they hit the U.S. Furthermore, zoonotic FADs could devastate public health as well, 

and until NBAF is operational in 2022/23, there's no U.S.Iaboratory where livestock research can 

be conducted on Nipah and Ebola. 

FOUNDATIONAL EFFORTS 

Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food- Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-94 

Delineating the federal role in bio/agrodefense post-09/11, President Bush issued Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, on January 30, 2004 to establish: "a national policy to 

defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies."4 Along with a number of other systems vital to U.S. survival and prosperity, the 

agriculture and food sector was appropriately noted to be "critical infrastructure."5 

HSPD-9 Roles and Responsibilities: 

A defined chain of command is critical to accomplish any national security mission. That's true 

for bio/agrodefense- defending the homeland agriculture and food system-just as it is for every 

other aspect of national defense. The leadership roles per HSPD-9 are as follows: 

0 Secretary of Homeland Security-As established in HSPD-7,6 the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) "is responsible for coordinating the overall 

national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources of the 

United States." 

4 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 

5 As delineated in Section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 [42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)] 

6 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7- Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection, December 17, 2003 
61 

0 Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the 

Environmental Protection Agency-The two Secretaries and the Administrator "will 

perform their responsibilities as Sector-Specific Agencies as delineated in HSPD-7:"7 

);> For the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), sector-specific responsibilities mean 

agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products);7 

);> For the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), it means public health, 

healthcare, and food (other than meat, poultry, and egg products);7 and 

);> For the Environmental Protection Agency, sector-specific means drinking water and 

water treatment systems. 7 

Thus, DHS was named to lead bio/agrodefense, with USDA, DHHS, and EPA supporting. Other 

departments and agencies also provide support with the HSPD-9 requirements that follow. 

HSPD-9 Requirements: 

0 "Awareness and Warning"8 - Knowing what's happening over-the-horizon- beyond U.S. 

borders- is vital if America is to be prepared to confront emerging biological threats; if the 

U.S. is to respond quickly and decisively to defeat the threat. 

);> HSPD-9 required the development of "robust, comprehensive, and fully coordinated 

surveillance and monitoring systems"8 for diseases of animals, plants, wildlife and 

people along with threats to food and water quality. This system was to include 

nationwide diagnostic networks for "food, veterinary, plant health and water quality."8 

The Department of the Interior (DOl), USDA, DHHS, EPA and other departments and 

agencies would develop the systems. 

);> HSPD-9 required "intelligence operations and analysis capabilities focusing on 

agriculture, food, and water sectors."8 This would be led by the Attorney General/ 

Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 

coordination with USDA, DHHS, and EPA. 

);> HSPD-9 required the creation of "a new biological threat awareness capacity that will 

enhance detection and characterization of an attack.''8 DHS was to coordinate with 

USDA, DHHS, EPA and other departments and agencies to carry this out. 

0 "Vulnerability Assessments"8 - HSPD-9 mandated "vulnerability assessments of the 

agriculture and food sectors"8 and the identification of "requirements for the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan"8 that was to be updated every 2 years. The assessments 

would be done by USDA, DHHS, and DHS, with DHS responsible for the plan every 2 years. 

0 "Mitigation Strategies"8 - HSPD-9 required: 

);> The prioritization, development, and implementation of "mitigation strategies to 

protect vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing from the introduction of 

7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7- Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection, December 17, 2003 

8 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 
62 

diseases, pests, or poisonous agents."9 This was a responsibility of DHS and DOJ working 

with USDA, DHHS, EPA, and other departments and agencies. 

~ The development of "common screening and inspection procedures for agriculture and 

food items entering the United States"9 and maximizing "effective domestic inspection 

activities for food items within the United States."9 This was a responsibility of USDA, 

DHHS, and DHS. 

Cl "Response Planning and Recovery"9 - HSPD-9 required: 

~ Ensuring "that the combined Federal, State, and local response capabilities are 

adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major disease 

outbreak, or other disaster affecting the national agriculture or food infrastructure."9 

This was a responsibility of DHS in coordination with USDA, DHHS, DOJ, and EPA. 

~ Developing "a coordinated agriculture and food-specific standardized response plan that 

will be integrated into the National Response Plan."9 This was a responsibility of DHS in 

coordination with USDA, DHHS, DOJ and EPA. 

~ Enhancing "recovery systems that are able to stabilize agriculture production, the food 

supply, and the economy, rapidly remove and effectively dispose of contaminated 

agriculture and food products or infected plants and animals, and decontaminate 

premises.''9 This was a responsibility of USDA and DHHS in coordination with DHS and 

EPA. 

~ Making "recommendations to the Homeland Security Council, within 120 days of the 

date of this directive, for the use of existing, and the creation of new, financial risk 

management tools encouraging self-protection for agriculture and food enterprises 

vulnerable to losses due to terrorism."9 This was a responsibility of USDA. 

~ Working with State and local governments and the private sector to develop: 

"A National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal 

vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to the most 

damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the economy and that will be 

capable of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak."9 

"A National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) capable of responding to a highconsequence plant disease with pest control measures and the use of resistant seed 

varieties within a single growing season to sustain a reasonable level of production 

for economically important crops."9 

Both were requirements of USDA in coordination with DHS and in consultation with 

DHHS and EPA. 

Cl "Outreach and Professional Development"9 - HSPD-9 specified that the Secretaries shall: 

~ Work "with appropriate private sector entities to establish an effective information 

sharing and analysis mechanism for agriculture and food."9 This was a responsibility of 

DHS in coordination with USDA, DHHS and other appropriate departments and agencies. 

9 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 
63 

};> Support "the development of and promote higher education programs for the 

protection of animal, plant, and public health.''10 This was a responsibility of USDA and 

DHHS in consultation with DHS and the Department of Education (ED). 

};> Support the development of and promotion of "a higher education program to address 

protection of the food supply."10 This was a responsibility of USDA and DHHS in 

consultation with DHS and ED. 

};> Establish "opportunities for professional development and specialized training in 

agriculture and food protection, such as internships, fellowships, and other postgraduate opportunities that provide for homeland security professional workforce 

needs."10 This was a responsibility of USDA and DHHS. 

Cl "Research and Development"10 -HSPD-9 required: 

};> Accelerating and expanding "development of current and new countermeasures against 

the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and 

zoonotic diseases."10 This was a responsibility of DHS, USDA, DHHS, EPA and other 

appropriate departments and agencies in consultation with the Director of the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), with DHS coordinating the efforts. 

};> Developing "a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture 

biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for 

foreign animal and zoonotic diseases."10 This was a responsibility of USDA and DHS; DHS 

constructing the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF) meets this requirement. 

};> Establishing "university-based centers of excellence in agriculture and food security."10 

This was a responsibility of DHS in consultation with USDA and DHHS, but funding for 

these centers has been terminated by DHS. 

The summary above does not include all the details in HSPD-9, but it does note departments and 

agencies responsible for each requirement. For almost every task, there were multiple 

departments and agencies involved which would make every task very complex. Nonetheless, 

all six requirements are vitally important to protecting U.S. agriculture and food. 

Separating HSPD-9 from HSPD-10- Bioterrorism for the 21" Century11 

As already noted, HSPD-9 - protecting agriculture and food from bioterrorism - was signed on 

January 30, 2004, while HSPD-10- protecting people from bioterrorism- was finalized on April 

28, 2004. There were likely sound reasons in 2004 to separate bioweapon threats to people from 

bioweapon threats to agriculture and food, but the result of that over the past decade and a half 

is that agriculture and food have received minimal biodefense attention or funding. 

That's surprising for at least two reasons: (1) Essentially every country that ever developed an 

offensive bioweapons program, including the U.S., created weapons targeting agriculture as well 

as people; and (2) almost every pandemic threat today is a zoonotic disease that can spread from 

10 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 

11 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-10- Biodefense for the 21" Century, April 28, 2004 
64 

animals to people. As a result, significant federal funding should be focused on confronting and 

stopping these threats in the animal host; that's not being done. 

The only statement regarding agriculture and food in HSPD-10 referenced "new programs to 

secure and defend our agriculture and food systems against biological contamination."12 That's 

basically delineating a food safety role as a small part of HSPD-10. And, in fact, it was HSPD-7 

that outlined homeland security obligations regarding food safety.B Responsibilities for meat, 

poultry, and egg products went to USDA; the agency responsible for inspecting those processing 

activities. Inspections for everything other than meat, poultry, and egg products is the 

responsibility of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); a component within DHHS. 

That might actually explain some of the disparities between HSPD-9 and HSPD-10, e.g., why 

HSPD-10 specifies "increased funding for bioterrorism research within DHHS by thirty-fold"12 to 

protect human health, while USDA got nothing for bio/agroterrorism research within HSPD-9 to 

protect plant and animal health. Food was delineated by food processing responsibilities for 

USDA and DHHS/FDA, with little focus on safeguarding agriculture pre-harvest activities, i.e., 

protecting food crops or food animals from infectious diseases or bioweapons. Thus, USDA and 

DHHS have nearly equal roles in HSPD-9 (with DHS leading), while DHHS has an appropriately 

dominant role in HSPD-10 (also with DHS leading) with USDA having a minor food safety role. 

Infectious diseases and biological weapons target living things- plants, animals, and people; 

some target more than one. As noted above, bioweapon programs commonly included 

pathogens of plants and animals, not just people. Why? Because food-deprived - starving -

people are less fit to fight, less able or willing to fight, and more likely to surrender. 

Evidently, a/ Qaeda knew this, since their bioweapons list included 10 pathogens targeting 

animals and plants, and only 6 targeting people. 

U.S. Bio/Agrodefense Status Today 

U.S. biodefense efforts have been lacking for decades as pointed out in multiple reports; first by 

the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction {WMD) Proliferation and 

Terrorism,l4

•

15 and then by the bipartisan Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense.16•

17 The 

Commission looked at all WMD threats, and in their 2010 report card, 14 biological risks received 

a failing grade; an "F." All four citations concentrated on biothreats to people, although the Blue 

12 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-10- Biodefense for the 21" Century, April 28, 2004 13 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7- Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection, December 17, 2003 14 The Clock is Ticking: A Progress Report on America's Preparedness to Prevent Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism; Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 

Terrorism, October 21, 2009 

15 Prevention ofWMD Proliferation and Terrorism Report Card; Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, January, 2010 16 A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts; A Bipartisan 

Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, October 2015 17 Biodefense Indicators: One Year Later, Events Outpacing Federal Efforts to Defend the Nation) A Bipartisan 

Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, December 2016 
65 

Ribbon reports referenced threats to animals, primarily from a "One Health" perspective. The 

2015 Blue Ribbon18 report highlighted thirty-three major shortcomings requiring urgent 

attention by Washington, DC policy makers. The top three most problematic were: (1) no 

national leader; (2) no strategic plan; and (3) no dedicated budget. Unfortunately, none of these 

shortcomings have yet been corrected. 

Since few elements dealt with agriculture, K-State raised the bio/agrodefense issue with Blue 

Ribbon Panel members. That led to a Panel hearing on the K-State campus on January 26, 2017. 

The outcome of that was a special focus report entitled, "Defense of Animal Agriculture."19 Since 

Senator Lieberman will be covering Blue Ribbon reports, the only other issue that should be 

noted from the hearing at K-State is that defense of plant agriculture was discussed as well. It's 

our understanding those threats will be addressed in a separate report. 

Bio/ Agrodefense Focus at K-State 

As the Committee knows, protecting U.S. agriculture is a m1ss1on of America's land-grant 

universities; that began in 1862 when President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act. As someone 

relatively new to land-grant administration - but someone with a lifelong commitment to 

national defense -I'm convinced that the nation's land-grant universities can and should play a 

significant role in U.S. bio/agrodefense. These institutions participate in protecting agriculture 

and food in their states each and every day. 

Thus, we would encourage the Committee to integrate the land-grant universities into whatever 

solutions are developed. K-State stands ready to participate on the national team and lead when 

asked or when necessary. Protecting America's agriculture and food infrastructure is too 

important not to. 

K-State is not new to this realm. Back in 1999 with encouragement from the Chairman of this 

Committee, K-State developed a 100-page "Homeland Defense Food Safety, Security, and 

Emergency Preparedness Program"20 that detailed how to protect America's food crops, food 

animals, and food supply from biothreats. Later that year, K-State's President Jon Wefald 

testified before the U.S. Senate's Emerging Threats Subcommittee regarding the "Agricultural 

Biological Weapons Threat"21 facing America. That Senate subcommitee was also chaired by 

Kansas Senator Pat Roberts. 

The "Big Purple Book,"20 as the 1999 program became known, documented the need for a 

biocontainment facility capable of conducting R&D on biothreats to food crops, food animals, 

and the food supply. Prior to September 11th and the anthrax attacks in 2001, little traction was 

18 A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts; A Bipartisan 

Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, October 2015 

"Special Focus: Defense of Animal Agriculture; Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, 

October 2015 20 Homeland Defense Food Safety, Security, and Emergency Preparedness Program, March 22, 1999. See: 

http://www.k-state.edu/nbaf/documents/1999-Homeland·Defense-Program.pdf 21 Agricultural Biological Weapons Threat, October 27, 1999. See: http://www.k-state.edu/nbaf/documents/1999-

US·Senate-Testimony.pdf 
66 

gained for the need to build it. Post-09/11/2001, state and federal funding was obtained, and 

the Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) at Pat Roberts Hall (PRH) became a reality. 

The BRI/PRH is located immediately adjacent to the NBAF site and it includes five BSL-3Ag rooms 

that can be configured for research with cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and poultry. Work has been 

done on numerous species to date, including white-tailed deer in 2017 to determine their 

susceptibility to RVF. In addition to BSl-3Ag labs, the BRI/PRH has dedicated BSl-3 space for 

conducting research on crop and food pathogens. Wheat Blast R&D has been ongoing since 2009 

and food safety research began soon thereafter. The latter included studies for the Army 

whereby eight 1-ton grinds of hamburger were done in October 2011 to validate whether food 

pathogens could be detected at the end of a commercial process. The breadth of food-related 

biocontainment R&D conducted under one roof makes the BRI/PRH unique-in-the-world. 

K-State jump-started NBAF research in the BRI/PRH on RVF in 2013, JE in 2014, CSF in 2015, and 

ASF in 2016. We were able to do this because the State of Kansas agreed to fund $35 million for 

NBAF research in the BRI/PRH as part of our "best and final offer" for NBAF during the site 

selection competition. Research and development (R&D) continues on all four of these FADs, but 

the Kansas funding commitment will end in FY2019 when the last $5 million is appropriated. The 

majority of the research is conducted by K-State faculty, staff and students, but collaborators 

from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Center for Grain and Animal Health Research 

(CGAHR) in Manhattan participate on some ofthe NBAF-related FAD projects. Moreover, CGAHR 

conducts other USDA BSL-3/3Ag biocontainment research in K-State's BRI/PRH as well. Going 

forward, federal support is needed for R&D on RVF, JE, CSF, and ASFto help mitigate these threats 

to U.S. animal health and public health. 

Until NBAF is fully operational in 2022/23, USDA has no biocontainment facilities where R&D can 

be conducted on zoonotic FADs. Moreover, DHS stopped funding CSF and ASF research in 2017 

at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC); an antiquated facility unsafe for work with 

zoonotic diseases. Consequently, training the NBAF R&D workforce is highly reliant on the 

BRI/PRH until the new DHS facility becomes operational. 

PROPOSED PATH FORWARD 

The importance of implementing the requirements outlined in HSPD-922 to safeguarding 

American agriculture in a globalized world cannot be overstated. They are all critically important, 

but strides made to implement them in the early years have eroded today. 

K-State believes that statutory authorization - with clearly delineated and enforceable 

accountability - along with the appropriation of funds to support the following key provisions 

in HSPD-9 will advance this crucial humanitarian and economic mission. 

1) Enhance Intelligence Operations and Analysis Capabilities- Leverage "awareness and 

warning"22 intelligence information to conduct federal, state, and local agriculture and food 

"vulnerability assessments.'122 Advanced warning of over-the-horizon biothreats is vital, but 

22 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 
67 

today, the U.S. is often minimally aware and insufficiently warned. One reason appears to 

be insufficient numbers of bio/agrodefense subject matter experts (SMEs)- veterinarians, 

animal scientists, crop scientists, plant pathologists, etc. with high-level security 

clearances to assess classified intelligence. 

a) Security Clearances-Increase the number of food crop, food animal, and food supply 

SMEs with high-level security clearances (TS-SCI) to monitor bio/agrodefense threats 

worldwide. 

b) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) -Increase the number of 

SCIFs with secure communications that have agriculture/food SME analysts and/or 

cleared SME advisors with TS-SCI clearances. 

c) USDA Clearances -Increase the number of USDA personnel with TS-SCI clearances. 

It's unknown how many bio/agrodefense SMEs there are within the intelligence 

agencies, but there are nowhere near enough within USDA. Conversations in 2016 with 

the USDA's chief scientist and a USDA intelligence analyst confirmed their frustrations 

with an inability to convey critical classified information within USDA to make it 

actionable. This creates huge federal impediments to safeguarding agriculture, 

particularly when DHS stopped meeting their HSPD-9 responsibilities in 2016/17. 

Undertaking "vulnerability assessments;m developing "mitigation strategies;m 

conducting "response planning and recovery," 23 and defining time-critical "research and 

development"23 strategies are virtually impossible when there is limited awareness and 

no warning. This must be rectified immediately. 

d) Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs) -Increase the number of state IFCs with agriculture 

and food SMEs with TS-SCI clearances. The Kansas IFC (KIFC) appears to be the only 

such center of over 70 nationwide that has a biothreat team with cleared SMEs capable 

of assessing the full range of biohazards to food crops, food animals, the food supply, 

and people. These include a DVM and PhDs from K-State and MDs from the University 

of Kansas Medical Center as well as SMEs from multiple state agencies. These SMEs 

allow the KIFC to assess global intelligence for the purpose of preventing bioterrorism 

attacks and preparing for natural infectious disease events emerging globally. Thus, the 

KIFC focuses "left of boom" (prior to an attack or outbreak) rather than "right of boom" 

(after the event) like other fusion centers. This model should be emulated beyond 

Kansas, because it allows state-specific planning with regard to "vulnerability 

assessments, mitigation strategies, and response planning and recovery.'' 23 

2) Emerging FAD Threats- Exploit "awareness and warning"23 intelligence information 

regarding newly emerging biothreats to establish bio/agrodefense "mitigation strategies"23 

at USDA CGAHR prior to NBAF becoming operational and fund "research and 

development"23 in the BRI/PRH. 

23 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 
68 

3) Zoonotic Animal Disease Research- Establish federal threat "mitigation strategies"24 for 

zoonotic FADs at USDA CGAHR prior to NBAF becoming operational and fund RVF and JE 

"research and development"24 in the BRI/PRH. 

4) Non-Zoonotic Foreign Animal Disease Research- Expedite federal threat "mitigation 

strategies"24 for non-zoonotic FADs by moving the research portfolios for ASF and CSF from 

USDA PIADC to CGAHR and funding ASF and CSF "research and development"24 in the 

BRI/PRH until NBAF becomes operational. 

5) Private-Sector Outreach- Enhance private-sector "outreach and professional 

development"24 by leveraging the nation's land-grant universities that interact routinely 

with private-sector agriculture producers and food processors nationwide. 

An implementation problem for HSPD-9 was the expectation that the federal government 

would be able "to establish an effective information sharing and analysis mechanism"24 with 

private-sector agriculture producers and food processors. Having the federal government 

show up at the door is likely to be viewed with distrust and skepticism. In some instances, 

state government might be a somewhat better alternative, but this is an area where the 

nation's land-grant universities could serve as the facilitators/trusted brokers. 

6) Higher Education Programs-Support the development of higher education programs as 

called for in HSPD-9 "outreach and professional development."24 

a) For Capacity Building- "In veterinary medicine, public health, and agriculture."24 

b) For Protection-"Of the food supply."24 

7) Surveillance Systems -Increase support for "awareness and warning" 24 surveillance 

systems to provide early detection of U.S. disease outbreaks. 

a) For Food Animals- National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) 

b) For Food Crops- National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) 

c) For Wildlife- National Wildlife Disease Program (NWDP) 

B) Agriculture Response and Recovery-Support agriculture/food "response planning and 

recovery" 24 systems for the purpose of reestablishing full operations following infectious 

disease outbreaks. 

a) For Food Animals- By utilizing and expanding the USDA National Veterinary Stockpile 

(antigen bank) as called for in HSPD-9 "response planning and recovery"24 and endorsed 

by livestock producer groups and animal health companies. 

b) For Food Crops- By designing a National Plant Disease Recovery System as called for 

in HSPD-9 "response planning and recovery"24 and endorsed by crop producer groups 

and related stakeholders. 

24 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 
69 

9) FAD Advance Development and Manufacturing (ADM)-Advance "response planning and 

recovery" 25 by creating a FAD ADM facility for vaccines and other countermeasures against 

livestock-only and zoonotic FADs similar to ADM capabilities for human infectious diseases. 

Targeting zoonotic disease host animals could be the key to preventing global pandemics. 

10) Screening/Inspecting Agriculture and Food Items-Validate existing screening technology 

"mitigation strategies"25 and develop new/improved technologies. 

11} National Livestock Readiness Program (NLRP)- Ensure DHS is standing up the NLRP to 

help meet the requirements of the FY2017 "Securing Agriculture and Food Act" (Public Law 

115-43) in support of HSPD-9 "response planning and recovery." 25 

12) National Biodefense Strategy (NBS)- Confirm that the NBS- Section 1086, FY2017 

National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 114-328)- includes agriculture (protecting 

against plant and animal bioweapons and infectious diseases) and that bio/agrodefense 

components are adequate and implemented effectively. 

13) Biodefense Leadership-Support the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense's proposai to 

centralize bio/agrodefense leadership.26 

810/AGRODEFENSE BOTTOM LINE 

The bottom line today regarding bio/agrodefense is that "the clock is ticking"27 as stressed by the 

WMD Commission back in 2009. Much must be done to safeguard American agriculture in a 

globalized world-the U.S. agriculture and food critical infrastructure is not well protected from 

potentially catastrophic biological events. 

Bioterrorist attacks on America's food crops and/or food animals could devastate the U.S. 

economy, and the global economy wouldn't be far behind. America still feeds the world. Natural 

disease outbreaks could lead to similar outcomes. Food shortages in the U.S. may not occur 

immediately, or ever, depending on the effectiveness of the attack or the magnitude of the 

outbreak. However, there could still be hugely problematic outcomes for America and the world. 

Well-conceived Presidential Directives have not gotten the job done; neither did the Patriot Act 

nor the Homeland Security Act that preceded the directives. Key components of American critical 

infrastructure- agriculture and food - are vulnerable to terrorist attacks with bioweapons and 

undeliberate infectious disease outbreaks, and the U.S. is unprepared to confront these threats. 28 

Congress must act before it's too late. 

25 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9- Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; Jan. 30, 2004 

26 A Notional Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts; A Bipartisan 

Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, October 2015 

27 The Clock is Ticking: A Progress Report on America's Preparedness to Prevent Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism; Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 

Terrorism, October 21, 2009 

28 Bodin, Madeline; "U.S. Remains Unprepared for Agricultural Disease Outbreaks," Emergency Management, 

November 13, 2017 

(71) 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 13, 2017 
72 
73 

SPECIAL FOCUS 

DEFENSE 

OF ANIMAL 

AGRICULTURE 

October 2017 

\ 

BLUE RIBBON 

STUDY PANEL 

ON BIODEFENSE 

F 
74 

~UERIBBON 'STUDY PANEL 

ON BIODEFENSE 

Copyright © 2017 by the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense 

All rights reserved. 

www.biodefensestudy.org 

Cover and graphics by Delbridge Design. 

Base cover image courtesy of Getty lmages/feoris. 

SUGGESTED CITATION 

Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. Special Focus: Defense of Animal Agriculture. 

Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense: Washington, DC. October 2017. 
75 

PANEL MEMBERS 

Joseph I. Lieberman, Chair 

Thomas J. Ridge, Chair 

Donna E. Shalala 

Thomas A. Daschle 

James C. Greenwood 

Kenneth L. Wainstein 

PANEL EX OFFICIO MEMBERS 

Yonah Alexander, PhD 

William B. Karesh, DVM 

Rachel Levinson. MA 

I. Lewis Libby, JD 

Gerald W. Parker. DVM. PhD 

George Poste, DVM, PhD, DSc 

Tevi Troy, PhD 

PANEL STAFF 

Ellen P. Carlin, DVM, Co-Director 

Asha M. George, DrPH. Co-Director 

Robert H. Bradley, Policy Associate 

Patricia Prasada-Rao, MPH, Panel Coordinator 

Patricia de la Sota, Meeting Coordinator 

Katherine P. Royce, EcoHealth Alliance Intern 
76 

ACKN 0 W L.ED GEMENTS 

The Panel thanks Hudson Institute for serving as our fiscal 

sponsor. The Panel also thanks Kansas State University for 

hosting our special focus meeting on agrodefense, and the 

many experts that spoke at this meeting, some of whom 

came from great distances to do so. We are grateful to 

the many individuals both inside and outside of the federal 

government who provided input into the report throughout 

its development. For peer review of complete late-stage 

drafts. we would like to thank Dr. John Goldberg of Science 

Based Strategies; Dr. C. J. Mann of Empryse Group; Dr. 

Monique K. Mansoura of the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology; Dr. Tracey McNamara of Western University; 

and other anonymous reviewers. Their responses were 

exceptionally beneficial but should not be presumed to 

constitute an endorsement. The Panel's Ex Officio members 

also provided substantial technical input. Finally, the Panel 

gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by 

its donors. without which this report would not be possible. 
77 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 

INTRODUCTION 8 

THE THREAT TO FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 8 

THE THREAT OF ZOONOSES 10 

U.S. AGRODEFENSE TODAY 11 

LEADERSHIP 13 

FEDERAL STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION 13 

ARTIFICIAL POLICY DIVISIONS HAMPER PROGRESS 15 

RECOGNITION OF THE THREAT BY HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP 15 

COORDINATION · 20 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ATTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS 20 

COLLABORATION 23 

BIOSURVEILLANCE 23 

REPORTING AND INFORMATION SHARING 29 

INNOVATION 32 

NEXT-GENERATION MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES 32 

CONCLUSION 38 

PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HEARINGS 40 

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY 44 

APPENDIX B: MEETING AGENDA AND SPEAKERS 46 

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS 48 

REFERENCES 50 
78 
79 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The increasing rate of emerging and reemerging zoonotic disease. along with 

threats and attempts by those with nefarious intent to attack food and agriculture. 

point to the need to exert more effort to eliminate vulnerabilities and reduce 

consequences associated with America's agricultural sector. The Food and 

Agriculture (F&A) critical infrastructure sector produces. processes. and delivers 

the systems and commodities that feed billions of people and animals throughout 

the United States and globaHy. In 2015. the agriculture. food. and related industries 

contributed $992 billion (5.5%) to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). making it 

one of the largest sectors of the U.S. economy. Given its critical importance to 

food safety and availability in the United States and around the world, protecting 

this sector is a matter of national security. Federal agencies; state, local, tribal, 

and territorial (SLTT) governments; academic institutions; and industry partners 

all contribute to and are responsible for this vast enterprise. Our lives. culture. 

economy, and livelihood depend on their efforts. 

In its 2015 A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform 

Needed to Optimize Efforts. the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense determined 

that national biodefense lacked centralized leadership, interagency coordination 

and accountability, collaboration with non-federal stakeholders. and incentives 

for innovation sufficient to achieve needed capabilities and maximize mission 

effectiveness. With its series of special focus reports, the Panel undertakes indepth examinations of particular biodefense topics of concern. considers how the 

recommendations it made. in the Blueprint for Biodefense apply to these topics. 

and adds detail and new action items in keeping with its existing recommendations. 

This special focus report is the first in the series, and reflects the Panel's evaluation 

of threats to animal agriculture. a critical infrastructure component central to the 

health and well-being of the population and the security of a major element of the 

national economy. 

The Panel views protection of agriculture- the cultivation and breeding of animals 

and plants for food, fiber. and other products used to sustain human life- as a critical 

part of the overall biodefense mission space. While nearly all the Panel's Blueprint 

for Biodefense recommendations apply to agrodefense. some are especially 

important for the mission and deserve particular attention at this time. The goal of 

this report is to elucidate a few key, persistent challenges and to propose solutions. 

This report does not address every challenge in agrodefense. It emphasizes that 

intersection of issues which reflect the underlying principles of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense. and which have been inadequately evaluated or discussed in other 
80 

fora. This report does not directly assess threats to food (including food safety 

issues) or to plant agriculture, two areas of great import that rightfully deserve 

their own substantive analyses. Neither does it address food security (access to 

food), another important topic. These topics were beyond the scope defined for 

this special focus report Additional areas for oversight consideration are included 

at the end as proposed congressional hearings. 

The findings and recommendations herein are 

structured along the same thematic 

Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership, Coordination, 

Collaboration, and Innovation. Recommended actions 

are listed in the Summary of Proposals for the Executive 

Branch and the Summary of Proposals for Congress, and 

are designed to align directly to recommendations in the 

Blueprint for Biodefense. 

S I 

As assessed in our previous report White House-level political leadership is 

necessary to elevate biodefense as a critical national and federal imperative. As 

recommended, the Vice President in conjunction with strong congressional 

champions, could better drive priorities and activity across the large, unwieldy 

enterprise of agricultural defense. 

Agricultural defense is a broad and complex mission space that necessitates the 

significant involvement of most federal departments and agencies. Presidential 

Policy Directive 21 places the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as the federal leads for the F&A 

critical infrastructure sector. Roles and responsibilities under the U.S. Code and 

other authorities are not necessarily coordinated, however, nor are authorities 

necessarily exercised in a way that has prioritized needed activity. 

The ultimate ownership of F&A by the private sector, and its significant contribution 

to SL TI and international economies, necessitates substantial federal collaboration 

with non-federal stakeholders. White House-level leadership is critical to minimize 

overlap, identify mission gaps, and coordinate effort. The White House should 

ensure that the National Biodefense Strategy addresses threats to food and 

agriculture. The President and Congress should ensure that detailed agrodefense 

expenditures are incorporated into a cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis. 
81 

COORDIN.ATiON 

Agricultural outbreaks may result from natural events or from deliberate actions. 

Coordination between animal health (a USDA mission), and law enforcement (a 

Federal Bureau orlnvestigation. or FBI. responsibility), is critical. Sharing information 

among these and other interagency entities as well as non-federal stakeholders 

is necessary to focus attention on the most relevant threats and ensure that 

prevention and response measures are aligned with those threats. 

The Panel recommends increased coordination between the USDA and FBI. Further. 

since the FBI deems all domestic incidents of foreign animal diseases suspicious, 

law enforcement and health officials should conduct joint investigations of all 

such outbreaks. The development of an updated Food and Agriculture Incident 

Annex (FAIA) will be a critical step toward improving preparedness for agricultural 

outbreaks. Any revision must prioritize planning for both natural and intentional 

events. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the USDA Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. and the FBI should ensure that any update to the FAIA 

recognizes and addresses the investigative mission of the FBI, and dearly directs 

other federal departments and agencies to support inquiries into suspected acts of 

agricultural crime and terrorism. 

COLLABORATION 

Effective overall homeland security depends on successful collaboration among 

federal and non-federal stakeholders. The same is true for agrodefense. especially 

regarding early detection and surveillance efforts to characterize and prevent 

further spread of disease. The early detection of infectious disease outbreaks is one 

of the most important means we have for mitigating their impacts and shortening 

the duration of response. This detection should occur at the level of livestock 

production. but also in wildlife. 

Although the nation has made great strides, it still falls critically short in rapid 

biodetection, diagnosis. and integrated biosurveillance of outbreaks. Biodetection 

is hampered by an insufficient focus on rapid pen-side diagnostics. and insufficient 

investment to develop new wildlife disease detection technologies and validate 

existing tests. Although improving, biosurveiUance remains perpetually challenged 

by information sharing problems. Much of the data are owned by the private sector. 

thus requiring protected information policies that incentivize sharing. Success also 

depends on the cooperation of federal and state agencies. White House leadership 
82 

could provide the basis for the coordination and collaboration necessary to 

optimize the needed functions of biosurveillance collection. integration. and 

analysis. The White House should consider the full scope of wildlife surveillance 

activity that would benefit wildlife. livestock. and human health. and direct relevant 

departments to develop a commensurate budget request The National Security 

Council should direct interagency partners to develop a standard of quality by 

which the value of investment in biosurveillance can be measured. Congress should 

fund and facilitate enhanced opportunities tor data collection from livestock and 

wildlife. including through increased appropriations to the USDA National Wildlife 

Disease Program. 

INNOVATION 

Ultimately, the current paradigm for disease response is insufficient to protect the 

sector. The nation needs new ideas and scientific solutions to drive agrodefense 

approaches beyond their current limitations. One example would be to increase 

funding to the National Veterinary Stockpile to demonstrate a market commitment 

to procurement the way the BioShield Special Reserve Fund was designed to do for 

human medical countermeasures. 

To meet the requirements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9. far greater 

investment in advanced research and development is also necessary. The nation 

requires focused investment in pen-side. innovative diagnostic technology, and in 

better laboratory-based technology to enable rapid assessment for SLTI animal 

health officials. enabling earlier decision-making. The USDA should further develop 

its vaccine use policy for avian influenza and other high-consequence diseases. 

basing these policies on the use of platform technologies for rapid diagnostics and 

vaccines in response to outbreaks. 

Additionally. DHS and USDA should develop a business plan for the operation of 

the National Bio- and Agrodefense Facility. This plan should engage the public 

and private sectors; consider domestic and global markets for agrodefense 

research and development; and identify a dollar figure that defines both need and 

opportunity. 

The President's Fiscal Year 2018 budget request would eliminate all agriculture 

and animal-specific research by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. 
83 

This signals a substantive diminishment of support from the Executive Branch for 

agriculture and agrodefense research. 

The Administration must improve agrodefense efforts to prevent or combat a 

major agro-disease outbreak. Although accounting for only 5% of GDP. food safety 

and food access affects 100% of the population. F&A 'are increasingly vulnerable 

to large-scale disease outbreaks that could significantly impact the economy, and 

which could also threaten the security of the population. The Panel believes that 

current government efforts should be assessed and redirected as outlined in this 

report per the forthcoming National Biodefense Strategy. Federal investment in 

agrodefense must focus on prevention and early identification to reduce or prevent 

the incursion of major costs and losses. 

Like homeland security in general and biodefense in particular, the interagency 

nature of agrodefense means that many congressional committees oversee 

agrodefense efforts. These committees should both continue and expand previous 

efforts and increase their direction to the Executive Branch. The Farm Bill provides 

a significant opportunity every five years to accomplish this legislatively. 
84 

PROPOSALS FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

• Leadership 

• Ensure that the National Biodefense Strategy and its implementation 

plan address threats to food and agriculture, including any gaps in 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 implementation; 

• Collect detailed agrodefense expenditures and provide them to 

Congress as part of an annual biodefense data call; 

• Coordination 

• Formalize cooperation between the federal agriculture and law 

enforcement sectors to ensure that outbreaks are evenly addressed 

by both, in particular through the next iteration of the Food and 

Agriculture Incident Annex (FA/A); 

• Ensure that the FAIA describes the critical role played by the nation's 

fusion centers, and is regularly exercised at the state level; 

• Develop a standard of quality for biosurveillance; 

• Collaboration 

• Determine the optimal scope of wildlife disease surveillance activity 

and enhance support for the National Wildlife Disease Program 

commensurate with that need; 

• Enhance collaboration among federal. state, local, tribal, territorial, 

and private sector entities that collect animal health data; 

• Finalize the rule for the National List of Reportable Animal Diseases 

and incentivize rigorous reporting; 

• Innovation 

• Assess the ability of the National Veterinary Stockpile to meet the 

mandates of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, request 

budgets commensurate with the threat. and invest in countermeasure 

development. procurement, and usage policy based on the identified 

need; 

• Devote sufficient resources to diagnostics, including rapid diagnostics. 

for the National Veterinary Stockpile; 

• Establish an antigen bank for foot-and-mouth disease virus; and 

• Develop a business plan for the National Bio- and Agrodefense Facility 

that prioritizes public-private partnerships. 
85 

PROPOSALS FOR CONGRESS 

• Leadership 

• Require the identification of agrodefense expenditures across the 

federal government; 

• Collaboration 

• Commit to a more realistic funding plan for federal wildlife 

surveillance efforts, and facilitate increased data collection from 

livestock and wildlife populations; 

• Assess the authorities of the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Department of Agriculture to further collaboration with other 

public and private stakeholders that collect animal health data, and 

take necessary steps to support those efforts; 

• Continue funding the National Animal Health laboratory Network at 

no less than current authorized levels, with the possibility of additional 

funds should they be needed to fulfiH the Network's mission; 

• Innovation 

• Establish a prevention fund for animal health disease and disaster 

programs; and 

• Authorize the National Veterinary Stockpile, and require annual 

progress assessments toward requirements. 
86 

INTRODUCTION 

THE THREAT TO FOOD AND .AGRICULTURE 

The Food and Agriculture (F&Al critical infrastructure sector produces, processes, 

and delivers the systems and commodities that feed billions of people and animals 

throughout the United States and overseas.1 In 2015, agriculture, food, and related 

industries contributed $992 billion (5.5%) to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).2 

As one of the largest sectors of the U.S. economy, protecting this infrastructure is 

a matter of national security. 

Agriculture. the cultivation and breeding of animals and plants for food, fiber, and 

other products, is central to American culture, economy, wellbeing, and livelihood. 

Because of its importance, agriculture is a target for terrorism, warfare, and criminal 

activity.3

.4 The geographically dispersed yet industrially-concentrated nature of 

the sector makes it an especially vulnerable target. Farms dot the landscape in 

every state; livestock are often concentrated in specific locations; and lethal and 

contagious biological agents that impact plants and animals are more numerous 

even than those that directly impact human beings. 5 

As with other critical infrastructure sectors, criminals, terrorists, and enemy 

combatants may target F&A because disruption of this sector can lead to 

significant negative effects on the populations it serves. Al Oaeda has stated on 

numerous occasions that it seeks to impact the economies of those it considers 

to be its enemies, including with agricultural attacks. Targeted destruction of 

F&A critical infrastructure is a standard, long-standing, and effective element of 

warfare, with records of chemical and pathogenic attacks dating back to World 

War 1.6 An outbreak in 2011 of a rare strain of E. coli 0104:H4, first identified in 

northern Germany, spread to 16 countries including the United States, resulting in 

4,321 cases of illness and 53 deaths7 Although initially assumed to have a natural 

origin, epidemiological evaluation later concluded that an accidental or intentional 

introduction of contaminant into fenugreek seeds was plausibly responsible.8 The 

use of biological weapons to attack agriculture could result in billions of dollars in 

losses. Naturally occurring outbreaks in the United Kingdom of foot-and-mouth 

disease (FMD) in 2001 and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in 1996-7 cost 

the United Kingdom £8.6 billion (about $14 billion) 9 and £2.5 billion (about $3.2 

billion), respectively.10 Bioterrorism could easily do the same. 
87 

Criminals also target the F&A sector. Documented criminal activity has included theft 

of expensive foods, hybrid seeds, and hay; growth of poppies for opium; murder 

of farmers: rustling of cattle and other animals (e.g., bees); burglary of valuable 

metals; and stealing fertilizer elements (e.g., anhydrous ammonia. ammonium 

nitrate) that can be used to produce methamphetamines and explosives.11 

Naturally occurring disease outbreaks remain a persistent challenge. Outbreaks 

of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) have led to the deaths of more than 

67 million birds in the United States since 1983t2 In December 2014, a highly 

pathogenic strain of avian influenza entered the United States via migrating wild 

birds. (Wild birds play a key role in spreading these influenza viruses. such as when 

they move from northeast Asia into the west coast of North America on their longdistance migration routes. 13) The ensuing outbreak resulted in the largest animal 

health disaster ever experienced by the United States.14 The outbreak lasted until 

the middle of 2015, ultimately affected 21 states. and led to the depopulation of 

more than 50 million birds on 232 farms. 15 Subsequent trade bans impacted as 

many as 233,770 farms. 16 The total cost to the U.S. economy was estimated at $3.3 

billion, with the turkey sector losing $1.1 billion and the egg sector $2.2 billionY 

Federal and state governments spent $879 million on outbreak response. 18 

HPAI strains can also place humans at significant risk if the strains develop the 

capacity to spread from poultry to people. The public health community is 

concerned about possible mutations that would allow these viruses to spread in 

this fashion. Each case of animal infection during a large-scale outbreak is another 

opportunity for such a mutation to occur. Further. all avian influenzas can threaten 

egg production. thereby endangering the supply of human influenza vaccine and 

other vaccines that depend predominantly upon egg-based culture methods. 

The genetic code of the 2009 i-11N1 influenza pandemic arose in part from other 

influenza strains circulating in wild birds and commercial pigs. Media use of the 

misnomer "swine flu" created misplaced concern among the public over food 

safety. While human health was never at risk from pork consumption. the pork 

industry was negatively impacted: consumption declined. sales dropped. hog 

prices fell. futures prices on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange plunged. and several 

countries banned U.S. pork imports.19 Inaccurate media linkage of H1N1 to swine 

cost the U.S. pork industry $200 million.20 

Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDv) and porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCV) 

emerged for the first time in the U.S. domestic swine population with lethality 

and ferocity in 2013 and 2014. These swine enteric coronavirus diseases (SECD) 

cause acute and rapidly spreading diarrhea that does not affect humans. but which 

can result in 50-80% mortality in piglets. 21 PEDv. in particular. results in diarrhea. 
88 

vomiting, and high morbidity in a herd, and high mortality (90-95%) in piglets. In 

2013, PEDv cost the U.S. pork industry returns of $481 to $929 million.22 Although 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) guidelines should have been sufficient to 

control these outbreaks, the USDA did not take regulatory action against SECD 

immediately. As a result of this, the USDA cannot conclusively determine where or 

how either virus entered the United States.23 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) was not contacted to conduct an evaluation of the potential for an intentional 

(criminal or terrorist) origin for the outbreak. 

THE THREAT OF ZOONOSES 

Among the biological threats for which the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) has issued a Material Threat Determination, a!! but one (smallpox) are 

zoonotic, meaning the disease can move between animals and people. Many 

major infectious disease outbreaks over the last 10 years (e.g., Ebola, Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)) have 

originated in animals. Three-quarters of emerging infectious diseases are. in fact, 

zoonotic in nature. While most of these originate in wildlife, livestock can also 

act as conduits for infection. The recent U.S. avian influenza outbreaks did not 

affect humans, but other avian influenza strains in Asia have infected thousands of 

people; the H7N9 strain alone has infected more than 1,300 people since 2013. 25 

While influenza is the most likely virus to cause a pandemic, myriad other viruses 

cross over from wild animals into human populations. These viruses will continue 

to create pandemics. In 2003, the emergence of a previously unknown and virulent 

coronavirus, termed SARS, caused a rapid outbreak in Asia. It is believed to have 

jumped from bats to an intermediate animal and then to people. SARS quickly 

incapacitated tourism and trade as the outbreak spread as far as Canada. The 

economies of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan lost approximately $13 

billion in GDP collectively, despite the relative paucity of cases (7,000) and fatalities 

(700). 26 Other global economic costs were as high as $40 billionY The cost of 

patient treatment is not the predominant element in these estimates; the actual 

costs of SARS were the economic shocks resulting from shifts in human behavior. 

Ultimately, the infection spread to 29 countries.28 Authorities were finally able to 

contain its spread, but the rapidity with which the virus breached hemispheres 

revealed the extreme interconnectedness of human health in the modern era. The 

more recent Ebola and Zika outbreaks reinforce this fact. According to Dr. Ali Khan, 

former director of the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response at the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the primary threat to the health 

security of this nation remains a zoonotic disease.29 
89 

U.S. AGRO FEN 

In 2004, Dr. Roger Breeze, former director of the USDA biosafety level3 laboratory 

at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADCl wrote: 

Our national policy for inadvertent and deliberate foreign animal 

disease introductions should be simple: we will minimize direct and 

indirect economic impacts, and we will not engage in mass slaughter. 

Fortunately, most of the tools and technologies to permit such 

a policy already exist. We now have rapid, on-farm tests for these 

diseases; effective vaccination strategies; Internet-based command, 

control, and communication systems: and the means to track animal 

products from farm to table, even internationally ... If we choose this 

way forward, there will be little point in deliberate attacks, because the 

outcomes terrorists want to see will not be possible and Inadvertent 

introductions will be eliminated with scarcely a· footprint. 30 

Thirteen years tater, the U.S. government has made some notable commitments to 

countering the threat to animals. For example, the National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN) works to detect biological threats to food animals, although its 

funding is not as robust as its human-health counterpart, the Laboratory Response 

Network for Bioterrorism. DHS is spending $1.25 billion dollars to build a modern 

animal disease laboratory in Manhattan, Kansas (to replace PIADC). At the border, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection agricultural inspectors work daily to prevent 

the import of food and agricultural products that could harm human health, animal 

health, and the economy. USDA inspectors and veterinarians similarly safeguard 

the food supply through border-based health inspection and quarantine of 

incoming animals, and the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service and the U.S. 

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) safeguard food safety at processing plants 

throughout the United States and globally. USDA also accredits and trains privatesector veterinarians to detect and respond to disease outbreaks. These and other 

efforts account for a large portion of the federal investment in defending U.S. food 

and agriculture. 

Yet in context, the F&A sector receives far less attention than many other critical 

infrastructure sectors. This sector continues to be highly vulnerable, and many 

of the toots and technologies described by Breeze remain poorly developed and 

integrated into suitable plans and proper response operations. 

Further. many farms are open systems, and biosecurity varies from one farm to the 

next, a point clearly illustrated during the 2015 HPAI outbreak. As the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) found in an analysis of USDA efforts to combat avian 
90 

influenza. poultry producers and growers oftentimes did not adhere to basic 

biosecurity practices before and during the outbreak, which resulted in further 

infection. The USDA relies on poultry producers and contractors to voluntarily take 

preventive steps to protect their flocks from disease.31 In early 2016, USDA took 

the first steps to address this issue by publishing an interim rule making indemnity 

payments contingent on poultry and egg producers and growers certifying their 

adherence to a biosecurity plan. The rule is limited to large-scale operations for 

certain animals. and is particularly focused on HPAI. Biosecurity provisions have 

also been added to the National Poultry Improvement Plan. a voluntary program 

under which producers can be certified as disease-free for trade purposes. 

Thus. the production of food presents what amounts to a chain of vulnerabilities. 

The intentional disruption of any of the goods and services that comprise F&A 

could occur at myriad nodes along this chain. Weaknesses of these types put 

human health, animal health, and the entire agricultural-based economy at risk. 

According to GAO, the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 $23 billion budget request 

for USDA included only $287 million for animal health efforts - that is, 1.2%.32 

While this figure does not include use of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 

for response efforts, the dollar value of which can be substantial. the annually 

appropriated level is simply too low to preventively safeguard animal health to 

optimal levels. This is a department whose earliest and groundbreaking successes 

in the nineteenth century were for the proactive protection of animal health. 

Notable priorities for that nascent department. established by President Abraham 

Lincoln, included funding the study, control. and eradication of infectious diseases 

like contagious bovine pleuropneumonia and Texas cattle fever. DHS has invested 

research dollars at PIADC for FMD vaccines, and construction dollars for the 

new National Bio- and Agrodefense Facility (NBAF). Yet the President's FY 2018 

request disregards agriculture research and development funding support at DHS. 

eliminating all of its research programs at PIADC. 

Many of the activities in which DHS. USDA, and interagency partners engage are 

indispensable elements for the development of effective biosurveiUance, medical 

countermeasures (MCM), response capacity, and all other features of effective 

agrodefense. It is difficult to account for the ways in which these and other 

expenditures work together to reduce the threat to agriculture and to determine 

the areas where resources are most necessary. While the forthcoming National 

Bioderense Strategy should partially solve this problem, an Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) assessment of program productivity and return on investment 

- and one made publicly available - is still needed. 
91 

LEADERSHIP 

The ownership of F&A by the private sector and the significant contribution it makes 

to SLTT economies necessitates significant federal interaction and collaboration 

with non-federal stakeholders. Presidential Policy Directive 21 designated the USDA 

and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, delegated to the FDA) 

as the federal agencies to lead the infrastructure protection components of the 

F&A sector. 33 Like many of its critical infrastructure counterparts, the complexity 

of facilitating resilience within this sector necessitates significant involvement by 

other federal departments and agencies, as well as with the non-federal parties that 

own and operate it. The Panel has previously stated that political-levelleadership at 

the White House is needed to drive priorities for biodefense, and this by extension 

includes agrodefense, particularly in light of policy and political divisions outlined 

in this report. 

FEDERAL STRUCTURAL ORGAJ~IZATION 

The defense of U.S. agriculture is a broad and intricate mission space, its complexity 

reflected in the biodefense enterprise writ large. USDA and FDA have primary federal 

responsibility for encouraging the national security of agriculture. The USDA Office 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination provides the primary means 

of communication between USDA and other departments at a policy level. Most 

other federal departments and agencies also help to protect this sector, with DHS 

serving a leading role in addressing national security related incidents. 

The functions necessary to do this include intelligence analysis, law enforcement 

animal health, plant health, public health, environmental remediation, and outbreak 

response and recovery. The 2008 Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FA/A} 

to the National Response Framework. which addresses only the response and 

recovery element of agrodefense, lists USDA and HHS as Coordinating Agencies. 

and the Department of Commerce (DOC). the Department of Defense {DOD). the 

Department of Energy, DHS, the Department of Interior (DOl). the Department of 

Justice (DOJ), the Department of Labor, the Department of State, the Department 

of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the General Services 

Administration, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. 

Postal Service, and the American Red Cross as Cooperating Agencies.34 The 

forthcoming update to the FA/A (expected in 2017) will provide further specificity, 

naming subordinate agencies and offices within many of these departments, and 

detailing how agencies should coordinate with one another. 
92 

Ultimately, the United States Code (7 USC 8310(e)(2)) designates the USDA as the 

lead agency with respect to issues related to pests and diseases of livestock; 7 

USC 7652 likewise designates the Secretary of Agriculture as the principal federal 

official responsible for coordinating all federal research and extension activities 

related to food and agricultural sciences. However, like other areas of biodefense, 

federal responsibilities for agrodefense are by necessity spread broadly across the 

interagency. Roles and responsibilities under the U.S. Code and other authorities 

are not necessarily coordinated, nor are the authorities always exercised in a way 

that has prioritized needed activity. White House-level leadership is, therefore. 

critical to minimize overlap, identify mission gaps, and coordinate effort. The Panel 

has recommended previously that the Vice President serve in this role. 

SLTT leadership at the political level is no less fundamental to all phases of 

protecting animal agriculture. In January 2016, when avian influenza appeared 

in Indiana, then-Governor Michael R. Pence was the first high-level state official 

to arrive at the emergency command post in Jasper, Indiana. Governor Pence's 

appearance motivated both offi'cials and producers to act quickly and prevent 

this outbreak from spreading as far as it had during the national outbreak in 2015. 

According to Dr. Bret Marsh, Indiana State Veterinarian: 

He was there f rst. And it frustrated some of the press because they 

didn't know he was coming. But he didn't want to be the event. 

He wanted the people to complete the event and keep their work 

moving forward. And I would get these text messages from some guy 

named Mike ... I've worked for several governors. but I've never had 

text messages ... So I think, from the Vice President's of ce, clearly 

he has an understanding and understands the importance of these 

issues, in our state, and, therefore, across the country. 35 

Dr. Marsh also believes that without local collaboration, the outbreak would have 

spread farther. Producers, not officials, culled poultry at affected farms, realizing 

that it was "the right thing to do." Additional SLTT interventions are needed to 

strengthen government partnerships with industry, build expertise, and develop 

response plans before outbreaks occur. 

While the Panel emphasizes in this and in prior reports that two high levels of 

leadership are necessary to identify appropriate political direction and policy 

development and coordination, the Panel also reinforces the need for operational 

leadership during crises as the third critical piece. Congress should consider 

evaluating the response planning and recovery elements of Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), particularly those areas that pertain to response 

capabilities and F&A-specific response plans to ensure that they meet National 
93 

Preparedness System requirements. The forthcoming issuance of an updated 

National Food and Agricultural Incident Annex (see Coordination chapter) provides 

a timely opportunity to do so. 

ARTIFICIAL POLICY DIVISIONS HAMPER PROGRESS 

A complex web of ecological interactions governs the spread of infectious 

disease. All efforts to prevent and plan for biological events impacting humans 

must therefore integrate with animal and environmental health initiatives. Animals 

can be susceptible to many of the same threats as humans and they can also 

act as conduits for human infection. Further. animals can be terrorist targets in 

their own right. All agrodefense efforts must integrate human. animal. plant. and 

environmental health elements into decision-making. budgeting, and operations. 

Assessment and reduction of risk to the F&A sector have been led primarily by 

DHS. USDA. and FDA. HSPD-9 and the F&A Sector-Specific Plan (part of the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan) provide a foundation for the protection 

of this sector. 36 However. associated efforts to prevent. deter. prepare, detect. 

attribute, decontaminate. remediate. and mitigate agricultural events are not well 

integrated. Additionally, medical and other countermeasures to protect animals 

and plants are unavailable for most emerging pathogens. Further, the Bioterrorism 

Risk Assessment process conducted by DHS appears to be insufficiently linked 

to follow-on investments that could mitigate this problem via risk management 

activities. 

Optimal biodefense can only be achieved when grounded in an ecological 

understanding of the entire health picture. The distributed nature of healthrelated responsibilities across the federal government creates bureaucratic silos 

that often fail to recognize the interrelatedness of human, animal. plant. and 

environmental health. A designated leader at the White House who recognizes this 

interconnectedness could drive integration across federal efforts. 

RECOGNITION OF THE THREAT BY HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP 

In 1999, Congress established the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. also known 

as the Gilmore Commission. This Commission produced several reports for the 

President and Congress. the first of which noted that agriculture was a highly 

vulnerable sector and that the biological threat to it deserved more attention than 

it was getting at the time. 37 
94 

Since then, White House councils (e.g., Domestic Policy Council (DPC). National 

Economic Council (NEC). Homeland Security Council (HSC). and the National 

Security Council (NSC)) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 

have taken up the issue of agrodefense in various ways. Under the direction of 

President George W. Bush, White House staff evaluated the extent to which the 

nation had secured F&A critical infrastructure sector and related sectors and 

activities. President Bush's HSC identified agrodefense as a pressing concern. and 

began developing a presidential directive to address it as a part of biodefense. 

However. the enormity of the risk to agriculture. as well as the precedence of deepseated and long-standing turf protection among the departments and agencies. 

drove the Bush Administration to separate agrodefense from other biodefense 

efforts. The White House subsequently produced two directives in 2004: HSPD-9, 

Defense of United States Agriculture and Food38 and HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 

21st Century. 39 These were written separately, although the staffs were the same. 

and there was cross-over of ideas and an acknowledgement of the realities of One 

Health. But there were also deep-rooted turf issues that manifested during the 

process, reflecting the same territoriality seen throughout the federal government 

today. 

Congress also recognized the threat to the sector and sought to address it through 

oversight and legislation. Senator Pat Roberts convened the first congressional 

agroterrorism hearing in 1999.40 More oversight followed. The decision to 

build the NBAF resulted in hearings and legislation about the nat"1onal need for 

agrodefense research and response capability and capacity. The 2014-15 avian 

influenza outbreak drew attention to the flaws in agrosecurity, and both the House 

Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 

and Forestry held hearings to identify systemic shortcomings in the response to 

that outbreak.41 Both chambers of Congress heard from witnesses who identified 

biosecurity measures that could be legislated, including a mandatory disease 

prevention program and an FMD vaccine bank42 In addition, the House Committee 

on Agriculture held a hearing on the FMD threat,43 and the House Committee on 

Homeland Security held hearings on agrodefense more broadly.44 Congress tasked 

GAO in the first decade of the 2000s to conduct a variety of studies regarding 

protection of the F&A sector; since 2010, congressional requests have been few 

and usually in response to - not in advance of - outbreaks affecting agriculture. 

As a reflection of federal interest in agrodefense. the NBAF deserves special 

mention. The NBAF is part of the USDA and DHS ·plan to provide safe, secure, 

and state-of-the-art agricultural biocontainment laboratories that research and 

develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases" called for 

by HSPD-945 The Executive and Legislative Branches have supported the creation 

of the NBAF, if haltingly, while working through controversies. The overall trajectory 
95 

of support to build this laboratory has demonstrated a federal commitment to 

agrodefense research and response. DHS, with substantial contributions from the 

state of Kansas and the city of Manhattan. Kansas, will spend well over $1 billion to 

develop it. 

All of this oversight and commitment. and the areas that have lagged or been 

omitted from it as described in this report, are occurring in the absence of a 

national strategy and corresponding implementation plan. As described in the 

Blueprint for Biodefense, the nation requires a comprehensive National Biodefense 

Strategy that integrates the input of all non-federal stakeholder groups. Congress 

has acted upon the Panel's recommendation and required the development of 

this Strategy per Section 1086 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 

2017 (Public Law 114-328). While the Panel recommended that the Vice President 

take charge of producing this Strategy, Congress directed four departments. DOD, 

DHS, HHS, and USDA. to work together to do so. The drafters in the House and 

Senate Committees on Armed Services included USDA because they recognized 

the integral role of agriculture in our biological security and the serious threats to 

this sector. 

In accordance with Recommendation 3 of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense to develop, implement, and update a comprehensive 

National Biodefense Strategy: 

The White House must ensure that the National Biodefense 

Strategy (Strategy) and implementation plan address threats to 

food and agriculture. As part of this process. the National Security 

Council, Domestic Policy Council, and National Economic 

Council. in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture, 

Defense, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security, 

should jointly review Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, determine 

where it falls short in addressing today's agrodefense needs, and 

incorporate updates into the Strategy and its implementation 

plan. While leadership and policy coordination of interagency 

federal activity should be centralized, responsibilities for 

agrodefense witt continue to be distributed nationally. The 

Strategy must recognize this decentralized nature of the U.S. food 

and agriculture critical infrastructure sector. 
96 

USDA has made some critical investments in agrodefense, such as directing 

research efforts at PIADC with significant emphasis on FMD vaccine, providing food 

and agrodefense grants through the National Institute of Food and Agriculture. 

and working with the FBI, FDA, and other agencies to conduct law enforcement 

and public health investigations. USDA, with some White House direction, also 

produced a number of policy documents. In addition to USDA the DOC, DOl, 

and various HHS agencies (e.g., CDC, FDA), have generated relevant F&A policy 

documents. While these departments and agencies all take some responsibility for 

agrodefense, USDA and FDA are ultimately responsible. In addition to DHS input. 

USDA leadership and FDA leadership must make National Biodefense Strategy 

contributions a top priority. 

While policies and plans are important, they will mean little without an agency to 

own them and dollars to implement and exercise them. And yet, a federal fiscal 

commitment to agrodefense is not entirely apparent. The Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 (HSA) required that the President's budget request incorporate a homeland 

security funding analysis - in essence, a kind of budgetary cross-cut. According 

to the FY 2017 analysis, 29 agency budgets included federal homeland security 

funding across 17 functional areas. The agriculture function accounted for only 

0.76% of the total46 

Published not long after the HSA, HSPD-9 also acknowledged the pressing need for 

budget coordination: "For all future budgets, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health 

and Human Services, and Homeland Security shall submit to the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget, concurrent with their budget submissions. an 

integrated budget plan for defense of the United States food system. "

47 OMB did 

collect this information and included it in the annual homeland security analysis in 

accordance with the HSA. but this analysis was high level and did not provide any 

detail regarding the expenditures in the functional areas. Furthermore. Congress 

eliminated the reporting requirement altogether in its FY 2017 appropriations 

law. The Panel strongly recommends statutory reinstatement of the analysis and 

continued collection of this information on the part of OMB. 
97 

In accordance with Recommendation 4 of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense to develop a unified biodefense budget aligned 

with the national biodefense strategy, the Panel proposes the 

following: 

The President and congressional appropriators should ensure 

that detailed agrodefense expenditures are identified and 

included in the recommended data call for and development 

of a crosscutting biodefense budget analysis. These requested 

expenditures should be accompanied by impact evaluations. Any 

gaps recognized as a result should be addressed in the National 

Biodefense Strategy. 
98 

COORDINATION 

Many federal departments and agencies share responsibility for agrodefense. 

Coordination of these efforts is paramount. Because agricultural outbreaks may 

result from natural events or from deliberate actions, coordination between animal 

health and law enforcement is particularly critical. The health mission of the USDA 

and the investigative mission of the FBI must be jointly acknowledged, exercised, 

and implemented. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND A TTR!BUTION OF ATTACKS 

According to the FBI, the intentional introduction of disease is difficult to 

differentiate from accidental or naturally occurring outbreaks. 48 Authorities for 

animal health, plant health, and law enforcement must work with one another 

from the earliest stages of an outbreak to attribute its source. Some of the most 

important elements of this joint cooperation include rapid notification of agreedupon triggers, early threat reports. and unusual disease events, as well as efficient 

criminal-epidemiological investigation and response. Yet there has been an 

inconsistent recognition that agriculture is a target of domestic and international 

terrorist elements, and that intentional means of introduction should be equally 

considered when suspicious or unusual animal-plant disease events and other 

recognized triggers are initially detected. Continued training such as that provided 

by the FBI through its Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation course will 

help support better understanding between the agriculture and law enforcement 

communities, help the investigation of threats to animals and plants, facilitate threat 

and operational awareness. develop information sharing protocols, and foster 

SLTT health-law enforcement contact networks. Additionally, broad distribution 

throughout the food and agricultural community of resources developed jointly by 

USDA, FBI, and FDA, such as the Criminal Investigation Handbook for Agroterrorism. 

will help increase awareness of the threats to F&A and how these communities can 

work together to investigate outbreaks in, and suspected acts of terrorism against. 

this sector. 

When this report went to press, federal partners were drafting a revised FAIA that 

would provide updated and more comprehensive guidance for federal interagency 

planning efforts involving food and agricultural incidents. The development of an 

updated annex is a critical step toward improved agricultural event preparedness, 

and ideally the final version will contain more in-depth detail on the roles and 
99 

responsibilities assigned to the federal interagency than the 2008 version. 

Challenges in developing the revision in a way that prioritizes both natural and 

intentional events may reflect a central issue about the perception of agricultural 

terrorism. Law enforcement investigation of terrorism is well within the scope of 

the FAIA's purpose - interagency planning and coordination for response and 

recovery. Much as the recently-updated Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex 

establishes a dearly-defined role for the Bureau's investigatory responsibilities in 

the aftermath of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist acts,49 discussion 

of the details and parameters of FBI and other law enforcement response must be 

included in the response to F&A events. 

Scenarios detailed in any new FA IA should include intentional introductions of food 

and agricultural pests or contaminants. and should address the source and means 

of those introductions. The FBI considers any foreign animal disease outbreak 

suspicious until proven otherwise, and seamless coordination in the early stages of 

investigation among law enforcement. animal health. and public health is therefore 

critical. Mitigating animal health impacts indeed must be the priority, but there 

is no reason that protocols developed by the FBI cannot be leveraged to ensure 

a concomitant investigation to determine the source of the outbreak which, if 

intentional. must be known quickly to then disrupt follow-on acts of terror or 

crime. 

In accordance with Recommendation 9 of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense to better support and inform decisions based 

on attribution of biological events, the Panel proposes the 

following: 

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency should coordinate with the Administrator of the Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure that any update 

of the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (Annex) recognizes 

and addresses the investigative mission of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), and dearly directs other federal departments 

and agencies to support inquiries into suspected acts of 

agricultural crime and terrorism. The next iteration of the Annex 

should incorporate concepts of initial consideration of intentional 

threats in unusual or suspicious disease events; the roles and 

responsibilities of the FBI. USDA Office of Inspector General. 

and FDA Office of Criminal Investigations; and subsequent joint 

criminal-epidemiological investigations. The Annex should also 

enumerate the role played by the nation's fusion centers in 

coordinating and disseminating information. 
100 

Further, the aforementioned officials should ensure that, to 

the greatest extent possible, responsibilities in this Annex 

related to law enforcement inquiries or investigations of acts of 

agricultural terrorism align with similar activities in the Nuclear/ 

Radiological incident Annex. the Biological Incident Annex. and 

any other incident annex to the Response and Recovery Federal 

Interagency Operational Plans. 

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency should coordinate with the Administrator of APHIS and 

the Director of the FBI to ensure that Annex updates would be 

required to be regularly exercised at least at the state level. as 

is done with other areas of national security. These exercises 

should provide a means for the named agencies. as well as other 

federal and non-federal partners. to develop measurements of 

the capabilities needed for adequate and economically justifiable 

response and recovery efforts. They should also be used to 

gauge the value of funding programs to enhance the capabilities 

described within the Annex. 
101 

COLLABORATION 

Collaborative effort within the interagency and among non-federal stakeholders 

has been a cornerstone of homeland security efforts since September 11. 2001. 

That same collaborative effort is necessary within agrodefense. This section of 

the report focuses on challenges in two areas: biosurveillance and reporting/ 

information sharing. Avian influenza and other outbreaks have demonstrated the 

critical importance of timely and accurate biosurveillance. Early detection is one 

of the best methods available to prevent the spread of infectious disease. The 

emergence of infections not just in rural but also in urban areas. as evidenced by 

a rare avian influenza strain that infected 500 cats (and at least one human) in a 

New York City animal shelter in late 2016, demonstrates a requirement for vigilance 

and an acknowledgement that all areas. rural and urban. and many species, wild 

and otherwise. must be part of any surveillance framework. Adequately funding 

data collection and establishing a nationally notifiable animal disease list are critical 

to the success of this system. as is reporting and information sharing among 

federal. SLTT. and private sector stakeholders. Ultimately, leadership over federal 

biosurveillance efforts and, in particular. the integration of these efforts is still 

needed. 

8 iOS URVE ILL A NCE 

The early detection of infectious disease outbreaks is one of the most important 

means available to mitigate their impacts and shorten the duration of response. 

This detection should occur at the level of livestock production and in wildlife. 

Stakeholders in this area span from government agencies at all levels to local 

farmers. veterinary hospitals. and even poison control centers. Although the 

control of many diseases is not possible in wildlife, early detection is one of the 

best defenses against catastrophic impacts of agricultural and zoonotic disease 

threats. 

The drafters of HSPD-9 understood this concept. HSPD-9 tasks 001, USDA, and 

EPA to operate surveillance and monitoring systems (section 8); DOJ. DHS, and the 

intelligence community (IC) with intelligence collection and analysis (section 9); 

and DHS with integration of this information (section 10). Each of these elements 

exists in various stages of maturity and interagency integration. An important 

missing element is a standard of expectation or quality by which the value of 

investment in biosurveillance can be measured. Such a standard could include: the 
102 

key area of characterization; risk determination; potential course of action; and a 

means of assessing the value of the contribution these measures have on health. 

Such a standard does not currently exist in biosurveiUance, and without it. funding 

will continue to be inhibited and uninformed. 

In December 2014, the USDA identified HPAI in poultry in Oregon and Washington 

in an outbreak that ultimately reached 232 farms across 21 states before federal 

and state officials and industry partners eradicated it.50 The federal government 

spent $879 million to contain the outbreak,51 a figure that includes $610 million 

toward response activities. $200 million in indemnity payments, $34 million in 

planning costs for the corning autumn, and $35 million in overtime, travel, and 

supplies for USDA ernployees.52 While the costly response prevented a larger 

disaster, the 2014-15 outbreak still cost the U.S. economy $3.3 billion. 5

3 Nearly 7.5 

million turkeys. 43 million layer hens, and 3.5 million replacement pullets (young 

female hens) were destroyed,5455 and an estimated 15,000 jobs were lost in the 

egg industry.56 Indirect costs included higher prices for eggs; 57 non-indemnified 

losses to producers (estimated at more than $1 billion); 58 and bans placed by 15 

countries on poultry imports from the United States, with many other countries 

placing targeted bans on particular U.S. states or regions. 5

9 

In January 2016, an unrelated HPAI strain appeared in a commercial turkey flock 

in Indiana. and a low. pathogenic strain was confirmed at eight nearby farms; 

approximately 414.000 birds were depopulated to control this outbreak which 

lasted until May of that year.60 

Combined, these avian influenza outbreaks resulted in the death or culling 

(selective slaughter) of 50.6 million animals. cost the federal government $930 

million. and cost the U.S. turkey and egg sectors $1.6 billion.61 Indirect impacts on 

the U.S. economy were even higher. We can expect more events of this nature in 

the years to corn~. As recently as March 2017. another HPAI outbreak occurred, 

this time in Tennessee. 

The 2014-17 U.S. avian influenza outbreaks exemplify a partially effective 

detection and surveillance capacity linked to a response capacity fraught 

with significant challenges. The GAO reported that USDA evaluated response 

weaknesses revealed by the first two outbreaks (2014-15 and 2016).62 USDA 

identified challenges in biosecurity, continuity of business planning, diagnostic 

testing, epidemiological investigation. incident management. mass depopulation 

and euthanasia, biosurveillance. and vaccination. among ·Other categories. While 

response capacity is clearly of significant importance given the inherent difficulty 

of preventing pathogens like HPAI from entering U.S. borders via wild birds, some 

increased emphasis on biodetection and biosurveillance in wildlife and livestock 
103 

could improve mitigation efforts toward avian influenza and other diseases. This is 

particularly true for wild bird surveillance, which requires steady funding in advance 

of outbreaks. 

Rapid biodetection, diagnosis, and integrated biosurveiltance remain critical 

functions toward which the nation has made great strides, yet which still lag behind 

the need. Biodetection is hampered by an insufficient focus on rapid pen-side 

diagnostics, and insufficient investment to develop new wildlife disease detection 

technologies and validate existing tests (e.g., PCR assays for avian influenza and 

other pathogens). BiosurveiUance is perpetually challenged by information sharing 

problems. HSPD-10 described the need for "an integrated and comprehensive 

attack warning system to rapidly recognize and characterize the dispersal of 

biological agents in human and animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and 

the environment. "

63 However, animal health surveillance remains somewhat 

segregated from the model of comprehensive biosurveillance described. Livestock 

health surveillance is currently performed for the benefit of agriculture and food 

animal production. These data are typically unavailable on a regular basis to federal 

agencies with surveillance responsibilities outside of the USDA, although reportable 

zoonoses do make their way to state and federal public health authorities. Some 

argue anecdotally that animal and human health surveillance data are insufficiently 

integrated; white this may be the case, the Panel has to-date identified few 

examples that any such lack of integration has directly caused negative health 

impacts in animals or people. A deep evaluation of the nodes of connectedness, 

the lack thereof, and case studies of where failures have occurred could help guide 

further biosurveillance policy. 

Spurred by outbreaks of FMD and BSE in the United Kingdom, along with the spread 

of West Nile virus in the United States, the USDA established the National Wildlife 

Disease Program (NWDP) in FY 2003 to provide wildlife disease surveillance and 

management at a national level. Because state wildlife agency efforts tend toward 

wildlife management rather than disease diagnosis, understanding of the wildlife 

disease surveillance picture, particularly in the context of the broader animal and 

human health picture, has fallen to the federal government. The NWDP program is 

designed to reveal key features of infectious diseases, such as prevalence, species 

predilections, spedes reservoirs, predominant strains, and geographic scope of 

given pathogens. The program accomplishes a great deal despite its low level of 

appropriated funding, For instance, NWDP instituted national disease monitoring 

programs for swine brucellosis, pseudorabies, and classical swine fever. 64 The 

program also undertook a pilot study examining feral swine as sentinels for 

anthrax.65 Anthrax and other material threats are targets of other NWDP initiatives, 

such as its efforts to sample wildlife species for the presence of tularemia and 

plague. The monitoring was put to use in Indiana after the 2016 avian influenza 
104 

outbreaks to sample mice. starlings. gulls. and other animals that might be 

harboring the offending virus.66 USDA also funded wild bird surveillance through 

its CCC funds; the USDA funding allotments toward surveillance are shared with 

partner agencies. an important example of collaboration. 

Initially funded at approximately $6.2 million. NWDP has not seen an increase since 

its inception and operates now at just under $4 million. This fact illustrates that 

each year for the last decade-and-a-half the operational side of the program has 

ended up with about $3 million to surveil for more than 75 pathogens. toxins. and 

syndromes. at multiple scales ranging from state to national. continental. or even 

international. 

This figure is surprisingly low when placed in context. USAID's EPT PREDICT. a 

critical global wild animal surveillance program, receives roughly $20 million 

annually; yet the core domestic program designed for wildlife sampling receives 

one-fifth of that. While the United States is not considered a hotspot for emerging 

infectious disease, its land mass, biodiversity, and commercial agricultural sector 

create a trifecta of risk for pathogen introduction. The surveillance effort should 

be commensurate with that risk. Much of the international biosurveillance work 

undertaken by USAID, particularly in predictive efforts, may serve as a model for 

future surveittance programs. and its work to build capacity abroad should be 

reflected as an element in the National Biodefense Strategy. 

Current funding levels present limitations to our situational awareness and 

accumulation of scientific knowledge. As stated by Bevins et at.. "Large-scale 

surveillance programs such as this ... are important for providing ecological data on 

infections at politically and biologically relevant scales."67 

Congress continues to appropriate funding as particular events occur. From 

2006-11, USDA. DOl, and SLTT agencies implemented an NSC-requested plan 

for a nationally coordinated avian influenza surveillance effort in wild birds.

68·69•

70 

Their funding came from separate appropriations to the two federal departments 

as per the standard congressional approach. one that does not incentivize interdepartmental cooperation unless the subcommittees jointly build such partnering 

into the law. White House direction was likely, therefore. an important element of 

the program's ultimate success. Efforts ceased in 2011, and were not renewed until 

2014 when HPAI reappeared in U.S. commercial poultry flocks. If history repeats 

itself, USDA or Congress may discontinue the program once again when a lull in 

avian influenza outbreaks tempts them to turn their funding elsewhere. 

The integration of collected surveillance information is an essential component 

of the processn Yet this piece has been perhaps the one most stymied by 

bureaucracy. The subject of a national. comprehensive, and integrated human and 
105 

animal health surveillance system has been much discussed since the issuance of 

HSPD-9, which stated: 

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with the 

Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the 

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 

heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to 

create a new biological threat awareness capacity that will enhance 

detection and characterization of an attack. This new capacity 

will build upon the improved and upgraded surveillance systems 

described in paragraph 8 and integrate and analyze domestic and 

international surveillance and monitoring data collected from human 

health, animal health, plant health, food, and water quality systems. 72 

Similar to the related requirement in HSPD-10. no such system has ever been 

implemented. DHS' National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) might have 

achieved this goal, at least in part, but has not realized the function envisioned for 

it for reasons described in the Blueprint for Biodefense. Acquiring the necessary 

data has proven to be difficult. Much of the data are owned by the private sector, 

thus requiring protected information policies that incentivize sharing. Similarly, 

successful analysis to detect emerging health threats depends on the cooperation 

of federal and state agencies. Despite such challenges, the Panel has previously 

concluded that NBIS could have been successful with centralized stewardship; 

and it remains true that White House leadership could still provide the basis for 

the coordination and collaboration necessary to optimize the function, if not the 

NBIS itself. Should NBIS be expected to continue its mission, the White House 

must get behind and support it. The White House would need to direct interagency 

sharing of information for the system, and encourage other departments to not 

just provide information, but to seek information from NBIS through well-formed 

queries with stated purpose for use. NBIS in turn should be required to evaluate 

how well its information contributions to DHS and other departments assist in risk 

reduction and other desired impacts associated with integrated biosurveillance. The 

approach should be tied to the standards for biosurveillance discussed previously. 

The implementing partners of the wild bird surveillance system established an 

interagency steering committee for surveillance of influenza in wild birds. USDA 

APHIS (Wildlife Services and Veterinary Services). the U.S. Geologic Survey {DOl). 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, CDC. state representatives, and the National Flyway 

Council are members of this Interagency Steering Committee for Surveillance for 

HPAI in Wild Birds. This committee has produced interagency plans for detection of 

HPAI in wild birds. 73 The steering committee has been a cohesive unit for designing 

and implementing large scale surveillance systems. The development of more 
106 

interagency steering committees similar to that for HPAI could perhaps provide a 

platform for this kind of education, information sharing, and relationship building. 

The NAHLN, a network of federally-supported partner tabs located across 

has country, also serves a vital function in quickly identifying, confirming, and 

providing diagnostic surge support for infectious disease outbreaks. ln the 2014 

Farm Bill, funding was authorized at the level of $15 million annually. The 2018 

Farm Bill provides an opportunity for Congress to consider whether the currently 

authorized level is sufficient to meet the growing need for a national system 

capable of handling its daily diagnostic demand as well as surge demand for a 

massive outbreak. Additionally, in the 2008 Farm Bill, Congress authorized the 

creation of a prevention program for plant diseases and disasters funded by the 

CCC.74 Congress should consider establishing a fund to address similar programs 

for animal health, one that provides more robust support for early detection and 

surveillance efforts at the state leveL 

In accordance with Recommendation 14 of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense to improve surveillance of and planning for animal 

and zoonotic outbreaks, the Panel proposes the following: 

The National Security Council should direct interagency partners 

to develop a standard of expectation or quality by which the value 

of investment in biosurveillance can be measured. The White 

House should consider the full scope of wildlife surveillance 

activity that would benefit wildlife, livestock, and human health, 

and develop a commensurate budget request. The Administration 

and Congress should commit to such a plan for the long term. 

Congress should fund and facilitate enhanced opportunities for 

data collection from livestock and wildlife by the Department 

of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and Department of Interior, through increased appropriations 

to the USDA National Wildlife Disease Program. The Secretary 

of Homeland Security should further DHS collaboration with 

other federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial, and private sector 

entities that collect animal health data. Congress should assess 

whether DHS and the USDA have the needed authorities to 

ensure the effective sharing of information, and amend statute as 

necessary. 

Congress should continue to fund the National Animal Health 

laboratory Network in FY2018 and thereafter at no less than 

authorized levels, leaving open the possibility that additional 

funds may be required to fulfill the Network's mission as the need 

to rapidly diagnose outbreaks grows. 
107 

Congress should establish a prevention fund for animal health 

disease and disaster programs through which capability gaps 

identified in this report and other relevant agrodefense analysis 

can be addressed. The Commodity Credit Corporation would be 

an appropriate vehicle for this funding. This fund could be based 

on the program created for plant health in Section 10201 of the 

Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008. 

REPORTING AND INFORMATIOI~ SHARING 

The SECD outbreak, perhaps more than any other livestock infectious disease 

outbreak in recent memory, demonstrated the importance of early reporting, 

whether for foreign or endemic diseases. APHIS has developed a National List 

of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRADl, which has two categories: Notifiable 

Diseases and Conditions, and Monitored Diseases. The Notifiable Diseases and 

Conditions consists of foreign animal diseases, emerging disease incidents, and 

regulated disease incidents. Currently, only accredited veterinarians are required 

to report specific diseases, such as foreign animal diseases and other diseases not 

known to exist in the United States.75 

Monitored diseases do not have a requirement for immediate reporting; they 

are included only in a monthly reporting requirement by state animal health 

officials and only when confirmed (not at the suspected or presumptive stage). 

Furthermore, disease reporting rules for monitored diseases do not require states 

to report the specific number of cases that have been identified. Last year, only 36 

states voluntarily reported diseases on this list to USDA. Furthermore, some states 

have their own unique reportable disease lists which often differ in terms of which 

diseases are reported (e.g., the only virus present on all state lists is influenza). 

Though newly-identified emerging infectious diseases are often placed on the 

mandatory notifiable reporting list, many known, long-standing diseases that 

are on the voluntary monitored list have not historically been tracked reliably or 

consistently. 

A systematic and comprehensive animal disease reporting system that codifies 

reporting requirements and provides for consistent reporting is needed. The 2013 

swine coronavirus outbreaks demonstrate the disadvantages apparent from the 
108 

lack of such a system. Although USDA was aware of the initial cases, it did not 

take further regulatory action that would require reporting from affected farms 

over concerns that it could have negative impacts on the swine industry. Instead, 

USDA initially supported industry-ted efforts to address the outbreaks76 A balance 

between restrictive reporting requirements and the ability of industry and states 

to manage their own agricultural affairs is needed. The goal should be to allow 

greater availability of information, coordination of effort, quicker response, and 

reduced impacts on all stakeholders. The foundation for this eventual outcome is 

in place: many states are already voluntarily working with USDA to report diseases, 

and further support through the NAHLN, cooperative agreements, and veterinary 

accreditation can help strengthen regular reporting of diseases at the state level. 

A 2014 concept paper from the USDA on building a reportable disease system has 

yet to be implemented, although the USDA has since issued a follow-on publication, 

a framework designed as a pre-cursor to rulemaking. USDA states that, "Regulatory 

action will officially recognize theN LRAD and codify specific reporting requirements 

for State animaL health officials, laboratory personnel. veterinarians, producers, 

and others. The U.S. agriculture infrastructure is vulnerable to significant damage 

from listed as well as emerging diseases:77 The NLRAD will provide consistent 

reporting across the United States and help animal health officials protect the U.S. 

agriculture infrastructure. USDA posted the draft framework for public comment 

in !ate 2016; if implemented in regulation, it would make reporting of notifiable 

diseases mandatory by veterinary practitioners, producers, diagnostic laboratory 

personnel. and others with knowledge of real or suspected occurrence of these 

notifiable disease categories. Monitored diseases are to be reported on a monthly 

mandatory basis by state animal health officials. Additionally, for the first time, 

private laboratories and entities would be required to report both notifiable and 

monitored diseases. Notably, the framework would rely on collaboration between 

federal, state and industry officials to decide the detail of data needed for each 

disease on the monitored list. At the time this report went to press, the framework 

was in a review period after receiving public comments. 
109 

In accordance with Recommendation 7 of the Blueprint 

for Biodefense to integrate animal health and one health 

approaches into biodefense strategies, the Panel proposes the 

following: 

The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS) should finalize the rule to establish the National 

List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD). in accordance with 

APHIS' proposed framework and stakeholder comment on that 

framework. Once finalized, the Administrator of APHIS should 

ensure that sufficient data systems are in place to properly 

support the reporting and dissemination of data through the 

NLRAD. Additionally, the Administt·ator of APHIS should take 

appropriate steps to encourage and incentivize rigorous reporting 

from laboratories, veterinarians, and other stakeholders for cases 

of diseases on the monitored list, beyond the requirements 

detailed in the proposed framework. 
110 

INNOVATION 

Innovative thinking, both in how we govern and in the technological solutions we 

bring to defense challenges. has been one of the foremost messages of this Panel. 

The nation needs new ideas and new scientific solutions to push agrodefense 

approaches beyond their current limitations. Options beyond culling, particularly 

those that consider animal welfare, must become core tenets of our response; 

government incentives for innovative research where commercial markets are 

lacking must become the norm; and academia, producers, and government 

officials must be encouraged to work together in new ways. 

NEX GENERATION MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES 

As important as biosurveillance is. the bigger challenges seem to rest with other 

elements of the system: we have minimal MCM stockpiles or agreements with 

vendors; we lack the capability to produce MCM on demand; we cull animals 

because it is deemed to be the only option: and the direct and indirect costs of 

response are enormous. Reasons for this vary from insufficient federal investment 

in innovative technologies to the logistical hurdles. cost. and trade ramifications of 

vaccinate-to-live control strategies. 

HSPD-9 requires a coordinated federal effort. led by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, to accelerate and expand the development of countermeasures against 

catastrophic animal. plant. and zoonotic diseases. Relatedly. HSPD-9 requires DHS, 

HHS, USDA, and EPA to develop a National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS). The White 

House envisioned the stockpile to contain "sufficient amounts of animal vaccine. 

antiviral. or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to the most damaging 

animal diseases affecting human health and the economy and that will be capable 

of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak."78 To date, the NVS has not been 

authorized in statute. 

While the NVS maintains supplies like personal protective equipment and 

depopulation equipment which have been distributed and used successfully 

in recent outbreaks, from an MCM standpoint. the NVS is entirely inadequate. 

For instance, although the stockpile had 9 million doses of vaccine for a North 

American avian influenza strain (H5N3) at the time of the 2015 HPAI outbreak, it 

lacked any doses for the strains that actually were infecting poultry during that 

outbreak. Following the outbreak, APHIS issued a series of Request for Proposals 

(RFPs) to stockpile avian influenza vaccine for those strains to be used in future 
111 

outbreaks. In July 2016. APHIS released its final RFP to acquire an undisclosed 

number of avian influenza vaccine doses. a purchase that used funding through 

the CCC. However. without sustained. continued funding, these additional doses 

will eventually reach the end of their shelf-life and will not be replaced. 

Vaccination is generally an effective method of influenza control in poultry.79 Yet 

vaccination factors only minimally into USDA HPAI plans80, and it is unlikely that 

the NVS has sufficient access to HPAI vaccine for use in combating any large 

epidemic. Many elements of vaccination indeed make it a complex technical and 

policy decision: an abundance of viral strains confounds vaccine formulation and 

stockpiling decisions; vaccinated animals can still shed virus; and vaccination can 

negatively impact trade status. Yet mass culling is losing favor among the public 

and should not be the only option. MCM will need to play a more prominent role, 

and policy and technology will need to catch up to that necessity. 

The lack of vaccine available for use during the 2015 outbreak points to larger 

problems facing the NVS. While USDA APHIS applies a threat-based approach to 

vaccine procurement. the agency lacks sufficient funding to procure the MCM that 

threat-based analysis actually reveals. APHIS is unable to support the procurement 

of MCM for many of the diseases on its High-Consequence Foreign Animal Disease 

and Pests list. There are no therapeutics in the stockpile, and mass procurement 

of vaccines for outbreaks is frequently a reactionary practice. In recent years, the 

NVS received on average $4 million per year in congressional appropriations. 

vastly less than that for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNSl which received $575 

million in FY 2017 to serve a similar role for human health. While the precise dollar 

value of an optimal veterinary stockpile is not publicly known, and may not be 

the same as for the human stockpile, the magnitude of the difference is striking 

given that many of the costs for development and stockpiling are expected to be 

similar. At $4 million annually, USDA is forced to find efficiencies in the NVS supply 

chain and forge outside partnerships just to provide a limited supply and range 

of countermeasures. The NVS appears to be little more than a vehicle for MCM 

distribution, rather than an end-use driver for federal identification, procurement. 

and stockpiling of priority MCM. It is extremely concerning that a funding level 

that appears to be based on historical precedent rather than risk-based allocation 

is driving the contents of the nation's stockpile of veterinary countermeasures. At 

$4 million, the NVS can only remain on standby and await emergency funding 

assistance (e.g., borrowing from the CCC). to purchase sufficient amounts of a 

vaccine during a crisis. 

Insufficient federal support for the development of animal vaccines and 

countermeasures has created an incentive vacuum for the private sector to create 

them. NVS funding has focused on procuring readily available vaccines. rather 
112 

than demonstrating a market commitment to procurement the way the BioShield 

Special Reserve Fund was designed to do for human MCM. Companies often face 

difficulties in bringing new animal vaccines, antivirals, and therapeutics to market. 

and those that would develop agricultural countermeasures that lack a commercial 

market have minimal advanced R&D support and no procurement commitment in 

the form of robust NVS funding. In the absence of such support. and without the 

guarantee of a viable federal market, companies hesitate to commit to developing 

countermeasures at all. Funding the NVS alone is, therefore. insufficient. If the 

federal government wants to meet the requirements of HSPD-9, a far greater 

investment in advanced R&D is also necessary. A system of determining how much 

funding is worth investing in which diseases is therefore of national interest. To 

date, APHIS has not approved the use of avian influenza vaccines in commercial 

poultry, including those it has purchased, and it has not indicated whether or 

when such a determination will be made. The potential of the stockpile will be 

significantly enhanced through the acquisition of necessary MCM, and through the 

establishment of policies for their use. 

In accordance with Recommendations 27 and 28 of the 

Blueprint for Biodefense to prioritize innovation and to fully fund 

and incentivize the medical countermeasure enterprise, the 

Panel proposes the following: 

To meet Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) 

requirements, the Secretary of Agriculture should assess the 

ability of the National Veterinary Stockpile to deploy sufficient 

high-consequence animal disease medical countermeasures 

within 24 hours. Assessments should prioritize the pathogens 

identified on the Department of Agriculture's High-Consequence 

Foreign Animal Diseases and Pests list. The Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) should determine the level of funding 

needed for these efforts. and request it. USDA should use the 

findings to: inform its budget request; drive federal priorities for 

medical countermeasure innovation; and incentivize publicprivate-partnerships to develop, transition. approve. license. 

and procure these products. Congress should authorize the 

National Veterinary Stockpile program. Such authorization should 

require an annual analysis by the USDA of its progress and an 

identification of persistent capability gaps and costs associated 

with achieving the HSPD-9 goal. 
113 

The Secretary of Agriculture. in consultation with relevant 

public and private stakeholders, and in alignment with World 

Organisation for Animal Health policies, should further develop 

its vaccine use policy for avian influenza and other highconsequence diseases. Vaccine use policy should be based 

on an underlying commitment by the federal government to 

respond to outbreaks with rapid diagnostic and vaccine platform 

technologies. 

The NVS also lacks therapeutics and rapid diagnostics. Rapid diagnostics, including 

patient-side diagnostics, may arguably be the most important element of an 

animal disease stockpile. They allow for quick decision-making to minimize the 

spread of disease before it spreads to larger groups, and to prevent inappropriate 

uses of vaccine or therapeutics. Absent these tools, diagnosis is dependent on 

empirical observation by veterinarians. followed by time-consuming laboratory 

identification. The ability to quickly deploy a user-friendly diagnostics capability 

to the field would allow for a rapid assessment for SLTT animal health officials, 

enabling earlier decision-making. 

The government does not invest sufficiently in pen-side. innovative diagnostic 

technology, nor even in today's laboratory-based technology. Diagnostic test kits 

have short shelf-lives. making them expensive to obtain and maintain. Stockpiling 

diagnostic test kits would indeed require a sustained financial investment the 

need must drive the funding levels, and USDA should determine requirements and 

request funding in its next budget request to OMB for this purpose. 

In accordance with Recommendation 30 of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense to incentivize development of rapid point-of-care 

diagnostic technology, the Panel proposes the following: 

The Secretary of Agriculture should request adequate resources 

tor the National Veterinary Stockpile to maintain a diagnostic test 

kit for each stockpiled vaccine sufficient to ensure timely delivery 

of the kits to laboratories. In the Department of Agriculture's 

budget request. the Secretary should request resources to 

incentivize the development of rapid point-of-care diagnostic 

devices for high-consequence pathogens. 
114 

Among all livestock infectious diseases, the United States has been singularly 

focused on the development of vaccines for FMD since the 1950s. Yet today, 

the USDA's own FMD vaccination strategy states that the United States does not 

have sufficient vaccine to vaccinate beyond a small focal or moderate regional 

outbreak. 81 The United States contributes funding to the North American FMD 

Vaccine Bank, which is a repository for vaccine antigen concentrate (VAC). 

PIADC holds this supply of antigen. Whereas vaccine production from scratch 

can take up to 14 weeks, industry can produce 2.5 million doses within 21 days 

with the antigens contained in the bank.82 Yet the supplies in the Vaccine Bank 

are insufficient to handle a major FMD outbreak in this country. Culling herds 

continues to be the highly unsatisfactory default tool for outbreak control. It will 

be years before the NVS and industrial capacity can address anything more than 

a local outbreak. No new and validated FMD technology, whether for diagnostics. 

vaccines, or therapeutics. is on the horizon that would rescue the United States in 

an FMD emergency. 

The NBAF is intended, in part, to address this problem. DHS, the state of Kansas, 

and the city of Manhattan, Kansas are building the NBAF to expand capacity for 

disease research and MCM R&D for foreign animal and other agricultural diseases. 

With its large-animal capabilities, NBAF will also assist with the diagnosis and study 

of additional diseases more rapidly than its predecessor does. NBAF, however, 

will only reach its full potential if the federal government commits to funding the 

research its planners envisioned for it. 

The fate of another DHS laboratory provides a case in point. The National 

Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is a new facility built 

across two presidential administrations and two parties to meet a national security 

threat. In the FY 2018 budget request, the Administration proposed elimination of 

NBACC to fund other priorities. If the federal government approaches the NBAF 

in similar fashion (a big vision to build, but a small vision to implement long-term 

programmatic activity once that building is erected). the $1 billion investment could 

be wasted. If the USDA is the only customer of the lab (much like the FBI has been 

the only customer of NBACC's bioforensics lab), this not only eliminates a large 

opportunity for public-private partnership, but places the lab at the mercy of USDA's 

R&D appropriations which are historically a fraction of what is needed.83 It is also 

the subject of some debate within DHS, USDA, and Congress as to which federal 

department will assume oversight and funding of NBAF operations. The President's 

FY 2018 request would eliminate all agriculture and animal-specific research by the 

DHS Science and Technology Directorate: this would include agricultural screening 

and surveillance research and development. as well as foreign animal disease MCM 

research. The budget request provides no compensatory funding for USDA to take 

on these missions. As agrodefense is fundamentally a national security concern, it 
115 

should continue to be a primary responsibility of DHS. While final appropriations 

language may reject these proposals, they speak to a diminishment of support 

from the Executive Branch for agriculture and agrodefense research. 

In accordance with Recommendation 27 of the Blueprint for 

Biodefense to prioritize innovation and incrementalism in 

medical countermeasure development, the Panel proposes the 

following: 

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security should 

establish an antigen bank for foot-and-mouth disease virus. 

This recommendation is consistent with the Panel's broader 

recommendation for federal stakeholders to establish a bank 

of antigen payloads to operationalize a plug-and-play strategy 

using proven platform technologies for use in emergencies. The 

Secretaries should ensure that the acquisition of any such antigen 

bank is tied to a business plan, to establishment of policies for 

vaccine usage, and to the National Biodefense Strategy. Further, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary 

of Agriculture, should develop a business plan for the operation 

of the National Bio- and Agrodefense Facility, one that would 

engage the public and private sectors; consider domestic and 

global markets for agrodefense research and development; and 

identify a dollar figure that defines the need and the opportunity. 

In the development of this plan, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security should issue a Request for Information to assess market 

opportunity for agricultural research in high-containment 

laboratories. The Secretary should submit the business plan to 

congressional committees of jurisdiction, including homeland 

security and agriculture authorizers and appropriators; future 

Department of Homeland Security and Department of Agriculture 

budget requests should align with the plan. 
116 

CONCLUSION 

Nearly all federal departments and a few independent agencies contribute directly 

or indirectly to the protection of American livestock. So do SLTI governments, and 

so does industry through the efforts of producers, veterinarians. biotechnology 

companies, and many others. Finding a way to coordinate them is not an easy 

charge. While a higher priority has understandably been placed to date on 

protecting human health from intentionally introduced, accidentally released, 

and naturally occurring infectious diseases, the increasing rate of emerging and 

reemerging zoonotic disease accompanied by the overt statements and attempts 

by those with nefarious intent to attack food and agriculture, indicate the necessity 

to exert more effort to combat threats. eliminate vulnerabilities, and reduce 

consequences associated with this sector. 

The Administration must improve agrodefense efforts at the departmental 

level and among the interagency. Departmental efforts should be assessed and 

redirected per the forthcoming National Biodefense Strategy and along the points 

outlined in this report. One of the most important elements that could materialize 

from the Strategy is the emergence of departmental ownership of agrodefense. 

DHS investments in NBAF development. and USDA's commitment to funding 

response activities. demonstrate an acknowledgement of the threat. However, 

current funding levels in areas such as biosurveillance and MCM are insufficient to 

address mission needs. Furthermore, political leadership and policy coordination. 

particularly that which acknowledges the intentional dimension of agricultural 

preparedness. require strengthening. Agrodefense in many ways appears to be an 

orphan, with long-view funding and policy priority finding a home in neither DHS 

nor USDA. 

Federal investment in the mission space is also temporalty lopsided, with more 

attention and funding brought to bear on the issue when disaster strikes, rather 

than beforehand. This situation leads inevitably to the incursion of major costs and 

losses. Such a disparity should be rectified. Budget requests should be submitted and 

reviewed by OMB and Congress in unified fashion. Beyond the recommendation 

in this report for such a unified approach to agrodefense budgeting, the Panel 

will be issuing further analysis of how a more integrated approach can benefit all 

biodefense efforts. Assessment of capabilities. accountability for these capabilities, 

and transparency in OMB budget and performance submissions are needed. 

The interagency nature of agrodefense means that many congressional committees 

oversee agrodefense efforts. The House and Senate Committees on Agriculture 
117 

and Homeland Security should lead these oversight efforts to ensure that all 

requirements for securing our agricultural enterprise are met These Committees 

shoutd both continue and expand previous efforts and increase their direction to 

the Executive Branch. The Farm Bill provides a significant opportunity every five 

years to do this legislatively. 

In the 115th Congress. Representative David Young and Senator Pat Roberts 

introduced legislation that would delineate agrodefense-related responsibilities 

within the Department of Homeland Security. Signed into law in June 2017, 84 these 

bills reflect congressional recognition of the need to establish some degree of 

ownership of the defense of F&A mission within the Executive Branch. The Panel's 

recommendation for further improvements could be directed via the Farm Bill and 

other authorization and appropriations vehicles. 

While many experts agree that bureaucratic silos of the kind that may inhibit 

collaboration or information sharing do indeed exist, some silos do appear to 

be thinning over time. Breaking down all bureaucratic stovepipes may never be 

possible, so the more apt question may be whether it is possible to make the 

interaction of those silos more efficient and effective. such as through more joint 

steering committees. While it is important to put in place policies and even statutes 

that require collaborative effort, the human beings who implement that effort have 

to want to do so. Examples of success are often based not on policy and law. 

but on personnel with long-standing relationships across the interagency and the 

public/private divide, and who want to drive progress. 

With each passing year, new threats are discovered that could have severe, longlasting impacts on animal agriculture. Some of these threats arise at home. and 

others come from abroad. necessitating concerted effort not just domestically but 

also internationally. Even with optimized levels of federal leadership, coordination, 

and funding in place, a common sense of ownership of the challenge. from 

governmental and non-governmental stakeholders alike, will be necessary. It is 

essential that our animals. our lives, and our economy are not left vulnerable. The 

Panel believes that the implementation of the proposals contained in this report is 

an important step toward that end. 
118 

PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HEARINGS 

Congressional oversight must ensure that federal 

departments and agencies meet congressional 

and other mandates, and in a coordinated fashion. 

The following proposed hearing topics reflect 

recommendations discussed in this repor( and raise 

additional ideas for consideration. Parentheticals at the 

end of each description direct the reader to relevant 

recommendations in the Blueprint for Biodefense. 

A nationally notifiable animal disease system akin to the existing system for human 

disease would enhance surveillance and detection of biological threats. A proposed 

National List of Reportable Animal Diseases has been offered by USDA. but not yet 

finalized. What is the status of implementation? Will the final rule reflect both the 

mission need as welt as stakeholder input? How could the list be integrated into 

a system by which states and other owners of disease information could willingly 

and comfortably report disease incidence? (See Recommendations 7, 14) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES 

• Agriculture 

COMMITTEES 

Agriculture. Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

• Homeland Security 

• Environment and Public 

Works 

• Natural Resources 

• Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

In what ways is agrodefense being addressed and incorporated into the National 

Biodefense Strategy? Is it receiving the emphasis that the F&A sector requires as a 

national asset? (See Recommendation 3) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES 

• Agriculture 

• Armed Services 

• Budget 

COMMITTEES 

• Agriculture, Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

• Armed Services 

• Energy and Commerce 

• Homeland Security 

• Budget 

• Health, Education, Labor, and 

Pensions 

Oversight and Government 

Reform 

Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 
119 

B URVEILL.ANCE 

The United States lacks a comprehensive biosurveillance and detection standard 

and capability. An integrated biosurveillance function exists in statute, but has been 

difficult to realize. The program designed to do this, the National Biosurveillance 

and Integration System, was eliminated in the President's Budget Request for FY 

2018. What would it take to bring agencies with biosurveillance responsibilities, 

including for animal agriculture and wildlife, together in a trusted, informationsharing environment? What is the needed end-state for a continuous capability to 

detect, validate. and warn of any biological threat including agricultural threats. 

within the United States? Many questions about wildlife zoonoses remain, including 

the ecology of material threats like Yersinia pestis, and how changing climate 

patterns will affect the disease distribution of pathogens like avian influenza. How 

can we achieve a comprehensive and effective national surveillance architecture 

if we do not invest to answer these scientific questions? (See Recommendations 

7, 11, 12, 13, 14) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture 

• Energy and Commerce 

SENATE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture. Nutrition. and 

Forestry 

• Environment and Public 

Works 

s PR 

• Homeland Security 

• Natural Resources 

• Oversight and 

Government Reform 

• Veterans Affairs 

• Energy and Natural • Homeland Security and 

Resources Governmental Affairs 

• Health. Education. Labor. and • Veterans Affairs 

Pensions 

RES NSE 

The F&A critical infrastructure sector is a distributed and highly complex system. 

Many efforts have been made to reduce its vulnerability to terrorism and other 

insults. HSPD-9 (2004) and the DHS F&A Sector Specific Plan (2010). among other 

policy documents, guide protection of this sector. Have these and other plans been 

updated, exercised, and sufficiently funded? Are they integrated with related efforts 

for biosurveillance, attribution, decontamination, and remediation? How wit! USDA. 

FDA. CDC. and other federal agencies respond if a terrorist attack impacts the food 

supply? How can PPP in this area be improved? What efforts and funding are still 

required to protect the food supply, including plants? Who and in what state is 

planning for decontamination and remediation to make food processing plants 

operational again after an incident? (See Recommendations 3, 9, 10) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture 

• Energy and Commerce 

SENATE COMMITTEES 

• Agriculture, Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

• Environment and Public 

Works 

• Homeland Security 

• Natural Resources 

• Health, Education. labor. and 

Pensions 

• Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 
120 

lNG NESS A SPO E EFFORTS 

Funding for federal agrodefense programs is spread amongst a number of 

Departments and their corresponding activities. Although HSPD-9 provides a basic 

framework of agrodefense roles at each phase of preparedness. much of the federal 

investment in agricultural defense comes in the response phase, leading to greater 

costs and damages when calamity strikes. The CCC provides significant support 

to USDA to react to crises, but is not currently utilized in developing more robust 

preparedness efforts up front. What steps can departments and agencies take to 

better coordinate their agrodefense spending? What incentives might there be to 

encourage more investment in preparedness and prevention efforts in advance of 

a threat to food and agriculture? Is there an opportunity for CCC funds to be used 

for USDA prevention and mitigation efforts? (See Recommendations 4, 7) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture 

• Appropriations 

SENATE COMMITTEES 

• Agriculture, Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

• Appropriations 

• Budget • Homeland Security 

• Energy and Commerce 

• Budget • Homeland Security and 

• Health, Education, Labor, and Governmental Affairs 

Pensions 

HEALTH RE SE 

The world lacks a global health response apparatus that can react quickly and 

insert public health teams to respond to human, animal. and plant outbreaks. What 

is the current global response capacity and in what ways is it not meeting needs? 

How can international efforts be evaluated and better coordinated? What is the 

status of current global health response programs and how can they show more 

progress? What level of funding would be necessary? What lessons can be learned 

from recent outbreaks in animals, such as HPAI in China? (See Recommendation 

33) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture 

• Armed Services 

SENATE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture. Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

• Armed Services 

• Foreign Affairs 

• Energy and Commerce 

• Foreign Relations 

• Health, Education, labor, and 

Pensions 

• Natural Resources 
121 

N RESP E ION 

In the midst of a crisis, operational leadership is critical to successful outcomes. 

What is the status of response and recovery planning and recovery efforts for high 

consequence infectious disease scenarios at all levels of government? What further 

capabilities do responders, particularly those at the local level. require to combat 

threats to F&A? What can be done to further multi-agency coordination in this 

area? How can we increase training efforts related to existing plans and protocols? 

How can we strengthen relationships and communications among the responsible 

agencies, to ensure operational leadership? (See Recommendations 16, 17) 

HOUSE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture 

SENATE COMMITTEES 

• Agriculture. Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

WORKFORCE 

• Homeland Security 

• Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

The national veterinary workforce trained to prevent detect, and respond to 

livestock outbreaks of foreign animal diseases is limited. Yet it is this profession that 

is responsible for protecting animal health and welfare and, therefore, all of the 

elements of this sector important to human health and the economy. The National 

Veterinary Emergency Response Teams (NVERT) are the core federal response 

capacity needed for large animal health situations. Are the available NVERTs 

sufficient to respond to an animal emergency of catastrophic proportions? Is a 

USAJOBS-based application requirement the best way to invite and incentivize 

private sector veterinary professionals into the system? Is the Public Service Loan 

Forgiveness Program a potential vehicle for expanding the workforce? How can 

the barriers of entry for interested veterinarians be lowered? 

HOUSE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture 

SENATE COMMITTEES: 

• Agriculture, Nutrition, and 

Forestry 

• Appropriations 

• Appropriations 
122 

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY 

Established in 2014, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense informs U.S. 

biodefense efforts and provides recommendations for needed change. The Panel. 

supported by seven ex officio members and funds from foundations, industry, 

and individual donors, assesses where the United States falls short in addressing 

biological terrorism, warfare. accidents, and emerging, reemerging, and other 

naturally occurring infectious diseases. Information-gathering is achieved primarily 

through public and private meetings and literature research, and recommendations 

are issued in the form of reports. The Panel works to educate all stakeholders and 

the public about its findings through these reports. public appearances, and other 

communications platforms. 

RESL~RCH QUESTIONS 

In order to assess gaps in the animal agrodefense enterprise, the Panel developed 

the following research questions: 

1) Are our priorities correct? 

2) Are our investments commensurate with the challenge? 

3) Can we benefit by rebalancing investments. or is new funding required? 

4) What have we done that has brought a significant return on investment? 

5) What else should we be doing that we are not? 

RESEARCH ACTIVITY 

For this special focus report. the Panel reviewed scientific studies; reports by 

congressional and presidential commissions; presidential directives; statute 

and proposed legislation; GAO reports; and federal strategies. plans, budgets. 

organizational constructs, and programs related to defense against deliberately 

introduced, accidentally released. and naturally occurring biological events with 

catastrophic potentiaL This review: ll informed the Panel's assessment of the 

comprehensiveness of efforts to address postulated and actual agrodefense 

challenges; 2) informed the Panel's determination of how the understanding of 

the threat knowledge base, and elements of the agrodefense enterprise should 

change in light of this assessment; and 3) shaped the structure and topics of 

the agrodefense special focus meeting held by the Panel on January 26, 2017 in 

Manhattan, Kansas. 
123 

AGRODEFENSE SPECI.AL FOCUS ME !NG 

The Panel organized this special focus meeting around the major activities that 

comprise the biodefense enterprise at large: prevention, deterrence, preparedness. 

surveillance and detection. response. recovery. attribution, and mitigation. 

Two Panel Members. former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and former 

Homeland Security Advisor Ken Wainstein, co-chaired the meeting and received: 

1) information regarding national agrodefense policy, departmental and agency 

programmatic activities, and legislative matters; and 2) statements from a sitting 

member of Congress, former federal officials, current state officials, academic and 

private sector representatives, thought leaders, and subject matter experts. After 

the meeting, Panel staff summarized major insights. areas for improvement. and 

recommendations articulated by meeting speakers, and conducted preliminary 

high-level analysis of the meeting. See Appendix C for the meeting agenda and 

speakers. 

ANALYSIS 

Panel staff qualitatively analyzed the information gleaned from their research 

and from the special focus meeting. Staff evaluated facts, findings, and 

recommendations provided by meeting speakers and through other means. 

including policy research and interviews with subject matter experts and former 

high-level officials. Throughout the process. the five research questions above 

provided the basis for assessment This approach allowed Panel Members and staff 

to identify continuing organizational, legal, policy, and programmatic issues, and 

to recommend solutions. Panel staff did not use statistical and other quantitative 

methods for this study. The study is not considered pseudo-qualitative/quasiquantitative. 

STUDY LIMITATIONS 

Funding and other resource constraints prevented the Panel from performing site 

visits beyond visiting the Biosecurity Research Institute at Kansas State University. 

The Panel did not assess challenges in protecting the food supply or the plant 

sector, as these are extensive enterprises in and of themselves and reQuire their own 

special focus. In addition, some agrodefense programs and policies; intelligence, 

raw data. and documents; appropriations and budget documents; and other 

sensitive pieces of information are classified or otherwise unavailable, and were 

not reviewed by the Panel as this was a wholly unclassified endeavor. 
124 

APPENDIX B: MEETING AGENDA AND SPEAKERS 

The following is the agenda tor the special focus meeting at Kansas State University, 

Manhattan. Kansas. Names and affiliations appear here as they did at the time of 

the meeting. 

AGRODEFENSE: CHALLENGES AND SOL IONS 

JANUARY 26, 2017 

Opening Remarks 

• Former Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle, Panel Member, Blue 

Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense 

• Former Homeland Security Advisor. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Panel 

Member, Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense 

• President Richard B. Myers, Kansas State University (General. USAF -

retired) 

Congressional Perspective 

• The Honorable Roger Marshall. MD. United States Representative. Kansas 

Panel One - Prevention and Deterrence 

Challenges and opportunities in reducing risk from agricultural threats. 

Understanding the challenges of laboratory research in the context of threats to 

F&A. regulatory regimes. and new technologies. Ways in which outbreaks have 

demonstrated strengths and weaknesses. with respect to medical countermeasures. 

• Stephen Higgs, PhD, Associate Vice President for Research and Director. 

Biosecurity Research Institute 

• Amy Kircher, DrPH. Director. Food Protection and Defense Institute. 

University of Minnesota 

• Steve Parker, MBA. MSCM, Head, North America Veterinary Public 

Health. Merial 

Lunch Keynote - Leadership in Protecting the Agricultural Sector 

• Bret D. Marsh. DVM. Indiana State Veterinarian 
125 

Panel Two - Surveillance and Detection 

Key elements of effective agricultural biosurveillance and detection, and 

continued challenges in the effectiveness of ongoing efforts. Technological and 

policy challenges for early and reliable detection of environmentally dispersed 

biological agents to attack agriculture. Key elements of effective animal and plant 

surveillance and detection architecture, and impediments and opportunities to 

increase situational awareness for early and accurate disease detection and clinical 

diagnoses. Requirements for medical countermeasures, including the need for 

extremely rapid development. distribution, and dispensing. 

• Tammy R. Beckham, DVM. PhD, Dean. College of Veterinary Medicine, 

Kansas State University 

• Ali S. Khan, MD, MPH. Dean, College of Public Health, University of 

Nebraska Medical Center 

• Kelly F. Lechtenberg, DVM, PhD, President. Midwest Veterinary Services/ 

Central States Research Center/Veterinary and Biomedical Research 

Center 

Panel Three - Preparedness. Response. Recovery, and Mitigation 

Pre- and post-event planning, including the challenges faced by the food. 

agriculture, and public health communities, and the roles of state, local. and federal 

governments. Challenges of epidemiology and other tools for characterizing the 

spread of animal. plant. and food borne diseases in the United States. Recovery and 

mitigation. including the challenges posed by cutting edge technology, lack of 

agreement regarding state and federal responsibilities. and implications for future 

preparedness. 

• Jackie McClaskey, PhD. Secretary, Kansas Department of Agriculture 

• D. Charles Hunt, MPH, State Epidemiologist and Director, Bureau of 

Epidemiology and Public Health Informatics, Kansas Department of 

Health and Environment 

• C. J. Mann. DVM. Chief Executive, Empryse Group 

Closing Remarks 

• President Richard B. Myers. Kansas State University (General. USAF -

retired) 

• Former Homeland Security Advisor, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Panel 

Member, Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense 

• Former Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle. Panel Member, Blue 

Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense 
126 

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS 

APHIS .......... Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

BARDA ........ Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 

BSE .............. bovine spongiform encephalopathy 

CCC ............. Commodity Credit Corporation 

CDC ............. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

DHS ............. U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

DDC ............. U.S. Department of Commerce 

DOD ............. U.S. Department of Defense 

DOl .............. U.S. Department of Interior 

DOJ .............. U.S. Department of Justice 

DPC ............. Domestic Policy Council 

EPA .............. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Fit A ............. Food and Agriculture 

FA IA ............ Food and Agriculture Incident Annex 

FBI... ............ Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDA ............. U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

FEMA ........... Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FM D ............. foot-and- mouth disease 

FY ................ fiscal year 

GAO ............. Government Accountability Office 

GDP ............. gross domestic product 

HHS ............. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

HPAI.. .......... highly pathogenic avian influenza 

HSA ............. Homeland Security Act of 2002 

HSC ............. Homeland Security Council 

HSPD ........... Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IC ............... Intelligence Community 

MCM ............ medical countermeasure(s) 

NAHLN ........ National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

NBACC ........ National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center 

NBAF ........... National Bio- and Agrodefense Facility 

N B IS ............ National Biosu rveillance Integration System 
127 

NLRAD ........ National List of Reportable Animal Diseases 

NEG ............. National Economic Council 

NSC ............. National Security Council 

NVS ............. National Veterinary Stockpile 

OMB ............ Office of Management and Budget 

PEDV ............ porcine epidemic diarrhea virus 

PIA DC .......... Plum Island Animal Disease Center 

PPP .............. public-private partnershlp(s) 

R&D ............. research and development 

RFP ............. Request for Proposal 

S6T ............. science and technology 

SLTT ............ state. local. tribal. and territorial 

SNS .............. Strategic National Stockpile 

USDA ........... U.S. Department of Agriculture 

US AID .......... U.S. Agency for International Development 

WMD ............ weapon(s) of mass destruction 

VAC .............. vaccine antigen concentrate 
128 

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(133) 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

DECEMBER 13, 2017 
134 

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry 

"Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World" 

December 13,2017 

Statement for the Record 

Senator Claire McCaskill 

I would like to thank Chairman Roberts and Ranking Member Stabenow for holding this 

hearing on agriculture security. 

Chairman Roberts and I introduced the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act to help 

outline in law the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security in this area, and 

President Trump signed the bill into law in June. In August, Chairman Roberts and I held a 

roundtable in Kansas City, Missouri on agricultural security and we had a chance to hear from a 

wide variety of federal, state, local and private sector stakeholders about challenges and 

problems facing the agricultural community. 

I very much appreciate this committee continuing to follow through with an oversight 

hearing on this important issue. Homeland security is a govermnent-wide enterprise and 

departments and agencies across the federal govermnent - Agriculture, Health and Human 

Services, Homeland Security and others- must partner and work together. We in Congress can 

help ensure this cooperation through thoughtful oversight and legislation, and that is what 

Senator Roberts' and my bill and the hearing today aim to achieve. 

Our food and agriculture sector is the backbone of our economy. The sector is incredibly 

diverse and diffuse and almost completely under private ownership. It is not easy to secure. The 

food and agriculture sector includes an estimated 2.1 million farms, 935,000 restaurants, and 

more than 200,000 registered food manufacturing, processing, and storage facilities. It accounts 

for roughly 20% our country's economic activity. With almost 100,000 farms across Missouri 

spanning over 28 million acres, the agriculture industry generates about $88 billion a year for the 

state's economy. Missouri is one of the top producers for a number of crops including long grain 

rice, cotton, soybean, and corn. One in ten Missouri jobs are in the agriculture or forestry 

industries. 

The food and agriculture sector is considered critical infrastructure - an attack on this 

sector- naturally occurring or intentional - could bring extraordinary consequences. An 

outbreak of avian influenza across 15 states in 2014 and 2015 forced U.S. farmers to kill 

approximately 50 million turkeys and chickens, including 29,000 in Missouri, at a cost of 

between $1 billion and $3.3 billion in total losses. An outbreak of two lethal, highly contagious 

diseases in pigs in 2013 and 2014 caused the deaths of millions of pigs in a number of U.S. 

states. Missouri also experienced outbreaks oflow pathogenic avian influenza in 2011 and 

2016, which led to the depopulation of approximately 70,000 turkeys. 

There are many questions that need to be answered in order to safeguard American 

agriculture. What does effective security look like in the food and agriculture sector? How do 

we ensure that Americans are better prepared and build resilience into this critical sector of the 
135 

economy? Who is in charge when we have an agricultural security crisis? Are we appropriately 

funding biodefense and agricultural security measures? It is key to resolve these questions and 

make more coherent the patchwork of currently existing presidential directives and laws. 

The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense offers Congress and the executive branch 

agencies recommendations focused on addressing shortcomings in the areas of coordinated 

leadership, funding for the National Bio-and Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) and medical counter 

measures, and in research and innovation. These are all areas that deserve congressional 

attention. I thank Secretary Ridge, Senator Lieberman and the members of the panel for their 

thoughtful work and their continued engagement in biodefense. Organizing high-level, 

interagency leadership, increasing investment in bio surveillance and medical countermeasures, 

and improving animal-based bio surveillance are critical efforts to a sustained approach on 

agricultural security for real progress. 

In additional to a longer term efforts, a few common sense measures should be taken now 

including increasing the number of Customs and Border Protection Officers and agricultural 

inspectors at our ports of entry. The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border 

Protection Office of Field Operations has been understaffed at our ports of entry for years. 

These inspectors are the front line defense for ensuring that plant and animal species that enter 

the U.S are safe. 

And consistent steady progress towards our security goals requires transparency -what 

are agencies across government doing - and metrics - how much progress are agencies across 

government making. To that end a portal for agricultural security and biodefense that provides 

government agencies with some visibility into the work of their partner agencies in complying 

with statutory and presidential directives may be a useful tool. 

I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for their willingness to focus on this 

key issue and for partnering with me to advocate for the agricultural community in Missouri, 

Kansas, Michigan and across our nation. 
136 

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, & Forestry 

"Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World" 

December 13, 2017 

Questions for the Record 

Dr. Raymond Hammerschmidt 

Chairman Pat Roberts 

1. In your testimony, you addressed the importance of early detection and accurate 

diagnoses. With new pests and diseases constantly emerging, how can we foster 

coordination among the federal government, state and local officials, and the farmers in 

the field, to ensure that the latest and best information is being collected and shared? 

What role does the extension service play in that effort? 

Coordination starts with effective communication and trust among all entities. Let's 

begin with the role of Extension. Through county-based educators/agents and campusbased specialists, Extension is a vital mechanism and conduit for gathering information 

from growers and delivering useful, practical advice in return. Equally important is the 

overall trust that agriculture producers have in Extension. With a presence in every 

county and working on behalf of every sector of agriculture, Extension agents and 

specialists are in a unique position to aid in the early detection of new and emerging 

problems. In addition, through educational programs such as the National Plant 

Diagnostic Network (NPDN) first detector programs, individuals have access to tools to 

aid them in the detection of new or unusual pest and/or disease events. 

Detection must be followed by accurate and rapid diagnostics. This is accomplished, in 

most cases, through plant and animal diagnostic labs at the land-grant universities. In 

many cases, the diagnoses are of a non-regulatory nature and can be dealt with via 

direct communication with the grower. However, when the diagnosis is of potential or 

serious regulatory concern, the diagnosticians need to contact the appropriate state 

agencies (e.g. State departments of agriculture) and/or federal agencies (e.g. USDA 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS)) for confirmatory diagnoses and 

requirement of any appropriate action. 

Establishing effective communication networks and building trust can be formed 

through relationship building exercises. For years, the NPDN conducted scenarios 

simulating the detection of a pest or pathogen of regulatory concern. These involved 

everything from how to gather sample collections to diagnostics and recommendations 

for mitigation. Equally important was the establishment of the lines of communication 

to effectively carry out these steps. Through these exercises, the various participants 

interact with, get to know and build relationships with each other and understand the 

roles that each individual and entity (e.g., Federal and State regulatory agencies, 

universities, including Extension, commodity groups, etc.) play in a successful detection 
137 

diagnosis and mitigation. Because of job changeover and change to policies and 

regulations over time, it is important that these types of activities be performed on a 

continuous basis. 

In summary, an effective program requires full cooperation among all entities, including 

government agencies, the land grant system -- especially Extension -- industry and the 

public. An understanding of each entity's role is also essential. The role ofthe NPDN in 

the detection of a new or regulatory pathogen/pest is one of coordination and support 

of diagnostics (e.g. assistance in diagnosis of the problem, surge support and 

communication). The diagnoses from the NPDN labs aid in the decision-making process 

with final say coming from state or federal agencies if the pest/pathogen is regulatory in 

nature. Decisions on how to manage or mitigate the problem are based on the nature of 

the final diagnosis. Having strong lines of communication with industry, including 

individual farms, is essential to ensure that decisions are understood and the 

appropriate actions are taken. 

2. Have you encountered any obstacles to improving coordination and collaboration within 

the Federal Government to advance agriculture security? Similarly, what barriers may 

exist between the federal government, state governments, and private industry? And 

from your perspective, what risk management principles can government and industry 

each utilize when directing resources towards planning and preparedness? 

The main obstacle I have faced, as part of the National Plant Diagnostic Network 

(NPDN), has been our inability to conduct as many or frequent exercise scenarios as I 

believe necessary. This is directly related to the reduction in funding that occurred 

several years ago. These exercises were the foundation of relationship building 

between state and federal agencies, land grant universities and the industry. These 

exercises led to better coordination on how to deal with plant biosecurity issues, such as 

the introduction of a new pest or pathogen. 

Communication and "siloed" programs (ones that operate independently from one 

another) are some of the major barriers between the different agencies and industry. 

Competition for limited resources is also a driver in keeping some programs more 

inward focused than outward thinking. Helping to illuminate this issue were the two 

USDA-NIFA "Call to Conversation" meetings on Tactical Sciences (the program within 

NIFA that engages in animal and crop protection including the NPDN). The meetings 

united representatives from industry, land-grant universities, USDA NIFA and USDA ARS 

and USDA APHIS. Although the focus was on the tactical sciences program, one of the 

strongest messages that I took home was a need for better coordination of programs 

and communication. This means finding ways to keep programs from becoming too 

distanced from one another within a framework that absolutely relies on a coordinated 
138 

effort. We should move beyond the NIFA programs and look at how to better 

communicate between other USDA agencies, as well as other agencies involved in 

agro/biosecurity. These types of meetings would be beneficial in determining next steps 

and setting milestones. 

We also need to find ways to engage all programs involved in agricultural security so 

that the various mission and responsibilities of each will be more broadly understood. 

This has happened in the past, but we must maintain communications so that each unit 

within the agrosecurtity sector knows its roles and how it relates to the others. This will 

help provide a framework for the coordination that is necessary to protect agriculture. 

The USDA ERS lists several risks facing agriculture. Of those, diseases and pests are 

noted under the category of production risks. Knowing what potential biological pests 

and pathogens, including both endemic and exotic, may be potentially in play is a first 

step. However, evaluating the risk of unexpected threats must also be considered. This 

requires planning and preparation, including approaches for rapid detection and 

diagnostics followed by ways in which to eradicate and/or contain the pest or pathogen. 

Identifying the risks and developing mitigation and recovery plans through the 

collaboration of government agencies, industry and the land grant system is essential in 

effective action. It is also critical in avoiding the risk all together. Careful monitoring of 

pest/pathogen movement is key, and it may ultimately be necessary to develop 

strategies to reduce risk once an event is identified. This rapid and coordinated action 

across all groups further supports the need for each unit to know its role and the roles 

of the other entities, effective communication and trust. 

Ranking Member Debbie Stabenow 

1. In Michigan, we're constantly fighting against new pests and diseases. In 2016 our 

cherry growers lost over 21 percent of their crop due to the spotted wing drosophila. 

a. How do you and other researchers at MSU work with Michigan farmers to detect 

and combat plant pests and disease? 

The first step is identification of the problem through detection and diagnosis. 

Extension educators and specialists are often the first line of detection, although 

individual growers and crop consultants are also involved in the process. Once a 

potential issue is detected, a sample is sent to MSU's Diagnostic Services for 

diagnosis. The staff can perform diagnoses across all major pest and pathogen types 

and call on faculty for additional assistance if necessary. Through the NPDN network, 

the diagnosticians can also obtain advice and share expertise to aid in diagnostics. 

Once a diagnosis is complete, the growers are provided with one or more options for 

management. Researchers and faculty are brought in to assist when the identified 

problem needs further information and/or study to help identify a long-term 
139 

solution to the problem. Communication, rapid diagnostics and the trust between 

the diagnosticians, Extension staff and researchers with the growers and other 

members of the agricultural community is vital to success. 

b. What are some examples of your work and successful eradication of a pest or 

disease in Michigan? 

Eradication of disease and pest, while ultimately desirable, may not always be 

achievable. In some cases, for example in trade, it must be demonstrated that the 

product is pathogen- and pest-free. Much of this is done via regulatory inspection, 

although the tools to eliminate the pests or pathogens and the appropriate use of 

the tools often comes from university research. 

Some pathogens, such as plum pox virus, have been eradicated in Michigan. 

However, in most cases, the research is aimed at management of disease and pests 

to a level that causes no damage to the crop. Spotted wing drosophila (SWD) is one 

example of an invasive pest that is proving to be extremely difficult to treat and/or 

manage, let alone eradicate. Researchers are feverishly working to find effective 

treatment options with little to no advancements. 

Below are some examples, in addition to the intensive research on SWD, of how my 

colleagues at MSU are working to manage pest and diseases to protect Michigan's 

diverse and valuable agriculture and natural resources industries. This list also 

illustrates the diversity of crops and pests/pathogens Michigan faces. 

European Brown Rot 

Michigan leads the nation in tart cherry production, and its growers produce 

approximately 70 percent of the total U.S. crop. Controlling fungal diseases of tart 

cherry is imperative to produce this economically important crop annually, and in an 

average year, growers apply six to eight fungicide applications per season to manage 

key diseases, such as cherry leaf spot and powdery mildew. However, in 2013, an 

outbreak of European brown rot (EBR) occurred on Montmorency tart cherries in 

northwest Michigan. MSU researchers reported effective fungicides that could be 

utilized for EBR control, and fungicides that were not heavily used to control other 

tart cherry diseases. Our response to EBR through identifying effective fungicides for 

control and breaking down key wetting requirements for infection helped inform 

growers on the best methods for control and will better enable disease prediction 

and spray decisions into the future. 

Soybean Sudden Death Syndrome 

Sudden death syndrome (SDS) reduced soybean production by over 444 million 

bushels from 1996 to 2010 in the U.S. Yearly loss from the disease was estimated at 

over $190 million. SDS first appeared in Michigan in 2008 and has been found in 

more locations scattered throughout most Michigan fields since then. With support 
140 

from Michigan Soybean Promotion Committee, MSU researchers have evaluated 

over 300 soybean germplasm lines from the MSU soybean breeding program for SDS 

resistance in both artificially inoculated fields and natural heavy SDS-infected sites. 

This research identified DNA markers associated with SDS resistance. SDS resistance 

from resistance sources were transferred to elite soybean germ plasm and the best 

SDS resistant lines were entered in 2016 Regional SDS trials in multiple states. One 

SDS resistant variety "Sparta --the Soybean Aphid Shield" has been released to date. 

Potato Common Scab 

In the U.S., potato common scab is a devastating disease and is the primary factor 

limiting market quality. Use of scab-resistant varieties provides the best method of 

control for the commercial grower and to supply a quality product to the market. 

Researchers have made a set of crosses between advanced breeding lines and 

varieties from MSU and four other breeding programs that should combine high 

yield, scab resistance, market-quality traits, high specific gravity and smooth round 

shape. One variety is being named (Saginaw Chipper) and two other scab-resistant 

breeding lines are in the commercialization queue. The methods for detecting the 

pathogen via DNA sequencing in a commercial field were developed. This pathogen 

can also attack root crops, and is causing issues in crops such as turnip. The research 

on potato is now being utilized to develop new diagnostic tools for these crops as a 

means of slowing its spread by notifying problem areas. 

Downy mildew on hops 

Michigan is the largest hop producer outside of the Pacific Northwest. In 2016, hops 

were grown on 800 Michigan acres and valued at $16.4 million. Downy mildew is the 

No. 1 threat to Michigan hops. Currently, state-specific control strategies are not 

available for hop downy mildew but will be accomplished through developing 

greenhouse, nursery and hop recommendations to include fungicides and 

identification of resistant commercial cultivars. Fungicides with different active 

ingredients have been tested for efficacy under Michigan conditions. Multiple 

fungicide active ingredients are needed to delay the development of fungicide 

insensitivity in the pathogen. Growers have been advised on how to maximize the 

efficacy of currently registered fungicides in managing hop downy mildew. Multiple 

hop cultivars have been tested for resistance to the strains of downy mildew present 

in Michigan. Incorporating resistant cultivars and effective fungicides as part of an 

integrated management system can contribute to long-term management of hop 

downy mildew. 

Stem gall wasp 

The blueberry stem gall wasp is a sporadic but increasing pest of high bush 

blueberries in Michigan. MSU researchers are helping growers manage this insect by 

establishing novel methods of managing the pest. One significant challenge is that 

the gull wasp is closely related to bees so growers must take care not to poison bees 

in the process of getting rid of the wasps. Research has identified numerous varieties 
141 

of high bush blueberries highly susceptible to infestation. This information can be 

used in planting decisions. A few new insecticides were also uncovered in a trial last 

spring. 

Hemlock woolly adelgid 

Hemlock woolly adelgid (HWA) is an invasive forest pest that has been a nuisance to 

Michigan trees for years. Eastern hemlock is highly vulnerable to this pest, and 

infested trees typically die within 10 years. Hundreds of thousands of hemlocks in 

eastern forests have been killed by HWA since this invader was first reported in 

Virginia in 1951. MSU research is developing and evaluating a geographic 

information system-based, high·resolution model to project the likelihood of 

hemlock presence in residential and urban areas, as well as forested areas. Results 

of a 2015-16 surveys were regularly provided to cooperators at state regulatory and 

natural resource agencies. The work contributed to an improved understanding of 

the extent of the HWA invasion, eventually leading to a decision that HWA 

eradication was not feasible. The project also reinforced the need for better 

statewide information on distribution, size and condition of the hemlock resource in 

forests, as well as in residential or urban areas. 

Dollar spot in tufgrass 

Dollar spot, a foliar disease named for the silver dollar-sized dead patches and 

silvery dust it leaves behind, is the most common and deadly turfgrass disease in the 

Northeast and Midwest United States. MSU researchers have released Flagstick the 

first turgfrass cultivar that shows resistance to the fungal pathogen that causes 

dollar spot. This will have benefits both environmentally and economically with less 

pesticide use by golf courses. More money is spent each year on the chemical 

control of dollar spot than on any other turfgrass disease. 

c. Can you describe how USDA's National Plant Diagnostic Network works with 

other state and federal partners across the country? 

The NPDN interacts with both USDA agencies and State departments of agriculture at 

several levels. The main point of contact is with USDA National Institute for Food and 

Agriculture (NIFA) since funding for NPDN flows through this agency. We work closely 

with NIFA in the development of policy and programming on an ongoing basis through a 

committee that consists of each NPDN regional director and the USDA NIFA national 

program leader who has responsibility for the NPDN. The network also has a larger 

operations committee that consists of NPDN directors, diagnostician representatives 

from each region and representatives from USDA APHIS Plant Protection and 

Quarantine (PPQ) and the National Plant Board. This is the overall governing body of the 

NPDN. 
142 

The NPDN has very close ties with USDA APHIS PPQ in several areas. First, the NPDN has 

several labs that have been certified by APHIS to conduct diagnostics on specific pests 

and pathogens of regulatory concern. Through this, the NPDN labs serve as triage sites 

for samples, and though diagnostics at the NPDN lab level, can eliminate samples that 

are not of concern and send only those to APHIS that need final confirmation. At MSU, 

we currently aid APHIS in triage for the sudden oak death (Ramorum blight) pathogen 

and have assisted, along with the Michigan Department of Agriculture, in diagnostics for 

Plum Pox virus. Thus, the NPDN also can assist agencies if a need for doing many 

samples at once, such as in the event of an outbreak, occurs. 

USDA APHIS has been a great value to the NPDN by offering diagnostics training on 

pests and pathogen of regulatory concern. Multiple day, hands-on trainings are offered 

on a regular basis. The trainings are well attended by NPDN diagnosticians. The NPDN 

has also benefitted from funds made available from APHIS through the current Farm Bill. 

We have also worked with USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in the development 

and deployment of new diagnostic tools (molecular diagnostics for soybean rust is one 

example) and in the development of new tools and trainings. For example, the North 

Central Plant Diagnostic Network (NCPDN) will meet in Beltsville, Maryland this spring to 

learn more about some of the newer diagnostic tools being developed byARS scientists 

and how these can be deployed to aid the labs. 

The NPDN also works closely with diagnosticians and others involved with plant 

protection in state departments of agriculture. At the regional level, state department 

diagnosticians participate in activities such as regional meetings. In the NCPDN, 

diagnosticians from several of the state departments attend and participate in the 

annual meetings allowing for information exchange and new training opportunities. 

The NPDN serves a central role in plant biosecurity through coordination and support. It 

also provides linkages between the USDA, State departments of agriculture, the industry 

and the public that help enhance the linkages that already exist (e.g. between USDA 

APHIS PPQ and the state departments of Agriculture). Through cooperation among all of 

these groups, we can promote biosecurity through detection/diagnosis, response and 

overall protection of plant industries. 

2. In your testimony you mention some of your work on plant resiliency and climate 

change. As you know, USDA's own reports, coupled with those from other federal 

agencies, indicate climate change poses a serious threat to production agriculture. 

a. Given that we're talking about safeguarding the future of American agriculture 

today, can you briefly discuss your thoughts on climate change and how it poses 

a threat to agriculture security? 
143 

Climate change can have major effects on production agriculture. With respect to 

crops, the changing climate may certainly alter when and where certain crops may 

be successfully planted. As changes in average temperatures and rainfall occur, it is 

likely that without alterations of the host though breeding or other genetic 

manipulation, certain crops may no longer be viable for production. 

The aggressiveness and severity of certain diseases and pests is also driven by 

changes in climate. In addition to having a pest or pathogen, the environment plays 

an important role in determining the severity of an outbreak. Environmental stresses 

can weaken a plant's natural defense system leaving it more susceptible to infection 

and/or pest damage. In addition, there are some plant disease resistance genes that 

are sensitive to temperature. 

Some changes, such as elevated C02 levels, may increase the amount of foliage 

produced. While this may increase plant productivity, this may also provide a 

microclimate that is more conducive to disease. Changes in the climate may also 

result in expansion of the geographic range of pathogens and pests, thus introducing 

new threats as well as potentially making them easier to survive the winter in 

greater numbers. 

Climate can have multiple effects on plant growth and productivity at multiple 

levels. This can include effects on regional as well as more localized agroecosystems, 

the microclimate around plants within a field or orchard and even effects on the 

cellular processes that control growth, development and resistance to pests and 

pathogens. Thus, the changing climate has the potential for multiple effects on 

production agriculture and must be understood at numerous levels. 

b. Do you feel that the current direction of our domestic policies to stem carbon 

pollution is adequate to protect agriculture from the climate impacts that 

scientists are warning us about? 

This topic is out of my area of expertise, but I would be willing to assist in finding the 

appropriate scientists to provide this information. 

c. What role could farmers, ranchers, and foresters play in the effort to reduce 

carbon pollution? 

This topic is out of my area of expertise, but I would be willing to assist in finding the 

appropriate scientists to provide this information. 
144 

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, & Forestry 

"Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World" 

December 13, 2017 

Questions for the Record 

Senator Joseph Lieberman 

Chairman Pat Roberts 

1. Considering the fiscal constraints we face in Congress, what are some suggestions for 

improving governmental coordination and prioritization of agriculture security? 

The new National Biodefense Strategy, which our Panel recommended 201S, is in the 

final phases of review at the White House. We are hopeful that the Strategy and its 

implementation plan will lay out the "universe" of biodefense responsibilities among 

federal agencies, a comprehensive perspective that will enable significant improvement 

in the way the federal government prioritizes and coordinates biodefense activities, 

including agrodefense. 

We next need to assess where we are (and are not) spending money. This process can 

be initiated through an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) budgetary data call 

and cross-cut analysis, ideally to occur on an annual basis. This process would allow 

OMB (and Congress) to better identify existing agrodefense investments across all 

departments and agencies. The White House would then be positioned to assess the 

extent to which existing efforts align with the National Biodefense Strategy and any 

other relevant policies, and determine appropriate future budget requests. This should, 

in turn, result in increased coordination in spending and goals amongst those actors. 

Importantly, this exercise will also help identify gaps in the federal government's 

agricultural security apparatus. By determining where those weak points are, we can 

better understand the areas with the greatest need, and adjust departmental and 

agency priorities accordingly. Such an approach will require OMB to assess overarching 

programs that have shared federal jurisdiction, such as biosurveillance, which, per 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9, Defense of United States 

Agriculture and Food), is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, the 

Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The process will, 

as a result, enable improved information sharing and coordination among these federal 

entities. 

The Committee is well positioned to encourage these kinds of activities through its 

regular oversight and especially through the 2018 Farm Bill. 

2. Have you encountered any obstacles to improving coordination and collaboration 

within the Federal Government to advance agriculture security? Similarly, what 

barriers may exist between the federal government, state governments, and private 
145 

industry? And from your perspective, what risk management principles can 

government and industry each utilize when directing resources to planning and 

preparedness? 

The Panel found that, as with much of the nation's biodefense apparatus, the biggest 

obstacle to improved communication and collaboration among relevant federal 

agencies involved in agrodefense has been a lack of a centralized, unified strategy and 

corresponding accountability structure. It is difficult for federal agriculture programs to 

coordinate absent clear priorities by which to measure the mission. Additionally, we 

recognize the natural frictions at play in the budget and congressional appropriations 

process, where requests and legislation are generally delineated by department, rather 

than integrated across a common goal, such as agrodefense. The result can be 

duplication in effort and resources across departments, or, alternatively, gaps in needed 

effort. 

The Panel has stated that strong leadership from the White House is essential to bring 

agencies together to better collaborate on the various aspects of the biodefense 

mission, including agricultural security. For example, the Departments of Interior and 

the Department of Agriculture jointly implemented an avian influenza surveillance effort 

in wild birds from 2006-2011, a success we believe would not have been possible 

without White House leadership. The Panel's Nationa/8/ueprintfor Biodefense 

recommended that the Office of the Vice President is best placed to serve in that role by 

providing the political leadership for federal biodefense. 

Regarding barriers among federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments 

and industry, information sharing is the key issue. Industry is a willing partner if issues 

like business sensitive information and incentivization structures and policies are 

addressed in advance. The majority of information needed to detect and diagnose 

emerging biological threats is in the hands of the producers and farmers who directly 

manage livestock and crops. Information can be shared in advance of emergencies 

through such means as enhanced data collection through the National Wildlife Disease 

Program and other relevant biosurveillance programs, and via improved reporting via 

the National list of Reportable Animal Diseases (the rule for which should be finalized). 

To improve coordination of response, any new iteration of the Food and Agriculture 

Incident Annex should provide detailed guidance on how information can best be shared 

in an agricultural emergency, such as through increased use of fusion centers. 

Managing the risk of agricultural threats relies on a robust awareness and assessment 

process. Threats must first be identified characterized, and the federal government is 

uniquely positioned to characterize that risk (reference HSPD-9), both for the sake of its 

own programs and to aid state and industry partners in their own efforts. This 

information should then be used to assess risk, with a strong emphasis on the nature 

and scale of impact that a particular threat may have. Emphasizing efforts that could 

mitigate multiple threats- for instance, investing in platform medical countermeasure 
146 

technologies- is an approach to risk management that is necessary when budgets are 

finite. Finally, we emphasize the need for systematic response planning and exercising 

of those plans. Strong training and exercising regimens are demonstrated to improve 

response, and can help manage risk by stemming the scale of an outbreak. The 

Committee should encourage FEMA to ensure that agricultural emergency plans are 

regularly exercised. It should also ensure that federal agricultural partners are placing 

sufficient emphasis on providing training for animal and plant health criminalepidemiological investigations; the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Department 

of Agriculture can and should take the lead in this area. 

Ranking Member Debbie Stabenow 

1. You were a leader on the imperative to address climate change during your time in 

the Senate. USDA's own reports, coupled with those from other federal agencies, 

indicate climate change poses a serious threat to production agriculture. 

a. Given that we're talking about safeguarding the future of American agriculture 

today, can you briefly discuss your thoughts on climate change and how it poses a 

threat to agriculture security? 

The Blue Ribbon Study Panel's agrodefense report focuses on the threat posed by 

biological agents, whether by natural, intentional, or accidental introduction. We 

wanted to understand, in an immediate way, what steps we could recommend that 

would strengthen the country's ability to defend against those threats. We therefore 

focused on issues like biosurveillance, medical countermeasures, and interagency 

coordination as near- and medium-term touchpoints for change. We did not look at 

the external drivers of natural outbreaks. As you noted, many reports both within 

and outside of government have pointed to the risks posed by rapid changes in 

climate to the environment and agriculture. To that end, I would say that it is 

perfectly reasonable to ask scientific and policy questions about all potential risks to 

livestock and crops, including extreme weather events, and including drivers like 

changing temperatures that may cause a change in the prevalence or geographic 

spread of pathogens. 

b. Do you feel that the current direction of our domestic policies to stem carbon 

pollution is adequate to protect agriculture from the impacts that scientists are 

warning us about? 

While the Study Panel has not issued findings or recommendations regarding 

climate change, I am happy to answer this from my personal perspective. I believe 

that more can be done to safeguard our country's agricultural infrastructure. That 

includes taking steps to mitigate weather- and climate-related impacts. One need 
147 

only to look at the increasing frequency of wild fires in certain parts of the country 

to understand the threat posed to agribusiness by extreme weather. 

As you know, when I served in the Senate, I worked with you and our colleagues to 

try to address the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. That is why I coordinated 

with Senators Lindsey Graham and John Kerry to produce a framework for eventual 

bipartisan legislation that would have both ensured our energy security while also 

safeguarding our environment. The proposal acknowledged the need for further 

action on this topic, and sought to address the issue through consensus, mutual 

respect, and compromise. I am proud of the work that went into that proposal, and 

though we were ultimately unable to see those principals passed into law, I continue 

to believe that economic prosperity and the protection of our environment are not 

mutually exclusive. 

c. What role could farmers, ranchers, and foresters play in that effort? In the Kerry, 

Graham, Lieberman framework for the Senate climate/energy bill, released in late 

2009, what was the role for farmers and ranchers? 

Farmers, ranchers, and foresters all have important roles to play in the cultivation 

and protection of our agriculture. They are often the first line of defense in 

identifying and intercepting threats to wildlife, livestock, and plants, such as avian 

influenza, fungal infections, or destructive pests. We should all rightfully recognize 

that our mission to safeguard the agricultural sector is deeply reliant on the 

successes of these professionals, and support them as such. 

As you noted, in the 2009 Senate framework, Senators Graham and Kerry and I 

acknowledged the impact that a proposal for controlling carbon emissions may have 

had on these producers. Any solution that tries to address carbon output should 

strive to avoid harming one of the backbones of the U.S. economy. That is why the 

framework (and the eventual draft bill I released in 2010 alongside Senator Kerry) 

considered the economic realities of addressing carbon pollution, proposing a 

voluntary carbon reduction system for those groups by using monetary incentives 

and offsets to benefit farmers, ranchers, and foresters who took steps to reduce 

their carbon footprint. These programs would have been overseen by the 

Department of Agriculture. In pursuing this route, we would have rewarded those 

who chose to seize the initiative, rather than punish those who did not. 

Senator Amy Klobuchar 

1. When Minnesota dealt with an outbreak of Avian Influenza in 2015, we found that it 

takes a tremendous amount of people and financial resources to deal with the 

challenges associated with a disease outbreak of this size. That's why I've been 

working to ensure the next Farm Bill includes language to support activities to 

enhance early detection and rapid response. In your testimony you noted that the 
148 

establishment of such a program would create a legislative basis for prevention 

activities. 

How would having sustained capabilities to detect animal disease threats improve 

rapid response and prevention? In your opinion, would an animal disease prevention 

fund- similar to the current plant health program -assist us in addressing risks to 

agriculture and our economy? 

Federal efforts are often reactive. While billions of dollars are spent for federal response 

and recovery efforts to natural disasters, efforts to mitigate and prevent the damage in 

the first place receive a fraction of the amount. The same imbalance in attention and 

funding exists for agricultural security. 

Early detection is one of our best defenses against agricultural threats. We do fund this 

function, but we don't fund it concomitant with the need, and we often only increase 

the funding after an outbreak has occurred. The National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network, a vital tool used to rapidly detect and diagnose animal diseases, is currently 

authorized for only $15 million in annual funding, which must be distributed across 59 

veterinary laboratories in every state. The dedicated program dedicated to 

biosurveillance for avian influenzas in wild birds was stopped in 2011, being revived only 

in 2014 when highly pathogenic avian influenza reappeared in commercial poultry 

flocks. The Nationally Biodefense Strategy should have a strong animal health 

component, and we believe that a well-crafted implementation plan based on risk 

prioritization could ensure that key preventive programs do not lapse, and that they are 

funded for as long as they are needed to mitigate the most serious risks. 

A well-supported diagnostic network, in conjunction with strong coordination among all 

levels of government and industry, and a fully-supported medical countermeasure 

stockpile, could make all the difference in curbing the next outbreak. For this reason, 

the Panel strongly supports the creation of an animal disease prevention fund to make 

the necessary advance investments in early warning activities and support state efforts 

to detect potential agricultural threats in their own backyards, quickly and effectively. 

This would bring animal disease prevention activities in line with programs already in 

statute for plant health. Such a move is made all the more important by the fact that 

three quarters of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic- that is, transmissible 

between humans and animals. Safeguarding livestock from these diseases can directly 

benefit human health. 
149 

Chairman Pat Roberts 

1. One of the complicating factors in protecting American agriculture from biological threats is 

the sheer scale and diversity of our agriculture sector. Most of that critical infrastructure 

where interventions to improve security can be adopted are privately held -the processing 

plants, mills, trucks, barges, etc. Can you describe a few of the activities you are seeing 

implemented in North Carolina by formers and those involved in food production to achieve 

this end of bolstering ag security? Further, could you describe a few ways in which the 

government could partner with private entities to bolster the security of our critical 

infrastructure? 

There are two considerations related to protecting American agriculture from biological threats. 

The first is the idea of physical security- frequently referred to as guns, guards, and gates. 

While the state's animal agriculture industries are just beginning some of these activities, we 

have found increased use of cameras and cell phone technology to monitor facilities, especially 

as those capabilities have become less expensive. We have even seen security guards posted at 

feed mills, hatcheries, and processing plant entrances. There is also an increased sensitivity to 

"insider" activity at facilities, as groups and individuals opposed to animal agriculture make 

efforts to gain access to operations by seeking employment and engaging in questionable 

activities. Industries have also encouraged installation of door locks and gates on growing 

facilities as a possible means to limit access by unauthorized personnel. 

Obviously, the other piece of protecting American agriculture is biosecurity. After the Avian 

Influenza outbreaks in 2015, 2016, and 2017, and the Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea Virus that 

spread across the country in 2013 (33 states in 13 months), there was renewed emphasis on 

biosecurity across all facets of animal agriculture. In North Carolina, the industry has installed 

vehicle washing/disinfection facilities at processing plants that can be used for all vehicles 

entering and leaving should an event occur. The industry is also training staff and contract 

personnel twice yearly in biosecurity practices, and is auditing all farms quarterly for adhering 

to biosecurity practices which would include adding additional steps of cleaning or changing 

clothing/boots/gloves to existing protocols. Some have developed in-house laboratories 

capable of obtaining samples, rendering some diagnoses, and rapidly forwarding suspicious 

samples to appropriate reference laboratories. Others have purchased depopulation and 

disposal equipment and trained staff in its use. The poultry and swine industries continually 

work to improve biosecurity techniques as endemic diseases are an ever-present threat. The 

dairy a~nd beef industries have learned by observing and applying the biosecurity techniques of 

their fellow food animal production partners as they have not yet experienced firsthand the 

industry-wide disease outbreaks seen in the vertically-integrated food production systems. 

Finally, exercises, advancing plans, and continued improvement in response procedures all help 

to identify weaknesses in the biosecurity programs at all levels. 

Effective, consistent, and competent biosecurity has associated costs measurable in dollars, 

time, commitment, and effort, and as a result its implementation can suffer from personnel 
150 

attrition, business cost prioritization, tired personnel, and worker inconsistency. To achieve the 

desired level of biosecurity on the farm, the partnership of government and industry has 

already been successful through efforts to create of the myriad of Secure Food Supply Plans; 

the Secure Beef Supply Plan (SBS) is a great example of public and private partnership. The SBS 

plan was developed through collaborative efforts between the beef industry, state and federal 

government officials, Iowa State University and Kansas State University. For more information 

on the SBS plan visit www.securebeef.org. All in all, the nation is definitely in a better position 

with regards to safer and more protected farms/systems, though in truth we are still quite 

vulnerable to highly-contagious diseases and those who would want to attack the production 

systems, leaving much work to be done. The federal government should continue to provide 

financial incentives for producers to implement animal identification and traceability, improved 

biosecurity, and comprehensive surveillance. Another possibility- government could act as a 

partner to facilitate insurance premium reductions or other perks for agricultural entities 

possessing completed biosecurity plans or fully implemented Secure Food Supply Plans. 

2. How are our foreign animal protein producing competitors addressing agriculture security? 

Is it something they are acting on? Are there any lessons we can draw from them? Do you 

believe the U.S. lack of attention and focus on agriculture security threatens our competitive 

advantage over other countries that are taking a more proactive approach to agriculture 

security? 

There are very few proprietary secrets with regard to biosecurity; rather, the opposite would be 

more often the case. Agriculture across international borders has shared biosecurity models 

and practices quite readily, with a well-known example being the Danish biosecurity entry 

model that has been accepted in many counties, including the US, for prevention of 

introduction of HPAI to poultry farms. There are always advances in techniques and protocols, 

and since many of the US food animal production companies are international by virtue of 

trading across national borders, biosecurity measures and advances are shared quite readily. 

The point that food animal production competitors understand is that there is no one vaccine, 

no one protocol, no one biosecurity measure that can protect production facilities from highly 

contagious diseases once the disease has entered the marketing systems which all the 

competitors use. Thus, competitors are subject to one another's biosecurity weaknesses and 

gaps. The world markets reward the high health standards of US agriculture with open markets 

(at least from a disease standpoint) which has allowed the US to build its exports. However, 

therein lies the problem: so much of the dollar is tied to international exports that the US, 

without a rapid and effective recovery capability, has lost its ability to recover if a disease 

outbreak such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) shuts down exports. Very few businesses can 

survive the loss of 30-50% of its profits with additional input costs over a long time period. 

Thus, the importance of staying free of Foreign Animal Disease (FAD), which allows the US to 

promote and grow its position in the markets as well as protect itself from the fact that 

competitors would easily be able to replace the US once regulatory restrictions cease exports. 

The most sobering thought is what it would take for the US to regain those markets in addition 
151 

to the battle that would ensue for even US domestic markets. As US food animal production 

continues to expand its exports, these challenges will continue to grow. 

Many other exporting countries have well-developed animal identification and traceability 

systems (the US continues efforts to achieve appropriate ID and timely traceability), which 

helps to rapidly identify the spread of animal disease and help to bring it under control. Animal 

ID and traceability enhance confidence by assuring trading partners that we can contain an 

outbreak to a limited area, and provide strong assurances that other areas are free of disease 

and can continue to export, or resume exporting sooner. New Zealand and Australia have very 

strong biosecurity efforts in place, and are actively funding biosecurity planning, training, and 

education. 

Finally, politics continually plays a role in trade between countries, and agricultural security can 

easily be used to limit trade between other countries and the US. Given the tremendous impact 

transboundary animal disease has historically had on trade (eg. BSE in US), countries will 

continue to escalate the level of importance placed on the protection of their animal 

agriculture industries through international biosecurity. 

3. Zoonotic diseases were mentioned in several testimonies. Can you describe some of the 

early warning work that may be occurring with regards to zoonotic disease detection? And 

do you have any suggestions for improving surveillance and protection from zoonotic 

threats? 

In recent years, USDA has funded the development and delivery of educational materials to 

enhance the ability of recently-graduated veterinarians to be aware of and to detect emerging 

and exotic diseases of animals that may be zoonotic. This One Health/One Medicine approach 

to address infectious diseases needs to be emphasized more amongst veterinary and human 

medical professionals alike, and in doing so will promote sharing of information and data 

regarding disease syndromes observed in clinical settings to assist in early identification of 

zoonotic diseases shared between people and animals. Efforts should be undertaken to 

promote the integration of human health, animal health, and environmental health. 

Recognition by all involved that 75% of emerging diseases over the last decade have had an 

animal component would ensure adequate funding to bring the One Health/One Medicine 

concept to the forefront of battling infectious disease. 

With regard to surveillance, as is always the case, the National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network (NAHLN) stands on the front line of surveillance for animal and zoonotic diseases. 

Additional funding is a necessity. 

4. Have you encountered any obstacles to improving coordination and collaboration within the 

Federal Government to advance agriculture security? Similarly, what barriers may exist 

between the federal government, state governments, and private industry? And from your 

perspective, what risk management principles can government and industry each utilize 

when directing resources towards planning and preparedness? 
152 

USDA has made commendable progress in working with states to advance response capability 

and capacity over the past 10 years. Even so, there is still much to be done- protecting a 

constantly growing, changing agriculture infrastructure against ever-evolving disease agents 

and the threat of bad actors continues to be, as recently described, a wicked, complex problem. 

That said, state Low Path Avian Influenza (LPAI) plans, which were previously approved by 

USDA APHIS, were not followed in the LPAI outbreaks in the Spring of 2017. Surveillance, 

permitting terminology, and indemnity/compensation were inconsistent with previous 

understanding of existing state plans. This is currently being addressed through meetings and 

discussions involving the US Animal Health Association's National Assembly, USDA, and industry 

partners. Indications are that resources, specifically financial, are limited as a result of the 2015 

High Path Avian Influenza (HPAI) epidemic in the US. 

Another concern is that, because the footprint and commercial effects of food animal 

production infrastructure spans state and local jurisdictions, there are no borders. However, 

too often our planning and preparedness efforts do have borders. Disease preparedness 

efforts are hampered because they are subject to jurisdictional funding and development 

rather than being more accurately applied to the actual footprint of the industry. For example, 

the swine industry in the US is not state-oriented in production. Not one swine-heavy state 

handles all phases of production within its own borders. Every swine state is dependent on the 

whole system, but planning from a system perspective is incredibly difficult because each state 

divides the system and plans to its capability and strategy due to its jurisdictional authority and 

funding. All-encompassing response planning should be more frequently implemented rather 

than limited to state or small regional areas. 

Finally, federal select agent rules and laws against having FMD virus on the US mainland are 

regulatory hurdles precluding the production of safe, new-generation FMD vaccines by US 

manufacturers. These regulations are intended to prevent virulent virus from being used on the 

US mainland. They are being over-interpreted to include new-generation, geneticallyengineered vaccines which cannot spread in animals even if accidentally released from a 

laboratory or manufacturer. Allowing US manufacturers to produce these new-generation 

vaccines and sell them internationally would provide a rapidly available source of US vaccines in 

the event of an FMD outbreak. 

5. Your testimony mentions that the current Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) vaccine stockpile 

shared by the U.S., Canada and Mexico is insufficient in addressing a domestic outbreak of 

scale, and that the agriculture sector stands to lose $200 billion over ten years from a 

domestic outbreak of FMD. If a more robust vaccine bank were established and should 

immediate and aggressive vaccine use be deployed in response to a U.S. outbreak of FMD, 

as was done in Uruguay, compared to the "stamp out" approach used by England when 

those countries experienced FMD outbreaks, do you anticipate the economic impact to U.S. 

agriculture to be lessened, and to what degree? 
153 

The US would still lose export markets at the beginning of an outbreak. However, rapid use of 

vaccines can help to bring the outbreak under control much more quickly so that exports can be 

regained sooner. In a large outbreak that is not controlled with the benefit of vaccination, it is 

likely that many herds will become infected, stamping out would be discontinued, and infected 

herds would be allowed to recover. Producers will have extremely high losses due to the effects 

of FMD infection on animal health and productivity. An unknown number of animals will likely 

die or need to be euthanized. This will depend on the strain of the virus. Indemnity is only paid 

for animals that the government requires to be destroyed. If stamping out is discontinued 

because it is not feasible, producers will have to withstand their losses due to FMD infection 

like any other disease. The effects of the disease, coupled with a dramatic decrease in prices 

due to lost exports, will likely drive many producers into bankruptcy. Rapid use of vaccines will 

keep herds healthy and productive, and will prevent the spread of the virus to new herds. This 

could have a dramatic effect on the overall cost of the outbreak. As much as we would like to 

take an "either/or" approach to an FMD outbreak in the US, no one technique will be successful 

alone. Given the tremendous number of animals in the US, stamping out is not going to be a 

solution; however, in certain situations and in certain types of livestock, stamping out will 

definitely be one of the tools in the arsenal. The same can be said for vaccination. While not a 

total solution, it can be effectively used to create a buffer zone around actively infected 

premises. An adequate and readily accessible supply of vaccine must be available at the time it 

is needed. What is critical in addressing an FMD outbreak is a continuing and realistic dialogue 

to identify as closely as possible the vaccine needs, personnel projections, and length of time to 

implement response activities. 

6. Aside from the need to increase our U.S. FMD vaccine stockpile, what other preparedness 

and response priorities necessary in responding to an FMD outbreak remain unaddressed or 

insufficient? For example, does USDA have appropriate quantities of pen-side FMD 

diagnostic tests and FMD Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) tests that 

will also be critical in managing an outbreak? What other "tools" will be necessary to 

manage an FMD outbreak that merit additional resources? 

While the FMD vaccine stockpile would be the highest priority, having stockpiles of pen-side 

tests to detect infected animals and DIVA serology test kits to detect vaccinated herds that also 

have some infected animals would be ideal. Radio-frequency animal identification tags and 

mandatory animal identification would greatly facilitate tracking vaccinated animals as part of 

the eradication program. Additionally, there needs to be a significant focus on continuous 

training for ag response personnel due to the turnover of personnel in this area, which leads to 

states hiring individuals to replace lost experience and then not providing them with adequate 

training. Another tool which is critical to responding to a significant transboundary animal 

disease outbreak in US livestock is position typing and credentialing for response personnel. 

Vaccines and surveillance are closely intertwined if DIVA technology is in play, and so a 

comprehensive vaccine/surveillance response program should be the path we pursue, as 
154 

opposed to the current situation where surveillance is considered apart from vaccines as we do 

not currently have a realistic vaccination capability. 

Finally, a major issue will be adequate cleaning and disinfection of transport equipment before 

it leaves production facilities and processing plants. Inadequate sanitation has significantly 

prolonged control of several different swine diseases in recent years (pseudorabies, PRRS, PED). 

The cattle industry is even further behind on transport equipment sanitation. 

7. Have sufficient exhaustive plans detailing federal and state administrative planning in 

preparation for a potential FMD outbreak been developed? Are current plans pertaining to 

establishing FMD vaccination protocol, establishing biosecurity requirements for impacted 

farms and regions, establishing cleaning and disinfecting policies, developing carcass 

disposal plans, continuing contractor training, etc. sufficient or do they require greater 

development? 

At the federal level, progress has been made in each of the areas listed above and is ongoing. 

States vary greatly in their plans so more planning opportunities are always beneficial. 

Additional topics that have not received very much attention are: 1) design of an eradication 

program for after the outbreak is coming under control; 2) factors which could help mitigate 

the economic impact of lost export markets; and 3) approaches to zoning and 

compartmentalization for segments of the industry to demonstrate that they are free of 

infection. 

However, the preparedness planning efforts have only matured to level of the capabilities that 

we possess .. For example, our vaccination plans suffer because we cannot craft plans for 

vaccines that we know will not be available. Without a credible vaccine supply, our planning 

efforts in the US have been based on a partial and limited "defense" strategy that has 

prevented in-depth planning. As more sophisticated measures are added to our response 

capabilities through funding (such as vaccine or surveillance technologies), then more 

sophisticated planning and preparation will be encouraged and undertaken. These next 

planning steps utilizing advancements are critical as they address more fully the type of 

business continuity planning that will allow for a safer arena (vaccines harden immune systems 

and surveillance advancements provide a clearer picture of the outbreak). 

8. Many countries have FMD countermeasure stockpiles which they have established through a 

variety of structures. Some countries, such as Australia, have implemented a collaborative 

approach between government and industry to both manage and fund their FMD vaccine 

banks. Given the severity of the threat posed by an outbreak of FMD, has there been any 

consideration of collaborative approach in the U.S. for a FMD vaccine stockpile to ensure this 

risk is addressed as thoroughly as possible? 

The issue has been broached. However, industry has thus far been unwilling to discuss a 

collaborative approach. Perhaps a facilitated "FMD Vaccine Stockpile Summit" which brings 

together federal, state and industry representatives could identify issues and seek solutions. 
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Ranking Member Debbie Stabenow 

1. As we have seen in recent years, animal disease outbreaks pose a serious threat to our 

nation's biosecurity, rural economies, and export markets. The 2015 avian influenza 

outbreak, in particular, demonstrated that a rapid and coordinated response to disease 

outbreaks is critical. 

a. Could you expand a bit more on the importance of broad-based animal disease 

surveillance efforts and why early detection and response is so critical for animal 

disease outbreaks in particular? 

On any given day, there are 1,000,000 pigs, SOO,OOO head of cattle, and 25 million birds on the 

highways of America. That much movement of animals, which is inherent to American 

agriculture, requires the earliest possible identification of a disease event. Avian Influenza is the 

perfect disease to demonstrate early detection for disease elimination. Any HS or H7 subtype 

of Avian Influenza may quickly turn from low path to high path (as seen during both the 2016 

Indiana and 2017 Tennessee breaks where both LPAI and HPAI overlapped). Monitoring for 

LPAI and then eradicating affected populations before HPAI develops should abbreviate any 

breaks and limit damage to contract farmers as well as export markets. Similarly, early 

identification of disease in the cattle and swine industries will initiate a "stop movement" of 

livestock until the extent of the disease spread is determined, and mitigation efforts can be 

initiated. Early detection and effective, timely response minimizes the impact to the animal 

agriculture industry and the US economy. 

b. While vaccines are one aspect of disease response, what more do you believe should 

be done to adequately prepare for and quickly respond to animal disease outbreaks? 

We must do the following: 

• Continue to maintain emergency response depopulation equipment and crews at the 

federal and state levels 

• Fully fund LPAI eradication efforts rather than wait for LPAI to turn into HPAI · 

• Ensure pen-side diagnostic capability 

• Increase surveillance testing with additional staffing at our state veterinary diagnostic 

laboratories 

• Develop plans that will adapt/streamline the marketing systems to account for 

vaccine/surveillance advancements 

Our current marketing systems do not adequately account for disease response where animals 

would need to move with as little comingling through production to processing as well as 

parallel positive/negative marketing channels to move recovered/vaccinated non-clinical 

animals. The dual marketing system used in the Pseudorabies eradication effort in the 1990s is 
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a great model to consider as we develop our FMD marketing strategies for a managed FMD 

response program. 

Senator Amy Klobuchar 

1. In your testimony you discussed the importance of an early warning system for animal 

diseases. Both our turkey and hog industries in Minnesota have faced hardships due to 

disease in recent years, which makes it particularly important to me that we ensure we have 

the right policies in place for investments in animal health research and response 

preparedness. lied a letter to the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee with eleven of 

my colleagues requesting strong funding for the National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN} this fiscal year. 

How would providing additional federal resources to the NAHLN increase its ability to 

further protect animal agriculture? Could the NAHLN meet the challenges of another 

outbreak situation without emergency resources? 

The NAHLN is the first line of defense for rapid detection of new disease outbreaks, and it is 

absolutely essential to manage an outbreak. A large outbreak will overwhelm the current ability 

of the NAHLN labs to analyze samples in a timely manner. Rapid diagnostic results are essential 

to determine which herds or flocks are infected. Uninfected animals can be safely sent to 

market. Allowing infected animals to move will spread the infection. It is not possible to reliably 

determine which herds are infected early in the disease process just by examining them. The 

NAHLN labs also need state of the art biosecurity equipment so that they can operate at 

biosafety level 3 to safely work with some of the most highly contagious animal pathogens. 

Additional federal resources for the NAHLN would allow for the stockpiling of diagnostic test 

kits. Such diagnostic tests cannot be mass-produced in a short period of time. In the event of an 

FMD outbreak we would need a large quantity of tests to be readily available to diagnose 

infected animals and differentiate between vaccinated and infected animals. There are obvious 

and astounding gaps in capability and capacity to respond to diseases that currently exist in 

many countries, shortfalls that have been identified and that we deal with every day but have 

not been addressed. Considering the potential impact and what is at risk, the fact that our 

country would even consider responding to a disease as contagious as FMD without a credible 

vaccine capability (a tried and true component of every successful response to modern 

contagious disease outbreaks) is simply beyond comprehension. Biosecurity is a fantastic and 

needed capability and should not be down played, but once an outbreak of a highly contagious 

virus appears, the HPAI experience has taught us that it has limited ability to stop the disease 

itself. Thus, the funding of research and implementation of response and surveillance 

advancements needs to be a priority. Furthering the efforts of the NAHLN is a very effective 

component, but it must be recognized that once established the laboratory network must be 

given the opportunity to support an aggressive response strategy that includes tools such as 

vaccines and DIVA-based surveillance. We currently are not able to implement those 
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sophisticated and aggressive protective responses to recovery strategies thus somewhat 

negating the full investment in NAHLN. 
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Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, & Forestry 

"Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World" 

December13,2017 

Questions for the Record 

General Richard Myers 

Chairman Pat Roberts 

1. Chairman Roberts' Question: In the next few years, we will be nearing completion of the 

construction of NBAF. I know that a great deal of work has been done at the university, and 

throughout the state, in preparation for the work that will be done there. (a) What has 

Kansas State done to prepare for the transfer of research from Plum Island to NBAF? (b) In 

what areas do we need to continue developing to ensure that the best and the brightest 

work force in the world is in Manhattan, Kansas, conducting this critical research? 

President Myers' Answer (l.a.): In 2008 as part of the "best and final offer" for NBAF during 

the site selection process, the State of Kansas included $35 million for NBAF-related 

research inK-State's biocontainment facility, the Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) at Pat 

Roberts Hall (PRH). If NBAF is to have "the best and the brightest work force in the world," 

hands-on research in BSL-3/3Ag biocontainment is required, and the BRI/PRH is one of a 

limited number of laboratories in the world that can provide such research training with 

livestock. While the BRI/PRH doesn't have BSL-41ivestock space (NBAF will be the first such 

facility in the U.S.), the safety and security principles are the same in BSL-3Ag. Thus, K-State 

can provide much of the research training needs for the future NBAF workforce. 

As of 2017, there were seven (7) foreign animal diseases (FADs) projected to be worked on 

in NBAF when operations begin in 2022/2023. These include the livestock-only threats, 

African Swine Fever (ASF), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), 

along with the zoonotic threats, Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Japanese Encephalitis (JE), Nipah 

virus, and Ebola virus. Any of these and innumerable other FADs could ravage America's 

agricultural infrastructure, food supply, and economy if they hit the U.S. Furthermore, 

zoonotic FADs could devastate public health as well. 

K-State jump-started NBAF research in the BRI/PRH on RVF in 2013, JE in 2014, CSF in 2015, 

and ASF in 2016. Research and development (R&D) continues on all four of these FADs, but 

the Kansas funding commitment will end in FY2019 when the last $5 million is appropriated. 

The majority of the research is conducted by K-State faculty, staff and students, but 

collaborators from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Center for Grain and 

Animal Health Research (CGAHR) in Manhattan participate on some of the NBAF-related 

FAD projects. Going forward, federal support is needed for R&D on RVF, JE, CSF, and ASF to 

help mitigate these threats to U.S. animal health and public health. It's needed to continue 

training the workforce for NBAF as well. 

President Myers' Answer (l.b.): Until NBAF is fully operational in 2022/23, USDA has no 

livestock biocontainment facilities where R&D can be conducted on zoonotic FADs. 

Moreover, DHS stopped funding CSF and ASF research in 2017 at PIADC; a facility unsafe for 
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work with zoonotic diseases. As a result, training the NBAF R&D workforce is highly reliant 

on the BRI/PRH until the new DHS facility becomes operational. Of the thirteen (13) 

recommendations in my written testimony, three (3) of them (#2, #3, #4) are particularly 

relevant to your question regarding what "do we need to continue developing to ensure 

that the best and the brightest work force in the world is in Manhattan, Kansas?" 

2) Emerging FAD Threats- Exploit "awareness and warning" intelligence information 

regarding newly emerging biothreats to establish bio/agrodefense "mitigation 

strategies" at USDA CGAHR prior to NBAF becoming operational and fund "research 

and development" in the BRI/PRH. 

3) Zoonotic Animal Disease Research- Establish federal threat "mitigation 

strategies" for zoonotic FADs at USDA CGAHR prior to NBAF becoming operational 

and fund RVF and JE "research and development" in the BRI/PRH. 

4) Non-Zoonotic Foreign Animal Disease Research- Expedite federal threat 

"mitigation strategies" for non-zoonotic FADs by moving the research portfolios for 

ASF and CSF from USDA PIADC to CGAHR and funding ASF and CSF "research and 

development" in the BRI/PRH until NBAF becomes operational. 

With federal R&D funding at USDA CGAHR for the global FAD threats, RVF, JE, ASF, and CSF, 

critical research and workforce training can continue inK-State's BRI/PRH until NBAF 

becomes fully operational. That should help "ensure that the best and the brightest work 

force in the world is in Manhattan, Kansas." 

2. Chairman Roberts' Question: (a) Have you encountered any obstacles to improving 

coordination and collaboration within the Federal Government to advance agriculture 

security? (b) Similarly, what barriers may exist between the federal government, state 

governments, and private industry? (c) And from your perspective, what risk management 

principles can government and industry each utilize when directing resources towards 

planning and preparedness? 

President Myers' Answer (2.a.): With regard to "any obstacles to improving coordination 

and collaboration within the Federal Government," the biggest obstacle I have encountered 

relates to significant shortcomings in biological threat intelligence analysis and operations. 

The lack of sufficient numbers of plant and animal infectious disease SMEs with high-level 

security clearances became clear during my visits to the Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center 

(KIFC) for classified briefings. As you know, the KIFC reviews the same intelligence 

information as other cleared analysts do, but identification of biothreats requires Subject 

Matter Experts (SMEs) that understand biology to make connections most non-SMEs can't. 

The KIFC biothreat team includes such SMEs, and they make the required connections. 

Potential solutions to overcoming these obstacles were outlined in parts a) to d) of the first 

(#1) of thirteen (13) recommendations in my written testimony, so they are reproduced 

here. Additional suggestions -long-term and near-term -follow. 
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1) Enhance Intelligence Operations and Analysis Capabilities- Leverage "awareness 

and warning" intelligence information to conduct federal, state, and local agriculture 

and food "vulnerability assessments." Advanced warning of over-the-horizon 

biothreats is vital, but today, the U.S. is often minimally aware and insufficiently 

warned. One reason appears to be insufficient numbers of bio/agrodefense subject 

matter experts (SMEs) -veterinarians, animal scientists, crop scientists, plant 

pathologists, etc. with high-level security clearances to assess classified 

intelligence. 

a) Security Clearances -Increase the number of food crop, food animal, and 

food supply SMEs with high-level security clearances (TS-SCI) to monitor 

bio/agrodefense threats worldwide. 

b) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) -Increase the 

number of SCIFs with secure communications that have agriculture/food 

SME analysts and/or cleared SME advisors with TS-SCI clearances. 

c) USDA Clearances -Increase the number of USDA personnel with TS-SCI 

clearances. It's unknown how many bio/agrodefense SMEs there are within 

the intelligence agencies, but there are nowhere near enough within USDA. 

Conversations in 2016 with the USDA's chief scientist and a USDA intelligence 

analyst confirmed their frustrations with an inability to convey critical 

classified information within USDA to make it actionable. This creates huge 

federal impediments to safeguarding agriculture, particularly when DHS 

stopped meeting their HSPD-9 responsibilities in 2016/17. Undertaking 

"vulnerability assessments," developing "mitigation strategies," conducting 

"response planning and recovery,"23 and defining time-critical "research and 

development" strategies are virtually impossible when there is limited 

awareness and no warning. This must be rectified immediately. 

d) Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs) -Increase the number of state IFCs with 

agriculture and food SMEs with TS-SCI clearances. The Kansas IFC (KIFC) 

appears to be the only such center of over 70 nationwide that has a biothreat 

team with cleared SMEs capable of assessing the full range of biohazards to 

food crops, food animals, the food supply, and people. These include a DVM 

and PhDs from K-State and MDs from the University of Kansas Medical 

Center as well as SMEs from multiple state agencies. These SMEs allow the 

KIFC to assess global intelligence for the purpose of preventing bioterrorism 

attacks and preparing for natural infectious disease events emerging globally. 

Thus, the KIFC focuses "left of boom" (prior to an attack or outbreak) rather 

than "right of boom" (after the event) like other fusion centers. This model 

should be emulated beyond Kansas, because it allows state-specific planning 

with regard to "vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, and 

response planning and recovery." 
161 

Long-Term Solutions: The intelligence community overall must have more analysts and 

SMEs that understand biology; i.e., individuals that have formal training in the biological 

sciences. However, that will take time and global terrorist groups could employ 

bioweapons against the U.S. at any time, targeting crops, livestock, poultry, or people. 

Thus, consideration should be given to stop-gap measures, particularly in the agriculture 

realm where biothreat expertise is most lacking. 

Potential Near-Term Solutions: Two potential stop-gap measures come to mind based on 

expertise that already exists in Kansas on the KIFC biothreat team. 

A. First, there's a SCIF in the basement of the BRI/PRH that is of sufficient size to 

accommodate multiple tenants; the FBI is the sole tenant today. If that SCIF was 

to become a KIFC annex with intelligence analysts stationed there, the K-State 

biothreat SMEs (3 PhDs and 1 DVM) with high-end clearances could be "on-call" 

almost immediately if/when agriculture issues arise requiring their input. To 

accommodate this, secure communications would need to be installed in the 

SCIF, some minor renovations would be required, and a source of funding for 

analyst staffing would need to be identified. However, doing so would provide a 

rapid and significant step forward in protecting U.S. agriculture. 

B. Second, to start growing biothreat analyst capabilities nationally, consideration 

should be given to having existing intelligence analysts from the federal 

government and other state fusion centers spend blocks of time at the KIFC. 

Interacting with the KIFC biothreat team would allow them to gain an 

understanding of how to identify biothreat indicators within raw intelligence. 

A Marine intelligence officer with a biology degree attending your hearing 

confirmed afterwards that few in the intelligence community have a clue what to 

look for in the biothreat realm. Since it would take years to recruit the requisite 

biology SMEs into those ranks (assuming the intelligence community actually 

does so), utilizing the KIFC biothreat team to provide "in the trenches" training 

for existing analysts could be beneficial. The KIFC biothreat team monitors 

natural disease outbreaks globally, not just bioterrorism threats, so making this 

part of "business as usual" within the intelligence community would also help 

protect the nation. Biothreats can be naturally occurring or deliberate, and 

some terrorist groups have been known to monitor emerging infectious disease 

outbreaks for the purpose of exploiting them. Therefore, intelligence analysts 

should pay attention to those too. 

The KIFC has SCIF space available that could accommodate additional cleared 

analysts, but lease or rent payments would be required; the KIFC operates on a 

minuscule budget already and the biothreat SMEs are volunteers. Thus, external 

resources would almost certainly be required. 

President Myers' Answer (2.b.): With regard to "what barriers may exist between the 

federal government, state governments, and private industry," there are clearly many, 

particularly between private industry and the federal government. First and foremost, 
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private industry doesn't interact regularly with the federal government, and when they do, 

it may not be for positive reasons. And although there may be fewer issues between state 

government and private industry, there may be instances where those interactions are 

negative as well. Thus, a "trusted broker" intermediary might be in order, and in most 

states, the 1862 land-grant university would be positioned to serve in that role. land-grant 

personnel interact with agriculture producers in their state routinely and food processors 

quite frequently as well. Thus, assigning agriculture security intermediary duty to America's 

land-grant institutions could make great sense, perhaps in partnership with the state's 

agriculture department. 

Significant portions of the research conducted at land-grant universities benefit the privatesector agriculture producers in the state where they're located, so adding agriculture 

security research to the portfolio makes sense. Federal funding in the state where the R&D 

solutions are needed should go a long way towards knocking down barriers. 

President Myers' Answer (2.c.): With regard to "what risk management principles can 

government and industry each utilize when directing resources towards planning and 

preparedness," a few general observations can be made, noting that agriculture risk 

management is not my specialty. 

Nonetheless, first response always begins where an adverse event occurs- i.e., locally- so 

in this case, with private-sector agriculture industry producers- farmers and ranchers. 

With an animal disease, the first call will likely be to a private-sector veterinarian serving 

that farm or ranch. With a plant disease, the call might go to a county extension specialist 

from the state's land-grant university. If the infectious disease appears to be something 

unusual/exotic, it's at that point when state and/or federal experts are likely to be brought 

on board. 

As a result, planning and preparedness resources must be directed to the state and local 

levels. The federal government must respond, but planning and preparedness should be 

outsourced to where the first response will occur. That would seem to be an important risk 

management principle to follow. 

Two final risk management-related points: (1) Agriculture is often overlooked when U.S. 

"critical infrastructure" is considered; it was not on the original protection list in 1998, but 

was added after Sept. 11, 2001. Today, it seems to be slipping to second tier status again, 

which is hugely problematic from a risk management perspective. (2) USDA is not a 

national security agency, so if DHS removes agriculture- crops, livestock- and food from its 

critical infrastructure protection portfolio (as recent trends indicate), that could make 

agriculture risk management even more difficult. 

Our enemies focus on our vulnerabilities, not our strengths. As a result, strengthening 

agriculture security is vital to safeguarding national security. 

So, to reiterate the last statement in my testimony, "Congress must act before it's too late." 

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