United States Army in Vietnam 

Advice and Support: The Early 

Years 

1941-1960 

by 

Ronald H. Spector 

) MIUTi\RY 1NS1I~VCTON 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 1985 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Specto r, Rona ld H., 1943-

Advice and s uppo rt : the ea rly yea rs, 194'1-1960. 

(United States Army in Vie tnam) 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : 7/3Ad9/941-60 

1. Vietnam- H istory, M ilitary. 2. Vietnam- H istory20th ce ntury. 3. United States. Army- History. 

4. United States- Fore ign re lations- Vie tnam. 5. Vietnam- Fore ign re lations- United States. I. Center of 

Mili ta ry History. II . Titl e. Il l. Series. 

0 5556.8.567 1983 959.704 83-600103 

First Printed 1983-CMH Pub 91- 1 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U .S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
United States Army in Vietnam 

David F. Trask, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of I January 1982) 

James C. Olson 

University of Missouri 

Maj. Gen. Quinn H . Becker 

Deputy Surgeon General, U.S.A. 

Maj. Gen. john B. Blount 

U.S. Army Tra ining and 

Doctrine Command 

Brig. Gen. Dallas C. Brown, Jr. 

U.S. Army War College 

Richard D. Cha llener 

Princeton University 

Col. Roy K. Flint 

U.S. Military Academy 

Arthur L. Funk 

University of Florida 

Joseph E. Harris 

Howard University 

John H. Hatcher 

The Adjutant General Center 

Morten jay Luvaas 

Allegheny College 

James O'Neill 

National Archives and 

Records Service 

john Shy 

University of Michigan 

Col. William A. Stofft 

U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College 

Betty M. Unterberger 

Texas A&M University 

U.S. Army Center of Militanj History 

Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr. , Chief of Military History 

Chief Historian 

Chief, Histories Division 

Editor in Chief 

David F. Trask 

Col. James W. Dunn 

John Elsberg 

iii 

• • . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

With the publication of this volume the United States Army Center of 

Milita ry History inaugurates the United States Army in Vie tnam series. This 

comprehensive new collection of historical studies continues the Army's 

attempt to record its role in major conflicts, an effort begun in the earlier 

United States Army in World War II and United States Army in the Korea n 

War series. Advice alld Slipport: Tile Early Years, 1941- 1960 is the first of three 

volumes that will trea t the Army's effort to ad vise the South Vietnamese. 

Other titles in the se ries will describe combat operations; the Army's role in 

pacification, logistics, communications, engineer operations, medical support, 

and tra ining; relations with the media; and activities at the Department of the 

Army level. 

The present volume describes the activities of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 

during World War II, military advice and assistance to the French government 

during the immediate postwa r yea rs, and the advisory program that developed after the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Its scope ranges from high-level 

policy decisions to low-echelon advisory operations in the field, p resented 

against a background of relevant military and politica l developments. The 

author enjoyed access to the official records of the period and examined 

personal papers, interviews, other documentary sources, and miscellaneous 

published materials. Useful not only as a study of military assistance but as a 

view of the Army as an agent of national policy, this volume is a fitting 

introduction to the overall study of the conflict in Vietnam. 

Washington, D.C. 

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR. 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 

vii 
The Author 

Ronald H. Spector is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University and received 

his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Yale University. He served as a fie ld 

historian with the U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam during 1968 and 1969 and is 

a major in the Marine Corps Reserve. He was assistant professor of history at 

Louisiana State University from 1969 until 1971, when he jOined the U.S. 

Army Center of Military History. During 1977 - 78 he was a Fulbright senior 

lecturer in India. 

Dr. Spector is the author of Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of 

George Dewey and Professors of War: The Naval War Col/ege and the Development of 

the Naval Profession and coeditor with Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. , of Voices of 

History: America at War and Related SlIbjects. He has contributed articles to a 

number of journals including Armed Forces and Society, the JOllrnal of SOlltheast 

Asian History, Military Affairs, and the Pacific Historical Review. He is currently 

writing a second book in the U.S. Army in Vietnam series, The War and the 

Soldier. 

viii 
Preface 

This book traces the origins of the Army's long, and frequently unhappy, 

involvement in Indochina from World War II to the end of the Eisenhower 

administration. In order to place that involvement in context, I have frequently found it necessary to describe at some length the evolution of overall 

U.S. policy toward Indochina as well. The focus of the work, however, is 

American military involvement. Those readers seeking a comprehensive history of U.S.-Vietnam relations, the political development of North and South 

Vietnam, or the internationa l and legal ramifications of the wars in Indochina 

may refer to the many excellent works on those subjects cited in the footnotes 

and the Bibliographical Note. 

While this book does not cover all aspects of American policy toward 

Vietnam, I believe the reader will find that this examination of the activities of 

Americans on the scene sheds considerable light on that policy. He will also 

agree, I think, that frequently U.S. actions in Vietnam were shaped far more 

by the beliefs and decisions of Americans in Saigon than by those in 

Washington. 

The Vietnam War has left a legacy of controversy concerning most major 

American actions and decisions as well as those of our enemies and allies. I 

have no expectation that the conclusions reached in this account will meet 

with universal agreement on the part of former participants in, and students 

of, the conflict. Nevertheless, I hope they will agree that the events and 

decisions have been described fairly, accurately, and without bias toward any 

particular organization or individual. 

In the course of research and writing of this book I have received the 

generous support of a large number of people. Brig. Gen . James L. Collins, 

Jr., Chief of Military History, was a constant source of support throughout, as 

were Col. John E. jessup, jr., and Col. james F. Ransone, successively chiefs 

of the center's Histories Division. lowe a special debt of gratitude to Col. 

James W. Dunn, the present Histories Division chief, who overcame many 

obstacles in the process of preparing the book for publication. Charles V. P. 

von Luttichau and Vincent H. Demma began this project as a monograph in 

the early 1960s. Mr. Demma also generously shared with me many of the 

documents he has gathered in connection with research for the successor 

volume, now in preparation. Maj. Arthur Chapa, USAR, performed much of 

the basic research upon which Chapter 18 is based during his tour of active 

duty at the center in 1978. Charles B. MacDonald, former chief of the Current 

History Branch (now Southeast Asia Branch), guided the first draft to com pleix 
tion, while his successor, Stanley L. Falk, aided and supported me in the 

many tasks connected with readying the book for publication. 

I have also benefited greatly from the advice of the official review panel, 

under the chairmanship of Maurice Matloff, then chief historian, which 

included Vincent Demma , William J. Duiker, Col. James Dunn, Maj. Gen. 

Edward G. Lansdale, Charles B. MacDonald, and Robert Ross Smith. 

In addition to the panel members, many other individuals generously read 

and commented on the manuscript. They include Emily Brown, Edmund 

Gullion, Robert H. Ferrell, Gerald C. Hickey, Col. James I. Mu ir, Lt. Gen. 

Samuel L. Myers, Col. Ernest P. Lasche, Jeffrey Race, Anna Rubino Schneider, 

General Matthew B. Ridgway, Reginald Ungern, Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, 

Lt. Gen. Robert C. Taber, Col. Na thaniel P. Ward, and Brig. Gen. Charles A. 

Symroski. Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell also 

read the manuscript and remained constant sources of information and 

encouragemen t throughout the period of the book's preparation. 

Like all researchers in the voluminous yet elusive records of the Vietnam 

conflict, I have depended heavily on the knowledge and perseverance of 

many capable archivists, records managers, and fellow historians in the federal government. I am especially grateful to William H. Cunliffe, John Taylor, 

and Edward Reese of the Military Archives Division, National Archives and 

Records Service, Sandra Rangel, Cathy Nica stro, Pat Dowling, a nd Sa lly 

Marks of the Diplomatic Branch, and Mary M. Wolfskill of the Library of 

Congress. Dean C. Allard of the Naval Historical Center was as usual a 

source of ideas and information as well as a sure guide to Navy records. 

Benis M. Frank of the Marine Corps Historical Center facilitated my research 

in the Marine Corps oral history collection. Paul L. Taborn and John H. 

Hatcher of the Adjutant Genera l's Office and Theresa Farrell of the State 

Department took time from their many other duties as records managers to 

aid me in my search for relevant materia l. My former colleagues Robert J. 

Watson and Willard J. Webb of the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff helped greatly in my research in the records of that organization. 

I am also grateful to George H. Curtis and Sue Jackson of the Dwight D. 

Eisenhower Library, George Chalou and Michael Miller of the Suitland Federal Records Center, and Nancy Bressler of the Princeton University Library 

and to General J. Lawton Collins for permission to review portions of his 

personal fil es relati ng to Vietnam. Ann P. Crumpler of th e U.s. Army Corps 

of Engineers Library and Carol I. Anderson of the center's library patiently 

bore with my many requests for assistance and always found the sometimes 

arcane material I required. Special thanks are due to Edward L. Morse, 

former special assistant to the under secretary of state, for his timely assistance at a critical moment in the preparation of the volume. 

Finally, I am grateful to fellow players in the Giant Vietnam Jigsaw Puzzle 

Game-Robert Blum, Lt. Col. John D. Bergen, Sam Adams, Richard A. Hunt, 

Jeffrey J. Clarke, Neal Petersen, Osca r P. Fitzgerald, Trumbull Higgins, Joel 

D. Meyerson, Gary R. Hess, Jack Shulimson, George L. MacGarrigle, and 

William M. Hammond-for advice and criticism. My editors, Catherine A. 

Heerin, Barbara H. Gilbert, and Joycelyn M. Bobo, ably led by John Elsberg, 

Editor in Chief, displayed remarkable fortitude in coping with the idiosyncrax 
sies of the author. Arthur S. Hardyman, Chief, Graphic Arts Branch, and 

Howell C. Brewer, Jr., respectively, planned a nd prepa red the artwork and 

attempted, with little success, to improve the author's knowledge of geography. Mr. Hardyman worked with me in selecting the illustratio;'ls. 

This first volume in the U.S. Army's history of the Vietnam War is 

dedicated to all who served in that conflict. In this connection the au thor 

wishes to recall fri ends and members of his unit who died in Vietnam: 

Christopher Bell, Kurt C. Hussmann, Timothy John O'Keefe, Thomas Rainy, 

and Morton Singer. 

The author alone is responsible for interpretations and conclusions, as well 

as for any errors that may appea r. 

Washington, D.C. RONALD H. SPECTOR 

xi 

Contents 

PART ONE 

The American Discovery of Vietnam 

C/l(lpter Pnge 

1. Conquest and Revolt 3 

Nine Centuries of War 3 

French Indochina . . 5 

The Impact of War. . 17 

2. From Pearl Harbor to the Japanese Coup 21 

Conflicting Policies. . 21 

America and Indochina . 24 

The Japanese Takeover . 29 

3. From the Japanese Coup to V - J Day 37 

A Reassessment of Policy 43 

Policy at the Field Level . . 45 

4. The Chinese Occupation of North Vietnam, August - October, 1945 51 

The Occupation and the Viet Minh 53 

Gallagher's Mission 59 

Americans in Southern Vietnam 64 

Possible Trouble . 68 

PART TWO 

The Franco - Viet Minh War 

5. "Heading Into a Very Bad Mess": Origins of Military Aid 

A Reluctance to Intervene . . 

The French Offensive of 1947 

The Bao Dai Experiment . . 

American Aid 

6. Establishing a Military Assistance Program 

The Griffin Mission 

A Growing Commitment 

The Melby-Erskine Mission 

The Military Assistance Advisory Group 

77 

77 

85 

90 

97 

105 

105 

106 

111 

115 

xiii 
Chapter Page 

7. Defeats in Tonkin, Deliberations in Washington 123 

Increasing Aid and Continuing Debate 126 

Toward a Vietnamese Army 131 

8. The de LaUre Interlude, 1950 - 1951 135 

Viet Minh Offensives in Tonkin 136 

The de Lattre Visit 141 

Solving the Supply Problem 144 

9. Looking for a Way Out, January 1952 - February 1953 149 

Problems of a Vietnamese Army 153 

A U.S. Role in Training? 155 

Fall Offensives 157 

The Light Battalion Proposal 162 

The Unconventional Warfare Option 164 

10. The Road to Dien Bien Phu 167 

The Letourneau Plan 170 

Financing the French 176 

The Second O'Daniel Visit 179 

Dien Bien Phu 182 

11. The Question of Intervention 191 

U.S. Strategic Options 194 

The Debate Over Intervention 198 

Operation V AUTOUR 204 

The Army Resists Intervention 208 

PART THREE 

Going It Alone 

12. "Political Considerations Are Overriding": The Decision on 

Training 219 

Reorganizing the Vietnamese Army 221 

Diem Comes to Power 224 

The Refugee Operation 225 

The Decision on Training 228 

13. The Collins Mission 231 

Preventing a Coup 232 

Establishing a Training Mission 238 

Confrontations With the Sects 243 

The French Withdraw 250 

14. Picking Up the Pieces, 1955 - 1956 255 

The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission 257 

South Vietnamese Force Structure 262 

Dealing With the Threat From the North 268 

xiv 
Chapler 

15. Building a Vietnamese Army, 1956- 1959 

The State of the Vietnamese Army 

Schools and Training 

The Language Barrier . 

The Adviser's Role . 

The Army Reorganizes 

16. Roots of a New War, 1957 - 1959 

The Uses of American Aid 

Land Reform 

Communist Strategy After Geneva 

Problems of Intelligence 

Forces for Internal Security 

The Situation Deteriorates 

17. Things Fall Apart, July 1959 - June 1960 

A New Viet Cong Strategy 

The Viet Cong Take the Offensive 

The Breakdown of the Army . 

lB. "Something Extra and Special" .-

The Counterinsurgency Controversy 

Crisis Planning 

The Cou nterinsurgency Plan 

The Coup Attempt 

19. Assessment 

Bibliographical Note 

Index 

No. 

Table 

1. South Vietnamese Army Force Basis as Proposed by O'Daniel, 

Page 

275 

278 

282 

286 

291 

295 

303 

306 

308 

310 

316 

320 

325 

329 

329 

337 

343 

349 

349 

357 

361 

369 

375 

381 

387 

May 1955 . 264 

Charts 

1. South Vietnamese Army Light Division, 1956 . 

2. South Vietnamese Army Field Division, 1956 . 

3. Reorganized South Vietnamese Army Infantry Division, 1959 

Maps 

266 

267 

297 

1. Regions of Vietnam 6 

2. Operation LEA, Autumn 1947 88 

3. Viet Minh Offensive Operations, October 1950 - February 1952 138 

xv 
No. 

4. Battles of 1952 and Operation LORRAINE 

5. Dien Bien Phu, March 1954 . 

6. Probable Attack Routes, 1956 

7. Advisory Commands (Before 1960) 

8. Major Viet Cong Activity, 1957 - 1959 

Illustrations 

Page 

· 158 

· 188 

· 269 

.290 

· 314 

Royal Officials of Tonkin . . Facillg page 1 

The Imperial Palace in Hue 5 

Military Mandarin in Traditional Uniform 8 

Commander of the Imperial Guard at Hue, Early Nineteenth Century 9 

French Colonial Troops in Saigon Between the World Wars 12 

Japanese Troops Approach Haiphong, Fall 1940 16 

Com mo. Milton E. Miles, U.S. Navy. 25 

Montagnard Village Near Ban Me Thuot . 26 

Maj . Gen. Claire L. Chennault With Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley 28 

Gia Lam Rail Center Under Attack by Fourteenth Air Force Bombers 31 

Indochinese Troops of French ColomaJ Forces Retreat to China 32 

Ho Chi Minh . 39 

Viet Minh Guerrillas, Instructed by 055 Team, Fire U.S. Carbines 41 

Vice-Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten on Inspection Tour, 1944 47 

Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer With Ambassador Hurley . 48 

Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher With Lt. Gen. Lu Han . 53 

Postage Stamps Depicting Marshal Henri Philippe Petain and Ho Chi 

Minh . 54 

Maj. Archimedes L. A. Patti With Vo Nguyen Giap . 57 

French Prisoners of War in the Citadel, Hanoi . 58 

Japanese Surrender Ceremony in Hanoi, September 1945 62 

French Forces Move Against the Viet Minh 74 

Ho Arrives in France, 1946 . 78 

Viet Minh Rally in Hanoi, Early 1946 . 80 

Giap Addresses a Viet Minh Armed Propaganda Unit 81 

French Troops Search Houses in Hanoi, January 1947 82 

Viet Minh Arms Factory . 86 

High Commissioner Emile Bollaert and Emperor Bao Dai Sign the 

First Ha Long Bay Agreement, 1947 . 91 

Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, U.S. Marine Corps 112 

French Convoy Near Ninh Hoa . 113 

Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink . 117 

French Officer Trains Vietnamese Troops To Use 57-mm. Recoilless Rifle 130 

Prime Minister Tran Van Huu and Emperor Bao Dai 132 

President Harry S. Truman, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, 

Ambassadors Henri Bonnet and Donald R. Heath 143 

Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins Reviews French Expeditionary Corps 

Tankers and Vietnamese National Army Troops in Hanoi, 1951 . 146 

xvi 
Page 

French Forces Near Hoa Binh 151 

Ambassador Heath Greets Brig. Gen. Thomas j. H. Trapnell on Arrival 

in Vietnam, August 1952 . 156 

Vietnamese Troops of the French Expeditionary Corps Ford a Stream 

During Operation LORRAINE . 160 

French Troops View Captured Viet Minh Equipment . 160 

French Colonia l Troops Board Aircraft at Nan San . 162 

Vietnamese National Army Troops With 81-mm. Mortar 163 

Minister for the Associated States jean Letourneau and Ambassador 

Bonnet Arrive in Washington 165 

Lt. Gen. Henri Navarre 173 

Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh With Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor 178 

Maj. Gen. Rene Cogny, Col. Christian de Castries, and General 

Navarre 183 

U.S. Air Force Technician Paints French Insignia on C - 119 . 192 

President Eisenhower, General Paul Ely, and Admiral Arthur W. Radford 193 

The joint Chiefs 'of Staff . 204 

Dien Bien Phu Under Viet Minh Bombardment . 205 

Lt. Gen. john W. O'Daniel Bids Farewell to Brig. Gen. Nguyen 

Van Vy and Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don. 

Delegates of the Great Powers, Geneva, 1954 . 

Vietnamese Refugees Board U.S. Navy LST at Haiphong 

Catholic Refugees on Their Way South 

General j. Lawton Collins 

General Hinh With Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon 

Vietnamese Army Troops Fight the Binh Xuyen in Saigon 

Cao Dai Troops of the Vietnamese National Army 

President Diem With General Ely 

General O'Daniel Confers With President Diem 

Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams 

U.S. Tanks, Trucks, and Gun Carriages Abandoned by the French, 

1955 

Axles and Engines in Outdoor Storage . 

U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Headquarters 

General O'Daniel Visits Vietnamese National Army Training Center 

Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow . 

Recruits at Quang Trung Basic Training Center 

Cadets at Dalat Military Academy . 

216 

220 

226 

227 

232 

234 

244 

245 

· 246 

· 252 

.256 

.257 

.258 

· 261 

.265 

.276 

.283 

.283 

Vietnamese Army Trainees on Obstacle Course, 

School 

2d Division Gunners Fire 105-mm. Howitzer . 

15th Light Division Cantonment Near Due My 

Nha Trang Commando 

.284 

.284 

.287 

U.S. Advisory Detachment Buildings at Ban Me Thuot 

General Williams Receives Briefing on Amphibious Exercise 

Vietnamese and U.S. Instructors on Rifle Range, Nha Trang Training 

Center 

Vietnamese Army Convoy in the Central Highlands . 

.287 

292 

294 

.306 

xvii 
Page 

u.s. Operations Mission Director Leland Barrows . 323 

Agroville Under Construction at Vi Thanh, Phong Dinh Province . 333 

Vietnamese Navy Patrol Boats on the Song Be River . . 341 

Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr Inspects Vietnamese Honor Guard With 

General Williams and Lt. Gen. Le Van Ty . . . 366 

General McGarr Visits Montagnard Village Near Dalat . . 369 

Senior Advisers' Conference Participants, January 1960 . 377 

llIustrations courtesy of the following sources: pp. 8, 9, 86, 130, 163, 165, 173, 

183, and 205, Illdochille; pp. 74, 276, and 323, Department of State; pp. 39, 78, 82, 

91, 113, 226, and 245, National Archives; p. 132, Library of Congress; pp. 53 and 62, 

Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher Papers; pp. 366 and 369, Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr; 

pp. 283, 264, 287 (top), 294, 306, and 341, Lt. Gen. Samuel L. Myers; pp. 216, 252, 

and 265, Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel Papers; pp. 234and 246, James H. Tate; p. 156, 

Lt. Gen. ThomasJ. H. Trapnell; pp. 287 (bottom) and 377, Col. Nathaniel P. Ward; 

p. 54, Lt. Col. Joseph W. A. Whitehorne; and pp. 256, 257, 258, and 292, Lt. Gen. 

Samuel T. Williams; p. 16, United Press International; p. 81, Douglas Pike; and 

p. 244, Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale. All other illustrations from the files of 

Department of Defense and U.S. Army Center of Military History. 

xviii 

Royal Officials of Tonkin 
PART ONE 

The American Discovery of 

Vietnam 

1 

Conquest and Revolt 

The author of a widely read history of the Vietnam conflict observed that " in 

a sense we discovered Vietnam in ]954.,,1 This American discovery came 

abou t as a result of the imminent collapse of French power in Indochina. The 

factors in volved in the French collapse went back many years, and in some 

respects centu ries, before the 1950s. These factors, while clear enough to 

present-day historians, were not at all obvious to the American leaders of the 

1950s, who for the most part lacked a knowledge of Vietnamese culture and 

history. Like the Eu ropean discoverers of America who believed that the loca l 

inhabitants were citizens of China and pa inted them dressed in European 

clothing, the America n discoverers of Vietnam viewed that cou ntry from the 

vantage point of their own preconceptions. 

Nine Centuries of War 

T he recorded history of Vietnam begins in 208 B.C., and many historians trace the origins of the Vietnamese to an even earlier period. 2 For over a 

th ousand years, from 111 8.C. until A.D. 939, Vietnam was ru led as a part of 

the Chinese Empire. Although the Vietnamese were heavily influenced by 

Chinese culture, they never willingly accepted Chinese ru le. Sporadic revolts 

against the Chinese overlords occurred throughout the thousa nd years, notably in A.D. 39 under the semilegenda ry Tru ng sisters, in 248 under Trieu Au, 

and in 542 under Ly Bon. Independence was finally attained in the tenth 

century under the leadership of the Ly, Vietnam's first ruling dynasty.' 

lChester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America ill Vietnam (New York: Dodd Mead, 1970), p. 16. 

2Joseph Bullinger, Vie/Ill/III: A Political History (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 3- 21; D. G. E. 

Hall, History of Smtlll-East Asia (New York: SI. Martin's, 1955), pp. 169-70. 

3Le Thanh Kho, Le Viet Nam: Histoire et Civilisatioll (Paris: Edilions de M inuit, 1955), pp. 

98- 134. 

3 
Advice and Support: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The Vietnam which emerged from Chinese ru le comprised the Red River 

valley and a narrow coastal strip stretching from the present-day city of 

Thanh Hoa south to the vicinity of the modern town of Vinh. To the north 

was China and to the south were other powerful neighbors. In the southwest 

was the great Khmer Empire of Cambodia, then at the height of its power, 

and to the immediate south was th e kingdom of Champa. The Chams were a 

people of Indian cultu ral traditions who were more or less constantly at war 

with the Sinicized Vietnamese. 

The Vietnamese were more than able to hold their own against those 

formidable neighbors. The Chams were defeated in the eleventh century and 

again in the fourteenth. Each time a furth er portion of their kingdom passed 

unde r Vietnamese rule. Finally, in 1471, the last remna nts of Champa, in 

what is now central Vietnam, became part of the expa nding Vietnamese state. 

In the interim, the Vietnamese had succeeded in repu lsing an invasion by the 

Mongols in the fourteenth century and a Chinese attempt at reconquest in the 

fifteenth' 

By the mid-eighteenth century the Vietnamese reached the Gulf of Siam 

(Thaila nd), occupying new territories and wresting others from the Khmers. 

By that time, however, the traditional machinery of government, patterned 

after, but far less effective than, the government of imperial Chi na , had 

broken down. At the imperial ca pital of Hue in the central part of the 

country, the emperors still reigned as the religious and symbolic. head of the 

na tion, but actual power since the early seventeenth century had been held 

by two rival families, the Trinh, who controlled the north, and the Nguyen, 

who ruled the south S 

In 1774 three brothers, ca lled the Tay Son after the name of their native 

village, led a successfu l revolt in the sou th aga inst the Nguyen. They then 

turned on the Trinh, driving them from Hue and capturing Hanoi. In 1787 

one of the Tay Son brothers deposed the moribund imperial dynasty and 

declared himself emperor under the name Quang Trung. One year later he 

successfully defea ted a Chinese expeditionary force sent to restore the old 

dynasty, but his reign was short. In a long and bitter war, the last survivor of 

the Ngu yen family, Nguyen Anh, with the aid of French military advisers 

and technicians, destroyed the Tay Son and in 1802 ascended the throne of a 

united Vietnam as the Emperor Gia Long. 

By any sta nda rd, the long history of Vietnam presents an impressive 

picture of martial prowess, of victory aga inst odd s, of violent and often 

successful resistance to domestic oppression and foreign conquest. Yet on the 

eve of Vietnam's emergence on the international scene, few Americans 

appea red to appreciate that history. In 1945, for example, President Franklin 

"'A brief account, based on Vietnamese sources, is in Dilvid C. Marr, Vie/I/amese Alllic%llin/islII , 

1885- 1925 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 197 1), pp. 11 - 17. 

5J'ruong Buu Lam, " Intervention vs. Tribute in Si no-Vietnamese Relations," in John K. Fairbank, ed., Ti,e Chillese World Order: Traditiollal Chit/a'S Foreig" Relatiolls, East Asian Series no. 32 

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 165- 72; Buttinger, Vietllam: A Political History, 

pp. 49- 53. 

4 
COl/quest and Revolt 

The Imperial Palace in Hue 

D. Roosevelt casually remarked to Josef Sta lin that "the Indochinese were 

people of small statu re .. . and were not war-li ke."· Roosevelt and the handful of Americans who concerned themselves in any way with Vietnam during 

the 1930s and 1940s viewed it primarily through the eyes of the French. 

French Indochina 

The French conquest of Vietnam and the rest of what became known as 

French Indochina had occurred in two stages. Cambodia and the southern areas of Vietnam were occupied during the 1850s and 1860s, and central 

Vietnam and the Red River valley, in the north, in the early 1880s. Although 

the Vietnamese fiercely resisted, they suffered from a lack of knowledge of 

modern military techn iques, from a paucity of modern weapons, and from 

poor coordination a nd leadership by the moribund and increasingly unpopular imperial government at Hue. The Vietnamese were forced to submit, but 

bDepartment of Stale, Foreign RelntiollS of the U"ited States: The COII[eretlces nt Malta alf(i Yalta , 

1945 (Washington, 1955), p. 770. 

5 
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COllquest alld Revolt 

sporadic movements of resistance by Nghia Quan ("righteous armies" ) or 

guerrillas continued to the end of the centu ry? 

The French divided Indochi na in to fi ve parts. They ruled the southern 

part, Cochinchina, where the loca l officials had refused to cooperate, directly 

as a colony of France; central Vietnam, called Annam, and northe rn Vietnam, 

called Tonkin, along with Cambodia and Laos (parts of the latter were wrested 

from Siam in 1893), became protectorates. (Map 1) [n Annam, the emperor 

and his traditional officials con tinued to conduct the ordina ry business of 

government under the wa tchful eye of a French " resident superior. " Both 

protectorates and the colony of Cochinchina were subject to the authori ty of 

the French governor-general of Indochina with headquarters in Hanoi. 

To American observers, before World War Il, this French Indochina 

appeared unexciting, unin teresting, and unimportant. The United States had 

no tradition of cultural and commercial relations with Indochina as she had 

long maintained with China and Japa n s A young American journalist who 

visited Haiphong in 1923, Gertrude Emerson, found a total of six Americans 

in that fourth largest city of Vie tnam . "An American consul was non-existenc 

there was not even a tourist bureau to offer expensive tours.. three weeks 

before, I myself had never heard of Haiphong."9 [n the 1920s there were less 

than a hundred Americans living in Vietnam. Many were Protestant missionaries of the Christian and Missiona ry Alliance Church who operated modest 

missions in Saigon, Da Nang, My Tho, Hanoi, Vin h Long, and Bien Hoa. 10 

Until 1940 when a consular office was opened in Hanoi, America n interests in Indochina were looked after by a single consul in Sa igon. [n 1923, the 

same yea r Emerson visited Haiphong, that American consul described [ndochina as "almost cut off, commercially, from the United States." Opportunities for America n business improved somewhat in the late 1920s with the 

inauguration of a direct Saigon- San Francisco steamship line. American 

exports of petroleum products, canned goods, and machinery to Indochina 

grew steadily throughout the interwar period, even after the steamship line 

became a casualty of the Great Depression in 1937. But American trade with 

70 n the French conquest of Indochina and the Vietnamese response, see John F. Cady, Roots of 

Frenell Imperialislll i/l Eastem Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954); Truong Buu Lam, 

Patfems of Viet llall/ese Response to Foreign /ntl'rvel/tioll, 1858 - 1900, Southeast Asia Studies no. 1"1 

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); M ilton E. Osborne, Frellcil PreSt'lI ce ill Cocliillcililla alld 

Call/bol/ia: Rille alld Respo"se, 1859- 1905 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); and Marr, Viet · 

namese A,,/iCO/Ollia/iSlII. 

8For a fuller discussion of American views of Southeast Asia in the interwar period, see Ronald 

H. Spector, "European Colonialism and American Attitudes Toward Southeast Asia: The Case of 

Indochina, 1919- 1941," vol. I , Pr(x.:eedillgs of file Seve,,/I, II/tema /iollal Associatioll of Historialls of 

Asia COllferellce (Bangkok, 1978), pp. 269- 89. 

9Gertrude Emerson, "Backwa ters of Empire in French Indo-China," Asia 23 (September 1923): 

672. 

lOAm Consul, Saigon (H arri s M. Cookingham), to Dept of State, 23 Nov 27, 851G.OO I4, Saigon 

Post records, Record Group (RG) 84, National Archives, Washington, O.c. Although few in 

number, these missionaries were looked on with great suspicion by the French . In 1940 an article 

in Le Courrier d'HaipllOIIg alleged that their efforts to combat opiu m addiction among the Vietnamese were actually a plol to encourage the use of American cigarettes instead and that the 

American missionary effort was being funded by the tobacco industry. Am Consul, Saigon (Peter 

Flood), to Dept of Stale, 3 Mar 40, 851G.OOI12, RG 84. 

7 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

, 

Military Mandarin in traditio/wi IlIIiforlll. 

Indochina was never a signifi cant item in the total of American exports. 

American consular officers pointed out that such fa ctors as discriminatory 

import duties and transit dues tended to discourage America n businessmen 

from trading in Indochina." Indochina did export large amounts of rubber to 

the United Sta tes, but this trade was entirely in the hands of the French. 

If French Indochina was of some minor concern to businessmen, American 

popular interest in the region was almost n il. Articles about Indochina in the 

New York Times averaged less than six per year from 1919 until 1940. In 

popular magazines, articles on Indochi na were even less frequent, averaging 

about two per year in such journa ls as Asia and the Na tional Geographic that 

specialized in stories about exotic areasl2 John Gunther's II/side Asia , one of 

the most widely read American books about Asia published between the 

wars, devoted less than 2 of its 659 pages to Indochi na, about the same 

amount of space that was devoted to the maharaja of Mysore and somewhat 

less tha n that given to the rajah of Sa rawak. 13 

lL Am Consul, Saigon, to Dept of State, 26 Jul 23; ibid" 7 Jul 38. Both in RG 59. 

l2New York Times II/dex, 19'19 - 7940; Reader's Gu ide 10 Periodical Literatllre. 191 9- 1940. Popular 

magazines are defined rather arbitraril y here to mea n magazines intended for the general public 

and indexed in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Lilerat ure. 

13See John Gunther, II/side Asia (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939). 

8 
COllquest and Revolt 

Commander of the Imperial Guard at Hue, early lIilleteelltil celltury. 

The image of Indochina which Americans on the scene conveyed to Washington was of a rather somnolent, backward corner of the French Empire. The 

French were always trying to "develop" it, and the "natives" were contented 

but lazy. "Indochina is one of the quietest portions of Asia," reported the 

American consul in 1924. "The Annamites as a race are very lazy and not 

prone to be ambitious. As for the Laotians and Cambodians [they] have 

hardly been touched by civilization and are even lazier than the Annamites.,,'4 

Another American diplomat, Henry l. Waterman, gave a similar but more 

colorful description of Laos. "Laos ... is still in a state of savagery with most 

of the inhabitants roaming the jungles without clothing and still killing their 

meat with poisoned arrows."'s The veteran Far East news correspondent 

Frank Warren described the Vietnamese as "without any keen desires, disdaining money and clothes, living their low grade existence in perpetual melancholy." '· In 1927 the American consul suggested that the State Department 

excuse him from the requirement to submit monthly politica l reports because 

"there were almost no political developments to report.,,17 

14Am Consul, Saigon (Leland L. Smith), to State Dept, 28 Aug 24, 851G'(XH, RG 84. 

'Slbid. (Henry Waterman) to Sta te Dept, 16 May 30, Saigon Post records, RG 84. 

16Frank Warren, "On the Mandarin Road to Hue," Asia 39 (October 1939):563. 

17Under Seey of Stale (Nelson T. Johnson) to Am Consul, Saigon (Harris M. Cookingham), 29 

Nov 27, 851G.OO16, RG 59. 

9 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Virginia Thompson, who visited Indochina and published a highly regarded study in 1937, echoed these reports. She emphasized the apathy, insensitivity, and placid ity of the Vietnamese, which she attributed to their inadequate diet and the intense tropica l heat. The Vietnamese lacked "the d riving 

power given by strong desires." Their intelligence was " keen" but their 

character "weak." So convincing was Thompson's picture of the backwardness of the Vietnamese that her work was cited by the British Foreign Office 

du ring World War II to buttress its argument that Indochina should be 

returned to France. 18 

In contrast to this portrait of a backward and changeless society (as late as 

1963 Ambassad or Henry Ca bot Lodge would describe Vietnam as "a medieval 

country"), Vietnam actually was undergoing a number of significant transformations which had been precipitated, if not understood, by the French. One 

immediate consequence of the French conquest of Vietnam had been the 

destruction or d rastic modifica tion of traditional social groupings within 

Vietnamese society. In central a nd northern Vietnam, the trad itional elite of 

Confucian-trained scholar-burea ucrats disappeared or survived with grea tly 

reduced power and preroga tives simply as an appendage to the French 

colonial bureaucracy. The decay of this leadership group greatly weakened 

the whole fa bric of traditional Vietnamese society a nd removed one· of the 

strongest conservative e lements in the country.]9 

The rural village, the most important insti tution in Vietnam, also drastica lly changed. The traditional Vietnamese village was autonomous, selfcontained, and largely self-s upporting. The villagers paid their taxes as a 

grou p and were collectively responsible to the imperial or regional government in all matters of law and rituaI. 2o This village structure was profoundly 

shaken when the French introduced such "modern" measures as individual 

taxa tion, money, private property, elections, and a census. 21 

By wea kening the traditional Vietnamese leadership group and promoting 

the lega l autonomy of individ ual villagers without establishing new forms of 

political orga nization to encompass these changes, "the French were inviting 

the disintegration of the Vietnamese social system.'''' By the beginni ng of the 

twentieth century that disin tegration was already well adva nced. What 

America n and other observers saw as a traditional and unchanging Vie tnam 

was in fact a society in the midst of transition. 

French ru le furth ered this transition also by contributing to the crea tion of 

new social groupings. As the French encouraged production, a sma ll but 

growing working class emerged in the coal mines and on the rubber plantations. In the sou th, the French sold land seized during their conquest of 

18F478 166/61, 26 Jan 44, sub: Record of French in Indochina, FO 37 1 41723 Fore ign Office 

records, Public Records Office, London. 

19Quote from Alexander B. Woodside, Comml/llity alld Revo/Il lioll ill Modern Vie/l1alll (Boston: 

H oughton M ifflin, 1976), p. 248; see <l Isa pp. 26- 27. 

2oIbid ., pp. 8 - 9, 27, 130- 31. 

21Paul Mus, "Vietnam: A Nation Off Balance," ¥ale Review 41 (Summer 1952):526- 29. 

22Woodside, COI1l1llllllily mId Revo/Illioll, p. 11 9; see also John T. McAlister, Jr. , Vieilltim: Ti,e 

Orixius of Revo/ulioll (Carden City: Doubleday, 1971), p. 45. 

10 
COllquest alld Revolt 

Cochinchina to French colonists and wealthy Vietnamese in large lots. By 

1930, 45 percent of the arable land in the Mekong Delta was owned by the 

wealthiest 2 percent of the population. 23 With landholding so highly concentrated, most of the population in the south was reduced to the status of small 

tenants or agricultural laborers. 

The wealthy landowners, together with the Vietnamese in urban areas 

who held administrative posts in the French colonial bureaucracy and law 

courts or who owned businesses, constituted a new e lite. Many were absentee landlords. Ed ucated in Western-style schools, often in France, and living 

mainly in the larger urban areas, these bureaucrats, large landowners, professionals, and businessmen were almost as far removed from the outlook 

and life-style of the mass of rural Vietnamese as were the French. Yet to 

Americans and most Frenchmen this small clique constituted " the Vietnamese." 

It was the only portion of the local population which Westerners could easily 

communicate with and understand. For many years, both before and after 

World War II, Americans equated the opinions of this sma ll elite with the 

views and desires of the Vietnamese people as a whole. 

Neither French nor American observers of Indochina before World War II 

appear to have had any inkling that these social and politica l developments 

could someday coa lesce to produce a movement that would drive the French 

from Vietnam. On the contrary, European colonialism in Asia, particularly in 

Vietnam, appeared stronger and more vigorous than ever. Even Ho Chi Minh 

in the early 1930s saw France not as a declining power but as one bent on 

new imperialist ventures. 24 

Developments since the turn of the century seemed to confirm the assumption of observers that colonialism was here to stay. The last scattered antiFrench revolts led by scholar-burea ucrats in the name of the old monarchy 

had been easily snuffed out by the end of the 1890s. 25 During World War I 

the French had kept Vietnam peaceful and quiet with less than 10,000 troops 

and about 15,000 Vietnamese auxiliaries, while sending more than 43,000 

Vietnamese to Europe to serve on the Western Front. 26 The indifferent showing of these Vietnamese troops on European battlefields only reinforced the 

idea that the Vietnamese could never seriously challenge a Western power. 

During the interwar period American observers generally saw no evid ence 

that the Vietnamese had either the desire or the capacity for self-government. 

Most tended to accept the view of the conservative French colonials that "the 

natives" were too backward to be entrusted with Western-style political rights 

and civil liberties. 27 

At the end of the 1920s a wave of violent anti-French incidents swept 

Vietnam. The moving force behind them was the Vietnamese Nationalist 

23McAlister, Viefl1flll/; Origills of ~evoilitiol/, pp. 64- 65. 

l-iWoodside, COlllllllll1ity ami Revolutioll, p. 171; Spector, "European Colonialism and American 

Attitudes Toward Southeast Asia," p. 272. 

'2SMarr, Vietnam A"ticolollialism, pp. 47- 76. 

26McAlister, Vietllalll; Origills of RCUO/UtiOIl, p. 62. 

27 Am Consul. Saigon (Leland L. Smith), to Dept of State, 28 Aug 24, RG 59; ibid. (Cookingham) 

to Dept of State, 24 Oct 27 and 5 Jun 28, both in RG 84. 

11 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

French Colonial Troops in Saigon betweerz the World Wars. 

Party, the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang. Known by its initials, VNQDD, the 

party was a clandestine organization of civil servants, teachers, small shopkeepers, and militiamen, loosely modeled on the Chinese Kuornintang. Its 

aim was nothing less than the expulsion of the French. 28 

On 9 February 1929, members of the VNQDD murdered a Frenchman 

named Bazin, the director of the French labor bureau which recruited workers 

for French plantations in southern Vietnam and on the islands of New 

Caledonia in the Pacific. The contract labor system which Bazin represented 

was notorious as little more than "a scandalous slave trade" that sent hundreds of Vietnamese for long years of labor on the French Pacific islands, 

from which many never returned alive.29 By their act the young Nationalists 

of the VNQDD hoped to increase their prestige and widen their support 

among the population. 

One year after the murder of Bazin, two companies of Vietnamese militiamen, subverted by the VNQDD, mutinied at Yen Bay and killed five of their 

French officers and noncommissioned officers as well as six Vietnamese who 

2ilJoseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 1, From Colonialism to tile Viet mill}' (New 

York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 207- 09; Woodside, Community mid Revolution. pp. 59- 61; McAlister, 

Vietnam: Origins of Revoilltioll, pp. 79- 81. 

29Yirginia Thompson, French Itldoclli1lt1 (New York: Macmi.llan, 1937), p. 164. 

12 
COllqllest alld Revolt 

refused to join them. After French and loya l Vietnamese troops quickly 

su ppressed the mutiny, the colonial authorities bega n a roundup of VNQDD 

members. French aircraft bombed the village of Co Am, the reputed headquarters of the rebels in the Red River Delta, and killed two hundred villagers. 30 Most of the members of the VNQDD were quickly ca ptured, and th e 

leaders were executed. 

Although these measures effectively removed the immediate threat to 

colonial rule represented by the VNQDD, the long-term consequ ences would 

prove disastrous to the French in later yea rs. For into the vacuum created by 

the destruction of the VNQDD stepped the Communists. Ironica lly, in searching for a nationalistic alternative to the Vi etnamese Communist movement 

during the late 1940s, the French would discover that in crushing the VNQDD 

they had destroyed the very roots of the alternative they sought.

3I 

The Communist movement in Vietnam dated from the mid-1920s when 

the Tonkinese Ho Chi Minh had fo rmed the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth 

League among a group of Vietnamese exiles living in Canton, China. Although 

then only about thirty-five, Ho had already established himself as a veteran 

revolutionary. 32 He had partiCipated in the creation of the French Communist 

Party in 1920 and had spent a year in Moscow. Many graduates of a training 

school for cadres that Ho established at Canton returned to Vietnam to 

organize cells in their home districts, mainly in Tonkin . 

When a wave of strikes, riots, and demonstrations swept Vietnam ea rly in 

1930 in the wake of the Yen Bay rebellion, the Communists moved to organize the peasan ts and industrial laborers aga inst the French. For a while they 

enjoyed a limited success. In the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh, the 

colonial authorities fl ed or went into hiding and were replaced by village 

peasant soviets under Communist leadership. 33 

By the fall of 1930, the French colonial authorities had recovered from 

their surprise. They brought in foreign legionnaires, oth er troops, and a 

horde of security police and suppressed the soviets with extreme brutality. 

An estimated 10,000 Vietnamese, many of whom had taken no part in the 

rebellion, were killed and another 50,000 were deported. 34 Many others suffered assa ult, rape, robbery, and unjust imprisonment. The conduct of the 

legionnaires was especially reprehensible. A French court determined, for 

JOFor details of these events, see the following: M cAlister, Vie /Mill: Origills of Revoirllioll, pp. 

80- 91; R. B. Smith, "The Development of Opposition to French Rule in Southern Vietnam, 

1880 - 1940," Past {/ml PrescII/ 54 (February 1972): 11 7- 2 1; Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragoll Em/J{ltllt'd, 

1:214- 20; and Thompson, Frellc/' Illdochi1la, pp. 487- 89. The bombing of Co Am is in Louis 

Roubaud, Viet1lam: La Tragedie ll1dochilloise (Paris: Va lois, 193 1), p. 11 6. 

J1McAliste r, Vietnam: Origins of Reoo/lltiol/, p. 83; see also Woodside, COllllllllllity ami Reooiutiotl , 

p. 62. 

32 1-10's o riginal name, so fa r as can be determined, was Nguyen Sinh Cung, late r changed to 

Nguyen Tat Thanh, and by the mid · 1920s to Nguyen Ai Quoc. Because the re are few family 

na mes in Vie tnam, most Vietnamese are addressed by the ir given name, w hich comes last; but 

there are exceptions among public figures or people, such as Ho, w ho take a new name. 

33William J. Duiker, "The Red Soviets of Nghe-Tinh: An Ea rl y Communist Rebell ion in 

Vietnam," Journal of Solltheast Asian Stlldies 4 (2 September 1973): 186- 98. 

J.iBUltinger, Vietnam: A Drago" Embatlled, 1:2 13. 

13 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

example, that a group of legionnaires had murdered an entire truckload of 

prisoners whom they were transporting to trial. 35 

It would have seemed incredible in 1930 that other legionnaires less than 

twenty-five years later would be outfought, outgunned, outwitted, a nd forced 

to surrender to the sons and grandsons of those same terrorized peasants and 

laborers at a place called Dien Bien Phu. Yet th e uprisings of 1930, though 

effecti vely crushed, could be seen later as another step along a road leading 

inexorably to the French defeat in 1954. The Communists, though their ranks 

were seriously depleted, had lea rned valuable lessons and techniques, lessons 

that would serve them well in their war against the French in the 1940s. 36 

American perceptions of these developments were casual, unconce rned, 

and distorted, as evidenced by a long report on "communistic activities" in 

Indochina filed in 1930 by Henry I. Waterman, the American consul general 

in Saigon. Waterman's sources of information were mainly French officials 

and journalists, among whom a principal informant was Henri Cha vigny I 

whose pen name was Henri de la Chevrotier. A former draft dodger and 

police info rmer who had served time fo r bribery and blackmail, Chavigny 

published L'llllpartial, a newspaper heavily subsidized by the French colonial 

administration." Not surprisingly, Waterman's dispatches inevitably reflected 

the views of the more reactionary French colonials. He attributed the outbreaks of violence to " the influence of revolutionary ideas imported from 

commu nistic China" and believed that "the agitation was primarily directed 

against the graft and extortion of the Vietnamese mandarin officia ls rather 

than the French .""" 

Not only Ho Chi Minh's Revolutionary Youth League, wrote Waterman, 

but also the VNQDD was "communistic." He described the VNQDD as led 

by "young men of education but without experience who became the leaders 

of the organiza tion for purposes of personal aggrandizement." The VNQDD 

"gradually became nationalist in the sense that it became ambitious to use its 

communistic principles against the French. They formed their cells among the 

poorest and most ignorant.. making the most absurd promises to them 

that they would be genera ls or ma nda rins or judges."3. 

Waterman genera lly accepted the officia l French explanation of revolutionary outbreaks as the work of a few agitators in the protectorates of Annam 

and Tonkin. The people of Cochi nchina, under the direct rule of France, he 

reported, were " happy to let other people run the affairs of government since 

they have better living conditions than they ever had before the coming of 

the French ."'o Only in Annam was there fertile ground for revolutiongenerated by overpopulation, frequent famines, poor communications, and 

;)5Andrce Viollis, II/dOC/linn S.O.S. (Paris: Gallimard, 1935), p. 88; Thompson, Frelld/ IIIdociJil/a, 

pp. 192- 93. 

360 uiker, "The Red Soviets of NgIH::*Ti nh," pp. 195- 97. 

370n Chavigny, see Wa lte r L1nglois, Alltire Malraux: Tile Im/oc/li1ln Arive,,!ure (New York: Pracgcr, 

1966), pp. 42, 46, 86, 9l. 

3tlAm Consul, Saigon, to Dept of State, 16 May 30, 851C.OO IB/3, RG 59. 

3~ bid . 

4olbid. 

14 
COllqllest alld Revolt 

ignorance-but even in Annam, Waterman believed, most of the discontent 

was caused by the graft and extortion of Vietnamese mandarins. 

[n other reports Waterman tended to emp hasize the terrorism and brutality of the revolutionaries and to approve the repressive measures of the 

French as "necessary to counter the communist policy of terrorism and extortion. "" He quoted with approval Henri Chavigny's prediction that " the day 

w hen we place in these provinces sufficient troops, communisrn wi ll disappear rapidly because the people, no longer fearing reprisals, will themselves 

deliver up all the communists to the authorities.',42 

One of the few American scholars of the time to deal with the events of 

1930, Thomas E. Ennis, was even more inaccurate than Waterman. In writing 

French Policy nlld DevelopmeNts in Indochina, Ennis, a West Virginia history 

professor, relied upon official French sources. He described the uprisings of 

1930 as "controlled from Moscow" and explained the Yen Bay rebellion as the 

result of the machinations of Soviet agent Michael Borodin, who had, in fact, 

left Asia in 1927. Like Waterman, Ennis emphasized " the numerous acts of 

terror committed by the communists."43 

The American press, in genera l, paid little attention to the events of 

1930- 31 in Vietnam. Ennis expressed surprise that "the French government 

is the only one which has experienced serious trouble in a colony and has 

been able to suppress detailed news of the many revolts from reaching the 

foreign press.,,44 The Far East correspondent of the Christiall Sciellce MOllitor, 

Marc T. Greene, was one of the few Americans to cover the revolt. He placed 

much of the blame for the uprisings upon the French. "The 'iron heel' policy 

of France," he wrote, " has certa inly added fuel to the latent discontent of the 

Annamese population. . A heavy burden of taxation lies upon them, which 

holds them in an economic state not far from servitude and often casts them 

into jail. There is no doubt however that the high object of France- to make 

her possessions pay-is to be achieved if at all possible, and at whatever cost 

in terms of everything but money."45 Writing four years later in the Nl!1.u 

Rep"blic, British Socialist Raymond Postgate also blamed the French authorities and described instances of their brutality46 The New York Tillles, however, 

appea red to accept the explanation offered by many French officials that the 

Vietnamese had been "contaminated" by the spread of nationalist impulses 

similar to those which the "permissive" poliCies of the Americans and Dutch 

had encouraged in the Philippines and Indonesia 4 ? The paper focused main ly 

on the effect that the unrest might have on France's posture at an upcoming 

disarmament conference in London. 

'''Ibid" 21 May 3 1, 8S1G.OO.OOB17, RG 59. 

·''ib;d., 30 Jul 3 1, 85 IG.OOBI19, RG 59. 

""'Thorna s E. Ennis, Frel/cll Policy alia Devc/oplllclIIs ill /"docllina (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1936), pp. 185, 190. 

4-1 lbid ., p. 187. 

45Marc T. Greene, "Shadows Over Indochina," Asia, December 1930, p. 678. 

-It.Raymond rostate, "Echoes of a Revolt," New RCp"IJIiC, 22 May 1935. 

47Ncw York Times, 15 Feb 30. 

15 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

l 

Japanese Troops approach Haiphong, fall 1940. 

In the mid-1930s Waterman's successor as consul in Saigon, Quincy Roberts, 

had begun to question the rhetoric and methods of French rule. " 'Communism' out in these parts of the world," he told the Providel/ce /ollma/, "very 

often is the term used by the governing authorities to cover up a nationa listic 

movement. ''''s Later, he reiterated that a key point " in any survey of the 

communist danger in French Indochina is that government officials and local 

press are prone to label any criticism or expression of dissatisfaction with 

Indochinese institutions or existing conditions as communist activity. Certainly any movement or party advocating a Commonwealth of Indochina 

similar to the Commonwea lth of the Philippines would be called communist 

at once.,,49 In his reports Roberts emphasized the large nationalistic ingredient 

in Vietnamese communism and explained that in Vietnam "the communists 

have abandoned strict adherence to their principles and now are ready to 

recruit any enemy of French imperialism regardless of whether he believes in 

private property, religion, etc. "so "Repression," he wrote, "drives [both] communist and nationalist agitators under cover," and in the harsh and repressive environment of Vietnam only the Communists could provide such agi-

"BRoberts to Ma rc T. Greene, 18 Feb 35, State Dept Central files, RG 59. 

49Am Consul, Saigon, to Dept of Sta te, 25 May 37, 8SI C.OO, RG 59. 

SORoberts to Dept of State, 31 Jan 36, 8S 1G.OO8/22, RG 84. 

16 
Conqllest and Revolt 

tators with the type of highly disciplined clandestine organization necessary 

for survival. 5 1 

In her French Indochilla Virginia Thompson also acknowledged the nationalistic element in Vietnamese communism, even while emphasizing the latter's 

subordination to Moscow. "The orientation Nguyen Ai Quoc [Ho Chi Minh] 

gave to its program was nationalistic rather than communistic, which he 

regards as a subsequent stage.. . Recognizing the Annamite love of property and their patriarchal family system as well as the numerica l and intellectual weakness of the proletariat, he planned first to assure Annam's independence under a democratic bourgeois regime and then by a second step to 

integrate it into the Soviet Union.,,52 Yet few Americans before World War [[ 

other than Roberts and Thompson displayed anything approaching a sophisticated understanding of the nature of nationalist opposition in Vietnam. 

The Impact of War 

D espite the wid espread discontent of the 1930s, serious opposition to 

French rule probably would have been slow in developing had it not 

been for events during World War II. France's defeat and partial occupation 

by Germany in the spring of 1940 had a profound influence upon developments in Indochina. Having been at war with China since 1937, the Japanese 

moved swiftly to take advantage of France's distress. They demanded that the 

French cease to allow war materials to be sent to China from Tonkin, grant 

Japan free access to the raw materials of Indochina, and allow the Japanese to 

use Indochina as a staging area for operations against China. 

Washington viewed this development with alarm. As a strong supporter 

of China and the only remaining power strong enough to challenge Japan in 

the Pacific, the United States felt obliged to try to prevent what appeared to 

be but a first step in new Japanese aggressive moves against Southeast Asia. 53 

America, however, had few options. It urged the French to resist the Japanese demands but had to admit that it could not offer military or naval aid for 

the defense of Indochina ' 4 

By September 1940 the French had been intimidated into allowing the 

Japanese transit rights and airfields in northern Indochina and the right to 

station troops at the port of Haiphong. The United States responded by 

5 1 Am Consul, Saigon, to Dept of State, 16 Jan 37, 8SIC.OOIOl, RG 59. 

52Thompson, Freud, I"dochilla, pp. 489- 90. 

5JMcmoranduTn for Record (MFR), Cecil W. Gray, Asst to Seey of Slate, 24 luI 42, U"iff!f( 

Slaies- Vie/llam I~ l{/tio" s, 1945- 1967: A Study Pre/mrer! by the DCI){Ir/lllclIl of Defellse, 12 vols. 

(Washington, 1971), I:A- II - A- 12. A thorough discussion of American policy toward Indochina 

during 1940- 41 may be found in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Ullricc/art'd War, 

1940- 1941 (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 9 - 16. 641- 44. 

SoiMemo, Adviser on Political Relations (James C. Dunn) for Under Secy of State (Sumner 

Welles), 6 Aug 40, Department of State, Foreigll ReJatiolls of the U"ited Statt!S. 1940, vol. 4, Tile Far 

East (Washington, 1955), pp. 64 - 65. 

17 
Advice alld Slipport: TIle Early Yea rs, 1941 - 1960 

placing an embargo on sa les of high-grade fuels and scrap iron to Japan. In 

July 1941 the Japanese occupied the southern half of Vietna m without resistance. The French fla g still fl ew over Vietn am and French officials sti ll 

governed, but 50,000 Japa nese garrisoned the country. The Japa nese used 

airfields in the south and naval bases at Cam Ranh Bay. 

The Japanese move into southern Vietnam triggered the final crisis in 

Japanese-American relations w hich precipitated the Pearl Harbor attack. It 

also left a legacy of anger and bad feeling on the pa rt of both the French and 

the Americans. American officials saw France's actions as a supine capitulation to Japanese imperialism that opened the door for a Japanese attack on 

the Philippines and the British and Dutch col onies in Southeast Asia. " Indochina," wrote Admiral Harold R. Stark, chief of naval operations in 1940 and 

1941 , " is one of th ose. . points that I have always been sore over. . I 

somehow or other always had more or less a grudge with Vichy for th is 

particular action down there in that vital region. . Kamranh Bay became a 

very important assembly and jumping off poin t fo r the Japs in their penetration to the South .,,55 The French, on the other hand, believed that the 

negative response by the United States to their repeated ca lls for aid had left 

them no choice but to make the best dea l possible with the Japanese S6 

Within Vietnam, France's defea t and the capitulation of the colonia l authorities to Japan encouraged anticolonialist groups to launch new revolts in 1940. 

In the northeast leaders of the Phuc Q uoc, a traditionalist and monarchica l 

movement with close ties to Japan, took advantage of the Japanese movement 

into Tonkin to launch a series of uprisings in mountain regions near the 

Chinese border around Bac 50n, while in November a more serious revolt 

broke out in Cochinchina where rebels cut major highways and seized public 

buildings in the Mekong Delta region .

57 The French quickly suppressed the 

rebellions with troops, artillery, and planes. The American consul in Saigon 

reported that " thousands of natives have been killed and more are in prison 

awaiting execution. "58 The vice-consul in Saigon, Peter Flood, described "the 

promiscuous machine-gunning" of towns by French troops passing through 

in trucks and the "burning of entire villages" in reprisal for acts of defiance 

against the French . In the town of My Tho, he reported, the jail was "crowded 

with 2500 prisoners and many oth ers are reported to have been execu ted."s. 

In a world preoccupied with the European war and with other Japanese 

moves in the Fa r East, the bloody events of 1940 in Vietnam received even 

less attention than had the uprisings of 1930- 31. Most Americans who wrote 

55Ltr, Stark to Adm Ernest J. King, 3 Mar 43, King Papers, Double 0 files, Naval Historical 

Center, Washington, D.C. 

sc.see, for example. Telg, Ambassador in France (Ad mira l Wi lliam Leahy) to Seey of State. 

Aug 41, Department of State, Fore ~1I Relatiol1s of the UI/ ited States, 1941, vol. 5, The far fast 

(Washington, 1956). pp. 246- 47. 

57MeAlister, Viet "am: Origil1s of Revolutioll, pp. 109- 1 J; Butti nger, Viet "am: A Dragon Emilt/tlled. 

10243- 45. 

58Am Consul, Saigon (George D. Lamont), to State Dept. 23 Dec 40. 85 IG.OO/67, RG 59; 

McAlister, Vie/llam: Origills of Revol1ltioll, pp. 12 1- 24. 

5<JVice-Consul, Saigon (Peter 1-1. A. Flood), to Dept of Stale, 10 Dec 40, 85IG.OO/63, RG 59. 

18 
COllquest alld Revolt 

on the Far East still doubted the existence of any widespread nationalistic 

feeling in Vietnam. After a visit to Annam, for example, a writer for the 

popJ.llar magazine Asia stressed the apathy and misery of the people. "The 

number of those who discuss politica l policy is very small," he wrote, "and 

even in Hue it is hard to find people who are interested in international 

affairs. ,,60 The former Tokyo correspondent of the Christiall Sciellce MOllitor, 

William H. Chamberlain, also writing in Asia, observed that "the peoples of 

Indochina are too passive and backward and lacking in political consciousness 

and training for modern warfare to play a ny grea t part in determining their 

own destiny.,,6! The veteran Far East correspondent Robert Aura Smith concluded in a volume published in 1940 that "the actual threat to the French 

colonial structure [in Vietnarn] has been lessened by the fact that no unified 

nationalist movement exists. Grievances for the most part have been localized 

and in most cases might just as well have been directed aga inst the native 

rulers as against the French overlords. . The French administrators have 

known how to command respect and loyalty."62 

On the eve of Pearl Harbor, American interest in Indochina was primarily 

confined to the region's strategic position in the path of a southward Japanese 

advance . The question of the political future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia 

was recognized as a problem only by a hand ful of experts. Almost no one 

was aware of the political forces within Vietnam that would in the end play 

the decisive role in settling the question. 

6OWarren, "On the Mandarin Road to Hue," p. 563. 

6lWiliiam H . Chamberlain, "Derelict Empire in Indochina," Asia 40 (December 1940): 626. 

62Roberl Aura Smith, Ollr Future ;11 Asia (New York: Viking Press, 1940), pp. 71- 72. 

19 

2 

From Pearl Harbor to the Japanese Coup 

From Pearl Harbor until V - J Day, Indochina was of comparatively little 

political or military in terest to th e Un ited States. For most of the war American strategists viewed it as a minor part of the China-Burma-India theater, 

which itself rema ined a minor theater in th e globa l war against the Axis. For 

a time, in ea rly 1943, Allied planners considered the possibility that Indochina, 

or at least a deep water anchorage known as Cam Ranh Bay along the central 

coast of Vietnam, might be seized by British forces for use as an alternate 

route into China.' But as the war progressed and as the Centra l Pacific and 

South Pacific emerged as the most promising approaches to victory, American 

interest in an offensive from Southeast Asia or China gradually faded. Probably for that reason the United Sta tes never developed a coherent politica l 

policy toward Indochina during the war years. 

Conflicting Policies 

Officia l American policy regarding Indochi na appeared at times to favor 

continued recognition of French sovereignty. In April 1941, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles sta ted that the United States "recognizes the 

sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France. . over French possessions 

overseas."2 Somewhat more effusively, Ambassador Robert Murphy assured 

the American-sponsored governor-general of French North Africa, General 

Henri Giraud, that "the restoration of France, in all her grandeur, and in all 

the area which she possessed before the war in Europe as well as overseas, is 

lMcmo, Brig Cen J. E. H ull (oreofS, 8 Apr43, sub: Indochina in Relation to FutureOperations in the 

P<lcific, OPO 38 1 era (3 - 2 - 43), RG 165; Gmce P. Hayes, The History of the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff in 

World War II: The War Against Japan, vol. 2, Advance to Victory, H ist Sec, JCS, 1954, pp. 6·1- 66, 

Na tional Archives; Louis Morton, Strategy (lJI{I COII//I/(llId: TI/(! First Two Yenrs, United States Army in 

World War Ir (Wash ington, 1962), pp. 447 - 52. 

2Department of State BlIlldill, 18 April 1942. 

21 
Advice a1ld S"pport: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

one of the wa r aims of the United Nations. French sovereignty should be 

re-established as soon as possible over all territories, Metropolitan as well as 

colonial. ,,3 

Yet Ameri can policy was not nearly as clear-cut and unequivoca l as those 

stateme nts s uggest. President Franklin D. Roosevelt possessed strong, if somewhat vague, views about the futu re of In dochina . The president firml y 

believed that Indochina should not be returned to France at the end of the 

war but sho uld be given trusteeship status, with Chin a or perhaps Britain as 

the trustee." In conversa tions with advisers and foreign diplomats and at 

wartime conferences, Roosevelt made his position clear. " I saw Halifax [the 

Britis h ambassador to the United Sta tes] last week," he wrote to Secretary of 

State Cordell Hull in Jan uary 1944, "and told him that it was perfectly 

tru e that I had , for over a yea r, expressed the opinion that In do-China sho uld 

not go back to France . . it should be administered by an international 

trusteeship. France has had the country . one hundred yea rs, and the 

people a re worse off than they we re at the beginning. ,,5 

The president's views on Indochina may ha ve been strongly influenced by 

his attitude toward France. To Roosevelt the swift French defeat at the hands 

of the Germans in 1940 was proof that France was no longer worthy of being 

conside red a g reat power. He was convinced that only the complete collapse 

of French ne rve, socie ty, and government could have accou nted fbr that 

debacle,6 In his view the French acquiescence to the Japanese occupation of 

Indochina was o nly of a piece with Fra nce's ea rlie r collapse before the German assault? 

Given Roosevelt's views, it might appear surprising that the United States 

at first opted to maintain friendly-or at least correct- ties with the quasiindependent French government of Marshal Henri Phili ppe Petain, established at Vichy afte r the French surrender. Th e French Fleet and the French 

Colonial Empire, however, were un der Vichy control, and America n leaders 

believed that d iplomatic ties with the Vichy government were essential for the 

time being . At the sa me time, Gene ral Charles de Gaulle, who headed the 

Free French movement in London, was viewed with slispicion and dislike by 

both the president and Secretary of Sta te Hull, w ho considered him a rrogan t, 

untrustworthy, and authori ta rian. They doubted that de Ga ulle spoke for th e 

.1William L. La nger, Our Vichy Ca/llble (New York: H arper, J966), p. 33. Roosevelt taler told (he Jain! 

Chiefs of Staff tha t M urphy " had exceeded his authority" in promisi ng tha t French sovereignty would 

be restored over all French possessions. Min, JCS Mig, 7 Jan 43, Department of Stale, foreigll RelatiOI1S 

of fhe Ull ited Sta tes: The COl/ferel/ces at Washillgtoll, 1947 - 1942, fllld Casab/tIllC(l, 1943 (Washington, 1968), 

p. 5 14 . 

. IElliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: D uell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 11 5. Fora discussion of 

Roosevelt's views on Indochina, see Ga ry R. Hess, "Fra nklin D . Roosevelt and Indochina," /ollmnl of 

AmericfIIl His/ory 59 (Septembe r 1972): 353 - 68. 

sMemo, President Rooseve lt for Secy of State, 24 Jan 44, Department of State, Foreigll Reln/iolls of III" 

United Sta les: The COllferellces al Cairo alld Tehrall, 1943 (Washington, 1961), pp. 872 - 73. 

('Marv in R. Zahniser, Ullcertaill Frjelldshif): Alllericall-Frellc/l Reln/jOlls Through Ihe Cold War (New York: 

John Wiley Sons, 1975), p. 244. 

7Hess, "Franklin D. Rooseve lt and Indochina," p. 354. 

22 
From Pearl Harbor 10 tile Japallese COliP 

majo ri ty of Frenchmen, as he cla imed, and they on ly re luctantly consented in 

late "1944 to recogni ze hi s government.,s 

The president and some of his adv isers a lso felt a commitment to the 

cause of anti-imperia lism a nd self-determina tio n in genera l. They were resolved not to sacrifice American lives in the wa r w ith Japan simply to restore 

the o ld Eu ropea n colon ial empires in Asia. Until 1944 America n in terest in 

Asia cen tered on the lise of China as a base fo r aeria l bombardment and 

perhaps in vasion of Japan. For that pu rpose they favored the ea rly reopeni ng 

of supply routes to Ch ina by recapturing northern Burma from the Japa nese. 9 

The British seemed to American leaders to be more interested in efforts to 

liberate their Asia n possessions, especially Singapo re and Hong Kong. Maj. 

Gen . Raymond A. Wheeler, the chief of the American Services of Supply in 

the China-India theater, observed, "American interest points north to Japan, 

British inte rest south to Singapore."IO 

Despite s uch views, the Uni ted Sta tes in Aug ust 1943 agreed with Brita in 

to establish a new Anglo-America n command to co ntrol operatio ns in Southeast Asia, specifi ca lly in l3 urma, Cey lon, Sumatra, and Ma laya . Many America ns viewed this new Sou theast Asia Command, under Vice-Adm. Lord 

Louis Mou ntba tten, with considerable suspicion. Some facetiously suggested 

tha t the command's acronym- SEAC- stood for "Save England's Asia tic 

Colonies." The fact th a t the precise boundaries between the Southeast Asia 

Com mand and the neighboring China thea ter, under Generalissimo Chiang 

Ka i-shek, were never clea rly defined later proved a source of considerable 

controversy. 

Altho ug h the president approved establis hing the Southeast Asia Comma nd, the United States was carefu l to dissociate itself politica lly from the 

colonia l concern s of its Allies. The Uni ted Sta tes refused to assign any diplomatic representa ti ves to the command, a nd when the Free French sent a 

milita ry mission to the head quarters of the Sou theast Asia Command to plan 

fo r the libera tio n of Indochina, the president d irected the State Department to 

inform "ou r British friends that Mr. Chu rchill and I d id not officia lly recognize" the French prese nce at Mountbatten's headquarters. I 1 

Roosevelt Simila rly opposed any plans to use French troops in li berating 

Ind ochina. Wi th the concu rrence of the Jo int Chiefs o f Staff, he refused to 

auth orize the a llocation of shipping to the French to transport an expedition-

~Zahnise , Ullcertaill Frielldship, pp. 245 - 50, 256 - 58; James MacGregor Burns, I~oosevelt: TIle Soldier 

of Freerlolll (New York: Harcou rt Brace, 1970), pp. 320 - 21 and passim; Milton Viorst, I-Iostile Allies: FD/~ 

(llId De Gaullc (New York: Macmillan, \965); Cordell Hull, Tile Memoirs of Cordell I-lull, vol. 2 (New York: 

Macm il la n, '1948), pp . 96·1 - 62. 

9Ch ristop her Thorne, " Indochi na and Anglo-America n Relatio ns, 1942 - 1945," PaCIfic Historical 

Review 45 (February 1976): 79. 

IOCharies F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Missio/l to Glilla, United States Army in World 

Wa r II (Washingto n, 1953), pp. 357 - 60; Thorne, "Indochina and Anglo-American Relations," pp. 

75 - 76; Raymond A. Whee ler to George C. Marshall, 24 Mar 45, O PD files; Lt Col Henry G. Morgan, 

Planning the Defeat of Japan: A Study of Tota l Wa r Strategy, pp. 109 - 10, Ms in CMH . 

llHess, "Frankli n D. Rooseve lt ,1 nd Indochina," pp. 360 - 61; sec also Memo, Roosevelt for Under 

Seey of State (Ed ward R. Stettinius, Jr.), 3 Nov 44, Department of Stale, Foreigl1 Re/afiolls Of tile Ulli/ed 

States, '1944, vol. 3, The Britisll Commol1wealtll alld Ellrope (Washington, 1965), p. 780. 

23 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

ary corps to Southeast Asia. 12 The president even refu sed to sanction lowlevel intelligence and commando-type operations in Indochina involving 

French participation. In October 1944 Roosevelt told Hull that "we should do 

nothing in regard to resistance groups, or in any other way in relation to 

Indochina ." 13 

Nevertheless, by 1944 a good deal had already been done, particularly in 

the area of intelligence. The French in Southeast Asia were in a good position 

to provide information for Allied bombers on likely Japanese targets in Indochina, on air defenses, on weather, and on Japanese troop movements. 

Information on troop movements was of special significance because the 

shifting of japanese fo rces in or out of Indochina could affect the military 

situation in southern Chi na. '4 The French also could help in rescui ng pilots 

shot down over Indochina. In add ition, it was widely believed that the 

Vietnamese-if not the Laotians and Cambodians-were restive under their 

japanese masters and that their services might also be enlisted for various 

types of espionage and fifth-column activities. 

Although American commanders in China and India made no deliberate 

effort to contravene or circumvent American policy toward Indochina, that 

policy was sufficiently vague and ambiguous to allow for a wide variety of 

in terpretations, and local commanders were seldom kept abreast of its latest 

twists and modifications. The need for tactical intelligence was sometimes 

urgent; the instructions from Washington were few and uncertain. From 1943 

on, American commanders in the Fa r East frequently violated the spirit, if not 

the letter, of Roosevelt's dictum that the Un ited States should "do nothing in 

regard to Indochina." 

America and Indochina 

A mong the first to take an active in terest in Indochina- specifica lly 

.l"'\. Vietnam- was Commo. Milton E. Miles. As comma nder of Navy Grou p, 

China, and director in the Far East of the Office of Stra tegic Services (OSS), 

the organiza tion responsible under the joint Chiefs of Staff for unconventiona l warfare, Miles in 1943 presided over a kaleidoscopic organization with 

responsibility for liaison, training, espionage, guerrilla warfare, and support 

of nava l operations. ' 5 He also served as deputy director of a joint Chi neseAmerican espionage group known as the Sino-American Co-operati ve Organiza tion, led by a Chinese master spy, General Tai Li. One of the principal 

missions given Miles by the Navy Department was to prepare for an All ied 

12Edward R. Drachman, Ul1itcd Stales Policy Toward Vic/nam (Mad ison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson 

Press, 1970), p. 71. 

13Memo, Roosevelt for Secy of State, 16 OCI 44, Dept of State, Forei>:11 I~elaliolls, 1944: Britisll 

C0l/1l/1oIHuca/t11 and Europe, 3:777. 

l"McAlister, Vietllam: Origills of Revoilitioll, p. 136. 

15For a discussion of the activities of Navy Group, China, see Milton E. Miles, A Differelll Killd afWar 

(New York: Macmilla n, 1966), and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, "Naval Group China: A Study of Guerrilla 

Warfare During World War II" (M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1968). 

24 
Frolll Pearl Harbor to the Japallese COIlP 

land ing on the coast of China, a possibility that still seemed likely in 1942 

and 1943. Since that landing might 

also involve operations in Indochina, 

Miles attempted to extend his intelligence network to Vietnam. 

The man he chose to head the 

operation was a French naval officer, 

Comdr. Robert Meynier, a supporter 

of General Giraud. Like Giraud, 

Meynier was a war hero; he was also 

anti-German, anti-British, and strongly pro-American. More important, he 

was married to a woman with important connections among the Vietnamese mandarin cla ss. His wife's 

uncle, Hoang Trang Phu, was a member of the Privy Council and a former 

governor of Tonkin . Members of Commodore Miles 

Meynier's espionage group had extensive contacts also with French officers and officials in Vietnam. 

Almost from the start the Meynier group found its operations hampered 

and circumscribed by the French Military Mission in Chu ngking, China, 

which was Gau llist in its loya lties. Ironically, the Vichyite French in Indochina 

were also suspicious of the Meynier group because it was associated with the 

Gaullists in Chungking . By mid-1944 Meynier's position had become untenable, and he returned to Europe . 

Despite these handicaps, Meynier enjoyed some success in his efforts. 

Before his departure, he succeeded in establishing a network of agents in 

Indochina. Many of them operated inside French government agencies and 

even inside the French intelligence office, the Deuxieme Bureau. They sent 

back to Miles a steady stream of information on field fortifications, troop 

movements, bombing targets, and local political developments. 16 

To complement Meynier's activities among the French in Indochina , 

Commodore Miles also prepared a plan to utilize the mountain tribesmen of 

Vietnam for guerrilla warfare and espionage against the Japanese. The mountain peoples, who included the Meo, the Jara i, and the Rhade, were ethnically and culturally distinct from each other and from the lowland Vietnamese. 

Miles' p lan to enlist the support of the tribesmen, labeled the "Special Military Plan for Indochina," had been suggested by U.S. Navy Lt. (jg.) George 

Devereux, a psychologica l warfare expert attached to Miles' staff. As a civilian 

Devereux had done anthropological research among the Meo and was familiar 

with their dialects and social customs. 17 

16Miles, Report on the Activities of SA CO Directed Toward Indochina, pp. 1 - 22and passim, Milton 

E. Miles Papers, Office of Naval History. 

17Memo, Miles for Cen William J. Donovan, 7 May 43, Miles Papers. 

25 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Montagnard Village lIenr Ball Me Till/of. 

Devereux's plan ca lled for a g roup of twenty specially trai ned agents to be 

pa rachuted into the Central Highlands of Vietnam near the town of Kontum. 

The group would establish friend ly relations with the mountain tribesmenw hose long-standing hatred of the French, the Japa nese, and the Vietnamese 

wa s well known- and would orga ni ze them into guerrilla bands. Arms, 

amm unition , and medicines wou ld be supplied by air. Devereux hoped to 

begin operations w ithin four or five months after entering Ind ochina. The 

guerrilla bands would supply intelligence, " tie up enemy forces, offer a 

rallying ground for French patriots and native opponents of the Japanese," 

and pose a threat to the enemy rear during the projected All ied inva sion of 

Burma. Devereux confidently predicted th at "a rnin imum of 20,000" triba l 

gue rrilla s cou ld eventually be recruited and trained. IX The plan was approved 

by the Office of Strategic Services and by Miles' superiors in the Navy 

Department, and it was en thu siastica lly endorsed by the comma nder of the 

China-based Fourteenth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Cla ire L. Chennault, who promised to launch diversionary air raids to cover the parachute drop. 1<) 

By the end of May 1943, Miles and Devereux had succeeded in assembling 

a group of eighteen Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel, most of 

IliA I")rogram for Guerrilla Warfare in French Indoch ina, Apr 43, Miles Papers. 

I<lMemo, Chennault for Capl Miles, 3 Aug 43, Miles Papers. 

26 
From Pearl Harbor 10 Ihe Japallese CO IlP 

whom spoke French and some of w hom had civilian backgrounds in anthropology or psychology. For political reasons, two French officers, also former 

anthropologists, were attached to the mission. In Ju ne the group assembled at 

Fort Benning, Georgia, for special parachute train ing, but political arguments 

with the French in Chungking, squabbles between the Office of Strategic 

Services and Navy Group, China, and a constant "kidnapping" of Devereux's 

personnel for more urgent assignments delayed and eventually forced cancellation of the project. 20 

Aside from Miles' efforts, the most reliable and widely used source of 

American inte lligence in regard to Indochina was an organization known as 

the "GBT group," an acronym of the last names of the three leaders of the 

group: Laurence Gordon, a Canadian citizen who had worked in Vietnam as 

an employee of the Ca l-Texaco Oil Company; Harry Bernard, a British tobacco 

merchant; and Frank Tan, a Chinese-American businessman. Formed at first 

to look after Allied business property in Vietnam, the GBT group soon 

expanded into espionage. From an outpost at Lungching near the ChineseVietnamese border, it directed a network of couriers and clandestine radio 

operators throughout Vietnam that provided "consistently outstanding intelligence on transporters, industry, shi pping and airfields." As time passed the 

group also developed strong contacts within the French government and 

armed forces in Vietnam, and it encouraged the formation of an anti-Japanese 

underground among the French colonials." The group was originally sponsored by the director of in telligence of the Chinese Mili tary Operations Board, 

Admira l Yang Hsuan Chen, with funds and equ ipment supplied by the 

British, but as the value of its work came to be appreciated, it received 

increasing support from the Fourteenth Air Force. By late 1944 the latter was 

supplying most of the gro up's opera ting funds as well as more modern and 

powerfu l transmitters for its radio net in Vietnam. 22 

Although the Fourteenth Air Force supported the GBT group primarily to 

obtain mili tary intelligence, the relationship nevertheless brought the United 

States into collaboration with a colonial power. Strong anticolonialists such as 

Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, appointed ambassador to China in December 

1944, were suspicious of all British and French clandestine activities in South -

east Asia, viewing them as part of an effort to reestablish prewar empires. "I 

indicated to Hurley that I had given you permission to issue some equipment 

to certa in forces in Indochina as requested by Colonel Gordon," wrote Lt. 

Gen. Albert C. Wedemeye r, commander of United States Forces in th e China 

Theater and chief of staff to Genera lissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in late 1944. "He 

was not p leased by my action, although I mentioned the intelligence contribu2{)lnterv, author with Professor Weston La Barre (former member of Devereux group), 9 Jan 73, 

Historians files, CMH. Professor La Barre expressed the opinion that the operation "might very well 

have succeeded" had it been pu t into dfect. 

21Wedemeyer's Data Book, sec. 20, RG 332; quote from Organiz:ational Report, 5329th Air Ground 

Forces Resources Technical Staff, Aug - Sep 44, pp. 13 - 15, 14th Air Force records, 30 Sep 44, Albert F. 

Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base; Charles Fenn, rio (I,,' Mil/II (London: 

Studio Vista, 1973), pp. 75 - 76. 

2253291h Air Ground Forces Resources Tech Staff RpL Aug - Sep 44, pp. 13 - 15. 

27 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

tion which you desire very rn uch and 

which caused me to approve the 

request. However, General Hurley has had increasing evidence that 

the British, French, and Dutch are 

working. for the atta inme nt of 

imperia listic pol icies and he fe lt we 

s hou ld do nothing to assist them in 

their endeavors w hich rlln counter to 

U.S. po licy ."" 

Hurley's position faithfully refl ected President Roosevelt's own 

views, as expressed again in December 1944 when the British government protested that "it would be d ifficu lt to deny French participation in 

the liberation of Indochina." Roosevelt responded by informing Secretary of State Edwa rd R. Stettini us, General Chennault talks with Jr., that " I still do not want to get A b d H I 

rnixed u p in any Indochina decision . ", nssn or IIr ey. 

lt is a matter for post-wa r. By the same token, I do not want to get mixed up 

in any mili tary effort towa rd the liberation of Indoch ina."24 The Army Air 

Forces and other America n u nits in China nevertheless continued to cooperate to a limited extent with the Fre nch in Indochina in order to obtain 

intell ige nce and aid in rescuing downed pi lo ts 25 When General Wedemeyer 

assumed comma nd of the China theater in Octobe r ] 944 he foun d relations 

be tween the Free French in Kunming and the Fo urteenth Air Force to be 

"very co-operative and friendly." He believed that "a n a rrangement had been 

made" between the two w ithou t the cogn izance of his predecessor, Lt. Gen . 

Joseph W. Stilwell 26 

Despite the concern occaSionally voiced by Ambassador Hurley and others, 

American cla ndestine contacts and activities in Indochi na before the spring of 

1945 had little or no effect on the in ternal situation in Indochina or on Allied 

policy. Their importance lay in the fact that th rough them American commande rs in the China theater came to depend upon intell igence gathered 

from In dochi na. This dependence would lead some commanders to cooperate 

in 1945 with forces hostile to French colonialism after the Japanese forCibly 

repressed the French colonia l regime in Vietnam. 

23Ltr, Wedemeye r to Maj Cen Claire L. Chenna ult, 27 Dec 44, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

24Memo, Roosevelt fo r Secy of State (Stettinius), 1 Jan 45, Department of State, Foreigll Relatiolls of tile 

Ulliled Stales, 1945, vol. 6, Tile British Commol/wenllll ami 'lie Far East (Washington, 1969), p. 293. 

25fn late January 1945, a group described as "the Free French under-grou nd" provided the Navy and 

the Fourteenth Air Force wit h "pinpoi nt targets in the Saigon area," see records of G - 2, 14th AF 

Indochi na fi le, 14th AF records. 

2('lnte rv, author with Cell Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wa shington, D.C., 2 Feb 72, Historians files, 

CMH. 

28 
From Pearl Harbor 10 Ihe Japallese COlip 

The Japanese Takeover 

With the liberation of France and American victories in the Pacific, the 

French in Indochina underwent a dramatic change of attitude in the 

latter part of 1944 toward the Japanese occupation. Old feuds between Vichyites 

and Gaullists were put aside, and attempts were made to establish contact 

with the new French government of General Charles de Gau lle in Paris. 27 

French officers and colonial administrators made preparations to organize an 

underground resistance movement similar to the Maquis in metropolitan 

France. 

Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command headquarters in Ceylon parachuted specially trained French officers and agents into Indochina, along with 

arms, communications equipment, and demolition gear, and brought out 

resistance leaders for discussions. Eleven wireless stations provided a new 

communications network throughout the country.>8 Local French leaders told 

the ass that following a planned uprising they might be able to hold parts of 

northern Vietnam for up to three or four months with help from Allied air 

power.29 

These French plans and preparations were a poorly kept secret. Japanese 

intelligence was well aware of the local preparations for resistance, and the 

Japanese moved energetically to counter them 30 Japanese Army officials in 

Indochina wished to place the colony under direct military administration as 

in Manchukuo. However, officials in Tokyo decided in favor of a grant of 

"independence" to Vietnam. Such a move, they hoped, would win the 

cooperation of the Vietnamese and make the takeover look less aggressive 31 

Mountbatten and his political adviser, Esler Denning, cau tioned the de 

Gau lle government to discourage any premature action in Indochina, but to 

no ava il.32 As ea rly as September 1944, a State Department expert on Southeast Asia advised President Roosevelt in a draft memorandum that "it is 

thought the Japanese may shortly disarm the French and take over the 

country.,,33 At the same time, the Office of War Information's Air Liaison 

representative in Chungking, William Powell, reported that "all of us out 

here anticipate quite an upheaval in Indochina."J4 

As the likelihood of a Japanese takeover increased, French officials in 

27Conditions in French Indochina, ass R&A Unit Kunming, Rpt 0016, 15 Oct 44, copy in G - 2 1D 

filcs, RG 319. 

2KForce 136, Future Plans, 16 Nov 44; ibid., Future Plans for French Indochina, 28 Dec 44. Both in WO 

203/433 1, SEAC records, Public Records Office (PRO). U.s. Military Intelligence Div, Rpt 45, 11 

Apr 45, sub: Indochina Question, G - 2 ID files, RG 319. 

290SS Rpt Yl-UKM-l, 15 Nov 44, sub: Conditions in Northern Tonkin, 15 Nov 44, G - 2 1D files, RG 

319. 

JOlt Col Sakai Tateki, "French Indo-China Operations Record," Japanese Monograph no. 25, p. 22, 

co~y in CMH. 

IRecent Political Developments in French Indo-China, 6 Apr 45, SRI-] - 095, records of National 

Security Agency, RG 457 . 

. n political Adviser, SEAC, to Foreign Office, 24 Jan 45, WO 203/556 1A, SEAC records, PRO. 

3.JOra ft memo, Chief, Sou thwest Pacific Oiv, State Dept, for President, 8 Scp 44, RG 59. 

3-IPowell to Clarence Gauss, 6 Sep 44, Inel to Gauss to 5c<:y of State, 9 Sep 44, 851G.OOI9 - 0944, RG 

59. 

29 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Kunming "made strenuous efforts to determine the possible lines of action 

the Uni ted States might take."" On 2 February 1945 the French military 

attache in Chungking approached General Wedemeyer to express his anxiety. 

If the japanese assumed control of th e government the French forces in 

Indochina, the attache believed, would retreat to the mountains to carryon 

guerrilla warfare. The attache asked w hether, under those circumstances, the 

United States would be prepared to provide assistance . Wedemeyer was 

noncommittal, merely indicating that the matter was one for decision at a 

highe r level. Aware that the questi on of American coopera tion with the 

French in Indochi na was delicate and that the president himself held strong 

views on the subj ect, Wedemeyer cabled Washington for guidance. The State 

and War Departments responded that they could only reiterate the president's 

policy of noninvolvement in Indochina matters. 

Roosevelt's position, however, already had begun to change. At the Yalta 

Conference in Februa ry 1945 he told the U.S. joint Chiefs of Staff that he was 

" in favor of anything that is agai nst the japanese in Indochina provided that 

we do not align ourselves with the French."36 Accordingly, the acting chief 01 

staff of the China thea ter, Brig. Gen . Melvin E. Gross, instructed subordinate 

commanders on 20 February that "appropriate and feasible help," such as 

medical supplies, might be given to Free French g uerrillas who made their 

way to the Chinese border. The matter of allowing the guerrillas to enter 

China, however, "should be settled directly between the Chi nese and the 

French."37 On 7 March, China thea ter headquarters lurther ca utioned commanders that "any help or aid given to the French by us shall be in such a 

way that it ca nn ot pOSSibly be constru ed as furthering the politica l aims of the 

French. . The govern ing lactor is that the action be in furtherance of Dil l' 

military objectives and not a matter of convenience to the French or to any 

other nation. "38 

Two days later, at eight o'clock on the evening of 9 March, the japanese 

ambassador to French Indoch ina presented Governor-Gene ral Admira l jean 

Decoux with an ultimatum demanding that direct control of the government, 

police, and armed forces of the colony be turned over to the japanese. Two 

hours later Japanese forces moved against French forts and garrisons all over 

Indochina. Most were quickly disarmed, but a few offered fierce, although 

brief, resistance, and a sizable body of troops stationed in the north fell back 

to the mountainous jungle areas of western Tonkin and Laos, from w here 

they began a fighting retreat to the Chinese border. 39 

The japa nese coup of Ma rch 1945 marked a turning poin t in the history of 

Indochina. It signaled the end of the painful French pretense to sovereignty 

and provided new opportunities for Vietnamese opponents of the French to 

351-Hstory of U.S. Forces in the Ch inCl Thea ter, p. 24, M s in CM H . 

3('Memo, Gen Gross, 20 Feb 45, Wedemeyer FIC (French Indochina) Book 2, RG 332; Dept of State, 

Foreigll ~el{/tiolls, 1945: British Com mOl/wealth al/d Far Easl, 6:297. 

:I7History of U.s. Forces, China Theater, p. 30. 

38M sg, Chennault to Gross, 9 Mar 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

3'1'he Aftermath of Japanese Occupation of French Indo-ChinCl, SRH - 100,31 May 45, RC; 457. 

30 
From Pearl Harbor to tile Japallese COIlP 

Gia Lam Rail Center IIIlder attack by FOllrteel/ til Air Force bombers. 

expand their activities and add to their following. At the same time, it created 

acute difficulties for the Free French government of General de Gau lle, newly 

installed in Paris, which was at pains to obtain Allied recognition of its claim 

to continued sovereignty in Indochina. 

The first news of the Japanese coup received by Americans in the China 

theater was a radio message from the French garrison at Lang Son in northeastern Vietnam, transmitted about midnight on 9 March . The message 

reported a heavy Japanese assault on the garrison and speculated that an 

attack on all French units in Indochina was probably under way. The defenders requested American air strikes on deSignated targets in their area. 

The commander of the Fourteenth Air Force, General Chennault, requested 

permission to provide the air assistance that the French had asked for and, 

more generally, "to co-operate directly with the French authorities in 

Kunming" to conduct other attacks in Indochina . A few hours later the 

thea ter headquarters, apparently on the authority of Maj. Gen. Robert B. 

McCl ure, acting commander in the absence of General Wedemeyer, replied, 

"Go ahead. Co-operate completely with the French. You can use Poseh 

airfield. Give them hell."4!1 A second message sent later that day added that 

the authorization "pertains entirely to the present emergency."" 

'WM sg, Gross to Chennault, CFBX 34041, 10 Mar 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

;!llbid., CFBX 34064, 10 Mar 45, Wedemeyer fil es, RG 332. 

31 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Indochinese Colonial Troops retreat to Chi'Ia, March 1945. 

At t he same time, General Wedemeyer, in Washington to confer with th e 

Joint Chiefs, was receiving contra ry in structions in a private conference with 

the presiden t himself. Accord ing to Wedemeyer, Roosevelt said that he 

wa nted "to discontin ue colonization in the Sou theast Asia area" and that he 

was "determined that there wou ld be no mili tary assistance to the French in 

In dochina."42 Wed emeyer undoubtedly would not have granted General 

Chennault such sweeping authority to aid the French. 43 Yet the authority had 

been given, and it set in motion a chain of events which was to involve 

American forces in Indochina from that day until the Japanese surre nder. 

While American planes were preparing to aid the French, Genera l Chennault on 10 March also persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to a ll ow French troops 

fl eeing the Japa nese to take refuge in China. Chi nese a uthorities furth e r 

agreed that "if stiff resistance is put up by the French against the Japanese, 

military assista nce may be rendered.,,44 

McClure's authorization of assistance to the French app lied only to the 

Fourteenth Air Force, but on 11 March an event occurred that officials of the 

'

12 Interv, author with Wedemeyer, 2 Feb 72. oI3 lbid. 

""Min, Meeting of Nationa l Military Council, JO Mar45, Inel to Gen Hsu Yung to Cen Gross, 16 Mar 

45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

32 
From Pearl Harbor fa fhe lapallese Coup 

Office of Strategic Services seized upon as a means to obtain permission for 

themselves to operate in Indochina. On that date a force of about a thousa nd 

Vietnamese colonial troops with twenty French officers, slowly fi ghting the ir 

way toward the Chinese border, appea led for American air support. Since the 

commander, a Colonel LeCog, had been operating an underground radio 

station that had provided "valuable information" to the Fourteenth Air Force, 

055 officia ls saw "an excellent opportunity to organize this group into an 

effective guerrilla force and thereby maintain a fruitful source of information.,,45 When the 055 proposed to drop arms, equipment, and guerrilla 

trai ning teams in Vietnam, General McClure and General Chennault resolved 

to seek "a clear-cut statement" from Washington regarding increased support 

to the French'6 

Meanwhile, in Washington, on 12 March, F"ench Ambassador Henri Bonnet met with the secretary of state to request "all possible support" in 

Indochina. Apparen tly unaware that the Fourteenth Air Force was already 

flying tactical air support missions for the French, Bonnet asked for " immediate tactical and material assistance in every fi eld: direct support of opera tions 

and the parachuting of arms, medica l supplies, quini ne and food."" The 

following evening in Paris, General de Gaulle expressed concern to American 

Ambassador Jefferson Caffery about reports that the Americans and British 

had fa iled to come to the aid of the French in Vietnam'S 

Bonnet's and de Gau lle's remarks and McClure's and Chennault's request 

for a policy statement were before Secretary of State Stettinius on 16 March 

w hen he discussed the question of American aid for Indochina in a memorandum for the president. He assumed that the French were attempting to make 

the United States "appear responsible for the weakness of their resistance to 

the Japanese," and suggested that "we combat th is trend by making public 

our desire to render such assistance as may be wa rran ted by the circumstances. ,,49 

Although the president sanctioned no public statement, he did give his 

consent to continued support fo r the French . On the evening of 18 March th e 

U.S. Army's deputy chief of staff, Genera l Thomas C. Handy, telephoned 

Gene ral Wedemeyer's home just outside Washington to report that the president's personal chief of staff, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, had "sa id it 

was all rig ht to help the Frogs, providing such help does not inte rfere with 

o ur operations."so In Wedemeyer's absence, his chief of staff, Col. Paul W. 

Ca raway, took General Handy'S ca ll. After trying unsuccessfully to contact 

General Wedemeyer, Ca raway himself drafted and sent a priority message to 

Genera l Chennault. "The U.S. Governmen t's present attitude," he wrote, "is 

to aid the French providing such assistance does not interfere with operations 

.ISlbid.; Col Willi s H. Bird to HQ OSS, Washington, D.C., 11 Mar 45, records of the 05S . 

.J6Msg, Chennault to Marshall for Hull, Mar 45, Wedemeyer FIe Book 2, RG 332 . 

. 

17Dept of State, Foreign Rcln/iolls, 1945: British COllllllol1w!?altll al/d Far Easl, 6:297 - 99. 

"!!"felg, Caffery to Seey ofStilte. 13 Mar45, Dept ofSlatc, F()rc(~1I1~elatiolls, 1945: British Commonwealtll 

and Far East, 6:300. 

-I'IMemo, Stettiniu5 for President, 16 Ma r 45, U. S.-Vie/llfl/II Relatiolls, 7:66. 

'\()Mcmo, Col Paul Caraway for Wedemeyer, 19 Mar 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

33 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

now planned. . . operations against the Japanese to aid the French may be 

under-taken by the Fourteenth Air Force."S] 

Although the United States was now definitely committed to aiding the 

French in Indochina, the French government continued to express dissatisfaction about th e kind and extent of American support. O n 24 March General de 

Gaulle told Ambassador Caffery that no supplies had been dropped to the 

French. He could only assume, he said, that, as a matter of policy, the 

American government did not want to help the French.52 De Ga ulle's complaint was partially justified, for only small quantities of blankets and medicines had been supplied. The problem was an extreme scarcity in the China 

theater, wh ich had to obtain almost a ll of its supplies by hazardous fl ights 

over the "hump" of the Himalaya Mountains or by truck over the still 

uncompleted Ledo Road from India. 

Yet the Fourteenth Air Force had been helping the French . Between 12 

and 28 March it fl ew a tota l of 34 missions over Indochina , in volving 43 

bombing, 24 offensive reconnaissance, and 31 regular reconnaissance sorties. 

Twenty-eight of these 98 sorties were " in reponse to direct request by the 

French ." General Chennault reported on 14 April that " bad weather, nonavailability of surplus equipment, and the flui dity of the situation" had 

prevented an even larger number of sorties. 53 

Concerned over French complaints, the head of the State Depa rtment's 

European Division, H. Freeman Matthews, suggested informally to the War 

Department that "even a token drop of supplies would assist in refuting the 

allegations and accusations" that the United States had no wish to help 

the French . The War Department in turn, on 7 April, instructed General 

Wedemeyer, who had returned to China, to honor French requests for supplies " providing they represent only a negligible diversion from Thea ter's 

planned operations and enta il no additional commitments."S4 

General Wedemeyer, who was hard put to supply his own forces, was in 

no position to supply much material, particularly a sca rce item such as gasoline, which the French had specifica lly requested. Although a limited number 

of items were dropped to the French during April, General Wedemeyer was 

still obliged to turn down most requests except for medicines. 55 Unaware of 

the War Department's instructions to Wedemeyer, the French were again 

quick to attribute the failure to provide supplies to a deliberate American 

policy. 

The view that the United States deliberately limited and delayed its help 

to the French during the Japanese takeover is thus incorrect. 56 Yet that belief 

lbid ., 20 Mar 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

52Telg. Caffery to Seey of State, 24 Mar45, Dept of Stal e, Foreign Relntiolls, 1945: Bri/is!1 COllllllollluc(lltil 

and Far E1151, 6:302. 

5.1M sg, Chen nault to War Dept, 14 Apr 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

5-i M sg, Hull to Wedemeyer, 7 Apr 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

55Msg, Wedemeyer to Sabattier, 21 Apr 45, Wedemeyer files, RG 332. 

56 A typically distorted version is in Bernard Fall, Ti,e Two Viet/IflIllS: A Politicnl nlld Militnry Allnlysis, 2d 

ed. rev. (New York: Praeger, 1967). Fall states (page 55) that the American posture toward Indochina 

"meant an automatic death sentence for any French attempt at organized resistance in case of Japanese 

attack." See also pages 56 - 57. 

34 
From Pearl Harbor 10 Ihe !apmlese CO IlP 

came to be accepted by many Frenchmen and not a few Americans. The memory of America's su pposedly tardy and ca llous response while Frenchmen 

died at the hands of th e Japanese in the spring of 1945 wou ld endure to 

poi son later Franco-American efforts at cooperation in Indochina, but it was 

only the first of a series of events during 1945 which would complica te 

relations. Another disagreement, even more disturbing than the first, soon 

arose over Ame rican contact with the Viet Minh . 

35 

3 

From the Japanese Coup to V - J Day 

In a cave near the village of Pac Bo in a remote part of northeastern Vietnam, 

Ho Chi Minh in May 1941 conyened the eighth meeting of the Centra l 

Committee of the Ind ochinese Communist Party. The meeting produced a 

decision to found a new anticolonial coalition, the Vietnamese Independence 

League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Min h Hoi), or Viet Minh, designed to 

appeal to all opponents of the French and Japa nese. ' The Viet Minh then 

began an ambitious propaganda program to recruit peasants in the nearby 

provinces as well as members of the Tho, the mountain tribe least hostile to 

the Vietnamese. Remnants of the rebel bands that had fought the French in 

the 1940 uprisings formed the core of the first Viet Minh g uerrilla units. 

During 1943 and 1944 those units occasionally skirmished with elements of 

the French colonial militia, but they concentrated on developing their strength 

throug h a network of training and supply bases in the mountainous regions 

near the Chinese border. 2 

Ho Chi Minh also soug ht assistance from China and a ttempted to organize 

groups of Vie tnamese exil es livi ng in southe rn China into suppo rte rs of the 

Viet Minh, but Chinese wa rlords who controlled Kwangsi and Yunnan Provinces had their own plans for Vietnam. On a visit to China in August 1942, 

Ho was arrested and spent over a year in a Chinese prison; meanwhil e, the 

Chinese organized their own Vietnarnese independence movement among the 

expatriate remnants of the Vie tnamese Na tio nalist Party, the Phuc Q uoc 

monarchists, and old anti-French mandarins. Known as the Dong Minh Hoi, 

the Chinese-backed organization lacked able leadership or any real following 

and faced stiff opposition from the Viet Minh. 3 

In Septembe r 1943 the Chinese warlord Chang Fa Kwei, who controlled 

LOnys Wilh I-Iv Chi Mill/i (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1965), pp. 191- 93; 

Woodside, COIlllll llll ity (llId ~evoll/ ioll, pp. 2'1 8 - 19; McAlister, Vic/I/am: Origins of Revolrlf iol1, pp. 

112- 13; William J. Duiker, Tile Rise of NatiOllalism ill Vic/I/III1/: 1900 -"/941 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer5i,!: P,e5s, 1976), pp. 274 - 75. 

McAlister, Vietl/am: Origills of Rl'vollliioll, pp. 110 - 12, 140 - 43, and passim. 

Jlbid., pp. 134 - 40; King C. Chen, Vie/llam and Chillll , 1938 - 1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 56 - 71. 

37 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

the region adjacent to th e Vietnamese border, decided to try a different 

approach. He arranged for Ho to be released from prison and put him in 

charge of orga nizing the Vietnamese exiles with a subsidy of 100,000 Chi nese 

dolla rs a month. Altho ugh Ho oste nsibly made the Viet Minh a part of the 

Dong Minh Hoi, the Viet Minh soon were in contro!. With the Chinese 

subsidy and the cooperation of Tho mounta in tribesmen, the Viet Minh 

esta blished an im pressive underground ne twork throughout Tonkin. 

American diploma ts and consular officials in south China were dimly 

aware of the activities of the Viet Minh but genera lly d iscounted them as of 

little significance. In December 1942, for example, when Secreta ry of State 

Hu ll queried the American embassy in Ch ungking concerning reports that "a 

pro-allied Provisiona l Government of Indo-China" had been established by an 

orga nization known as the" All Indo-Ch ina Anti-Imperialist League" (a Viet 

Min h front organiza tion), Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss replied that the 

league and other Vietnamese exile groups in China only represented an 

unimportant "attempt by the Chinese to show their fri endly fee lings for 

su bject peoples. ,,' 

State Department observers tended to confuse the letha rgic Chinesedomina ted Dong Minh Hoi with the dynamic and relatively independent Viet 

Minh. Their "merger" in 1943 further confused American diplomats. In May 

1943 the embassy in Chungking reported that the Vietnamese revolutionary 

groups were of " no particu la r im portance" and added that the Dong Minh 

Hoi at Liuchow was "com posed entirely of overseas Chinese" from northern 

Indochina.s 

In July 1943, w he n Washingto n requested a more detailed report on 

Vietnamese organizations in China, the embassy reported that "all our 

sources concur in the belief tha t the organ ization a nd support of th is group 

by the Kuornintang is with a view to having a nucleus of pro-Chinese 

Annamites." The embassy reite rated its belief that the organization was "of 

little importance." The "sources" cited in the embassy's memorandum 

included a Korean exile group, members of the French M ilitary M ission in 

Chungking, and some Chinese Comm unists, but no Vietnamese. 6 

With the Japanese takeover in Ma rch 1945, the casual American attitude 

towa rd the Viet Minh abruptly changed to one of serious interest. The w hole 

intelligence network in Vietnam, carefully built upon sources with in the 

French administration and military, at that point became inoperable. As the 

d irector of th e Office of Strategic Services detachment in China, Col. Paul E. 

Helliwell , noted at the end of March, " the GBT Group is knocked out, the 

French system has been destroyed, and Genera l Tai Li's setup ha s been 

knocked ou t lock, stock, and barre!. "? The Viet Minh appeared to be the one 

~Causs to Secy of State, 23 Dec 42, 851G.OOIl2 - 2342, RC 59. 

5Charge d'Affaires, Chungking, to State, 31 May 43, 85JC.OO/5-3 143, RC 59. Sec also Ronald 

H. Spector, " 'What the Local Annamites Arc Thinking': American Views of Vietnamese in South 

China, ·1942 - 1945," SOlltheas/ Asia II/Iema/;Olln/ Qunrterly 3 (Spring 1974): 741 - 52. 

6Charge d'Affaires, Chu ngking, to State, "J Jul 43, 851C.OO/6 - 143, RG 59. 

7Ur, Helliwe11 to Strategic Services Officer, China Thc<1ter, 29 Mar 45, records of the OSS. 

38 
organization in Vietnam still able to 

supply informatio n and help in th e 

rescue of All ied pilots. 

In March 1945 officers of the U.S. 

Army Air Forces Air Ground Aid 

Service contacted Ho Chi Minh in 

Kunming a nd agreed to supp ly him 

w ith communications equipment, 

med ica l supplies, and sma ll arms in 

re tu rn fo r in tell igence and assistan ce 

in rescuing Allied pilots" During the 

next few months th e Air Ground Aid 

Service supplied Ho's forces with ra -

tions, sma ll arms, and medicines by 

airdrop, w hile a radio operator station ed with the Viet Min h transmitted intell igence reports to the China 

theater. 

Fro", the lapallese Coup to V - I Day 

Th e OSS organization in China, Ho Chi Minh 

known as the Specia l Intelligence 

Branch, or Detachme nt 202, had been at work for some time on a project to 

penetrate Indochina for intell igence purposes. The goa l was to obtain information on the trans portation system, on the Japanese o rde r of battle, and on the 

attitudes of "internal movements in regard to Chinese, French, and British 

policies." The Office of Stra tegiC Serv ices expected to receive coo pe ration 

from French officials and colonia l troops along th e China-Indochina borde r 

and from "numerous revolutionary groups which have been lIsed successfully 

in the past." These grou ps were expected to provide the OSS with both 

practical aid and a means of "obta in ing a clear pi cture of French Indo-China 

Poli tics. U') 

Although Detachment 202 on 1 March 1945 forwa rded a plan for penetrating Indochina to OSS headquarters in Washington, two days late r the G - 5 

section of the China theater staff instructed the detachment to hold the plan 

in abeya nce pend ing a fina l decision on extending opera tions into Indochina. 

The Ja pa nese takeover six days later and the resultant red uction in the fl ow of 

intelligence, togethe r with the increased demand for measures to aid the 

French, led to a revival of interest in the possibility of OSS operatio ns in 

Indochina. On 18 March, w hen General Wedemeyer was in Washington, his 

chie f of staff, Colonel Ca raway, me t there with OSS offi cials, including th e 

d irector, Ma j. Ge n . William ]. Donova n. Ca raway observed tha t the re were 

nn, flo Clli Millll, pp. 74 - 83. Fenn reca lls (page 78) that "We asked CHQ Chungking 

[China Theaterl for clearance, in view of Ho's reputed communist background. The instructions 

came back to 'ge t th"t net reg" rdless.' " See also Lloyd Sheare r, "When Ho Chi Minh Was an 

inte llige nce Agent for the U.S.," Parade, 18 March 1973, p. 8. 

'}Ltr, Col Willis H. Bird (Ocp Chief 055) to Cen Cross, 9 Apr 45, FIC Book 2, China Theater 

records. 

39 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

three possible ways to proceed: utilize what was left of th e GBT network, 

crea te an independent Vietnamese network, or coopera te with the French 

through the French Military Mission in Chungking. He requ ested that the 

Office of Strategic Services pre pa re plans for th e fi rst two types of operations 

so that they could be irnplemented as soon as General Wedemeyer returned 

to the China theater. M indful of Wedemeyer's recent conversa tion w ith the 

president, in w hich Roosevelt had opposed military assistance to the French 

in In dochina, Ca raway s uggested avoid ing the th ird alternati ve until th e 

politica l situation was clari fied. 10 

While plans were being developed in Washington, Gene ral Gross, acting 

chief of staff in China, had decided to proceed with clandestine opera tio ns 

forthwith. On 20 March he issued two new directives to the OSS. The first 

provided for esta blishing an intelligence network in Indochi na as proposed by 

Detachment 202 in Februa ry. The second d irective auth orized th e OSS to 

render milita ry aid "in the form of supp lies a ndlor U.S.-controlled milita ry 

personnel to any and all groups opposing the Japa nese fo rces." This directive 

prov ided that all resistance groups were to be treated impa rtia lly, " irrespective of any particular governmental or politica l affiliations," since all "resista nce to the Japanese accrues to the advantage o f United States and China 

military operations." l l Groups would receive aid not because of their resistance to or sympathy for French colonialism but solely on the basis uf their 

performance in combat or their usefulness as sources of information. As the 

deputy chief of the OSS detachment, Col. Willis H. Bird, put it, "If o ur men 

dea l only with th e French, the French will see we never meet any other 

groups. If we stay away from the French entirely, we will never have a true 

picture of the situation. we should help the French w hen they a re 

d irectly fighting the Ja ps but also find some othe r groups fighting the Japs 

and help them too."" 

The first OSS team to enter Indochina parachuted in to Vietnam soon after 

the Japanese coup and joined a retrea ting French colu mn under Generals 

Ma rcel Alessa nd ri and Gabriel Sabattier. Afte r a g rueli ng retrea t lasting 

almost two months, sca ttered groups and units entered southern China, 

whe re OSS representatives me t with General Alessand ri and worked out an 

agreement to conduct joint intelligence missions in Indochina. In ea rly June 

twenty-five French officers an d about a hundred Vietnamese colonial troops 

from Gene ral Alessandri's fo rce were assigned to the O ffice of Strategic 

Services for join t opera tio ns in northe rn Vietnam. The ass was to eq uip, 

transport, and supply the teams. They were to repo rt to the OSS in code; the 

OSS was to keep the French informed through Genera l Sabather.

13 

lUMsg, 055, WaShington, to Heppner, 18 M ar 45, records of the 055. 

II ACofS to 055, China Theater, 20 M ar 45, sub: Intelligence Activities and Aid to Resistance 

Crou ps in French Indochina, PSYWA R 09 1 Indochina, RC 319. 

12M sg, Bird to Myela nd, 23 Mar 45, record s of the 055. 

l3-yext of Agreement, 9 Jun 45, in FIC Book 2, Wedemeyer files; Msg, Col Paul Helliwell to Cen 

Cross, 23 Jun 45, pp. 35, 40, CH P K5053, China Theater records; R. Harris Smith, 055: TIlt' Secret 

His/ory of America's first Cel/tml II/telligel/ce Agcllcy (Berkeley: University of Cali fornia Press, 1973), 

pp. 328 - 29. 

40 
From the lapanese Coup to V - I Day 

Viet Minh Guerrillas, instructed by ass team, fire U.S. carbines. 

The joint Franco-American operations carried out under that agreement 

were mostly unsuccessful, primarily because the Vietnamese refused to help 

the French. In July 1945, for example, Vietnamese g uides deliberately led a 

Franco-American force conducting a raid against Japanese positions at the 

town of Lang Son in northeastern Vietnam into an ambush set by the Viet 

Minh. The Viet Minh, reported an American officer, held "the entire a rea 

from Langson to the China Frontier.'''4 Another American officer observed, "I 

don't think the French will ever do a hell of a lot of good in Indochina 

because Annamite hatred makes it a more dangerous place for them than for 

US. 1f1 5 

That the Viet Minh were well organized, efficient, and extreme ly helpful 

for intelligence purposes was made clear by an ass operation known as the 

"Deer mission" under Maj. Allison K. Thomas. Major Thomas, anoth er 

American officer, and five Amerkan enlisted men formed a team to operate 

with about a hun dred French and Vietnamese colonial troops aga inst the 

Hanoi - Lang Son railroad , but while the force was train ing during June 1945 

I.jLt Lucien Cone in to Capt A. L. Patti, 26 Jul 45, Records of Mission "eomore," 21 Aug 45, 

records of the 055. 

15Lt James W. Jordan, USNR, to Capt A. L. Patti, "10 Jul 45, Records of Mission "Pakhoi," 

records of the 055. 

41 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

at Tsingsi in south China, Chinese and Vietnamese agents advised Thomas 

that if he ente red Vietnam with the French, he would "find the whole 

population against him, . .. would be sniped at ... and would get no food 

as the natives ha te the French."I6 Major Thomas decided to parachute with 

only part of his American team and a single French officer in American 

uniform as an advance party to see if the reports were true. 

O n 16 July, Thomas and his party parachuted into northe rn Tonkin near 

the city of Thai Nguyen, a little over fifty kilometers north of Hanoi. The Viet 

Minh welcomed them warmly, displaying a large sign reading " Welcome to 

O ur American Friends." Thoma s had a long conference with Ho Chi Minhwhom Thomas ca lled "Mr. Hoo"- who informed him that French troops 

would not be welcome. Thomas remained with the Viet Minh for over two 

months, training them for operations against Japanese communications. He 

was joined a t the end of July by an additional team of four men unde r Ca pt. 

Cha rles M. Holland. The Viet Minh provided Thoma s with useful informa tion 

on the Japanese order of battle and on Japanese troop movements within the 

country, and Thomas reported that the Viet Minh had "the sympathy of 85% 

of the people of Tonkin." He saw no evidence that the Viet Minh were 

communistic and thought that their "sole purpose was independence."I7 

The limited and almost accidental coope ration be tween the ass and the 

Vie t Minh late r became the s ubj ect of considerable co ntroversy . Frenchmen 

would protest in the 1950s tha t without American-supplied arms and ammunition the Vie t Minh would have been unable to seize control of much of 

Vietnam after the Japanese surrender, while some American critics of U.S. 

involvement in Vie tnam during the 1960s wou ld argue that ass contacts with 

the Viet Minh s hould have led, if they had been better exploited, to a clearer 

understanding of political opinion in Vietnam and to a firm basis for cooperation between the United Sta tes and future leade rs of the country. 

As to the French charge, arms received during World Wa r 11 accounted for 

only about 12 pe rcent of the estima ted 36,000 small arms in Viet Minh hands 

in March 1946 and only about 5 percent of th e weapons ava ilable to them at 

the sta rt of the war against the French in December 1946, according to one 

estimate based on French records. 18 Not all of these arms, moreover, had 

come from American sources. French intelligence agents also had " retained 

liaison w ith Viet Minh elements and [had] supplied them with a rms." The 

principal source of Viet Minh armaments was neither the Americans nor the 

French but the Japanese . Even before the Japanese surrender, Viet Minh units 

had been able to acquire a rms and ammunition from the puppet Vietnamese 

militia forces of the Emperor Bao Dai set up by the Japanese after the March 

takeover. 19 

16Report of M ission "Deer," 16 Sep 45, records of the 055. 

17lbid. 

18McAlister, Vietnam: Origins of Reoo/lltioll, pp. 229 - 30. 

19Jean Sainteny, Histoire (/'Iwe Paix Manqllee (Paris: Fayard, 1967), pp. 104 - 05; see also McAlister, 

Vidlltlm: Origins of Rt.'VOllltioll, pp. 147 - 48; French Indochina (Political Situation), 11 Oct 45, 

SRH - 094, RG 457. 

42 
From the ]apallese Coup to V - ] Day 

[t is true that little information from the ass on the strength and intentions of the Viet Minh ever reached the policy level in Washington. [n july 

1945, Under Secretary of State joseph C. Grew complained that "the State 

Department lacks accurate information from ass and the military on conditions in Indo-China and as to the temper of the native peoples.,,20 Even 

Genera[ Wedemeyer's headquarters received only brief reports on ass operations in Indochina, and those were wholly tactical in nature. 21 Yet a considerable amount of information about the Viet Minh was forwarded to Washington from American diplomats in southern China, w ho had frequent contact 

with Vietnamese Nationalists there, but that information had litt[e discernible 

influence on American policy. 22 

The principal effect of the brief America n collaboration with the Viet Minh 

during the last months of the war was probably psychologica l. It aroused 

annoyance and suspicion on the part of the French, and it enhanced the 

prestige of the Viet Minh, who could claim to be the associates, and by 

inference, the representatives, of the victorious Americans. Ho Chi Minh 

himself reportedly used an autographed pictu re presented to him by General 

Chennault for rescuing a Fourteenth Air Force pilot and six pistols given him 

by the Air Ground Aid Service to demonstrate to his rivals that he was the 

special representative of the American military.23 

A Reassessment of Policy 

The period after the japanese takeover in March 1945 thus witnessed a shift to 

more direct and active involvement by American forces in Indochina. Yet 

the basic American policy toward Indochina , particularly in regard to the 

question of the region's postwar fate, remained indefinite. This indecision left 

U.S. Army and Army Air Forces commanders on the scene without any firm 

sense of direction. 

The need for a more definite Indochina policy was appreCiated by most 

leaders in Washington. There was a general feeling, at least in State and War 

Department circles, that the matter could be postponed no longer- that certain basic d ecisions would have to be made well before the end of the war. 

The State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee on 13 March 1945 feared 

that " inaction by the United States [would have] the practical effect of indicating lack of American interest in this area and giving greater influence to the 

British and the French. ,,24 The committee recommended that the secretary of 

state attempt to obta in a "clarification" of U.S. policy from the president. 

Before any action could be taken, however, President Roosevelt died. 

20Grew to Director 055, 19 Jul 45, records of the 055, RG 59. 

2ICf., ass Weekl y Op Rpt, 6 - 14 Jul 45, China Thea ter records. 

22Spector, "'What the Local Annamites Are Thinking,''' pp. 744 - 52; Thorne, "Indochina and 

~lo.America n Relations," pp. 82 - 83. 

Fenn, Ho Chi M inll, p. 76. 

24Min, Meeting of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, 13 Mar 45, records of 

State, War. and Navy Coordina ting Committee, RG 165, National Archives. 

43 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

On 13 April 1945, the day after the president's dea th, Under Secretary of 

the Army Robert A. Lovett told the State, War, and Navy Coordina ting 

Committee that it was essential to reconsider Roosevelt's prohibition on formulating a definite Indochina policy before the end of the war. The lack of a 

definite policy was "a source of serious embarrassment to the military," and 

the head of the French Military Mission in Washington, Admiral Fenard, had 

taken adva ntage of the situation. Fenard, Lovett explained, had submitted 

questions to various agencies of the U.5. government, and "by obtaining 

negative or even non-committal answers" he had been, "in e ffect, writing 

American policy in Indochina. ,,25 

The State Department's representative on the Coordinating Committee 

observed that his department's subcommittee on the Far East had been 

unable to formulate a firm Indochina policy "due to a divergence of views."2. 

That divergence in the subcommittee reflected in microcosm differences in th e 

entire State Department. Support for Roosevelt's anticolonialist policy came 

mainly from a few Far Eastern specialists, such as John Ca rter Vincent, head 

of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and Abbot Low Moffat, chief of a newly 

created Southwest Pacific Affairs Division (later the Southeast Asian Affa irs 

Division), who were convinced that the United States had to come to terms 

with "the mounting groundswell of nationalism ... engulfing all Southeast 

Asia. ,,27 

Most other officials were more concerned about Europe and were anxious 

to avoid any policy that would tend to complicate America's already strained 

relations with France. French cooperation would be needed, they pointed out, 

in helping check Soviet expansionism in Europe and in making the United 

Nations work. 28 A study prepared by the Office of Strategic Services warned 

against "schemes of international trusteeships which may provoke unrest and 

result in colonial diSintegration and may at the same time alienate us from the 

European states whose help we need to balance Soviet power. ,,29 The State 

Department's Southeast Asia desk officer, Kenneth P. Landon, reca lled that 

"There was virtually no sympathy ... for Roosevelt's Indochina policy" ou tside the Far East Division. 30 

The State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee's requ est for a policy 

statement on Indochina inevitably touched off a debate in the State Department. After two weeks of discussion, the department adopted a policy paper 

recommending that the United Sta tes not oppose restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina but seek assurances of French intentions to establish 

25Ibid., 13 Apr 45, records of State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, RG 165. 

2blbid. 

27Testimony of Abbot Low Moffat, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Hel/rillgs Before tile Committee 011 

Foreig1l Relations: COl/ses, Origills, and Lessolls of the Vietllam War, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972 

(hereafter cited as Moffat Testimony), p. 163. 

28George C. Herring, "The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty 

in Indochina," Diplomatic History 1 (Spring 1977): 100 - 101, 116. 

29055 Rpt, Problems and Objectives of U .5. Policy, 2 Apr 45, cited in H erring, "Truman 

Administration and Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," p. 107. 

3OInterv, author with Kenneth P. Landon, 29 Nov 71, Historians files, CMH . 

44 
From the lapanese Coup to V - I Day 

self-government and local autonomy.31 While labeled a compromise, the recommendation was a long step away from Roosevelt's unwavering insistence 

on creating a trusteeship. 

Over the next few months the United States moved even further away 

from Roosevelt's position. At the San Francisco Conference, which convened 

on 26 April 1945 to discuss the postwar structure of the United Nations, the 

United States did not raise the question of a trusteeship for Indochina. 

Indeed, a member of the U.S. delegation, Harold E. Stassen, told fellow 

delegates that independence was "not as important as interdependence" and 

compared colonial empires to the American federal system.32 Two weeks 

later, on 8 May, Secretary of State Stettinius told French Foreign Minister 

Georges Bidault that "the record is entirely innocent of any official statement 

of the U.S. government questioning, even by implication, French sovereignty 

over Indochina."33 Meanwhile, the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee had finally agreed upon a policy for Indochina. It was incorporated 

into a long report, "Politico-Military Problems in the Far East and Initial 

Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, " which the secretary of state sent to 

President Harry S. Truman on 2 June 1945. While conceding that "independence sentiment in the area is believed to be increasingly strong," the report declared that "the United States recognizes French sovereignty over 

Indochina ."34 

Policy at the Field Level 

President Roosevelt's death marked the end of any real opposition in Washington to a French return to Indochina, but that fact did not become 

immediately apparent to American leaders in the Far East. Even as Indochina 

policy was being carefully reassessed, General Wedemeyer was engaged in a 

heated dispute with Admiral Mountbatten, commander of the Southeast Asia 

Command, over theater boundaries in Southeast Asia. At the root of the 

dispute was the Roosevelt policy. 

Since the beginning of 1944 the Southeast Asia Command had been conducting intelligence and paramilitary operations in Siam and Indochina in 

anticipation of the day when Allied military operations would be extended to 

those countries. Operations into Indochina, carried out in cooperation with 

officers of the French Military Mission at the command's headquarters, were 

intended to establish contact with French leaders in Indochina loyal to de 

Gaulle and to lay the foundation for underground operations against the 

Japanese. JS 

310raft Memo for French Government, 30 Apr 45, 851G.OO/4-2845, RG 59; Moffat Testimony, 

pp. 176 - 77. 

32Department of State, Foreign Relations of 'lie Ullited States, 1945, vol. 1, Get/eral: Tile Ullited 

Natiolls (Washington, 1967), pp. 790ff. 

)JOept of State, Foreigll Relntiot/5, 1945: British Commomuealtl! alld Far East, 6:307. 

34Ibid,,6:557-68. 

35Force 136, Future Plans for French Indochina, 28 Dec 44. 

45 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 -1960 

Although Indochina lay within the boundaries of the China theater, Admiral Mountbatten felt justified in conducting those operations, for Siam and 

Indochina were of direct importance to his planned future military operations. 

"With the passage of time," he wrote, those areas would "become of ever 

increasing importance to the strategy of SEAC.,,36 In addition, Moun tbatten 

considered that he had obtained Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's approval 

for the operations at Chungking in October 1943; that meeting had resulted in 

an informal gentlemen'S agreement: Siam and Indochina were to remain in the 

China theater but since, "as the war develops, the scope of operations. . of 

the Southeast Asia theatre ... may involve Thailand and Indochina, ... the 

boundaries between the two theatres are to be decided ... in accordance 

with the progress of advances the respective forces make."37 Mountbatten 

also claimed to have obtained additional approval to carry out clandestine 

operations in Indochina when Chiang had visited India in November 1944. 

Mountbatten could further claim to have received President Roosevelt's 

tacit approval for his actions. Only a few weeks after Roosevelt, in October 

1944, had bluntly declared that "we should do nothing in regard to resistance 

groups ... in relation to Indochina," the British ambassador, Lord Ha lifax, 

had told the president that it was essential that "Mountbatten should be free 

without delay to get some parties of French into Indochina to do sabotage." 

According to Ha lifax, the president had replied " that if we felt it was important that we had better tell Mountbatten to do it and ask no questions" but 

that " he did not want to appear to be committed to anything to prejudice a 

political decision. ,,38 

General Wedemeyer, for his part, with little or no knowledge of those 

informal understandings, was concerned that military operations over which 

he had no control and about which he had scant information were being 

conducted in the theater for which he was responsible. To the British he 

expressed himself as " diametrically opposed to [Mountbatten's) conception 

of his 'gentlemen's agreement''' with Chiang Kai-shek. 39 Wedemeyer and 

Ambassador Hurley believed that the British operations in Indochina were 

designed to aid the French to reestablish their hegemony. Mountbatten's chief 

political adviser, on the other hand, complained that it was "militarily indefensible that this command, which at present is alone in a position to organize effective clandestine operations in these areas, should be hampered ... 

by American obstruction which we know to be based on purely political 

considerations. /1 40 

When the French refused to tell Wedemeyer details of their part in the 

36Political Adviser, SEAC, to Foreign O ffice, 8 Feb 45, WO 203/5561, SEAC records, PRO. 

37Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Killd: The United Slates, Brilllill, {Iud the War Agai/lst jap(l1I, 

1942 - 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), p. 301. 

sg, AMSSO to Argonaut, 12 Feb 45, F98611 11G, FO 371, Fore ign Office records, PRO. 

:WChief Political Adviser, SEAC, to Foreign Office, 10 Feb 45, WO 20315561, SEAC records, 

PRO. 

4OIbid., also 8 Feb 45, WO 20315561; extract from Rpt, Lt Col Carver, WO 20315210. All in SEAC 

records, PRO. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time RUlls 0111 ;11 CBI, United States 

Army in World War II (Washington, 1959), pp. 259 - 60. 

46 
From Ihe lapanese COIIP 10 V - I Day 

Admiral Mountbatten 0 11 illspeclioll /ollr, 1944. 

operations, Wedemeyer closed Kunming Airport to planes of the Southeast 

Asia Command flying in support of the clandestine efforts. The British continued to carry out operations from jessore, near Calcutta in eastern India, and 

on the night of 23 january 1945 fighters of the Fourteenth Air Force mistook 

three British bombers, on an intelligence mission into Indochina, for japanese 

planes and shot them down. The Royal Air Force liaison officer with the 

Fourteenth Air Force had not been informed of the mission " owing to the 

political situation.,,'1 

Both Mountbatten and Wedemeyer appealed to their respective governments, whereupon President Roosevelt suggested to Prime Minister Churchill 

in February "the best solution at present is for you and me to agree that 

all Anglo-American-Chinese milita ry operations in Indo-China, regardless of 

their nature, be coordinated by General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to 

the Generalissimo. " " In the Far East itself, General Wedemeyer visited 

Mountbatten's headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon, in March, and left believing 

firmly that Mountbatten had agreed not to conduct further operations in 

Indochina unless approved in ad vance by the China theater. 43 

;IiNote on Loss of 3 Libera tor Ai rcraft of No. 358 Squadron, Night of 22 - 23 Jan 45, WO 

203/4331, SEAC records, PRO. 

42M emo, Ass! to President's Naval Aide, sub: Indochina, Department of State, Poreign Relations 

of lite United States, vol. 1, Tire COllferellcc of Berli", 1945 (Washington, 1960), p. 918. 

43lbid . 

47 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

General Wedemeyer (left) with Ambassador Hurley 

Admiral Mountbatten, to the contrary, understood only that he had 

agreed to inform Wedemeyer about his ope rations, not to submit them for 

approva l. 44 When he informed Wedemeyer in May that he intended to fl y 

twenty-six sorties into Indochina, Wedemeyer asked for more information 

and suggested that the equipment being fu rnished to French forces within 

Indochina might be used to better advantage reequipping the French who 

had retreated into China following the Japanese takeover. He also wa nted to 

be sure that "equipment furnished guerrilla units will be employed against 

the Japanese." When Mountbatten responded with only ge neral info rmation, 

Wedemeyer pronounced it incomplete and asked for more details. After a 

further fruitless exchange of messages, Mountbatten a nnounced that, beca use 

of weather, he could delay no longer and that " the operations are now being 

carried OUt.,,45 

Wedemeyer was furious. "It had never occurred to me," he radioed 

Admiral Mountbatten on 25 May, " that you would presume that you have 

authority to operate in an area contiguous to your own without cognizance 

and full authority of the commander of that area .... Your decision ... is a 

oWlbid.; Msg, SACSEA to Chungking, 8 Apr 45, WO 203/S561A, SEAC records. 

45Mcmo, Asst to President's Nav(1 i Aide, p. 919. The exchange of messages is in WO 203/5210, 

SEAC records. 

48 
From the lapallese CO IlP to V - I Day 

direct violation of the intent of our respective directives."'" Wedemeyer was 

being true to his charge from President Roosevelt to "watch carefully to 

prevent any British and French political activities in Indochina," for control of 

clandestine activities in Indochina might enable the British to influence politica l developments and alignments there." Wedemeyer was concerned also 

that the French guerrillas might employ their arms not against the Japanese 

but against indigenous forces that opposed them'S 

To the U.S. Army's chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, Wedemeyer 

noted that the British refusal to recognize Indochina as being in the China 

thea ter, the increased activities of the British in Indochina, and the large 

French military staff at the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Command 

pointed to the existence of "a British and French plan to reestablish their 

pre-war political and economic positions in Southeast Asia .,,49 Ambassador 

Hurley supported the general with an even stronger letter to President 

Truman. The ambassador asserted that Lord Mountbatten " is using the American lend-lease supplies and other American resources to invade Indo-China to 

defeat what we believe to be the American policy, and to reestablish French 

imperialism."so 

Washington's reply undoubtedly came as a su rprise to Wedemeyer and 

Hurley. While declaring that " there has been no basic change in [United 

States] policy," the State Department added that decisions reached at the 

conferences at Yalta and San Francisco "would preclude the establishment 

of a trusteeship for Indochina except under the French government. The 

latter seems unlikely. " The United States, the message stated, "welcomes 

French participation in the Pacific war to the extent practical," and French 

offers of assistance should " be considered on their mili tary merits." American 

forces in China were free to cooperate with French resistance groups in 

Indochina "provided such assistance does not interfere with requirements of 

other planned operations." In a similar message General Marshall informed 

Wedemeyer that " the Sta te Department's [new] position eliminates the political necessity of curtailing Lord Mountbatten's operations in Indo-China." 5! 

Those operations should in the future " be judged strictly on their military 

merits and in relation to the stand of the Generalissimo."52 

So ended the last American attempts at the fi eld command level to restrict 

French and British activities in Indochina. Yet the true nature of the changes 

in American policy toward Indochina during the spring of 1945 were never 

fu lly perceived in the China thea ter. General Wedemeyer, for example, saw 

the Marshall message as signifying no fundamenta l change in American 

policy but as merely another concession to French pressure for a role in the 

46Msg. Wedemeyer to Mountbalten, 25 May 45, FIe Book 1, China Thea ter records. 

47Msg. Wedemeyer to Marshall, 28 May 45, FIC Book 2. 

48M emo, Ass t to President's Naval Aide, p. 919. 

49Msg, Wedemeyer to Marshall , 28 May 45. 

5OMsg, Hurley to Harry S. Truman, 28 May 45, Dept of Slate, Foreigll Relatio1lS: Conferellce of 

Berli", 1945. 1: 920. 

SI5ecy of State to Hurley, 7 Jun 45, RG 165. 

52Msg. Marshall to Wedemeyer, 4 Jun 45, FIC Book 2. 

49 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Pacific war. In regard to Indochina he still considered himself bound by the 

instructions he had received from the president. Both Wedemeyer and Hurley 

would continue to try to implement Roosevelt's policy long after Washington 

had abandoned it. 53 

531n interviewing Americans concerned with Indoch ina near the end of the war, the author 

asked, "What d id you believe American policy on the postwar political dispositi on of Indochina 

would be?" Answe rs ranged from " return to the French" to trusteeship under the United 

Nations, France, China, o r the United States. See intervs, author wit h Maj Cen Philip E. 

Ga llagher, 13 Jan 72; Maj Cen Robert B. McClure, 26 May 72; Archimedes L. Patti, 26 Jan 73; Col 

John H. Stadler, 19 May 72; Frank White, 18 Feb 72; and James R. Withrow, Jr., 9 Mar 72. All in 

Historians files. CMH. 

50 
4 

The Chinese Occupation of North Vietnam 

August - October 1945 

When the heads of the Allied governments and the Soviet Union met at 

Potsdam in July 1945, the dispute between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer over 

theater boundaries was still fresh in the minds of the British and American 

Chiefs of Staff. The British had decided that the only solution was to transfer 

the whole of Indochina to Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command.' When 

they proposed that arrangement at Potsdam, the American Joint Chiefs of 

Staff countered with a suggestion that Indochina be divided between the two 

theaters. In the end it was agreed, despite General Wedemeyer's objections, 

to divide Indochina along the 16th Parallel with the Southeast Asia Command 

responsible for the south and the China theater for the north. 

That command arrangement was in effect on 14 August 1945 when Japan 

accepted the Allied surrender terms. Thus it followed that the Chinese would 

accept the surrender of the Japanese north of the 16th Parallel and the British 

the surrender south of it. In the process each would temporarily occupy its 

respective zone. Since there were few Japanese in Laos and Cambodia, occupation would be confined largely to Vietnam. 

Since Americans in the China theater were advisers to the Chinese armies 

that would enter the northern part of Vietnam, General Wedemeyer's Theater 

Planning Section at Chungking began work in early August on a joint 

American-Chinese plan for the occupation of the northern part of Vietnam.' 

By 7 September Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer had approved a 

plan based on the assumption that no American ground forces would be 

committed but that American " liaison and advisory personnel would accompany the occupation troops to assist the Chinese commanders."J The plan 

provided that the number of occupation forces "should be held to an absolute 

minimum," partly because only 50,000 Japanese troops were involved but 

primarily because of food shortages in Vietnam. Tonkin was suffering from a 

iThorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 627. 

2Msg, CSM 113, 23 Aug 45, China Theater files, RG 407. 

3History of U.s. Forces, China Theater, p. 28. 

51 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

severe food shortage ca used by fl ooding of the Red River and wartime 

disruption of the transportation system, and famine in va rious parts of the 

country had recently claimed about two million lives. A large body of 

occupying troops would only serve to aggravate those conditions. 

In his guidance for the American liaison teams, which were to accompany 

the Chinese forces, Wedemeyer added his long-held belief that " the ultimate 

political fate of Indo-China remains to be decided. ,,4 At the same time, he and 

the theater planners regarded the occupation of Indochina as a rather unimportant sideshow compared to the problems likely to be encountered in the 

occupation of north China, Manchuria, and Korea 5 Wedemeyer's directive 

gave first priority to the occupation of those areas of China proper that had 

been held by the Japanese, second priority to Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa, 

and third priority to Indochina6 Three of the four Chinese armies assigned to 

enter Vietnam- the 52d, the 62d, and the 93d- were scheduled for early 

redeployment to Formosa and Manchuria once they had completed the preliminary task of disarming the Japanese in northern Vietnam. Only the fo urth 

Chinese army, the 60th, with a strength of about 38,000 men and a " very 

good" rating from its American advisers, was to remain in northern Vietnam 

as the occupation fo rce. 

Events, however, followed a different course. The plan called for a minimum force, but some 125,000 to 150,000 Chinese troops came to be stationed 

in, or passed through, northern Vietnam between October 1945 and the 

spring of 1946. The 93d Chinese Army, assigned to "secure the length of the 

Red River a nd relieve the 52d Army at Hanoi," instead " took up positions in 

the highlands of Laos, where no Japanese had ever been, in order to control 

the opium poppy harvest. The 93d Army refused to leave Indo-China until 

September, 1946 . . when a second crop became available."7 

The reason for the wide divergence between the plan and what happened 

lay in the different conceptions of the occupation held by the Chinese and the 

Americans. The Americans saw the occupation as an unimportant but necessary bit of postwar housekeeping until the future of Indochina was decided. 

General Wedemeyer, for example, instructed his commanders that there was 

to be "no intimation that U.S. personnel are in French Indo-China for any 

mission other than a humanitarian one."s To the Chinese, on the other hand, 

the occupation was "a projection of the warlord politics of south China onto 

the revolutionary scene of northern Viet Nam."9 Of the troops chosen for the 

occupation, more than 60 percent were Yunnanese soldiers of the warlord 

Lung Yun. This was a premeditated step on the part of the Chinese Na tionalist government in Chungking to weaken General Lung Yun's military strength 

4lbid. 

5lntervs, author with Ga llagher, 13 Jan 72; McClure, 26 May 72; and Reginald Ungern, 18 Nov 

71. Historians files, CMH. 

60p Di rective 25, HQ U5FCf, 28 Aug 45, China Theater files. 

'History of U.S. Forces, China Theater, p. 31; McAlister, Vietllam: Origills of Revo/ll /ioll , p. 211. 

tlRadiogram on Censorship, Wedemeyer, 31 Aug 45, China Thea ter files. 

9McAlister, Vie/"om: Origins of Revolutioll, p. 209. 

52 
The Chinese Occupation of North Vietna", 

Generals Gallagher and Lu Han 

by sending the bulk of his troops outside China. Early in the occupation the 

Nationalist government would take advantage of the situation to depose him. 

The Occupation and the Viet Minh 

Tung Yun's cousin, Lt. Gen. Lu Han, commanded the occupation troops. 

LLu Han neither trusted, nor was trusted by, the central government of 

China and pursued his own policies, which were sometimes at variance with 

those of Chungking. Basica lly, Lu Han intended to enrich himself and his 

supporters at the expense of the Vietnamese, to settle old scores with the 

French, and to manipulate volatile political forces unleashed by the Japanese 

surrender. That Lu Han was conducting the occupation for his own ends was 

apparently never fully understood by either the Americans or the French. 

American liaison teams accompanied each of the major components of Lu 

Han's forces. General Wedemeyer drew these teams from the Chinese Training Combat Command, an advisory command that for just under a year had 

been working with newly formed units in south China. All the teams were 

under the command of Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher, Lu Han's adviser. The 

primary task of the liaison teams was to advise and assist the Chinese in 

53 
Advice alld Supporl: TIIe Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The Completeness of the August Revolution exlellded evell 10 postage 

stalllPs. Lefl, IIIe ViclIy govenIlllelll slalllp depictillg Marslwl Pelaill. RiglIt, 

Ho elIi Millii replaces Pelaill. 

implementing the Ja pa nese s urrender and conducting the occupation. The 

teams were charged specifica lly with rendering all possible assistance to 

recovered Allied prisone rs and reporting on the "effectiveness and spirit of 

the Chinese enforcement of the terms of surrender.',1Q Instructions to the 

teams said nothing about politica l matte rs. For Ga llagher and his men, the 

occupation was basica lly a logistical problem involving the prompt disarming 

of the Japanese and the repa triation of Allied prisoners. As for the poli tical 

future of Vietnam, some believed the country wou ld be returned to French 

control, others expected it would attain independence or be accorded a trusteeship sta tu s, and others had no opinion. All agreed that it was not their 

concern. I I 

Hindered by the flood s in the Red River va ll ey, the Chinese armies and 

their American advisers adva nced slowly into Tonkin, and not until nearly a 

lOMaj Cen Robert 13. McClure, Instructions to CCC Liaison Teams, 4 Sep 45, China Theater 

fi les. 

Il Ltr, Gallagher to Bernard B. Fa ll , 30 Mar 56, Ga llag her Papers; interv5, author with Ga llaghe r, 

13 Jan 72, Col John H. Stodler and Ungern, 18 Nov 71, and E. S. Waddell, 13 Jan 72, Historians 

files. All in CMH . 

54 
The Chinese Occllpation of North Viet.wlII 

month after Japan's surrender did they reach Hanoi, the capital, in force. In 

the interval Vietnam had undergone one of the most momentOllS events in its 

history, the assumption of power and declaration of independence by the 

Viet Minh, generally referred to as "the August Revolution." 

The August Revolution had its immed iate origins in the months following 

the Japanese coup in March 1945 that destroyed the French colonial regime." 

Senior colonial officials, except for a few who escaped to China, were imprisoned. After establishing a puppet regime under Nguyen Emperor Bao Dai, 

the Japanese proclaimed that Vietnam was "independent" and brought a 

longtime collaborator, Tran Trong Kim, from Singapore to head the new 

cabinet. 

Tran Trong Kim's government was one in name only. Although the 

Japanese were too preoccupied with immediate military needs to pay much 

attention to civil governmen t or in ternal politica l developments, the Japanese 

Army continued to exercise all rea l power in Vietnam. The Japanese grant of 

independence, spurious as it was, nevertheless inspired a great increase in 

patriotic and nationalistic activities among the Vietnamese people. "Once they 

were assured of Japanese indifference to political activities which were not 

ove rtly anti-Japanese, poli tical participation became increasingly varied, 

enthusiastic, and better organized." 13 

As the best organized and most experienced political group in Vietnam, 

the Communists, who controlled the Viet Minh, were able to take advantage 

of the upsurge of nationalistic feeling. Membership in Viet Minh - sponsored 

organizations swelled. At the same time, the Viet Minh stepped up guerrilla 

activities against the Japanese, utilizing weapons and ammunition left behind 

by the French forces that had withdrawn to China and recruiting former 

members of the French-trained Vietnamese militia into their own military 

units. 14 In more remote rural areas the Viet Minh established shadow governments ca lled People's Revolutionary Committees which were soon in effective 

control of th eir d istricts. They also capita lized on the widespread hardship 

and starvation caused by the famine in much of northern Vietnam by organizing tax boycotts and raiding granaries. By V - J Day, 15 August 1945, the Viet 

Minh con trolled large areas of north and north central Vietnam. 

With news of the Japanese acceptance of surrender terms, the Viet Minh 

stepped easily into the power vacuum created by japa n's co lla pse and the 

tardy arriva l of Allied occupation forces. Everywhere in northern Vietnam 

loca l People's Revolutionary Committees took control of the governmental 

machinery. In Hanoi the Viet Min h expelled the Tran Trong Kim government, 

while in Hue on 30 August th e Emperor Bao Dai, last descendant of the 

Nguyen lords of Vietnam, abdicated in favor of what would be known as the 

12U nless otherwise noted this account is bilsed on Huynh Kim Khanh, "The Vie tnamese 

August Revolution Reinterpreted," Juurnal of Asial/ Studies 30 (1971): 76 1- 82, and Ellen J. 

Hammer, The Struggle for /Ju/oc/lilla, 1940 - 1955 (Sta nford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 

95 - 105. 

') Khanh, "The Vietnamese August Revolution Reinterpreted," p. 767. 

'·'French Indochina (Political Situation), II Oct 45, pp. 4 - 7. 

55 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Three days later, in an impressive ceremony 

ca refully stage-managed by th e Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the 

independence of Vietnam before a crowd of some 500,000 in Hanoi. 15 

It was in the midst of those rapid and far-reaching political events that the 

first Americans entered Hanoi on 22 August 1945, almost a month in advance 

of the Chinese troops. The first U.S. unit to arrive was a joint 055 - Air 

Ground Aid Service team of about a dozen men under an ass officer who 

had organized and directed some of the wartime ass missions into Vietnam, 

Maj. Archimedes L. A. Patti. With Patti's team came fi ve French officers 

commanded by the head of th e French intelligence mission in Kunming, Maj. 

Jean Sainteny. Patti established a headquarters in the Hotel Metropole, while 

the Japanese temporarily interned the French officers in the palace of the 

former governor-general "as a protective measure."16 Two days later, on 24 

August, eight more men arrived to join Pa tti's team, and at the end of the 

month a small U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government detachment 

under Col. Stephen Nord linger also reached Hanoi. 

Although clear on paper, the missions and command relationship of the 

American groups soon became a SOUTce of confusion. Reporting to the G - 5 

(Civil Affairs) Division of the China theater, Nord linger was to loca te and aid 

prisoners of war and "to do everything possible to secure humanitarian 

treatment of a ll elements of the civil community."l7 Although Patti's team 

was under Nordlinger's operational control in rega rd to matters having to do 

with prisoners of war, Nord linger had no authority over Patti's ass intelligence work. For the latter, Patti was responsible both to the Strategic Services 

Officer, China theater, and directly to the chief, Secret Intelligence Branch, 

ass, in Wa shington. The men of the Air Ground Aid Service, although 

also concerned with prisoners of war, reported to the Fourteenth Air Force. 

Sa inteny claimed to be the official representative in Indochina of the French 

government, but by his own admission French authorities in Kunming and 

Calcutta had not confirmed his status. I" 

The fact that the Americans in Hanoi also lacked a true knowledge of 

current U.S. policy rega rding Indochina also contributed to the confusion. 

That lack was attributable, at least in part, to General Wedemeyer's continu -

ing failure to understand that the United States had come to recognize French 

sovereignty in Indochina. Orders from the China theater specified the U.S. 

personnel in Indochina were "not to become involved. in French-Chinese 

relations or in any way become associated with either side in possible conflicts.,, '9 As Major Patti reported during his first week in Hanoi, "our policy 

15Ibid. , p. 12. 

16Rpt of G- 5 to Shangha i Base Comma nd, 2 Jan 46, China Theater files; Drachman, United 

States Po/iet) Towaal VieIlUlIII, pp. 140 - 4'1 . 

'7Drachman, United StatL'S Policy Toward Vietnam, pp. 140 - 41. 

lI~OSS Msg, Mayer and Helliwell to Nordlinger and Bcrnigue, No. 55, 7 Sep 45; Palti, Project 

NO.1 IRptJ, pt. B, p. 6. Both in PSYWAR 09 1 (1 957) Indochina, RC 319. Sec also, Sainteny, 

lIistoire d'III1C fJni;r Mnnqllce, pp. 105 - 09. 

19Rpt o f G- 5 to Shanghai Base Command; OSS Msg, Indi v to Patti, No. 22, 28 Aug 45, 

rsVWAR 091 (1 957) Indochina , RG 319. 

56 
The Chinese Occupation of North Vietnam 

Major Patti, left, with OSS team members and Viet Minh leaders. Ciap is 

third from right. 

here has been one of strict neutrality." The Americans had made "it quite 

clear . .. that OUT interests here at the moment are strictly a military mission 

and have no political implications."20 

Such a stance was certainly not appreciated by the French. Indeed, Sainteny 

was later to accuse Patti of having deliberately delayed the departure of his 

French mission to Hanoi for more than a week after the Japanese surrender 

and of having engaged in anti-French and pro - Viet Minh activities. Other 

French writers have charged Patti's men with siding openly with the Viet 

Minh and with prospecting for American business interests.

2I 

Patti had always been willing to work with the French during the war, but 

it took only a day or two in Hanoi to convince him that any attempt by the 

French to reoccupy Vietnam would precipitate civil war. "Political situation 

critical," he signaled to Kunming. "Viet Minh strong and belligerent and 

definitely anti-French. Suggest no more French be permitted to enter French 

Indo-China and especially not armed."22 Patti later asserted that only the 

2°055 Msg, Patti to Indiv, No. 19, 27 Aug 45, PSYWAR 091 (1957) Indochina, RG 319. 

2lSee Sainteny, Histoire d'ulle ?nix Mtmqllee, pp. 62 - 87, 95 - 125, passim; Gabriel Sabattier, Le 

Destin de /'II/doc/lille (Paris: Pion, 1952), pp. 334 - 40; and Pierre Maurice Dessinges, "Les Intrigues 

Internationalcs en Indochine," Le Mondc, 13 A pril 1947. 

22055 M sg, Patti to Indiv, No. 2, 23 Aug 45, PSYWAR 091 (1957) Indochina, RG 319. 

57 
Advice al1d Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

French Prisoners of War ill the Citadel, Halloi. 

presence of armed Americans had prevented a Vietnamese massacre of French 

civilians during the turbulent days of the August Revolution. 23 French civilians in Hanoi, observed another American officer, were "terrified of the 

Annamese." Their homes were being looted by armed bands of Annamese, 

and Frenchmen found on the streets at night were frequently jailed for short 

periods. 24 

Particularly serious was the plight of some 4,500 Frenchmen, mainly foreign legionnaires, who had been imprisoned in the old Citadel in Hanoi 

during the Japanese takeover in March.'5 One of Patti's men described health 

and sanitary conditions in the Citadel as "incredibly bad." A prison hospital 

designed to accommodate 150 had 350 patients, half of them critically ill. Six 

or seven people were dying daily.'6 The prisoners were the specia l concern of 

Colonel Nordlinger's Civil Affairs detachment. One of Nordlinger's first tasks, 

accomplished by late September with the help of the Air Ground Aid Service, 

was to provide a new hospital with 400 beds.27 He was able to obtain a 

23Drachman, United States Policy TOlVard Vietnam, pp. 141 - 42; Abbot Low Moffat, Memo of 

Conversation With Major A. L. Patti, 5 Dec 46, 851C.OOI12 - 546, RC 59. 

24U r, Lt Col John C. Bane to Gallagher, 1S Sep 45, Fie file, China Theater files. 

25Rpt, Col Stephen Nordlinger to Lt Col John C. Bane, Sep 45, FIe file, China Theater files. 

26Ibid.; Rpt of C - S to Shanghai Base Command, 2 Jan 46; OSS Msg, Patti to Indiv, No. 62, 1 

Sep, 45 PSYWAR 091 (1957) Indochina, RG 319. 

7Ur, Bane to Gallagher, 15 Sep 45. 

58 
The Chillese OcclIpation of North Vietllam 

considerable quantity of medica l supplies and such emergency food items as 

powdered milk from American headquarters in Kunming and from the Red 

CrosS.>8 Nord linger also persuaded the Viet Minh to return control of all the 

hospitals in Hanoi to French medical personnel. 

Although French officials pressed for release of able-bod ied prisoners from 

the Citadel to "serve as a protective force against Annamites' attacks on 

French civilians," both Nordli nger and Patti categorica lly refu sed to consider 

the proposal in the belief that release of the prisoners might set off a civil 

war. 29 Patti pointed out that arms and ammunition were stored in the houses 

of many Frenchmen and that the healthy prisoners in the Citadel were 

waiting for the moment of liberation to take up arms. 30 This decision not to 

release the French prisoners earned for the United States the lasti ng enmity of 

ma ny Frenchmen, but it may well have foresta lled fighting.'1 When the 

commander of the British occupation forces in southern Vietnam, Maj. Gen. 

Douglas D. Gracey, released French prisoners in Saigon, the result was 

preCisely the kind of civil strife that Patti and Nord linger had feared. 

W hile endeavoring to remain neutral, the Americans in Hanoi agreed to 

arrange meetings between the Sain teny missio n and the Viet Minh, but at the 

end of August the China theater ordered them to stop.32 During that brief 

period Patti had ample opportunity to observe the Viet Min h government in 

action. His initial impressions were negative. "The Provisional Government is 

groping in the dark," he reported to Ku nming. "I am convinced they are not 

politica lly ma ture and being misled by Japanese agent provocateurs and Red 

elements.,,33 Yet a few days later, on 1 September, he was advising Kunm ing 

that "Ho Chi Minh impresses me as a sensible, well balanced, politically 

minded individual. From what I have seen these people mean business 

and 1 am afraid th e French will have to dea l with them. For that matter we 

will all have to deal with them."" 

Gallagher's Mission 

Such was the situation in mid-September 1945 when the Chinese occupation armies entered Hanoi: the Viet Minh rema ined in control, the French 

2t!Drachman, Ulliled Slaies Policy Toward VietHalll, pp. 142 - 43. 

29055 Msg, Nordlinger Thru Patti to Indiv for G - 5, No. 54, 31 Aug 45, P5YWAR 091 (1957) 

Indochina, RG 319. 

JOlbid., also 055 Msg, Patti to Indiv, Rclay to Gi"l lIaghcr, No. 63, 2 Sep 45, PSYWAR 091 (1957) 

Indochina, RG 319. 

31 As Bernard Fall observed in 1962, "Many of the French officii"l ls who were involved in 

Indo-China then are still in high posts in the French governmen t today . .. and hundreds of 

present day French majors and colonels were lieutenants interned in Japanese concentmtion 

ca mps and to this day they te rm Americ<ln actions of thai period <IS rank 'betmyal' of <I loyal 

alii." See Fall, Tile Two Vietlla/1/s, pp. 69 - 70. 

2055 Msg, Indiv to Patti, No. 22, 28 Aug 45. 

33055 M sg, Patti to Indiv, No. 36, 28 Aug 45, PSYWAR 091 ( 1957) Indochina, RG 3 19. 

3-I lbid., No. 61, 1 Sep 45, PSYWAR 09"1 (1957) Indochina, RG 3"19. 

59 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

were helpless to oust them, and the japanese were passive but ready to obey 

any orders put to them by the ass and Civil Affairs detachment. The 

Americans, however, had refu sed to make any change in the status quo. 

Arriving w ith the Chinese troops, General Gallagher and his staff now 

brought the total number of Americans in Hanoi to about sixty.35 

The small group of Americans who had preceded Gallagher- the men of 

the ass, Air Ground Aid Service, and Civil Affairs detachment- had already 

become the focus of extravagant hopes and fea rs on the part of both the 

Vietnamese and the French. The Vietnamese saw the Americans "as a symbol 

of liberation, not from the japanese, but from decades of French colonial 

rule."36 Fastening on the example of the Philippines (which was about to 

receive independence) and the high-sounding declarations of the Atlantic 

Charter, many Vietnamese expected that the United States would champion 

their revolution. " The French, on the other hand, greeted the Americans 

as allies. "The French are extremely friendly and look to us for protection," 

reported one of Gallagher's offi cers.

38 Both groups were to be sorely 

disappointed. 

For the moment, it was not the handful of Americans in Hanoi but the 

Chinese who controlled the fate of northern Vietnam. Specifically, it was the 

Yunnan warlord Lu Han, and he apparently had no intention of helping the 

French to rega in control. When Colonel Nordlinger recommended that Viet 

Minh forces in Ha noi be disarmed, Genera l Lu Han flatly refused, and he 

promptly expelled the small French mission under Sainteny from the palace 

of the former governor-genera l. 39 The Chinese also made no move to release 

the French soldiers still held in the Citadel or to interfere in any way with the 

day-to-day fun ctioning of the Viet Minh government. Having received no 

clea r guidance about what the political future of Vietnam was to be, General 

Gallagher gene rally approved Lu Han's hands-off approach but supported 

Colonel Nordlinger's efforts to alleviate conditions for the French prisoners'o 

For Genera l Ga llagher it was difficult to come to a concl usion abou t the 

revolution he was witnessing. Upon arrival in Hanoi he was presented with 

confused and often contradictory reports on the Viet Minh by the American 

offi cers who had preceded him. Colonel Nord linger and his intelligence 

officer, Lt. Col. john C. Bane, for example, believed that the Viet Minh were 

sponsored by the japanese, had "a menacing attitude," and constituted a 

threat to good order. In urging Genera l Lu Han to disa rm the Viet Minh 

35History of U.S. Forces, China Theater, p. 32; Ltr, Bane to Gallagher, 15 Sep 45; Alert Plan for 

American Personnel in Hanoi, 24 Sep 45, FIe file. China Theater files. 

36Reporl of Arthur Hale, USIS (U.s. Information Service), Nov 45. copy in Gallagher Papers, 

CMH. 

37Tha! was the impression received by nearly all Americans in Vietnam at the time. See Hale 

Rpt. See also Ga llagher to McClure, 20 Scp 45, Gallagher Papers; lntcrv, author with Ga llagher, 

13 Jan 72, and Ungern, 18 Nov 71; Ltr, Maj f . M . Mullins to Gallagher, 26 Sep 45, FIC file, China 

Thea ter files. 

38Ltr, Bane to Gallagher, 15 Sep 45. 

39 lbid. 

-IOlnterv, author with Gallagher, 13 Jan 72. 

60 
The Chillese OCCllpatioll of North Vietllam 

troops, Nordlinger hoped that once Ho Chi Minh's gove rnment had lost its 

coerci ve power, "a more democratic orga niza tion would probably evolve 

under new leadership to take its place.",1! Another officer, Maj. F. M. Mullins, 

reported that Ho, although "a disciple of communism," was "pro-American" 

and "sincere in his politica l motives and anxious to co-opera te with the 

Americans.,,42 While recognizing that Ho was "an old revolutionist" and "a 

product of Moscow," General Ga llagher fina lly decided that "the Prime Minister and his party represented the real aspirations of the Vietnamese people 

for independence.,,"3 

In conversa tions with Ho, Ga llagher quickly learned that the Vietnamese 

leader looked to th e United States fo r support. " He looks upon Ame rica as 

the savior of all small nations," Gallagher reported to the China thea ter, 

"and is basing all his actions on the statement in the Atlantic Charter that 

the independence of th e smaller nations wou ld be assured by the major 

powers. I pointed out frankl y that my job was not as a representative of 

the State Department nor was I interested in th e politica l situation that I 

was merely working with Lu Han. Confidentially I wish the Annamites could 

be given their independence, but, of cou rse we have no voice in this matter. ,,44 

The French saw Ge ne ral Ga ll agher's attitude not as neutral but as conSCiously a nti-French. How else, th ey asked, could they explain the fact that 

French soldiers were still languishing in the Citadel, or Gallagher's refusal to 

do anything to help restore Fra nce's rightful position in Vietnam? Indeed , the 

French read politica l significance into almost everything said or done by the 

srnall body of Americans in Hanoi. Many Frenchmen saw American actions 

as part of a propaganda campaign to impress the Vietnamese with the wealth 

and power of America and to di scredit the French. 45 

General Gallagher unw ittingly exacerbated relations with th e French on 18 

September when he observed in a casual conversation with a Chinese general, 

Gaston Wang, that the Viet Minh's opposition to return of the French was so 

strong that entrance of French troops into northe rn Vietnam would probably 

initiate armed conflict or disturbances which would make it difficult for Lu 

Han to maintain peace and order. 46 Genera l Wang, w ho had many friends 

and associates among the French colonials, promptly reported this conversation to Sainteny, w ho in turn reported it to Paris. 4? When the State Department received a protest from the French Foreign Office, the conversation had 

become a "secret conference" between Gallagher, Wang, and Alessandri . 

General Ga llagher was alleged to have said that the All ies had not yet 

recognized French sovereignty, that premature participation by the French in 

.HUr, Bane to Gallagher, 15 Sep 45. 

42Ur, Mullins to Gallagher, 26 Sep 45. 

4JUr, Gall<l gher to M cClure, 20 Sep 45. 

·!-'Ibid. 

4SSee Dessinges, " Les Intrigues intern<ltionales en lndochine," Saba tlier, Le Dt'~till dl' /'flldochi1le, 

and Sainteny, His/oire (flme Pnix Mflll'll/l·e. 

4f>Msg, Gallagher to HQ. CCC, 2 1 Sep 45. China Theater files. 

41lnterv, <lu thor with Gallagher, 13 Jan 72. 

61 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Japanese Surrender Ceremony ill Halloi, Septelllber 1945. 

the occupation might precipitate a conflict, and that there could be no question of the restoration of French sovereignty to Indochina 48 

When General Ga llagher learned of the protest, he rushed to General 

Wang's apartment with a demand that the Chinese officer report the true 

version of their conversation and its circumstances. 4<) Wang eventually provided a written statement, which Gallagher enclosed in a letter to Maj. Gen. 

Robert B. McClure, commande r of the Chinese Combat Command . Ga llagher 

denied that he had ever held a secret meeting with Wang and Alessandri 

and gave his version of his conversation with Wang. so Although General 

Wedemeyer cautioned Gallagher to be more circumspect in future conversations, both he and General McClure accepted the exp lana tion. 5I The Chinese 

government, added McClure, recognized French sovereignty in Indochina 

and desired that its own commanders in Indochina facilitate the resumption 

of French administration. As for American policy, "it remains hands off. ,,52 

Although Genera l Gallagher passed that information to the Chinese com4MMsg. HQ, CCC, to Gallagher, 2 1 Sep 45, Fie files. 

4'Jlnterv, author with Gallagher, 13 Jan 72. 

soLtr, Gallagher to McClure, 21 Sep 45, Fie files. 

5lMsg. ee, C hina Theater, to Gallagher, 30 Sep 45, FIe radio m5g. China Theater files. 

52Msg. McClure to Ga llagher, Sep 45, Gallaghe r Papers. 

62 
The Chillese OcclIpatioll of North Viet 110m 

mand, Gene ral Lu Han discounted it. He had received no orders from his 

superio rs to assist the French, he said, a nd added that to help the French 

might turn the Vie tnamese aga in st the ethn ic Chinese living in Hanoi. 53 At a 

meeting with French representatives on 21 September, Lu Han emphasized 

that he was in command in north Indochina and that he would show no 

partiality to either French or Vietnamese. 54 

When Genera l Alessandri arrived in Hanoi to attend the formal Japanese 

surrende r ceremony, Gene ral Ga llagher on 26 Sep tember met with him, 

passed on the Chinese government's view in regard to French sovereignty in 

Vie tnam as he had lea rn ed it from Genera l McClure, and indica ted his 

willi ngness to be of assistance. "Overj oyed," Alessandri presented Ga llaghe r 

with a long list of measures he wa nted the Chinese to implement. They 

included releasing all prisoners from the Citadel, rearming the French police 

and mili tary, and returning control of the rad io station and the public utili ties 

to the French .

55 

Although General Lu Han promised Ga llaghe r th at he would meet the 

French dema nds w he re possible, the attitu de he displayed at the forma l 

Japanese surrende r was hardly conducive to French optimism. 56 Even though 

General Alessandri had flown to Hanoi speCifically to attend the ceremony, 

Lu Han refu sed to allow him to participate in an official capacity because of 

his " unclear position."" Lu Han refu sed also to allow the French flag to be 

flown at the ceremony alongside the flags of the other Allied nations.'8 When 

both Ga llagher and Alessa nd ri as ked him to reconside r, Lu Han in formed 

Ga llaghe r that he would raise th e fl ag only if specifically ordered to do 

so by his superiors.'9 Two days later the China theater confidentially advised 

Ga llagher that the Chinese high command wou ld instruct Lu Han to display 

the Fre nch fla g at the surrender. Whethe r he received such an order or not, 

the fl ag was conspicuously absent on the day of the ceremony. Displaying it, 

Lu Han sa id, might incite the Vietnamese to riot. 6U After Alessandri departed 

Hanoi in a rage, Lu H an issued a public proclamation warning " the enemy of 

Vietnam" that if he "dared to stir up any bloody tragedy," he wou ld be 

severely punished 6 ' Few doubted that the proclamation wa s aimed at the 

French. 

Despite Lu Ha n's promise to try to meet French demands, the Chinese 

gave the French, in Gallaghe r's words, "damn little." At Ga llaghe r's urging, 

Lu Han grudgingly agreed to release all French captives from the Citadel and 

also to provid e a small amo unt of gasoli ne to the French Milita ry Mission . 

5JLlr, Ga llagher to McClure, 27 Sep 45, Gallagher Papers. 

S4MFR, Gallagher, 21 Sep 45, Ga llagher Papers. 

55 Memo, LI Reginald Ungcrn, ADC, to Gen Gallagher, 26 Sep 45, Gallagher Papers. 

5t>Llr, Gallagher to McClure, 27 Sep 45. 

57Chen, Vietnam lIJ/(1 Cllilla , "1938 - 1954 , p. 125. Alessa ndri was placed 11 5th among those 

attending as guests, see McA lister, Vietllam: Origills of Rcvolutioll, p. 212. 

Msg, Ga llagher to CG, USFCT, 27 Sep 45, FIC radio msg, China Thea ter fi les. 

S'JM sg, CG, USFCT, to Gallagher, 29 Sep 45, FIC radio msg, China Theater files. 

6Olbid. 

61 Llr, Gallagher to McClure, 27 Sep 45. 

63 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Anything more he would not do. His reasons were famili ar: he had received 

no clea r instructions from his headquarters, and he feared reprisa ls aga inst 

the ethnic Chinese if his army appeared to be aiding the French6 2 When 

Ga llagher suggested to the China theater that Lu Han be given firm and 

unequivoca l instructions from the Chinese government, General Wedemeyer 

replied that the matter was for the Chinese to decide and that he was 

unwilling to initiate any action which .might be interpreted as meddling by 

China theater in the Indochina political situation63 

Chinese and American help to the French, small and ineffective as it was, 

was still sufficient to alarm the Viet Minh. General Ga llagher reported on 4 

October "a noticeable change in the attitud e of th e Annamites toward the 

Americans here . . since they became aware of the fact that we were not 

going to interfere and would probably help the French.,,64 In a meeting with 

Gallagher and Major Patti, Ho Chi Minh had "expressed the fea r that the 

Allies considered Indochina a conquered cou ntry and that the Chinese came 

as conquerers." Ga llagher and Patti attempted to reassure him and also urged 

him to continue to negotiate with the French6 5 

Americans in Southern Vietnam 

The situation in Hanoi was also undoubtedly influenced by events in 

Vietnam south of the 16th Parallel where the British, unlike the Chinese, 

were doing nothing to interfere with France's resuming control and in many 

ways were actually facilitating a French return to power.66 The occupation 

plan for Indochina prepared by the Southeast Asia Command at the end of 

August had provided that "eventual reoccupation of French Indochina is a 

matter for the French" and that "as far as possible all matters affecting the 

civil population should be dea lt with through the French."o7 In addition, an 

Anglo-French civil affairs agreement signed at the same time had specified 

that among the reasons for stationing Allied troops in Indochina was restoration of French authority in the country.68 Given that understanding, it was 

probably unavoidable that the British forces came into conflict with Vietnamese 

Na tionalists, but relations were further strained by the actions of Maj. Gen. 

Douglas Gracey, the commander of the occupation force. 

The British had arrived in Sa igon around the middle of September to find 

that city, like Hanoi, in the hands of a Nationalist Revolutionary government, 

62Memo of Conference, 5 Sep 45, Ga llagher Papers; Ltr, Ga llagher to McClure, 27 Sep 45. 

6.JMsg, ec, China Theater, to Ga llagher, 4 Oct 45, Fie radio msg, China Theater files. 

Mlbid. 

65Ur, Gallagher to McClure. 27 Sep 45. 

66For a discussion of the evolution of British policy toward Indochina during World War II, see 

Thorne, Allies of n Kind, pp. 501, 619 - 22, 678, passim. 

67SEAC Force Plan No. 1, Occupation of French Indochina, 31 Aug 45, WO 20315444, SEAC 

records. 

68Msg, War Office to SACSEA, 31 Aug 45, WO 203/411 7, SEAC records. 

64 
The Chinese Occupation of North Vietnam 

but there were impo rtant d ifferences. In the north, the Viet Minh had few 

serious rivals for the leadership of the independence movement; in the south, 

they competed for leadership w ith the Trotskyite Dai Viet Party, the old 

pro-Japanese Phuc Quoc Pa rty, and two part-religious, part-politica l sects 

known as the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. Out of a total of thirteen members 

of a Provisional Executive Committee for the South, which was governing 

when the occupation troops arrived, only four were Viet Minh69 

From the o utset, General Gracey made it clear that, unlike Lu Han and 

Gallagher in the north, he was unwilling to work with and through the 

existing nationalist government. He demanded instead that all Vietnamese be 

disarmed, and he informed the loca l Japanese commander, Field Marshal 

Terauchi Hisaichi, tha t the Japanese were responsible for maintaining order. 

In protest aga inst that action the nationalists on 17 September staged a 

general strike. Gracey responded with a proclamation of ma rtial law, suspension of all Vietnamese newspapers, and a ban on all public meetings and 

demonstra tions. He also released and rea rmed about 1,400 French soldie rs 

w ho had been interned in the Saigon a rea since the Japanese takeover in 

March 1945. 

The French, described by a member of Mountbatten's staff as " ill-disciplined 

and excited," promptly reoccupied all public buildings and evicted the Vietnamese from the post offices and police stations. There were "wild shootings 

and Annamites were openly dragged through the streets to be locked up in 

prison s. Generally spea king there was complete chaos. "70 

The Provisional Execu tive Committee for the South answered with a crippling general strike and widespread acts of sabotage. On the evening of 24 

September membe rs of the Binh Xuyen, a ga ngster-type politica l sect, entered 

a French residential section of Saigon ca lled the Cite Herault and massacred 

more than 150 French colonia ls, mostly women and children. From that point 

civil wa r was gene ral throughout the south, w ith British and even Japanese 

troops supporting the French against the Viet Minh and other nationalists. 

The American role in the south was more conspicuous althoug h much less 

important than in the north. As early as 10 August, OSS Detachment 404 

based in Ceylon had beg un plans fo r an intelligence and observer group to 

accompany British troops to Sa igon. Known by the code name Embankment, 

the project had a number of widely divergent objectives. A primary purpose 

was to locate and assist Allied prisoners of war, particularly Americans, and 

to identify and track down Japanese war criminals. Members of the mission 

were also to locate and inventory all property of the United Sta tes governmen t and American citizens and confiscate or microfilm all Japanese documents and code books. Other objectives were to report on political trends and 

to keep track of the activities of any anti-Allied or pro-Japanese political 

groups.7I The OSS group was instructed to reveal only as much of its mission 

69B uttinger, Vielllnlll: A Political History. p. 324. 

7OMemo for Adm Mountbatten, 3 Oct 45, sub: FIC Political and Internal Situation, WO 203/5562, 

SEAC records. 

7LMaj Amos D. Moscrip, A Plan to Penetrate Saigon, 10 Aug 45, records of the OSS. 

65 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

objectives to the French authorities "as will not offend their sensibilities."72 

The man selected to command Embankment was Maj. A. Peter Dewey. 

Dewey spoke flu ent French and had served with the OSS in France and 

North Africa, but his knowledge of current conditions in Indochina was 

spotty. In a memorandum on French policy in the Far East, prepa red for 

Detachment 404 in August 1945, Dewey made no mention of the nationa listic 

stirrings in Vie tnam and Laos but devoted his attention exclusively to what 

the French might do. Like the French themselves, Dewey viewed the question of Indochina primarily as a problem for Fra nce, Britain, the United 

States, and China. Dewey pointed out that the French were worried about 

th e possibility of a joint British-America n-Chinese trusteeship for Indochina 

and were determined to place elements of their army in southern Vietnam as 

soon as possible." 

On 1 September the adva nce element of Emban kment, a prisoner of war 

evacuation team under 1st Lt. Emile R. Con nasse, was parachuted into Saigon. 

The men were greeted respectfully by the japanese and allowed to proceed 

with their work.74 Connasse dismissed the establishment by the Vietnamese 

of an independent government as "a drugstore revolution" but acknowledged 

that " for the present [its] control is complete.,,75 

On the day after their arrival, the Americans witnessed a massive demonstration and parade by severa l hundred thousand men and women organized 

by the Provisional Execu tive Committee for the South . Intended by the Viet 

Minh as a demonstration of solidarity, the parade was soon manipulated by 

extremists in to an attack on the French residents of the city. Dozens of French 

men and women were beaten up or arbitrarily th rown into jail, and many of 

their homes were looted. 

Th is attack was the first serious breakdown of public order since the 

Committee for the Sou th had taken control and would not be repeated until 

well after the arriva l of the British a nd French ?6 Yet it gave th e newly arrived 

Americans of the Embankment team a sense that the revolutionary government was naturally prone to violence and disorder. Many of its actions 

"appeared crazy or unexplainable."n The Americans commandeered the large 

Continental Palace Hotel as a refuge for French civilians, using the japanese 

to guard it against attacks by the Vietnamese.?8 

Major Dewey arrived with the remainder of the Embankment team on 

4 September and relieved Lieutenan t Connasse, who returned to Ceylon . 

Dewey and his executive officer, Capt. Herbert j. Bluechel, continu ed to do 

their best to protect French civilians, but they also established close contact 

n lbid. 

73Peter Dewey, Aug 45, French Policy in the Far East and Its Instrumentation, records of the 

OSS. 

74Report of Embankment P.O. W. Evacuation Team, 8 Sep 45, records of the 055. 

751bid. 

76Buttinger, Vietl1am; A Dragoll Ellllmltled, 1:320 - 21; Hammer, Tile Struggle for Illdocllil1a, pp. 

108 - 09. 

77lnterv, author with Frank White, 18 Feb 72, H istorians files, CM I-I. 

7!l lbid. 

66 
The Chillese OCClipatioll of North Vietllalll 

with the leaders of the independence movement. After th e arrival of th e 

British and French, Dewey was under considerable pressure to break off 

those meetings with the Vietnamese. 79 General Gracey cla imed that Dewey 

was going outside normal command channels and that his actions would be 

interpreted by the Vietnamese as evidence of official American support for 

the independence movement.so On 14 September Gracey forma lly ordered the 

Embankment team to cease all intelligence activities until its mission in Saigon 

was "clarified." Dewey compla ined bitterly about that directive to ass headquarters and evidently continued his intelligence activities. 

Although French and British relations with the Vietnamese were deteriorating, th e America ns experienced little difficulty until 24 September, whe n 

Capt. Joseph Coolidge was ambus hed along with a British officer o n a trip to 

Da lat. Coolidge was seriou sly wound ed and had to be evacuated to Ceylon. 

A more serious incident occurred on 26 September when Major Dewey and 

Captain Bluechel, while riding in a jeep, were fired upon without warning by 

a group of Vietnamese. Dewey was killed instantly, but B1uechel, who was 

slig htly wounded, managed to fight his way back to a nearby villa where the 

ass team had its headquarters. Th e Vietnamese then attacked the vi lla. Capt. 

Frank White and Sgt. George Wickes held them off until he lp arrived from a 

nearby British post"' 

The motives of the Vietnamese who killed Major Dewey and attacked th e 

villa were never determined. The ambushers could have been Viet M inh, 

members of the Binh Xuyen, or eve n hirelings of the French . Since Genera l 

Gracey had forbidden the Americans to fly the American fla g from their 

vehicle, Dewey might have been mistaken for a Frenchman. The major's body 

was never recovered. In 1981 a Vietnamese refugee in France told U.s. 

Defense Department officials that a band of Avant Garde Youth (a Viet Minh 

front movement) led by a man named Muoi Cuong had ambushed Dewey, 

burned his jeep, and dumped his body into a nearby well. Learn ing later that 

Dewey was in fact an American and fearing discovery, they removed the 

body from the well and disposed of it near the village of An Phu Dong. Both 

Muoi Cuong and his deputy Bay Tay, a renegade soldier o f the French 

colonial troops w ho wore Dewey'S Colt 12 pistol on his hip, were later killed 

fighting the French"2 

Dewey was succeeded as commander of the Embankment team by Lt. 

James R. Withrow, Jr. , U.s. Navy, a veteran of ass operations in India. 

Withrow's mission was the same as Dewey's: to help repatriate All ied prisoners, hunt for war criminals, and report on the intentions and attitude of the 

7')lbid.; Maj F. M. Small, Memorandum on Investigation of the Death of Mnjor Peter Dewey, 25 

Oct 45, and Msg, Dewey to I-IQ, 404, 14 Sep 45, both in records of the 055. 

/IOlnterv, author with White, 26 Feb 72. 

III Ibid.; Affidavits by Capt Herbert J. Bluechel <lnd Sgt George Wickes, both in records of the 

OSS. 

1l2Small, Memo on Investigation of the Death of Dewey, 25 Oct 45. Dewey was promoted 

posthumously to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Ltr to U.S. Embassy, Paris, 1981, copy in 

Historians files, CMH. 

67 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

French83 Shortly after Withrow's arrival, the French fo rces in Sa igon were 

reinforced by regular units under the command of General Jacques Leclerc. 

The French then began the reconquest of southern Vietnam in ea rnest. 

Withrow establis hed contact with the local Viet Minh leaders but also maintained a close relationship with General Leclerc. In a private conversation 

with Withrow, Leclerc outlined his plans to regain control of Indochina and 

stated that he in tended to ask the United States for arms and equipment to 

enable him to pacify the country.!l4 When Withrow passed on that information to the Sta te and War Departments, he was admonished not to interfere 

in French affairs·5 The ass role in southern Indochina had become one 

simply of obse rving the Fre nch conquest of Cochinchina and reporting the 

results to Washington. 

Possible Trouble 

I n Hanoi, word of Major Dewey's dea th ca used uneasiness among the 

Americans of General Ga llagher's command. Prime M inister Ho Chi M inh 

hastened to the genera l's headq uarters to express his regrets and assured the 

Americans that sti ch an incident would occur in the north only "over my 

dead body."86 The prime minister said he intended to write personally to the 

State Department to explain the incident. 

At the same time, news of the turmoil in the south fri ghtened a nd 

angered the Vietnamese population in Hanoi a nd led to bea tings and even 

murders of members of the French community. At one point Major Sa in teny, 

displaying a French fla g on his car, was seized and imprisoned by a 

Vietnamese mob, but at American insistence he was soon released. Scattered 

rioting a nd unruly street demonstrations erupted, climaxing on 23 October 

when s hots from a mob killed two French officers. The next day Vietnamese 

markets and stores declared a boycott on sales to the French. "The situation 

here," General Ga llagher observed, " is pregnant with possible trouble." To 

General Lu Han he declared that "unless the Provisional government can 

demonstrate at once that it ca n control the population . you will be forced 

to assume direct control. "S7 But Lu Han was no more anxious than before to 

assume responsibility for governing northern Vietnam. He was content to 

leave this thankless task to Ho Chi Minh. 

Despite the tense atmosphere, Genera l Ga llagher and his staff proceeded 

with preparations to transport three of the Chinese armies to Formosa and 

Manchuria. When a naval task force arrived off th e port of Haiphong in 

mid-October to load the Chinese, it was discovered that mines sown in the 

83 lnterv, author with Withrow, 9 M ar 72. 

IW lbid. 

gSlbid. 

!l6MFR, Ungern, 28 Sep 45, Ga llagher Papers. 

W7MFR, 26 Oct 45, Gallagher Papers. 

68 
The Chillese Occllpatioll of North Vietnam 

harbor by the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II had never been 

cleared. 88 Since sweeping the mines wou ld open the harbor to French troopships and thu s possibly lead to war between the French and the Vietnamese, 

neither General Ga llagher nor General Lu Han wanted th e harbor cleared. 

The task force commander, Rear Adm. Elliott Buckmaster, suggested that 

only the outer approaches to the harbor be clea red a nd that the troops 

be put aboard from Iighters S9 Usi ng comma ndeered Japanese minesweepers, 

Buckmaster completed the task by 22 October, and contingents of the 52d 

Army began to board seven Liberty ships. Through most of November, 

General Ga llagher and his staff personally supervised the loading of the 

troops. 

Returning to Hanoi on the 29th, Gallagher found a full-blown economic 

crisis in progress. This crisis was an outgrowth of Chinese occupation policy 

which, as practiced by General Lu Han, was essentially an opportunistic 

exploitation of the situation in Vietnam. One aspect of this policy was the 

deliberate manipulation of the Vietnamese currency system to enrich the 

Chinese. The exchange rate between the Chinese dollar and the Vietnamese 

piaster had been arbitrarily set at 1.5 piasters to 1 Chinese dollar, thus 

making the value of the Chinese dollar approximately three times greater in 

Hanoi than across the Chinese border in Kunming. 90 

The Chi nese soon began to flood northern Vietnam with their currency. In 

one instance 60 million Chinese dollars were reported on a single flight from 

China. The Chinese bought hotels, shops, hou ses, and any other property 

that became available. At the same time, according to one estimate, they 

extracted some 400 million Bank of Indochina piasters. Y1 This sum came from 

the poorer half of a country whose total gross national product in 1939 had 

been around $1.14 billion. 

General Ga llagher's civil affairs officer, Lt. Col. C. Radford Berry, early 

predicted that continued manipulation of the exchange rate, fo rced loans from 

the Ba nk of Indochina, and concurrent use of both Chinese and Vietnamese 

money as legal tender wou ld result in the collapse of the currency of Indochina 92 Attributing the Chinese practices to simple ignorance of the mechanics of finance, Berry suggested that Genera l Ga llagher dispatch a memo on 

the subject to Lu Han. Gallagher instead sent Lu Han a copy of Berry's 

memorandum. Berry observed that "it appears [my] memo has caused the 

Chi nese to rea lize the gravity of the situation and provoked early action by 

them looking to a remedy.,,93 Action proceeded- but not in the manner 

envisioned by Colonel Berry. The Chinese continued doing business as usual. 

At the end of October, Genera l Gallagher felt compelled to wa rn Lu Han 

that "the situation with respect to currency . . . is growing steadily worse. ,,94 

~Ltr, Vice Adm Ell iott Buckmaster to author, 6 Nov 71, H istorians files, CMJ-I . 

!l9MFR's, 26 Oct and 29 Oct 45; L1 r, Ga llagher to McClure, 26 Oct 45. All in Ga llaghe r Papers. 

<)(lChen, Vie/llmll alld Chilla , pp. 134 - 35. 

9lMcAliste r, Viet1lam: Origil1 s of Revolutioll, pp. 225 - 26. 

92Ltr, C. Radford Berry to Gallagher, 18 Oct 45, FIC fil e, China Theater files. 

9J lbid., 25 Oct 45, FIC file, China Theater files. 

<J4Lt r, Ga llagher to Lu Han, 31 Oct 45, Ga llaghe r Papers. 

69 
Advice mId SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Despite that warning, the Chinese on 14 November demanded that Major 

Sainteny arrange that the Bank of Indochina make available at least 600,000 

piasters a day for exchange and grant an immediate loa n of 40 million piasters 

to meet " urgen t military needs."·s Although protesting, Sainteny felt he had 

no choice but to accede to the Chinese demands. 

The French authorities in Saigon, however, who were now professing 

au thority over all of Vietnam, rejected any further Chinese levies. On 17 

November the French high commissioner in Saigon issued a decree withdrawing all SOO-piaster bank notes from circulation in Vietnam, devaluating them 

by 30 percent, and directing that they be deposited in the Ba nk of Indochina 

in special blocked accounts. He also declared all SOO-piaster notes printed by 

the Japanese followin g their takeover in March to be of no value 96 The 

SOO-piaster note formed the backbone of Vietnamese currency, and many 

small tradesmen, merchants, and artisans had put their life savings into a few 

of them. The French decree thus caused consternation and panic among the 

people of Hanoi. There were demonstrations and riots, and large crowds 

besieged the Hanoi offices of the Bank of Indochi na. 97 

Since the decree caught ma ny Chinese officers and soldiers in possession 

of great numbers of SOO-piaster notes and since th e ethnic Chinese in Hanoi, 

a la rge portion of the city's trad esmen, were sharply affected, the Chinese 

command on 24 November not surprisingly notified Sa inteny that the French 

high commissioner's decree was invalid north of the 16th Para llel. Two days 

later they told the manager of the Hanoi branch of the Bank of Indochina 

that unless the decree was rescinded immediately, they could no longer be 

responsible for the safety of th e bank"8 

The Viet Minh orga nized a mass demonstration outside the Ba nk of Indochina. When two Chinese guards were wounded, other guards opened fire 

on the crowd . After this fire apparently was returned, the Chinese responded 

by tossing hand grenades into the crowd. Six Vietnamese were killed. Blaming the French for th e incident, the Viet Minh- with apparent encouragement 

by the Chinese command-organized another boycott; Vietnamese (and ethnic Chinese) merchants refused again to sell food or goods to members of the 

French community. Under pressure from the America ns, the Chinese continued to guard the bank, but when Sa inteny, after conferring with French 

au thorities, announced that "the invalidation of the SOO piaster note is a 

financial policy of the French government [and] no change will be made," the 

Chinese responded by taking the two officials of the bank into custody."" 

Throughout the crisis, General Lu Han stayed away from the city, claiming ill-hea lth . He failed to return even after Genera l Gallagher sent him 

an urgent message from Haiphong saying his presence in the city was essen-

'.lSChen, Vie/ llalll (llId Chilla, p. 135. 

96Decree of the High Commissioner of France for Indochina, Inc! to Ltr, Sainleny to Gallagher, 

21 Nov 45, Gallagher Papers. 

97Reginald Ungern, History of the $500 [sicJ Note Incident, Ms in Ga llagher Papers. 

98Chen, Viet"am (llId Chilla , p. 136. 

99lbid. , p. 137. 

70 
The Chinese OCClipalion of Norlh Vielnalll 

tial. 100 In his absence, his chief of staff, Genera l Yin, was in charge. When 

General Gallagher returned to Hanoi, he met immediately with Yin . Pointing 

out th at neither the officials of the bank nor any other loca l French official 

had authority to alte r financia l poliCies of the French government, Gallagher 

demanded immediate release of the two bankers, followed by a meeting 

between Chinese and French officials. 101 When the Chinese released the two 

the next afternoon, Major Sa inteny agreed to meet with the Chinese on l 

December at Gene ral Ga llagher's resid ence. 

At the meeting, th e Chinese genera ls reiterated that it wou ld be very difficult to maintain loca l peace in view of the measures taken by th e French. J02 

Powerless to alter moneta ry policy d irected by the French government, 

Sainteny had no choice but to stand finn . Seemingly unable to cornprehend 

Sa inteny's inabi lity to act, the Chinese suggested that in exchange for French 

cooperation, they might be able to use their inOuence to end the Vie tnamese 

boycott on selling to the French community. Genera l Ga llagher then interceded, arguing that the two sides "could not solve the ba nking problem by 

having women a nd children go hung ry." Saying that he found it impossible 

to believe that the Chinese intended to do so, he asked approva l of both sides 

for him to ca ll personally on Ho Chi Minh to ask that the Vie tnamese end the 

boycott. 103 Thus confronted, the Chinese agreed. Seeing that agreement as a 

concession by the Chinese, Gallagher told Sa inteny that it left the French w ith 

a moral responsibility to try to solve the problem over withdrawal of the 

500-piaster notes. 

The meeting tempora rily adjourned; Ga llagher called on Ho Chi Minh, 

who agreed to try to stop the boycott but demanded that the French indemnify the fam ilies of the Vietnamese killed du ring the demonstration at the 

bank. When Ga llagher next me t with th e French and Chinese, Sainteny 

announced that French financial experts with full authority to make an agreement would be sent from Saigon to confer with the Chinese. 

After a few days of acrimonious discussion with these experts, the two 

sid es finall y agreed upon a joint proclamation declari ng that the 500-piaster 

notes would continue in circulation north of the 16th Parallel. Persons possessing SOD-piaster notes in amounts greater tha n 5,000 piasters were required to 

deposit them in special accounts in the Bank of Indochina but would be 

allowed a month ly withdrawa l of up to 20 pe rcent of their balance. As a part 

of a g radual effort to withdraw the notes printed by the Japa nese, individua ls 

possessing less th an 5,000 piasters of those no tes could exchange them at face 

value. I04 The immedia te crisis was over, although Chinese exploitation of 

Vietnamese currency continued. 

Th e 500-piaste r crisis proved to be General Ga llaghe r's last major probIOHUngern, History of $500 Note Incident, p. 3. 

LOIMFR, 29 Nov 45, Gallagher Papers. 

IU2Ibid ., 2 Dec 45, Ga llagher Papers. 

ltJ"llbid . 

HHUr, High Commissioner of Fra nce for Indochina to Cen Lu Han, 5 Oct 45, copy in Cilllagher 

Papers. 

71 
Advice nlld Support: The Enrly Yenrs, 1941 - 1960 

lem in Vietnam. As early as 3 October 1945 the chief of the War Department's O pera tions Division, Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, had suggested to General 

Wedemeyer, in the wake of th e Gallagher-Wang incident, that America n 

advisers be withdrawn to "preclude further embarrassment and in consonance with U.S. policy that all matters pertaining to that area should be 

resolved between the Chinese and French governments.,,105 Since ea rly 

November the China theater itself had become increasingly anxious to withdraw its contingent from Vie tnam in order to meet other personne l needs, 

while the State and the War Depa rtments were becoming more concerned 

about persistent French complaints and accusa tions that American military 

men were interfering in Franco-Vietnamese and Franco-Chinese relations. 

Because Genera l Ga llagher believed that the presence of an America n general 

officer in H anoi was still advisable, he was permitted to remain in the capita l 

with a steadily diminishing sta ff until 12 December 1945, when he was fin ally 

ordered to close out the American advisory mission. 

General Ga llagher's mission to Hanoi must certainly rank among the most 

difficult assignments of the immediate postwa r period . Gallagher and his men 

viewed their role as a purely military one: to advise the Chinese Army. In 

Hanoi they found themselves ca ught up in a volatile political crisis which 

they only partially understood . They became the focus of extravaga nt hopes 

on the part of the French and the Vietnamese, and their every action was 

viewed as politically significa nt. In this situation they were inevitably doomed 

to disa ppoint both the French and the Vietnamese. 

The Ga llagher mission was the last and perhaps the most important of a 

series of America n World War II military involvements with Indochina. During the period between 1943 and March 1945, American commanders felt 

compelled by their need for timely intelligence about Vietnam to cultivate the 

various politica l groups involved in the struggle for con trol of the country: the 

Free French, th e Vichyites, the Nationalist Chinese, and the Viet Minh . The 

Japanese takeover in March 1945 destroyed many of the traditional American 

sources of intelligence and ultimately led to more direct and intensive U.S. 

involvement in Indochina. Finally the postwar Allied occupation of Vietnam 

led to American military participation as advisers in northern Vietnam. 

That advisory role ended American involvement in Vietnam for a time, 

but a strong legacy of bitterness and mistrust towa rd the United States 

lingered among the French. The legend of so-ca lled America n double-dealing 

and collusion with the Viet Minh would later provide French officials, faced 

with American criticism of their policies and actions, with the convenient 

accusa tion that their postwa r difficulties in Vietnam had stemmed from 

American obstruction of French efforts to rega in Vietnam and alleged aid and 

encouragement to the Viet Minh. That Washington , more than th ree months 

before V - J Day, had virtually capitulated to French demands for the return 

of all of Indochina, that American material aid to the Viet Minh had been 

inconsequential, and that the very existence of the Viet Minh was largely a 

IUSUr, Hull to eG, China Theate r, 3 Oct 45, oro 312. '12, RG 165. 

72 
The Chi"ese Occllpatio" of North Vietllam 

response to French exploitation and oppression were rarely acknowledged by 

the men who wou ld lead France to Dien Bien Phu. 

73 
French Forces Move Against the Viet Minh 
PART TWO 

The Franco-Viet Minh War 

5 

"Heading Into aVery Bad Mess": Origins 

of Military Aid 

When the last American officers and soldiers left northern Vietnam in December 

1945, they did so with a feeling of relief. They had carried out their mission 

in the midst of revolution, famine, warlord feuds, and an incipient colonial 

confrontation and had helped to maintain a fragile peace. Less than fi ve years 

later the U.S. Army would return to Southeast Asia during the FrancoVietnamese conflict. In those fi ve years the United States, impelled by the 

pressures and anxieties of the cold wa r, would move from concerned neutrality 

to active participation in the struggle for Vietnam. 

A Reluctance to Intervene 

As General Ga llagher a nd his staff departed in December 1945, serious 

negotiations were already under way between the French and Ch inese 

governments rega rdin g the evacua tion of Chinese troops from northern 

Indochina, a development which the Viet Minh watched wa rily. At the same 

time, meetings between the Viet Minh and the French, which General Gallagher 

and Major Patti had encouraged, became more frequent, although what the 

French had in mind for Vietnam was still unclear. In February 1946 Ambassador 

Jeffe rson Caffe ry ad vised the Sta te Depa rtment from Paris that "all 

indications . .. point to the fact that the French Gov at this time favors ... a 

moderate policy ... [but] this does not mean ... that they are thinking in 

terms of independence for Indo-China.'" 

Throughout this immediate postwa r period the United States adhered to 

its hands-off policy. Although Ho Chi Minh appealed to Washington for 

support through letters to President Harry S. Truman and through conversations 

ITelg, Ambassador in France (Caffery) to Seey of State, 6 Feb 46, Department of State. Foreig" 

Relatiolls of the United Slates, 1946, vol. 8, Tlte Far East (Washington, 1971). p. 24. 

77 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Ho Arrives in France, 1946 

with State Department officials in Hanoi, the American government made no 

reply, and in February 1946 the Department of State rejected a Chinese 

proposal for joint Chinese-American mediation of the Franco - Viet Minh 

dispute 2 On the other hand, the United States was still unwilling to be 

involved in any way in a French reconquest of Vietnam. The government 

continued to prohibit American-fla g vessels or aircraft from transporting troops, 

arms, and ammunition to or from French Indochina. 

At the end of February 1946 the French and Chinese governments at last 

concluded a treaty providing for withdrawal of the Chinese occupation troops 

from northern Indochina. A few days later, on 6 March, Sainteny and Ho 

signed an agreement, subsequently accepted by the French government, which 

recognized the Viet Minh - controlled Democratic Republic of Vietnam as "a 

free state having its own government, its own parliament, its own army, and 

its own finances, forming a part of the Indo-China Federation and of the 

French Union." The question of the unification of the Democratic Republic of 

Vietnam with the other two regions of Vietnam-Annam and Cochinchinawas to be decided by plebiscite. The Vietnamese agreed to "welcome amicably" 

2-felg, Counselor of Embassy in China (Smythe) to Seey of State, 28 Feb 46, Dept of Stale, 

Foreign Relatiolls, 1946: Far East, 8:29 - 30. 

78 
Origins of Milita ry Aid 

the French Army back in to Tonkin to " relieve" the Chinese. The number of 

French troops was fixed at 15,000, and they were to be gradually withdrawn 

over a five-year period .

3 

When Sainteny and Ho signed their agreement, British officials were 

negotiating with Indian and Burmese leaders on terms of independence for 

those former colonies, and the Dutch were begi nning negotiations with the 

Republic of Indonesia, which, after many false starts and considerable bloodshed, 

would lead to an independent Indonesia in 1949 4 Yet French Indochina did 

not follow the road of the other Asian colonies to early independence . Traditional 

colonial interest groups in France worked against a peaceful colonial settlement. 

They were reinforced by the desire of most Frenchmen " to bury the humiliating 

memory of 1940 by the establishment of a powerful closely-knit French Un ion" 

and the fear that independ ence for Indochina would lead to the unraveling of 

the entire French Empire.s The three national elections and two referendums 

which marked the birth of the Fourth French Republic in 1946 also left French 

leaders with neither the time nor the inclination to grapple with the problems 

of decolonization. 

Almost at once there was trouble over the March agreements. The new 

French high commissioner for Indochina, Admiral Georges Thierry d' Argenlieu, 

insisted that the 6 March accords had no application to Cochinchina, which 

he claimed was a separate state withi n the Indochinese Federation, and on 1 

June without consulting the government in Paris, he announced the formation 

of a provisional government for the Republic of Cochinch ina. In August Ho 

and a Viet Minh delegation went to Paris for what were to be the defin itive 

negotiations to settle the future relationship between Vietnam and France. 

D' Argenlieu, again without the approval of the French government, chose 

that time to convene a conference at Dalat on the future organization of the 

Indochinese Union, to which he invited representatives of the royal governments 

of Laos and Cambod ia, of the Republic of Cochinchina, and of the ethnic 

minorities of the Central Highlands. This clear attempt to sabotage the 

Franco - Viet Minh negotiations in Paris led to heated protests by the Democratic 

Republic of Vietnam and a near rupture of the Paris conference 6 

D' Argenlieu's action was a source of concern to American observers. The 

American vice-consul in Hanoi, James L. O'Sullivan, reported "an imminent 

danger of an open break between the French and Viet Nam," and predicted 

"that, although the French could quickly overrun the country, they could 

not- as they themselves admit-pacify it except through a long and bitter 

military operation.,,7 The chief of the State Department's Division of Southeast 

Asian Affairs, Abbot Low Moffat, who had come to Vietnam in March to 

3Hammer, Tile Struggle for h,rlochillfl, p. 153. 

;'Evclyn Colbert, SOlltlleast Asia ill Illtemaliollat Politics (Ithaca: Corne ll University Press, 1977), 

pp. 65- 93, 105 - 07. 

5Ronald E. Irving, Tile First l"dochilltl War: Frcl/ch fll1d AII1CriCfI1l Policy, 1945- 1954 (London: 

Crown He lm, 1975), pp. 33- 34. 

"Ibid ., pp. 23- 28. 

7Quoted in Memo, Chief, Southeast Asian Affa irs (Moffat), to Director, Far Eastern Affairs, 9 

Aug 46, Dept of Sta te, Foreign Rein/iollS, 1946: Far East, 8:54 . 

79 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Viet Minh Rally in Hanoi, early 1946. 

observe the Franco-Vietnamese negotiations, warned that "the Annamese are 

faced with the choice of a costly submission to the French or of open 

resistance, and that the French may be preparing to resort to force."s 

Although Ho signed a modus vivendi with the French on 14 September 1946 

that temporarily averted a break, the agreement left most of the outstanding 

issues to be settled at a later conference, and when Ho returned to Vietnam 

in October he found both sides preparing for a showdown. During Ho's 

absence, Vo Nguyen Giap, the chairman of the Council of National Defense 

and minister of the interior, had swiftly neutralized the troops of the proChinese political parties and had arrested or executed their leaders along with 

scores of other potential opponents of the Viet Minh regime! By July he had 

scattered over 38,000 troops throughout northern Vietnam, generally in groups 

of 200 to 1,000. The largest concentrations were at Hanoi and Haiphong, with 

an estimated 4,500 and 3,000 troops, respectivelylO Giap had little hope of 

8Ibid. 

9Hammer, Tile Struggle for Indochina, pp. 178-79; Irving. The First ll1docilillfl War, p. 29; Yo 

Nguyen Ciap. People's War, People's Army (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. xxiii- xxiv; Am Consul, 

Saigon, to Seey of State, No. 90, 19 Sep 46, 851G.OOI9- 1946, RG 59. The nominal Viet Minh head 

of §overnment during this interlude was Huyn Thuc Khang. 

I Am Consul, Saigon, to Secy of State, No. 90, 19 Sep 46. 

80 
Origins of Military Aid 

Giap Addresses a Viel Minh arllled propaganda .mil. 

achieving a peaceful settlement with France. Preparing for the worst, he 

reportedly had trained his forces using Chinese Communist advisers and had 

equipped them with arms smuggled by sea from Shanghai to Hong Kong and 

then to Haiphong. 11 By November the strength of the Viet Minh regular 

army was estimated at 60,000 men.'2 

On 8 November the Viet Minh - controlled National Assembly declared 

that northern, southern, and central Vietnam were "one and indivisible." On 

20 November, after a minor incident involving the seizure of a Chinese junk 

by a French harbor patrol boat in the port of Haiphong, scattered fighting 

erupted between the French and Vietnamese in various parts of the city. A 

cease-fire was arranged by late the next day, but the French high commissioner 

in Saigon decided (with the approval of Paris) to use the incident as an 

excuse to seize control of the city. The French commander in Haiphong 

delivered an ultimatum to the local Viet Minh representatives demanding that 

all Vietnamese armed forces evacuate the city and that all the surrounding 

Villages be disarmed. Without allowing the Vietnamese sufficient time to 

reply, the French opened a brutal bombardment of the city by naval guns, 

!JAm Consul, Hanoi, to Seey of State, No. 101, 1 Nov 46, 851G.OO/11 - 146, RG 59. 

12Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embatfled, 1:421. 

81 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

_. 

French Troops search hOllses ill HmlOi, ' allllary 1947. 

artillery, and fighter aircraft in which an estimated 6,000 Vietnamese civilians 

were killed . 13 

Not quite a month later, on 19 December, the Viet Minh launched an 

attack against the French in Hanoi. The attack bega n at 8:00 P.M. when 

Giap's troops attempted to isolate French forces in the Citadel by blocking off 

the only roads connecting the fortress with the main part of the city. The 

French, forewa rned, managed to frustrate this attempt. Viet Minh militia put 

the electric power lines out of commission and attacked French posts and 

residential districts in the city, but these attacks were also contained . After 20 

December fighting was concentrated in the Chinese and Vietnamese quarters 

of the city. Each building became a Viet Minh strongpoint. The battle was 

fought house by house, block by block, with the French employing pointblan k artillery fire and occasiona l air attacks. Combat continued for almost 

1JAm Consul, Haiphong, to Seey of State, No.9, 23 Nov 46, 851G.OO/1l- 2346, No. 10, 24 Nov 

46, 851G. OOI1 1- 2446, No. 12, 1 Dec 46, 851G.OOI12- 146; all in RG 59. The standard account of 

the Haiphong "incident" is Philippe Devillers, Histoire dll Viet Nflm de 1940 a 1952 (Paris: Editions 

du Seuil, 1952), Chapter 19. The best li sh~ guage account is Joseph Buuinger, Vietl/am: A 

Dragon Embattled, vol. 2, Vietl/am at War (New York: Praeger, 1967), pages 424- 30. These 

accounts are generally substantiated by the eyewitness reports of the American consul cited 

above. 

82 
Origi/ls of Militanj Aid 

sixty days, at the end of which over 2,000 Vietnamese soldiers managed to 

escape via an underground tunnel. 14 

Resistance was not confined to Hanoi. On the first day of the battle 

General Giap had issued orders to commanders of all units in the north, 

central, and southern portions of Vietnam to "Stand up in Unison/Dash into 

battlelDestroy the invaders and save the country."IS Two days later, on 21 

December, Ho Chi Minh broadcast an appeal for nationwide resistance in 

which he sa id that although the war would be a long and hard one, in the 

end "we are bound to win .'''6 

The outbreak of gel1 eral war was hardly a surprise to America n officials, 

for Moffat and the American consuls had predicted for some time that a 

resort to force was likely. Writing in the first week of the confli ct, John Carter 

Vincent, the director of the Sta te Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 

summarized the problems which were to bedevil the French for the next three 

yeats. They lacked the military strength to reconquer Vietnam, lacked strong 

public support for such a course, and were handicapped by a weak and 

divided government in Paris. Under th ese circumstances, Vincent concluded, 

guerrilla wa rfare could continue indefinitely.1 7 

Washington nevertheless remained reluctant to intervene. The consensus 

was that attempting to pressure the French into making concessions to 

Vietnamese nationalism, which appeared the only way to end the fightin g, 

might lead the French in turn to withdraw support for a Western Eu ropea n 

coalition aimed at containing the Soviet Union in Europe. As a State Department 

policy paper put it, " interest in maintaining in power a friendly French 

government to assist in the furtherance of our aims in Europe" took precedence 

over realizing American goals in Vietnam. 18 

Another reason for Washington's reluctance to pressure the French wa s 

that American misgivings about French policies in Southeast Asia were balanced 

by increasing American uneasiness about the apparent Communist nature of 

the Viet Minh. Throughout 1946 and ea rly 1947 the question of Communist 

influence in Vietnam preoccupied American policymakers. The State epa rtm n~ s 

14Am Consul, Hanoi, 10 Seey of State, No. "ISO, 24 Dec 46, 851G.OO/12- 2446, RG 59; Intel Rpt, 

Office of U.S. Military Attache, Bangkok, 5 Apr 47, R- 72- 47, G- 2 10 file 860866 (this report is 

based on an account by United Press correspondent Emily Brown, who visited the sites of the 

fighting and interviewed eyewitnesses). See also Devillers, Histoire rill Viet Naill, pp. 353- 57, and 

Gia.E' People's War, People's Army, pp. 20- 28. 

1 Order for Nationwide Resis tance, in Gareth Porter, ed., Vie/I/alll; The Defillitive DOCWIII.',,/alioll 

of HUll/fill DL'Cisiolls (Stanfordville, N.Y.: Coleman Enterprises, 1979), pp. 133- 34. 

16Appeal by 1-1 0 Chi Minh for Nationwide Resistance, 21 Dec 46, in Porter, Viellll1l11: Defillitive 

DOCll1l1elltl1tioll of HIlII/all Decisiolls, pp. 134 - 35. 

17Memo, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, for Under Secy of State (Acheson), 24 Dec 46, 

p. 76; Telg, Consul at Saigon (Reed) to Secy of Slate, 24 Dec 46, pp. 78 - 79; both in Dept of State, 

Foreign Rell1tiolls, '1946, vol. 8, Far East. A poll (reported in Agcnces, France, Presse in February 

1947) found only 37 percent of the Frenchmen felt that " force should be used to maintain order" 

in Indochina, while 22 percent favored "anything ra ther than war," and an additional 25 percent 

favored further negotiations. See Am Embassy, Paris, to Dept of State, No. 7836, 4 Mar 47, 

85 I G.OO/3- 447, RG 59. 

18Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina, 27 Sep 48, Department of State, Foreigll 

l~ elatiQlls of the Ulli/ed Slates, 1948, vol. 6, Tile Far Easl alld Australasia (Washington, 1974), p. 49. 

83 
Advice alld Stlpport: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

concern extended even to questioning the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's 

adoption of a gold star on a field of red as the design for its national flag. ' 9 

When Abbot Low Moffa t prepared to meet with Ho in Hanoi in December 

1946, Under Secretary of State Acheson cautioned him to "keep in mind Ho's 

clear record as [an] agent [of] international communism, absence [of] evidence 

[of] recantation [of his] Moscow affili ations .... Least desirable eventuality 

would be [the] establishment [of a] Communist-dominated, Moscow-oriented 

state [in] Indochina."2o 

Communist expansionism was being clea rly demonstrated in various parts 

of the world. The tightening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe had produced 

a sharp increase in tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. 

In March 1946 the Americans and Ru ssians had clashed bitterly over the 

continued presence of Russian troops in Iran, and a year later, on 12 Ma rch 

1947, President Truman went before Congress to ask for military and economic 

aid to Greece and Turkey. Since " the people of a number of countries of the 

world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their 

will," the president declared, " in the future. . it must be the policy of the 

United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjuga tion 

by armed minorities or by outside pressures.,,21 A few weeks later State 

Department officials began work on a foreign aid program that would come 

to be known as the Marshall Plan. The Soviets responded in july 1947 by 

resurrecting the Communist International, the organization aimed at world 

revolution which they had ostensibly disbanded during World War II . That 

same month Ambassador jefferson Ca ffery in Paris observed that " recen t 

experiences have shown only too well how [a] relatively small, but welltrained and determined, minority can take over power in [an] area where 

democratic traditions are weak. Nor can remoteness of Moscow be regarded 

as [an] adequate sa feguard .,,22 

Given these developments, U.s. policy toward Indochina remained ambiguous 

and uncertain through 1947 and 1948. Secretary of State George C. Marshall 

candidly stated the predicament of American policymakers in May 1947. After 

criticizing France's " dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and method" 

and warning of Ho's " direct Communist connections," he concluded that 

"frankly we have no solution ... to suggest. ,,23 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army staff was developing its own pOSition on the 

continuing unrest in Southeast Asia. On 3 july 1947, in a memorandum fo r 

the chief of staff, the director of the Intelligence Division, Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, observed that Southeast Asia was an important source of "strategic 

19Ai rgram, Acting Seey o f Stale to Consul at Saigon, 9 Ocl 46, Dept of Stale, Foreigll Relatiolls, 

1946: Far East, 8:61. 

»relg, Acting Seey of State to Consul at Saigon for Moffat, 5 Dec 46, Dept of State, Forcigll 

RelatiOl/s, 1946: Far East, 8:67. 

2l pIlblic Papers of the Presidellts: Harry S. Tmlllall, 1947 (Washington, 1963), pp. 178-79. 

22Telg, Ambassador in France (Ca ffery) to Secy of State, 31 Ju l 47, Department of State, Foreign 

Relations of tile Ullited States, 1947, vol. 6, Tile Far East (Washington, 1972), p. 128. 

2~e g, Secy of State to Embassy in France, 3 Feb 47, Dept of State, Foreign Relatiolls, 1947: Far 

East, 6:67 - 68. 

84 
O,igi/ls of Military Aid 

resources" for the United States and tha t the fighting between the French and 

the Vietnamese nationalists in Indochina and between the Dutch and the 

Indonesian nationalists in the Netherlands East Indies threatened orderly 

economic development of those countries and the availability of their raw 

materials to the United States. Only the "mediation of a neutra l power with 

sufficient authority and prestige to ensure honest implementation," General 

Chamberlin believed, could sa tisfactorily resolve the confli ct in Vietnam. He 

suggested that the United States adopt a strong, positive approach to the 

problems of Southeast Asia and be prepared to undertake mediation if 

necessary. 24 

There was no direct response to that memorandum, but some weeks later, 

as Chinese Communist victories in Manchuria and North China appea red to 

presage the fa ll of the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, the Army staff 

became concerned about the potential consequences of that fa ll for the countries bordering China. A study by the Plans and Operations Division in 

September on the "effect of a continually weakening China" on the situation 

in French Indochina predicted that a Communist victory in China would 

strengthen the Viet Minh and bring them more d irectly under the influence of 

international communism. Although the French could probably still hold 

Indochina, there would be little chance of ending the fighting in view of the 

French refusal to dea l with the Viet Minh, the only nationalist group commanding broad allegiance from the people.25 

The French Offensive of 1947 

While Washington pondered, th e fighting continued. In the northern part 

of Vietnam the Viet Minh, sta rting in December 1946, had at fi rst laid 

siege to most of the principal towns, such as Hue, Vinh, Haiphong, and 

Nam Dinh, cutting off their communications. In the old imperial capita l of 

Hue the Vietnamese had besieged a French battalion of 750 men for fortyseven days. As a relief column neared the city, the Viet Minh had systematically destroyed the entire French section, blown up bridges, mined the roads, 

and demolished most of the larger buildings before withdrawing26 Yet in the 

end, the poorly armed Viet Minh troops proved no match for su perior French 

firepower. By March 1947 the French had reopened most of the main roads 

during daylight and had established control over Hanoi and the town of Son 

La in the north. At that time French forces in all of Vietnam tota led about 

94,000 men, and 11 ,000 reinforcements were on the way from France. 

Giap's regular forces in March totaled about 60,000 men, plus about 

24Mcmo, Lt Cen S. 1. Chamberlin for CofSA. 3 Jul 47, sub: Positive U.S. Action Required to 

Restore Normal Conditions in Southeast Asia, r&o 092 TS, RG 319. 

25Current Situatio n in Indochina, 2 Sep 47, Intel Resea rch Proj No. 3799, FIC, r&D 092 TS, RG 

319. 

::U'lntcl Rpt, Office of U.s. M ilitary Attache, Ba ngkok, 5 Apr 47. 

85 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

100,000 militia and part-time guerrillas. The Viet Minh regulars were 

armed with a mixture of Chinese, 

Japanese, America n, and French 

weapons. Crude but usable ammunition was produced in mobile workshops. A Red Cross representative 

who visited the Viet Minh positions 

around Hanoi in early 1947 found 

three concentric defensive lines. The 

first line of defense was manned by 

riflemen, the second by soldiers 

equipped with knives and spears, 

and the third by men armed with 

bows and arrows. 27 

In the spring of 1947 the Viet 

Minh turned to guerrilla warfare, 

which all along had been the pattern 

of fighting in the south. The regular 

units, organized into independ ent 

Viet Minh Arms Factory 

companies, were dispersed throughout northern Vietnam. A Viet Minh company had a strength of about 100 men plus the company commander, a 

political officer, and some communications personnel. It was organized into 

three combat sections, each consisting of three combat groups. The combat 

group included a leader with the rank of sergeant, an assistant group leader, 

a machine gu nner and two assistants, three riflemen, and a grenadier. Aided 

by loca l militia forces, the independent companies--occasionally forMed in to 

battalions or regiments-conducted a campaign of hit-a nd-run attacks while 

gradually consolidating and extending their base areas. 2S "The soil of the 

fatherland was being freed inch by inch right in the enemy's rear lines," 

Genera l Giap later wrote. "There was no clearly defined front in this war. It 

was there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere.,,29 

Vice-Consul O'Su llivan reported from Hanoi that the 

destruction in Tonkin is literally appalling. Damage is due very largely 

to Vietnam Government policy of "scorchea earth" although French bombiog and shelling have contributed. Of small cities I have seen personally, 

Haiduong is about 60 to 70 percent destroyed, Hoabinh 100 percent razed, 

Hadong had perhaps a dozen buildings of several hundred standing. French 

aerial observers state that Tuyenquang and Thainguyen have been aestroyed 

27Dept of Sta te, Circula r Memo for Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 9 Jan 

47, 851G.OO/1- 947, RG 59; Intel Rpt, Asst Mit Attache, Nanking, 24 Mar 47, R- 186- 47, G - 2 ID 

file 357789. 

28 1nte l Rpt, U. S. Naval Attache, Ba ngkok, 13 May 48, sub: Fie Vie tnam Military Organization 

G- 2 10 file 469139; Viet Minh Organizational System, Incl 1 to Am Consul, Hanoi, No. 122, 29 

Jan 51, copy in G- 2 IO file 763660. Edgar O'Ballance, Tile IlIrio-Cilifla War, 1945- 1954: A Study ill 

Gllerrilla Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), pp. n - 84; McAlister, Vietllam: Origins of 

Revoilltioll, pp. 313- 15; Ciap, People's War, People's Army, p. 23. 

29Ciap, People's War. People's Army, p. 23. 

86 
Origills of Military Aid 

by [the)., Vietnamese. .. No estimate ava ilable of number of villages destroyed. 

The French were convinced that they had the situation in hand. In May 

1947, French War Minister Paul Coste Floret observed "there is no military problem any longer in Indo-China.. the success of French arms complete.,,31 But if the French controlled most of the towns and cities, the Viet 

Minh controlled over half the countryside of Vietnam and were able to 

subject well over half the population to direct or indirect political control. 

When the French government in March 1947 replaced d' Argen lieu as high 

commissioner with a civilian member of the French National Assembly, Emile 

Bollaert, American officials saw the change, with guarded optimism, as a 

signal that France had adopted a more fl exible policy. Yet the stolid opposition of the French colonials in Vietnam, the French Army, and the political 

right in France had not weakened. Nor were Vietnamese nationalists of any 

political persuasion willing to accept the meager concessions proffered by 

Bollaert. Consul Reed in Sa igon summed up the situation in a telegram of 23 

May: "Bollaert trying [to] find satisfactory solution, but finding it all but 

impossible [to] treat with anyone except Ho; also finding it difficult [to] find 

formula [to] protect French interests, as [Bollaert] has no confidence in Ho or 

his group. /132 

By September 1947 it was clear to American observers in Indochina that, 

far from accepting compromise, the French were preparing a major military 

offensive designed to destroy the Viet Minh. Although the consuls in Hanoi 

and Saigon differed in their assessment of how successful a new military 

offensive might be, they agreed that an attempt to restore the prewar status 

quo by armed force would be "catastrophic to U.S. prestige in Asia."" Both 

called for active American intervention to prevent the French from taking that 

course . 

Secretary of State Marshall directed Ambassador Caffery in France to make 

appropriate informal inquiries and to report promptly. Such an offensive, said 

Marshall, wou ld have a serious negative effect on U.S. public opinion and on 

Congress, which would soon " be called upon to consider extensive financial 

aid for [the] western European nations, including France."" In response to 

Caffery's inquiries, the French FO(" ign Office on 27 October assured him that 

France was carrying out no major offensive but only "small sca le raids" to 

seize Viet Minh broadcasting posts and arms caches and to seal off the 

Chinese frontier against arms smuggling. Total French losses, the Foreign 

Office added, had been less than fifty killed. 35 

3Ofelg, Vice-Consul at Hanoi (O'Sullivan) to Seey of State, 5 Jun 47, Oept of State, Foreigll 

Relatiolls, 1947: Far East, 6:101. 

3 1 Buttinger, Vie/llam: A Political History, pp. 316- 17. 

32Teig, Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Seey of State, 23 Ma y 47, Dept of State, Foreigll Relatiolls, 

1947: Far Easl, 6: 100. 

33Reed to Siale Dcpt, 9 Scp 47, 851G.OI J9- 947, and 26 Sep 47. 851G.01 /9- 2647; O'Sullivan to 

Slate Dept, 24 Sep 47, 8S1C.01l9 - 2447. All in records of Dept of Slate, RG 59 . 

.).ITclg. Seey of State to Embassy in France, 11 Sep 47, Dept of State, Foreign RelntiOt/5, 1947: Fnr 

East, 6:136. 

3Yfelg, Ambassador in France (Caffery) to Secy of State, 28 Oct 47, Dept o f State, Foreigll 

Reln/iolls, 1947: Far East, 6:145. 

87 
CHJN"~ 

-</' -~ 

\ ANO LAOS VIETNA 

~ I 

THAILANO' 

2 

OPERATION LEA 

o 

I 

o 

MAP 2 

Autumn 1947 

AX . IS 0 f iilm ph ibious allack 

Airborne assau, It drop . zone 

A X. IS 0 f ar mared, artillery, 

engineer attack 

High ground 

40 M ILES 

J 

I' 46 ~OMETE S 

CHIN A 

Hai 
Origills of Military Aid 

French officials were being less than candid, for the French offensive in 

Tonkin during late 1947 would involve close to 60,000 troops, which included 

three battalions of paratroopers, most of the French Air Force in the Far East, 

and small naval de tachments. It was, noted a new American consul in Hanoi, 

Edwin C. Rendall, in Jan uary 1948, "a period of military activity far exceeding 

in scope and number of troops employed any previous French effort since 

[Francis] Carnier seized most of the Red River Delta with a few hundred men 

in 1874.,,36 The French objectives, he reported, were to cut the fl ow of arms 

across the Chinese border, to kill or capture the principal Viet Minh leaders, 

and to destroy the Viet Minh army. The area of opera tions was due north 

and northwest of Hanoi near Thai Nguyen, Backan, Chiem Hoa, and Tuyen 

Quang. 

In the first phase of the French offensive, Operation LEA, paratroopers 

descended on the Viet Minh headquarters area at Backan early in October. 

They captured large stores of food and ammunition as well as the Viet Minh 

broadcasting station, but all of the politica l and military leaders of the Viet 

Minh government escaped ." Meanwhile, a French armored column with 

artillery and engineer support pushed northward from the border fort of Lang 

Son along Route 4 toward the town of Cao Bang, and a river flotilla with two 

infantry battalions worked its way up the Red and Clear Rivers through 

Tuyen Quang and up the Cam River to Chiem Hoa. (Ma p 2) During the 

second stage of the campaign in late November and December, nine re inforced battalions from Hai Duong moved to clear the northern part of the Red 

River Delta east and northeast of Hanoi, while other fo rmations operated in 

the region directly to the north of Hanoi.'8 

American officials were divided over the significance of the French effort. 

The Central Intelligence Agency interpreted the offensive as evidence that 

France had adopted a new policy of unrestrained military pressure in order to 

retain " undisputed control" of Vietnam. The America n embassy in Paris 

suggested, instead, that the offensive should be viewed as an attempt at 

saving face, with the more limited aim of creating so much disorder and 

destruction in Viet Minh - held territory that the authority and prestige of the 

Ho Chi Minh government would be weakened, thus making possible an 

agreement with other nationalist groupS.'9 

Whatever the French aim, the cost of these operations was high and the 

results were minimal. On 2 January 1948 Consul Rendall in Hanoi reported 

"no evidence that the 'hard core' of resistance on which the Viet Minh 

government relies has been broken. The fact that the Vietnamese may be 

dubious about the Viet Minh does not dispose him to seek salvation in the 

36Ltr, Edwin C. Rendall to Seey of State, 24 Jan 48, sub: The French Autumn Military 

Campaign in Tonkin, 851G.0111 - 2448, RG 59; State Department Division of Research on the Far 

East, Chronological H istory of Events in Indo-China Since 1948, 1 Apr 54, p. 47 . 

.37Ltr, Rendall to Seey of State, 24 Jan 48, sub: French Autumn Military Campaign in Tonkin; 

Berna rd B. Fa ll, S~reet Witlwllt loy, 4th cd. (Harrisburg, Pa. : Stackpole Co., 1967), pp. 28- 29. Fa ll 

e rroneously reports that one of Ho's ministers was captured near Backan . This prisoner was, in 

fact, an aide to Finance Minister Le Va n Hiem. 

3tlLtr, Rendall to Secy o f State, 24 Jan 48, sub: French Autumn Military Ca mpaign in Tonki n. 

)'JAm Embassy, Paris, to State Dept, 2 Jan 48, 851G.Ol /t - 248, RG 59. 

89 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 -1960 

French military-especially since the French frequently pursue their own 

scorched earth policy. "," By the end of the offensive, over a thousand French 

troops had been killed and 3,000 wounded. An American military observer 

estimated, moreover, that the French would not be able to make another such 

large-scale military effort because their equipment was rapidly deteriorating. 

Morale also was admittedly low, and replacements for paratroopers, who had 

incurred espeCially heavy losses on the campaign, were, for the present, 

almost impossible to find. 41 The financial cost of the offensive was estimated 

to have been around $34 million a month.42 By early 1948 military operations, 

except for patrol actions, were "at a standstill," and the Chinese border was 

"once more unguarded from Laokay to Caobang. ,,43 In April the American 

naval attache in Bangkok reported that the French military position in Indochina was steadily deteriorating.'" 

The French continued to hold some key towns and border posts in northern Vietnam, but their control of the countryside beyond these strongholds 

was tenuous. Beginning in 1948 the Viet Minh steadily increased the frequency and intensity of their attacks on French outposts and convoys. For a 

time during 1948 the French were obliged to dispense with the convoy system 

because of lack of manpower. Instead, they concentrated on patrolling a few 

key roads for limited periods of time to enable traHic to pass. 45 

The Bao Dai Experiment 

Frustrated militarily, the French sought a politica l solution, one involving 

not the Viet Minh but the former emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai, who had 

been living quietly in Hong Kong since March 1946 when he had had a 

falling out with the Viet Minh. Although he had a reputation of being 

something of a playboy and a bOil v:'Jallt, he also was an intelligent and 

patriotic nationalist. Since ea rly 1947 the French had been carrying on a 

diplomatiC flirtation with Bao Dai in the hope of persuading him to collaborate with them against Ho, but he refu sed to enter into any serious negotiations unless he received firm assurances that the French would gra nt real 

independence to Vietnam. In the meantime, a few groups of non-Communist 

nationalists-veterans of the Dong Minh Hoi and VNQDD, leaders of the 

religious sects, and independents-formed a National Union and pledged 

support for Bao Dai. Although the National Union had no real base of 

support among the Vietnamese people, it did lend to Bao Dai the outward 

appearance of being the leader of a broad nationalist movement. 

On 7 December 1947, in a meeting with French High Commissioner 

40lbid. 

·11 u.s. Nava l Attache (Lt William T. Hunter), BangkOk, to eNO. 27 Jan 48, records of Office of 

Nava l Inte lligence (ON I), RG 38. 

42William C. Bullitt, "The Saddest War," Life, 29 December 1947, p. 64. 

43Am Consul, H anoi, to State Dept, 9 Feb 48, 8SIG.OOI2 - 948, RG 59. 

""Am Naval Altache, Bangko k, to eNO, 19 Apr 48, records of ONI, RG 38. 

45Ibid., 10 Jun 48, records of ONI, RG 38; Maj Carmelo J. Bernardo, The Franco- Viet Minh 

War, 1946- 54: Mode rn Arms and Revolutionary War, p. 8, Historical ManUSCript fi le, CMH. 

90 
Origills of Military Aid 

High Commissioner Bollaert and Emperor Bao Oai sigll the first Ha Lollg 

Bay Agreemellt, 1947. 

Bollaert aboard a warship in Ha Long Bay, Bao Oai concluded a protocol 

which became known as the Ha Long Bay Agreement. Although it contained 

a vague promise of Vietnamese "independence within [the] French Union," it 

left control of Vietnam's foreign relations and armed forces to France and sa id 

nothing about the separate colony of Cochinchina. Bao Oai was to return to 

Vietnam to form a new government for Tonkin and Annam that wou ld 

exclude the Viet Minh. 46 

The French concessions at Ha Long Bay were so minimal that even Bao 

Oai's strongest supporters denounced the agreement. Unable to get further 

commitments from the French and disturbed by criticisms of his actions, he 

retired to Europe. On 5 June 1948, after pursuing the former emperor to 

many of the Continent's nightclubs and spas, the French prevailed upon him 

to return to Vietnam. In another meeting aboard ship in Ha Long Bay, Bao 

Oai signed a second agreement. France now declared its recognition of 

Vietnamese "independence," but it again failed to provide for unifying Vietnam, and France was still to retain control of foreign relations and armed 

forces. The agreement also left the transfer of governmental authority in other 

46-felg, Ambassador in France (Caffery) 10 Seey of State, 16 Dec 47, Dept of State, Foreign 

Rein/iolls, 1947: Far East, 6:151. 

91 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

areas to future negotiations.'17 After signing, Bao Dai almost immediately had 

misgivings and again exiled himself. 

The American government at first viewed Bao Dai with little enthusiasm . 

In May 1947 Secretary of Sta te Marshall told Ambassador Caffery that the 

State Department was "concerned lest French efforts [to] find 'true representatives [of] Vietnam' with whom [to] negotiate result" in the creation of a 

puppet government like that of Cochinchina. In addition the restoration of 

Bao Dai might be seen to imply that the democracies were reduced to 

resorting to "monarchy as a weapon against Communism."48 

Yet the choices for the United States were becoming progressively narrower. By the beginning of 1948 the State Department had reached a consensus that the establishment of a Viet Min h - dominated state in Indochina 

would be contrary to America n in terests' 9 As one official declared, "it may 

not be certa in . . that Ho and Co will succeed in setting up a Communist 

State if they get rid of the French but let me suggest that from the standpoint 

of the security of the United States, it is one hell of a big chance to take."so 

Consul General Abbot in Sa igon observed on 30 June that a French truce with 

Ho Chi Minh "would result in the non-communist elements [in Vietnam] 

being swa llowed up on the Czech pattern.,,5l Under Secretary of State Robert 

A. Lovett in turn wrote Abbot that a favorite strategy of the Communists in 

dependent areas was to pretend to champion the cause of local nationalists. 52 

The conviction that the Viet Minh were unacceptable ruled out any negotiated settlement on the model of Indonesia, where a U.N.-sponsored Good 

Offices Committee, strongly backed by the United States, was well on the 

way to achieving a final settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. 53 

These considerations, plus world events in 1948--the Berlin Blockade, the 

setbacks suffered by the Chinese Nationalist armies, and the Communist COIlP 

d'etat in Czechoslovakia- saw a shift in American policy toward what was 

becoming known as the Bao Dai experiment. Skepticism changed to qualified 

acceptance. Bao Dai, however, remained in Europe, adamantly refusing 

to return to Vietnam and take up the reins of government without some 

additional concrete concession from the French. In his absence the French 

installed a puppet government in Hanoi head ed by the little-respected politician Nguyen Van Xuan. 

The French blamed the Xuan government's lack of popular support on the 

refusal of Bao Dai to return to Vietnam, but the American consul in Hanoi 

believed the former emperor's return, if he could offer only vague hopes of 

future concessions, would have little effect on the local situation. What was 

4FButtinger, Vielllnm: A Political History, p. 305. 

48Te lg. Seey of State to Embassy in France, 13 May 47, Dept of State, Foreig" Relntiolls. 1947: F(lr 

Enst, 6:97. 

-

19

Ga ry R. Hess, "The First American Com mitment in Indochina : The Acceptance of the 'Bao 

Dai Solution, ' 1950," Diplomatic History 2 (Fall 1978):333 - 35. 

SOMarginal Comment, Woodruff Wallner to M emo, Director, Div of Philippine and Southeast 

Asian A ffairs, for O ffi ce of Far Eastern Affairs, 18 N ov 47, 85IC.DOI1 I- 1847, RG 59. 

5] Am Consul at Saigon to Secy of State, 30 Jun 48, 85 1C.DOI6- 3048, RC 59. 

52Lovelt to Am Consul, Saigon, 22 Scp 48. U.S. -Vietnam Relat ions, 8: 141. 

53Evelyn Colbert, "The Road Not Taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and 

Indochina," Foreign Affairs 51 (April 1973):608- 28. 

92 
Origills of Military Aid 

needed, Abbot suggested, was prompt and decisive action by the French to 

grant real independent powers to a Bao Dai governments. To the American 

embassy in Paris, Secretary of State Marsha ll noted that the department 

"believes nothing should be left undone which will strengthen truly nationalist groups [inJ Indochina and induce [theJ present supporters [of theJ Viet 

Minh ... to side [withJ that group."ss Yet for all the American urgings, the 

French neither liberalized their approach to Bao Dai nor succeeded in inducing him to return to Vietnam. 

By early 1949 American policymakers were split into two groups-those 

who favored American support for Bao Dai as the only hope for nonCommunist Vietnam, and those who were loath to hazard American money 

and prestige on what they were certain would be an unsuccessfu l experiment 

if the French refused to make far more substantial concessions. The differences were evident in February 1949 when Secretary of State Acheson reiterated the belief of the State Department's Far Eastern experts that it would be 

unwise to give public support to any arrangement for Indochina " unless 

that arrangement also embodies means clearly sufficient for its success." He 

instructed the American embassy in Paris to explain to the French Foreign 

Office that the United States was unwilling to approve the Bao Dai solution in 

its current form .

56 There appeared to be little reason, as Under Secretary of 

State Lovett put it, to " irretrievably commit US to [theJ su pport of ra j native 

gov which by failing [toJ develop appea l among [theJ Vietnamese might 

become virtually raj puppet gov, separated from [theJ people and existing 

only by [theJ presence [ofJ French military forces."57 Yet American diplomats 

in Paris saw the Bao Dai experiment as "the only non-communist solution in 

sight" and feared that the Acheson stance would only discourage the French 

from going further with the experimentSS From Saigon, Consul General 

Abbot pointed out that, while America n prestige would suffer if Bao Dai were 

to fail after receiving American su pport, "the lack of our support would be a 

heavy handicap which might well eliminate any chance of success." The only 

alternative to a Bao Dai government, according to Abbot, would be a costly 

colonial war or a Communist-dominated government in a strategic area of 

Southeast Asia s9 

By finally making a major concession, the French succeeded in winning 

Bao Dai's consent to a new accord, known as the Elysee Agreements, which 

consisted of an exchange of letters between Bao Dai and French President 

Vincent Auriol in March 1949. In the Elysee Agreements the French now 

sanctioned political unification of Vietnam, allowing Cochinchina to be united 

with Annam and Tonkin to form the State of Vietnam. Ending Cochinchina's 

status as a separate colony required an act of the French Na tional Assembly, 

54Teig, Consul General at Saigon (Abbot) to Seey of State, 28 Aug 48, Dept of State, Foreig" 

Relatiolls, 1948: Far Enst alld Australasia, 6:39. 

s5-y"e lg, Marshall to Am Embassy, Paris, 30 Aug 48, U.S. -Vie/I/am Reln/iolls, 8: 140. 

56Acheson to Am Embassy, Paris, 25 Feb 49, 851G.01l2 - 2549, RG 59. 

57Teig, Lovett to Am Embassy, Paris, 17 Jan 49, U.S.-Vie/llam Reln/iolls, 8: 152. 

58Ambassador in France (Caffery) to State Dept, 6 Mar 49, 851G.OIl3- 649, RG 59. 

59Paper Pre pared (31 Mar 49) for New Delhi Foreign Service Conference, George M. Abbot,S 

May 49, RG 59. 

93 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

which was obta ined after a hard struggle. Yet from th e Vietnamese viewpoint, there were still deficiencies in the Elysee Agreements, for even though 

they provided for a Vietnamese police force and some Vietnamese mili tary 

forces, they again stipulated that the French would retain control of Vietnam's 

military affairs and foreign relations. As before, the transfer of other governmental functions to the Vietnamese was left to later negotiations. 

American officials were deeply divided over the significance of the Elysee 

Agreements. Although the embassy in Paris continued to insist that Bao Dai 

offered the only non-Communist solution for Indochi na, the former viceconsul in Hanoi, O'Sullivan, doubted that the Un ited States should commit 

itself completely to his cause. 60 The cu rrent chief of the State Department's 

Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Charles E. Reed, similarly warned that 

Bao Dai might come to be seen merely as a puppet of the French; the United 

States, if publicly committed to him, would then be obliged "to follow bli ndly 

down a dead-end alley, expending our limited resources in money and most 

particularly in prestige in a fi ght wh ich would be hopeless."61 Adopting 

Reed's view for the moment, Secretary of State Acheson in May cautioned 

America n diplomats in the Far East to "guard carefully against any action 

which might be seized upon as premature endorsement or de facto recognition by US of Bao Dai. .. Dept desires [to] retain as much freedom of 

action ... as possible without ... giving the impression we oppose or wish 

to hinder ex-Emperor. ,,62 

When in June 1949 the French National Assembly ratified the Elysee 

Agreements, including the provision on Cochinchina, the State Department 

felt obliged to take some official notice of the agreements. In a note prepared 

by the Bureau of Far East Affairs, the department told the French government 

that the agreements provided insufficient incentive to win the support of 

most Vietnamese nationalists away from Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

63 Though couched in d iplomatic language, this statement was the bluntest yet made by the United States government on the shortcomings of the 

Bao Dai experiment. 

It was far too blunt for Ambassador Caffery'S successor, David K. E. 

Bruce, who successfully advised against delivering the note in its existing 

form. Bruce's staff believed the department's note unfairly prejudged the 

outcome of the experiment before it had even begun, and was unrealistic in 

its expectation of furth er concessions by France. They fea red that the note's 

effect on French officials who were "ba ttered and bruised by the long struggle 

to get passage of the Cochinchina bill" wou ld be "the opposite of constructive."64 The counselor of the State Department, Cha rles E. Bohlen, who was 

6OMcmo, Chief, Southeast Asian Affairs Div (Charles E. Reed), for Chief, Office of Far Eastern 

Affairs, 14 Apr 49, RG 59. 

61 lbid. 

b2Telg, Acheson to Am Consul, S .. igon, 2 May 49, U.S.-Vietl1am Relntiolls, 8:153. 

6JW. Walton Butterworth to David K. E. Bruce, Am Ambassador, Paris, 6 Jun 49, U.S.-Vietnflm 

Relations, 8:200 - 16. 

6-IBruce to State Dcpt, 13 Jun 49, 85 1G.OI /6 - 1349; Ur, Douglas MacArthur II to Chief, Bureau 

of Western Europea n Affairs, 19 Jun 49; both in RG 59. 

94 
Origins of Military Aid 

in Paris for talks with the French government, cha racterized the department's 

note as "a combination of 'holier than thou' lecture plus suggestions wh ich, 

in view of the March 8 [Elysee] agreements, are comple tely hopeless of 

French acceptance. ,,65 

The controversy over the Elysee accord was another manifestation of the 

co ntinuin g differences between the Bureau of Far East Affairs and most 

of the rest of the foreign policy establishment, w hose orientation was toward 

Europe. One State Department Far East ex pert, Cha rlton Ogburn, complained 

bitterly that the United States had been needlessly "gagged" and " hogtied" 

by its anxiety to avoid placing undue pressure on the French government. He 

warned that "we are heading into a very bad mess in the policy we are now 

following toward Indochina."·· Yet by mid-1949 most policymakers felt that 

the options open to the United States in rega rd to Vietnam had been reduced 

to two: to remain neutral, or to recognize Bao Dai. A third choice, to press for 

an accommodation with Ho, had alread y been ruled out in 1948, and the fall 

of China and Communist activities in other parts of the world had only 

further steeled the America n public against any reve rsal of that decision. As 

Dean Acheson bluntly asserted in May, "all Stalinists in colonial areas are 

nationalist," but "with the achievement of national aims (Le., independence) 

their objective necessa ril y becomes subordinatio n [of th e] state to Commie 

purposes. On th e basis [of th e ] examples lin ] Eastern Europe it mu st be 

assumed such would be ]the] goa l [of] 1-1 0 and [his] men."67 

As for a neutral, wait-and-see stance, pressures also were mounting against 

that alternative. The apparent menace of Communist China, whose troops 

were approaching the borders of Tonkin, weighed heavily on American 

minds. In April 1949 the America n consul in Hanoi had reported that th e 

Viet Minh were cooperating militarily with the Chinese People's Libe ration 

Army. "" That same month there was a flurry of anxie ty in Washington 

about the apparent attempt by French officia ls in Indochina, Thailand, and 

Washington to query Ame rica n diplomats about the likely U.S. attitude in the 

event the French reopened negotiations with Ho Chi Minh 69 Indeed, French 

officia ls repeated ly played on American fea rs regarding the spread of communism. In June a French cabinet minister told th e American military attache 

in Paris that "the U.S. does not seem to appreciate that France's fi ght in 

Indo-China is not a question of combatting nationalism but concerns a fig ht 

against inte rnational communism. The U.S. must decide where the southward drive of communisrn is to stop. She must assist the French in 'drawing 

a line somewhe re' and it is hoped that the line will be at least north of the 

Sin o - Indo-Chin ese border.',7o 

65Bohlen to State Dept, 13 Jun 49, 851G.01l6- 1349, RG 59. 

MMemo, Charlton Ogbu rn for Reed and O'Sullivan, 28 Jun 49, files of O ffice of Philippine and 

Soutlwast Asian Affairs, Lot 5401 90, RG 59. 

/,7 Acheson to Am Consul, Hanoi, 20 May 49, U.S.-Vietllmlt ReintiOlts, 8:196- 97. 

6/lA m Consul, Hanoi (Gibson), to State Dept, 2 Apr 49, 85IG.O I/4- 249, RG 59. 

("'Memo, Charles E. Reed for W. Walton l3utterworth, 27 Apr 49, sub: Paul Mus, files of Office 

of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, RG 59. 

7()M sg, USA RMA (U.S. Army Attache), Paris, to ACofS G - 2, 10 Jun 49, records of ACSI. 

95 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

In April 1949 twelve European nations had signed the North Atlantic 

Treaty. Aware of American hopes for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), in which French forces were to play a vital role, French leaders 

repeatedly emphasized the drain which the Indochina fighting imposed on 

their military resources. Over 150,000 ground troops and sizable air elements 

were in the Far East by 1949, including most of the experienced officers and 

noncommissioned officers. Since no conscripts could be sent to Indochina 

under French law, training programs and general military effi ciency had been 

adversely affected. 7l 

During 1948 the French had suffered over 8,000 casualties in Vietnam, and 

by 1949 they had incurred a total of more than 30,000 casualties since the 

fighting had begun . French authorities frequently asserted that the annual 

casualty rate among officers in Vietnam was equal to the total number graduated from the French military acad emy each year. The situation in regard to 

experienced noncommissioned officers was even more serious. These ca reer 

soldiers had suffered particularly heavy losses, and many chose to resign 

rather than retu rn to the Far East for a second tou r. The shortage of noncommissioned officers was aggrava ted by the necessity to transfer many of them 

to the separate army which the French were attempting to form for the State 

of Vietnam. Mea nwhile, French forces in Europe had to rely mainly on 

recently conscripted noncommissioned officers. 72 

In the fa ll of 1949, after the fina l Communist triumph in China, Ho 

exchanged cordial messages with Mao Tse-tung, and in late January 1950 both 

the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For American policymakers these events were 

final proof of the Communist nature of Ho's government. As Secretary 

Acheson put it, the recognition removed any illusions as to the nationalist 

nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and revealed Ho " in his true colors as the 

mortal enemy of native independence in Indo-China."7J 

Having decided that the Bao Dai experiment was the only alternative left 

to the United States, the State Department tried to persuade Asian states such 

as India to take the lead in recognizing a Bao Dai regime; but by early 1950 

the need to act became paramount. On 2 February 1950 Acheson recommended to President Truman that the United States recognize the lega lll. 

constituted non-Communist governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 4 

Two days later the United States officially recognized the Bao Dai regime. 

On 17 February U.S. Ambassador Loy W. Henderson declared to the 

Indian Council of World Affairs that " the United States is convinced that the 

71 USARMA. Pa ris. to Director of Intelligence, R- 1039 - 49, 10 Nov 49, G- 2 ID file 10669649; 

USARMA, Sel igon, to DEPTAR (Department of Army), R- 7 16, 28 Jul 52, sub: Casualty Tabulation, 

1945-46, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, records of ACSI. 

72Memo, Col Harris 119491; M emo, SY for Mr. Band, 18 May 50; both in files of Office of 

Philippine and Southeast Asian Affa irs. The beginnings of the Vietnamese National Army arc 

discussed in Chapter 7. 

73Department of State Blilletill, 13 February 1950, p. 244. 

74Memo, Acheson for President, 2 Feb 50, sub: U.S. Recognition of Vietnam, Laos, and 

Cambodia, U. S.-Vietllnm Relntiolls, 8:276 - 77. 

96 
Origills of Military Aid 

BaD Dai government ... reflects more accurately than rival claimants the 

nationalist aspirations of the people of that country .... My government felt 

therefore that Bao Dai offered more opportunity to the Vietnamese people 

than a leader, who, in accordance with his political creed, must obey the 

orders of international communism. ,,75 Less than three years earlier Secretary 

of State Marshall had warned of the dangers in accepting a Bao Dai government, but now the United States, spurred on by its fears and misconceptions, 

had embarked on that very course. 

American Aid 

D uring the long debate over recognizing a Bao Dai government, both the 

Americans and the French seemed to assume that American aid of some 

type would naturally follow recognition. As ea rly as September 1948, French 

Minister of National Defense Paul Ramadier told Ambassador Caffery in Paris 

that the operations in Vietnam were "costing much more money than the 

government could afford," a statement which Caffery interpreted as an 

"appeal to us for assistance.,,76 In January 1949 the director of the Division of 

Political Affairs of the Ministry of Overseas France told Caffery informally 

that the rapid economic rehabilitation of Vietnam could be the key to Bao 

Dai's success and that the French hoped the United Sta tes would consider 

extending Marshall Plan aid directly to Vietnam and the rest of Indochina . 

Not quite two months later one of Bao Dai's close advisers, Tran Van Huu, 

asked the United States to give serious consideration to directly supplying 

arms for a new Vietnamese army. To all the requests Caffery replied noncommittally that the United States had the question under study ?? 

The collapse of Nationalist China had influenced official American thinking not only on recognition but also on aid. In late 1949 congressional 

lawmakers were attempting to sort through the wreckage of U.S. Far Eastern 

policy to find what, if any, pieces might be salvaged. A group of diehard supporters of the Chinese Nationalist regime, led by Senator William 

Knowland, proposed an amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 

which would have provided funds for assistance to "the non-communist 

areas of China." At this time the only remaining "non-communist areas of 

China" were the island of Hainan, soon to fall, and the Nationalist stronghold of Taiwa n which also appeared likely to fall. 78 Since the State Department had little enthusiasm for additional aid to Chiang Kai-shek's defeated 

regime, and since there appeared to be no way to derail Knowland's proposa l, it was astutely shunted onto a different track by Secretary of State 

75Statc Dcpt Press Release. 17 Feb 50, RG 59. 

76Ca ffery to State Dept, 26 Sep 48, 851G.01l9- 2648, RG 59. 

n lbid ., 11 Jan 49, 851G.OOIl - 1149, and 19 Mar 49, 851G.01l3- 1949; both in RG 59. 

7I1 U .s. Congress, Senate, Hearillgs Held ill Executive Session Before the [SCI/ate} Commillee 011 ror/!i~1I 

Reia/iolls 011 ECOllomic Assistallce to China alld Korea: 1949 - 50, Historical Series (Washington, 1974), 

pp. 56- 61, 193- 99, passim. 

97 
Advice altd S"pport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Acheson a nd the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Conna lly. Wha t eme rged from the Sena te's deliberatio ns was Section 

303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, authorizing a sum of $75 million to 

be used in " the general area of Chi na." 

This broad geographical reference obviously could be interpreted to 

include French Indochina, w here, Acheson explained to Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, 

the situation has improved a grea t dea l ... in the last year. . . . The French 

Army has been reorga nized and mo ved up to the border, w here the morale is 

high, its equ ipment is good and it is a pretty effi cient outfit. . conditions in 

the area are very much improved. The whole delta region is . .. pacified and 

is now under cultivation again, w hich is a grea t Improvement, and the 

Vietn am system of blockhouses has ke,lit the raiae rs pre tty successfully in the 

hills. So it looks bette r- much bette r. 

Acheson's view of conditions in Indochina was far more optimistic than 

that of Ame rica n observers on the scene. As ea rly as Februa ry 1949 the U.S. 

nava l attache in Hanoi, Lt. William H. Hun ter, had pred icted that the French 

would probably abandon all but the coastal areas of Tonki n 8o In late March 

the America n consul in Hanoi, William H. Gibson, reported that the French 

military position in the border areas of northern Vietnam was serious and 

de te riorating, a nd that the current French losses of about five hundred 

killed a nd wounded per month could not be sustained without reinforcements. Gibson described Hanoi as "subject to increasingly da ring terroristic 

attacks. . which the present Hanoi garrison is appa rently unable to 

restrict," and in july the consul expressed the fea r that Bao Dai's prestige in 

Hanoi was rapidly deciining.B ' 

Yet in the wake of the China debacle legislato rs in Washington were 

appa rently inclined to grasp any possible reason fo r optimism abollt the Far 

East. In ja nua ry 1950 the House a nd Senate readily voted the $75 million with 

the hope that things were indeed loo king "much bette r." 

Well before Section 303 became law, Secreta ry of Defense Louis A. 

Johnson, anticipating the Senate's action and concerned about the situation in 

Asia, had requested the joint Chiefs of Staff to study the problems involved 

in milita ry assistance to countries " in the general area of China."S2 On 17 

Decembe r 1949 the joint Staff had submitted to the Joint Chiefs a draft report 

on American assistance to Southeast Asia. East Asia, especially Southeast 

Asia, had for long ranked low on the joint Chiefs' list of probable areas of 

conflict. Military planners since 1946 had been preoccupied with plan ning for 

a global confl ict with the Sovie t Unio n as the hypothetica l enemy. In such a 

war, the United States would end eavor to hold japa n, the Ryukyus, and 

Formosa; from these island bastions it would deliver air and sea attacks 

7<Jlbid., p. 216. 

IIOAm Consul, Hanoi (William H . Gibson), to Charles E. Reed, 9 Feb 49, 851G.O I/2- 949, RG 59. 

Gibso n to State Dept, 27 Ma r 49, 851G.OO/3 - 2749, 30 M ar 49, 85 I G.OO/3- 3049, and 8 Jul 49, 

85 1G.OOI7- 849; all in RG 59. 

tl2 Mcmo, Johnson for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 Sep 49, dted in Inel to JCS 172 1/42, 17 Dec 49, 

CCS 452 China (4 - 3- 45), JCS records. 

98 
Origills of Military Aid 

against the Soviet Union . Later, in 1948, the Philippines were added to the 

list of island bases to be held ."3 

The joint Staff planners undoubtedly had reference to these earlier studies 

in preparing their 1949 report. In it they expressed the view that the Communist success in China constituted a grievous defeat for the United States and 

wa rned that " if Sou theast Asia is also swept by Communism, we shall have 

suffered a rout the repercussions of w hich will be felt throughout the rest of 

the world ." The joint Staff observed that " in the last analysis the United 

States is the only nation which can offer a maj or check to the influence of the 

USSR in Asia," and that it was necessa ry for the United States to "maintain 

at least a minimum position in Asia if a successful defense is to be achieved 

against Soviet aggression, either directly, or in the guise of international 

communism." The minimum position in Asia involved the offshore island 

chain stretching from japa n south to Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines'"' 

The planners recommended formul ating as ea rly as possible a program to 

uti lize the $75 million that likely wou ld be authorized in Section 303. The 

object of the program wou ld be to "slow the communist advance with a view 

to eventually stopping it and causing it to retreat" and to minimize its 

penetration of Southeast Asia 85 

In reviewing the joint Staff's report, U.S. Army Chief of Staff j . Lawton 

Collins took a different view of the problem. While recognizing that the re 

were "strong implications in the events now taking place throughout the Far 

East," Collins ca utio ned that "the prospect of military disadva ntage to the 

U.S. . .. does not alone justify the seeking of a solution through a primarily 

military effort." Gene ral Collins believed that an integrated package of " politica l, economic, and psychologica l programs" would be more appropriate 

for Southeast Asia than "a program in which the primary effort would be 

restricted to miHtary assistance."&') 

Whether the struggle was to be poli tical and psychological or military, the 

American view of events in Southeast Asia had undergone marked change. 

Until the fall of China, American interest had been primarily in maintaining 

the goodwill of the peoples of the area and in ensu ring continued American 

access to the raw materials of the region . Although the State Department had 

also been concerned about the growing threat of Communist subversion and 

penetra tion in the a rea, its prescription for meeting this danger had been 

modest. As late as mid-1948 its position was that the Un ited States should 

step up its information and educa tional exchange programs to counter Soviet 

propaga nda and encourage settlement of outstanding colonial-nationalistic 

disputes."7 

The change that developments in China caused was illustrated by a draft 

IQRogcr Dingmcln, "Strategic Pla nning and the Policy Process: America n Plans for War in East 

Asia, 1945- 50," Naval War Col/ege Review, November-December 1979, pp. 5- 19. 

s-IjCS 172 1/42. 17 Dec 49, CCS 452 China (4 - 3- 45), leS records. 

K5lbid. 

:If'Merno, Chicf of Staff. A rmy, Dec 49. in jCS 1721142, 17 Dcc 49. 

tl7Mcrno. K. P. Landon, 29 Jun 48. sub: Southeast Asia: Communist Penetration, and Memo, 

W. S. B. Lacy for Charles Reed, 4 Aug 48. sub: Long Range Policy With Respect to Emergent 

Nations; both in files of Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs. RG 59. 

99 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

policy paper prepared for the Nationa l Security Council (NSC) during late 

1949, The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia (NSC 4811). The 

Soviet Union in Europe was " now and in the foreseeable future" the greatest 

menace to freedom, but the Communist victory in China threatened Southeast Asia. China, with its support from Russia, thus constituted a more 

immediate danger. Viewed in this light, the French struggle in Indochina was 

no longer an old-fashioned war between a colonial power and a subject 

people, no longer a mere embarrassment to American interests in Asia, but a 

contest between an American ally and a Communist-controlled insurrection 

supported by China. 88 

This change of emphasis could be observed also in the reaction by the 

joint Chiefs of Staff to NSC 48/1. The draft made little specific mention of 

Vietnam and addressed only in general terms a need to resolve the colonialistnationalist conflict in such a manner as to satisfy nationalist demands with 

minimum strain on the colonial powers S9 Such generalities held no satisfaction for the joint Chiefs of Staff, who ca lled for the "determination, development, and implementation of definite United States steps in Asia." The first 

of those steps would be the implementation of the joint Staffs recommendation- the programming and spending of the Section 303 funds. 90 Adopting 

the joint Chiefs' view, the Na tional Security Council revised NSC 4811, calling 

on the United States to "support non-communist forces in taking the initiative 

in Asia" and to pay particular attention "to the problem of French IndoChina. ,,91 The joint Chiefs also received approval for programming the Section 303 funds. 

On 5 january 1950, the director of the Office of Military Assistance, Maj. 

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer; the foreign affairs adviser to the Secretary of 

Defense, Najeeb Halaby; and Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk formulated 

a number of questions concerning the limitations on and the uses of the 

funds. The joint Chiefs assigned the task of answering the questions and 

formu lating a specific aid program for Asia to an ad hoc committee headed by 

Maj. Gen. Robinson E. Duff9z General Duff's committee accepted the earlier 

position of the joint Staff that th e United States had to retain control of the 

offshore island chain as a minimum defensive position, but it concluded that 

the chain would be unable to stand alone against an integrated, Sovietcontrolled Asia. japan and the other island nations required a stable, nonCommunist Southeast Asia from which to obtain food and raw materials. The 

minimum position was thus too minimal; a non-Communist Southeast Asia 

was required to maintain the stability of the island chain. 

Mainland Southeast Asia was pa rticularly "vulnerable to military attacks 

despite important terrain barriers," the committee added, and was politically 

and psychologically susceptible to Communist subversion. Unless outside 

&lU.S. -Vielllfllll Relntiolls, 8:227. 

INNSC 4811, U.S.-Viehwm Relations, 8:271. 

"'JCS 199m, 29 Dec 49, CCS 092 As;. (6- 25 - 48). 

9IU.S.-Viel llam Relatiolls, 8:266, 271. 

92Memo, K. T. Young for Rear Adm A. C. Davis, 6 Jan SO, CCS 452 China (4 - 3- 45), sec 7, pt. 

7, JCS records. 

100 
Origi"s of Military Aid 

infl uence was applied, the local Communists would likely succeed. To reverse 

this trend, the Duff committee recommended a program of overt assistance 

and covert operations in the general area of China to be initiated as ea rly as 

possible. Indochina, where the need was seen to be most critical, should 

receive first priority and $15 million of Section 303 aid, an amount second 

only to that allotted for Taiwan. The committee recognized hatred of colonialism, rather than fear of communism, as the dominant political concern of 

most of the peoples of Southeast Asia, and was awa re that by aiding French 

Indochina " the United States might come to be identified with the colonial 

cou ntries of Europe," but the members believed "ca refu l maneuvering and 

determined handling of the psychologica l factors in the individua l countries" 

could overcome this obstacle 93 

Secretary of Sta te Acheson had now come to much the same view. On 23 

Jan uary he told the Nationa l Press Club that America n military assistance 

to Southeast Asia might well provide "the missing component in a problem which might otherwise be unsolved.,,9" An important consideration for 

Acheson was the serious effect continued involvement in Vietnam was having 

on France's ability to contribute to the defense of Western Europe. Every 

franc spent in Vietnam was one franc less for French forces in the North 

Atlantic Treaty Orga nization 95 He thus acknowledged the French position; 

the current French commander in Vietnam, General Marcel Carpentier, for 

example, complained to a n American visitor, " the flower of the French Army 

was in Indo-China instead of on the Rhine,,,96 The respected foreign affairs 

analyst C. L. Sulzberger echoed Acheson's concern in the New York Times on 

23 January when he wrote that " the disCiplined machinery of international 

communism, directed by Moscow, is ca rrying out perhaps the most brilliant 

example of global political warfare so far known by drain ing the potential 

strength of Fra nce in the Indo-China civil war and thu s ... simultaneously 

weakening the Western Powers' position in Europe and Asia.,,97 That same 

day the Times reported that " highly competent military authorities in Tokyo" 

believed " the French might be able to hold off a concerted communist thrust 

[in Indochina] if properly equipped.,,9. 

Yet official American thinking about Indochina was less than unanimous. 

From Bangkok, the new head of the State Department Fa r East Division, W. 

Walton Butterworth , sent a blunt wa rning that economic and military aid did 

not constitute the "missing components" in solving the problems posed by 

Asia. The impression held by some Americans that aid to Indochina wou ld be 

as effective and successful as had been American aid to Greece was, said 

Butterworth, a dangerous delusion.99 

o,IJReport of Ad Hoc Committee, Duff to Seey, JCS, 14 Jan 50, CCS 452 China (4 - 3- 45), sec. 7, 

pI. 7, JCS records. 

9'!Department of Slate /Jllllel ill , 23 January 1950, p. 114. 

'J5Gaddis Smith, OCt/II Achesoll (New York: Cooper Square, 1972), pp. 313- 14. 

9l>Am Consulate, Saigon, to Sta te Dept, 31 Jan 50, 751G.02l1- 3l 50, RG 59. 

97c. L. Sulzberger, "Red Blow to West in Indochina Seen," Nt'll) York Times, 23 Jan SO. 

9g" lndo-China Viewed as Key Asia Point," New York Times, 23 Jan SO. 

9'9-fclg, Butterworth to Seey of State, 17 Feb 50, U.S.-Vietnam Relatiolls, 8:280. 

101 
Advice mId SlIpport: The Early Yea rs, 1941 - 1960 

Second thoughts about comrnitting American military resources to Southeast Asia also arose within the Plans and Operations Division of the Army 

staff. In February 1950 the planners took issue with the conclusions of a draft 

prepared by the staff of th e National Security Council. Entitled "The Position 

of th e United States With Respect to Indochina," the paper declared that 

Indochina was irnportant to U.S. security interests and that all practica l 

measures should be taken to protect it. The Army plann ers countered that " to 

condition a course of action on the security interest of this place is false and 

narrow " because it was not clear " that the U .s. has a vital security interest in 

thi s immediate area." The Plans and Operations Di vision contended that 

while the United States had a strategic interest in Southeast Asia as a whole, 

thi s interest was basically limited, in terms of required action, to guaranteeing 

Japan's access to the food supplies of the area . The paper noted the importance of denying resources to Communist China, but it argued that doing so 

was important not because of the need to defend against Communist aggression but because "China's failure to control this area may increase her dependence on the Western bloc lfor food and ra w materials] and serve as a 

stimulus for a durable long-term Western orientation .,, 1()() 

As for Indochina (and Vietnam, specifica lly), the Plans and Opera tion s 

Division recommended support "on a limited basis provided that France 

agrees to a more complete transfer of sovereignty to Bao Dai, a relinquishment of its colonial tenets and an acknowledgment that the Military pacification of Indo-China is not possible." Although the Army planners recognized 

that Bao Dai had the support of no more than a small p roportion of th e 

population, th ey beli eved th e United States had no choice but to back him. 

"The time has passed when th e United States could pursue an attitude of 

compl ete ne utrali ty. Our recognition of Bao Dai cast the die. French prestige 

is at stake and requests from them for. . assistance will probably be forthcoming shortly." 101 

The old argument about support for Bao Dai had thu s ta ken a new turn . 

For two yea rs adv ocates of the Bao Dai experiment had argued that the 

United States had to recognize Bao Dai or his regime would fail. With 

recognition a fact, the Army p lann ers now reasoned that keeping Bao Dai 

from failure was necessary because th e United States had recognized him . 

As discussions of military aid continued in the Pentagon, a State Department working group was attempting to put forwa rd some broad guideli nes 

for American assistance, both military and economic. The working group 

members ca utioned against a program so large that it would shift the burden 

of supply for the Indochina conflict from France to the United States. They 

believed that the United States should be willing to consider requests from 

the French only for " unique items of military equipment," that is, items not 

available from Europe . These supplies could be financed by the 303 funds, 

although the United States should do nothing to invite France to apply for 

lOOMcmo for Gen Schuyler, 24 Feb 50, sub: Position of the United Sta tes With Respcci to 

Indochina, ors 337, RG 319. 

lOl Jbid . 

102 
Origills of Military Aid 

milita ry or economic aid unde r Section 303. Within a few mo nth s all these 

criteria had gone by the boa rd . 102 

While the form of American aid for Indochina was still being discussed, 

the long-anticipated formal request for aid arrived from the French. O n 16 

February Ambassador Henri Bonnet me t w ith the secretary of state to present 

an aide-memoire urging the American government to affirm publicl y its so lidarity with France in the face of the Communist menace in the Fa r East and 

to begin an immediate prog ram of military and economic aid to France and 

the Associated States of Indochina. lin Six days la ter the French told American 

officials in Paris that without a long-term prog ram of American milita ry 

assistance, they might find it necessa ry to cut their losses and withdraw fforn 

Indochina. 104 

Although the United States was already moving toward aid for Indochina, 

American officials were anxio us to exploit full y the bargaining leverage presented by the French requests for help. They hoped specifica lly to compel 

the French to grant rea l powe r and independence to Bao Da i's regime in 

Vietnam. To Ambassador Bonnet, Secretary of State Acheson suggested tha t 

an America n statement of solidarity with France in Asia wou ld be more 

effective if coupled with a public French statement tha t the Elysee Agreements of 8 March 1949 "represented only a step in an evolving process" of 

grad ual independence for Vietnam,l OS Acheson privately expressed to his 

staff a concern that "our bargaining power with the French disappears the 

moment we agree to give them aid for Indo-China."J06 

The French respond ed to the American pressure for furth e r concessions 

with a warning: un less American support was forthcoming, they would have 

to abandon Vietnam and the rest of Indochina to communism. French Foreign 

Minister Robert Schuman told reporters he was "amazed that the United 

States insisted upon discussing future Vietnamese independence from France 

when Vietnamese independence from communism was at stake." 107 

Despite this Fre nch refu sa l to ma ke changes in their Vietnam policy, th e 

pressure in America for aid conti nued. Since Section 303 fund s were now 

ava ilable, th e service secretaries on 1 March urged approval of the $15 millio n 

allocation to Indoch ina recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on the 

same day the Nationa l Security Council recommended an immed ia te military 

aid program to Indochina a nd Thaila nd . lOS Presid ent Truman approved the 

$15 million military aid recommendation o n 10 March 1950. Thus, despite 

Genera l Colli ns' earlier warning aga inst trying to solve the problem of Indo· 

III:!M in, PSA·WE Working Groups. 17 Jan SO. fi les of Office of Philippine and Southeast Asi'ln 

Affairs. RG 59. 

'UJMemo o f Conversa tio n, Secy of Stat e, 16 Feb 50, Inel to lCS 1992110, CCS 092, Asia, sec. 3, 

leS records. 

I(HTe lg, Ambassador in France (Bruce) to Seey of State , 22 Feb 50, Department of State, foreigll 

Relntifms of tile Ullited Sin/e .;, 1950, vol. 6, Ensl As;n (lila tI/(' p(lcific (Washington, 1976), p. 740. 

105Memo of Conversa tion, Secy of State, 16 Feb 50. 

lI~ mith , Adu:5(l/l, p. 310. 

107M:w York Time:;, 4 May 50. 

UIIIMcll1o, Adm A. C. Dilvis for Col Shell, I Mar 50, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 3, lCS rL'cord ~. 

103 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

china primarily through military assistance, the first America n response to the 

problem was essentially military in nature. 

The transition from recognition of Bao Dai to supplying military aid 

to his government and its French patron seemed a logica l, easy, and natura l 

one. From ea rly 1948, when Washington reached the conclusion that a Viet 

Minh - dominated , and th erefore Communist, Vietnam wa s unacce ptable, to 

ea rly 1950, w hen military aid was extended, the cost of avoid ing the unacceptable was never ca lculated . Yet the cost was already beginning to rise: from 

diplomatic su pport for Bao Dai, to formal recognition, to $15 million of 

military aid . The cost was, in fact, open-ended, fo r if a Viet Minh victory was 

unacceptable, then a French defeat had to be forestalled no matter what the 

price. Any hint from Paris that the French were faltering in their will to stay 

in Vietnam and keep fighting usually produced in America political concession or additional aid or both . In time, avoiding French defea t would become 

more important to the United States than to France. It was, as Charlton 

Ogburn had foreseen, the beginning of "a very bad mess." 

104 
6 

Establishing a Military Assistance Program 

On 16 March 1950 the French government delivered to the U.s. embassy in 

Paris a list of urgently needed supplies and equipment for Indochina. Heading the list were radios and rad io equipment. Radio was the primary means 

of communication in Indochina and the only link between widely separated 

cities such as Hue and Saigon, which had no telephone connections. Also 

critically needed were bulldozers and other types of construction equipment 

to improve and expand the primitive road network, light planes or helicopters 

for medical evacua tion, and spare parts for aircraft. The cost of these arms 

and equipment tota led about $94 million. Included were $11 million for 

ammunition, $32 million for automotive equipment, $2 million for medica l 

supplies, $8 million for engineering equipment, and $8 million fo r signal 

equipment. 

General Duff of the Joint Chiefs' ad hoc committee on aid for Southeast 

Asia characterized the French request as modest and appropriate in view of 

the military situation in Vietnam. I Aid to Indochina on such a sca le, however, 

called for a more substantial and lasting commitment to the area than what 

was contemplated in Section 303. That a full er commitment might be forth -

coming could be inferred from the fact that in late February 1950 the Sta te 

Department had announced plans for an economic survey mission to Southeast Asia. Headed by Robert A. Griffin, an official of the Economic Cooperation Administration and a veteran of aid programs in China, the mission was 

to determine the nature, scope, and appropriateness of American economic 

and technical assistance to Southeast Asia 2 

The Griffin Mission 

The Griffin mission arrived in Saigon around the same time that units of 

the U.S. Seventh Fleet, at State Department behest, were paying a cour-

'Consul General, Saigon, to Stale Dept, 18 Ma r 50, 751G.5MAP/3 - 1850; Charge d'Affaires, 

London, to State Dept, 22 Mar 50, 7S1G .OI/3 - 22SO; State Dept to Am Legation, Saigon, 31 Mar 

50, 751G.5MAP/3 - 3150. All in records of Oept of Stale. 

2Ltr, Under Seey of State to Griffin, 1 Mar 50, U.S. -Vie/I/am Relntiolls, 8:286 - 87 . 

105 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

tesy visit to Vietnam.' It incl ud ed two military offi cers, Army Col. E. A. Duff 

and Navy Ca pt. W. Warder, who spent much of their time conferring with 

French military authorities· French High Commissioner Leon Pignon told the 

mission that French problems in Vietnam were primarily military. Only the 

rapid improvemen t of the wea pons and equipment of the French forces, he 

argued , wou ld permit a return of military confidence, and only the prospect 

of ultimate military success would make further political and economic progress possible 5 

French forces in Indochina were armed with a mixture of World War 11 

British, America n, French, and German wea pons and equipment. Most of the 

British and American small arms, which constituted about 40 percent of those 

possessed by the French Army and auxiliary forces in Indochina, were 

worn-out or unserviceable due to a shortage of spa re parts. A lack of suitable 

ammunition also limited the number of machine gun s that could be kept in 

service. The French field artillery units possessed about 400 field pieces, ranging in size from French 7S-mm. types to a hand ful of American World War 11 

ISS-mm. howitzers, but about 22 percent of all the artillery was worn-out or 

unserviceable. 6 The situation in rega rd to aircraft was no better . An American 

general who was invited to observe a French bombing mission rode in an 

an tique German aircraft which "actually had telephone wire tying things up." 

There were no bomb racks; the 100-pound bombs were tied down with wire 

until needed , then pitched out the door. 7 When Captain Warder accompanied 

French forces on an amphibious assault against the Viet Minh, he was 

impressed with the high morale of the troops, but he noted a lack of sufficient air cover and a shortage of officers. 8 The members of the survey mission 

quickly concluded that the aid requirements for French Indochina would far 

exceed the money available from Section 303 funds 9 

A Growing Commitment 

While the Griffin economic survey mission was in Asia, the State and 

Defense Departments bega n to formu late long-range assessments of the 

status of Indochina and of its importance to the United States. On 10 April 

19S0 the Joint Chiefs of Staff su bmitted a memorandum to Secreta ry of 

Defense Johnson on the strategic importance of Southeast Asia . In contrast to 

the rather ca utious approach of General Duff's ad hoc committee and the 

3Edwin Bickford Hooper, Dean C. Allard, and Oscar P. Fi tzgerald, Tile United States Navy alld 

the Viet /wm COllfl ict, vol. 1, The Settillg of the Stnge to 1959 (Washington, 1976), p. 173 . 

.\Colonel Duff had served on the JCS ad hoc committee headed by Maj . Gen. Robinson Duff. 

SStatement, M. Leon Pignon, French High Commissioner Indochinil, Incl 4 to U.S. Army 

A ttache, Saigon, to ACofS G - 2, 2 Aug 50, records of ACSI. 

6U.S. Army Attache, Saigon, to ACofS G - 2, 12 Ju150, sub: Arms and Armament of the French 

Army in Indochina, R - 13 - 50, OARMA 056, records of ACSI. 

70ral Hist In terv with General Graves B. Erski ne, 1969 - 70, U.S. M ilrinc Corps Historical 

Center. 

IIMin, Foreign Military Assistance Coordinati ng Comm ittee Meeti ng, 6 Mily 50, M - 17, Lot 

5405, records of Dept of Slate. 

"'Ibid. 

106 
Establishillg a Military Assistallce Progralll 

even mo re circumspect approach of th e Army staff, the joint Chiefs firml y 

decla red that mainland Southeast Asia was of critica l strategic impo rtance to 

the United States. 

Although military leaders ea rlier had viewed Southeast Asia as important 

chiefly beca use of its relationship to the island chain of japa n, O kinawa, 

Ta iwan, and the Ph ili ppines, the joint Chiefs now saw Southeast Asia as 

strategically important in its own right. The area was a major source of 

certain "strategic materials" required by the United States and was a "crossroad of communications" and a "vital segment in the line of containment of 

communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula." Should Southeast Asia fall to communism, the joint Chiefs noted, the 

security of japan, India , and Australia would be threa tened. Indochina was 

the key because its fa ll would undoubtedly bring about the fall of Bu rma and 

Thailand, and probably of the Philippines, Malaya, and In donesia. The join t 

Chiefs of Staff urged that funds allocated for aid to Indochina be programmed 

as soon as possible and that an additional appropriation of at least $10 million 

be sought for fisca l year 1951. 10 

The Sta te De partment was thinking alo ng similar lines. "The Departme nt's 

policy with respect to Southeast Asia," declared Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State Livingston T. Merchant, " is to sto p Communism at the sou the rn border 

of China. " The fate of French Indochina was crucial. Should it come under 

Communist control, Burma would be outflanked, Thailand wou ld change 

sides, and Malaya would be gravely threatened. The psychological effects 

would be felt even beyond Southeast Asia. I I 

Such views found expression also in a new National Security Council 

memorandum, the first to deal excl usively with the question of Indochina. 

That memorandum, NSC- 64, approved by the presid ent in Ma rch 1950, 

defined Indochina as a key area of Southeast Asia and pred icted, mu ch as the 

joint Chiefs would do, that if Indochina succumbed to Communist domination , Thailand and Burma cou ld also be expected to fa ll. The rest of "Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard ." 12 

The concepts embodied in the April memora ndum from the joint Chiefs 

and in NSC - 64 wou ld form the basis of American policy in Southeast 

Asia for at least the ensuing decade. The goal of containing communism in 

China and the related idea that the loss of one country in Southeast Asia 

would inevitably lead to the loss of others-eventually known as the dom ino 

theory-gradually took on the aura of a kind of dogma. Yet the writers of 

these two pi votal documents probably intended them more as arguments 

for immediate American aid to Indochina than as long-range geopolitical 

analyses. 

IUMemo for Seey of Defense, 10 Apr 50, sub: Strategic Assessmen t of Southeast Asia, U.S. ~ 

Vietl/alll Rela tiolls, 8:308 - 13. 

IIMemo, Mercha nt for W. Walton Butterworth, 7 Mar 50, sub: French Indochina, files of Office 

of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Lot 540190. records of Dept of Slate. 

'2Drafl report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With 

Respect to Indochina, NSC - 64, U.S.-Vie/llfl/II Relntiolls, 8:285. 

107 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Yenrs, 1941 - 1960 

Although agreement was fairly genera l that American military aid was 

needed in Indochina, the question remained: Aid to whom? One obvious way 

of increasing American influence in Indochina while avoiding the stigma of 

supporting French colonialists was to give the aid directly to Bao Dai. Robert 

Griffin in March advised th e State Department that such a course would 

greatly bolster the Bao Dai government by " increasing its appearance of 

inde pendence [a nd] its loca l and international prestige.",3 

To Bao Dai's government, the advantages were just as obvious. Consul 

General Edmund Gullion in Saigon reported on 18 March, for example, that 

responsible Vietnamese officia ls believed direct access to American military 

aid wou ld give them a "whip hand with the French."" To the commander of 

the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Vice Adm. Russell S. Berkey, Bao Dai explained that 

direct American aid would be useful in obta ining greater military independence from the French, and that greater independence was " the key to the 

situation.,,]5 His defense minister, Phan Huy Quat, proposed to Gu llion on 25 

March that the United States assume direct responsibility for training and 

equipping a Vietnamese army.'6 

Both Gullion and Admiral Berkey, however, were skeptical about direct 

military aid to Bao Dai. Berkey noted that while the French had submitted a 

detailed and specific list of their needs, the Vietnamese had been unable to 

furnish more than hazy ideas about their military requirements. Gullion 

dismissed Phan Huy Quat's proposal as "fantastic" and suggested that the 

early arrival of U.S. aid in Indochina was more important than "some evolutionary or renunciatory declaration to be wrung from the French.'''7 

Predictably, the French made clear that they would reject any plan to 

provide direct military aid to the Vietnamese. General Carpentier, for example, told the New York Tillles that he wou ld never agree to military equipment 

goi ng directly to Bao Dai a nd declared that if it did he "would resign within 

twenty-four hours." "The Vietnamese," said Carpentier, "have . . . no military organization which could effectively utilize the equipment. It would be 

wasted, and in China, the United States has had enough of that." French 

High Commissioner Leon Pignon explained that only the French military 

could handle the complex technical problems involved in the reception and 

distribution of arms and equipment. 18 

Always present in the background was the implied, and sometimes explicit, 

threat that France might, as French Foreign Offi ce Secretary Alexandre Parodi 

told the U.S. ambassador in February, "cut her losses" and quit Indochina if 

the United States failed to provide aid or if France was pressured to make too 

many concessions to Bao Dai. Although there was doubtless an element of 

bluff in the French threa ts, they seldom fa iled to elicit vigorous handwringing from American officials. Parodi's statement itself evoked an immedi13Griffin to Seey of State, 16 Mar 50, U.S.-Vie/llm1l Relatiolls, 8:292. 

14Gullion to Stale Dept, 18 Mar 50, 75 1G.OO/3- 1850, records of Dept of State. 

ISCmdr, Seventh Fleet, to eNO, 25 Mar SO, CCS 452 China, sec. 7, pt. 8, leS records. 

16Gullion to State Dept, 25 Mar SO, 751G.OO/3- 2550, records of Dept of State. 

171bid., 18 Mar SO, and 25 Mar SO. 

ItlNew York Times, 9 Mar SO. 

108 
Establishillg a Military Assistallce Program 

ate demand from Washington that France vow not to give up the war. 19 But 

in May Robert Griffin warned that the French might still withdraw entirel! "if 

[the] pressure . . . for 'evolutionary' treatment .. . became too severe ."2 

Given this wariness about French reactions, the idea of using aid to the 

Vietnamese as a lever to pry further concessions of local autonomy was 

quietly abandoned . The State Department continued to hope that France 

would make a public decla ration at least of its intent in time to grant grea ter 

authority to the Baa Dai regime, but the French government refused even this 

minimal concession under the pretext such a statement would cast doubt on 

the validity of the Elysee Agreements.>1 

Even though the question of who should receive aid remained, the movement for a large-sca le American commitment to Indochina had acquired a 

momentum of its own. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in April and May advised 

that although the establishment of -Political and economic stability would 

be the most important factor in the long-run struggle for Southeast Asia, 

the military situation there was of " pressing urgency." They recommended 

" immediate and positive steps to achieve the initiative in the present conflict.,,22 From Saigon., Consul General Gullion added the warning " that most 

of the colored races of the world will, in time, fall to the communist sickle if 

Indochina is taken over. "n On his return from Indochina, Robert Griffin 

reiterated his view that American aid to Baa Dai would help him win over the 

non-Communist elements of the Viet Minh and the "numerous fence sitters." 

Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, meanwhile, told a closed session of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the French would have a chance 

of gradually defeating the Communist forces if supplied with sufficient American economic and military aid. 24 

There were a few notes of caution. The chief of the State Department's 

Southeast Asia Branch, Charlton Ogburn, pointed out that Griffin, Jessup, and 

some of the other supporters of large-scale aid had only a brief and superficial 

familiarity with Southeast Asia and that even Consul General Gullion had 

been at his post less than two months. "The trouble is that none of us knows 

enough about Indochina," Ogburn explained. "We have had no real political 

reporting from there since [Charles E.] Reed and [James L.] O'Sullivan left 

two years ago." Ogburn doubted that the introduction of American military 

aid would make any decisive difference in the Franco-Vietnamese conflict. 

Ho's forces had fought the ISO, ODD-man French Army in Vietnam to a draw 

after four bitter years and were unlikely " to wilt under the psychological 

WAmbassador in France to Stale Dept, 22 Feb SO, 751G.OO/2 - 2250, records of Dept of State. 

2OMemo, Griffin for Secy o f State, 4 May 52, sub: Conference on Indo-China- May 2, 1950, 

Department of State, Foreign Relatiolls of the United States, 1950, voL 6, East Asia (I ud tile PaCific 

(WaShington, 1976), p. 797. 

2lTelg, Acheson to Am Embassy, Paris, 29 Mar 50, U.S.-Vietnam ReiatiollS, 8:30 1- 03. 

22Memo for Secy of Defense, 10 Apr SO, sub: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia, U .S.-

Vietnam Relatiolls, 8:310; ibid., leS for Secy of Defense, 2 May 50, sub: Southeast Asia, same 

volume, 8:318. 

23Gullion to State Dept, 6 May SO, 751G.OO/5 - 650, records of Dept of State . 

24Smith, AcJleSlJII, p. 313. 

109 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

impact of American military assistance." Even if American military aid on a 

large scale could turn the tide, the Viet Minh, Ogburn s urmised, would 

merely return to scattered guerrilla resistance and bide their time. 25 

Although Ogburn's skepticism was to prove well fo unded, the re was li ttle 

inclination in Washington to undertake the careful reexamination of American 

policy that Ogburn was suggesting. By May 1950, w hen Secretary of State 

Acheson flew to London for meetings with NATO fore ign ministers, it was 

appa rent that an open-ended Ame rica n commitment to Indochina much 

greater than that provided for by the Section 303 funds was in the offing. 

Policymakers were now convinced that large-scale military aid was essential 

and inevitable. Secre tary Acheson wa s worried about France's continued 

participation in the North Atlantic alliance, the Army was disturbed by the 

drain on France's NATO forces, and the Join t Chiefs wished to "achieve the 

initiative" in the battle for Southeast Asia. 

In London, French Foreign Minister Robe rt Schuman flatl y told Acheson 

that France wou ld be unable to meet its NATO military commitments in 

Western Europe so long as the Indochina conflict continued to drain French 

resources. When Acheson again raised the question of more autonomy for the 

Bao Oai regime, Schuman replied blandly that " if the United States gives 

France its support in the milita ry field and trusts it for the in ternal development of its policy, a happy ending will be achieved.,,26 Acheson and Schuman finally agreed that $20 to $30 million in American aid would be furnished forthwith and an inde terminate amount during the next fiscal year. 

"The United States Government," Acheson told the press on 8 May, "convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exists in 

any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation such as to 

warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated 

States and France.,,27 

The French had won the first round of bargaining over aid, as they would 

continue to do in all subseq uent rounds until their final defeat in Vietnam, for 

the American negotiating position was fundamenta lly untenable. Although 

America n officia ls agreed that the war could be won only if Bao Oai had 

sufficient authority and independence to attract substantial portions of Ho's 

ad herents and to subdue the others militarily, they were also convinced that 

rea l independence for Vietnam would mean a loss of all French incentive to 

continue the war. 

Ambassador Oavid Bruce recognized the problem when he pOinted out 

that the success of American policy depended upon both a continued French 

effort in Indochina and a steady growth in the authority and prestige of 

non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists. "Yet," he added, "these two 

forces ... are inherently antagonistic and the gains of one will be at the 

25Ltr, Ogburn to W. Walton Buttenvorth, 21 Mar SO, 751G .OO/3 - 21SO, records of Dept of State. 

26Documentary History o f U.s. Policy Toward Indochina (compilation by the State Dept Historica l Div), doc. 8 - 47, Acheson-Schuman Conversations, 8 May SO. 

27Smith, Achesotl, p. 314. 

110 
Establishillg a Military Assistallce Program 

expense of the other.,,28 Instead of drawing the conclusion that the task was 

impossible, Bruce merely spoke of the need for officers of exceptional tact and 

judgment to be assigned to Indochina. 

The Melby-Erskine Mission 

While policymakers in Washington pondered the problems of Indochina, 

the machinery of the American military aid program was gradually 

being assembled in Saigon . Saigon was chosen instead of Hanoi because of 

the location there of the French military headquarters and the seat of the Bao 

Dai government. Although American military representatives would play a 

major role in ensuring the efficient and timely delivery of aid to the French, 

they would not be able to exercise much influence upon the conduct of the 

war or even upon French use of the American material. During the first two 

years of the aid program, Americans in Saigon would prove no more able 

than Americans in Washington or Paris to use military aid to exercise leverage 

on the French. 

The counselor and second secretary of the American legation in Saigon 

spent the weeks immediately after the decision to supply military aid to the 

French negotiating military aid requests. That work was already well along 

when another survey mission arrived in Saigon on 15 July. This joint survey 

team, composed of representatives of the Defense and State Departments, 

was charged with determining the long-range nature and objectives of the aid 

program and the best organization for carrying it out. John F. Melby of the 

State Department headed the team. Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, U.s. Marine 

Corps, was in charge of its military component. 29 Shortly after the Americans' 

arrival three terrorist bombs wrecked the lobby of their hotel. Fortunately, the 

members of the team were absent at the time, but General Erskine suspected 

that the incident had been arranged by the French to persuade the team not 

to spend too much time looking into affairs in Indochina .

30 

The members of the team received over 5,000 pages in reports from the 

French for study, but the U.S. lega tion's overworked staff of three translators 

took so long to provide translations that the reports proved of little practical 

use. At the same time, General Erskine, a crusty veteran of the Pacific 

campaigns of World War II with no knowledge of French, was outspokenly 

annoyed at the amount of time that the French wished him to spend at 

forma l briefings, military reviews, and social occasions. Both Erskine and 

Melby were also worried by the apparen t lack of hard intelligence on the 

enemy. The French military dispositions were not the problem, Melby 

reca lled, for "we were free to look at them any place we chose and did 

so." The problem "was the strength and disposition of the Communist-led 

UlBruce to Secy of State, 31 May SO, 751G.00I5 - 3'1 SO, records o f Dept of State. 

29Am Minister, Saigon (Donald Heath), to State Dept, 5 Jan 51, 751G.5MAPI1 - 551, records of 

D~I of State. 

Erskine Interv, pp. 471 - 72. 

111 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Vietminh forces. It became increasingly clear that the French did not 

know this and that what they thought 

they knew just as likely as not was 

wrong.,,31 

Erskine was determined to see 

and judge for himself the state of the 

French military effort and " to find 

out just what the hell their ability 

was to use the equipment." The 

French, he told U.5. Minister Donald 

R. Heath, "haven't won a war since 

Napoleon so why listen to a bunch of 

second raters when they are losing 

this war. They are going to show 

down [sic] with me or I'll recommend 

they don't get a damn penny."32 

Such talk appa lled the minister and 

his staff, but in the end the general 

and his aides did manage to see a 

General Erskine 

good bit of the war. The joint survey team remained in Indochina for three 

weeks, visiting military installations in the Saigon area, participating as 

observers in a number of French military operations, touring the Red River 

Delta and the Chinese border in Tonkin, and making brief visits to Laos and 

Cambodia. When one of Erskine's aides, Capt. Nick Thorne, U.S. Marine 

Corps, secured permission, with considerable difficulty, to accompany a Vietnamese unit of the French Expeditionary Corps on a night ambush to capture 

prisoners for interrogation, he was impressed by the combat performance of 

the Vietnamese troops. The mission, however, was a failure because the 

Vietnamese "refused to bring back heads with bodies still attached to them."n 

At the time of the team's visit, French forces were engaged in three types 

of military operations. The first, pacification operations, consisted of cordoning off a region and securing the main lines of communication within the 

area. French and Vietnamese authorities then attempted to establish a working civil government and police force. This slow process absorbed many 

troops. A second type of operation involved offensive probes against the Viet 

Minh . The French admitted that enemy regular forces were hard to find. 

These large-scale attacks seldom resulted in heavy fighting against organized 

units, although small-scale, vicious, hand-to-hand encounters were common. 

The majority of French casualties on these offensive probes were caused by 

skillfully planted mines and night sniper fire. 

Protection of convoys, which were vulnerable to mines and to ambushes, 

31John F. Melby, "Vietnam- 1950," Diplomatic History 6 (Winter 1982):99. 

32Erskine Intcrv, p. 473; Ltrs, Heath to W. S. B. Lacy, 2 Aug 50, and 16 Jan 51, both in Lot 

580207, records of Dept of State . 

33Melby, "Vietnam-1950," p. 101; Erskine intcrv, p. 477. 

112 
Establishillg a Military Assistallce Program 

French Convoy Ilear Nillh /-lOfl. 

constituted a third type of operation. Since Viet Minh ambushes often 

employed lip to 6,000 men along a 3- to 5-kilometer section of a convoy route, 

convoys had to be heavily escorted by strong infantry forces and armored 

cars. To escort a convoy of 200 vehicles required up to 5 infantry battalions, 2 

artillery groups, and 2 squadrons of armored cars. Even smaller convoys 

required a minimum of 2 infantry batta lions. Supply convoys on the 200-

kilometer stretch of road between Cao Bang and Lang Son near the Chinese 

border took an average of fourteen days to reach their destination. 34 

The Viet Minh were now employing up to six or seven battalions in their 

major offensives and were able to slistain their attacks for almost a week. 

Improved Viet Minh capabilities obliged the French to alter their method of 

fortifying posts. Simple barbed wire or bamboo fences were no longer sufficient; concrete pillboxes were now necessary to deal with the increasing 

enemy numbers and firepower. 35 

The military members of the Melby-Erskine team qUickly concluded that 

th e Viet Minh, not the French, controlled the major portion of Indochina and 

34Staff Discussions Between the l3 irtish Service Authorities in Singupore and the French Service 

Authorities in Indo-China, Incl I to Army Attache, Singapore, to ACofS G - 2, 11 Scp 50, records 

of ACSI. 

J

5Viet Minh Documen t on Military Tactics, 9 Apr 54, Inel 29 to U.S. Army Attache to ACSI, 8 

Jun 54, records of ACSI. 

113 
Advice alld SlIpport: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

"for all practica l purposes have the French forces pinned to their occupied 

areas." The French appeared to have " lost most of their offensive s pirit. " 

Their efforts were stalemated and their casualties were very high.'6 While 

inspecting the French border fortress at Dong Dang, General Erskine discovered that the French had only about five units of fire for their machi ne guns 

and that the fort's water storage area was empty. No terrain obstacles or traps 

had been erected to bar likely avenues of attack even though bamboo and 

other types of wood were plentiful. "They had a brigadier in command of the 

area," Erskine recalled, "who gave me the impression he couldn't make a 

decent corpora I. ,,37 

The joint survey team concluded that "military action alone ca nnot solve 

the interna l security problems" in Vietnam, which they attributed less to 

technical military errors on the part of the French than to "the deep-sea ted 

hatred and suspicion" with which the Vietnamese people regarded their 

former colonial rulers. The French could overcome that hostility only by 

persuading the Vietnamese that cooperation with France was a more certain 

road to independence than support of the Viet Minh. That, in turn, could 

only be accomplished by further French concessions and reforms and ea rly 

implementation of the provisions of the Elysee Agreements. 

Once again the old paradox emerged : if the French were to do all those 

things, they wou ld have little incentive to continue the war; yet if they failed 

to do them, the Vietnamese would have little reason to oppose the Viet 

Minh. After private conversations with General Carpentier and other French 

and Vietnamese officials, Melby concluded that " the political interests of 

France and the Associated States are not only different, they are mutually 

exclusive." Despite that recognition, the team failed to concl ude that the 

inherent contradictions made the war fundamentally unwinnable; Melby and 

Erskine declared, instead, that " the Vietnamese and the French must be 

persuaded to rise above their parochial political interests."" Since those 

"parochial political interests" were the principal reasons for the wa r, the 

American job of persuasion wou ld be d ifficult indeed. 

In terms of the immed iate military situation, the Melby-Erskine mission 

concluded that, with th e troops and equipment then ava ilable, the French 

might be able to hold their own in the face of a large-scale Viet Minh 

offensive but not aga inst an attack in force by the Chinese Communists. The 

military aid received from the United States to that point was inadequate to 

meet the needs of the situation. More equipment and supplies were urgently 

needed .'9 

With their recommendations for aid, General Erskine and his staff included 

36Rpt of Joint MDAP Survey Mission, 24 Aug 50, CCS 092 Asia. or (Bulky Package) I, Jes 

records. 

'7Erskine Interv, pp. 478 - 79. 

J.8Rpt of Joint MDAP Survey Mission, 24 Aug 50. 

39yhe seriousness of the French supply problem was pOinted up a few weeks latcr, when an 

American officer discovered that the poor marksmanship of many Vietnamese and L."'lolian 

soldiers in the Frcnch forces was attributable to the lack of ammu nition for target practice. See 

Ltr, Gi llespie to Seey of Defense, 4 Sep 50, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

114 
Establishillg a Military Assistance Progralll 

a proposal that an American military assistance advisory group for Indochina 

be established as soon as possible. French leaders in Vietnam had repea tedly 

indica ted their strong opposition to such a group. They argued that French 

soldiers were already familiar with U.S. World War II equipment, and they 

ad ded that the presence of a n advisory group would allow disruptive native 

politicians to playoff the United States against the French and might suggest 

to some people that America was simply ta king over in Vietnam. 

U.S. representatives in Saigon, firml y backed by the d irector of the 

Defense Department Offi ce of Military Assistance, General Lemnitzer, nevertheless insisted that a military advisory group was necessa ry to assure p roper 

requisitioning, procurement, and receipt of supplies. The advisory group 

could also serve as a point of contact for U.S. and French military leaders and 

might prove of grea t practical value to the latter if th e United States, as most 

people an ticipated, decided to furnish the French with new, post- World War 

II types of equipment and weapons'o 

General Erskine and his staff recommended that the military assistance 

ad visory group be fairly small since it would have few training responsibilities 

and wou ld be concerned mainly with processing requests for aid and occa sionally inspecting military installations to observe end-use, pilferage, and loss of 

equipment through combat. The advisory group also was to "evaluate French 

tactical efficiency in the use of U.S. equipment." Given those limited duties, 

General Erskine personally believed the group would require no more than 30 

members, but the Erskine-Melby report of 24 August recommended a joint 

service ad visory group of 38 officers and enlisted men, headed by a general 

offi cer; the Army contingent was to consist of a colonel and 3 other officers, 

along with 6 en listed men and 4 civilian c1 erks" 

Another of Genera l Erskine's recommendations-that a regional military 

assistance advisory group headed by a two- or three-star American general be 

established for th e entire Southeast Asia area-was opposed by the State 

Department. The latter believed that such a group might impinge on the 

prerogatives of ambassadors as heads of their respective missions, and it was 

successful in blocking the measu re'2 

The Military Assistance Advisory Group 

When the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, was 

approved, General Erskine appointed the U.s. military attache, Col. 

Lee V. Harris, as acting chief. In September 1950 the first contingent of 

oI°Min, Foreign M ilitary Assistance Coordinating Committee M eeting. 6 M ay 50; M emo, U.S. 

Army Attache, Saigon, for Chief, U.S. M ission, 28 Jul 50, sub: Conference With General 

Carpentier, Incl to U.S. Army A ttache. Saigon, to ACofS G - 2, I Aug 50,2817502, records of 

ACSJ. 

41Memo,]. T. Forbes for Head. U.S. Survey Mission to SE Asia. 2 Aug 51. G - 3 091 Indochina. 

RG 319. 

-I1MarginaJ Note on Ltr. Heath to W. S. 13. L.'lcy. 3Jan 51. Lot 58D207. records of Dept of State. 

115 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

officers and enlisted men arrived in Saigon and took up temporary quarters at 

the Base Militaire. Col. P. J. Gillespie, who was senior to Colonel Harris, 

assumed temporary command, and at the end of the month the Department 

of Defense selected Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink as the commander. 43 

Few American officers had gained more experience in Asia than General 

Brink. Fifty-seven years old at the time of his appointment, he had served 

three years in the Philippines before World War II, and during the war he 

had been a military observer in Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma 

and then chief of the Operations Division of the Southeast Asia Command . 

As chief of the Army Advisory Staff in China in 1948 and 1949, he had 

witnessed the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's forces. Given that background, 

Genera l Brink, as he stepped from a plane at Tan Son Nh ut Airport on the 

outskirts of Saigon on 9 October 1950, likely had few illusions about the 

difficulty of his assignment. 

By that time the Military Assistance Advisory Group had grown to about 

65 officers and enlisted men and a civilian clerk. The Army section, headed 

by a colonel, was divided into five branches: Aid Supply, Transport, Technica l Services, Logistics, and Operations. Each branch was small, about 6 

officers and enlisted men. The single civilian, a clerk-stenographer borrowed 

from the American legation, was unequal to the large load of administrative 

paperwork genera ted by the group, and even after 6 more clerks were added 

in February 1951 the clerical and administrative staff remained too sma1l 44 

A serious consequence of the small staff was that the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group could not monitor adequately the distribu tion of military 

equipment. With no one assigned to that job, American officials had to rely 

on receipts furnished by the French. The advisory group's observation and 

supervision activities usually amounted to little more than obtaining a French 

signature for equipment and hoping that the equipment wou ld be distributed 

as agreed . 45 

The few men of the MAAG Army section worked as inspection teams to 

observe the use of American equipment by French and Vietnamese military 

units. According to the terms of the Penta lateral Mutual Defense Assistance 

Pact- signed by France, the United States, and the Associated States of 

Indochina on 23 December 1950---which set the ground rules for mili tary 

assistance, the French were to extend facilities to the advisory group "freely 

and fully to carry out their assigned responsibilities [for] observation of the 

progress and the technical use made of the assistance granted. ,,46 But French 

officials gave that provision a peculiar interpretation that made the Army 

inspections far from successful. They allowed no observation of units in 

° WAR 92946, 28 Sep SO, records of MAAG Indochina. RG 218. 

44Country Statement for 1951, USMAAG. Indochina, 12 Oct 5 1, records of MAAG Indochina, 

RG 218; Heath to Seey of State, 18 Jan 51, 751G.5MAP/l - 1851, and State Dept to Heath, 2 Feb 

51, 751G.5MAP/2 - 251, bo th in records of Dept of Stale. 

45Synopsis of Intcrv with Lt Col S. Fred Cummings, Logistics O fficer, MAAG Army Section, 1 

Nov 54, leS Historical Div files. 

46Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina, Treaties al/d Other 1"/erna/iOllal Acts 10 Which the 

United Stales Is a Party, Series 2447 (Washington, 1953), p. 4. 

116 
Establishing a Military Assistance Program 

combat operations, and inspections in 

the rear areas had to be arranged two 

months in advance. If th e request 

was approved, the American inspection team, usually an officer and an 

enlisted man, had to make a formal, 

aimost ceremonial inspection, with 

the entire unit turned out in formation. 47 A further complication was 

that few of the inspecting officers 

and noncommissioned office rs spoke 

French, and none spoke Vietnamese, 

so most questions and remarks had 

to be filtered through an interpreter. 

Under these circumstances, almost all 

units received ratings of "very good" 

or "excellent." 

[n contrast, the MAAG Air Force 

and Navy teams were far more critical of French methods of utilizin g aid General Brink 

equipment. French air and naval bases were located in secure areas, 

and their air and nava l cra ft norma lly opera ted from the same bases for 

weeks or months at a time. The use and maintenance of their equipment thus 

could be checked more adequately and more frequently. 

[n mid-1951 the Air Force section was reporting the "bad operational 

habits" of French mechanics, citing in pa rticular "the lack of appreciation of 

sa fety precautions, lack of respect for preventive maintenance," and the 

"standard French procedure of drinking whi le working.,,·8 Later in the year 

Air Force observers reported that French aircraft were so dirty that checking 

them thoroughly before and after fli g hts was impossible. Another report 

noted that insufficient maintenance was draining spare parts: "Under these 

conditions," the observers concl uded, "no amount of logistical support supplied [to the French] ... will greatly red uce the difficulties now being experienced by the French Air Force in maintaining sufficient aircraft at operational level.,,'9 Similarly, MAAG Navy inspectors reported in May 1952 that 

American vessels which had been turned over to the French in excellent 

condition were now rusty and dirty. The French sailors were also "sloppy 

and unkempt."so 

The problem of misuse of equipment was compounded by a tenuous 

supply line that stre tched halfway around the world. The advisory group 

often had to cope with unexpected s hortages or delays. During heavy fighting 

4'lCou ntry Statement for Presentation of 1954 MDA (Mutua l Defense Assistance) Program, 17 

Feb 53, records of MAAG Indochina, RG 218. 

411MDAP Monthly Rpl, Jun 51, Air Force Sec. records of MAAG Indochina, RG 218. 

49lbid " Nov and Dec 5 1, records of Dept of State . 

solbid .. May 52, records of Dept o f State. 

117 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

in 1951 around the town of Vinh Yen, for exa mple, Gene ral Brink had to fl y 

to Far East Command headquarte rs in Tokyo to obtain critica l supplies for the 

French . In June of that year, d uri ng fig hting in the town of Phat Diem, th e 

French sudde nly ran dangerously short of 105-mm. howitzer ammunition. 

Again Gene ral Brink fl ew to Tokyo to work o ut an emergency arrangement 

whereby the French would get ammunition directly from the stockpi les of the 

Far East Command . 51 

Keeping track of the large amount of eq uipment continually arri ving in 

Vietnam was even more difficult than coping with shortages. The equipment 

was shipped directly from the Un ited States, from Japan, from the Join t 

U.s. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Fra nce, and from other pa rts of 

Europe. Many shipments, especially those from o utside th e Un ited States, 

were so inadequately documented that the MAAG personnel cou ld not identify exactly w here they came from. 52 

Moreove r, despite repeated requests, the French refu sed to produce any 

detailed accou nting of the American equi pment they had received from 

sources other than the continental United States. 53 Because of an archaic 

record-kee ping system, they were perhaps simply unable to prov ide the 

de tailed information needed . The first MAAG logistics office r, Lt. Col. S. Fred 

Cummi ngs, Jr., for example, discovered to his surprise that the French had 

no stock-control system. "Requisitions were filled ," he noted, "without giving 

recognition to previous unfilled requests." By pa rceling out his six enlisted 

men to th e principal French supply depots, Cummings succeeded in a few 

months in establishing at least a makeshift stock-control system. "" 

Another principal MAAG function was to screen aid requests from the 

French in the light of criteria established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by 

budget ceilings, and by authorized force levels. Yet the group had little 

information to use in evaluating French requests, since the French from 1951 

through 1953 never discussed their strategic plans with the Ame rica ns. "We 

were not too certain just what program the French and Associated States had 

for Indochina," recalled Colonel Cummings. "They never even provided us 

with an order of battle."ss 

When they received a draft program or request from the French, American 

officers would carefully revi ew it, blue-pencil questionable items, and then 

ask the French to provide more information on those items.

56 Yet even when 

the information did not come, American examiners seldom went so far as to 

delete an item. "When there was doubt," o ne officer recalled, "material was 

left in the program."57 

51rbid., ]un 51, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

52Jnspector General's Rpt, Apr 51, MAAG Indochina, 54, Tab F, RG 218. 

53lbid . 

54lnterv with Cummings, 1 Nov 54. 

55fbid . 

56William J. Donova n, Report on Indochina, 1952, in Donovan Papers, RC 84, Box 5, records of 

Oe~t of State; sec also Interv with Cummings, 1 Nov 54. 

5 Synopsis of Intcrv with Maj H . L. 51. Onge, Adj uta nt to Cen Brink, 24 Oct 54, JCS Historicill 

Oiv fi les. 

118 
Establishillg a Military Assistallce Program 

Even that ligh t-handed policy failed to satisfy the French. In Jan uary 1951, 

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, then commander in chief in Indochina, 

heatedly complained to Minister Heath that subordinate MAAG officers were 

requiring "excessive justification" for French aid requests. Many of the French 

req uests had been turned down, he said, and the Americans "appeared to 

have lost interest in Indochina." They now seemed to be "more interested in 

arming Europe." After a thorough investiga tion, Gene ral Brink could find no 

evidence to substantiate de Lattre's charges. As far as he could determine, no 

member of the ad visory group had ever refused to consider French requests 

for military equipment. 58 

Genera l de Lattre's accusation was but a symptom of French suspicion 

and resentment. The Military Assistance Advisory Group was a continuing 

reminder that the French could no longer go it alone in Southeast Asia. It was 

also tangible evidence to the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians that 

their French patrons were themselves dependent upon a far more powerful patron, one that might someday replace the French as protectors of 

Indochi na. Even before the last contingents of the advisory group had 

arrived, the French commander in chief at the time, General Carpen tie r, had 

already complained that the group was too large. He was, Consul Gullion 

noted, at best lukewarm over the prospect of America n aid .'9 

The refusal of the French to recognize the importance, or even the necessity, of an ad ivsory group hindered all aspects of the group's operations. The 

American headquarters building, for example, at 284 Rue Cai May in the 

Cholon secti on of Saigon, was old and inadequate. The rickety five-story 

structure was located next door to a brothel much favored by troops of the 

French foreign legion. Around fi ve o'clock each afternoon the noise in th e 

crowded Rue Cai May wou ld rise to a crescendo as trucks and busloads of 

legionnaires trooped into the house. 60 

No billets were provided for officers, enlisted men, or dependents. Members of the advisory group lived in old hotels described by the embassy as 

unfit to live in and bad for the morale, efficiency, and health of the personnel 

billeted in them 6 ' The Army inspector general noted that billeting facilities in 

Vietnam for enlisted men without dependents were especially poor and that 

medical support for dependents was almost nonexistent except for that provided by loca l civilian doctors 62 When Minister Heath raised the question of 

more adequate housing with the French high commissioner, he was gruffl y 

asked, "Yours is a rich country, why don' t you bu ild houses?,,63 

In a host of minor ways the French made life diffi cult for the advisory 

group. The entire cost of renovating and remodeling the headquarters, for 

SlIHeath to State Dept, 9 Jan 51, 751G.5MAP/1 - 951, records of Dept of Stale. 

59MDA P Monthly Rpt, Ocl 50, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

(,°Interv, author with Col Donald W. Dunn, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired), Aide to Cen Brink, 

Be thesda, Md. , 27 May 80, H istorians fi les, eMH. 

6!Gullion to Stale Dept, 7 Sep 51, 7S'IGMAP/9 - 75 1, records of Dept of Siale. 

('2 lnspector General's Rpt, FY 53, 12 May 53, RG 218. 

('3Te lg, Heath to Secy of State, 15 Ma y 51, Department of State, Foreigll RelntiollS of tile Ullited 

States, 1951, vol. 6, Asia milt the Pacific. ParI f (Washi ngton, 1977), p. 419. 

119 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

example, was charged to the Americans even though the French retained title 

to the property. The French also billed the United States lor such items as 

telephones, other utilities, and jan itorial services, despite Minister Heath's 

protest that these items were normally charged against the governments 01 

countries receiving American aid. 64 The French also imposed a stiff luxury tax 

and an import duty on such equipment as lans, washing machines, and 

refrigerators, even though the items were the property 01 the advisory group 

rather than of individuals. 

After Genera l de Lattre a rrived and the Communists opened large-scale 

olfensives in the fa ll and winter 01 1950, the French attitude underwent 

some change. Consul Gullion attributed the change to "recognition that the 

recent Viet Minh assaults were repulsed only with [the help 01] American 

weapons." In public statements, General de Lattre duly credited the part 

played by American military equipment in the victories at Vinh Yen and Mao 

Khe. Alter a time de Lattre even conceded to the Americans the right to 

know some details of his tactical plans, a concession never made by his 

predecessors. Yet once the lirst flush 01 those victories passed, General de 

La ttre and his staff came to adopt a "somewhat more grudging attitude 

toward U.S. aid. "6s De Lattre was heard to remark that Minister Heath "was 

a dupe, presen ting an honest lace while all sorts of American machinations 

were transpiring behind our backs." The American legation observed that 

"we are confronted with a sudden access of suspicion and objection to 

America n operations and policy in Vie tnam."" In April 1951 de Lattre told 

Heath that there were "entirely too many Americans in Indochina." He 

placed the figure at around 700, more than three times the actua l number 6 7 

De Lattre directed much of his hostility and suspicion at an American 

group known as the Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM). The 

purpose 01 this mission was to "provide d irect support to the FrancoVietnamese lorces" through a variety 01 social, medical, technical, and civil 

works programs. Its varied projects included road repair, bridge construction, 

public hea lth, agricultural assista nce, land reclamation, and technica l training. 

Unlike milita ry aid projects, STEM projects were negotiated d irectly with the 

governments of the Associated States, and they were administered join tly by 

the Americans and those governments. 

That direct contact between American and Vietnamese officials worried 

French authorities. Some members of the special mission, they asserted, 

"may have been taken in by the more extreme nationalists."" STEM technicians and administrators did tend to be considerably less sympathetic to the 

problems of the French, and more concerned with promoting the sell-reliance 

of the Baa Dai government than were members 01 the advisory group 69 The 

MHea th to State Dept, 1"1 May 51, 751GMA P/S - 11 51, records of Dept of State. 

6sMDAP Mon thly Rpt, Mar 51, records of Dept of State. 

66Heath to State Dept, 8 Mar 5 1, 851G. OO/3 - 85 1, records of Dept of State. 

67MDAP Monthly Rpt, Apr 51, records of Dept of State. 

68Ibid" May 51, records of Dept of State. 

69lnterv, author with Austin Ivory, International Division, Office of Management and Budget, 8 

120 
Establishil1g a Military Assistal1ce Program 

sheer size and expense of many STEM projects also were disconcerting to the 

French. In the Cholon area of Saigon, for example, the mission built a 

demonstration low-cost housing project, the Cite Nguyen Tri Phuong, with 

over a thousand housing units, forty-four commerica l buildings, a school, a 

dispensary, and a police station. That kind of project, the French complained, 

"belittled them in the eyes of the Vietnamese.,,7o When the French tried 

to counter STEM infl uence with whispering campaigns and with planted 

anti-American articles in the controlled local press, the resu lting general 

atmosphere of jea lousy and suspicion only complicated the task of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group to establish effective Franco-American 

cooperation. 

In Washington, meanwhile, the National Security Council had established 

an interdepartmental Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee in 1950 to develop 

basic policy guidelines for all American assistance to Southeast Asia. The 

committee was primarily a consultative group. It monitored the workings of 

the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the Economic Aid and the 

Technical Assistance ("Point 4") Programs administered by the Economic 

Cooperation Administration. The Aid Policy Committee had no direct operational responsibility for any of those programs, but it was responsible for 

ensuring that major policy directives in regard to Southeast Asia aid programs 

were carried OUt. ?1 

Milita ry assista nce for Southeast Asia was also subj ect to the supervision 

of the interagency Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee, which 

directed all American military assistance abroad. The relationship between 

this committee and the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee was never 

clearly spelled out, but the latter exercised a vague mandate to ensure that 

the military assistance programs implemented by the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee prod uced no unfavorable political repercussions 72 Within the Department of Defense the military assistance program 

was administered by the Office of Military Assistance under the direction of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With the completion of these arra ngements in Washington, the mechanics of American aid were settled, yet many 

observers wondered whether French forces in Indochina, with Chinese Communist troops just to the north , would survive long enough to benefit from 

that aid. 

Mar 74, Historians files, CMH; see also Memo, Deputy Ass! Seey of State, Far Eastern Affairs, for 

Asst Seey, 27 Jul 51, Dept of State, Foreigl1 Relatiolls, 1951; Asia fwd the Pacific, Part /, 6:463. 

70MDAP Monthly Rpl, Mar 51; Rpt of Mutual Security Evaluation Team, Ju n 54, records of 

Bu reau of the Budget. 

71Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee, Meeting of 13 Jul SO, files of Office of Philippine and 

Southeast Asian A ffairs, RG 59. 

n lbid. 

121 

Defeats in Tonkin, Deliberations in 

Washington 

7 

The period from October 1950 to Februa ry 1951 was a time of shock and 

anxious deliberation for American leaders. A series of powerful Viet Minh 

attacks in Vietnam brought the French to the ve rge of defea t at the very time 

that Ame rica n forces in Ko rea were fi ghting desperately to halt the ad va nce 

of massed Chinese armies. These crises not only increased American concern 

for the security of Vie tnam but also led a few leaders to question the ve ry 

logic and feasibility of th e U.S. commitment there. 

The Ko rean War broke o ut on 27 Ju ne 1950, three weeks after the United 

States announced its aid program for Indochina. Some observers have seen 

that war as an important factor in the shaping of American policy toward 

Vietnam, but the basic decisions related to that policy had alread y been 

made. The Korea n War thus led to a change in degree rather than kind in 

the Ame rican commitment to Southeast Asia. I Although the basic assumptions behind America n aid to the French rema ined unchanged, the aid itself 

in creased dramatically. O n th e first day of the North Korea n attack, President 

Truman orde red an acceleration and increase in aid to Indochina, and on 30 

June, the day that U.S. groun d troops were committed to combat in Korea, 

eight C- 47 transports a rrived in Saigon with the first shi pments of American 

mate riel fo r the French. By 31 July milita ry supplies sufficient to equip twelve 

infantry battalions were en rou te by ship to Vietnam.

2 

Yet time was running out. The Viet Minh were being heavily aided and 

sup ported by the Chinese People's Liberation Army. By the summer of ]950 

"substantial and increasing quantities of small arms" and "large consign-

'Indeed, it might be argued that America n apprehensions about Vietnam in the months 

preced ing the North Korean invasion had tended to cause American officials to underrate the 

danger to South Korea. In March 1950, for example, the Army G - 2, Maj. Gen . Alexander R. 

Bolling, had predicted that Communist military moves in Korea "will be held in abeyance 

pending the outcome of their program in other areas, particularly Sou theast Asia." See J<lmes F. 

Schnabel, Policy alld Directioll: Tile First Year, United States Army in the Korea n Wa r (Washington, 

1972), p. 63. 

2MDAP Status Rpt, Jul 50, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

123 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

ments of a rtillery pieces, 'bazookas,' and anti-aircraft guns" were reaching the 

Vie t Minh forces by land from Kwa ngsi Province and by sea from Chinesecontrolled Hainan Island in the Gulf of To nkin . The Chinese were active also 

in the repair and construction of land communica tions leading into Vietnam.

3 

In la te Ma rch 1950 the French had reported that all majo r roads leading from 

China to Tonkin had been repaired , and tha t one had been banked for 

high-speed traffic. 4 

By mid-1950 the Vie t Minh a rmy had grown to a force of some 250,000 

men organized in three components: regula r forces, regional units, and popula r, o r irregular, forces. The regula r forces, with an estimated strength of 

120,000, we re organized into divisions, each consisting of three infantry regiments, an a rtillery ba ttalion, an antiaircraft ba tta lio n, and staff and support 

elements. The regula r army's mission was exclusively offensive. All defensive 

and security ta sks were assigned to the regional and popula r troops. 

Vo Nguyen Giap, who now bore the formal titles of General of the Army, 

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense, was 

assisted by Chief of Staff Maj. Gen . Hoang Van Thai and a general staff tha t 

included Maj. Gen . Van Tien Dung as politica l commissa r. The entire coun try 

was split into three main divisions: Tonkin on the north, Annam in central 

Vie tnam, and Cochinchina in the south . These were subdivided into regions 

o r secto rs, and still smaller " fronts." Each front commande r exercised direct 

operational control over units in his area. 5 

Each province and district was responsible for raising and equipping its 

own units of regional troops, w ho served as a cadre and sometimes as a 

gene ral reserve for the regular a rmy. These regional troops also served as a 

link between the popula r forces and the regula r troops and we re responsible 

for the milita ry training of the popula r forces. Th e latter constituted a kind of 

village militia. Una rmed or lightly armed , they were mainly assigned to such 

duties as intelligence, transport, and sabotage. A be tter a rmed element of th e 

popular forces, the Dall Quail du Kid z, or "elite irregula rs," was equipped 

w ith rifles, g renades, mines, and a few automatic weapons. It took pa rt w ith 

the regional forces in local ope rations. The French estimated tha t the regional 

forces had a strength of about 40,000 and the a rmed loca l forces about 85,000, 

but those estima tes were almost certainly low· 

Altho ugh the Chinese refrained from sending major units to Vietnam and 

failed to provide the Viet Minh with appreciable numbers of the more sophisticated weapons in the ir arsenal, the ir assistance was of great value to Ho Chi 

Minh's forces. An estima ted 15,000 Chinese ad visers and technicians helped 

to train and organize the Vie t Minh regula rs, and Vie tnamese troops used 

training installa tions and a rtillery ranges at Ching hsi and Paise in Kwangsi 

JArms Supply to Viet Minh Forces, 8 Aug SO, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

"Uri U.S. Army Attache, Paris, to ACofS G- 2, 5 Apr 50, sub: Situation in Indochina, C - 2 ID 

file 653146. 

5Yiet M inh Military Forces, 15 Jan 51, G - 2 ID fil e 761741; Viet Minh Armed Forces Order of 

Battle and H igh Command, 6 Feb 51, G - 2 10 file 643165. 

&rhe Viet Minh Army, FEC (Far East Command) Intelligence Digest, 16 - 30 Nov 50, FEC 

records; Appendix to National Intelligence Estimate, N IE- 35, 7 Aug 51, VI:476. 

124 
Defeats ill Tonkill, Deliberations ill Washillgton 

Province inside China ? Equally helpful were the large quantities of military 

equipment that the Chinese did make available . The French estimated that in 

one month the Viet Minh had received 50,000 rifles, 150 automa tic rifles, 95 

machine guns, 30 mortars, 32 75-mm. fie ld guns, 8 37-mm. g uns, and 4 

130-mm. fi eld g uns.s 

The re was a sense of growing danger in both Ame rica and France. In 

March the French Chiefs of Staff Committee had recommended a regrouping 

of French forces " for the p urpose of avoiding the present risk of a military 

catastrophe in case of intensified external aggression ."· The isola ted and 

exposed French posts along the Chinese borde r, however, had no t been evacua ted , alleged ly because High Commissioner Pignon and Gene ral Alessa nd ri 

feared a " loss of face ." 'o By June 1950 U.S. Army intelligence warned tha t " in 

a yea r's time it is quite possible tha t Vie t Minh ca pabilities will be sufficiently 

enhanced throug h receipt of Chinese communist aid tha t the French may be 

forced out of northe rn Ind ochina." " At the end of August the Joint Intell igence Committee gene rally endorsed the Melby-Erskine survey team's warning about the milita ry situa tion in Vietnam and pred icted a large-scale Viet 

Min h a ttack some time after the first of Septembe r. 12 

Th e catastro phe feared by the French Chiefs of Staff Committee came in 

the autumn of 1950. O n 18 Septembe r Viet Minh fo rces, supported by newly 

acquired a rtille ry and morta rs, overran a French fortress at Dong Khe on the 

Chinese frontie r. A few days la te r a French fo rce of almost 4, 000 men was 

comple tely destroyed in a series of Vie t Minh ambushes along the frontie r 

near the town of Cao Ba ng. One by one, the other isola ted French posts 

along the border were ca ptured by the Viet Minh or we re abandoned in panic 

by their ga rrisons. The French lost as many as 6,000 men killed or captured 

and ove r 10,000 riAes, mortars, and machine guns.

13 

The frontie r between China and Vietnam, U.S. Minister Heath observed , 

" ha s ceased to exist." He predicted tha t the Viet Minh would soon " be able 

to hurl tank-led plane-covered assaul t[s] against" the populo us a reas of northern Vie tnam . 14 The American consul in H anoi wa rned that "unless reinforcements in the form of mobile battalions are provided, the re is danger American 

7Am Consul, Hanoi, to Dept of State, 10 Oct SO, G - 2 ID file 728 120; CIA Information Rpt. sub: 

Sino - Viet Minh M ilitary Activities, 22 Nov SO, G - 2 IO file 652 176; Ltr, Col Hamilton H . Howze 

to Maj Cen A. C. Short, 20 Dec 51. G- 2 350.05 Indochina, records of ACSI; O'Ball ance, TIle 

11/do-Chino War, 1945 - 1954, p. 11 6. 

AArms Supply to Viet M inh, Incl to Jes 1992/22, 11 Sep SO, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

'>lOossier 0, Notes de C. Cheysson, A: Jugements sur la situation politique et militaire en 

Indochinc au debut de 1954. [French documents collected by Dr. Trumbull Higgins duri ng his 

research in France and presented to the Center of M ilitary History in 1975. Hereafter cited as 

French Documents Coll ec tion . I 

lOUr, U.S. A rmy A ttache, Paris, to ACofS G - 2, 8 N ov 50, sub: Indochina, 5 - 83 - 50, records 

of ACSI. 

Il probable Developments in the Far East in 1950, 6 Jun 50, G - 2, GSUSA, OPS 092 Asia, 10 

Ap c SO, RG 319. 

12History of Indochina Incident, 1940 - 1954, p. 175, manuscript in JCS Historical Div files. 

IJO'Ballance, Tile illrio-Cililla War, 1945 - 1954, p. 118. 

14Telg, M inister at Saigon to Secy of State, 17 Oct SO, records of Dept of State; ibid ., 15 Oct SO, 

Dept of State, Foreign Relatiolls, 1950: East Asia anri tile PaCific, 6:894. 

125 
Advice atld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

arms may fall into the hands of the Vietminh ."15 A young French Army 

officer described the civilian population in Hanoi and Haiphong as being " in 

a psychosis of fear."16 In the absence of any official government information 

on the military situation, rumors multiplied and most people had only the 

Viet Minh radio as their source of news. 17 

Yet the French, whether they knew it or not, were being afforded a 

breathing spell . The Viet Minh high command was unable to take full adva ntage of its successes at this time beca use of shortages of supplies and the 

need to train more troops. The next big offensive would have to await the 

correction of these deficiencies. 18 

The French defeats puzzled some American leaders. Meeting with President Truman at Wake Island, the head of the Fa r East Command, General of 

the Army Douglas MacArthur, observed , " the French have 150,000 of their 

best troops there with an officer of the highest reputation in command .... 1 

cannot understand why they do not clean it up. They should be able to do so 

in four months yet we have recently seen a debacle .... They have the 

flower of the French Army in Indochina and they are not fighting." The 

president replied, " I cannot understand it either.,,' 9 The U.S. Army's chief of 

staff, General J. Lawton Collins, went further, saying that it appeared that 

" France will be driven out of Indochina, at the very least out of Tonkin and 

they are wasting men and equipment trying to remain there ."'o 

American military observers closer to the scene took a less pessimistic 

view. The newly appointed chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory 

Group, General Brink, for example, attributed the French reverses to poor 

intelligence, improvement of the Viet Minh forces, static French defensive 

dispositions, a lack of coordination between air and ground forces, and failure 

to organize forces larger than battalions. These factors, however, were not 

insurmountable. He still expected the French to be able to hold the HanoiHaiphong delta area " if adequate military aid arrives within [the] next two 

months and French forces in Tonkin receive an additional 9 battalions and are 

reorganized and properly trained as the French plan."" 

Increasing Aid and Continuing Debate 

The shattering defeats in Tonkin produced calls for additional America n 

military aid. On 12 October French Defense Minister Jules Moch told 

'SAm Consul, Hanoi, to State Dept, 27 Oct SO, 75IG.OO/l 0 - 2750, records of Dept o f State. 

16Ltr, Bernard de Lattre to Cen Jean de laUre, 6 Nov SO, de laUre Papers (in the possession of 

Madame Ja Marechale de laUre de Tassigny, Paris). 

I?CJA Information Rpt 54624, 16 Nov SO, sub: Politica l and Military Situation in Tonkin, G - 2 

10 file 750342. 

18lbid. 

19Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference, 15 Oct SO, Department of State, 

Foreign Relations of tile United States, 1950, vol. 7, Korea (Washing ton, 1976), p. 957. 

lOU.S. Min of U.S.-U.K. Political-Military Conversations, 26 Oct 50, Department of State, 

Foreign RelatiOlIS of tile United States, 1950, vol. 3, Westeru Europe (Wa shington, 1977), p. 1696n. 

2lMsg, Chief, MAAG, to CofSA, Saigon 763, 4 Nov SO, U.S.-Vietnam Relatiolls, 8:408; MDAP 

Monthly Rpt, Oct SO, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

126 
Defeats ill TOllkill, Deliberatiolls ill Washillgtoll 

officials of the Defense Department that the current level of American aid was 

inadequate to meet the increased threat in Vietnam. Moch pressed for faster 

delivery of American equipment already programmed and for immediate 

transfer of two squadrons of B-26 light bombers. He a lso stressed the French 

need to know as soon as possible the exact size and nature of the military aid 

program planned by the United States. On 23 October President Truman and 

Budget Director Frederick J. Lawton agreed to a military aid program of $33 

million. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised that B- 26 bombers 

could not materially affect the situation in Vietnam, the program included, at 

the instigation of the secretaries of state and defense, w ho were anxious to 

bolster French mora le, twenty-one B- 26 aircra ft already en route to the Far 

East Air Forces?2 These commitments made the size of the military aid 

program for Indochina second only to the support for American combat 

forces in Korea. 

To Minister Heath and other Americans in Vietnam, the decision on future 

aid ca lled for a grea ter American voice in French politica l and military policy 

toward Vietnam. As Heath noted, information supplied by the French to the 

legation during the course of the military reverses had been fragmentary, 

tardy, and misleading. The French command, for example, had continued to 

deny that Cao Bang had been abandoned long after it had fallen. 23 "Nowhere 

else in the world ," Heath remarked in November, " have we been willing to 

spend the sums and make the effort now required [in Vietnam] without 

substantial and continuing opportunities to influence [the] directions and 

course of national enterprises we are supplementing."24 

Although Heath had no desire for America ns to assume management of 

the war, he did believe that an advisory and consultative role was a necessity. 

He wanted Genera l Brink, as chief of the new Military Assistance Advisory 

Group, Indochina, to act as an unofficial and unadvertised adviser to the 

French high command, while the American legation similarly advised the 

French high commissioner and the Bao Dai government. Yet such a relationship with the United States was precisely what the French were determined 

to avoid . It would be years before any French government would be willing 

to consider the type of relationship in Vietnam proposed by Heath.

25 

In the meantime, officials in Washington were becoming increaSingly concerned about the slow pace of progress towa rd self-government for the Associated States of Indochina. A conference between France and th e Associated 

States had been in session at Pau, France, since June. Under the provisions of 

the Elysee Agreements, it was to determine the scope and nature of authority 

to be exercised by France and the Associated States in such areas as communica22Acheson to Frederick Lawton, 20 Oct SO, records of Dept of State; Memo, JCS for Secy of 

Defense, 13 Oct 50, C - 3 091 Indochina, RC 3 19; Memo, Cen Lyman Lemnitzer for Dir, MDA, 

51ale Depl,16 Ocl SO, jC5 1992132, 16 Ocl 50, CC5 092 As;. (6 - 25 - 48), sec. 6. 

2.1MDAP Monthly Rpt, Oct 50; Heath to Secy o f Sta te, 13 Oct 50, Dept of State, ForeiK" 

Re/at;ol1s, 1950: Easl Asia al1d Ihe Pacific, 6:890 - 93. 

2"Telg, Minister at Saigon (Heath) to Secy of Slate, 15 Nov SO, Dept of Siale, Foreig" Rc1atiolls, 

1950: Easl Asia alld the PaCIfic, 6:922. 

2.'> lrving. TIle First /"docllilla War. pp. 102 - 06, passim . 

127 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

tions, fo reign trade, and customs, but the meeting had dragged on with 

increasing acrimony and with little apparent progress. In September the 

American legation in Saigon had reported that the " net effect" of the conference thus far had been "a serious erosion of public confidence in the 'Bao Oai 

formula' among the Vietnamese. ,,26 

Bao Oai himself was again in Europe, ostensibly to guide the conduct of 

his ministers at the Pau negotiations, but on the eve of his departure for Pau, 

the emperor had been extremely pessimistic in a meeting with Consul General Gullion and the head of the U.S. Economic Aid Mission to Indochina, 

Robert Bl um . He had received his two visitors dressed in Vietnamese clothes 

instead of his usual European business suit, a sure sign, according to Gullion, 

that he was severely depressed . The emperor said that he no longer believed 

that the French had any intention of ever relinquishing their hold on Vietnam 

and that the measures they had taken thus far had been a sham. "'This 

independence, what is it? Where is it? Do you see it? Is a government 

independent without a budget?' ,,27 

Most American officials continued to see the solution in Vietnam as political. 28 After conducting a detailed study for the joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded that "in view of the unrest in 

Indochina, any military victory over the Communists would be temporary in 

natu re. The long-term solution to the unrest in Indochina lies in sweeping 

political and economic concessions by France." Urging that the United States 

employ every possible pressure to convince the French to make concessions, 

the committee noted that "the more aid and assistance furnished to France 

before reforms are undertaken, the less the probability that France of its own 

accord will take the necessary action.,,29 

The committee warned against even a minor commitment of American 

military forces in Vietnam lest pressures build up for additional commitments. 

Although Indochina was "of some strategic importance to the United States, " 

the committee noted, it was not important enough, in view of the current 

Soviet threat, to warrant the United States' intervening and "dissipa ting its 

forces." Should Communist China intervene, said the committee, the French 

should bring the matter before the United Nations. 3O 

The view of the joint Strategic Survey Committee reflected a common 

concern among American policy makers during the early months of the Korean 

War: that the Communist attack in Korea might be but the prelude to a series 

of worldwide military moves engineered or conducted by the Soviet Union." 

26MDAP Monthl y Rpt No.2 for Sep 50, 6 Nov SO, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

27Telg, Charge at Saigon to Seey of State, 18 Jun SO, Dept of State, Foreign Relatiolls, 1950: East 

Asia and the Pacific, 6:824. 

~ee, for example, Secy of State (Acheson) to Am Legation, Saigon, 1 Sep SO, records of Dept 

of State, and Memo, Cen Omar Bradley for Seey of Defense, 7 Sep 50, sub: Indochina, CCS 092 

Asia (6 - 25 - 48), sec. 6, JCS records. 

29Rpt, JSSC to JCS, 7 OCI SO, sub: Possible Future Action in Indochina, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 

319. 

3Olbid. 

31Smith, Achesoll, p. 184; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sen Wnr ill Koren 

(Annapolis: U.s. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 34; Schnabel, Policy nlld Directioll, p. 67. 

128 
Defeats in Tonkin, Deliberations ill Washington 

Many experts therefore believed that the obvious course for the United States 

would be to husba nd its military resources for the eventual showdown with 

Russia, not to expend its resources in other peripheral involvements. The 

acting director of the State Department's Office of International Security 

Affairs, john H. Ohly, for example, called for a "reappraisal of U.S. policy 

with respect to Indochina." Continuing the current policy toward Indochina, 

said Ohly in November, wou ld probably require some $500 million in military 

equipment in the immediate future and more later. Providing that level of 

aid would have a substantial impact on U.S. military assistance to Western 

Europe, Greece, Turkey, and Iran and could well make it impossible to fu lfill some mutual defense goals in these areas. 32 Accordingly, Ohly maintained that the United States had to decide its long-term objective for 

Indochina. "Was it long-run, non-communist control of the area, temporary 

non-communist control, or simply a continuance of the present situation?" 

Once that goal was defined, planners would have to answer other questions. 

Were enough manpower and equipment available to attain U.S. objectives? 

Did the French and Vietnamese have the necessary will, morale, and leadership to continue the fight, and, most important, would it be possible to 

"prevent a political deterioration which will nullify any accomplishments in 

the military field?,,33 Ohly subsequently called for a task force of the National 

Security Council to study the subject. 34 

Yet other analysts emphasized the possible consequences of a French 

defeat. While noting that Indochina would be of little importance in a global 

conflict, U.S. Army planners in October 1950 maintained that it was "of 

critical, if not vital, strategic importance to the United States in the Cold 

War." They reiterated the oft-expressed belief that " the loss of Indochina to 

the Communists could initiate a train of events that could dea l a staggering 

blow to our position in the whole of Asia," leading to the fall of Burma 

and probably Thailand. Their fa ll in turn would place Indonesia and the 

Philippines in an extremely tenuous position and directly threaten India and 

Pakistan.

35 So important did Army Chief of Staff j. Lawton Collins consider 

Indochina that he recommended to the joint Chiefs of Staff that " if all fa ils 

the United Sta tes [should] be prepared to commit its own armed forces to the 

defense of Indo-China provided this could be done in concert with other 

United Na tions members and withou t endangering the U.S. capability to 

conduct a general war."36 

Further pointing up the contradictions in the view of American policymakers, the joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum prepared as a suggested 

statement of U.s. policy, emphasized the strategic importance of Indochina to 

the United States in the cold war bu t wa rned that the United Sta tes should 

]2Memo, Ohly for Seey of State, 20 Nov SO, sub: Reappraisal of U.S. Policy With Respect to 

Indochina, records of Dept of State . 

)3Ibid. 

MUr, Ohly to Seey of Sla te, 16 Jan 51, records of Dept of State. 

JSDraft Study, G - 3 Plans Div, 17 Oct 50, sub: Indochina, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

36Memo, CofSA, 18 Oct 50, sub: Possible Future Action in Indochina, leS 1992129, 7 Oct SO, 

CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48), sec. F, JCS records. 

129 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

French Officer trains Vietnamese Army troops 10 use 57-111111 . recoilless rifle. 

not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China. 

The Joint Chiefs repeated earlier calls for pressure on France to eliminate its 

policy of colonialism and for an accelerated program of self-government, but 

at the same time they worried that France might abandon its military position 

in Indochina . 37 

In commenting on the memorandum, the State Department's Office of 

Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs suggested that the recent French 

reverses in Vietnam were due mainly to the extensive military assistance 

which the Viet Minh had received from China and minimized the importa nce 

of popular support of the government by the Indochinese people. "The 

history of [Communist] sa tellites has proven, " that office noted, "that they 

were established without 'popular support. ' To therefore state ca tegorically 

that popular support of an anti-Communist government is essential may not 

be entirely correct.,,38 

The position of the two sides was thus paradoxica l, with the political 

agency stressing the importance of military actions and the military agency37Memo, JCS for Seey of Defense (Marshall), 28 Nov SO, sub: Possible Future Action in 

Indochina, Dept o f State, Foreigll Relntiolls, 1950: Ensf Asia alld the Pacific, 6:945 - 48. 

38Memo, Rober' E. Hoey for Ambassador-ai-large Oessup), 27 Dec SO, sub: Our Comments on 

NSC 64/1, Dept of State, Foreign Relatiolls, 1950: East Asia alld the PaCific, 6:956 - 58. 

130 
Defeats in Tonkin , Deliberations in Washington 

the joint Chiefs-stressing the political. Another illustration of that paradox 

occurred in january, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Livingston T. 

Merchant observed, after noting Ohly's call for a policy reassessment, that 

" the joint Chiefs of Staff are the proper arbiters of the military aspects of the 

problem and [they] have in fact resolved it by approving an expanded aid 

program for Indochina. .. I see no point in reopening the debate or even in 

troubling the Secretary [of state] abou t it.,,39 Merchant's note, in effect, left to 

the military the essentially political question of whether there should be aid 

for Indochina and how much it should be. 

Toward a Vietnamese Army 

The one point on which all American leaders could agree was a need to 

form indigenous national armies in the Associated States of Indochina, 

particularly in Vietnam. Si nce the disasters at Cao Bang and elsewhere had 

pOinted up the limits of France's military resources, Minister Heath and the 

State Department argued , a strong Vietnamese army was the only alternative 

to either a French defeat or the commitment of American troops'o The 

Erskine-Melby mission had already made weapons and equipment for a 

Vietnamese army a high priority, second only to filling shortages in the 

French Expeditionary Corps'l 

Although the French in 1948 and 1949 had taken a few faltering steps 

in the direction of a Vietnamese army, and sometimes referred to " the armed 

forces of the Associated States," the French high command retained sole 

responSibility for the conduct of operations and for interna l security in 

Vietnam'2 In May 1950 the existing Vietnamese forces numbered only about 

16,000 regulars. There were no higher headquarters or staffs, and only about 

three battalions were officered exclusively by Vietnamese. The French program called for twelve battalions to be activated by the end of 195043 French 

attitudes toward the project were well illustrated by General Carpentier's 

reaction to a suggestion by General Erskine that the former increase the 

number of Vietnamese under arms. According to Erskine, Carpentier "threw 

up his hands and said 'they are absolutely unreliable; you can't trust them, 

they'd never make good soldiers.' I said, 'General Ca rpentier, who in hell are 

you fi ghting but Vietnamese I' ,,44 

3<JMemo, Merchant for Rusk, 17 Jan 51, records of Dept of State. 

4°Heath to State Dept, S Sep 50, 7S1C.OO/9 - 550, records of Dept of State. 

4lMemo, Col F. J. Gillespie, Chief. Army Section, MAAG, Indochina, for Lt Col Stern, 20 Mar 

51, records of MAAG Indochina. 

421rvi ng, The First /"doch jll(l War, pp. 92 - 93; Memorandum on the Relations Between the 

French Command and the Armed Forces o f the Associated States, lncl 1 to Army Attache, 

Sai?on, to ACofS G - 2, 21 Jul 50, OARMA 052, records of ACSL 

.. Acting A rmy Attache, Saigon, to ACofS G - 2, 51ul SO, sub: A rmies of the Associated States, 

50816930, G - 2 ID files . 

.... Erskine Interv, p. 174. 

131 
Advice and Support: Tire Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Prime Minister Huu With Emperor Bao Dai 

The Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee complained that 

the French had not brought the training and combat efficiency of the Vietnamese up to the level necessa ry for the latter to utilize the American military 

equipment being supplied to Vietnam. The committee recommended that the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon be instructed to inform Bao Oai 

that a favorable reception would be accorded to requests for United States 

training of Vietnamese forces.

45 Estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) supported the committee's view. In a briefing for Secretary of Oefense 

Marshall, the agency reported that although there were considerable risks in 

entrusting the inexperienced Vietnamese with full responsibility for their own 

affairs, they had nevertheless already demonstrated considerable "resourcefulness, fighting capability and capability for organization under Ho Chi Minh 

and ought to be able to do the same fighting against him. "'6 The CIA 

suggested that French participation in the development of an indigenous 

Vietnamese fighting force be limited to paid advisers and technicians operating within the framework of the Bao Oai government. 47 That type of arrange4SMemo, Maj Cen S. L. Scott for Cen Duff, Oep Asst G- 3, 17 Nov SO, G- 3 file 350 - 2. RG 

319. 

46Recent Developments in Asia, 12 Oct SO, G- 3 092 Pacific, RG 319. 

47JCS 1992132, 18 Oct SO, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 6, leS records. 

132 
Defeats ill TOllkill, Deliberatiolls ill Washingtoll 

ment was precisely what Bao Dai had sought since the previous March. Yet 

many Americans suspected-with good reason- that the French would never 

consent to such an arrangement or that, if they did, they would have that 

much less incentive to continue the war. Moreover, U.S. Army officia ls 

doubted whether the Vietnamese had the logistical and techn ical capability to 

handle the variety of weapons and equipment needed for their army. 

Faced with these conflicting considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a compromise: that American aid should continue to be delivered to 

the French "with s uch participation by the governments of Vietnam, Laos 

and Cambodia as the Secretary of State may deem wise."'8 This compromise 

in rea lity left effective control in the hands of the French with some nominal 

Vietnamese participation as window dressing. In practice, all equipment for 

the Vietnamese was turned over to the French, and the French commander in 

chief retained the right under the Pentalateral Agreement to divert that 

equipment to other uses if he found it necessary for mutual defense. Representatives of the Bao Dai government were seldom even present when the 

equipment for their forces was received at Saigon or Haiphong."9 

Adoption of the compromise demonstrated that, even in the fa ce of French 

defea ts, American military leaders were unwilling to risk a French pullout 

by openly backing an indigenous Vietnamese army. Minister Heath angrily 

observed that, if Indochi na was really vital to the defense of the West, the 

United States had only three options: to rely on the French to achieve a 

military victory (a d ubious possibility by late 1950), to help non-Communist 

Vietnamese form major military forces of their own, or to commit American 

troops as in Korea .

so Yet in 1950 few America ns were willi ng to accept such 

stark choices; instead, most continued to hope somehow to obta in the best of 

both worlds: a continued French military presence along with political and 

military independence for Bao Dai. 

It did seem for a time that the French, shaken by the autumn setbacks, 

were prepared to be more flexible. The Pau Conference concluded in November with apparent Significant concessions to the Vietnamese. Control of finances, communications, immigration, foreign trade, and customs, all of which 

previously had been administered directly by the French high commissioner 

for Indochina, was to be vested in a group of joint agencies composed of 

representatives of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and France. 

Although a step forward from the old colonial system, these concessions 

were in no sense a complete transfer of sovereignty to the Associated States. 

In a long report entitled Vietnam Is Not Actua lly Independent, Edmund 

Gullion, then the counselor of the American embassy in Sa igon, noted various factors which still circumscribed Vietnamese sovereignty, including compulsory members hip in the French Union, French control of milita ry equipment, guarantees of French private property, and compulsory monetary union 

-Il:Ilbid. 

49Memo, Gillespie for Stern, 20 Mar 51. 

"iOHeath to Siale Dept, 5 Sep SO. 

133 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

with Francesl The French had representatives on all the jOint agencies of the 

Associated States, and since most decisions of these agencies required a 

unanimous vote, the French could veto any proposal they disliked. Prime 

Minister Tran Van Huu had complained to American Minister Heath that 

" the mechanism of the commissions including French membership was illogical, unworkable, and ... would put more checks on Vietnamese freedom 

than had existed before."s2 

Nevertheless, many Americans still saw the Pau agreements as a sign of a 

new and more liberal French attitude toward Indochina. In addition, the U.S. 

Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were pleased by a French decision to take 

further steps toward the crea tion of an independent Vietnamese army. At 

Dalat on 8 December 1950 the French concluded a military convention with 

the Bao Dai government. Most of the officers and noncommissioned officers 

of the new Vietnamese National Army would be French, but they would 

wear Vietnamese uniforms and be subject to the order of the emperor, who 

would serve as supreme commander of the army. The great majority of 

Vietnamese officers and enlisted men then serving in the French Army were 

transferred to the Vietnamese Army during the following month . 

Like the Pau agreements, the Dalat military arrangements represented a 

step forwa rd but not nearly as big a step as the United States wanted. 

Significantly, even though the success of the Vietnamese Army would depend 

on substantial quantities of U.S. military aid, the United States had not been 

invited to participate in the Dalat discussions. That exclusion said much about 

the French view of the proper sphere of American activity in Indochina. 

SICullion to State Dept, 29 Jan 51, 751G.OO/1 - 2951, records of Oept of Stale. 

s2Am Legation, Saigon, to State Dept, 27 Jan 51, 751C.OO/l - 2751, records of Dept of Slate. 

134 
8 

The de Lattre Interlude, 1950- 1951 

Questions of political and military policy seemed less urgent in late 1950 than 

the problem of stemming the tide of French defeat in Tonkin. By November 

the chief of the Milita ry Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, Brig. Gen . 

Francis G. Brink, was reporting that the French would need nine additional 

battalions merely to hold their own in the Red River Delta and that a 

counteroffensive was "out of the question for the predictable future.,,1 Paris 

acted quickly to shore up its faltering army in Vietnam. During November 

and December reinforcements-including an armored regiment, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, a parachute battalion, two artillery battalions, and five 

battalions of colonial infantry from North Africa and Senegal-sailed for the 

Fa r East.' 

Yet the most important French "reinforcement" proved to be a new 

commander in chief, General Jea n de La ttre de Tassigny. Unlike General 

Carpentier, de Lattre also held the position of high commissioner and thus 

had both civil and military authority. A popular and romantic figure (he had 

taken part in one of the last cava lry charges in history), de Lattre had been 

the youngest general in the French Army at the beginning of World War !I. 

After esca ping from Vichy France in 1943 to join General de Gaulle, he had 

led the First French Army in its drive to the Rhine and the Danube 3 An 

American officer who knew the general well described de Lattre in 1950 as 

probably the chief military personality in France today .... Based on grade 

he ranks second of the five star generals. The fa ct that he commandea the 

First French Army has not been fo rgotten by the French people, nor have 

they been permitted to forget it. He has kept up his asssoClation with veterans organizations of the "Rhine Danube" Army on an extensive scale. By 

virtue of his post as commander Ground Forces, Western Europe he has kept 

IBrink to CofS, Arm y, 4 Nov SO, 751C .OO/11 - 450, records of Dept of Siale. 

2Ltr, Chi MAAG, France, to AeofS G - 3, 4 Dec SO, sub: French Reinforcements Scheduled for 

Indochina, MAAG 00618, copy in files of Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affa irs, RG 59. 

)Pierre Da rcourt, de Lattre till Viet Nom: Ulle Allllee de Victoires (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1964), p. 

38. 

135 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

on the move visiting various commanders, capitals and insta llations of Western European countries. . The majority of mili tary men in high position 

are his people . ... His appeal for th e average fre nch soldie r or civilian is 

compa rable to the appeal which Eisenhowe r and Patton have for the average 

American.

4 

De La ttre assiduously cu ltivated newsmen and often held off-the-record briefings and conversations with them. As a consequence, the American press 

usually treated him mo re favorably than other French officials in Indochina s 

De Lattre knew that his first task was to restore the morale and the 

shatte red confidence of the French forces in northern Vietnam. Disembarking 

from his plane at Hanoi in full-dress uniform, he d ramatically anno unced to 

reporters, " I am proud to again fi nd myself at th e head of a French army in 

battle. ,,6 He promptly canceled a planned evacuation of French civilians from 

Hanoi, installed his wife in the governor-general's palace, and left on a 

whirlwind to ur of the battlefront. Everywhere de Lattre galvanized the disorganized and d isoriented French into action, ruth lessly weeding out incompetents and inspiring others with his confidence and enthusiasm.

7 "His military 

tactics of blunt and occasionally brutal criticism of subordinates' actions," 

reported Ministe r Heath, " frequently resulted not in resentment but in the 

admiratio n and loyalty of the latter, who appreciated [his] courage, unremitting energy, ability and honesty. He is an effective orator and continually 

refers to the theme that Vietnam is at last free and that it is his task to protect 

this freedom."· In ad dition to restoring the morale of the Expeditiona ry 

Corps, de Lattre intended to reorganize French forces into more effective 

units, create an able Vietnamese Nati onal Army, use America n aid effiCiently, 

defend To nkin , and reca pture the initiative from the Viet Minh " 

Viet Minh Offensives in Tonkin 

D e Lattre had barely begun that ambitious program when the Vie t Minh launched a ma jor new offensive nea r th e town of Vinh Yen north of the 

Red River and northwest of Hanoi. If Vinh Yen fell, the road to Hanoi would 

be open. On 13 January 1951, two Viet Min h divisions attacked French 

strongpoints in and around the town, which were manned by abou t 6,000 

French troops. Gene ral de Lattre deployed all available reserves to reinforce 

Vinh Yen and employed almost all the French Air Force planes in the country. Aga inst Viet Minh troops attacking in human-wave assa ults, the French 

for the first time used America n-made napalm bombs. For four days fie rce 

fighting raged around the town . Vie t Minh strength rose to twenty-one 

battalions as Gia p fed in reinforcements, but the French superiority in avia4Ltr, Brig Ceo J. J. O'Hare to ACofS G-2, 20 Nov SO, sub: General de laUre de Tassigny's 

ASJ;irations in NATO, 5 - 93 - 50, G - 2 ID fi le 735636. 

Cf. Tilman Durdin, "Fighter on a M ission," New York Tillles Magazillc, 18 February 1954, pp. 

19 - 2J. 

(oUr, O' Hare to ACofS G - 2, 20 Nov 50, sub: General de L.,ltre Tassigny's Aspirations in NATO. 

7Durdin, "Fighler on a Mission," pp. 19 - 21. 

sHealh 10 State Dept, 14 Jan 51, 75 1G.OO/1- 1451, records of Dept of State. 

9De LaUre to Comitc de Defense Nationale, 17 Mar 51, de La ttre Papers. 

136 
Tile de Latlre interlllde 

tion and artillery proved decisive. When the Viet Minh withdrew on 17 

January, they left behind about 500 prisoners and some 1,500 dead on the 

battlefield. Yet French casualties were so heavy that de Lattre's forces were in 

no condition to fo llow up their success. One "mobile group" of three battalions, totalin g about 2,000 men, had su ffered 540 losses.'o 

The narrOw French victory at Vinh Yen wou ld have been impossible 

without the timely arrival of American weapons and equipment, particularly 

napa lm bombs and lOS-mm. howitzers. I I In a Single week during January 

1951 the French received from the Un ited States 20 M24 tan ks, 40 lOS-mm. 

howitzers, and 250 conventional bombs, as well as napalm bombs, lOS-mm. 

ammunition, automatic weapons, and small arms." At the height of the Vinh 

Yen battie, General Brink flew to Japan to arrange for direct shipment of war 

materials from the Far East Command to Vietnam. '3 

Two months after the attack at Vinh Yen, the Viet Minh moved against 

French garrisons around the coastal village of Mao Khe, some thirty kilometers northeast of Haiphong. Although outnumbered almost three to one, the 

French again repulsed the attack. Losses on both sides were high. Three 

French battalions sustained casualties of over 25 percent; the French took 483 

prisoners, and the Viet Minh left more than 1,500 bodies on the battlefield. 

As at Vinh Yen, it was French superiority in aviation and artillery that 

enabled half a dozen French battalions to blunt an attack by twenty-one Viet 

Minh battalions. I. 

In June 1951 the Viet Minh attempted to overrun Catholic-dominated 

districts in the southwest corner of the Red River Delta around the towns of 

Ninh Binh and Phat Diem. The Viet Minh divisions, fi ghting in the open 

delta plain for the first time, lost heavily to French artillery and air power, 

wh ile French control of the strategic Day River successfully choked off Viet 

Minh supply lines. By 10 June the Viet Minh forces had begun to withdraw 

across the Day River, leaving the French in possession of the southwest delta. 

General de Lattre reported that "these three violent battles seriously 

eroded enemy strength," and Frenchmen tended to look upon their successes 

at Vinh Yen, Mao Khe, and Phat Diem as glorious victories. 15 American 

observers were more cautious. Edmund Gullion warned that " it would be 

wrong to view the victories. . as turning points in the Indochina struggle, 

or to overlook the special and non-duplicative factors which made them 

possible." At Vinh Yen the Viet Min h had faced modern American military 

equipment for the first time, and their daytime attack had enabled the French 

to employ the new weapons to maximum effect. Lacking air, armor, or heavy 

artillery support, the Viet Minh had nevertheless inflicted heavy losses on the 

French and had gained experience in delta fighting; as Gullion stressed, they 

lOAm Consul, Sai gon, to Dept of State, 21 Jan 51, 751C .OO/1- 2151, records of Dept of Sta te. 

llMDAP Monthly Rpt for Jan 51, 23 May 51, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

12Consui, Hanoi, to Sta te Dept, 4 Jan Sl, 751G .OOIl - 451, records of Dept of State. 

13MDAP Monthly Rpt for Jan 51, 23 May 51. 

loiAm Consul, Saigon, to Dept of State, 21 Jan 51. 

ISExpose d u Gene ral de La ttre, Comite de Defense Nationa le, 15 Oct 51, de LaUre Papers. 

137 
MAP 3 

CHINA 

GULF OF TONKIN 

VIET MINH 

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 

October 1950 - February 1952 

Viet Minh gain s 

.. Battle, Viet Min h initiated 

o 40 MILES 

l 

o ( [ 

40 KILOMETERS 
The de Lattre Interlude 

also still held the initiative. ' 6 (Map 3) The joint Intelligence Committee agreed 

that the Viet Minh had not been decisively defea ted and wa rned that the 

delivery of American milita ry assistance to the French would probably be 

counterbalanced by increased aid to the Viet Minh from China.'7 

These powerful Viet Minh attacks in Tonkin followed closely the massive 

intervention of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Korea . By early 

December 1950, United Na tions forces in Korea had appea red to be facing a 

disastrous defea t, perhaps even annihilation. Policymakers in the State and 

Defense Departments consequently began to consider pulling America n forces 

in Korea back into narrow defensive beachheads, evacuating them to japa n, 

or making important political concessions to the Communists in return for a 

cease-fire. 'M The reverses in Korea, particularly when combined with the 

Communist display of strength and resourcefu lness in Vietnam, reinfo rced 

the fea rs of many American political and military leaders that the Soviet 

Union was now moving " to conquer the world ."'9 Public opinion polls 

revealed that more than 50 percent of the American people believed that 

World War III was imminent20 

A particular concern by the end of 1950 was that China might intervene 

directly in Indochina. Columnist joseph Alsop declared that " the Kremlin 

[has] speed ed up its timetable in a way the worst pessimists never anticipated ." He reported that a Chinese army of "200,000 seasoned troops" 

supported by Russian military advisers stood poised at Nanking to attack 

Indochina, and "every element of the pattern of preparation for the onslaught 

in Korea is now visible again in this even more important region to the 

southward .,,2' Shortly therea fter, the State Department reported that its intelligence from Taipei, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Hanoi predicted an invasion of 

Indochina by Chinese " volunteers" about the end of May 1951. 22 The Central 

Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army intelligence, however, were more sa nguine; neither believed a Chinese invasion likely. The Army G - 2, Maj. Gen. 

Alexa nder R. Bolling, commented in December that since the Viet Minh 

seemed to be doing very well on their own, massive Chinese intervention on 

the pattern of Korea was both unnecessary and improbable23 

As American policymakers debated, the worst of the immediate crisis 

16Gullion to State Dept, 9 Feb 51, 751G.OO/2 - 95 1, records of Dept of State. 

17Estimate of the Indochina Situation, 20 Jul 51, Incl to M emo, Col C. E. Booth for Cabot, 21 Jul 

51, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

18Schnabe l, Policy alld Directioll, pp. 290 - 91; Smith, Acheson, pp. 225 - 26; Dean Acheson, 

Preswt at the Creatioll: My Years ill lite State Departmen t (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 

472 - 75. 

19Schnabel, Policy and Directioll, p. 298. 

2°David Rees, Korea: Tlte Limited War (New York: St. Martin's, 1964), p. 172. 

21Joseph Alsop, "In the Dark Shadow," Washington Post, 11 Dec 50. 

22Memo, FE Div fo r Secy of State, 19 Dec 50, records of Dept of State. 

2JBoliing to CofS, 11 Dec SO, CCS 091 Indochina, RG 319. The more general mood o f peSSimism 

was indicated by Rear Adm. Arthur C. Dav is, who suggested that the Joint Chiefs begin 

planning to aid in a pOSSible French evacuation from Tonkin. He warned that since the French 

lacked the strong sea and air support ava ilable to U.S. forces in Korea, the French army might 

conceivably "be driven into the sea and destroyed." Davis to Joint Staff Planners, 2 Jan 51, JCS 

1992145, CCS 092 Asia, BP 9, lCS records. 

139 
Advice and Support: Tlte Early Years, 1941 -1960 

passed. In Korea, United Nations forces halted the enemy adva nce, inflicted 

heavy losses on the Chinese, recaptured the capital of Seoul, and established 

a strong defensive line north of th e 38th Parallel. The much-fea red Chinese 

attack on French forces in Vietnam had fa iled to materialize. By the late 

spring of 1951 General de Lattre had constructed a strong chain of defensive 

positions stretching from Along Bay to Vinh Yen in the west and to Phat 

Diem and the sea in the south. That so-ca lled de Latlre Line was designed to 

protect the Red River Delta and the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong from "the 

initial shocks of a Chinese invasion" and to serve as "mooring points for 

offensive operations. ,,24 

De Lattre formed all French forces not engaged in defense of the de Lattre 

Line into "mobile groups," combined arms units roughly equivalent to the 

American regimenta l combat team. Like many of de Lattre's other military 

innovations, the mobile groups wou ld have been impossible without American aid. American tanks and half-tracks formed the backbone of their striking 

power. 25 Yet the groups were mobile only in the sense that they were 

motorized or mechanized , for their tanks, trucks, half-tracks, and armored 

cars were of little use in the mountainous jungles that covered much of 

northern Vietnam. The mobile groups were intended as both a quick-reaction 

defensive and an offensive force, but through the summer of 1951 the French 

conducted relatively few offensive operations. The main underpinning of de 

Lattre's long-range military strategy was the rapid mobilization and training 

of a Vietnamese Na tional Army, but although the general talked enthusiastically of the excellent combat potential of the Vietnamese and outlined ambitious plans for an army of 60,000 troops by 1952, little appa rent progress had 

been made toward that end2(, 

In his pOlitica l role as high commissioner, de Lattre had fared even less 

well, despite a ringing declaration to the Vietnamese people in a speech at 

Vinh Yen: " I have come to accomplish your independence, not to limit it." 

De Lattre genuinely believed that his mission was to eliminate old-style 

colonia lism. "The basis of all my work," he told the NATO commander, 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, "ought to be the ruin of the 

arguments which yet permit of the claim that we are conducting a colonial 

war in Indochina."27 But his concept of " independence" was limited. As he 

explained to a surprised Minister Hea th, " [the] Associated States could not 

enjoy the same status as former British colonies within the commonwealth 

since France had spent too much wealth and blood in protecting them."28 

Impatient with the leisurely pace of Vietnamese politics and adminstra24Exposc du General de Lattre, Comite de Defense Nationale, lS Oct 51. 

25lnterv, author with Dunn, 27 May SO. 

26De LaUre, Secret Note on the M obili za tion Proclamation of 25 July 1951, 24 Jul 5'1, No. 

46011564, de la Ure Papers; Telg, Hea th to Seey of Sla te, 23 Ma y 51, and Minutes of Second 

Mee ting With General de Lattre de Tassigny, 17 Sep 51, both in Dept o f State, Foreigll Relatiolls, 

1951: Asia a1l(1 tile Pacific, ParI I, 6: 421 and 6:512, respecti vely. 

27Notes sur les Entretiens avec Ie General Eisenhower Ie 4 Septembrc 1951. de LaUre Papers. 

2&relg, Heath to Secy of State, 8 Mar 51, Dept of State, Foreign Relations, 1951: Asia ami the 

Pacific, Part I, 6:390. 

140 
The de Laltre Interillde 

tion, de Lattre could not resist the temptation to intervene, sometimes rather 

heavy-handedly, in Vietnamese governmental affairs to the annoyance and 

embarrassment of Baa Dai and Prime Minister Huu. In June 1951 de Lattre 

refused at the last moment to permit the Vietnamese government to sign an 

economic agreement with the United States. Since that agreement was the 

first sepa rate treaty negotiated and signed by the "independent" Baa Dai 

government, de Lattre's refusal was particularly disturbing 2 9 

The de Lattre Visit 

I n September 1951 General de Lattre visited the United States for talks with American political and military leaders. Prior to his arrival, official assessments of de Lattre were mixed . Some leaders, impressed by his military 

achievements and apparent progress in creating an autonomous Vietnamese 

state and National Army, argued that the United States ought to try, as far as 

possible, to mollify his outspoken complaints about U.s. policies in Vietnam. 

Minister Heath, who during the military crisis in the fall of 1950 had called 

fo r a grea ter U.S. voice in French policy, now believed that de Lattre's 

military successes and French political concessions had changed the military 

situation, "almost overnight, for the better." Indochina was no longer easy 

prey for Communists. American policy should henceforth be to "supplement 

but not to supplant" French efforts in Indochina. To assuage de Lattre's 

suspicion of American actions in Vietnam Heath suggested discussing Special 

Technical and Economic Mission proj ects in advance with French officials, 

assuring them that the CIA wou ld conduct no clandestine opera tions in 

Ind ochina without French consent, and instructing the staff of the U.s. 

mission in Vietnam not to " listen to, or give encouragement to, improper 

criticism of French sacrifices and intentions."JO U.S. Ambassador to France 

David Bruce endorsed Hea th's ideas, pointing out that it " is only French arms 

and resources which can . . hold this area and serve as check to Commie 

advance." The United States should therefore "exert every ca re to avoid any 

actions which would tend to mar that common effort. "" 

Other Americans were troubled by Heath's proposals, which they saw as 

giving a blank check to the French and placing the United States " in the 

position of the 'Hea r No Evil' monkey." The State Department Office of 

In ternational Security Affairs wondered how, under Minister Heath's plan, 

the United States could persuade or pressure the French to move faster in 

strengthening the independence of the Associated States. STEM director Robert Blum pOinted out that while the United States ought to do everything it 

could to avoid undermining the French position, " this undermining is the 

2'Jlbid., 30 Jun 51, Dept of State, ForeigH Relntiolls, 1951: Asia alld the Pacific, Part I, 6:439 - 40. 

)()Ibid" 29 Ju n 51, Dept of State, Forcigll Reln/iolls, 1951: Asia fllld the Pacific. Part /, 6:433, 437. 

3lTclg, Ambassador in France (Bruce) to Secy of State, S Jut 51, Dept of State, Foreigll Relatiolls, 

1951: Asia and ti,e Pacific, Part f, 6:443 44. 

141 
Advice alld SlIpport: Tire Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

work of the Viet themselves, brought on in part by French mistakes, and has 

been going on for many years:'" 

Reviewing the divergent arguments, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Sta te 

Livingston Merchant observed that much would depend on the "nature and 

sincerity of French intentions" and of Genera l de Lattre. Merchant suggested 

postponing decisions until de Lattre's visit, since it "should enable us collectively to assess de Lattre and his intentions. ,,33 

To the joint Chiefs of Staff the most worrisome aspect of de Lattre's 

impending visit was not his insistence on equal priority for aid to Ind ochina 

but the possibility that he wou ld try to induce the United States to agree to a 

combined British-French-America n command arrangement for the defense of 

all Southeast Asia. Their unhappy experience with the Southeast Asia Command in World War" and their desire to preserve their freedom of action in 

any future large-scale conflict were probably responsible for the chiefs' lack of 

enthusiasm for any such formal tripartite defense arrangements for Asia. At 

State Department urging the chiefs had reluctantly agreed to allow the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to attend military consultations at Singapore in May 

1951 with British and French Far East commanders. Although little of importance was decided, the conference served to reinforce the join t Chiefs' determination to keep allied military collaboration to a minimum.34 There is little 

evidence that de Lattre was much concerned with this subject, but the joint 

Chiefs strongly suspected that he was. 3S 

De Lattre planned his visit to the United States with care and foresight. 

From the beginning of his mission in Indochina he had understood the 

importance of the "development in the United States of certain general attitudes, whose acceptance by the leaders and the public would condition the 

granting of supplementary aid.,,'6 His objective was to convince American 

leaders that the Indochina War and the Korean conflict were "one war" and 

that they deserved equal priority. In the process he contended that the 

American stake in the Indochina War was as grea t as the stake in Korea. 

De Lattre arrived in New York aboard the lie de Fra llce in September 1951, 

posed for pictures with Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall in front of the 

Statue of Liberty, and immediately began his successfu l courtship of the 

press. "The war in Indochina is not a colonial war," he told reporters in New 

York. "It is a war against Red colonia lism. As in Korea. . we are fighting on 

a Red battlefield for liberty and peace." In a cover story on de Lattre Ti/lle 

observed, "In Indochina the battlelines of Asia and Europe merge. This is th e 

32M emo, Asst Dir for Non-European Affairs, O ffice of International Security Affairs (Bingham), 

for Asst Seey of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), 12 Jul 51; Telg, Chief, STEM , to ECA 

Administrator, 12 Jul 51. Both in Dept of Sta te, Foreigll Relatio"s, 1951: Asia (/lid tile Pacific, Part I, 

6:447 -52. 

33Memo, Deputy Asst Seey of State for Far Eastern Affa irs (Merchant) for Ass! Secy (Ru sk), 27 

Jul 51, Dept of State, Foreigll Relatiolls, 1951: Asill 111/(1 fi,e Pacific, Part I, 6:462 - 64. 

J.;! History of the Indochina Incide nt, pp. 211 - 14. 

35lbid . 

J6Note sur la Mission du Genera l de laUre aux Elats-Unis, de LaUre Papers. 

142 
The de Lallre Ill terillde 

Seated, President Truman and General de Lattre. Standillg, Ambassadors 

BOllllet and Heath. De Lattre wenrs black arm balld in mOllrllillg for his 5011 

killed in Vietllam. 

crucial point which Douglas MacArthur fo ught to prove; that communism 

cannot go unchecked in Asia and still be defeated in Europe."37 

In Washington the general called on President Truman and held lengthy 

discussions with State and Defense Department officials. To the president, de 

Lattre "emphasized the oneness of [the] anti-commie struggle [in] Korea, 

Europe and [Indochina]." President Truman, according to the State Department summary, "expressed warm interest in [the] General's exegesis.,,38 At 

the Pentagon the French commander was even more graphic in his warnings. 

" 'If you lose Korea, Asia is not lost; but if I lose Indochina, Asia is lost.' 

Tonkin is the key to Southeast Asia, if Southeast Asia is lost, India will 

'burn like a match' and there will be no barrier to the advance of communism before Suez and Africa. If the Moslem world were thus engulfed, the 

Moslems in North Africa would soon fall in line and Europe itself would be 

outflanked."39 

:

J7Yime, 25 Septembe r 1951. 

~elg, Acting Seey of State to Am Legation, Sa igon, 18 Sep 51, Dept of State, Foreigll Relatiolls, 

1951: Asia lIlId tile Pacific, Part /, 6:515 - 16. 

39Record of a Meeting at the Pentagon Building, WaShington, September 20, 1951, Dept of 

Sta te, Foreigll Relatiolls, 1951: Asia al/(i the PaCifiC. Part I, 6:517. 

143 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

After completing talks in Washington, de Lattre embarked on a tour of 

American military installations. In one week he visited the naval and military 

academies, the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, and Langley Air Force 

Base, and he laid a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Everywhere 

his message was the same: Indochina and Korea were two fronts in one wa r 

aga inst communism, a war which France could win in Indochina w ith American help'o " I am absolutely sure," he told reporters on "Meet the Press" 

(v iewed by an audience estimated at ten to twelve million) " that it is a 

question of months, perhaps one or two yea rs, but we shall dominate the 

problem surely."" 

De LaUre's campaign came at a time w hen the American public and its 

leaders were unsettled and frustrated over recent events in Korea and indeed 

over the whole course of America n fo reign policy" In April 1951 Genera l 

MacArthur had been reca lled from Korea, and d uring the summer the Senate 

Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees opened joint hearings on 

the military situation in the Far East. M any Americans were inclined to agree 

with MacArthur a nd his Republica n supporters that Asia rather than Western 

Europe was the decisive area of conflict with world communism. 

Yet though America n leaders were willing to accept de La ttre's concept of 

one war, they were unenthusiastic about taking any practica l steps toward 

establishing a unified Franco-America n war effort in th e Fa r East. Whatever 

the logical appeal of de Lattre's geopolitical analysis and the level of official 

acceptance of his theories, th e fact remained that the America n public did not 

v iew the colonial conflict in Vietnam in the same light as the Korea n War. 

M oreover, the British government, highly nervous about the Korean commitment, would be adamantly opposed to any combined military ventures in 

Indochina. 43 As the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, although the struggles in 

Korea and Indochina were "but two manifestations of the same ideological 

conflict between the USSR and the Western World . . it would be wholly 

unacceptable under existing circumstances to integrate the forces of the Western World engaged in the two wars.'''''' 

Solving the Supply Problem 

De Lattre was more sliccessful in accomplishing a second objective: to 

increase the amount and speed of delivery of U.S. military supplies. In 

meetings with American officials he vivid ly described his supply difficulties. 

In the battles of May and June there we re at times less than 6,000 artillery 

.IOjean de L..,tt re de Tassigny, " Indochina 195 1: Ma M ission aux Elats-Unis," Ln l~ez!/lc Dellx 

MOl/des, December 1951, pp. 387 - 89. 

·1l"Meet the Press," NBC-TV, 16 Sep 51; Teig, Acting Seey of State to Lega ton at Saigon, 18Scp 

57, Dept of State, Foreigll Relatiolls, '1951: Asia and the Pacific. Part f. 6:516. 

42 Rces, Korea , pp. 196 - 229. 

°Smith, Aclll.'SOtI. p. 323. 

44Memo, jeS for Seey of Defense, 19 Nov 51, sub: Combat Opns in Indochina, CCS 092 Asia 

(6 - 25 - 48), sec. 19, Jes records. 

144 
The de Laltre lllterlllde 

shells in all of Indochina. During one eight-day period it had been impossible 

to counterattack because of lack of reserve ammunition. French paratroop 

ope ra tions were limited by lack of airlift, and French Hellcat fi ghter-bombers 

were "finished" and needed to be replaced by F - 86 jets to impress the 

Vietnamese and deter Chinese aggression.

45 

De Lattre's complaints were in part justified, for during the summer of 

1951 deliveries to Vietnam had in many cases lagged. That problem was 

especially acute for military vehicles. Only 444 of a scheduled 968 jeeps and 

393 of 906 programmed 6 x 6 trucks had been delivered during fisca l year 

1951 46 Secretary of Defen se Robert Lovett attributed the slow pace to a dea rth 

of production capacity and skilled workers in certain areas, strikes in defen se 

industries, shortages of machine tools and critical materials, and lack of 

expe rience in producing new types of equipment. Uncertainty w ithin the 

Defense Department about the precise extent and nature of the Indochina 

aid program and the ava ilability of funds to support it also had delayed 

deliveries'? Part of the problem, however, was attributable to the French 

themselves, particularly their inadequate maintenance practices. If de Lattre's 

planes were indeed " finished," a lack of preventive maintenance was probably as much a ca use as the wear and tear of combat. Also, as Genera l Brink 

reported from Saigon, the French were far behind in distributing material 

already delivered'8 Beca use supplies could be moved within Vietnam only by 

armed convoys, w he ther by water or road, delivery of equipment to units in 

the field was inhe rently slow, a fact that made it essential to maintain stocks 

in forward areas at highe r than normal levels."9 

Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins assured de Lattre tha t eve rything 

pOSSible would be done to speed deli veries. Collins promised speCifically that 

the Army staff wou ld a rrange for 4,500 gene ral-purpose vehicles to be deli vered in January rathe r tha n in March so they wou ld be ava ilable before the 

sta rt of the rainy season. He also promised to expedite delivery of combat 

vehicles and Thompson submachine guns and noted that the Army staff 

would carefully review reserve levels in Korea to determine if ma teriel stored 

the re might be made ava ilable. 50 

General de Lattre left New York for France in early October well satisfied 

with the results of his trip. Although he had fail ed to persuade the American 

government to adopt a one-wa r strategy, his visit nevertheless represented a 

public rela tions success. If he had not " radica lly changed" American thinking about Indochina, as he la te r claimed in a letter to Bao Dai, he had 

left behind a g reater awa reness of, and respect and sympathy for, the French 

'

15Memo, Maj Mitchell, 20 Sep 51, sub: Memorandum of Convs With de Lattre, G - 3 091 

Indochina, RG 319. 

46Memo, Livingston Merchant for Robert A. Lovett, 20 Sep 51, 7S IG.5- MAP/9 - 20S1, records 

o f Dept of Stale . 

,'7Memo, Lovett, 30 Oct 51, in leS 2099/138, CCS 092 (8 - 22 - 46), sec. 61, leS records . 

. IIIAir Force Section, MDAP Monthly Rpt, Aug 52, G - 3 09 1 Indochina, RG 319; Ltr, Brink to 

DA, 4 Jan 52, 751GMSP/I - 452, records of Dept of State . 

. 

'9MDAP Monthly Rpt, Jun 52, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 3 19. 

soMemo, Maj Mitche ll , 20 Sep 5 1, sub: Memorandum of Con v With de Lattre; Memo, Merchant 

for Secy of State, 4 Jan 52, 75IG.5-MAPII - 452, records of Dept of State. 

145 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Chief of Staff Collins reviews French Expeditionary Corps tankers, left, and 

Vietnamese National Army troops, backgrollnd, in Hanoi, 1951. Tallks still 

bear U.S. markings. 

effort there S ! The most dramatic effect of the general's visit was a marked 

increase in the size and speed of American aid deliveries to Saigon. Between 

de Lattre's visit and February 1952, the French received over 130,000 tons of 

equipment, including 53 million rounds of ammunition, 8,000 general-purpose 

vehicles, 650 combat vehicles, 200 aircraft, 3,500 radio sets, and 14,000 automatic weapons. 52 

To cut down on the amount of supplies that had to be shipped thousands 

of miles across the Pacific, the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the 

American legation in September 1951 suggested the possibility of manufacturing certain simple items of military equipment in Vietnam. They pOinted out 

that manpower, coal, and wood were in ample supply in Vietnam and that 

the Cao Oai religious sect was already producing its own small arms, mines, 

mortars, and hand grenades. 53 The advisory group believed that with relatively simple, even obsolete, U.S. machine tools, the Vietnamese might pro51MDAP Monthly Rpt, Oct 51, G - 3 091 Indochina, sec. 1, RG 319. 

SlAm Legation, Saigon, to Embassy in Paris, 28 May 52, 751G.OO/S - 2852, records of Dept of 

State. 

53lbid. to State Dept, 23 Sep 51, 751G.OO/9 - 235 1, records of Dept of State. 

146 
The de Laltre Interlude 

duce such items as cartridge clips, canned rations, and small arms ammunition, probably at lower cost due to comparatively low wage levels in Sa igon. 54 

Loca l military production might also be of long-range benefit to the Associated States since it would constitute a step toward industria liza tion and lessen 

their dependence upon the French. 

American officers offered to open discussions on the subject with the 

French, although recogni zing that the latter were hardly likely to be enthusiastic about a plan that might weaken their control over the distribution 

of military equipment. To counter French misgivings, the advisory grou p 

planned to limit the proposal to items for use by French forces only. On 10 

October the State Department asked the American legation to prepare a 

report on "facilities for production of military and paramilitary items in 

Indochina ." ss Although Minister Heath wrote to General de Lattre requesting 

information on the amoun t and types of equipment then being procured 

loca lly by the French and on the state of ex isting production fa cilities, General 

de Lattre never replied to the letter and fa iled even to show it to his staff. 56 

Despite that evidence of French apathy to loca l procuremen t, Minister 

Heath in January 1952 reported that the legation and the advisory group were 

impressed with the possibilities for light industry in Indochi na and believed 

that the Associated States wou ld be in a strong competiti ve position vis-a-vis 

France in the manufacture of certain products. 57 A month later, after making 

a joint study with the advisory group and the Special Technica l and Economic 

Mission, the legation reported it was practical to establish manufacturing 

facilities in Indochina for small arms and small arms ammunition, tires and 

tubes, tarpaulins and webbing, camouflage nets, dock fe nders, and canned 

rations. The cost of esta blishing the appropriate production fa cilities was 

estimated at $5. 1 million s8 

Yet by that time it was apparent that the French had no interest in or 

enthusiasm for local procurement. The French high commissa riat had frequen tly 

"volunteered numerous reasons why the whole idea of such a program 

should be considered impracticable. Nor have the Associated States shown 

any grea t alacrity in seizing this opportunity." The real question, observed 

Hea th , was wheth er the program was important enough to warrant a major 

American effort to obtain French concurrence or at least acquiescence. 59 

The answer, as the next six months were to demonstrate, was no. As had 

other schemes to improve the military aid program, the loca l production 

project foundered on the rocks of French indifference. Although d iscussions 

of local production between the advisory group and the French continued 

intermittently, with the French ofte n promising to study the matter furth er, 

few concrete results were achieved. The conti nued military dependence of the 

"" [bid. to Sta te Dept, 21 Sep 51, 75 IG.9MAP/9 - 2151, records of Dept of State. 

55Sccy of State to Am Legation, Saigon, 10 Oct 5 1, 75 1G.OOIlO - 1051, records 0 1 Dept of State. 

56MDAP Monthly Rpt, Nov 51, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

57lbid., Jan 52, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

5IIMemo, Heath, 8 Feb 52, sub: Capabilities for Production of M ilita ry items, records of Dept of 

State. 

5'Jlbid. 

147 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Associated States upon France was far more important to the high commissariat 

than any savings to the United States or any ga ins to the Vietnamese economy that might result from Vietnamese military industries. 

From the short-range mili ta ry viewpoint, the impact of American aid in 

Indochina was enormous. Contemporary observers were undoubtedly correct 

in attributing the narrow French victories in the winter and spring of 1950 -

51 to the timely arrival of American wea pons and equipment. The responsiveness and efficiency of the military aid program we re in turn the result of the 

extraordinary efforts of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Yet it could 

do little more than deliver the goods. The advisory group's position with the 

French was little changed from the ea rly months of 1950. Among themselves 

advisory group offi cers might fume at French waste or sloppiness or express 

impatience with "outmod ed strategy and tactics," but they could exert little 

influence on the conduct of the war.60 They could only ensure that the French 

would be able to conduct it their way a little longer. 

6OInte rv, author w ith Dunn, 27 Ma y SO. 

148 
Looking for a Way Out, January 1952-

February 1953 

9 

During 1952 and early 1953 it became apparent to nearly all American leaders 

that the conflict in Vietnam was a stalemate. Although the massive infusion 

of American aid and de Lattre's military successes had prevented a dec.isive 

Viet Minh victory in 195], the French had fa iled to devise any politica l or 

military programs to defeat the Communists, and the prospect of important 

new French initiatives was bleak. From early 1952 to the end of the Truman 

administration in January 1953, American officials sought some means to 

break the dead lock in Indochina and to end the increasingly severe drain on 

American money and arms. In their search they set in motion a number of 

expedients and policies that would come to fruition under the Eisen hower 

administration and would mark the cl imactic phase of the Franco-Ameri can 

coLlaboration in Vietnam. 

In January 1952 Genera l de Lattre died of ca ncer in Paris. His death 

produced a feeling of pessimism and despair among the French. "Many had 

come to believe that he was the la st chance for a solution in Indochina," the 

American embassy reported. "They now fear that th e gains he has achieved 

might fall away." I Genera l Brink tried to be more optimistic. "Although 

in places the [Vie tn amese] government appears to be coming apa rt at the 

seams," he noted, "perhaps it would be better to say that not all seams are 

sewn togeth er yet.,,2 

Almost as dishea rtening as de Lattre's death was a development at the 

town of Hoa Bin h on the Black River, west of Hanoi. De Lattre had occupied 

Hoa Binh in force in November ]951, ostensibly to cut Communist supply 

lines running southeast to a Viet Minh stronghold near Thang Hoa and to 

maintain the loya lty of the Muong tribesmen, w hose principal town was Hoa 

Binh . As the American legation in Saigon observed, the offensive was as 

much politica l as military, for de Lattre hoped to impress the French government, preparing to deba te the Indochina budget, with his vigor and enterlMDAP Monthly Rpt, Jan 52. 

2Ibid.; Ur, Brink to Maj Gen George H. Olrnste<1d, OMA, 29 Mar 52, OMA 09"1. 3 Indochina, 

149 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

prise and to show the Americans that their military equipment was being put 

to good use. Some American observers, however, thought the move to Hoa 

Binh put French forces in a dangerously extended position and pred icted a 

swift, vigorous Communist reaction. 

T he seizure of Hoa Binh probably caused the Viet Minh high command to 

cancel plans for its own offensive elsewhere in the north and to concentrate 0 11 

dislodging the French. To divert French forces from the Hoa Binh sector the 

Viet Minh infiltrated some 25,000 regulars into the Red River Delta region. 

These forces in turn recruited and trained new members of the regional and 

popular forces. In the meantime General Giap assumed personal command of 

three divisions and supporting a rtille ry that he had concentrated in the Hoa 

Binh area and between December 1951 and ea rly February laun ched a series 

of heavy attacks against the French strongpoints around Hoa Binh. Although 

un successful in taking the strongpoints, the Viet Minh were able to cut first 

the wa te r and then the land routes into Hoa Bin h. Attempts to reopen 

communications cost the French heavy losses in men and equipment. By this 

time the security situation in the delta had so deteriorated that on 24 February 1952, after having lost almost as many troops as in the border battles of 

1950, the French abandoned Hoa Binh to concentrate on the delta. The 

French completed the evacuation with relative ly light casualties, but had to 

blow up over 150 tons of supplies and ammunition at Hoa Binh beca use they 

lacked the mea ns to tran sport them back to the delta.' 

In the Hoa Binh battles the Viet Minh demonstrated a new degree of 

military sophistication. Their logistica l s upport was much improved, enabling 

them to continue fighting at Hoa Binh for weeks at a time. They possessed a 

sophisticated intelligence appara tu s including a radio inte rcept unit to supply 

Giap and his staff with timely information. Fina ll y, they made effecti ve 

use of fi eld and antia ircraft artillery with the aid of Chinese advisers and 

technicians.

4 

The retreat from Hoa Binh led to s peculation that the French might lack 

the resolve to continue the struggle in Vietnam. State Department officials 

observed that "it is now clear that the prospect of any offensive to clear out 

the Viet Minh in Tonkin, as promised by de Lattre, does not exist," and the 

CIA reported that "over the long term the combat effectiveness of the Vie t 

Minh [will] probably continue to improve." The agency believed that growing 

domestic pressures and the difficulty of supporting a milita ry effort in the Far 

East wh ile fulfillin g NATO commitments would eventually lead France to 

withdraw from Vietnam. s There were rumors of an impending French dea l 

RG 330, Secy o f De fense records. 

3This account of the Hoa Binh operation is based on the following sources: Rappo rt du general 

de Corps d' Armee Salan sur les operations menees sur Ja Ri viere Noire a Hoa Binh ct Sllr la R. c. 

6 . .. , Inc1 3 to USARMA, Saigon, to ACofS G - 2, R- lr1 - 52,29 May 52, G - 2 10 file 1054654, 

pt. II; Ltr, USARMA to ACofS G - 2, 27 Feb 52, records of ACSI; MDAP Monthly Rpt, Dec 52, 

G - 3091 Indochinil, RG 319; Fall , Street Wit/Wilt loY, pp. 47 - 60 . 

. IRapport du Gene ral Salan. 

sMemo, Far East Div fo r Western Europea n Div, 28 Feb 52, records of Dept o f State; National 

Intelligence Estimate 35/1,28 Feb 52, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

150 
Looking for a Way Dllt 

French Forces Near Hoa Binh 

with Ho Chi Minh and much talk of French loss of nerve. In February the 

Paris newspapers carried an interview with the minister for Relations with the 

Associated States, Jean Letourneau, in which he admitted that France had no 

hope of winning in Indochina 6 At the end of March Secretary of State Dean 

Acheson found it necessary to assure British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks 

that the United States had no evidence or reason to believe that the French 

were negotiating with the Viet Minh.7 

U.S. Army officials were less pessimistic. General Brink reported that 

although the French had not dealt adequately with the grave political and 

economic problems confronting them, there was no sign of a French slackening8 The Army's acting chief of intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Weckerling, 

also believed a French withdrawal unlikely. Although the struggle severely 

strained French resources and the French budget, he noted, "any government 

that pulled out [of Vietnam] would fall" and France would " lose prestige 

throughout her Empire. ,,9 

6Army Attache, Paris, to ACofS G - 2, 27 Feb 52, sub: Press Interview of M. Letourneau, 52, 

records of ACSI. 

7Memo of Conversation, Acheson with Sir Oli ver Franks, 28 Ma r 52, in Historica l Division, 

State Department, Documentary History of U.s. Policy Toward Indochi na, 1940 - 1953, doc. 

C - 46. 

8Ur, Brink to Maj Cen Reuben E. Jenkins, 1 Apr 52, lncl to Jenkins to CofSA, 12 May 51, G - 3 

091 Indochina, RG 319. 

9Memo, Weckerling for CofSA, 2 Jan 52, sub: Current fre nch Positio n in Indochina, G - 3 091 

151 
Adv ice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

America n policymakers during the early months of 1952 also continu ed to 

worry that the Chi nese would invade Vietnam. That fea r persisted although 

both the CIA and the joint Intelligence Committee of th e joi nt Chiefs of Sta ff 

had concluded in early 1952 that despite improved Chinese military ca pabilities along the Vietnamese border, an invasion was unlikely. \0 The joint Chiefs 

of Staff a nd the National Security Council believed that in any event it was 

important to agree upon a course of action should the Chinese move. At a 

meeting of the America n, British, and French Chiefs of Staff in Washington in 

january 1952, the America n chiefs suggested that the three powers agree on 

such a course. I I The conferees appOinted an ad hoc committee composed of 

the military representatives of the three powers plus Australia and New 

Zea land to discuss what collective military measures might be taken .

12 

A meeting of the committee a few weeks later revealed that the allies 

could reach no rea l agreement about the best response to a Chi nese attack. 

The America ns favored air attacks and a blockade of the Chinese coast, 

measures opposed by the French beca use they disapproved any di version of 

resources from Vietnam and by the British because they wanted to avoid 

provoking the Chinese into moving agai nst their colony at Hong Kong. The 

British and French desired a combined command for Southeast Asia, but the 

America ns did not want U.S. forces under British or French command. As the 

joint Chiefs' representative, Vice Adm. Arthur C. Da v is, complained, "They 

would like not only to determine what we s hall do with our own forces in the 

event of our ta king military action with respect to the Southeast Asia situation, but also to command our forces w hile these limited actions are being 

taken .,,13 

Despite the disagreement, President Truman and the National Security 

Council decided in June 1952 to continue planning for air and nava l action 

aga inst China. NSC 124/2, United States Objectives and Courses of Action 

with Respect to Southeast Asia, adopted on 25 june 1952, called for the 

United States to contribute air and nava l su pport for the defense of Indochina, to interdict Chinese Communist lines of communications, including 

those in China, and to blockade the Chinese coast. If those "minimum" 

measures p roved to be insufficient, the United States would " take air and 

nava l actio n in conjunction with at least France and the U.K. aga inst all 

suitable military targets in China." If Britain and France refused to pa rticipa te, 

the United States "should consider takin g unilateral action .,,14 Still, the chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, 

explained to the State Depa rtment that the service chiefs did not rea lly expect 

Indochina, RG 319. 

lONationa l Intelligence Estimate 35/1, 28 Feb 52; jle 529/10, 9 Jan 52, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48), 

BP pt. 3, jeS records. 

llNotes Recorded by Seey and Dep Seey, jeS, at the U.5.-U. K.-Frcnch Chid of Staff Ta lks on 

Southeast Asia, 11 Ja n 52, CCS 092 Asia (6 25 48), sec. 22. 

12History of Indochina Incident, pp. 24 1 42. 

13Memo, Adm Davis, 5 Feb 52, sub: Report of the Five Power Ad Hoc Committee on Southeast 

Asia, CCS 092 Asia (6 ~ 25 ~ 48), sec. 24, JCS records. 

I.INSC 124/2, U.S. · ViC/11n1l1 Relatiolls, 8:531 - 34. 

152 
Lookillg for a Way Ollt 

air and nava l attacks alone to be decisive. The point in limiting reaction to a 

blockade and aerial bombardment campaign was to avoid getting too deeply 

involved in another Asian ground war. 15 

Problems of a Vietnamese Army 

D espite the attention paid to China, the primary threat to Vietnam 

remained France's inability to cope with the Viet Minh revolution. 16 The 

long weeks of discussion and debate which accompanied the drafting of NSC 

124 had revea led the dissatisfaction of many America n offi cials with the 

course of events in Vietnam and their desire to reverse the pattern of drift 

and stalema te. Yet the only new development of any promise was the formation of an indigenous Vietnamese army, under the control of the State of 

Vietnam. Such an army, if it were able to play at least a seconda ry role 

in combating the armed forces of the Viet Minh, would greatly increase 

the prestige and power of the Bao Dai government, demonstrating to the 

Vietnamese people and to the world that Vietnam was truly independent and 

able to defend itself against insurrection and subversion. 

However promising the idea, rea lizing it proved to be difficul t. Even 

though France expected the United States to provide much of the money 

and equipment for the undertaking, the French insisted that creating a 

Vietnamese army was a matter wholly between them and th e Bao Dai government. Recurrent cabinet crises in Paris and Saigon and squabbling between 

the Vietnamese and the French over the amount of money each should 

contribute a lso delayed the proj ect. Prime Minister Huu had complained to 

Consul General Gullion in January 1951 that the Vietnamese government could 

not pOSSibly meet its assigned share of the financial burden until it assumed 

control of customs services as provided fo r in the Elysee Agreements. 17 

The French also persisted in recruiting Vietnamese for their own forces in 

Vie tnam, a practice which angered the Bao Dai government and made recruiting for a Vietnamese army more difficult. 

By May 1951 the Vietnamese National Army had less than 40,000 men. 

O nly 24 of a projected 34 battalions existed, even on paper, and only 7 of 

those had Vietnamese officers. IS Yet small as it was, the Vietnamese Army 

was already beyond th e mea ns of the French and Vietnamese to support. By 

June 1951 the Vietnamese were ta lking of slowin g the activa tion of the army 

to cope with soaring costs. 19 

In July the Huu government tried a new strategy by decreeing a "genera l 

ISMernora ndurn of Conversation Between General Bradley and Under Secretary of State, 12 

Ma;,: 52, records of Dept of State. 

"NSC 124/2. U.S.-Vict llum Relutiolls, 8:524. 

17Cullion to State Dept, 27 Jan 51, 751G.OO/ I - 2751, records o f Dept of State. 

'8Brig Cen Francis Brink, A Study of the Vietnamese Army, 21 Mar 51, updated 7 May 51, 

records of Dept of State. 

''IMDAP Monthly Rpt, Jun 51. 

153 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

mobilization" to conscript 60,000 men in four increments for two months of 

training. Although de Lattre saw the decree as a major step forward "which 

cannot fail to produce a very strong impression on the majority of Vietnamese 

fence-sitters," American observers dismissed it as "an expensive gesture" and 

pointed out that two months were far too short to prepare an adequately 

trained reserve 20 The small number of officer candidates (1,000) and specialists (600) who were to be drafted under the plan constituted less than 

one-fourth the number needed. American officials believed that the Vietnamese government was proceeding so conserva tively because it doubted 

whether it could compel any large proportion of th e population to answer the 

ca ll to the colors.21 

Modest and inadequate as was the planned mobiliza tion, it soon ran into 

difficulties. The first increment of 6,000 men was released after only about six 

and a ha lf weeks of service instead of the planned two months. Only half of 

the 500 student reserve officer candidates handpicked by the Ministry of 

Defense ever reported for duty at the officer training schools in Thu Due and 

Nam Din h. The second increment of draftees was released after only five 

weeks of training, a nd the third increment was never called at all. Less than 

10 percent of the Vietnamese who underwent training could be induced to 

enlist in the regu lar long-service Vietnamese Army 22 

To stimulate recruiting, the Military Assistance Ad visory Group and the 

United States Information Executive (a predecessor of the U.S. Information 

Agency) produced a booklet, Phil !oills the Army, and through Vietnamese 

government information services distributed 200,000 copies to potentia l 

recruits. The U.S. Information Execu tive optimistically predicted that "this 

type of propaga nda .. wou ld carry a great impact," but Phil !oills the Army 

was more a refl ection of American hopes for the Vietnamese Army than a 

successful stimulant to recruiting. The booklet's hero, Anh Phu Tung Quan, 

becomes acquainted with the National Army when its soldiers liberate his 

village from the Viet Minh. The villagers note that the soldiers are "correctly 

dressed, well diSci plined, helpful and considerate to the people." They aid 

the people in rebu ilding their homes and roads. When an officer informs the 

villagers of the establishment of the State of Vietnam under the leadership of 

Bao Dai, "the crowd, very happy to lea rn this, unanimously swears total 

support to Bao Da i and to the Army." After enlisting in the army, Anh Phu is 

heroica lly wou nded in battle and awa kens in a hospital bed where, " looking 

over at the wall he saw a picture of His Majesty, Bao Dai, and deeply moved, 

he prayed for His Majesty's hea lth."2O 

As recruiting continued to lag, in January 1952 the Vietnamese reduced 

the quota for enlisted specialists from 800 to 500 and cut the training period 

for officer candidates from twelve to eight months. Of 1,000 officer candidates 

20De LaUre Note, 24 Jul 51, No. 4601ISG4, de Laure Papers. 

21 MDAP Monthly Rpt, Aug 51, C - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

22 Ibid., Oct, Nov, Dec 51, C - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

23USIE (U.S. Information Executive) Translation, Nov 51, records of Dept of State. 

154 
Looking for a Way Dllt 

projected in the mobilization plan only 690 were actually enrolled.24 The little 

army's credibility as a viable military fo rce suffered also from the lack of a 

general staff, a chief of staff, or even a full-time minister of defense. Few 

senior officers were available to fill important staff and command assignments, and the shortage of trained junior officers was severe. 25 

A U.S. Role in Training? 

Lack of progress in organizing and training an effective Vietnamese National Army prompted many America n officials to call for a more active U.5. 

role in the project. In April 1952 the three service secretaries, in a draft paper 

presented to the State Department, suggested a program of direct American 

training of the Vietnamese Army by an ex panded Military Assistance Advisory Group. If Indochina was rea lly "the key to Southeast Asia," sa id the 

secreta ries, the United States should make greater efforts to establish an 

indigenous force ca pable at least of preserving internal security.26 The head of 

the Economic Cooperation Administration in Vietnam, Robert Blum, agreed 

that the United States should "assume a direct influence commensurate with 

our contribution" in the formation of the National Army. Blum believed the 

United Sta tes had assumed grea t responsibilities and provided decisive aid in 

Indochina but had been accorded little say in military matters. Now was the 

time for the United States to assume a larger military role 27 The State 

Department also felt a strong Nationa l Army wou ld increase political stability 

(an idea which wou ld later be emphasized by Secretary of State John Foster 

Du lles) and represent a highly visible symbol of the Bao Dai government's 

independence and sovereignty2H 

Genera l Brink and most of the Army members of the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group disagreed. They believed that training the Vietnamese 

should remain a French responsibility, for the French had "learned how to 

deal with the native soldier and how to teach him; they Ihave] also learned 

his limitations and have solved the problems caused by language difficulties. ,,29 General Brink also poin ted ou t that an advisory group with trainin g 

responsibility would require over 4,000 officers and enlisted men.'o 

Washington officials discounted those views, partly because of the dis24M DAP Mon thly Rpt, Jan 52. 

25Ibid .. Aug 51, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

26Mcmo, Seey of Army (Frank Pace). Seey of Air Force (Roswell Gilpatrick). and Seey of Navy 

(Da n A. Kimball) for Seey of Defense, 8 Apr 52, RG 335. 

27Ltr, Blu m to State Dcpt, Dec 52, Incl to I-Iarl .. n C1cveli1lld to John 1-1. Ohly, 5 Jan 52, OMA 

091.3 Indochina, RG 330. 

2f1Position Paper on Indochina for Discussion With French and British, 15 May 52, fil es of Office 

of Philippine and Sout heast Asian Affairs, Lot 580207, record s of Dept of State. 

~Army Section, MDAP Monthly Rpt, Jun 52; Llr, Brink to Maj Geo Reuben E. Jenkins, 12 May 

52; Memo, Tyler PorI (Under Secy of Army) for Secy of Army, 6 May 52, sub: Indochina. All in 

G - 3091 Indochina, RG 319. 

JOMemo, Port for Secy of Arm y, 6 May 52, sub: Indochina. 

155 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Ambassador Heath Greets General Trapnell (left) 011 arrival ill Vietllalll, 

Allgllst 1952 . 

couraging reports about the state of the Vietnamese Army submitted by the 

advisory group itself. Those reports described how Vietnamese units were 

often organized on paper for months before any men or supplies were 

actually assembled; " units are at least six months old before any progress 

other than the most basic training is made."31 Although the French had 

requested large amounts of American weapons and equipment for the Vietnamese forces, the advisory group's Army section reported that native troops 

knew nothing about an item of American equipment until it actually arrived, 

and even then training aids or mock-ups of equipment were not used. 32 

Reports by the Navy section were even more pessimistic. Naval officers 

assigned to the advisory group reported that a French claim of having established a Vietnamese navy to which responsibilities could someday be transferred was "wholly without founda tion." The so-called navy actually consisted 

of abou t 400 sailors serving in river forces under the command of French 

officers and noncommissioned officers. French plans for training additional 

sailors were very modest, and the naval training school at Nha Trang had yet 

to open.

33 

31MDAP Monthly Rpt, Jun 52. 

32lbid., May 52. 

"Navy Section, MDAP Monthly Rpt, Jun 52, G- 3 09 1 Indochina, RC 319. 

156 
Looking for a Way Gilt 

Debate over American participation in training Vietnamese forces was 

continuing in July 1952 when General Brink, who for some time had been 

suffering from diabetes and arteriosclerosis, committed suicide while on a 

visit to Washington.

34 To succeed him, the Army named Brig. Gen. Thomas ). 

H. Trapnell, who at the time was commanding the 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team, which had just completed the difficult and dangerous mission 

of putting down an uprising of North Korea n prisoners of wa r at Koje-do 

prison camp in South Korea. 35 

Not yet fifty years old when he arrived in Vietnam in August 1952, 

General Trapnell brought vigor, enthusiasm, and a hea lthy skepticism to 

his new assignment. He quickly established friendly relations with senior 

Vietnamese officers, particularly General Nguyen Van Hinh, nominal commander of the Vietnamese National Army, who sometimes took the American 

general tiger hunting. Through such personal contacts General Trapnell was 

able to arrange on-the-spot visits to Vietnamese units without going through 

French intermediaries.'6 What Trapnell saw was disturbing. He quickly concluded that the French seemed to lack confidence in either the fighting abili ty 

or the political reliability of the Vietnamese soldiers and were making little 

use of them. Like numbers of other Americans, General Trapnell was soon 

convinced that the United States would have to playa more active role in the 

creation of the Vietnamese Na tional Army. 

Fall Offensives 

General Trapnell was still learning details of his new post when the most 

serious crisis since the disasters at Cao Bang in 1950 developed. [t began 

when three Viet Minh regiments supported by an artillery regiment attacked 

a French post in the Tai country, the heavily wooded region north and east of 

the Black River inhabited mainly by mountain tribesmen. The anchor of the 

French defenses there was the town of Nghia Lo, midway between the Red 

and Black Rivers. The Viet Minh attacked Nghia Lo in mid-October. The 

French fell back from weakly defended outposts around the town towa rd 

their main fortifi ed positions, drawing the attackers with them. Paratroopers 

were then to drop behind the attacking forces to trap them. But bad wea ther 

prevented the use of paratroopers, and the Viet Minh attackers used a pincer 

movement to cut off the retreat of the French forces falling back on Ngh ia Lo. 

On 17 October the Viet Minh overwhelmed the town's last defenses; withi n a 

few days all of the Tai country east and north of the Black River was under 

Viet Minh control. 37 

34Ur, Hea th to Ceo J. Law to n Collins, 1 Aug 52, CS 09 1 Indochina, RG 319. 

3SSee Walter G. H ermes, Truce Teflt (/lid Figlltillg Frolll , United States Army in the Korean War 

(Washing ton, 1966), pp. 233 - 63. 

36lnterv, author with Lt Cen Thomas J. H. Trapnell, 5 Scp 74, Historians files, CM H. 

37Memo, ACofS G- 2, for CofSA, 4 Dec 52, sub: French Campaign, Indochina, G- 3 09 1 

Indochina, RG 319; Be rnardo, The Franco - Vie t Minh War, pp. 32 - 34. 

157 
~ 

:;; 

~ 

CHINA 

/''' ---1 

( 

I 

LaCl CAl ==" " " " ,-

BATILES OF 1952 & 

OPERATION LORRAINE 

o 

I 

o 

( • Viet Minh attack 

I 

French advance 

Battle. Viet Minhl 

French initiated 

30 MilES 

! 

30 KILOMETERS 

MAP4 

/ " '" / , 

~ 

\ 

CJritn! HOfl • 

~ 

"1' 
Looking for a Way Ollt 

To divert the Viet Minh from the Black River, the French lau nched a 

strong offensive along the line of the Red and Clear Rivers northeast of 

Hanoi . This offensive, code named Operation LORRAINE, began at the end of 

October 1952 amid considerable fanfare and publicity. The largest operation 

ever attempted by the French in Vietnam, it involved over 30,000 men with 

large numbers of artillery, tanks, and planes. Advancing northwest, the 

French quickly seized the towns of Phu Doan and Phu Yen Binh, important 

Viet Minh supply centers where they fo und large stocks of weapons and 

ammunition. (Map 4) Then the attack bogged down, hampered by a long and 

preca rious supply line. By mid-November O peration LORRAINE was in reverse 

gea r, with French troops and supply columns withdrawing behind the de 

Lattre Line under constant harassment from Viet Minh troops and irregulars. 

American observers were sharply disappointed, believing that the French 

had bungled a chance to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. They pointed 

out that the French had a two-and-a-half to one superiority in infantry and an 

overwhelming edge in artillery, tanks, and air support.

J8 Yet to take advantage of their superiority, the French forces required large quantities of supplies that could be moved only by road, and the roads were particularly 

susceptible to Viet Minh infiltration and counterattack. 

Only a few weeks later another major engagement developed along the 

Black River line at Na San, a strongpoint held by nine full-strength French 

battalions, supported by aircra ft and five batteries of 105-mm. howitzers. Cu t 

off from overland supply, Na San was a fortified area of about fifteen square 

kilometers with an airstrip on the fl oor of a valley. The French fortified the 

surrounding high ground and ran su pplies to the beleaguered fortress by 

air.'9 Probably und erestimating the strength of the defenders, the Viet Minh 

attacked Na San with two regiments. The major fightin g occurred on 23 and 

30 November. The Viet Minh attacked with skill and tenacity. Some French 

outposts received as many as five assau lts in one night, but the defenses 

held. On the morning of 1 December the defenders counted almost 540 

enemy dead on the field. Viet Minh losses probably totaled between six and 

seven thousand. 

Although the French could count Na San as a victory, the intense fighting 

there and elsewhere during the autumn of 1952 severely taxed French resources, particularly those of the Air Force. Under pressure of battle, its 

maintenance facilities, never very effi cient, had collapsed completely. At one 

airfield, for example, advisory group observers discovered only two men 

assigned to overhaul 20-mm. cannon, and they could handle only ten cannon 

a month, less than one-sixth the tota l requ iring maintenance40 

The Viet Minh offensives led to new requests for additional American 

.)8Mcmo, U.S. Army Attache (Col Leo W. H. Shaughnessey) for Heath, 24 Dec 52, sub: Request 

for Comments, records of ACSI. 

3'JClNCPAC Study, Review of Autumn Campaign in Tonkin, Annex B to Inel 1 of Memo, Chief 

of Nava l Operatio ns for }e5, 18 Mar 53, sub: Staff Study (OP - 3QZD3fjcr), CCS 092 Asia 

(6 - 25 - 58), sec. 42, BP pt. 9; Bernardo, The Franco - Viet Minh Waf, pp. 35 - 37. See also, 

O'Ballance, Tile j"docliillfl War, 1945 - 1954, pp. 184 - 86. 

40Air Force Section, MDAP Monthly Rpt, Aug 52. 

159 
Vietnamese Troops of the French Expeditionary Corps ford a stream durillg 

Operation Lorraine. 

French Troops view captured Viet Minh equipment. 
Lookillg for a Way Ollt 

assistance. In December the French government formally asked that U.S. Air 

Force mechanics be sent to Vietnam for a month to perform routine maintenance checks on French C - 47 aircraft. General Trapnell firm ly supported the 

request, and in January 1953 twenty-eight Air Force mechan ics on loan from 

the Far East Air Force arrived to perform the requ ired maintenance and to 

train French ground crews in American techniques. 41 

In the mea ntime, to American officials in both the United Sta tes and 

Vietnam the fighting at Nghia Lo, Phu Doan, and Na San provided a graphic 

illustration of the bankruptcy of French military policy in Vietnam. Although 

the French ca lled their successful defense of Na San an important victory, an 

eva luation team from the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific 

(CINCPAC), which had been at Na San during the engagement, assessed it 

as "an inconclusive battle in a mountain wilderness.,,'2 As the CINCPAC 

team saw it, the French command, with numerical superiority, interior lines 

of communica tions, and absolute command of the air, had chosen to wait 

passively until the enemy moved . After the Viet Minh offensive developed , 

the French, " instead of a vigorous counter-stroke at the enemy's lines of 

communication, laboriously transferred part of a division ahead of the enemy 

with th e clea r intent to establish a line of defense against which the enemy 

would break. " When the French finally did attack two weeks after Operation 

LORRAINE had begun, they staged their attack " not as [aJ decisive stroke but 

as a hit-and-run raid." Even if one accepted that the French had to fight 

a defensive battle, the American observers wrote, they would have done 

far better by holding Phu Doan with a reinforced LORRAINE task force. A 

powerful French force, firmly established across the enemy's lines of communica tions, would have been in an excellen t position "to fight a decisive 

battle under conditions of French choosing. ,,4) French conduct of the entire 

campaign, the observers concluded, had been timid, unimaginative, and 

extremely defensive-minded. 

General Trapnell agreed. He told General Collins that the French had been 

taken by surprise in the autumn campa ign and that they had committed a 

major e rror by failing to make a stand at Phu Doan. "The enemy," Trapnell 

concluded, "retains the initiative. ,,44 

Though correct in many respects, these analyses tended to overemphasize 

the va lue of French numerica l superiority. Intelligence officers on the U.S. 

Army sta ff, while noting that the French had more troops, remarked that this 

ad vantage was offset by the enemy's guerrilla tactics, which obliged the 

French to maintain a large proportion of their forces in static positions. 45 

-ILHistory of Indochina Inciden t, pp. 267 - 68. 

-I 2C1NCPAC Study, Review of Autumn Campaign in Tonkin. 

-I3Ibid. 

-I-IUr, Trapnell to CofSA, 20 Dec 52, CSA 091 Indochina, RG 319 . 

-IsMemo, ACofS G - 2 for CofSA, 14 Dec 52, sub: Situation in Indochina, CSA 09'1 Indochi na, 

RG 319. 

161 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

French Colonial Troops board aircraft at Na Sail. 

The Light Battalion Proposal 

The outcome of the fighting in the faU of 1952 prompted America n officials 

to renew their call for a genuinely effective Vietnamese Army. Since 

reinforcements from metropolitan France appeared unlikely (the French 

Assembly had forbidden use of draftees in Vietnam), increasing the number 

of Vietnamese troops seemed the only answer. In December 1952 General 

Trapnell urged that units for the Vietnamese Army "over and above those 

units already provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff" should be formed on a 

priority ba sis. The forty to fifty additional units would be organized as " light 

battalions." First suggested by the French military adviser to Bao Dai, General 

Marcel Alessandri, the light battalion was envisaged as an infantry unit 

armed only with shoulder weapons, light machine guns, and mortars and 

able to find and destroy the enemy on his own terrain.

46 Each battalion would 

have a cadre of at least seven French offi cers and thirty French noncommissioned officers. 

Although the French commander, General Raoul Salan, agreed to the 

plan, he maintained that the cost was too high for the French. Trapnell 

#>Ltr, Trapnell to CofSA, 20 Dec 52. 

162 
believed that the United States could 

provide the necessary equipment by 

substituting it for material already 

programmed in the fiscal year 1954 

Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 

but such items as pay and rations 

would require additional fundin g. 

Yet Trapnell believed it would be 

money well spent. General Collins 

saw the proposal as an "excellent 

opportunity to persuade the French 

to grant more responsibility to the 

Associated States for participation in 

military matters," and strongly recommended acceptance.

47 Collins suggested that the French training system for the Vietnamese National 

Army should be restructured after a 

system of schools developed for training South Korean troops. Although 

the program would require additional 

Looking for a Way alit 

Vietnamese National Army Troops 

with 81-mm. mortar. 

funds, General Collins believed that Congress would readily support a program along these Iines'"s 

The only dissenting voice came from the State Department. After visiting Vietnam, the director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 

Affairs, Philip W. BonsaI, expressed doubts that the Vietnamese Nationa l 

Army would ever be able to cope with the Viet Minh unless the latter 

were seriously weakened by French military action. He also worried that 

large numbers of the newly armed Vietnamese recruits might defect to the 

Communists. 49 

Untroubled by these considera tions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the 

forty-battalion proposal, and the secretary of defense appointed an ad hoc 

committee to study the plan in detail. Visiting Washington at the end of 

January 1953, General Trapnell explained his ideas to representatives of the 

State Department and the Joint Staff and answered questions from the ad hoc 

committee. He emphasized that additional manpower was absolutely essential 

to achieve military success in Indochina. Since timing was also important, he 

hoped to have the new formations ready by the end of 1953, in time for the 

next campaigning season. He agreed with General Collins that the French 

should adopt the American training methods that had proven effective in 

South Korea and hoped to have senior French and Vietnamese officers visit 

47Msg, Collins to Trapnell, 19 Jan 53, eSA 091 Indochina, RC 319. 

'"'Memo, SGS for CofS, 14 Jan 53, sub: Forty Battalions, G- 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

49Memo, Bonsai for Chief, FE, 18 Nov 52, sub: Report on Visit to Indochina; Ur, BonsaI to 

Donald Heath, 10 Dec 52. Both in files of Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Lot 

580207, records of Dept of State. 

163 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

South Korea to observe American training techniques. Because Trapnell believed the French would stubbornly resist a direct America n role in training 

the Vietnamese, he made no such proposal. On 9 February the ad hoc 

committee reported favorably on the light battalion program and recommended that the United States raise the subject with the French in talks 

scheduled to begin later that month in Washington. 50 

The Unconventional Warfare Option 

I n the continuing search for something to change the pattern of events in Vietnam, a number of American officials came to believe that the best way 

for the French to deal with the unconventional warfare of the Viet Minh was 

to wage unconventional warfare themselves. During 1951 the CIA had suggested to General de Lattre that the French form "counterguerrilla" warfa re 

groups to operate in rebel-controlled territory, but de Lattre had been uninterested . In the spring of 1952 Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. , suggested that the United Sta tes again raise the question with the French during 

a visit to Washington by the French Minister for Indochina Jean Letournea u. 

On the theory that the " natives . .. resented French colonialism," Pace 

wanted to employ Vietnamese orga nized by American agents, a move which 

he believed would "materially reduce the psycholOgical barrier" that existed 

between the French and the Vietnamese. 51 

When Pace asked the Army to report on the desirability of the project and 

whether the Army would be the appropriate agency to run it, the staff was 

less than enthusiastic. The plans and operations officer, Maj. Gen. Reuben E. 

Jenkins, re ported that the staff saw numerous obstacles. The Viet Minh had 

established a firm police state in the areas under their control and had already 

conscripted most of the available manpower. General Jenkins also questioned 

whether political stability would really be increased by arming elements of the 

population of questionable loyalty. He doubted that U.S. control of the program would, in itself, remove the stigma of colonialism.

52 

That exchange of memos for a time ended official American discussion of 

forming unconventional warfare units. Along with the plan for Vietnamese 

light battalions, those discussions reflected an attempt to correct what American military observers saw as the two fundamental weaknesses in the French 

military position, a fa ulty strategy and a lack of manpower. The hope was 

that the light battalions would help to solve both problems at once. If the 

French would grant grea ter independence in military matters to the State of 

SOPrepared Questions for General Trapnell, 29 Jan 53, Annex C to AppendiX A, Report of the 

Ad Hoc Committee to the Assistant Secreta ry Defense, International Security Affai rs (ASO, ISA), 

9 Feb 53, records of ASO, ISA, RG 330. 

s'Memo, Pace for CofSA, 13 Jun 52, sub: Unconventional Wa rfare Plan for Indochina, eSA 091 

Indochina, RG 319. 

52Memo, Maj Cen Reuben E. Je nkins, ACofS G- 3, for Seey of Army, 14 Jun 52, sub: 

Unconventional Warfare in Indochina, eSA 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

164 
Vietnam, that concession would increase the prestige of the Bao Dai government in the eyes of the Vietnamese and make the people more 

willing to oppose the Viet Minh. The 

increased manpower would also 

make possible a more aggressive 

strategy for the Franco-Vietnamese 

forces. 

In the end few of the hoped-for 

results were forthcoming. The plan 

for creating light battalions, like other 

plans for the Vietnamese National 

Army, was soon crippled by squabbles between Bao Dai and the French 

and by the continued indifference of 

the Vietnamese people. Concentrating on the manpower problem while 

Looking for a Way Gilt 

assuming that the political and social Letourneau and Bonnet arrive ill 

problems would take care of them- WI· t 

I . as ung on. 

se ves proved a faIlure. As long as 

the underlying .political problem-the unwillingness of Fra nce to grant meaningful independence to the State of Vietnam and the inability of the Sta te of 

Vietnam to produce leaders who could command the respect and support of 

the people-remained unsolved, the French and their Vietnamese clients 

would never be able to attract the loyalty and support of any large segment of 

the population. And without the support of the people, forming an effective 

army, conventional or otherwise, was impossible. A new administration was 

about to enter office in Washington, but the pattern of simply tinkering with 

strategy, training techniques, and manpower policies was not over. Rather, it 

would continue on a far larger scale. 

165 
) 
10 

The Road to Dien Bien Phu 

Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in january 1953 pledged to new initiatives 

in foreign policy, particularly in Asia. In his first State of the Union message, 

the new president characterized the Indochina War as part of a worldwide 

scheme of Communist aggression. I Secretary of State john Foster Dulles also 

left little doubt that he considered success in Vietnam vital to the defense of 

the free world. In March 1953 Dulles told French Foreign Minister Georges 

Bidault that he and the president believed Korea and Vietnam were parts of a 

single front and that Eisenhower was the first president publicly to recognize 

this 2 

While the new American administration radiated purpose and resolution 

toward Vietnam, French nerves were rapidly wearing thin over a bloody 

conflict that continued to consume thousands of lives and millions of francs. 

Since 1952 an increasing number of French politicians had called for negotiations with the Viet Minh to stop the war, and by early 1953 prominent French 

leaders including newspaper publisher jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and fo rmer Prime Minister Edouard Daladier had joined the ranks of those calling for 

an early end to hostilities. In May 1953 the American embassy in Paris 

reported that non-Communist newspapers were devoting increasing attention 

to the possibility of a negotiated settlement. A French officer in Saigon told 

the head of the U.S. Information Service that "most of the intelligent young 

French military men believed that a negotiated settlement was the only 

solution ."J Marshal Alphonse juin and other high-ranking French offi cers 

were reported to think that France no longer had interests in Indochina worth 

the costs of continuing the struggle there' 

At the time the Eisen hower administration took office, more than 137,000 

lPliblic Papers of ti,e PresidcIIls: Dwight O. Eisen/lOwer, 1953 (Washington, 1960). p. 16. 

2Hist Div, State Dept, Documentary History o f U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, doc. D - 4. 

)Memo for Ambassado r Heath, 9 Jan 53. Incl I to Am Embassy, Saigon, to Stale Dept, 23 Jan 

53, 75tG.OOIl - 2353, records of Dept of State. 

"Statement of French Military Desires Regarding the Role of the United States in Indochina, 

Incl to USARMA to ACofS G- 2, 13 Apr 53,5 - 49-52. records of ACSI. 

167 
Advice alld Su pport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

long tons of American equi pment had been deli vered to the French, including 

some 900 combat vehicles, 15,000 other vehicles, almost 2,500 artillery pieces, 

24,000 automatic weapons, 75,000 small arms, and nearly 9,000 radios. In 

addition, French air units had received 160 F-6F and F-8F fighter aircraft, 

41 B- 26 light bombers, and 28 C - 47 transports plus 155 aircraft engines and 

93,000 bombss Despite such massive assistance America n leaders were still 

largely ignorant of future French plans and programs for Indochina. Washi ngton was receiving a considerable amount of tactical intelligence on the military 

situation in Vietnam, but there was still no exchange of views with Pa ris on 

military strategy, no sharing of plans or eva luations" 

What Washington did know was discouraging. All American observers 

agreed that in operations during 1952 the French had, at best, achieved a 

stalemate. Military observers from Pacific headquarters believed that " decisive 

defeat of the Viet Minh military forces in Indochina is prevented by the 

current attitude of the French Union forces, which is strategically defensive in 

nature and which surrenders the initiative to the enemy.,,7 That atti tude 

persisted although, by Pacific headquarters reckoning, the French forces had 

13 percent more men; greatly superior equipment, logistical support, and 

command and staff experience; and complete control of the air. The Viet 

Minh had won and retained the initiative despite the handicap of " heterogeneous equipment, long supply lines, and inadequate transport."· 

While conceding that the French command " lacked the offensive spirit," 

the Military Assistance AdviSOry Group in Saigon argued that the French 

Expeditionary Corps lacked the numerica l strength to mount an all-out offensive, a more realistic assessment of French resources than was usual among 

U.5. observers. Americans would normally total up the number of French 

battalions, as often as not in cluding the relatively ineffective Vietnamese 

national fo rces, compare them with the estimated number of Viet Minh 

regular and regional units, and prod uce a neat comparison which seemed to 

suggest that the French with their greater mobility enj oyed a substa ntial 

advantage . Yet such calculation took no account of Viet Minh guerrillas and 

of the fact that the strength of the regular and regional Viet Minh forces was 

almost certainly underestimated. Nor did this reckoning consider the special 

nature of the war being waged by the Communists. When an American 

offi cial touring Vietnam in March 1953 asked the French commander in 

Tonkin, Maj. Gen. Francois Gonzalez de Linares, why he did not take 

advantage of the French edge in firepower, armor, and air to "deliver a 

knockout blow," General de Linares replied that the opposing forces in 

5U.S. Assistance EqUipment Furnished up to February 1953, Appendix to Field Estimate of 

French Army Forces, 3 Feb 53, file 370.2, records of MAAG Indochina, RC 334. 

/'Memo, Chief, FE, for Seey of State, 28 Jan 53, sub: Discussions of Indochina Situation With M. 

Maye r and M. Letourneau, Lot 540190, records of Dept of State. 

7Evaluation of Military Ope rations in Indochina, 18 Apr 53, C1NCPAC serial 00043, CCS 092 

Asia (6 - 25 - 48), sec. 42, BP pt. 9, leS records. 

fiField Estimate of Effecti veness of French Union Forces, 3 Feb 53, file 370.2, records n{ ~ •. 

Indochina. 

168 
The Road to Oiell Biell Ph" 

Tonkin were not really in balance. Although both sides had about ninety 

maneuver battalions, the Viet Minh had no posts or communication lines to 

gua rd . The French were obliged to employ more than two-third s of their 

strength to protect their rea r areas, leaving only twenty-five battalions for 

mobile operations. 9 

America n observers also tended to err in assessing the French supply and 

transport system as superior to that of the Viet Minh. In fact, the reverse was 

true, for the road-bound French supply convoys, with hundreds of trucks 

constantly exposed to ambush, were far more vulnerable and less flexible 

than the primitive Viet Minh supply services. The Viet Minh also knew the 

terrain and had large numbers of laborers and porters who could operate 

along concealed routes. Despite their trucks, tanks, planes, and helicopters, 

the French were less mobile in a practica l military sense than were the Viet 

Minh, who could shift entire divisions across vast areas unimpeded and often 

undetected by the French. 

The principal hope for overcoming the deficiencies continued to rest with 

an indigenous Vie tnamese National Army . In commenting on pessimistic 

reports by American military observers in Vietnam, the counselor of the 

embassy in Sa igon, Robert McClintock, noted that such analyses fa iled to take 

into account the potential of that indigenous army. " If we are able to utilize 

native energies for the libera tion of Vietnam," McClintock believed, the military situation would improve. "Once the new native battalions have been 

trained, we may look with ever-increasing confidence to good performance in 

the future.',10 But even though the United States in March 1953 formally 

notified the French government that it would underwrite the light battalion 

proposal first put forward by General Trapnell in December, conflict between 

the French and the Vietnamese continued to delay the project. II Emperor Bao 

Dai wanted the new battalions under his persona l contro\' and the French 

were reluctant to sa nction that step. The French in turn complained that the 

Vietnamese government was dragging its feet in recruiting for the new units. 

Neither the French nor the Vietnamese could agree on the amount or proper 

sharing of projected costs. 12 In May the Viet Minh provided a graphic demonstration of the inadequacies of the Vietnamese Army when three companies 

of Viet Minh troops attacked a training school for cadres at Nam Dinh and 

captured the entire 600-man student body and all the school weapons without 

incurring casualties. 13 

9Am Embassy, Saigon, 10 State Dept, 5 Mar 53, 751G.OOIl3 - 553. records of Dept of State. 

IOLtr, McClintock to Frank C. Nash, 10 Apr 53, Incl of Counselor of State Dept (Douglas 

MacArthur II) to Secy of State, 24 Apr 53, 751G.OO/4 - 2453, records of Dept of State. MacArthur 

"strongly recommended" that Secretary Dulles read McClintock's lettcr becausc it "cast a vcr}' 

interesting light on the way in which our military in Indochina arc prone to rcport. " 

llMFR, R. G. Ferguson, sub: Forty Additional Battalions for Vietnam Army, G - 3 091.3 

Indochina, RG 319. 

12Hcath to State Dept, 4 Mar 53, 751G.OO/3 - 453, and 9 May 53, 7S1G.OO/S - 9S3, both in 

records of Dept of State. 

13Am Consul, Hanoi, to Sta te Dept, 4 May 53, 7S1G.OOIS - 4S3, and 18 May 53, 75 1G.OO/5 -

1853, both in records of Dept of State. 

169 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The Letourneau Plan 

A gainst this backdrop of continued failure and frustration in Vietnam, the 

.fiEisenhower administration took up the search for a way out of the 

impasse. Committed to frugality in government yet also pledged to a vigorous anti-Communist policy in Asia while avoiding any more Korean-style 

involvements, the new administration could afford, even less than its predecessors, to underwrite a continued stalemate in Vietnam. What American 

policymakers now required of France was motion, progress, a plan. 

They made that fact quite clear to the government of Premier Rene 

Mayer, which took office in January 1953. To the French government's 

request for still greater American financial and military aid in Vietnam, Secretary of State Dulles replied that the administration could obtain the additional 

funds from Congress "only if they were convinced that a sound strategic plan 

for Indochina existed and would be energetically carried out." The secretary 

explained that French officials would have to produce a program which 

would result in "the liquidation of the principal enemy forces within twentyfour months.,,14 At the end of March, Mayer came to Washington with Minister for Indochina Jean Letourneau. In a conversation aboard the presidential 

yacht, Williamsbllrg, President Eisenhower told Mayer "in a very pOinted 

manner" that before the United States could consider providing any additional aid, the French would have to produce a plan which "if it did not lead 

to complete victory, would, at least, give hope of an ultimate solution."lS 

That American insistence engendered the so-called Letourneau plan, a 

clever piece of improvisation produced by Letourneau and his staff on the 

spot in Washington. The plan was divided into three phases. In the first, 

French and Vietnamese forces would concentrate on securing rear areas, with 

the most rapid ~gress expected in central and southern Vietnam. The 

secure areas would then be occupied by the newly formed light battalions of 

the VietnameSl!. National Army. In a second phase, as the situation in the 

south stabilized, regular French forces would be increasingly concentrated in 

Tonkin. In the final phase, projected for spring 1955, Franco-Vietnamese 

forces would take the offensive against the Viet Minh main forces and destroy 

them. The plan depended on the creation of an effective Vietnamese army of 

over 120,000 men and on the absence of any devastating new Viet Minh 

offensives during the two years required to carry out the plan.'6 

A series of oral briefings rather than a formal document, the Letourneau 

plan was received with mixed feelings by American officials. Ambassador 

Heath pronounced the plan politically feasible and desirable and predicted 

that the Viet Minh propaganda advantage would be lost when Vietnamese 

14DuUes to Am Embassy, Paris, 19 Mar 53, Hist Div, State Dept, Documentary History of U.s, 

Policy Toward Indochina, doc. 0 - 5. 

15Notes Made by Assistant Secretary Frank C. Nash of Initial Meeting With French Delegates, 

Frank C. Nash subject file, RG 330. 

16Appendix to loci 1 to res 19921217, 22 Apr 53, Comments Concerning the Proposed French 

Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of the War in Indochina, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 39, leS 

records. 

170 

[ 
The Road to Dien Bien PllII 

Na tional Army troops finall y conquered and controlled the southern region, 

but the chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, General Trapnell, 

expressed disappointment at the plan's timetable.' ? He believed the plan was 

too conservative and cautious but warned that the French high command 

would resist any pressure to modify it. General Trapnell preferred the plan, 

"slow and expensive" as it was, to the alternative of continued inaction. 18 

For want of anything better, Washington officials were also inclined to 

accept the Letourneau plan. While findin g obvious political drawbacks and 

questioning whether the Viet Minh would obligingly remain static long 

enough for the Franco-Vietnamese forces to train and expand, the State 

Department was willing to go along on the political aspects if the Defense 

Department found the plan "militarily acceptable."'9 Echoing the objections of 

General Trapnell and the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed 

that the plan relied excessively on small unit operations but pronounced it 

"workable." In the privacy of their meeting room the chiefs were considerably more pessimistic. Air Force Chief of Staff Genera l Hoyt S. Vandenberg 

delivered a scathing critique of French military methods in Vietnam and of 

their failure to take the Vietnamese into their confidence. Army Chief J. 

Lawton Collins spoke at length on French shortsightedness in failing to use 

training methods proved in Korea. General Vandenberg called for "a 100 

degree change in French political and military affairs in Indochina" and the 

dispatch of two additional French divisions to the area.'o 

The proposal to send large-scale French reinforcements to Vietnam, which 

would have entailed the assignment of conscripts as well as volunteers 

to duty there, was one long favored by some State Department officials. 2I 

The French government had considered such a course on at least half a 

dozen occasions since December 1950. In May 1952 Marshal Juin himself had 

requested that the Committee of National Defense take up the question. 

Yet no French government was inclined to face the political consequences 

of such a decision. 22 The Letourneau plan thus contained no mention of 

reinforcements. 

Lest the French think that the American military was enthusiastic about 

the Letourneau plan, the Joint Chiefs cautioned the American embassy in 

Paris to point out that they accepted it only with great reservations. 23 Clearly 

no one in the American government was rea lly satisfied with the Letourneau 

plan, and during talks in Paris in April Secretary Dulles told the French 

17Heath to State Dept, 31 Mar 53, Incl to leS 19921215, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 39, leS records. 

IIIYiews of General T. 1. H . Trapnell on the Letourneau Plan, lncl B to leS 19921214, 31 M ar 53, 

CCS 092 Asia, sec. 39, jeS records. 

19Dept Working Papers, 11 Apr 53, lncl to Philip W. Bonsai to Fra nk C. Nash, 13 Apr 53, Seey 

of Defense 091. 3 Indochina, RG 330. 

2°Memo, FE Div for Mr. Ma tlhews, 4 May 53, sub: Evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff o f the 

Le tourneau Plan for Military Operatio ns in Indochina, Lot 580207, records of Dept of State. 

2l Memo, Philip W. Bo nsai for Douglas MacArthur II, 20 Apr 53, Lot 58D207, records of Oept of 

State. 

llNote d'information: Le recours au contingent, French Documents file, CMH. 

23State Dept to Embassy, Paris, 24 Apr 53, records of Dept of State. 

171 
Advice and Support: Tile Early Years, 1941 -1960 

frankly that the Letourneau plan was not the type of dynamic program that 

would convince a skeptical Congress. 24 

A new sense of crisis developed in mid-April 1953 when three Viet Minh 

divisions invaded neighboring Laos, which until then had been a backwater 

in the war. By the end of the month the roya l capital of Luang Prabang was 

partially surrounded, and French strongpoints at Muong Khoua and on the 

Plain of Jars were isolated . In early May the Viet Minh suddenly withdrew, 

leaving the French and Laotians badly shaken and Laotian Communist followers of Prince Souphanouvong encouraged and strengthened. The Laos 

invasion reinforced the American conviction that the French were foundering. 

The president's special assistant for Na tional Security Affairs, Charles D. 

Jackson, told the National Security Council that until the invasion the president " had imagined that in due course, however slowly, the French would 

overcome their enemies. This confidence is now shattered ." The president 

believed that if Laos were lost, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow and 

" the gateway to India would be opened .,,25 Counselor Robert McClintock 

wrote from Saigon that the time had arrived to " tell our French fri ends very 

frankly what we think ought to be done by them if they are to receive the 

added aid they want. The new administration has every right.. to demand 

that new conditions be met. ,,26 The administration was preparing to do 

precisely that. Eisenhower was convinced that " two and only two developments would really save the situation in French Indochina." The first was a n 

official statement from the French government guaranteeing independence to 

the Associated States as soon as the fighting in Vietnam ended. The second 

was a dynamiC new leader. Most of the French generals in Vietnam "struck 

the President as a poor lot. ,,27 

In early May 1953 Eisenhower addressed a frank letter to the American 

ambassador in France, C. Douglas Dillon, for delivery to Premier Mayer. 

Except for a word or two, the first portion of the letter could have been 

written by Dean Acheson. It repeated the same demand American officials 

had been making since early 1950: France must grant real indepen dence to 

Vietnam. The president called on the French government to make a "clear 

and unequivocal public announcement ... that France seeks self-rule for 

Indochina and that practica l political freedom will be an accomplished fa ct as 

soon as victory against the communists is won." If the first portion of the 

president's letter held no surprise for the French, the second part may have 

caused some raised eyebrows. Eisenhower urged Mayer to appoint a new 

commander in chief for Indochina, a "forceful and inspirational leader" in the 

tradition of de Lattre. Eisenhower recommended either Lt. Gen. Jean E. 

24First Session, Bipartite U.S.-French Conversations, 22 Apr 53, Hist Div, State Dept, Oocumenta7s History of U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, doc. 0 - 13. 

sMin, 141 51 Mee ting of the National Security Council (NSC), 28 Apr 53, C. O. Jackson Papers, 

Eisenhower Library. 

26Ltr, McClintock to Douglas MacArthur II, 21 Apr 53, 751G.OO/4 - 2153, records of Dept of 

State. 

27Min, 143d Meeting of the NSC, 3 May 53, Eisenhowcr-as-President Papers, Eisenhower 

Library. 

172 
VaUuy, who had long experience in 

Indochina and was the officer respon- , 

sible for the bloody bombardment 

of Haiphong in 1946, or General 

Augustin Guillaume, who had commanded French occupation troops in 

Germany and was then inspector of 

French forces in North Africa. 28 

Yet even as the president's message arrived in Paris, the French government was announcing the name 

of the new commander for Vietnam: 

Lt. Gen. Henri Navarre. Navarre was 

probably on no America n list of candidates for the Indochina commandU.S. officers who had known him in 

NATO claimed that he was unaggressive, lacked organiza tional ability, 

and was inclined to vacillate. One 

general even believed that Navarre 

The Road to Dien Bien Ph" 

General Navarre 

had been appointed to give the French government a sca pegoat for anticipated failures in Indochina 29 A relatively junior lieutenant general, Navarre 

had been serving as chief of staff to Marshal Alphonse Juin, commander of 

NATO forces in Central Europe. He had never served in Vietnam, but Paris 

considered that "absence of prejudice toward operations in Indochina" as 

something of an asset. 30 Having spent a number of years in pacification 

campaigns in Morocco and Syria, he was considered an expert on counterguerrilla operations. While the choice of Navarre failed to impress American 

officials, there was a general feeling that any change would probably be for 

the better, and that the choice of a new commander was far less important 

than the adoption of an aggressive, systematic program to bring the wa r to a 

successful conclusion. 

During the Eisenhower-Mayer talks in March, the latter had invited the 

United States to send a military mission to Indochina to look into the French 

requirements for additiona l aid. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met in late 

May 1953 to discuss sending such a mission, they agreed that it should be 

headed by an Army general and selected Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, then 

commander of the U.S. Army, Pacific, and a veteran of combat in North 

Africa, Italy, France, and Korea . The choice was particularly apt in that 

O'Daniel was recommended by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral 

Arthur W. Radford, whose headquarters would have to support the mission. 

28Eisenhower to C. Douglas Dillon, 7 May 53, 751G.OO/S- 753, records of Dept of State. 

29Memo, Acting ACofS G - 2 for CofSA, 20 May 53, sub: Personality and Chara cter Assessment 

of Lt Cen H enri Navarre, records of ACSI. 

JOBernard 6. Fall, Hell ill a Very Small Place: Tile Siege of Diell Bie" Plw (New York: 1. B. 

Lippincott Co., 1967), p. 29. 

173 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Other members of the mission were to be named by the va rious services. 31 

The instructions drawn up for General O'Daniel clearly showed that the 

Joint Chiefs intended the mission as far more than a survey of French military 

requirements. O'Daniel was to gain "sufficient detailed knowledge of French 

military plans to acquaint U.S. leaders thoroughly with the plan of future 

conduct of the war in Indochina, the chances for ultimate victory," as well as 

the progress made in developing indigenous forces and strengthening the 

French Expeditionary Forces. He was to impress upon the French the necessity for " revision and aggressive implementation of [their] military plans for 

successfully concluding the war in Indochina," expanding and modernizing 

their training faciliti es, and accelerating the transfer of responsible military 

leadership to the Associated States. 32 

Essentially, the Joint Chiefs wanted General O'Daniel to make an overa ll 

judgment as to whether the French had a chance of succeeding in Vietnam. 

Although never explicitly stated, that requirement was reflected throughout 

the instructions. One paragraph, for example, requested the chief of mission's 

comments on whether the "scheduled build-up of Associated States forces 

during 1953 and 1954 ... together with existing French forces [would] be 

sufficient to accomplish the decisive defeat of the Viet Minh by 1955.,,33 There 

was no indication of what might happen should the mission return with a 

negative report. 34 

The O'Daniel mission arrived in Saigon on 20 June 1953, exactly a month 

after Genera l Navarre had assumed command . Unlike ODaniel, a harddriving combat soldier whose nickname, " Iron Mike," testified to his toughness and tenacity in three wars, Navarre had made his reputation mainly as a 

staff officer. While O'Daniel was forthright and blunt (as military attache in 

Russia, he once told reporters that Moscow resembled "a vast slum" ), 

Navarre was known for reticence and inscrutability35 A fri endly writer noted 

that Navarre preferred to work alone and had " kept from the years he spent 

in intelligence the respect for secrecy and a taste for mystery."36 A critic 

observed that " physically and morally he was a cat. ... With him everything 

took place in the mind."" Yet for all the differences in temperament between 

O'Daniel and Navarre, the two almost immediately established a friendly 

relationship. 

:UMFR, Joint Secre tariat, 29 May 53, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48), sec. 42, JCS records. Lt . Gen. 

Robert C. Taber, at the time assistant Army attache in Saigon, observed: "I do not believe the 

choice was apt! They were sending an outstanding field soldier with no diplomatic or linguistic 

ability into a sophisticated arena where even the people immersed in the operation had a hard 

time understanding it. " Marginal Comments by Gen Taber on Draft Manuscript, Inel to Ltr, Lt 

Gen Robe rt C. Taber to Chief of Military History, 10 Oct 79, Historians files, CM H. 

32Proposed Terms o f Reference for the Chie f of the U.s. Mil itary Mission to Indochina, 10 Jun 

53, U.S.-Vietnam Relatiolls, 9:61 - 62. 

Dlbid ., 9:66. 

3-IIntcrv, author with John W. O'Danie l, 4 - 5 Feb 75, Historians files, CMH. 

3510hn W. O'Daniel Obituary, Wasllington Post, 29 Mar 75. 

36Max Oli vier, "Portrait du General Nava rre," Itldoellitle - Sud-Est Asiatique, February 1954, p. 

83. 

371ule5 Roy, TIle Baltle of Diw Biell PIIIl (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 6 - 7. 

174 
The Rond to Oiell Biell PIIII 

At O'Daniel's urging and with his assistance Navarre prepared an aggressive new concept for the conduct of operations in Indochina, soon to become 

known as the Navarre plan. Navarre proposed "taking the initiative immediately" in local attacks, with a full-sca le offensive to follow in September 1953. 

In the interim, rear-area units in static defensive positions were to be consolidated into a mobile striking force and maneuver battalions combined into 

regiments and divisions. The Vietnamese National Army was to be trained 

and equipped at an accelerated pace and given progressively greater responsibility in the conduct of operations,38 As the American mission traveled 

throughout Vietnam, O'Danie l became convinced that Navarre and his principal commanders were determined "to see this war through to success at an 

ea rly date." He detected an "increased aggressiveness in attitude" and a 

greater receptivity to American ideas and suggestions. Q'Daniel returned 

home convinced that Navarre had "brought a new aggressive psychology to 

the war" and that the United States should " henceforth ... think in terms of 

the 'Navarre concept' in association with the war in Indochina."39 

Others were less optimistic. Throughout O'Dan iel's visit the service 

attaches and CIA representatives attempted to correct what they believed to 

be the excessively favorable picture the French had been pain ting for his 

benefit. "You may ask why we didn't convince him," a former Army attache 

later wrote. "Naturally a three-star general is more inclined to believe a 

friendly nation's four-star [sic] general who is in the midst of fighting a 

war.""o Although agreeing with O'Dan iei that the Navarre concept of operations appeared sound and in keeping with French capabilities, Adrniral 

Radford cau tioned that only the test of actua l performance would show 

whether the reported new aggressive attitude really existed. Radford nevertheless recommended that the United States give France "full an d positive 

support.,,41 

For the moment the outlook appeared unusually promising, for in late 

June 1953 a new French governr.1ent headed by Premier Joseph Laniel took 

office pledged to prosecute the war to an ea rly and successful conclusion. The 

new premier swept old hands from the government's Indochina agencies and 

embraced the Nava rre p lan as the official blueprint for victory. Laniel eve n 

agreed to send reinforcements from France to bolster Navarre's striking 

power. To the Associated States th e French promised to "perfect their 

independence" within the French Union by giving them wider autho rity in 

military, political, financial, and lega l affairs.'12 

:lHReport of U.S. Joint Mission to Indochina, U Gen John W. O'Daniel Thru CINCPAC to lCS, 

14 Jul 53 (hereafter ci ted as O'Daniel Report), U.S.-Vietnam RciatiOlIS, 9:69. 

:l9Ibid., 9:96 . 

. ,oMarginal Comments by Gen Taber on Draft Manuscript, ]nel to Ur, Taber to Chief of Military 

History, 10 Oct 79 . 

. IILtr, CiNCPAC to lCS, 22 Jul 53, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 44, lCS records. 

42Hammer, The Slrugxle for Indochina, pp. 3D ] - 02. 

175 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Financing the French 

A merican leaders were fin ally dea ling with a government that seemed to 

ft. have the determination to fight the war to a decisive conclusion, a plan 

for d oing so, and a commitment to real independence for the states of 

Indochina. The French reinforcements, the Navarre plan, and the accelerated 

build up of the Vietnamese fo rces contemplated by the Laniel government, 

however, would aU cost American money. At the end of July, La niel told 

Ambassador Dillon that France would require an additional $400 million in 

aid for Ind ochina over the next year·3 

Washington leade rs felt they had no choice but to go along. As the State 

Department noted, the armistice just concluded in Korea would undoubtedly 

increase the pressure on the French government for a negotiated settlement 

in Vietnam, which, in the American view, "would mean the eventual loss to 

Communism not only of Indo-China but of the whole of Southeast Asia." A 

French withdrawa l from Indochina would leave the United States with the 

unwelcome alternatives of either assuming the French burden or facing the 

certain loss of this critical area. The Laniel government was lIalmost certainly 

the last French government which would undertake to continue the war 

in Indo-China."" On 5 August 1953 the State Department recommended 

approval of the $400 million increase, and the next day the Na tional Security 

Council endorsed the additional funds " providing the Department of State, 

the Foreign Operations Administration, and the join t Chiefs of Staff were 

willing to affirm that the French program held promise of success and could 

be implemented .,,45 The joint Chiefs of Staff were inclined to concur. After 

expressing the usual cautions concerning past French performance and the 

need for close liaison " together with friend ly but firm encouragement and 

advice," the joint Chiefs declared that "if vigorously pursued militarily in 

Indochina and supported politica lly in France, the Navarre concept offers a 

promise of success suffi cient to warra nt appropriate additional U.S. aid .,,'6 

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson was about to submit the views of 

the Joint Chiefs to the State Departmen t when, near the end of August 1953, 

disquieting news arrived from Vietnam. General Trapnell and the three service attaches reported that the French apparently had no plans for implementing the large-sca le autumn offensive called for in the Navarre plan . The 

reorganiza tion of the French battalions into larger units was "still in the 

plan ning stages," and the reinforcemen ts from France had amounted not to 

two d ivisions, as General O'Daniel had hoped, but to a few infa ntry battalions. There was also no sense of urgency in the tra ining of senior 

Vietnamese commanders and staff officers, and no French military assistance 

advisory group had yet materialized. 47 

° Dillon to State Dept, 29 1ul 53, 751G.OOI7 - 2953, records of Dcpt of State. 

4"Memo, Dept of State for National Security Council, 5 Aug 53, sub: Further United Slates 

Sugport for Fra nce and the Associated States of Indochina. U.S.-Vietl1f11/1 Relations, 9: 128. 

H istory of Indochina Incident, p. 284. 

46Memo, Chairma n, Jes, for Seey of Defense, 11 Aug 53, sub: The Navarre Concept for 

Operations in Indochina, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 9: 134 - 35. 

'I 7Msg, Trapnell to CJNCPAC, DAIN 299535, 24 Aug 53, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. General 

176 
The Road to Dien Bien PIIII 

Tra pnell reported further that the French were showing as Little enthusiasm as ever about adopting U.S. training methods. French officers and 

instructors had repeatedly visited American training schools in South Korea, 

w here, th e America ns believed, results were obvious. Still, they remained 

unconvinced that the Ame rica ns had anything to teach them in Vietnam. 

Although the chief of the French general staff, Marshal juin, returned from 

South Korea with high praise for "the magnificent effort in trai ning the ROK 

[Republic of Korea] divisions," he doubted that the school method was 

applicable in Vietnam since the Vietnamese cou ld ha rdly hope to recru it and 

train troops on the scale of the United States in South Korea.-'" A joint 

American - South Korean team that visited the French training centers in 

Vietnam reported that the centers were operating at a very limited capacity by 

U.S. sta nda rds and that the basic training provided to the Vietnamese was 

insufficient. Because the classes were not staggered, the centers cou ld take 

fewer students. Observing that the wa rs in Vietnam and in Korea had little in 

common, they noted that "Vietnamese political and military leaders have not 

yet developed the same intense desire to e radicate" the enemy as had the 

Koreans. 49 

Even as those disquieting reports were be ing received, new members were 

appointed to the joint Chiefs of Sta ff, including General Matthew B. Ridgway 

as the ch ief of staff of the Army, Admira l Robert B. Ca rney as chief of naval 

operations, and Admiral Radford as chairman. Confronted with the reports 

from Vietnam and just returned from duty as Commander in Chief, Pacific, 

and United Nations commander in South Korea, respectively, Radford and 

Ridgway may have been more skeptical about the Nava rre plan than were 

their predecessors. In any case, the new joint Chiefs withd rew the earlier 

endorsement of the plan and submitted an even more cautious memorandum 

for forwarding to the State Department. They decla red that milita ry success in 

Indochina depended on "crea ting a politica l climate in the country which will 

provide the incentive for [the] natives to su pport the French and supp ly them 

with adequate intelligence." Noting French lassitude in implementing their 

plan as reported by Genera l Trapnell, the joint Chiefs recommended that 

additional U.S. support be made contingent upon actua l French performance 

and French willingness to take and act upon American military advice. 50 

Yet the United States still had no acceptable alte rnati ve to supporting the 

French . If a negotiated settlement of the war was intolerable, then the only 

choice was to bankroll the Navarre plan and hope for the best. On I September the Fre nch government formally submitted its request for $385 million in 

additional aid, and a week later the National Securi ty Council recommended 

Q'Daniel had particularly stressed the importance of divisions which "endowed with a divisional 

concept of teamwork, conti nuity, impetus, and employment of artillery could provide the military 

balance to assure an early victory . ... I feel that any addition other than in divisional organization would be in error." O'Da niel Report, U.S. -Vic/llam Rela/iolls, 9:76 . 

. II:I Hcath to State Dept, 4 Mar 53 . 

. 

19Report of U.S.-ROK Training Mission to Indochina, 17 Apr 53, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

soMemo, Radford for Secy of Defense, 28 Aug 53, sub: The Navarre Concept for Operations in 

Indochina, U.S. -Vic/llam Rela/iolls, 9:140 - 41. 

177 
Advice and Support: Tlte Early Years, 1941 -1960 

Generals Hinh and Taylor during Hilllt's visit to obse/7Je U.S. traillillg of 

Korean armed forces. 

to the president that the request be met, subject to a French promise to 

pursue the Navarre plan vigorously and to grant rea l independence to the 

Associated States. 51 At the end of the month the president approved the 

expenditure. Since Congress had already adjourned and a request for a 

supplemental appropriation seemed politically unwise, the administration 

shifted funds to Indochina from other foreign assistance programs. 

The president's decision to divert funds to the new French assistance 

program touched off an immediate reaction by individual congressmen, many 

of whom expressed concern over the effect that this diversion would have on 

NATO military posture. Some congressional leaders doubted that the administration would be able to persuade Congress to appropriate the large amounts 

of money necessary to finance the Navarre plan in 1954 and 1955. Congressman John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, a Democratic leader in the House 

of Representatives, expressed concern that if the Navarre plan failed the 

United States might be obliged to deploy troops to Indochina. Although 

5JFurther U. S. Suppo rt for Operations in Indochina, NSC 161st Meeting. 9 Sep 53, Ite m 2; 

Dulles to Am Embassy, Paris, 9 Sep 53. Both in U.S.-Vietllllm Relations, 9:144 - 49 and ISO, 

respectively. 

178 
The Road to Dien Bien PlllI 

McCormack agreed to back the plan in the House, he trusted the administration realized it was a calculated risk. 52 

Just how risky the commitment to the Navarre plan might be was revea led 

by another military setback in Vietnam during the autumn of 1953. The 

French had launched a special operation to clear Bui Chu in Tonkin in order 

to install a numbe r of Vietnamese light battalions as regional security troops. 

They then turned over responsibility for the sector to the Vietnamese National 

Army. Soon afte rward regular and regional Viet Minh forces from two neighboring provinces attacked. With little artillery support and no radio communications, the inexperienced Vietnamese battalions were badly mauled. By 

October the military situation had so de teriorated that the French were 

obliged to resume control of the province . 53 There were mutual recriminations. The Vietnamese Army commande r, General Nguyen Van Van, maintained that the lig ht battalions had been forced to stand up to regular Viet 

Minh units, something they had never been designed to do. In any case, the 

episode badly tarnished the reputation of the light battalions. 

Political developments were also discouraging. The Vietnamese National 

Congress, apparently taking literally the French invitation to " pe rfect independence," in October refused to have any furth e r dealings with France 

under the existing system and demanded that Vietnam be allowed to leave 

the French Union." That action aroused widespread indignation in France, 

making it again apparent that, despite talk of protecting Vietnam from communism, the main French objective remained the preserva tion of French 

interests. 

Yet if the American commitment to the Navarre plan was to make sense, 

that fa ct had to be resolutely denied. American leaders had to believe, as 

Dulles told the American Legion in September 1953, that Vietnam was " no 

longer a French colony but [a country] w here complete independence is now 

in the making . ,,55 The refusa l to acknowledge that France was in Vietnam to 

advance national ends rather than to stop communism led inevitably to a 

reluctance to accept that France would quit Indochina not when communism 

was vanquished but w hen the French had concluded that the sacrifices outweighed the ga ins. 

The Second O'Daniel Visit 

At the time of General O'Daniel's first visit to Vietnam, Gene ral Nava rre 

and other French officers had repeatedly encouraged him to return in a 

few months "to witness the progress we will have made," and on 6 Novem52Memo, John H. Oh ly for Director, FAD, 17 Sep 53, sub: Congressional Reaction to the 

Indochin .. Program, OMA Indochina file, RC 330. 

s3Am Consul, Hanoi (Paul J. Sturm), to State Dept, 14 Oct 53, 751G.OOIlO - 1453, records of 

Dept o f State. 

S:llbid. 

5sAdd ress by the Honorable John Foste r Dulles, Secretary of State, Before the American Legion 

at J(j el Audit orium, S1. Louis, Missouri , Wednesday, 2 September 1953, U.S. -Vietllum {<elatiolls, 

9,142. 

179 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

ber 1953 he arrived in Sa igon for a second look. 56 Concluding that the Red 

River Delta was the vital battlefield, O'Daniel urged General Nava rre to seal 

off the delta by establishing numerous small, mutually supporting posts along 

a perimeter, which would be completely wired in and controlled by fire from 

the posts. 57 Navarre replied that he had considered such a plan but had 

concluded that he had insufficient means to seal off the delta and at the same 

time take the offensive aga inst the enemy's main forces. 

Despite that negative response, General O'Daniel found reason for optimism. A mobile stri king force was being formed in Tonkin, and activation of 

the light batta lions was proceeding. The French, O'Da niel believed, " have 

established a far better situation than existed during the last dry season. " sa 

He was also pleased that General Navarre had agreed to accept fOllr America n officers on his staff. Since they would be working at the French operations center, O'Daniel hoped the Americans would be able to improve liaison 

with the French and to exert some influence on the staffS 9 Navarre also 

agreed to a small increase in the Military Assistance Advisory Group. 

To provide the advisory group with a tactical intelligence capability to 

compensate for what the Americans considered unreliable French intelligence, 

Navarre allowed the group to bring in a combat intelligence detachment, 

a step for which General Trapnell had been seeking approval for several 

months·o Detachment P, 8533d Army Attache Unit (Special Foreign Assignment), arrived in Hanoi in December 1953. The unit consisted of 4 officers 

and 9 enlisted men, employed 7 Vietnamese, and operated directly under the 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Washington. Its mission was to 

obtain such data on Viet Minh forces as unit histories, prisoner of war 

interrogation reports, and logistica l capabilities estimates, as well as information on any Chinese units or individua ls operating with the Viet Minh · ' 

Although French concessions had been few, General O'Daniel returned to 

Washington with his basic faith in French leadership unimpaired. "We should 

fully support Genera l Navarre, in whose success we have such a large stake," 

said O'Daniel. 62 Only later would O'Daniel conclude that his assessment was 

overoptimistic and that he had been misled by an impressive show of energy 

and activity probably staged for his benefit. 6) But by the fall of 1953 few other 

American military officials were willing to go along completely with such an 

optimistic report. The Commande r in Chief, Pacific, Admira l Felix Stump, for 

example, "agreed in general" but warned that ultimate victory could not be 

achieved until sufficient Vietnamese forces were available to establish effective 

56Q'Daniel Report. U .S.·Viefllflm Relatiolls, 9:71. 

57Progress Report on M ilitary Situation in Indochina, 19 N ov 53, Appendix to Incl A , Jes 

19921260, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 52, leS records. 

5illbid. 

59lnterv, author with Q'Daniel, 4 Feb 75. 

6OMemo, N. E. Halaby for Under Seey of Army, 25 Apr 53, sub: Combat Intell igence Detachme nt to U.s. Army Atlache, Indochina, OSA 340.09 Indoch ina, RG 319. 

61Memo, Under Seey of Army (EMI O. Johnson) for ASO (ISA), sub: Combat Intelligence 

Section, G-3 091 Indochina, RC 319. 

62Progress Report on Military Situation in Indochina, 19 Nov 53. 

6Jlnterv, author with O'Daniel. 4 Feb 75. 

180 
The Road to Dien Bien Phil 

control of cleared areas and until " the native population has been won over 

by anti-communist psychological warfare." Admiral Stump also hoped that 

French and American politica l leaders would once again reaffirm their determination to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. 64 

One U.S. Army observer, Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, a member of the 

joint Staff who accompanied Vice President Richard M. Nixon on a factfinding tour to Southeast Asia soon after O'Daniel returned, would not 

accept even Admira l Stump's measured optimism. "Navarre talks," observed 

Caraway, "but there is nothing stirring at the grass roots." Caraway reported 

that the French had failed to free any appreciable number of battalions from 

static defense duties, that 60 percent of the Red River Delta was under Viet 

Minh control, and that the French were hard put even to maintain communications with outlying regions. "After dark," said Caraway, "the French hold 

only Hanoi and Haiphong. " The only French operation of any size then 

under way had fai led to make contact with major enemy units 65 The sizable 

Vietnamese forces called for in the Navarre plan did not exist, and the 

competence of those operating with the French was so marginal as to pose 

a haza rd to the French troops. "The French are not interested in producing indigenous forces," observed Caraway; their training system for the 

Vietnamese was unsatisfactory, yet they had no wish for the United States to 

exercise any responsibili ty for training. 

The U.S. Army attache in Saigon, Col. Leo W. H. Shaughnessey, was as 

blunt as General Caraway, declaring that after six months of the Navarre plan 

the French were still on the defensive and appeared unlikely to change.'''' The 

assistant chief of staff for intelligence generally agreed with Shaughnessey's 

findings and pointed out that other high U.5. officials had also found the 

O'Daniel report too optimistic 6 7 

When the joint Strategic Plans Committee prepared an indorsement of the 

O'Daniel report for signature by the joint Chiefs which noted " real military 

progress" in Vietnam and concluded that "prospects for victory are increasingly encouraging," General Ridgway opposed such unqualified acceptance. 

Reflecting the views of the Army staff, Ridgway objected to statements that 

the French Union forces had "wrested the initiative from the enemy" and 

wanted the joint Chiefs to point out explicitly that the entire O'Daniel report 

was "overly optimistic." Although the joint Chiefs declined to use that 

phrase, they agreed at Ridgway's insistence to state that military progress had 

been " limited" and that development of a large and effective indigenous force 

and a psychological warfare capability remained indispensable requirements 

for French victory.68 

""Msg, CINCPAC to eNO, DAI N 2565 1, 2 Dec 53, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48). sec. 5, OP pt. 10, 

leS record s. 

65Ltr, Caraway to CofSA, 23 Nov 53, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 3 19. 

66U.S.-Vietllam Relations, vol. 1, pt. II, sec. f1. A.2, p. A - 39. 

b7 ACSI to CofSA, 17 Dec 53, sub: Critique of French Operations in Indochina, G - 3 09 1 

Indochina, RC 319. 

68Memo, CofSA, 19 Dec 55, sub: O'Daniel Report, JSPC 14811400, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 57, leS records. 

181 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Dien Bien Phu 

As American leaders deba ted progress under the Navarre plan, the ultimate fate of that plan and of the entire French campaign in Vietnam was 

about to be decided. On 20 November 1953, 3,000 French paratroopers 

descended upon a broad valley in the Tai country close to the Laotian frontier 

near a village called Dien Bien Phu. The precise reasons behind the French 

decision to occupy and hold Dien Bien Phu remain obscure. General Navarre 

later justified the operation as necessary to defend northern Laos against a 

renewed Viet Minh invasion, but the French commander in Tonkin, Maj. 

Gen. Rene Cogny considered Dien Bien Phu useful only as a guerrilla base 

for Tai partisans operating against the Viet Minh in northwestern Tonkin and 

Laos69 French leaders sometimes spoke of Dien Bien Phu as bait to lure the 

Viet Minh into a costly confrontation like the one at Na San in November 

1952. General O'Daniel later observed that Navarre might have been influenced by the example of American "killer" operations in Korea, in which a 

unit would be purposely exposed to attack in order to draw the enemy into 

the range of American artillery. In the case of Dien Bien Phu, however, 

O'Daniel saw the idea as entirely inappropriate. 7o 

Reports of American observers reflected the French confusion about the 

real purposes of the Dien Bien Phu operation. A day after the assault on the 

valley, General Navarre assured Ambassador Heath that " there is no intention of establishing a new Na San at Dien Bien Phu" but rather a " base for 

positive and offensive operations."" In December General Cogny confided to 

the American consul at Hanoi that he would "be surprised" if the enemy 

could maintain more than two divisions in the Tai country. In fact, during the 

next two months the Viet Minh were to move four infantry divisions and an 

artillery division into the country around Dien Bien Phu. Cogny confidently 

asserted that the commander at Dien Bien Phu, Col. Christian de Castries, 

could be counted on " to seize the initiative and not remain behind defensive 

positions. lin 

The French consulted neither General Trapnell nor any other member of 

the American advisory group before the operation. Nor was there at first any 

particular America n concern about the action- no one saw it as the beginning 

of the decisive phase of the French struggle for Vietnam. The U.s. Army's 

assistant chief of staff for intelligence, for example, considered it simply 

another French operation designed to keep the enemy off balance while the 

mobile striking force was being assembled in the Red River Delta. 73 

Yet by January 1954 the Military Assistance Advisory Group was becoming 

69Fa lt Hell ill a Very Small Place, pp. 34- 35; Rene Cogny, "La Ubre Confession du General 

Co.,§ny," L'Exprcss, 6 December 1963. 

Intcrv, author with O' Daniel, 3 Feb 75. 

71 Heath to Sta le Dept, 23 Nov 53, 751G.OO/11 - 2353, records of Dept of State . 

nAm Consul, Hanoi (Sturm), to Slate Dept, 10 Dec 53, 7S IC.OO/12 - 1053, records of Dcpt of 

State. 

7JM emo, ACofS G - 2 for CofSA, 17 Dec 53, sub: Critique of French Operations in Indochina, 

G - 3091 Indochina, RG 319. 

182 
The Rand to Dien Bien Phu 

General Navarre (right) confers with Gelleral Cagily (left) nlld Colollel de 

Cnstries (center). 

concerned. General Trapnell warned that the French at Dien Bien Phu were 

in serious danger. Since the French forces were "operating from an inferior 

defensive position, facing an enemy battle corps stronger by at least one 

division," and depending entirely upon "overtaxed air facilities" for resupply, 

he gave them only a fifty-fifty chance of surviving.74 Trapnell was alarmed 

about the overall military situation as well. If the French saw their forces at 

Dien Bien Phu as a barrier to renewed invasion of Laos, they were mistaken, 

for in December 1953 the Viet Minh had returned to Laos, and General 

Trapnell considered that " the present situation bears a striking resemblance to 

last yea r's pattern in which the campaign season fo und the French in widely 

scattered defensive positions." They had again lost the initiative and were 

bei ng seriously threatened not only at Dien Bien Phu but also in Laos and 

along the Red River. 75 

General Navarre meanwhile had begun to complain about delays in d eliveries of American materiel and to charge that the Military Assistance Advisory Group had modified or reduced his requests for aid before forwarding them to Washington. " 1 cannot accept having my potential whittled away 

74Msg, Trapnell to CINCPAC, Jan 54, G-3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

7SLtr, Trapnell to C1NCPAC, 2 Jan 54, copy in Historians files, CMH. 

183 
Advice and Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

in such a manner," protested Navarre in an indignant letter to General 

Trapnell?6 American officials hastened to reassure Navarre and even arranged 

for certain items programmed for fiscal year 1954 to be delivered ahead of 

schedule. But they believed that Navarre was actually trying to document 

excuses for his probable failure to meet the goals of the Navarre plan during 

the coming yearn 

Such skepticism about France's chances of success was not yet evident in 

Washington . NSC policy paper 177, United States Objectives and Courses of 

Action With Respect to Southeast Asia, which President Eisenhower approved 

on 16 January 1954, still reflected an essentia lly optimistic assessment of the 

overall military situation. "With continued U.S. economic and material assistance," the paper stated, " the Franco-Vietnamese forces are not in danger 

of being militarily defeated by the Viet Minh. "78 Eisenhower nevertheless 

remained markedly concerned about the situation in Vietnam. He told officials of the State and Defense Departments on 16 January 1954 that he saw no 

alternative to continued support for the Navarre plan; at the same time he 

emphasized the need to do everything possible to improve the French effort. 

The president ventured the opinion that if a distinguished American officer, 

such as General James A. Van Fleet, former United Nations commander in 

South Korea, could be sent to Vietnam in some capacity, it might enable the 

United States to exert more influence on French operations. In the end he 

appointed a Special Committee on Indochina, composed of CIA Director 

Allen W. Dulles, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger M. Kyes, Admiral Radford, and SpeCial Assistant for 

National Security Charles D. Jackson. 

Beginning deliberations at the end of January, the Special Committee 

produced a number of recommendations. It suggested forming a volunteer 

American air group to operate in Vietnam much as the "Flying Tigers" had 

served Chiang Kai-shek's government early in World War II, assigning more 

CIA operatives to Vietnam, and providing aid to the Associated States to 

help them develop an unconventional warfare capability.79 The committee 

also recommended modifying and expandin g the duties of the Military Assistance Advisory Group to include at least some involvement in training the 

Vietnamese and advising the French, and stationing General O'Daniel, then 

on a third inspection visit to Vietnam, in Saigon as a kind of informal 

strategic adviser to Navarre on matters of operations and trainingSO The 

French requests for additional military aid, the committee suggested, might 

be used to induce the French to agree to "maximum collaboration [with 

76Msg, Trapnell to OSO for OM A, DAIN 27618, 19 Dec 53, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

" History of Indochina Incident, p. 327; Heath 10 Stale Dept, 27 Dec 53, 751C.00I12 - 2753. 

records of Dept of State. 

78U.S.-Viettltlm Relatiolls, 9:225. 

7YSpeciaJ Committee Rpt: Program for Securing Military Victory in Indochina Short of Overt 

Involvement of U.S. Combat Forces, NSC 1019a, no. 53, 10 Mar 54, copy in PSYWAR 091 

Indochina. 

IIOMFR, Brig Ceo C. H . Bonesteel III, 30 Jan 54, sub: Meeting of President's Special Committee 

on Indochina, 29 Jan 54, U.S.-Vie/llam Relntiolls, 9:240 - 44. 

184 
Tile Road to Diel! Biel! Pil" 

O'Daniel] in training a nd strategy." The committee agreed that General 

O'Daniel's position should be reinforced " in every way possible ... not only 

with the French in Indochina but also at the highest level in Paris."" To 

ensure that O'Daniel stay in Vietnam, the committee wanted him to succeed 

General Trapnell, who was due for rotation, as chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Such a move would require no clearance by the 

French government. 

Despite the evident resolve of American policy makers, this bid to use 

American aid to increase U.S. influence in Vietnam proved no more successfu l than earlier attempts to exercise leverage on the French. From Saigon 

General O'Daniel reported that Navarre had no interest in any permanent 

American "superadviser." At most, the French commander would agree to 

increase the number of American liaison officers at his headquarters from four 

to five and to allow periodic visits by O'Daniel. Soon afterward Navarre told 

Ambassador Heath that he "wanted it clearly understood" that he would 

accept O'Daniel only if " his attributes did not exceed those of Trapnell" 

and that his functions would be " limited to military assista nce without any 

powers," advisory or otherwise, in the conduct and planning of operations or 

in the training of the Vietnamese National Army.82 In addition, the French 

government let it be known that if O'Daniel were to be appOinted chief of the 

advisory group, he wou ld have to accept a reduction from lieutenant general 

to major general so as not to be the equal in rank of Navarre. 

The President's Special Committee had consulted neither General Ridgway 

nor the other Joint Chiefs about O'Daniel's proposed assignment, and when 

Ridgway lea rned of the proposed reduction in rank, he obj ected strongly. He 

believed it would be " distinctly detrimental to prestige of the United States 

military services in general and to the United States Army in particular to 

demote a distinguished senior Army officer" merely to salve the pride of the 

French. Moreover, Ridgway pOinted out, there was no indication that the 

French intended to accord to the Military Assistance Advisory Group the 

increased authority that the Special Committee contemplated. 83 Agreeing with 

General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that " the basic issue of 

increased responsibility of MAAG, Indochina, with respect to training be 

satisfactorily resolved" with the French. 84 But when the American embassy 

in Paris approached the French government concerning General O'Daniel's 

status, the French remained adamant. as 

Thus the attempt to trade aid for increased influence in the person of 

General O'Daniel came to naught, as had all other attempts before it. But by 

early 1954 the political and military position of France was so delicate and 

changeable, the possibility that France might opt for a negotiated settlement 

1I 'lbid ., 9:242. 

82Heath to State Dept, 21 Feb 54, 751G.OOI2 - 2154, records of Dept of State. 

83Memo, Ridgway for ACofS, 25 Feb 54, sub: Demotion of General O'Daniel, eSA 091 indochina, RG 319. 

IWMemo, Radfo rd for Secy of Defense, 5 Mar 54, sub: Reappraisal of General O/Daniel's Status 

With Respect to Indochina, U.S.-Vietllnm Relntiolls, 9:264 - 65. 

SSHistory of Indochina Incident, p. 358. 

185 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

so likely, that American officials again decided they had no choice but to go 

along with whatever Nava rre wa nted . At a meeting in Berlin with Britain, 

France, and Russia, the United States reluctantly agreed to participate in a 

conference in Geneva at the end of April to discuss the two Koreas and 

Vietnam. Dulles and other officials feared that France might use that opportunity to end the burden of the Indochina War even by making a settlement 

favorable to the Communists. 

Mea nwhile, General O'Daniel, on his third visit to Vietnam, had received 

little information about Washington's plans and unsuccessful efforts to install him as a special adviser in Vietnam. O'Daniel considered that he was 

merely replacing General Trapnell as chief of the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group. Never a stickler for form, he graciously accepted his "demotion" as 

necessary to assuage French pride. 86 When General O'Daniel left Washington 

in mid-January it had seemed that he might not even be granted an audience 

with Navarre, who pled preoccupation with visitors from Paris and suggested 

that a trip by O'Daniel "was not advisable politica lly."87 Still, O'Daniel had 

decided to proceed with the mission. During a stopover in the Philippines, 

O'Daniel received word from Trapnell that Navarre was still unwilling to meet 

with him. O'Daniel then dispatched a personal message to Navarre emphasizing the desirability of a meeting, but he had received no reply when he left 

the Philippines for Sa igon . Only upon his arrival did Navarre send a letter 

agreeing to a meeting two days later.

88 

When O'Daniel met with Nava rre at his Saigon headquarters on 28 January, Navarre was cordial and apologetic about the delays in arranging the 

meeting. He explained that having O'Daniel in Saigon except as chief of the 

advisory group would be too awkward politically, bu\ he would be agreeable 

to having O' Daniel visit Sa igon regularly, perhaps every four to six weeks. 

He reiterated his approval of the assignment of fi ve Americans to his command as "special liaison officers," two with his training command and one 

each with headquarters of the French Army, Navy, and Air Force. General 

O'Daniel came away hopeful that the liaison officers might serve as "a mea ns 

of influencing French conduct of the war."" O'Daniel also remained optimistic about the general military situation. The Viet Minh, he reported, had 

" been blocked in all their moves by General Navarre and do not have the 

strength for a sustained effor!. " The military situation was "well in hand and 

will improve rapidly.,,90 

On the afternoon of 3 February, General O'Daniel visited Dien Bien 

Phu for a briefing by Colonel de Castries and his staff. O'Daniel accepted 

Navarre's explanation that Dien Bien Phu was a blocking base astride the 

main invasion route to Laos and that French forces in the base could maneu86lnterv, author with O' Daniel, 4 Feb 75. 

!l7M emo, O'Daniel for Jes, 5 Feb 54, sub: Report of U.s. Special M ission to Indochina, p. 1, 

O'Daniel Papers, CMH . 

88Ibid ., p. 5. 

89Ibid., p. 7. 

"'lb;d., pp. 23 - 24. 

186 
Tile Road to Dien Bien PIIU 

ver at will to attack the invading forces'"] In fact, the French were by that 

time completely surrou nded and unable to move more than a few thousand 

yards from their base and surrounding strongpoints. Unknown to O'Daniel, 

two hours before his arrival the Viet Minh had fired 103 rounds at the 

base with 75-mm. guns they had captured from the French the year before at 

Hoa Binh . Although the French had replied with counterbattery fire, fi ghter 

planes, and light bombers, they had failed to hit anything'"2 

Several aspects of the French position did disturb O'Daniel. The French 

dugouts and bunkers did not appear particularly strong, and he was especially troubled by the fact that the French had failed to occupy the high 

ground around the Dien Bien Phu valley. "A force with two or three battalions of medium artillery/' he wa rned, "could make the area untenable.,,93 

Despite those reservations, the general impression conveyed in O'Danie)'s 

report to Washington was that there was no serious danger to Dien Bien Phu . 

O'Daniel believed the base could "withstand any kind of attack the Viet Minh 

are capable of launching" and summarized the milita ry situation as one 

where "the French are in no danger of suffering a major military reverse. On 

the contrary they are ga ining strength and confidence in their abili ty to fight 

the war to a successful conclusion."94 

General Trapnell and his staff were disturbed by what they considered to 

be an excessively optimistic, even misleading, tone in O'Daniel's report. With 

Trapnell's encouragement, the acting U.S. Army attache, Lt. Col. Robert C. 

Taber, paid a number of visits to Dien Bien Phu. What he saw there confirmed the serious misgivings he already held about French conduct of the 

war. Early in February Taber reported to General Ridgway that Navarre was 

in reality conducting a "minimum casualty holding action in Indochina ... 

with a view to eventual negotiations." Navarre had, as General O'Daniel 

reported, recovered a number of battalions from static defensive positions, 

but those units were dispersed throughout the country. The French had 

manifested little progress in such important fields as training and psychological warfare, and " their staff thinking and procedure is vintage 1935-39.,,95 

Reaching Washington around the same time as O'Danie)'s report, Taber's 

analysis created a considerable stir96 The unmistakable contrast in tone and 

substance between the reports prompted Secretary of State Dulles to ask 

the Defense Department to obtain General Trapnell's views on the conflicting analyses. Trapnell was pleased fina lly to have an opportunity to present his eva luation of the military situation to American policymakers 97 In 

blunt language Trapnell emphasized that " despite the confidence reposed in 

91Cf. ibid" p. 24. 

92Roy, Battle of Dien Biel/ PIIII , p. 127. 

93Memo, O'Daniel for leS, 5 Feb 54, sub: Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina, p. 27; 

d. Fall, Hell ill n Very Small Place, pp. 108, 295 - 96. Fall all eges incorrectl y that O' Daniel gave 

un~ualif d endorsement to the French position. 

'J Memo, O'Daniel for leS, 5 Feb 54, sub: Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina, p. 27. 

95USARMA, Sa igon, to CSUSA for G - 2. Feb 54, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 57, JCS records. 

96Ltr, Philip Bonsai to Donald Heath, 12 Feb 54, Lot 580207, records of Dept o f State. 

97'lnterv, au thor with Trapnell , 10 Sep 74. 

187 
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March 1954 

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o ~I ---,-J--~I'~K~L:O:M; TT ERS 
The Road to Dien Bien P/1LI 

Navarre and the French forces by visiting U.S. political notables and military 

missions,. . the current campaign season has been dominated by the Vie t 

Minh. "98 He endorsed Taber's conclusions in general and repea ted criticisms 

of French strategy and techniques that he had outlined in previous reports. 

At the Department of the Army, staff planners were equally concerned 

about the situation in Vietnam. The Operations and Plans Division warned 

that there was li ttle evidence that the war in Indochina wou ld be brought to a 

successful conclusion and pointed out that even a major French military 

success would not " in itself insure the attainment of U.S. objectives in 

the area," nor would American materiel support alone produce desirable 

results in the absence of "basic corrective actions." All the familiar problems 

remained: the absence of Vietnamese politica l motivation, French lethargy 

and negativism, deficiencies in military operations, lack of progress in crea ting a Vietnamese army. It was "imperative" that additional measures be 

taken to forestall further erosion of the French position. 99 

Taber's and Trapnell 's warnings nevertheless failed to create any real 

sense of urgency at top levels in Washington. When questions were raised 

about the contrasts between O'Danie!'s report and the reports from the 

attache and the advisory group, Admiral Radford explained that "our attaches 

tend to become frustrated as a result of con tinuously being on the scene. 

They tend to look at the situation from strictly a service point of view ." lOO 

In testimony before the House and Senate on 16 and 18 February, both 

Under Secretary of Sta te Walter Bedell Smith and Admiral Radford d iscounted "alarmist interpretations of recent military opera tions" in Vietnam. 101 

Colonel Taber was summoned by Ambassador Hea th and asked to stop 

sending messages questioning the French ability to win the war, a request he 

politely declined. 102 

By that time, close to 35,000 Viet Minh troops were deployed on the high 

ground around Dien Bien Phu. About a hundred IOs-mm. and 7s-mm. artillery pieces, together with another hundred heavy mortars and recoilless 

rifles, were sighted in on the French strong points in the valley below. (Map 5) 

At the beginning of February, Washington received the disquieting news 

from the U.S. Army attache that the French were doing no patrolling at Dien 

Bien Phu outside their perimeter and using no infrared equipment or scouting 

planes. 103 The French litany of assurances nevertheless continued. General 

Nava rre confided to Ambassador Heath that he would be "disappointed" if a 

battle did not develop at Dien Bien Phu, because it was there that he saw the 

opportunity to " inflict a substantial, if not decisive, defea t: d04 Foreign Opera-

'lKMsg, Trapnell to Dept of Army, Feb 54, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 57, JCS records. 

99Memo, G - 3 Plans Div, Intel Br, 7 Feb 54, sub: Situation in Indochina, in JCS 1992/275, CCS 

092 Asia, sec. 57, lCS records. 

looM in, 184th M eeti ng of the NSC, 11 Feb 54, Eiscnhower-as-President Papers, Eisenhower 

Library. 

101State Dept to Saigon, 18 Feb 54, 751G.OO/2 - 1854, records of Dept of State. 

l02Ltr, Taber to Chief of M ilitary History, ·10 Oct 79. 

l03M sg, ARMA, Saigon, to CofSA, 28 Jan 54, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

{~ eal h 10 State Dept, 9 Feb 54, 751G.OO/2 - 954, records of Dept of State. 

189 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

tions Administration Director Harold E. Stassen returned from a visit to 

Vietnam to report that the French were confident they could crush any 

enemy attack and that General Navarre "continued to look forward to the 

opening of a big offensive in October."I05 

On the night of 13 March Viet Minh infantry, supported by heavy and 

accurate artillery fire, overran French strongpoint Beatrice on the northeast 

edge of Dien Bien Phu. During four more days of heavy fighting, the other 

northern strongpoi nts, Gabrielle and Anne Marie, were also lost. On the 

second day of the attack the French artillery commander, Col. Charles Piroth, 

committed suicide, reportedly out of despa ir over his inability to silence the 

Viet Minh batteries. 106 For the United States the "alarmist interpretation" of 

events in Vietnam had at last become inescapable rea lity. 

I05Min, 187th Meeting of the NSC, 4 Mar 54, Eisenhower-as-President Papers, Eisenhower 

Library. 

I06Fall, Hell ill IT Very Small Place, pp. 134 - 41 ; Roy, Battle of Dielt Biell PJIII, pp. 174 - 75. 

190 
11 

The Question of Intervention 

On Sa turday morning 1 March 1954, the chief of the French armed forces 

staff, General Pau l Ely, arrived in New York and immed iately proceeded to 

Wa shington aboard Admiral Radford's persona l plane. General Ely had come 

to Washington to inforrn the Americans of some unpalatable facts. I During 

the preceding month, Ely and the French service chiefs had accompanied 

Minister of National Defense Rene PI even on an inspection tour of the 

Vietnam battlefi elds and had returned convinced that the best they could 

hope for was a military situation fa vorable enough to give France a tenable 

bargaining position during the forthcoming talks in Geneva. 2 That was far 

from the decisive military successes that the United States had expected from 

the Na varre plan and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff still believed essential for a 

sa ti sfactory Vietnam settlement. 

One week before Gene ral Ely's arriva l in Vietnam, the Viet Minh had 

la unched th eir powe rful assau lt on Dien Bien Phu, and Ely brought to Washington a long list of additional military equipment and supplies that Genera l 

Nava rre required,3 Moreover. the French were deeply concerned about the 

possibility of Chinese intervention, particularl y aerial intervention. Since such 

action would radica lly alter the military ba lance in Vietnam, the French 

sought assurances that they could count upon effective American support to 

counter Chinese air power. Ely stressed the need for more aircraft and, in the 

event of Chinese intervention, for American air support. 

On his first night in Washington Ely had a working dinner with Vice 

President Nixon, Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, and CIA Director Allen 

Dulles. Perceiving that American officials were even more pessimistic than his 

own government about the fate of Dien Bien Phu, he used the somber mood 

to press for more aid, particularly aircraft. General Ridgway pOinted out that 

'General Paul Ely, L'llIdoellilll: dl1l1s 111 TOllrll/wl/, (pari s; Libraric Pion, 1964), pp. 25 - 37, passim. 

2Extraits du Proces-Verbal du Comite de Defense Nationa le du 6 Fevrier 1954, French Documents file, CMH. 

' Memo, Secy of Defense for Dept of Army, 25 Mar 54, sub: Transfer of Addi tional Material to 

Indochina, eM - 74 - 54, JCS records. 

191 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

1 

U.S. Air Force Technician paints French insignia on C - 119. 

in Korea th e United States had had complete domination of the air and his 

experience in that co nflict afforded no basis for believing that some additional 

air power in Indochina was going to give decisive results; nevertheless, 

General Ely persisted." He told Secretary of State Dulles that a poli tical 

settlement appeared to be the only way out, but that American air support 

might be required in the interim should th e Chinese intervene. Dulles replied 

that before the United States committed any forces, it would want a greater 

degree of partnership with France and proof that the Associated States had 

achieved real independence and that both they and the French were resolved 

to fight on to final victory.5 

In detailed conve rsations with Admiral Radford, Ely noted that French 

chances of holding Dien Bien Phu were no better than 50 percent and again 

requested prompt delivery of aircraft. When Radford suggested programs of 

psychological and guerrilla warfare, General Ely showed little inte rest, and 

"Memo of Conversation, Ridgway, 22 Mar 54, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, U.S. Army Military 

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

"Ely, L'llIrio<:hil1c dalls In TOl/rll/cllle, p. 61; Memo, Dulles for President, 23 Mar 54, sub: Indochina Situation, copy in Arthur W. Radford Papers, U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, 

D.C. 

192 
The Qllestioll of illterve/ltioll 

President Eisenhower, General Ely, and Admiral Radford ill Washillgtoll , 

March 1954. 

w hen Radford proposed expa nding the Mil ita ry Assista nce Adv isory Grou p 

so that American adv isers cou ld help in tra in ing the Vie tna mese Natio na l 

Arrn y, Ely respond ed that such a measure wou ld have und esirable effects on 

the politica l situ ation in Fra nce and on French prestige in Vie tnam .f> 

At Admira l Radfo rd's suggestion, Gene ra l Ely prolonged his stay an extra 

day so the two could d iscuss the problem of Dien Bien Phu in more deta il . If 

th e situ ation co ntinued to d eteriorate, sa id Radford, the Un ited States wou ld 

like ly be w illi ng to consid e r committing planes of the Far East Air Force and 

of the Seve nth Flee t. Alth ough Radford and Ely recognized th e p roposition as 

onl y a possibility tha t would require approva l at th e highest governmental 

levels of both na tio ns, Ely came away wi th a strong impression that America n 

consent would be readily forthcorning. 7 He based that concl usion o n the talks 

with Radford a nd on the brie f visit the two had with President Eisenhower, 

who, as Genera l Ely reca lled , "i nstru cted the Admiral [Rad ford], withou t 

"Memo, R<ldford for Presiden t's Speci<l! Committee 011 Indochina, 29 Mar 54, sub: Discussion 

With Ge nera! Paul Ely. Ti,!, S!'I/a/or Cm1!d edilioll of III!' PI'lIlnXIJII {'fWI'I'S. 4 vo!s. (Boston: Beacon 

l'ress. 1971), 1:455 - 57. 

7Ely. L'I"dex:llillt: cif/IIS /(1 Tm/Y/IlI'lIft'. p. 63. In a n interview Admira l Radford characte ri zed 

Ge nerill Ely's book <IS being " fairly <lccur<ltc." Interv with Arthur W. Rildford, Du lles Oral 

History Collection. Princeton Uni versi ty Libr.lry. 

193 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

seeming to set limits, to furnish us with whatever we needed to save the 

entrenched camp.,,8 

General Ely saw commitment of American aircra ft as a onetime action to 

enable the French to "disengage the garrison" and "regain the initiative," 

after w hich the French would continue to prosecute the wa r as before.\} But 

Admira l Radford was determined that " in case we did relieve Dien Bien Phu, 

we would have to have a voice in the command and in the planning of the 

wa r from then on." Radford had lost all confidence in French milita ry leadershi p and would settle for nothing less than a total French effort aimed at 

victory. ' 0 The ta lks with Ely had convinced him that the French position in 

Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly. The United Sta tes, Radford ad vised th e 

preside nt, " had to be prepa red to act promptly and in force to retrieve the 

situation." 11 

U,S. Strategic Options 

A merica n leaders were thu s faced with a possibility w hich they had 

always drea ded : a French defea t or withd rawal in Vietnam. As ea rly as 

June 1952 the National Security Council had agreed that " the loss of any 

single country [of Southeast Asia] wou ld probably lead to relatively swift 

submission to or an alignment w ith communism by the remaining countries 

of this g ro up.,, '2 A Nationa l Security Council pape r (NSC 16212), w hich was 

adopted in October 1953 and set fo rth the basic na tiona l security policy of th e 

Eisenhower administration, had noted that certain countries, Indochina 

among them, were "of such stra tegic importance to the United States that an 

attack on th em probably would compel the U.S. to react with milita ry force 

eith er loca lly at the po in t of attack or aga inst the mili tary powe r of th e 

aggressor.,, 13 A merican leaders thus seemed determined to fight for Indochina 

if necessa ry, but the question of what form American defense of Indochina 

mig ht take continued to trouble them. 

The Eisenhower administration was committed by its basic defense policy, 

popularly known as the New Look, to reduce defense spend ing through 

greater reliance on strategic nuclea r air forces and less emphasis on large land 

and naval forces designed for conventional wars. Administration leaders also 

believed that the tactica l use of smaller nuclear weapons in limited wars 

would greatly redu ce the need for large conventional forces.' " Consequ ently, 

IlEly, L"ll/doc"il1/! dallS In TOllrmel1ft', p. 32. 

'.l lbid. , p. 38. 

1UInterv with Radford. 

IIMemo, Rndford for President, 24 Mar 54, sub: Discuss ions With General Ely, CCS 092 Asin 

(6 - 25 - 48), sec. 60, Jes records. 

'2NSC 12412, United States Objecti ves and Courses of Ac tion With Respect to Sou theast Asia, 

25 JU Il 52, U.S. -Vietllam Reln/iolls, 8:522. 

i3NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, U.S.-Vie/llam Relatioll.">, 9: 182. 

HGlenn 1-1. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and 

194 
The Qllestioll of Illtervelltioll 

NSC 16212 directed that in the even t of hostilities brought abou t by Chinese 

or Russian aggression, " the United States will conside r nuclea r weapons to be 

as available for use as other munitions."[S 

Army strategists planning for the defen se of Indochina were bothe red by 

that statement. Did it mean, they wondered, that atomic weapons would be 

used in defense of Indochina ? If they were employed would they be most 

effective aga inst enemy troops in the field or against lines of communications 

or industrial and military installations in China itself? What wou ld be the 

probable political and psychological effects at home and abroad of American 

use of atomic weapons against Communist forces in Southeast Asia? Army 

Chief of Staff Ridgway pressed for systematic studies of these questions by 

the Defense and State Depa rtments, but with little success. ' 6 

Army leaders were convinced that with or without atomic wea pons a 

successful U.S. defense of Indochina would be far more difficult than was 

genera lly realized. In two studies at the end of 1953 the Plans Division, G - 3, 

of the Army staff had concluded that sho uld the French decide to withdraw 

their fo rces from Indochina, it would take seven U.s. Army divisions plus a 

Marine division to replace them. The effects on the overa ll U.s. defense 

posture would be severe. Indochina operations would preclude further assistance by the United Sta tes in the buildup of NATO stockpiles, pa rticularly 

ammunition, and prevent the Army from fulfilling its NATO commitments in 

the event of general war. Replacing the French in Vietnam would entail an 

extension within the U.S. Army of all terms of service by at least one year, a 

recall of individual reserve officers and technicians, an increase in the size of 

monthly dra ft ca lls, a nd a net increase of 500,000 men in the size of the 

Army.'7 

Th e planners estimated that U.S. forces could establish a secure base in 

the Red Rive r Delta region in a few months but cautioned that successful 

military operations alone wou ld not destroy the Viet Minh political organization. To accomplish this goal five to eight years of effective political and 

psychological measures like those being carried out by the British in Malaya 

would be required. ,. With these considerations in mind the G - 3 Plans 

Division suggested that the United States reconside r " the impo rtance of 

Indochina and Southeast Asia in relation to the possible cost of saving it."'9 

At the same time, the CIA und ertook a special intelligence estimate of the 

"probable consequences in non-communist Asia of possible developments in 

Indochina before mid -1954" and concl ud ed that while a Communist victory in 

Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, ami De/elise Blldgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 

1962), p. 433. 

]<; NSC 162/2,30 Oct 53, U. S. Vietllnl1l Relntiolls, 9:195. 

]('Memo for CofSA, 21 Dec 53, sub: National Estimates and Stra tegic Concepts Necessary to 

Defense Planning, fil e NSC 162, Tab 24, DCSOPS records. 

17M emo, Chief, Plans Div, G - 3 for ACofS G - I, ACofS G - 2, ACofS G - 4, 16 Feb 54, 

Inclosing two studies on Indochina prepared in Plans Div, copy in G - 2 319.25 Indochina, 

records of ACSI. 

lo'1 lbid. 

1'1 .S. Vidllnlll Reln/iolls, vol. I , pI. II. B. I, p. 6 - 6. 

195 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 -1960 

Vietnam would expose the remaining countries of the region to grea tly 

increased external and internal pressures from the Communists, it would not 

necessarily lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia 20 

The joint Chi efs of Staff, on the other hand, still fe lt strongly about the 

importance of Indochina . At the direction of the jCS Special Assistant for 

National Security Affairs, Air Force Maj . Gen. john K. Ge rhart, the joint 

Intell igence Committee prepa red an estimate which predicted that "Communist control over Indochina would almost certainly result in the communiza tion of all of Southeast Asia.,,21 In subsequent discussions in the NSC 

Planning Board, General Gerhart convinced his colleagues of the critical 

importance of Indochina . As a result, the conclusions the Na tional Security 

Council had drawn in June 1952 were largely reaffirmed in a new paper on 

Southeast Asia, NSC 177, completed at the end of December 1953. 

NSC 177 recognized two principal threats to Southeast Asia: the deteriorating situation in Indochina, with the strong possibility that that cou ntry 

would succumb to Viet Minh domination, and the less probable danger of 

overt Chinese military attack aga inst some part of Southeast Asia. In the 

event of Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, the National Security 

Council called for the United States to provide "air and naval assistance 

for a resolute defense of Indochina itself; ca lling upon Fra nce and the Associated States to provide ground forces.'''' This provision bothered Army 

planners. If the proposed air and naval actions proved insufficient, they 

asked, was the United States then prepared to abandon Indochina? If so, 

what of the statements in other parts of NCS 177 that Indochina was vita l to 

U. S. security interests? Yet the New Look budgetary ceilings, manpower 

limitations, and production cutbacks had left U.s. ground forces so reduced 

as to make abandonment of Indochina " the only feasible U.S. course und er 

these conditions. ,,23 

These disparities in U.S. planning became even more apparent when the 

JCS Joint Strategic and Logistics Plans Committees undertook to explore the 

possible alternative courses of action open to the Un ited States in two contingencies not discussed in NSC 177. The contingencies were a French decision 

to conclude the war in Indochina on unfavorable terms unless the United 

States agreed to military participation, or a French decision to pull out regardless of all offers of American assistance. In either case the United States 

would be confronted with the choice of doing nothing and accepting a 

Communist success in Indochina or committing its own service forces and, if 

necessa ry, combat troops to prevent a Viet Minh victory. 24 The committees 

recommended that the United States be prepared to use its own troops in 

Indochina and to provide such additional support to the forces of the AssocilOSE- 52, 10 Nov 53, ci ted in History of Indochina Incident, p. 332. 

2IIbid .; MFR of Interv, Sa muel Tucker with Lt Col John Vogt, 4 Jan 55, JCS Historical Div files. 

22NSC 177, 16 Jan 54, U.S.-Vietllalll Relatiolls, 9:234. 

2JArmy Proposed JCS Comment to the Secretary of Defense on NSC 177, Tab B to Memo, 

ACofS G- 3 for VCofS, 5 Jan 54, sub: U.s, Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to 

Southeast Asia , DCSOPS 1954 TS, DCSOPS records. 

2"' lbid. 

196 
The Qllestioll of llltervelltioll 

ated States as seemed fea sible. They also recommend ed that th e United Sta tes 

inform Paris that a French decision to quit Indochina "under unsati sfactory 

conditions would necessitate a review of our overall strategy in regard to 

NATO on the assumption that France was no longer a fu ll partner in the Free 

World coa lition." At the strong insistence of the State Department the latter 

recommendation was dropped. 2S 

Once aga in Army planners felt obliged to point out that action to mee t 

these provisions would require manpower and other resources beyond those 

provided in the administration's New Look defense programs. The Na tional 

Security Council Planning Board, however, incorporated th e jCS report into a 

paper that was submitted to the National Security Council as a special annex 

to NSC 17726 At a meeting on 6 jan uary, the joint Chiefs of Staff qu ickly 

approved the adoption of the special annex, but when the Armed Forces 

Policy Council met the following day, Deputy Secreta ry of Defense Roger 

Kyes vigorously attacked the idea of U.S. participation in the Indoch ina War. 

Although Kyes ostensibly objected to inaccuracies in the logistica l conside rations in the annex, his real concern was with the effect of intervention on the 

defense budget. 27 The year 1954 was to inaugurate the Eisen hower administration's New Look in defense policy, and a major military commitment in 

Vietnam would almost certainly necessitate a sizable increase in the armed 

forces and in defense production and send the defense budget skyrocketing. 

At the National Security Council meeting on 8 january, Kyes, representing the Defense Department, requested that the special annex to NSC 

177 be withdrawn from consideration. The State Department representatives 

objected; the situation in Vietnam, they believed, was so serious that th e 

United States had no choice but to use its own forces 28 Admiral Radford 

suggested that if a French defea t at Dien Bien Phu appea red li kely, th e 

United States should be prepared to send an aircraft carrier; a single squadron of planes over Dien Bien Phu, he said, might in one afternoon save 

the situation 29 The president's Specia l Assistant for Nationa l Security 

Affairs Robert Cutler and Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey were 

strongly opposed to any intervention. "When we start putting our men into 

Indochina, how long will it be before we get into the war?" asked Humphrey. 

"And ca n we afford it?" President Eisen hower told the council "with great 

force" that he "could not imagine the United States putting grou nd forces 

anywhere in Southeast Asia except possibly in Malaya/' and that a war in 

Vietnam "would absorb our troops by divisions." He neverth eless cautioned 

that the United States had vital interests in a non-Communist Indochina . The 

situation there was like "a leaky dike and with a leaky dike it's sometimes 

25Memo, P. E. Bonsai for R. R. Bowie, 1 I Dec 53, sub: NSC Special Annex, Lot 580 207, record s 

of Dept of Sia Ie. 

26History of Indochina Incident, p. 338. 

27MFR of Intcrv, Tucker with Vogt, 4 Jan 55. 

2"U. S. -Vieil/tllI/ Relatiolls, vol. 1, pI. II.B. I, p. B- 7. 

29Min, 179th Meeting of the NSC. 8 Jan 54, Eisenhower-as-President Papers, Eisenhower 

Library. 

197 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

bette r to put a finger in than to let the whole thing be swept away."JO 

Althoug h the discussion of inte rvention proved inconclusive, by the end of 

the meeting Kyes convinced the council that the French could still end ure and 

even "win by the spring of 1955," and it withdrew the special annex." At the 

d irection of the president, the a nnex was subseq uently destroyed. 

In the wake of these deliberations came an offer of help from an unexpected source. At the end of January 1954, South Korean President Syngman 

Rhee proposed to the Commander in Chief, Far East, General Joh n E. Hull, 

that the Republic of Korea send a di vision to Indochina " to help in the Laos 

fig hting ." Rhee explained that he wa nted to show his appreciation for United 

Nations help in the Korean War and to encourage anti-comm unism in Southeast Asia.J2 Reporting the offer to Washington, General Hull noted that, wh ile 

the gesture was " the first instance of one anti-communist nation offering to 

come to the assistance of another" and might lead to closer cooperation and 

mutual support among Asian nations, it also had a number of disadvantages. 

The Korean division would have to serve under operational control of the 

Fre nch, airlift and air s upply for the division would be difficult, and the 

American public mig ht wonder why Ame rica n troops had to remain in South 

Korea jf the South Koreans could spare a division to serve in Indochina. The 

American ambassador to South Korea , Ellis O. Briggs, told the State Department that the offer was motivated by Rhee's " burning desire to mobilize an 

anti-communist front in Asia under his leadership and to court U.s. publiC 

opinion. "33 

At first the Army staff reacted favorably to the Rhee offer. A study by the 

In telligence Division, submitted to the chief of staff on 12 February, pronounced the plan "feasible and desirable as a first step in the strategy of 

countering Communism in Asia with Asians with grea t psychological gain for 

the free wo rld ." In addition, the stre ngthening of French Union forces by an 

entire division might encourage the French to ca rry out more aggressive 

o pe ra tions.'" The Joint Chiefs of Sta ff, o n the o the r hand, ci ted many of the 

same disadvantages mentioned by General Hull and recommended against 

accepting the proposa l. JS The South Korea n offer was politely refused. 

The Debate Over Intervention 

By ea rly March the worsening situatio n at Dien Bien Phu, the tone of the 

conversa tions with Gene ral Ely, and the approaching Geneva Conference 

:lOlbid . 

31lbid. 

32J-1 Q, FECIUNC Command Rpt, Jan 54, 338 - 75 - 10009/35, FEe records. 

33 lbid. 

34RO K Division to Indochina, 9 Feb 54, Inel to M emo, Chief, Psy War, for Chief, Plans Div, 12 

Feb 54, sub: Staff Study on ROK O ffer of a Division to Indochina, G - 3 091 Indochina. 

35Memo, JCS for Secy of Defense, I Mar 54, sub: Consideration of the ROK Offer to Send a 

Division to Indochina, U. S.-Vietllnm Reln/iolls, 9:259 - 63. 

198 
The Questioll of Illtervelltioll 

had n1ade it clear that a French defeat or a withdrawa l under unfavorable 

co nditions was a rea l possibility. On 11 March 1954 the joint Chiefs of Staff 

aga in recommended that the Na tional Security Council decide immediately 

w hethe r the United States should commit its own armed forces to Vie tnam if 

that step became necessary.'6 A few days later a special working group of the 

President's Special Committee on Indochina, headed by General Graves B. 

Erskine (U.5. Marine Corps, retired), concl uded that "from the point of view 

of the U.S. strategic position in Asia ... no sol ution to the Indochina problern short of victory is acceptable." The Erskine subcommittee recommended 

that if the French decided to accept a settlement that fe ll short of achieving 

rea l security and independence for the Associated States, th e United States 

s ho uld disassociate itse lf from the agreement and "pursue, directly with th e 

governments of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the 

U.K.), ways a nd mea ns of co ntinui ng the struggle." The subcommittee also 

recommended that the National Security Council consider committing air, 

nava l, and grou nd forces " to the direct resol ution of the war in Indochina 

with o r without French suppor!."37 Secreta ry of Defense Wilson endorsed 

both the joint Chiefs' recommendation and the Erskine report and forwarded 

them to the secretary of state. 38 

Convening on 25 March with President Eisenhower presiding, the National 

Security Council considered both items along with an urgent telegram from 

Ambassador Dillon in Paris emphasizing the necessity for an ea rly decision 

on the question of interven tion .'9 Secretary Dulles warned that the Uni ted 

States might soon be faced with a choice between aba ndoning its in terests in 

Southeast Asia or assuming direct responsibility for the security of the region, 

but President Eisenhower told the council that he would agree to military 

in tervention only if four conditions were met: the Associated States would 

ha ve to request assistance, the United Nations would have to approve, other 

nations would have to participate, and Congress would have to sanction it. 40 

The president's remarks made it clear that the United States was not 

nearly as ready to enter the wa r as Genera l Ely had assumed. None of the 

president's four conditions wou ld be easy to meet, and obtaining congressional sa nction cou ld prove particularly difficult. At the end of january, 

Chairman of th e Senate Armed Services Committee jo hn Stennis had told 

Secretary of Defense Wilson that he would not approve sending America n 

troops to Vietnam even in relatively small numbers. 41 The National Security 

Council nevertheless decided to direct its Planning Board to continue studies 

on the feasibility and consequences of intervention.

42 

At the Pentagon, planners were also studying the question. From at least 

·'l6lbid., 11 Mar 54, JCS 1992/287, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 24 - 48), sec. 59, lCS records . 

. 

17Memo, Erskine fo r Special Committee, NSC. 17 Ma r 54, sub: Military Implications of the U.S. 

Positio n o n Indochina in Geneva, U.S. ~V ietllalll T{eta/iV/ls, 9:27 1- 75. 

1RLh', Wilson to Secy of Slate, 23 Mar 54, U.S. Viellla/ll T~datiOI1 S, 9:276. 

:;NOilion to Secy of Stale, 11 Mar 54, records of Dept of State. 

-IuNSC Record of Action, 1074 - a, 25 Mar 54, cited in History of Indochina Incident, p. 377. 

-I'Ur, Stennis to Charles E. Wilson, 29 Jan 54, U.S.-Vie/I/am Relatiolls, 9:239. 

42NSC Action 1074, NSC Section, Plans Div, 25 Mar 54, G - 3 Ops, DCSOPS records. 

199 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

the latte r pa rt of March, the Army and Air Force staffs had been discussing 

the feasibility and desirability of employing atomic weapons in Indochina. 

While such a course was not specifically ca lled for in the NSC 177 special 

annex, the New Look emphasis on ea rly use of nuclear weapons on the 

battlefield caused many officers to believe that such weapons would li kely be 

used in Indochina in the event of U.S. intervention." In 1954 Air Force F- 8F 

aircraft stationed in the Far East could deliver an implosion-type atomic bomb 

with a circu lar error probability of about 600 yards on targets in Indochina 

with a maximum of ten hours' preparation 4 " Navy AD - 5, AD - 6, F- 2H, 

and F - 2B aircraft opera ti ng from carriers or land bases were capable of 

delivering the same type of weapon. Carriers then in Far Eastern waters 

cou ld reach launching points off the coast of Indochina in a minimum of four 

days.45 

On 25 March officers of the G - 3 Pla ns Division completed a study w hich 

concl ud ed that atomic weapons could be used to relieve the beleaguered 

ga rrison at Dien Bien Phu in a numbe r of ways, including bombing of the 

besieging Viet Minh, of areas in tentiona lly abandoned to the Viet Minh, a nd 

of supply and base areas serving the Viet Min h forces around Dien Bien 

Phu 4 6 Another study dated 8 April included a tentative operationa l plan for 

the use of one to six 31-kiloton atomic bombs to be de li vered by Navy carrier 

aircraft during daylight aga inst Viet Minh positions around Dien Bien PhU .'17 

Both studies concluded that the use of atomic weapons in Indochina was 

technically and milita rily feasible and cou ld produce a major alteration in the 

military situation in favor of the French, turning "the entire course of events 

in Indochina to the advantage of the U.s. and the free world. If th e act 

occurred before the Geneva Conference, that conference might never be 

held .''''8 The authors of the two studies recogn ized that employment of atomic 

weapons risked reta liatory military action by the Soviet Union or China but 

argued that this risk could be minimized by disguising the U.S. role, for 

example by using aircraft with French markings. They also poin ted out that 

allY attempt by the United States to intervene decisively in the French - Viet 

M inh battle carried a risk of provoking Chinese or Russian counteraction. 49 

The chief of the Pla ns Division approved the G - 3 studies and circulated 

them to the heads of the other staff sections, w he re they provoked s harp 

disagreement. The assistant chief of staff fo r intell igence questioned th e use 

-O lntcrv. aut hor with Lt Gen Jamcs Gavin, 1 Aug 80, Historians files, CM H . 

. 

14Thc circula r error probability (CEP) was the radius of a circle within which half of the bombs 

could be expected to fall. Using a ground control team the CEP could be reduced to under 250 

yards. 

oIYfechnica l and Military Feasibility of Success fully Employing Atomic Weapons in Indochina, 

Tab B to Draft G - 3 Study, 25 MiH 54, sub: Employment of Atomic Weapons in Indochina, G - 3 

091 Indochina TS, 8 Sep 54, DCSOPS records. 

·!('Ibid. 

'!7Proposed Tentative Operational Plan, Tab D to Draft G - 3 Study, 8 Apr 54, sub: Employment 

of Atom ic Weapons in Indochina, G - 3 091 Indochina TS, 8 Sep 54, Dcsors records; Llr, J. 1. 

Coffey to author, 5 Sep 80, Historians fil es, CM H . 

4~Draft G - 3 Study, 8 Apr 54, sub: Employment of Atomic WCClpons in Indochina. 

4'1lbid., and for 25 Mar 54. 

200 
The Questioll of IlltervelltiOl/ 

of either tactical atomic weapons or saturation bombing with conventional 

bombs, arguing that the terrain arou nd Dien Bien Phu, which offered excellent cover for the Viet Minh, and the widely dispersed nature of Viet Minh 

artillery emplacements would severely limit the effectiveness of this type of 

air attack. 50 Air Force intelligence analysts reached the same conclusion, 

noting that "Very few if any suitable targets wou ld occur or could be induced 

if the target location were restricted to Indochina." In addition, the Air Force 

study ca utioned that the use of atomic weapons in Southeast Asia "may 

involve the serious risk of initiating allout war."SI 

The G-3 Office of Psychologica l Warfare warned that the employment of 

atomic weapons in Indochina, while pOSSibly resulting in an improvement in 

the local military situation, would also create resentment and distrust among 

U.S. allies who had not been consulted even " to the point of dangerously 

weakening existing collective security arrangements." It would also completely alienate Asian nations such as India, Burma, and Indonesia and 

furnish a rationale for overt Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia. The 

Psychological Warfare Office dismissed the idea that U.S. involvement cou ld 

somehow be disguised. World opinion would certainly attribute a nuclear 

strike to the United States regardless of the cover plan employed. Communist 

propaganda would depict the United States as unstable, barbaric, and impatient. The chief of psychologica l warfare concluded that the damage to 

America's reputation arising from use of atomic weapons "would outweigh 

the psychologica l disadvantages which wou ld follow the loss of Dien Bien 

Phu. ,,52 

The details of other discussions of the G - 3 study within the Army sta ff 

have not been preserved, but the arguments of the Plans Division in favor of 

atomic weapons failed to convince either Genera l Ridgway or his G - 3, Maj. 

Gen . James M. Gavin, who ordered the studies shelved. Ridgway then 

directed the staff to conduct still another study of the consequences of intervention. This time th e planners concluded that any form of military action 

by the Un ited States in Vietnam would be ill-advised. Intervention with U.S. 

air and naval units operating from bases outside Indochina would probably 

lead to committing ground troops, would entail a diversion of American air 

resources in the Far East, might prompt retaliatory Chinese air attacks on 

American aircraft or even full-sca le Chinese intervention, and would still not 

provide sufficient power to achieve a military victory over the Viet Minh. 

Usi ng aircraft based inside Indoch ina would have the same d isadvantages 

and would also require a substantial logistica l buildup and commitment of 

U.s. ground forces to provide security for air bases. Intervention by ground 

troops, the staff noted, would necessitate ca lling nine National Guard divic,olncl I, Tab A to G - 2 OF, C - 2 PREA to G - 3, 29 M ar 54, sub: Request for Intelligence 

Ta rr:c ts in Indochina, records of ACSI. 

.. AIE - 9 - J, 5 Apr 54, sub: Opportunities for Air Action in Indochina, copy in aCE T - 2068, 

Optimum A tomic Weapons for Defeating a Communist Assault on South Vietnam, 19 Oct 55, 

OCSOPS records. 

"20F, Oa psy War to ACofS G - 3, 25 Mar 54, sub: Employment of Atomic Weil pons in 

Indochina, PSYWAR 385 - 2 TS, DCSOPS records. 

201 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Yea rs, J 941 - 1960 

sians into federa l service, extending terms of se rvice for draftees, and resuming immediately war production of critical items. Until the newly mobilized 

divisions could become fully effective, a period of seven to nine months, 

the Army's strength and readiness in other areas of the Far East and in 

Eu rope would be seriou sly weakened. 53 Armed with these conclusions, Genera l Ridgway continu ed resolutely to oppose any talk of military operations in 

Indochina. 

On 31 Ma rch Admiral Radford convened a meeting of the Joi nt Chiefs to 

ascertain their views about recommending the commitment of U .S. naval air 

and Air Force units for the defense of Dien Bien Phu . General Ridgway's 

answer "was an emphatic No," He argued that any ga in from "effecti ve 

intervention in the Dien Bien Phu operation was altogether disproportionate 

to the liability it would incu r" since the outcome of the Dien Bien Phu battle 

in itself would not decisively affect the military situation in Vietnam, although 

by intervening in Vietnam th e Uni ted States wou ld grea tly increase the risk of 

general wa r. Genera l Ridgway added that unless the question of intervention 

was put to the Joint Chiefs by prope r autho rity, that body would be exceeding its authority by volunteering recommendations to the president and the 

cabinet. 54 The other service chiefs also recommended against such a course of 

action.

55 

In private conve rsa tions the next day Admira l Radford urged the service 

chiefs to reconsider their position. He reminded them that many times they 

had gone on record about the great importance of Indochina and th e dire 

consequences of a French defeat. 56 On 2 April Radford reconvened the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and requested the chiefs to consider the 

question: "If prope r authority asked the JCS for a statement of their recommended response to a French requ est for intervention, what wou ld it be?" 

The discussion was apparently inconclusive, for the following morning Ad miral Radford returned with a written request from the secretary of defense 

asking specifically for the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. Genera l 

Ridgway again recommended against inte rvening. 57 The Chief of Nava l 

Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, took much the same positio nS8 

Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., noted that the 

Uni ted States "could expect no significant military results from an improvised 

air offensive against guerrilla fo rces." The inevitable result of intervention, he 

said, would be either to accept a military fa ilure or to intervene further. 59 

O nly th e Air Force Chief of Sta ff, Genera l Nathan F. Twining, was willing to 

!t"!Memo, ACofS G- 3 (Maj Cen james M . Cavin) for CofS, Mar 54, Military Consequences of 

Va rious Courses of Action With Respect to Application of U.s. Military Forces in Indochinil, G- 3 

091 Indochina, copy in Ridgwily Papers. 

54Memo, Ridgway for Radford, Twining, Carney, and Shepherd , 2 Apr 54, copy in Ridgway 

PaRers. 

:osMemo, Radford for Secy of Defense, 31 Mar 54, sub: Indochina Situation, Radford Pilpcrs. 

S6Merno of Telephone Conversations, I Apr 54, Rildford Papers. 

57lbid. 

SIIMemo, Carney (or Radford, Twini ng, Ridgwily, ilnd Shepherd, 2 Apr 54, sub: U .S. Intervention in Indochina, copy in Ridgway Papers. 

59Memo, Shepherd for Radford, Twining, Ridgway, and Carney, 2 Apr 54, Ridgway Papers. 

202 
The Qllestioll of Intervention 

give even a qualified assent to the proposal, but his agreernent was contingent 

upon French accepta nce of "U.S. leade rship in the training an d employment 

of combat fo rces" and other conditions unlikely to be met. 60 Thus the answer 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was nega tive. 

A few days later, the Nationa l Security Council again recommended that 

the United States "reach a decision whether or not to intervene [in Vietnam] 

with combat forces."61 Once more the Army filed an emphatic dissent, taking 

the position that a military victory in Indochina could not be achieved with 

air and naval forces alone even if tactical nuclear weapons were employed. 

Army staff plan ners repea ted their warn ing that the equiva lent of seven U.S. 

Army divisions would be needed to replace the French in Vietnam even in 

the absence of Chinese intervention . If the Chinese were in volved, no less 

than twelve divisions wou ld be needed. Those divisions wou ld require the 

support of "five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive of interdiction and counter-a ir operations," a divisional airlift capabiJity, and a division 

amphibious Iift 62 Finally, deploying siza ble forces to Vietnam would seriously 

weaken American ground strength in Europe and in other parts of Asia. 

Congress had already given an equally nega tive response on 3 April w hen 

Secretary of State Dulles had in vited eight Democratic and Republican leaders 

of the House and Senate to a confidential meeting at the State Department. 

Also present were Admira l Radford, Under Secretary of Defense Kyes, Navy 

Secreta ry Robert B. Anderson, and Assistant Secre tary of State Thruston B. 

Morton . Dulles had arranged the meeting to keep congressional leaders 

informed on developments in Indochina , and Radford and Du lles hoped to 

satisfy the conferees that "the particular job we want to do. . can be done 

without sending manpowe r to Asia.,,63 Admiral Radford presented a briefing 

w hich congressional leaders later told reporters included a plan fo r an air 

strike aga inst Dien Bien Phu. The congressmen expressed concern and skepticism, particularly when Radford admitted he lacked the support of th e othe r 

service chiefs. Senators Richard B. Ru ssell and Lyndon B. Johnson clearly 

indicated that they would support no project that was unde rtaken witho ut 

Britis h and othe r all ied participation. " It was the sense of the meeting," 

Dulles reported, "that the U.s. should not intervene alone but should attempt 

to secure the cooperation of othe r free nations."64 In a telephone conversation 

with the president that day, the secretary expressed the belief that "Congress 

wou ld be quite prepared to go along on some vigorous action" but only if 

"we were not doing it alone" and that "they wa nt to be sure th e people in 

the area a re involved too." The president agreed. "You ca n't go in and win 

unless the people want you," he told Du lles. "The French cou ld win in six 

months if the people were with them.,,65 

(,oMemo, Twining for Radford, 2 Apr 54, sub: Indochina Situation, Ridgway Pa pers. 

61NSC Action No. 1074 - 01, 5 Apr 54, U. S.-VidlllHlI 1~c/l1li ll . 9:304. 

62A rmy Position on NSC Action 1074 - a, U. S.-Vic//wlII /~ l(/fi ll s, 9:332 . 

(>:lOulies Telecon with Admiral Radford, I Apr 54, Dulles PClpers, Princeton University. 

(~ IU. S. Vi illf/lll Rdatiolls, vol. I, pI. 11.0. 2, p. B- 24. 

6~ Dull s Te lecon with President, 3 Apr 54, Dulles Papers. 

203 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Gelleral Twillillg , Admiral Radford, Gelleral 

Ridgway, General Shepherd, alld Admiral Carney. 

Operation V AUTOUR 

M eanwhile, in Paris General Ely was proceeding on the assumption that American intervention was virtually assured. Al thoug h Ely fou nd the 

French cabinet generally disposed to accept his plan for a short and decisive 

American aerial bombardment in support of Dien Bien Phu, the government 

was unwilling to make a fina l decision on the matter without consulting 

Gene ral Navarre in Vietnam. General Ely's aide, Col. Raymond Brohon, was 

dispatched to inform Navarre about the proposed American aerial intervention, code named VAUTOUR (VU LTU RE), and to solicit his opinion of its probable effectiveness. 66 

As Colonel Brohon was meeting on 2 and 3 April with Navarre in Hanoi, 

the defenders of Dien Bien Phu were fi ghting desperately to repel massive 

Vie t Minh attacks. Portions of both the northeastern strongpoints, Eliane and 

Dominique, had already fa llen to th e enemy. General Navarre apparently first 

disapproved the air strike lest it provoke Chi nese intervention, but on 4 April 

he radioed Paris his approval

67 

(,f'Ely, L'1//{/ochil/c dalls /(1 TOl/rll/eIIle, p. 39. 

("According to Ely, L'llIdochiJ/c am/s /(1 TOlIrIllClltc, p. 39, .. nd Roy, Battle of Diell BiclI PII1I , p. 214. 

204 
TIle Questioll of Illteromtioll 

Dien Bien Phu u1lder Viet Minh bombardment. 

A week later, when the commander of the Far East Air Force, General 

Earle E. Partridge, arrived in Vietnam on a routine liaison visit, General 

Navarre told him of the plan for Operation V AUTOUR, saying that the operation "had been cleared through diplomatic channels.,,68 Although Partridge 

had received no indication from Washington that any operation was in the 

offing, he felt it was important to begin planning for the possibility of 

a large air strike. On the way home, Partridge radioed the commander of the 

Far East Air Force Bomber Command, Brig. Gen. Joseph D. C. Ca ldara, to 

meet him in Japan. Partridge briefed Caldara on his conversations with 

Navarre and, while making it plain that he had received no instructions 

from Washington, directed Ca ldara to confer with the French and prepare a 

contingency plan. Caldara had ava ilable about a hundred B- 29 heavy bombers based in Japan and Okinawa. Partridge directed him to retain complete operationa l control over any aerial attack by the B - 29's and specified 

that "the bomber force would be employed as a unit under mass-strike 

conditions.,,69 

Bernard Fall, however, quotes Maj. Jean r ouget, Navarre's "ide, to the effect that Navarre 

favored the operation from the start. See Fall, Hell ill fI Very SIIIf/1I Place, p. 299. 

68Robert F. Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1950 - 1965, p. 173, manuscript in 

Office of Air Force History. 

69Ibid. 

205 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Traveling in a B- 17 to avoid attracting attention, Ca ldara and a small sta ff 

arrived in Saigon on 19 April 1954 and conferred with French officials. After 

inspecting the target areas around Dien Bien Phu from his B - 17, Caldara 

concluded that there were " no true B - 29 targets" in the area but that his 

aircraft, operating from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and escorted 

by carrier-based Navy fighters, could do the job if required. Because of the 

monsoon weather in the Dien Bien Phu region, he added, the bombers would 

require the aid of ground-based short-range navigational radar (SHORAN). 

This requirement posed an immediate problem, for Ca ldara and his staff 

lea rned, much to their consternation, that the French in Vietnam lacked that 

capability .70 

The fate of Operation V AUTOUR, however, had already been decided in 

Paris, Washington, and London . Upon receiving Navarre's message of 4 April 

agreeing to V AUTOUR, General Ely had immediately met with Defense Minister Pleven and then with the cabinet and the chiefs of armed forces. Later in 

the evening Ambassador Dillon was summoned to join the meeting. The 

French told him that only "immediate armed intervention of U.S. ca rrier 

aircraft" could save Dien Bien Phu. Since the Chinese had been providing the 

Viet Minh with massive aid, including technical advisers, radar-controlled 

antiaircraft guns, communications systems, and supply trucks, the French 

government considered that the Chinese, in effect, had already intervened. It 

was therefore appropriate that the United States government initiate the 

actions Radford and Ely had discussed .

7l 

The same evening Dulles and Radford had met in Washington with the 

president to assess the situation. Eisenhower had rea ffirmed his determination not to become involved in the Vietnam fighting without congressional 

approva l and without the support of the British and other nations. He also 

would require assurance from the French that they would not withdraw 

their own forces and would grant complete independence to the Associated 

Statesn To satisfy the French request, said the president, "would be unconstitutional and indefensible." Dulles agreed, alluding to the insistence of 

congressional leaders two days before that the United States would not 

act alone. Referring to Admiral Radford's conversations with Ely in early 

March the secretary said he was sure Radford had made no commitment and 

recalled that he had made plain to Ely that " the political aspects needed to 

be attended to first. We can't lose our own prestige by going in and being 

defea ted."73 Under these circumstances, when the French request for immediate intervention arrived in Washington, Dulles simply replied that the United 

States was "doing everything possible ... to prepare public, Congressional 

and Constitutional basis for united action" but that the United States could 

not commit acts of war in Indochina without a full political understa nding 

7Olbid. 

7lTelg, Dillon to Seey of State, 5 Apr 54, U.S. -Vie/Mill Relatio1/s, 9:296 - 97 . 

720wight D. Eisenhower, Tile White HOl/se Years: Mauriate for Chat/ge (New York: Doubleday, 

1963), p. 345. 

73Dullcs Telecon with President, 5 Apr 54, Dulles Papers. 

206 
The Qllestion of Intervention 

with France, the active cooperation of Great Britain, and the consent of 

Congress. 74 

Foreign Minister Bidault replied that he "could well understand the position of the U.S. Government," but General Ely considered the American 

response tepid and disappointing. "The conditional answer made by the U.S. 

Government to our request for emergency in tervention," wrote Ely to the 

French military attache in Washington, "causes me to fear that this in tervention would be subject to a time lag which would be too 10ng."75 When the 

attache relayed this reaction to Radford, the admiral replied that he had made 

no commitment to Ely other than to promise " prompt and thorough consideration by the United States Government" of any French request; this was 

being done. 76 

These exchanges pOinted up a fundamental misunderstanding between 

French and America n officials about the nature of American intervention. The 

French wanted to limit U.S. intervention to a single military action, Operation 

VAUTOUR, to relieve Dien Bien Phu, but on the American side even Admiral 

Radford, the repu ted author of Operation VAUTOUR, saw it as only the first 

step in American military involvement. As he later recalled, " I was not ready 

to support the French at Dien Bien Phu or anywhere unless we had proper 

arrangements with [the French]. In case we did relieve Dien Bien Phu, we 

would have to have a voice in the war, in the command, in the planning, 

from then on. ,,77 President Eisenhower told the National Security Cou ncil, 

"We are not prepared now to take action with respect to Dien Bien Phu in 

and by itself. But if we ca n put together a coalition program for Southeast 

Asia, we ca n assume that then the battle is 2/3 won."" 

America n consideration of military intervention thu s did not end with the 

de facto rejection of the French plea for an attack at Dien Bien Phu. Throughou t April the Joint Chiefs of Sta ff and the Department of Defense continued 

to plan for possible military action in Vietnam either unilaterally or in cooperation with the French. A plan worked out by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in early April drew heavily on earlier planning by the Army staff. It ca lled 

for "a coordinated attack in the northern part of Vietnam from the Tonkin 

Delta with the primary objective of destroying the organized Viet Minh 

forces" in the area.'" That objective was to be accomplished in three phases. 

First, four infantry divisions and an airborne division with air support were to 

attack to secu re the "major communications centers" of Yen Bay, Tuyen 

Quang, and Thai Nguyen, thereby interdicting the enemy's lines of communications and pOSSibly trapping three Viet Minh divisions. Next, an infantry 

division was to seize and occupy an enemy base complex in the Hoa Binh 

74Teig, Dulles to Am Embassy, Paris, 5 Apr 54, U. S.-Vietnflm Relations, 9:359. 

75Ely to Valluy for Radford, 7 Apr 54, cited in History of Indochina Incident, pp. 383 - 85. 

76lbid . 

n lnte rv w ith Radfo rd. 

711 192d Meeting of the NSC, 16 Apr 54, EisenhowCNls-President Pape rs. 

7'9Report by the ]SPC on Defense Implementation of O perations Coordinating Board Program 

for Indochina, Phase A, 1 Apr 54, jCS records; Outline Plan for Military Operations Indochina, 

Tab B of Memo, ACofS G - 3 for CofSA, 24 Mar 54, CS 091 Indochina, DCSOPS records. 

207 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

area, while a second division was to make an amphibious assault around 

Thanh Hoa and advance to seize the road junction at Hoi Xuan. The third 

phase, a reconnaissance in force to the Chinese border, was to reestablish 

frontier garrisons there. The planners believed that all three phases could be 

accomplished in about six months and saw the concept of the operation as 

valid "whether U.S. forces participated or not." 

This plan- never implemented- appeared to take little cognizance of the 

underlying ca uses of French failures. As the French experience had demonstrated, capturing key bases and interdicting lines of communications usually 

had limited effect on an enemy who put little reliance on conventional 

road-bound supply and movement. The plan also largely ignored the underlying political and social conditions which contributed heavily to the effectiveness of the Viet Minh. Although the plan specified that " increased and full 

support for the indigenous peoples" and the "corresponding development of 

adequate responsible [Vietnamese] leadership" were essential to victory, it 

provided no mechanism for achieving those elusive aims. 

At the same time, Army planners were alarmed at the Navy's insistence in 

the planning discussions that if U.S. operations were carried out in northern 

Vietnam, Hainan, a large island just east of the Gulf of Tonkin and a part of 

the People's Republic of China, would have to be attacked to neutralize the 

Chinese air bases there . Otherwise, those bases would pose an unacceptable 

threa t to Seventh Fleet operations in Indochinese waters. As Lt. Gen. James 

M. Gavin, then Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G - 3, recalls, the Army 

planners believed that an attack on Hainan would be considered 

an act of war against the People's Republic of China. Based on our experience 

in Korea we bel ieved that the PRC would enter the conflict. .. . We planned 

on dropping one airborne division in northern Vietnam. It would probably 

have been engaged with the Chinese at once. Further if we were intentionally 

going to war with China we could see no military objectives worthwhile 

seizing. It was obviously the wrong place to go to war with China. Much 

better would be seizing the war making capacity of Manchuria. So, as we 

thought the situation through it seemed to us to be utter folly to invade 

Southeast AsiaBo 

The Army Resists Intervention 

Led by General Ridgway, the Army continued to protest most strongly 

against intervention . On 6 April, the Army chief warned that the use of 

American forces in Vietnam "aside from any local success they might achieve, 

would constitute a dangerous strategic diversion of limited U.S. military 

capabilities and would commit our armed forces in a non-decisive theatre 

to the attainment of non-decisive local objectives. "S I American commitment 

would also greatly increase the risk of general wa r and would play into the 

hands of the Chinese and Russians, who could stand aside while vital American military resources were dissipated in inconclusive fighting. 

/:IOLtr , Gavin to Chief of Military History. 8 May 79, copy in Historia ns files, CMH. 

8lMemo, CofSA, 6 Apr 54, jCS 19921296, CCS 092 Asia, sec. 62, JCS records. 

208 
The Queslion of Inieroelllio" 

Looking back on the period General Gavin recalls, " It was not an easy 

position for the Army to take. Washington was full of gossip about the 

combat readiness of the Army. After all the new look was based upon 

massive retaliation and many foresaw little need for an Army. The Army's 

attitude seemed to play into their hands. . a well known columnist ... told 

me that the gossip all over Washington was that the Army was splitting from 

the other services on the Vietnam issue because it was not combat-ready. So, 

as I say, it was a difficult position for the Army to take, but it seemed to be a 

commonsense one, so Rjdgway and I stuck to our guns."·' 

If it was really vital to the United States to prevent the loss of Vietnam, 

the wisest course, in Ridgway's view, would be to strike directly at China , 

without whose aid the Viet Minh would be unable to persist. Yet that action 

should be taken only with the support of America's allies and after the start 

of a general mobiliza tion to support the military effort. As General Rjdgway 

later noted , he had no wish for a war with China or a preventive war with 

the Soviet Union but merely wished to point out, in the starkest terms, the 

magnitude of the decision confronting the country on the issue of intervention in Vietnam, 83 

The joint Strategic Plans Committee was apparently surprised and upset 

by Rjdgway's pronouncement. With the Army member dissenting, the committee declared that Rjdgway's views were " inconsistent" with NSC 5405, 

which called for considering unilateral action, and with jCS 19921262, which 

had concluded that Indochina could be "saved" by committing certain limited 

U.S. forces. "Direct action against Communist China. . had .. . many 

advantages from the strictly military point of view," the committee declared, 

although conceding that it had " obvious political disadvantages."'" But it was 

precisely those " obvious political disadva ntages" and dangers of the entire 

movement towa rd involvement in Indochina that General Rjdgway wanted to 

emphasize . At a meeting of the joint Chiefs on 26 April he pressed his views 

and elicited an agreement to forward them in a memorandum to the secretary 

of defense 85 

The British meanwhile were reacting in much the same way to an effort 

by Secretary Dulles to enlist them in a military coalition to save Vietnam. 

Arriving in Europe on 11 April with the avowed purpose of building a 

" united front to resist Communist aggression in Southeast Asia," Dulles 

found that Prime Minister Anthony Eden would engage in no discussion 

concerning a regional security arrangement until after the Geneva Conference 

had concluded .

86 

Many America n leaders nevertheless continued to raise the prospect of 

S2Ur, Gavin to Chief of Military History, 8 May 79. 

IQM emo, CofSA, 6 Apr 54. 

IW Memo, JSPC for jeS, 16 Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48), sec. 92, leS records. 

8~No e, Secreta ries to Holders of jeS 19921296, 26 Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 23 - 48), jeS 

records; MFR, Ridgway, 28 Apr 54, Ridgway Papers. 

86Department of State BlIlletin, 19 April 1954; History of Indochina Incident, p. 387; Antho ny 

Eden, The Memoirs of Alit/lOlly Edell: Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mimin Co., 1960), p. 11 0; 

Townsend H oopes, TIle Devil (lnd }ollll Foster Dillies (Boston: Little Brown Co., 1973), pp. 214 - 15. 

209 
Advice and SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

doing something to "save" Indochina from the Communists. On 17 April, 

Vice President Nixon told a press conference that "Th e United States as a 

leader of the fre e world ca nnot afford further retreat in Asia"; if the French 

withdrew, the United States might have to " take the risk now by putting 

our boys in. ,,87 Although the vice president was spea king for himself, he 

knew that many administration leaders, including Secretary Dulles, shared 

his views. 88 

General Ridgway enlisted the aid of Army Secretary Robert Stevens in an 

effort to reverse the trend toward intervention. Directing the Army sta ff to 

prepare a special briefing on Vietnam, Ridgway recommended that Stevens 

" have the briefing at the ea rliest opportunity."s9 Following the briefin g o n 19 

May, Stevens drafted a memorandum for Secretary of Defense Wilson summarizing the main points of the Army's case. Vie tnam, Stevens told Wilson, 

was "devoid of local resources of use to the armed forces," and its monsoon 

climate made it extremely unhea lthy for Western troops. Logistical facilities 

were totally inadequate to support a major military effort; the principal ports 

would require dredging, and even then considerable tonnage wou ld have to 

be brought in over open beaches. Only three airfield s were capable of handling heavy bombers; only eight cou ld support C - 119 su pply aircraft, and 

almost all were unusable during the rainy season. The major logistic effort 

required wou ld have to be protected by the Army, making the total number 

of ground forces needed for both loca l security a nd offensive operations "very 

large." During the next two weeks, Genera l Ridgway personally presented 

the briefing both to Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson and to President 

Eisenhower. 90 

While Ridgway sought to discourage intervention in Washington, the 

French government in Paris was making a desperate ast~minute attempt to 

obtain Amerian military assistance at Dien Bien Phu . On 21 April, when 

Dulles arrived in Paris for pre-Geneva talks, he was met with new French 

pleas and suggestions. An American air attack at Dien Bien Phu, Premier 

Laniel told another American diploma t, "would galvanize the defenders and 

dramatically change the situation.,,9! Foreign Minister Georges Bidault urged 

that the United States "give the most serious consideration to armed intervention promptly as the only way to save the situation." He predicted that a 

defeat at Dien Bien Phu would make the French public feel that furthe r 

efforts in Ind ochina were futile. Dulles could only reite rate that the United 

States could not take military measures in Vietnam without the consent of 

Congress and the support of Britain. The British, however, had made their 

87New York Times, 17 Apr 54. 

R/:I lnlerv with Richard M. N ixon, Dulles Oral History Collection. 

89Memo, Ridgway for Seey of Army, 29 Apr 54, sub: Indochina . An outline of the briefing is 

attached to Memo, ACofS G - 2 for SCS, 17 Apr 54, sub: Army Speciall3ricfing. Both in eSA 091 

Indochina, DCSOPS records. 

9OMemo, Stevens for Seey of Defense, 19 May 54, sub: Indochina; MFR, Ridgway, 17 Ma y 54, 

Ridgway Papers. 

91 Ur, Doughts MacArthur II to President, 24 Apr 54, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, Eisenhower Library. 

210 
The Qllestion of Intervention 

position qu ite clear when Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill stated publicly 

that Her Maj esty's Government was " not prepared to give any undertaking 

now, in advance of the Geneva Conference, concerning United Kingdom 

military action in Indochina in advance of the results of Geneva.'''' 

The situation at Dien Bien Phu was at that point so grim that most 

American military observers believed the stronghold would fall in a matter 

of days. From Hanoi General O'Daniel, who had assumed comma nd of the 

U.S. Military Assista nce Advisory Group on 31 March, reported that he had 

begun to lose faith in Navarre's ability to command. To O'Daniel and other 

Americans, Navarre appeared gloomy and increasingly unsure of himself. " I 

have supported him in the past based upon his statements and his intentions," wrote Q'Daniel; "however, circumstances have led me to conclude 

that he fails to mea sure up to the ability to wage war here on a scale 

necessary to win. ,,93 

O'Da niel bombarded French headquarters with suggestions to break the 

siege at Dien Bien Phu by sending strong relief columns overland from Laos 

and the Red River Delta."4 From Washington, Admiral Radford contributed a 

plan to support the garrison by using six Fairchild Packet transport planes, 

recently lent to the French. Since heavy equipment could be dropped from 

rear doors of the plane, Radford wanted to drop bulldozers for constructing 

an airstrip some fifty kilometers from Dien Bien Phu so that troops might be 

brought in by air to march overland and link with the besieged forces."5 But 

those and other schemes for raising the siege of Dien Bien Phu all foundered 

on the same rock: lack of manpower. A large proportion of Nava rre's mobile 

forces were tied down in defending Laos, while many of the remai nder had 

been engaged in Operation ATLANTE, a large-scale sweep along the coasta l 

area of central Vietnam which achieved little of military significance. On 1 

May, when the Viet Minh opened a final offensive against Dien Bien Phu, the 

fortress was clearly doomed. Seven days later, as the Indochina phase of the 

Geneva Conference was abou t to begin, the last defenses at Dien Bien Phu 

collapsed. 

The defeat at Dien Bien Phu signaled the failure of American policy 

toward Indochina , a policy that had consisted principally of bankrolling the 

Navarre plan in the hope that it wou ld achieve significa nt military success on 

the battlefield and a strong, reliable Vietnamese army. Although responsibility for the debacle at Dien Bien Phu rested with the French, acceptance by too 

many American officia ls of faulty French estimates of the battlefield situation meant that Washington policymakers, accustomed to reports of "steady 

progress," had been unprepared for the crises of March and April 1954. 

American delusions about Dien Bien Phu and the Navarre plan were 

merely the products of a larger delusion, a belief that military success alone 

would be sufficient to achieve American objectives in Vietnam and elsewhere 

92Eden, FilII Circle, p. 118. 

93Msg, O'Daniel to CofSA, MG 11 22A, 22 Apr 54, 75 1G.OO/4 - 2254, records of Dcpt of State. 

~Am Embassy to Slate Dept, 24 Apr 54, 751G.OO/4 - 2454, records of Dcpt of State. 

95lnterv with Radford . 

211 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 -1960 

in Indochina. That belief ignored the fact that no lasting military success was 

possible without the active support of th e majority of the Vietnamese people, 

support that could be achieved only by esta blishing a tru ly independent 

Vietnamese government. 

Secretary Dulles put the best face possible on the situation, urging the 

French to "react vigorously to temporary setbacks and surmount them" and 

suggesting to the press that "Southeast Asia could be secured even without 

perhaps Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.,,96 Yet it was unrea listic to expect the 

French to carry on alone any longer. The Army attache in Sa igon reported 

that the Viet Minh would be in a position to launch an all-out attack on the 

Red River Delta by 15 June, and the chief of French intelligence in Vietnam 

confided to a CIA official that " internal security in Saigon was in a critica l 

state ." Vietnamese officials were described as "almost hypnotized by the 

Geneva conference" and unable to maintain order 9 ? By the end of May Maj. 

Gen. Rene Cogny, the French commander in Tonkin, was "speaking frankly 

of the probable necessity to evacuate Hanoi" and Genera l Navarre was call ing 

for an early cease-fire98 

Under those circumstances, the United States could intervene with American forces or accept whatever settlement the war-weary French could achieve 

at Geneva. As for a settlement, the National Security Council with the 

endorsement of President Eisenhower declared on 8 May that the United 

States would " not associate itself with any proposa l ... directed toward 

a cease-fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls."99 The State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the National Security Council all agreed that " no sa tisfactory settlement 

was possible without a substantial improvement" in the French military 

position. 100 

Echoing this last point, on 10 May Premier Laniel told Ambassador Dillon 

in Paris that " the strength with wh ich the French could oppose Chinese 

propositions at Geneva would have a direct connection with the amount of 

support they received from th e other Western powers, particularly the 

U.S."tol Describing the situation in northern Vietnam as critical, La niel 

declared that it was vitally important lor him to know what, if any, military 

action the Un ited States might be prepared to take. Wash ington responded to 

Laniel's request with a list of six conditions that wou ld have to be met before 

the president would agree to ask Congress for authority to commit American 

forces: 

1. A formal French request for U.S. military participation. 

96Dulles to Acting Seey o f State, 23 Apr 54, records of Dept of State; Dulles Press Conference, 

11 May 54, U.S.*Vietll(/l1l Reln/iollS, vol. 1, pI. II.B.2, p. B- 30. 

97Am Embilssy, Saigon, to State Dept, 26 May 54, 751G.OO/5 - 2654, and 20 May 54, 7SIC.OO/S -

2054, both in records of Dept of State. 

98Msg, USARMA to Dept of Army, Ju ne 54; McClintock to Seey of State, 6 May 54, both in 

records of Dept of Siale. 

99U.S.*Vielmll1l ~elalio" , vol. 1, pt. III. A. I, p. A - 10. 

'OOHistory of Indochina Incident, p. 402. 

'OITelg, Dillon to Secy of State, 10 May 54, U.S.*Viefl/(II1/ Reln/iolls, 9:447. 

212 
The Questioll of llltervelltioll 

2. Simila r invitations to Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Brita in, with an understanding that the first two would accept at 

once, that the next two would probably accept, and that Britain would either 

participate or be acqu iescent. 

3. Immediate presentation of some aspect of the ma tter to th e United 

Nations. 

4. French guarantee to the Associated Sta tes of complete independence, 

including an unqualified option to withdraw from the French Union. 

5. No withdrawal of French military forces from Indoch ina during the 

period of united action in order to assure that American forces-principally 

air and sea forces-and others would supplement French forces, not substitute for them. 

6. An agreement on training native troops and on a sa tisfactory command 

structure for united action. l02 Although President Eisenhower had specified 

similar conditions for intervention during the Dien Bien Phu crisis, there were 

now two important differences. The proviso that Britain had to be one of the 

participating nations was dropped, and the demand that the Associated 

States be accorded rea l independence was made much more specific by the 

provision of a right to withdraw from the French Union. 

With intervention again under consideration, the acting secretary of 

defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare contingency plans for 

submission to the Na tional Security Council. Still strongly opposed to intervention, General Ridgway had apparently made some headway in bringing 

his fellow service chiefs to his point of view, for the Join t Chiefs now 

recognized, as they put it in a memorandum to the secretary of defense, that 

Vietnam was " devoid of decisive military objectives" and that to commit 

more than token forces would be a misallocation of limited American military 

resources. 103 The major emphasis, the chiefs suggested, should be on development of an effective Vietnamese army. American commitment should be 

limited to a carrier task force and selected units of the Far East Air Force. 104 

In any case, the question of intervention was becoming academic, for 

French and Ame rican political leaders were unable to agree on the conditions 

for American military in volvement, particularly in regard to independence for 

the Associated States. Th e French government maintained that guaranteeing 

102Telg, State Dept to Am Embassy, Paris, 1'1 May 54, U.S.-Vie/llam Relatiolls, 9:452 - 53. 

lU3Alarmed by renewed talk of intervention, Ceneral Ridgway decided to send a special 

reconnaissance team to Vietnam to examine logistical <l nd topographical conditions there. In strict 

secrecy a team of fi ve officers was formed under the command of Col. David W. Heiman and 

dispatched to Vietnam in the guise of inspecting the Military Assistance Advisory Croup. 

Heiman's team arrived in Vietnam 011 27 May 1954 and remained about three weeks. The team's 

report, received on 22 June, provided the chief of staff with additional ammu nition. See Memo, 

Lt Cen L. L. Lem nitzer for ACofS G - 3, 10 Mny 54, sub: Engineer Reconnaissance in Indochill<l; 

Memo, ACa fS G - 2 for CofSA, 29 Jul 54, sub: Award for Col David W. Heiman, CSUSA 201.2. 

Both in RG 3'19. 

1O.llnterv, author with General Matthew B. Ridgw<ly, 15 Apr 76, Historians files, CMH; Memos, 

JCS for Secy of Defense, 20 May 54, sub: U.S. M ilitary Participation in Indochina, and 26 M<ly 54, 

sub: Studies With Respect to Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina, both in U.S. -VietI1l1111 

Relatiolls, 9:477 - 79, 487 - 93, respectively. 

213 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

the Associated States the right to withdraw from the French Union, a right 

they had never requested, was a gratuitous insult to French good faith and 

would have an adve rse effect o n French public opinion. American leade rs 

contended that witho ut that explicit evidence of Vietnam's real independence, 

the participation of such countries as Thailand and the Philippines would be 

impossible. 

By late June, it had become obvious that the French would not request 

Ame rica n intervention until all possibility of a negotiated settlement had been 

exhausted. The Americans for their part had come to believe that military 

intervention of the type envisaged by the French could have no decisive effect 

on the situation in Vietnam . That intervention had not taken place was in 

large measure attributable to differences be tween the Americans, the French, 

and the British, but it was also attributable in part to General Ridgway and 

the Army staff, w hose skeptical view of prospects in Vietnam had prevailed, 

at least for the moment. A negotiated settlement of the war, so long dreaded 

by American policymakers, appeared at that point inevitable, even though a 

numbe r of American leaders still hoped to find some mea ns to "save" 

Indochina. In the end they found a way. 

214 
General O'Daniel Bids Farewell to Generals Vy and Don 

PART THREE 

Going It Alone 

12 

"Political Considerations Are Overriding" 

The Decision on Training 

Most American officials regarded the Geneva Agreements as a major defeat 

for United States policy in Southeast Asia. Under terms of a separate military 

agreement between the French and the Viet Minh, Vietnam was partitioned 

along the 17th Parallel. I Armed forces of the Viet Minh were to regroup north 

of the parallel, French forces to the south . No new equipment or troops were 

to be introduced into Vietnam except as replacements, a proviso to be supervised by an International Control Commission (ICC) composed of representatives of India, Poland, and Canada. 

On 21 July 1954 a majority of the governments participating in the conference-the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, France, the United 

lGngdom, Cambodia, Laos, and the Vi et Minh-adopted a final declaration 

confirming the military agreements and adding a provision that general 

elections were to be held in July 1956 under the supervision of the commission. Neither the United States nor the Bao Oai government (known as the 

State of Vietnam) concurred in the final declaration, although the United 

States pledged to " refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the 

agreements while warning that " it would view any renewal of aggression in 

violation of the. . agreements with gra ve concern and as seriously threa tening international peace and security."2 

Although American officials adopted a public attitude of guarded optimism toward the agreements, private assessments were gloomy. The G- 3 

Plans Oivision of the Army staff observed that American prestige and influence in Southeast Asia had been seriously lowered and Communist influence 

correspondingly increased by the Geneva Agreements. As a result the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia had become " far more difficult and 

IFrance concluded similar agreements with Laos and Cambodia. 

lA convenient reproduction of the agreements and the final declaration is in Dept of State, 

American Foreig n Po/icy, 1950 - 1955: Basic DOCllmellts. Department of State Publication 6446, 2 vols. 

(Washington, 1957), 1:750 - 67. Quotes from page 788, same volume. 

219 
Advice and Support: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Delegates of the Great Powers, Gelleva, 1954. 

costly."3 The National Security Council was even more pessimistic, pointing 

out that the Communists had secured an "advance sa lient" from which to 

mount operations aga inst neighboring countries. The council's Operations 

Coordinating Board declared that the Geneva Agreements represented "a 

drastic defeat of key [American] policies ... the psychological and political 

effects of which will be felt throughout the Far East and around the globe.'''' 

"I think this is going to be looked back on as a great mistake," predicted 

Admiral Radford to Vice President Nixon. "It is a black day for us," the vice 

president agreed S 

Until Dien Bien Phu the two principal goals of the Army, and of other 

American agencies, had been to foster a genuinely independent State of 

Vietnam with its own army and to have a strong voice in forming and 

training that army. Ironica lly, both of those objectives were substantially 

achieved only after Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva settlement had rendered 

them irreleva nt for Vietnam as a whole. Independence was largely attained 

on 3 June 1954 with the initialing by France and the Baa Dai government of 

3Rpt, G - 3 Plans Div, Military Implications of the Cease-Fire Agreements, 22 Jul 54, CS 091 

Indochina, RG 319. 

4Cited in U.S.-Vie/llnm Relatiolls, vol. 1, pt. 111.0.2, p. 0 - 15. 

sRadford Telecon, 21 Jul 54, Radford Papers. 

220 
Tire Decision on Tra ining 

two trea ties which recognized Vietnam as "a fully independent and sovereign 

state invested with all the competence recognized by international law." Yet 

those treaties, while ostensibly applying to all of Vietnam, were concluded 

less than seven weeks before the agreement at Geneva effectively created two 

separate countries, a Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and a 

State of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Only the latter was in any meaningful way 

under the jurisdiction of the Bao Dai government. 

Reorganizing the Vietnamese Army 

The United States now also achieved its other aim, a role in training a Vietnamese Army. Although the French had long resisted any such 

American role, as their military position had grown more precarious in the 

spring of 1954 they had become more amenable. By early May General Ely 

had consented to allow America ns to participate in training the Vietnamese 

Army as well as to place U.S. advisers with Vietnamese units. The French 

command would, however, retain operational control. 

By that time American officials were beginning to reconsider the French 

offer. From Saigon, Charge d'Affaires Robert McClintock observed that " the 

complete apathy of the Vietnamese populace.. the absolute breakdown of 

the mobilization plan, internecine rivalries between the few men capable of 

showing leadershi p and the lack of leadership from Bao Dai and his ministries" all made the task of increasing the effectiveness of the Vietnamese 

Army in a relati vely short time extremely difficult, if not impossible'" Army 

Chief of Staff Ridgway, commenting on what he called Ely's "ironic offer," 

warned that the assumption of responsibility by the United States for training 

and leading Vietnamese forces "while the French still retained overa ll control 

wou ld put the U.S. in an invidious position, where we would be blamed for 

fa ilures even though these failures were beyond our control and authority.,,7 

General O'Daniel, however, was anxious to proceed . On 13 May he urged 

that the United States act quickly before the end of the Geneva Conference 

to expand the Military Assistance Advisory Group and to reorganize the 

Vietnamese Army into 9 divisions'" O'Daniel wanted 4 light and 5 medium 

divisions, each to consist of 3 regiments of 3 battalions. The light d ivisions 

would have only shoulder wea pons and light mortars; the med ium d ivisions, 

some artillery and heavy mortars 9 

Despite the disaster at Dien Bien Phu, General O'Daniel believed that the 

war in Indochina could still be won. 10 Since early March he and his staff had 

6McCiintock to State Dept, 9 Ma y 54, 751C.OO/5 - 954, records of Dept of State. 

7Memo, Brig Cen F. W. Moorman for ACofS C - 3, 11 Ma y 54, sub: Cen Ridgway's Comments 

on French Offer, C - 3 091 Indochina, RC 319. 

IIMsg, Ch, MAAC, to DA, 13 May 54, G - 3 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

9Interv, author with O'Daniel, 3 Feb 75. 

lOMsg, Ch, MAAG, to DA, 13 May 54. 

221 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

been developing a plan for a gene ral offensive against the Viet Minh, code 

named REDLAND and ba sed on a plan developed in 1949 by Genera l James A. 

Van Fleet for the Greek Army in its war against indigenous Communist 

guerrillas. O'Daniel wanted to consolidate the eighty-odd battalions of the 

Vietnamese Army into nine divisions while keeping eight light battalions as a 

reserve to occupy areas won from the enemy. He intended the French to 

provide air and naval s upport; the United States wou ld supply additional 

military assistance and division-level advisers. I 1 

A three-phase operation, REDLAND was to be completed within two years. 

First, three Vietnamese divisions were to clear the Cochin peninsula and the 

Mekong Delta. In pha se two an amphibious task force was to seize Bong Son 

and Vinh in central Vietnam, joining with a larger force from the south . In 

the final phase the Vietnamese divisions, having ga ined experience and confidence in the ea rlier actions, were to join with French Union forces to destroy 

the Viet Minh in the Red Rive r Delta. 12 "The whole idea," O'Daniel later 

recalled, "was to create enthusiasm and increasing momentum as we went 

along."J3 The ope ration was to be accompanied "by an intense psychological warfare campa ign to convince the people that the Associated States' 

armies symbOlized the independe nce" of the states and that " the powerfu l 

Vietnamese army [was] piling up victory after victory for the security of all. "I'1 

To provide the troops for th e operation, General O'Daniel hoped to expa nd 

and strengthen the Vietnamese training program, using American me thods 

and concepts. More training facilities, includin g a command and gene ral staff 

college, an amphibious training center, and a specialist training center, were 

to be established and Vietnamese officers and noncommissioned officers sent 

to training schools in the United States. 15 

Since Genera l Van Fleet had devised the original plan, O'Daniel and a 

s pecial assistant, Lt. Col. William R. Rosson, took adva ntage of a visit by 

Van Fleet to Hong Kong to present their plan to him; Van Fleet promptly 

endorsed it. General Ely, on the other hand, was unimpressed. He found the 

plan too complex and believed it to be " unrealistic [beca use] it gave priority 

to operations in the south while the principal and immedia te threat [was] in 

the north." 16 

Ely was nevertheless becoming ever more interested in American training of the Vietnamese Army. At the beginning of Jun e 1954, he formally 

requested that O'Daniel and the United States join France in organizing and 

training the Army of Vietnam . 17 O'Daniel told General Ridgway that his first 

priority would be to reorganize the Vietnamese Army into regiment- and 

division-size units. Because most Vietnamese battalions were committed to 

static defensive operations and Gene ral Navarre was reluctant to pull them 

" Campaign Plan REDLAND, 5 M ar 54, p. 2, 350.09, records of MAAG Indochina, RG 370. 

12Ibid. , pp. 2 - 3. 

'3Interv, author with Q'Daniel. 

14Campaign Plan REDLAND, Annex F, 24 Mar 54. 

17rraining Plan REDLAND, 23 Mar 54, 350.09, records of MAAG Indochina, RG 370. 

l~ g, U.S. Embassy, Paris, 10 Siale Dcpt, 27 May 54, U.S .·Vietllalll Relations, 9:496. 

17M sg, Ch, MAAG, 10 DA for CSUSA, DAIN 64 188, 9 Jun 54, G - 3 09 1 Indochina, RG 319. 

222 
The Decisiol1 0 11 Trainillg 

out for reorganiza tion and training, Q'Daniel suggested withdrawing a few 

offi cers and noncommissioned officers from each battalion to form cadres 

for new battalions and regiments. Again the French were unenthusiastic. 

"Nava rre did state," noted O'Daniel, " that if the Vietnamese could furnish 

the men and the U.S. the equipment he would have no objections. He may 

have felt this was a safe statement. I sure wou ld like to ca ll him on i!.,,!8 

By that time Washington was becoming wary of all French proposals. 

Secretary of Sta te Dulles suspected that Ely's request might be part of a 

French scheme " to draw the U.S. into [the Vietnam] conflict without having 

U.S. conditions on intervention me!." Other American officials feared that the 

military situation had already degenerated to such a point that a training 

program, no matter how well conceived, would have no chance of influencing the outcome. 19 

O'Daniel protested any delay in undertaking a training program 20 He 

believed that a liberal reading of the Military Assistance Advisory Group's 

directive to perform "end use checks of American equipment" could be 

rationalized as a cover to begin reorganizing the Vietnamese Army2! When 

his intentions became known in Washington, General Ridgway issued explicit 

instructions that Q'Daniel was to "make no commitments whatsoever in 

regard to training:'" A few days later, however, Secretary Dulles directed 

that O'Da niel might "assist by advising in the training activities of the Vietnam National Army" and approved augmenting the Military Assistance Advisory Group by ninety spaces. The key word was apparently "advising," for 

the sanction was "not to be construed as U.S. approval of a MAAG Training 

Mission. ,,23 

Even after the Geneva Conference, Genera l O'Da niel continued his 

appeals for authority to form a training mission. Vietnam, O'Daniel believed, 

would prove a testing ground for determining the ability of the United States 

"to combat the kind of warfare Communist troops wou ld hope to employ 

everywhere, including the United States. ,,24 

For most American leaders, however, the reluctance to assume responsibility fo r training had grown even stronger. On 2 August 1954 Genera l 

Ridgway, who had long opposed America n intervention in Indochina, recommended that " before the United States assumes responsibility for training the 

forces of any of the Associated States" four essential conditions should be 

met. The conditions, wh ich would consititute the position of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff for the next five months, were: 

IIiLt r, O'Dani el to CofSA, 2 Jun 54, Attachment to ACofS Summary Sheet for CofSA, 28 Jun 54, 

CS 09 1 Indochina, RG 319. 

19Dulles to Am Embassy, Pa ris, 12 Ju n 54, 751G.OO/6 - 1254. See also Tclg, State Dept (Murphy) 

to Am Embassy, Paris, 10 Jun 54, U.S. -Vie/I/alll Relatiolls, 9:553 - 54. 

2HMsg, Ch, MAAG, to CSUSA, DAIN 65099, JUIl 54, eSA 09 1 In dochi na, RG 319. 

21Am Embassy, Saigon, to State, 15Jun 54, 75 1G.OO/6 - 1554, records o f Dept o f State. 

22 Ibid., 12 Jun 54, 75 1G.OO/6 - 1254, records of Dept of State. 

23Msg, Joint State-Defense to Saigon, 26 Jun 54, 75 1 G.OO/6 - 2654, records of Dept of Siale. 

24Msg, Ch, MAAG, to DA, 27 Jul 54, 751G.OOfl - 2754, records of Dept of Slate . Ambassador 

Heath concurred in Gene ral O'Da niel's recommendations. 

223 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

(1) A reasonably strong, stable, civil governmen t in control. It is hopeless to 

expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless the nation 

concerned is able to effectively perform [its] governmental functions. 

(2) The government of the Associated States SllOUld formally request that the 

United States assume responsibility for training its forces. 

(3) Arrangements should be made with the French ... providing for the 

phased orderly withdrawal of French forces, French officials and French 

advisors from Indochina. The United States from the beginning should insist 

on dealing directly with the governments of the respective Associated States. 

(4) The size and composition of the forces of each of the Associated States 

should be dictated by the local military requirements and the overa ll U.S. 

interests. 25 

Diem Comes to Power 

I n the summer of 1954 those conditions appeared unlikely to be fu lfilled. In 

South Vietnam a strong and stable civil government seemed especia lly far 

from realization. A government with Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister, 

which had taken office in Saigon on 7 July 1954, talked bravely of achieving 

real independence and victory over communism, but in fact it was in a 

precarious position. Although Diem had a reputation for incorruptible honesty and uncompromising nationalism, he was also inexperienced, shy, dogmatic, and relatively unknown outside his native Annam. Bao Dai offered 

him little support, the French were suspicious of his ultranationalism, and 

most other South Vietnamese leaders, unwilling to be associated with a 

government that might well collapse, held themselves aloof. The government 

as instituted consisted primarily of Diem's relatives. 

Born in 1901 in Hue, the new prime minister came from a Catholic 

mandarin family. After attend ing the French school of administration in Hue, 

Diem rose rapidly in the mandarinate . In 1933 he resigned his post as 

minister of the interior, the most important position in the emperor's government, to protest the French refusal to allow more Vietnamese participation in 

governing the country. For the next twenty years he held no office. The 

Japanese offered him a position in their puppet regime after their March 1945 

coup, and Ho Chi Minh personally invited him to join the Viet Minh government in 1946, but Diem refused both offers. He left Vietnam in 1950 and 

spent two years at Maryknoll seminaries in the United States before settling 

in Europe in 1953. On 7 June 1954 Bao Dai invited Diem to become prime 

minister. The emperor had little choice-there was simply no other nonCommunist leader of Diem's stature who was not tainted by close association 

with the French. 

"Tell me about Diem," an American journalist asked a Vietnamese fri end, 

observing that the prime minister reminded him of a priest. "Not a priest," 

25Memo, CofSA for JCS, 2 Aug 54, sub: U.s. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in 

Indochina, JCS 19921367, 4 Aug 54, JCS records. 

224 
The Decision 011 Training 

replied the Vietnamese. "A priest at least learns of the world through the 

confessional. Diem is a monk living behind stone walls. He knows nothing. ,,26 

The Geneva settlement had denied Diem the heavily Catholic districts of 

the North, which would have been a basic source of his support. Large areas 

of South Vietnam were still ruled by Viet Minh shadow governments in rural 

villages and districts; other regions were under the firm control of two 

politico-religious sects, the Cao Da i and the Hoa Hao, which had their own 

private armies subsidized by the French .27 Not even in Saigon was the Diem 

government in complete command, for a gangster organization, the Binh 

Xuyen, controlled the city's police. Neither the sects nor the Binh Xuyen were 

represented in the Diem government. 

The National Army of Vietnam had, in the opinion of U.S. observers, 

experienced "a complete breakdown of comba t capabilities since the ceasefire and the stopping of supplies from the United States. ,,28 On paper the 

army numbered about 150,000 men plus 35,000 auxiliaries, all organized into 

some 125 battalions. Many of the battalions were considerably understrength 

through desertion and defections to the Viet Minh, and all lacked adequate 

combat support and combat service support units. The best units were the 

Vietnamese paratroopers, some of whom had fought in the final battles of 

1954, but they were few in number. In fact, the army's weakness probably 

benefited the Diem regime since Chief of Staff Hinh, the son of former 

Premier Nguyen Van Tam, was Diem's avowed enemy. Counting the French 

Expeditionary Corps, the armies of the sects and the Binh Xuyen, and Hinh's 

forces, there were fi ve separate and competing armies in South Vietnam, 

none fully supporting the Diem government.

29 Facing the Vietnamese and the 

dwindling French forces were approximately 230,000 veteran Viet Minh regulars organized into nine infantry and two artillery divisions backed by more 

than 100,000 "Armed People's Militia."JO 

The Refugee Operation 

I n addition to its military problems, the new regime had to transport and 

resettle approximately 800,000 refugees from North Vietnam who wanted 

to move to South Vietnam. Article 14(d) of the Geneva Agreements had set 

aside a period of approximately ten months during which "any civilians 

residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live 

26Denis Warner, TIle Lnst COIlluciall (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 71. 

27NIE 63 - 5-54, Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina, 3 Aug 54, U.S.-Vietnam Re/atiolls, 10:696. 

2!1MAAG Monthly Activities Report No. 21 for Aug 54, 751G.5 - MSP/9- 2254, records of Dept 

of State. 

29Collins to Am Embassy, Paris, 4 Feb 55, 75 1G.OO/2 - 455, records of Dept of State; Interv with 

J. Lawton Collins, Dulles O ral History Collec tion. 

3OMemo, ACSI for CofSA, 31 Aug 54, sub: Visit to Pacific Areas; Rpt, Maj T. J. Hanifen, Staff 

Visit to Far East and Southeas t Asia, 15 Sep - 19 Nov 54. Both in records of ACSI. Memo, K. T. 

You ng for Under Seey of State, 4 Jan 55, Lot 580207, records of Dept of State. 

225 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Vietnamese Refugees board U.S. Navy LST at Haiphollg. 

in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted ... to do SO.,,31 

Many of the refugees were Catholics from the Red River Delta who had 

strongly opposed the Viet Minh during the war. They were joined by other 

Vietnamese who had been functionaries or servants of the French or who had 

served in the French Army. During August 1954 these people began to flee in 

large numbers to Hanoi and Haiphong, seeking passage south. Although the 

French government promised to evacuate all persons who wished to leave the 

North, the French appeared unequal to the gigantic task of moving almost 

one million civilians in a few months' time. 

On 7 August the South Vietnamese government formally requested assistance from the United States in dealing with the refugee problem. Designated 

as coordinator of all U.S. activities in support of the evacuation, General 

O'Daniel established an Evacuation Staff Group with headquarters at 461 Rue 

Gallieni in Saigon. The United States Navy formed a special group-Task 

Force 90-under Rear Adm. Lorenzo S. Sabin to evacuate the French and 

Vietnamese from the North; with 28 ships, which included 15 attack transports, and 5 attack cargo ships, the task force began embarking refugees a t 

Haiphong on 16 August. 32 Liaison detachments from the Military Assistance 

310ept of State, Americall Foreigll Policy, 1950 - 1955: Basic Documents, 1:755. 

32MAAG Rpt 21 for Aug 54. A detailed discussion of the evacuation may be found in Edwin 

Bickford Hooper, Dean C. Allard, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United SIf/leS Navy and ti,e Vie tllam 

226 
The Decisioll on Trainillg 

Catholic Refugees all their way sOllth. 

Advisory Group operated in the Haiphong area to coordinate embarkation. 

Civilian refugees were transferred by lighter to the ships of Task Force 90 

anchored in Henrietta Pass at the mouth of the Red River. The first ship to 

depart, the U.S.S. Mellard, left Haiphong on 17 August with 2,000 refugees 

aboard, and by the end of the month nearly 50,000 people, 133 vehicles, and 

117 tons of military equipment had been transported south .

33 The evacuation 

continued through May 1955; of the more than 800,000 people transported to 

South Vietnam, Task Force 90 moved 311,000. 

The United States and the State of Vietnam reaped enormous propaganda 

benefits from the mass exodus. The spectacle of hundreds of thousands of 

refugees, approximately one-thirteenth of Vietnam's population, fleeing to the 

South, was a striking indictment of the Viet Minh regime. Ruthless and brutal 

actions by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to try to prevent the migration 

lent credence to Diem's claim that his government, and not that of the Viet 

Minh, was the true representative of democracy and freedom. Even so, 

resettling the refugees and integrating them into the population of South 

Vietnam was an enormously complex and costly job servi ng to tax still further 

the slender resources of the Diem regime. 

COllflict. vot. 1, Ti,e Setting of ti,e Slage to 1959 (Washington: Naval History Division, 1976), pp. 

273 - 98. 

33MAAG Rpt 21 for Aug 54; Interv, author with O'Da nie l, 3 Feb 75. 

227 
Adv ice atld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The Decision on Training 

Viewing South Vietnam in late summer of 1954-a country burdened with 

refugees, rent by the power struggles of the sects, and threatened by a 

formidable Viet Minh presence in the provinces-the U.S. Joi nt Chiefs of Staff 

were reluctant to begin a long-term military training program unless th e four 

conditions set out by Genera l Ridgway could be met. Secretary of Sta te Dulles 

reasoned differently. Conceding that the Diem government was "far from 

strong or stable," Dulles believed that "one of the most efficient means of 

enabling the [South] Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it 

in reorganizing the National Army and in training that army." He suggested 

that training could be undertaken as one of a number of political and economic measures to strenghen the Vietnamese government. 34 In an informal 

conversation with Army staff planners Dulles explained that the sole purpose 

of the reorganized South Vietnamese Army would be to maintain internal 

security; a ny external threat would be met by a new regional defense organization for Southeast Asia that was then being discussed in Manila by representatives of the United States, France, Britain, Australia, and various Asian 

nations. Given the limited mission of the South Vietnamese Army, a force of 

about 50,000 would be adequate; since that mission was to defend aga inst 

political subversion, "guidance as to the size and nature of the forces should 

come from the State Department rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The 

important thing, Dulles told Deputy Defense Secretary Robert B. Anderson, 

was " to start training rather than worry about the specific number of people 

we are prepared to train."35 

Anderson agreed, as did the other members of the National Security 

Council and the president, who, on 12 August, approved NSC 542911 providing for U.S. assistance, "working through the French only insofar as necessary," in the creation of indigenous military forces for internal security.36 

The State Department on 18 August notified the French government that 

the United States intended to assign a training mission to its Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam. 37 Two days later President Eisen hower 

approved a new policy statement on Southeast Asia , NSC 5429/2, which called 

upon the United States to "make every possible effort, not openly inconsistent with the U.S. position as to the [Geneva] armistice agreements, to defeat 

Communist subversion and influence and to maintain and support friendly 

non-Communist governments" in Indochina and reaffirmed the decision to 

assist the non-Communist states economically and militarily.'8 

34Ltr, Dulles to Charles E. Wilson, 18 Aug 54, U.S.-Viel/U/l/I ReinliOlls, 10:728. 

35Mc1llO, ACofS G - 3 for G - 3 Plans Div, Int ernational Bra nch, 10 Nov 54, sub: Views of Seey 

of Stale on Strategy and Force Levels in Indochinil, PSYWAR 09 1 Indochina; Record of Telccon, 

Dulles to A nderson, 9 Ju l 54, Dulles Pilpcrs, Prince ton University. 

36-f'he Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1954 - 1959, p. 61, manuscript in JCS 

Historical Div files. 

37SIate Dept to Am Embassy, Pari s, 18 Aug 54, 751G.OO/8 - 1854, records of Dept of State. 

38NSC 5429/2, Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East, 20 Aug 54, U.S.-Vie/llml/ Reln ,iolls, 

10,731 - 41. 

228 
The Decision on Training 

On 8 September representatives of Britain, France, the United Sta tes, 

New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand signed the 

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea ty, which established a loose regional 

defense organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Its 

members pledged to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of 

aggression against any of th e signatories.'9 Un li ke NATO, SEATO wou ld 

have no standing military forces, and the members made no specific pledge 

of military action. A separate protocol of the treaty extended its security 

provisions to Laos, Cambodia , and the "free territory under the jurisdiction of 

the State of Vietnam" should those nations request assistance'O 

The joint Chiefs of Sta ff, meanwhile, continued a rearguard action against 

assuming training responsibilities. When the State Department was drafting 

its letter of 18 August to the French government, the Joint Chiefs objected to 

the wording on the grounds tha t the French might interpret it to mea n that 

the United States was prepared to furnish training assistance regard less of 

French compliance with th e American conditions'l On 22 September the Joint 

Chiefs declared that the provisions of the Geneva cease-fire agreement would 

present a major obstacle to introducing a sufficient number of American 

training personnel and additional arms and equipment42 

But by mid-October 1954 th e joint Chiefs had acceded. While still strongly 

opposed to a Vietnamese training program, "from a military point of view," 

they agreed to go along "if it is considered that politica l considera tions are 

overriding.,,·3 In fact, the joint Chiefs were well aware that Dulles, the State 

Department, and most members of the National Security Council considered 

precisely those conditions overrid ing. The outspoken desire of such powerful 

officials as Secretary Dulles and presidential assistant Robert Cutler to see 

the training program undertaken may have contributed to their capitulation, and they may also have been awa re that President Eisenhower himself 

wanted it. Only three days after the Joint Chiefs acquiesced, the president 

told the Na tional Security Council that " in the land of the blind, the one-eyed 

men are kings. What we want is a Vietnamese force which will support 

Diem. th e obvious thing to do is simply to authorize O'Da niel to use up 

to X millions of dollars to produce the maximum number of Vietnamese units 

which Prime Minister Diem can depend on to sustain himself in power. ,,44 

Read litera lly, the Joint Chiefs' position was quite illogica l. Their paper 

said that the crea tion of an effective Vietnamese Army under existing conditions was impossible, but they were nevertheless prepared to undertake the 

task because of political considerations. In other words, they wou ld agree to 

39Dept of State, American Foreigll Policy, 1950 - 1955: Basic Docllments, 1:9 13. 

4()Ibid. , 1:916. 

4lMemo, JCS for Seey of De fense, 12 Aug 54, sub: Message to the French Prime Mi nister, 

U. S.-Vietnam Relations, 10:715. 

'

12U.S.-Vietllam Relations, vo l. 1, pt. IV.A.3, p. 9. 

° Memo, JCS for Seey of Defense, 19 Oct 54, sub: Development and Training of Indigenous 

Forces in Indochina, U.S.-Vietnam Relatio/ls, 10:773 - 74. 

44Min, 2 1Sth Meeting of the NSC, 22 Oct 54, Eisenhower-as-President Papers, Eisenhower 

Library. 

229 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

do that which they had just declared to be unwise and impossible. Actually, 

the joint Chiefs designed their statement as a bureaucratic compromise, to 

put on record the military's objections to the training program and thereby 

shift responsibility to the political leaders while at the same time allowing the 

program to proceed. 

The joint Chiefs of Staff, and particularly the Army staff, had recently 

succeeded in preventing the commitment of American combat forces in Vietnam. Having risked much, fought hard, and won the fight, Army leaders 

thought it foolish to quarrel over the relatively minor issue of American 

training assistance. As the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Lt. Gen. 

james M. Gavin, recalled, "we in the Army were so relieved that we had 

blocked the decision to commit ground troops to Vietnam that we were in no 

mood to quibble. ,,45 Whatever the motives, the joint Chiefs of Staff had 

agreed to a proposal that set in motion a chain of events that would soon 

prove irreversible. 

45James M. Gavin, Crisis Now (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 49. 

230 
13 

The Collins Mission 

By the time the Joint Chiefs approved training of the Vietnamese Army, the 

Operations Control Board of the Na tional Security Council had already been 

working for several days on a program for Indochina which included training 

of "minimum Vietnamese security forces."l When the State Department incorporated that provision into a draft message for the American embassy in 

Saigon, the stipulation was so general that Admiral Radford feared that 

Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel would interpret it as a signal to 

implement their long-awaited, full-scale training program (which indeed they 

did). Radford directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up a more precisely 

worded directive; but before the staff could act, the National Security Council 

met and authorized sending the original message 2 On 22 October 1954, the 

State Department instructed the Saigon mission immediately to develop and 

to initiate with the Vietnamese government a "program for training that 

number of Vie tnamese armed forces necessary to carry out internal security 

missions,"3 

In addition to the military training effort, the new program included 

measures by the State Department and the CIA to help the Diem government 

cope with the refugee problem and win the support of the Vietnamese 

people. To provide impetus to the program, Admiral Felix Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific, suggested that the United States appoint a single 

individual with overall authority to control the entire American effort in 

Vietnam. Such an individual would need great personal prestige and proven 

executive ability to break the " long history of U.5. officials in Indochina being 

duped by the French." French foot-dragging, said the admiral, "must be 

ruthlessly overcome.'" Apparently impressed with Stump's suggestion, Secrelitem 4, Indochina, NSC 218th Meeting, 22 Oct 54, U.S. -Vietnam Relnt;olls, 10:789 - 90. 

2The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, p. 63. Col. Alfred E. Stevens of the Army 

staff, who was present at the meeting of the Operations Control Board, reported that the Defense 

Department representatives on the board felt the message "reflected the best terms obtainable" 

from the State Department. Stevens' Notes of OCB Meeting, 28 Oct 54, PSYWAR 337. 

3Sta le Dept 10 Am Embassy, Saigon, 21 OCI 54, U.S.-Vietllam Relatiolls, 10:784. 

'!Msg, Slump to eNO, 300402F, Oct 54, copy in Collins Papers, National Archives. 

231 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

tary of Sta te Dulles asked the president's military adviser, Col. And rew 

J. Goodpaster, to suggest "any fairly 

senior military man that might be sent 

out to assess [the situation] and see 

whether a viable military position 

could be created."s Goodpaster recommended the man who had been Army 

chief of staff during the Korean War, 

retired General J. Lawton Collins. 

Dulles discussed the proposed mission with the president and received 

his approval. General Collins was to 

go to Vietnam as the president's special representative with wide authority and the personal rank of ambassador. In a letter of instruction, 

Eisenhower gave Collins "broad 

au thority to direct, utilize and control 

all agencies and resources of the U.S. General CoIlins 

government with respect to Vietnam. " The immediate and urgent requirement was to assist in stabilizing and strengthening the government of Prime 

Minister Diem.

6 Secretary Dulles explained to Coll ins that the most pressing 

need was to decide on the size and scope of the U.S. effort in Vietnam, "in 

view of the slim chances of great accomplishments." How much, for example, 

should the United States spend to support the French Expeditionary Corps, 

the Vietnamese Army, and the Vietnamese economy, and for how long?7 The 

secretary rated the chances for success in Vietnam as "only one in ten."8 

While General Collins d id, in fact, quickly become the coordinator and 

director of U.S. activity in Indochina, his original concept of his mission was 

less ambitious. "The idea was that I would go down on a brief mission, make 

a survey, some recommendations and come back and make a report and that 

would be that," Collins later recalled 9 Yet unlike ea rlier short and usually 

fru itless fact-finding missions, the Collins mission wou ld last for an extend ed 

period and profoundly affect U.S. policy in South Vietnam. 

Preventing a Coup 

A lthough General Collins had considerable experience in Asia and had visited Vietnam in 1951, he was amazed and appalled at the situa5Interv with Andrew ]. Goodpaster, Dulles Oral History Collection . 

6Eisenhower to Collins, 2 Nov 54, 120.2SG/l 1 - 254; Dulles to Am Embassy, Saigon, 1 Nov 54, 

120.25G111 - 154; both in records of Dept of State. 

7Indochina Bri efing Papers, 1 Nov 54, Coltins Papers. 

8General 1. Lawton Collins, Lig/lll1illg Joe: A1I Autobiograplly (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Slate 

University Press, 1979), p. 379. 

"'Interv with Collins. 

232 
The Col/ills Missioll 

tion that greeted him as he arrived in Saigon on 8 November 1954. '0 Chief 

of Staff General Nguyen Va n Hinh had concentrated tanks a few blocks 

from the presidential palace where Diem was "guarded" by police under 

the control of the Binh Xuyen . It was obvious to Collins that until this crisis 

could be resolved, no effective reorga nization and development of the South 

Vietnamese Army could be underta ken. Collins fou nd that Genera l O'Daniel 

and Ambassador Heath d iffered on how to deal with the situation. Having 

worked closely with Hinh on planning for tra ini ng and reorganizing the 

army, O'Daniel believed that the general was basically honest and patriotic 

and could be persuaded to cooperate with Prime Minister Diem. Ambassador 

Heath, on the other hand, thought that O'Da nie!'s view of Hinh was naive 

and that the Diem government's d iffic ulties could not be solved unless Hinh 

was removed. " As an officer in the U.S. mission recalls, "Nguyen Van Hin h 

was not only a French citizen w ith a French wife but was a regular or career 

officer in the French Air Force and thus supposedly under French military 

discipline .... To most Vietnamese in the army he was French; his politica l 

ascendancy would have been a mockery of Vie tnam's 'independence .' 1112 

By late August Hinh was freely admitting to members of the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group that he had been consulting with leaders of the 

Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects on forming a government to succeed Diem. 13 

Alarmed by that development, on 27 August Ambassador Hea th had met 

with General Ely, "stated very firmly to him that Diem must be given another 

chance," and two days later had warned Genera l Hinh that any attempt to 

overthrow the Diem government by force "would cause a very un favora ble 

impression in the U.S."" Heath worked to get Genera l Hinh out of the 

country, but Hin h had refused to leave. On 11 September, when President 

Diem directed Hinh to make a six-week "study tour" in France, Hinh had 

openly defied the order. 

Because of the delicacy of the situation, Ambassador Heath had instructed 

all members of the American mission to have no contact with Hinh . But 

Genera l O'Daniel had become convinced by the afternoon of the 12th that 

Hinh was about to launch a coup and that he should talk with Hinh and try 

to dissuade him from acting. Unable to contact either Ambassador Heath or 

Cou nselor Randolph A. Kidder (it was a Sunday), O'Daniel had seen no 

recourse but to take action on his own. Accompanied by his special assista nt, 

Colonel Rosson, O'Daniel had called on Hinh at his home, where in a 

two-hour conversation Hinh had protested his loyalty and his willi ngness to 

cooperate with Diem. O'Daniel always believed that his visit to Hinh was 

instrumental in averting a coup. 

The incident nevertheless worsened relations between O'Daniel and 

Ambassador Heath. Reporting to the State Department, Heath said that he 

IOlbid. 

llHeath to State Dept, 26 Aug 54, 751G.OO/8 - 2654, records of Dept of State. 

12Ltr, Maj Cell Edward Lansdale to Chief of Military H istory, 6 Jun 79, CMH files. 

13Heath to State Dept, 27 Aug 54, 7S"IG.OO/8 - 2754, records of Dept of Sta te. 

1.llbid., and 29 Aug 54, 751G.OO/8 - 2954, records of Dept of State. 

233 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

-I " 

General Hinh With Prime Minister Diem ill Saigoll. 

had explicitly told Q'Da niel not to see Hinh and that his action was " in direct 

contravention of my instructions, indulging his tendency to take matters into 

his own hands and to mix into political situations without proper clearance 

from the Chief of Mission." When confronted, Q'Daniel "insisted that he had 

not heard my instructions." Heath also said Q'Daniel told him that he preferred "Hinh to Diem should he have to make a choice between the two 

men.'dS General Q'Daniel later denied making either statement but said he 

was so convinced that something had to be done immediately that, when 

unable to reach Heath or the embassy's counselor, he had acted on his own. 16 

As the situation continued tense with recurring rumors of plots, Ambassador Heath, General Q'Daniel, and other members of the U.S. mission all 

made clear to Hinh that in the event of a coup, American aid would almost 

certainly be cut off. When Hinh told Q'Danie!'s aide, Maj. Frank Gorman, in 

late September that he would attempt a takeover if his terms were not met, 

LSUr, Heath to State Dept, 16 Scp 54, in U.S,-Vietnam Relatiol/s, 10:753 - 55. 

16See Intervs, author with O'Daniel, 2 Feb 75, and Charles V. P. von LuUichau and Charles 6. 

MacDonald w ith O'Danie l, 9 Mar 70. Hinh's chief of staff, Gene ral Tran Van Don, believed that 

"Hinh had the military clout to overthrow Diem but instead preferred to bluff and play arou nd." 

Don recalled only onc occasion, at the end of September, when Hinh seriously considered 

staging a takeover but was dissuaded by General Ely. MFR, Conversation Between Author and 

General Don, 6 Dec 76. All in Historians files. CMH . 

234 
The Col/ills Mission 

Heath "reminded Hinh that the bulk of the Vietnamese defense budget was 

defrayed by the United States. . any CO IlP de force by the Army wou ld 

be fatal to the future of the Army of Vietnam. It would be d isastrous for 

Hinh personally."17 Although by ea rly October General O'Daniel thought he 

had persuaded Hinh to issue a statement to the army affirming his loyalty to 

the Diem government and warning against violent action, Hinh at the last 

moment began to quibble over the wording. 

Hinh's reluctance to issue the statement may have come from an awareness that his position was steadily deteriorating, for the Diem government 

had begun to receive powerful psychological support from the United States. 

In mid-October Washington authorized Heath and O'Daniel to 

state without equivocation that no long range support to the Vietnamese 

armed force will be programed or extended by the U.S. as long as there is the 

slightest doubt as to the loyalty of the Chief of Staff or other high officers. 

Should you determine that It is not practical to work with the existing armed 

forces organization you are authorized to approach the Prime Minister to say 

that the U.S. is willing to commence immediately the organization of a 

national police or other force separate from the armed forces. ,. 

On 15 October an influential Democratic member of the Foreign Relations 

Committee, Senator Mike Mansfield, submitted a report on a visit to Vietnam 

in which he strongly endorsed Diem as the only pOSSible leader for a nonCommunist South Vietnam. If the Diem government fell, said Mansfield, the 

United States should consider suspending all aid to South Vietnam since it 

was improbable that any other suitable leader could be found. President 

Eisenhower voiced his support for Diem in a letter, made public on 25 

October, in which he told the Vietnamese prime minister that the American 

ambassador to South Vietnam had been instructed "to examine with you 

how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet Nam in its present hour of trial.,,19 

Although the Eisenhower letter and the Mansfield report delighted Diem, 

they surprised and irritated the French. Premier Pierre Mendes-France 

objected that the Eisenhower letter went far beyond his understanding of 

agreed Franco-American policy in regard to Diem 20 Ambassador Henri Bonnet in Washington complained to Secretary Dulles that "the President's 

letter had given Diem full rein without requiring of him ... that he should 

first succeed in forming a strong and stable government."2i The French 

regarded the Eisenhower letter as only the most glaring example of a dangerous and irresponsible anti-French policy pursued by the United States in 

South Vietnam. The French Deputy High Commissioner in Indochina, Jean 

Dariden, told an American diplomat that "while Heath was doing his best to 

11Hci1th to State Dept, 29 Sep 54, 751G.OO/9 - 2954, and 10 Oct 54, 751G.OO/IO - IOS4, both in 

records of Dept of Stille. 

lMOepl of State to Saigon 1679, 15 Oct 54, copy in Collins Papers. 

l'JPllblic Papers of tile Presidents: Dwigllf D. Eisel1/lOwer, 1954 (Washington, 19(0), Item 306, p. 949. 

20c. Douglas Dillon to Stille Dept, 24 Oct 54, 751G.OOIIO-2454, records of Dept of Slate. 

21Mcmorandum of Conversation, Dept of Stale, 26 Oct 54, sub: Indochina, U.s.-VidHam Relatiolls, 10:799. 

235 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

set things straight, the America n intelligence services, STEM, and MAAG 

were going off on separate tangents. One often gets the impression that their 

principal aim is to remove all French influence and prestige."" An article in 

Le MOllde en titled "M. Diem, Marionette Americaine," declared that " the 

young turks of the American embassy and the American services tea r each 

other apart in their rivalry. .. They see in Mr. Diem only what they consider his 'qualities: ,,23 

Just as the French saw in U.S. actions a concerted effort to undermine 

the ir interests and prestige, so many Americans in Sa igon were convinced 

that because of Diem's outspoken anti-French attitude, some elements among 

the French were scheming to overthrow him. The State Department observed 

that the Vietnamese factions and individuals most opposed to Diem were also 

those most susceptible to French influence and speculated that the knowledge 

that many French groups had never accepted Diem must have encouraged 

General Hinh and his followers. French officials sometimes spoke as if they 

were " hankering to reestablish a puppet regime similar to the Cochinchina 

Republic of 1946."24 The CIA reported persistent rumors of French-backed 

plots to overthrow Diem. 25 General Ely noted later that he was, in fa ct, often 

" hindered by elements that were sometimes difficu lt to identify but were 

sentimentally hostile to the Diem government as well as to the Americans.,,26 

Also worrisome to many Americans was a special mission under Jean 

Sainteny which the French had established in Hanoi after the Geneva Conference to look after their interests in North Vietnam. This action suggested to 

American officials that the French were hedging their bets and preparing to 

make a dea l with the Viet Minh at the expense of Diem to preserve their 

interests in Vietnam. 27 Rumors circulating in Paris that the French had given 

up hope of holding South Vietnam and were keeping in the south a force just 

large enough to fight its way out added to these misgivings.28 

In that atmosphere of mutual suspicion General Collins' arrival served at 

first to heighten French nervousness. General Ely believed that the United 

States wa s replacing Ambassador Heath " because his realism had caused him 

to oppose the State Department in defending positions which were very close 

22Memorandum of Conversa tion, 30 Nov 54, Incl to W. M. Gibson to Livingston M erchant, 3 

Dec 54, 751GOOtl2 - 354, records of Dept of Stale . 

Dlbid" see copy of article attached. 

24Stale Dept to Am Embassy, Saigon, 21 Oct 54, 751G .OO/1O - 2154, records of Dept of State . 

25lbid. 

26Ely, L'lmiocllillc (/(//15 /n TOII,II/ellte, p. 64 . Maj. Gen. Edward G. L..-lOsdale observed: " I respeci 

General Paul Ely as a man of greal decency. When I tried 10 ca rry oul a project jointly for him 

and General Collins in 1955 I discovered some of Ely's staff up 10 shena nigans unknown to him . 

Apparently they considered him to be a novice in the problems of 'their' Vietnam." Ltr, L<1Ilsdale 

10 Chicf of M ilitary Hislory, 6 Jun 79. 

27Memo, K. T. Young (or Acting Secy o( State, 2 1 Sep 54, Lot 580207, records of Dept of Sta te; 

Collins, Lightning Joe, p. 395. M inister Sainteny, in a conversa tion with the author in 1975, firmly 

denied that there was any contradiction between France's professed stlpport o( Diem and his 

mission to Hanoi. Interv, aulhor with Jean Sainteny, Paris, France, Nov 75, Historians (iles, 

CMH. 

28Memo, K. T. Young for Ass! Secy, FE, 4 Dec .54, sub: Principal Points for Discussion 

Regarding Associated States, Lot 580207, records of Dept of State. 

236 
TIle Collins Mission 

to ours." Ely predicted tha t the Collins visit would crea te a very unfavorable 

impression in France whe re it "would be taken as meaning that the U.S. was 

going to take over in Indochi na." He strongly hinted to Ambassador Heath 

that he did not care to remain in Vietnam under such conditions. 29 General 

Ely did not come to Sa igon for General Collins' a rrival, remaining instead at 

his villa in the highland resort of Dalat. The next day Coll ins flew to Dalat to 

see Ely, with whom he had worked on the NATO Standing Group. Collins' 

tact and candor, and perhaps also his excellent command of French, soon 

won Ely's confidence; by the end of the first day the two were calli ng "each 

othe r by the first names and exchanging hearty pats on the ba ck.,,30 

Ely and Co ll ins agreed tha t the feud between Diem and Hin h had to be 

ended and tha t there should be no support for the armed militias of the Bin h 

Xuyen and the sects, w hich posed a threat to the development of an effecti ve 

na tional army. Gene ral Ely also explained that even with the Vietnamese 

Army, a sizable French Expeditiona ry Corps would have to remain in Vietnam both to g uard aga inst Viet Minh aggression and to protect French 

Na tio nals. Little reliance, in his view, could be placed on assistance from the 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Coll ins agreed to recommend continued 

U.S. support of the French Expeditionary Corps, at least until the elections 

scheduled under the Geneva Agreements, but cautioned that Congress wou ld 

probably cut funding somewhat. He also pOinted out that even with the 

Exped itionary Corps at full strength and backed by the Vietnamese National 

Army, Vietnam would still have to rely on the SEATO pact as the major 

deterrent to aggression ,3! 

Four days after Gene ral Collins arrived in Saigon, the crisis engendered by 

General Hinh's intransigence was at last resolved. On 12 November, under 

considerable French and American pressure, Emperor Bao Dai ordered Hinh 

to report to him in France; two weeks la te r Hinh reluctantly complied. His 

departure left Gene ra l Collins free to proceed with the program directed by 

the National Security Council. Collins and his staff had developed a sevenpoint program of measures to strengthen the Vietnamese government, including U.S. support for refugee resettlement, land reform, creation of a national 

assembly, economic development aid, and a program to train Vie tnamese for 

publiC administration.'2 Collins also planned to extend his mission until midJanua ry when he would assess its chances of success. 

The most important aspect of the seven-point program was the revita lization of the Vietnamese Army. By mid-November Collins had drawn up a 

proposal to form a smaller but well-equipped and well-trained a rmy. Under 

its terms, the existing force of about 170,000 men was to be reduced by July 

1955 to some 77,000. En tirely under Vietnamese command and control, the 

2'JEly, L'/I/{Iocirillc dalls In TOllrmclltc, p. 168; Heath to State Dept, 3 Nov 54, 120.2510/ 11 - 354, 

records of Dept of State. 

~) Ely , L' /"dochille daJls /n TOllrlll(,IIle, p. 168. 

3IMFR, Col John Kell y. 15 Nov 54, sub: Discussions Between Ambassador Coll ins and General 

~, Collins Papers . 

. 2Mcmo, Chairman, DeB Working Committee on Indochina, for Chairman, OeB, 8 Dec 54, 

sub: Brief Sta tus Rpt, Lot 580207, records of Dept o f Siale . 

237 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

revamped army was to have 6 divisions-3 full fi eld divisions ca pable of at 

least delaying an invasion from North Vietnam and 3 territorial divisions 

organized around existing regional commands to provide internal security 

and, if necessary, to reinforce the fi eld d ivisions. 33 Quickly approved by the 

joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, Collins' proposa l would form 

the basis for American planning over the next six months. 

There remained the problem of obtaining French agreement and cooperation, an unlikely prospect, for American and French objectives in Vietnam 

were by that time far apart. The French resented what they saw as American 

attempts to assume the control of economic and military assistance to Vie tnam wh ile expecting France to bolster South Vietnam militarily. The French 

had asked for, and believed they deserved , American financial support of 

$330 million as a first-year outlay to maintain their Expeditionary Corps in 

Vietnam at a time when French troops were badly needed in North Africa. 

Washington, as General Collins had predicted, was unenthusiastic about 

bankrolling the Corps Expeditionaire although American leaders insisted that 

France cooperate in making South Vietnam militarily secure . Many American 

officials believed that the French forces were potentially more a source of 

trouble than of protection for the Diem government.

34 Even General Coll ins, 

who believed a premature withdrawa l of French forces would be disastrous 

militarily, was not inclined to support the huge sum the French asked. " The 

outcome was predictable. When the United States agreed to provide only 

$100 million for the first year's support of the French Expeditionary Corps, 

France immediately accelerated the withdrawal of its troops so that by the 

end of 1955 only about 40,000 French troops would be left in South Vietnam. 

Establishing a Training Mission 

Under those circumstances, it was imperative to implement the program 

for improving the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army as soon 

as possible . To General Ely, Collins proposed that the French agree to grant 

full autonomy- that is, actual command of all Vietnamese Army units by 

Vietnamese officers- by july 1955 and full American control of the tra ining 

program under Ely's general direction with a gradual phasing out of all 

French instructors and advisers. 36 

Meeting with Secretary Dulles in Washington in November, Premier 

Mendes-France objected to all aspects of the Collins proposal. He doubted 

that the South Vietnamese Army could be ready for autonomy by july 1955 

DMemo, John Foster Dulles for President, 17 Nov 54, sub: General Collins' Recommendations 

Rel1arding Force Levels, 7S1G .OOI11 - 1754, records of Dept of Slate. 

IU.S. -Vietl/am Relatiolls, vol. 1, pI. IV.A.3, p. 6; The Joint Ch iefs of Sta ff and the War in 

Vietnam, p. 67. 

35Memo, Du lles for President, 17 Nov 54, sub: General Collins' Recommendations Regarding 

Force Levels. 

J6The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam , p. 69. 

238 
The Col/ills Missioll 

and pointed out that a U.S. advisory group large enough to take over training 

would violate the limitations imposed at Geneva on stationing foreign troops 

in Vietnam. Replacing French instructors and advisers with Americans would 

represent an intolerable loss of prestige to France and would damage the 

morale of the French Expeditionary Corps. 

After prolonged discussion Dulles and Mendes-France agreed to let Collins 

and Ely settle the matter. On 13 December 1954, after three weeks of negotiation s, Collins and Ely initialed a draft minute of understanding. The 

agreement specified a force structure of around 88,000 men for the South 

Vietnamese Army, slightly more than Collins had recommended in November. That fi gure was to be attained by reducing the existing Vietnamese 

armed forces. The French were to grant fu ll autonomy to the South Vietnamese Army by July 1955. General O'Daniel was to have full respon sibility 

for assisting the government of Vietnam in organizing and training its armed 

forces, working under the French Commander in Chief, Indochina, who was 

specifically recognized as possessing "overall authority in all matters pertaining to the strategic direction of French and Vietnamese armed forces 

and to the security of Vietnam against external aggression and internal 

subversion",37 

Since the understanding embodied essentially what Collins had earlier 

asked, it was hardly likely to be well received in Paris; Mendes-France 

announced that it would have to be studied closely for possible confli cts with 

the Geneva Agreements."B Specifically objecting to the wording of the agreement, the French submitted a revised draft which made no mention of 

General O'Daniel's authority in matters of training. A month of bickering 

followed before the United Sta tes and France agreed on a compromise. The 

French formally presented the ir versiop. of the agreement to the Diem government; an exchange of letters spelled ou t the promise of autonomy for South 

Vietnamese forces and the grant of authority to General O'Daniel. On 12 

February 1955, almost ten months after first proposing to train Vietnamese 

forces, O'Daniel assumed responsibility for the organization and training 

of the South Vietnamese Army. The signing of the Collins-Ely agreement 

marked the achievement of a long-sought American goal, seemingly without 

sacrificing French goodwill and cooperation, as indica ted by the arrangement 

for joint Franco-American training under the overall au thority of General Ely 

but the direct command of General O'Daniel. 

On 3 December 1954, even before the formal adoption of the Collins-Ely 

agreement by the French and American governments, Collins and Ely directed 

General O'Daniel to establish a skeleton staff for the new binational training 

organiza tion, tentatively designated the Advisory Training and Organization 

Mission .'9 Three days later a skeleton staff of fi ve French and five American 

37 Am Embassy, Saigon, to State Dept, 13 Dec 54, 7S1G.00I12 - 1354, records of Dept of Sta te. 

38The Joint Chiefs of Sta ff and the War in Vietnam, p. 71. 

39Monthly Rpt o f TRIM Activities, Rpt No. I, 3 Dec 54 Through 28 Feb 55, Attachment to 

MAAG Monthly Activities Rpt No. 27 for Feb 55, 15 Mar 55, 370.2, records of MAAG Indochina, 

RG 334. 

239 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

officers reported to South Vietnamese general staff headquarters. Over the 

next few weeks as the staff grew, the mission established offices at the 

headquarters of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. The name of the 

training organization was changed to the Military Support Mission a nd finally 

to the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) 4o 

Genera l O'Daniel was forma lly designated chief of the training mission on 

12 February 1955, and all American and French advisory and training personnel attached to South Vietnamese u nits were assigned to his command. The 

French contingent consisted of about 200 officers who had previously served 

as advisers or officer cadre. Although the table of distribution for the training 

mission ca lled for 217 America n officers, in March 1955 only 68 were available. By July the total had increased to 121, but the goa l of 217 was not to be 

reached during 1955. 41 In the directive specifying the mission's duties, General Ely said the South Vietnamese Army should be trained to establish order 

and govern mental authority in all areas of South Vietnam, to conduct counterguerrilla activities in the event of a new insurrection, and to wage conventiona l warfare against a Viet Minh invasion of South Vietnam. Deficient 

leadership at all levels, Ely believed, was the principal problem facing the 

South Vietnamese. 42 

General O'Daniel organized the tra ining mission in two parts: a staff 

echelon at the level of the South Vietnamese armed forces headquarters and a 

field and school echelon assigned to speCific units and agencies of the South 

Vietnamese Army. Commanded by Col. Andre Masse of the French Army, 

the staff echelon was respon sible for plans, operations, and intelligence. It 

consisted of fOlif divisions, with air force, army, and navy sections responsible for the training, organiza tion, and logistics of their respective services. 

The fourth, national security, division was led by Air Force Col. Edward G. 

Lansdale. Nominally the assistant U.S. air attache, Lansdale actually headed 

the Saigon Military Mission, a special Centra l Intelligence Agency team separate from the regular CIA organization in Vietnam. 

Lansdale was a colorful and controversial figure who had served as an 

adviser to President Ramon Magsaysay in the anti-Huk campaign in the 

Philippines. 43 His specialty was politica l and psychologica l warfare, his objective to help the Diem government use the army to win the loyalty and 

cooperation of the rura l population, particularly in areas formerly controlled 

by the Viet Minh, and to ferret out and destroy the Viet Minh underground 

-t°Col. Victo r J. Croizat, U.S. Marine Corps, recalled that because the acronym for the Aovisory 

Training and Organi zation Mission (ATOM) had "unfortunate connotations . .. a little group 

gathered in O'Daniel's office to choose a new name. After seeing how ATOM wa s functioning, I suggested we redeSignate it Supreme Headquarters Instruction and Training . ... General 

O'Daniel didn't think that was very fun ny, but some staff officers thought it quite appropriate. " 

O ral History lnterv with Croizat, U.s. Marine Corps Historical Center. 

"IU.s. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Staff Study on Army Aspects of 

the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam, 10 June 1960, p. D - 4, copy in Historians files, 

CMH . 

. 12Ely, General Directives Concerning the Training of the Vietnamese A rmy, 26 Feb 55, Incl 0 to 

Monthly Rpt of TRIM Act ivities, Rpt No. I. 

"JEdward Geary Lansdale, /" tile Midst of Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 32 - 125. 

240 
The Col/ills Mission 

network. Lansdale enjoyed the confidence of Prime Minister Diem and had 

been active in efforts to resolve the problem of General Hinh. 

At the fie ld and school echelon of the training mission, adviser groups 

consisting of a senior adviser and several associate advisers were assigned to 

subordinate headqua rters, units, schools, and training centers. The French 

assumed primary responsibility for officer and specialist training schools at 

Da lat, Thu Due, and Camp Chanson; the America ns were responsible for 

other schools, basic training centers, and fi eld forces. 

The Tra ining Relations and Instruction Mission was thoroughly binational 

in structure. American division chiefs had French deputies and vice versa, 

wh ile at the fi eld and school echelon senior and associate advisers were of 

diffe rent nationality. Despite that binational composition, the training mission was primarily an American enterprise, and French cooperation was 

sometimes slow and grudging . Differences between French and American 

training concepts, standard s of efficiency, and supply procedures made friction between the officers of the two countries almost unavoidable, and the 

South Vietnamese comp lained that French instructors often ridiculed the 

South Vietnamese soldiers and the new American training me thods. At one 

point the army's chief of staff asked the American s not to d iscuss the shortcomings and errors of South Vietnamese units in the presence of the French 

during the monthly senior advisers' conferences .

44 

With precipitate withd rawal of the French Expeditionary Corps and 

renewal of hostilities by North Vietnam both considered likely, th e American 

offi cers in the training mission fe lt they were working against a desperately 

short timetable. In an attempt to improve the South Vietnamese units rapidly, 

they employed on-the-job training, orientation courses, and mobile and technical traini ng teams. A program to provide 6,300 specialists by the end of 

1955 was instituted in which students were to receive only the minimum 

tra ining needed to perform the ir functions.

45 A demonstration battalion was 

esta blished to "show the Vietnamese how a battalion ought to look, how it 

ought to function, how it ought to be organized. ,,46 A division course was 

instituted for commanders of the light divisions and a six-week civil guard 

course for militiamen. Yet until adequate numbers of South Vietnamese could 

be trained as instructors, no fundamental reorganization of the training program or school system could take place. 

A basic problem was language. Few Americans spoke Vietnamese, nor 

were there nearly enough South Vietnamese interpreters and translators. All 

forms of training aids and literature had to be translated from French or 

English into Vietnamese, a job complicated by the fac t that there were no 

expressions in the Vietnamese language for most American military terms and 

oI-IUr, Lt Cell Sa muel T. W illiams to Adm Felt, 20 Feb 59, Samuel T. WiJliams Papers, Folder 54, 

CM H . 

. lsBricfing for Lt Cen Bruce C. Clarke, CGUSA RPAC, Incl to Rpt of Visit of Lt Cen Bruce C. 

Cla rke to Weste rn Pacific and Southeilsl Asia, 6 - 29 Sep 55, vol. III, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48), 

OP pt. 5, JCS records. 

oIblnterv, author with O' Daniel, 3 Feb 75. 

241 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

ph rases. 47 With the help of the United States Information Service, the advisory group opened an English-language school in Saigon in June 1955, but it 

was many months before enough translators and interpreters ~e e available 

to meet the needs of the training program. 

Although the basic aims of the Training Relations and Instruction Mission 

were to train and develop the effi ciency of the South Vietnamese armed 

forces, most of its activities during the first three months were devoted to 

aiding Diem in asserting the authority of the South Vietnamese government 

over areas which had formerly been under Viet Minh control. Of particular 

concern were the Ca Mau peninsula at the southern tip of South Vietnam and 

the central coastal provinces of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai, areas designated 

by the Geneva Convention as regroupment zones for Viet Minh military 

forces. Since the Viet Minh were scheduled to evacuate Ca Mau on 8 February 1955 and Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces in April, the government 

had to be prepared to move in quickly to fi ll the vacuum. American officers in 

Colonel Lansda le's National Security Division, many of them specialists in 

psychological warfare, bega n an accelerated program to prepare the South 

Vietnamese for those moves. They helped the South Vietnamese to set up a 

civil affairs organization, to create specialized task forces, and to draft appropriate directives. 48 American advisers were convinced that areas that had been 

under firm Viet Minh control had to be occupied by the army, for whatever 

the shortcomings of the military leaders, they were more experienced than 

civilian officials and they controlled fairly efficient transport and communications systems.

49 

On 31 December 1954 President Diem issued a national security action 

directive, which established three classifications for the areas to be occupied. 

Provinces in a first category- national security- would require troops to establish governmental authority; those areas were to be placed under a military 

commander with both civil and military power. Provinces in a second 

category- transition- were those in w hich the transfer from military to civilian jurisdiction might be started, with a civilian deputy province chief who 

was to be granted progressively wider responsibilities as the province became 

more stabilized. Provinces in the third, civil, category were considered sufficiently under control to be run by a civilian province chief so 

Occupying the Ca Mau peninsula was clearly an assignment for th e 

South Vietnamese Army. In planning for the occupation---;:alled Operation 

LIBERTY- American advisers were particularly concerned lest the troops 

indulge their usual penchant for intimidating, abusing, and robbing the population (in November 300 officers and men had combined to rob the treasury of 

the town of Phan Rang).51 Thus the advisers stressed training for civic action: 

47B riefing for Clarke. 

,u1Interv, au thor with Rufus Phillips, formerly of National Security Div, TRIM, 24 Mar 76; 

Memo, Lansdale for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 18 May 67, sub: Historica l Notes; copy of 

both in Historians files, CMH . 

.J'JLansdale, III the Midst of Wars, pp. 229 - 30. 

SOMonthly Rpt of TRIM Activities, Rpt No. ·1, sec. III, Na tional Security, pp. 52 - 53. 

5 1 Min, Conf at MAAG, 29 Nov 54, O'Da ni e l Papers. 

242 
The Col/ills Missioll 

psychological warfare, food distribution, and medical care. At the same time, 

troop information teams staged plays and demonstrations to emphasize the 

need for soldiers to behave considerately toward the civilian population s2 

With virtually no active opposition from the Viet Minh, the operation proceeded smoothly, and the training mission was soon able to cite impressive 

statistics: 1,300 patients a day trea ted by medical civic action teams during the 

first weeks, 250,000 propaganda leaflets dropped. But the long-range impact 

on the population was minimal: the Viet Minh had left behind an underground governmental structure and cadres of guerrillas upon which the occupation had little apparent effect.53 

Operation GIAI PHONG in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces in April 

produced similar results. The training mission's report cited "enthusiastic 

demonstrations everywhere ... dispensaries established. . 1,020 tons of 

rice moved to the area, roads improved.,,54 Yet those accomplishments also 

produced no lasting effect, for the political and social conditions which had 

long generated support for the Viet Minh remained virtually unchanged. 

Confrontations With the Sects 

The problems of civic action were soon overshadowed by the complexities 

of South Vietnamese politics. On 3 March 1955 leaders of the Cao Dai 

and Hoa Hao sects joined with the Binh Xu yen to form a United Front of 

Nationalist Forces; three weeks later they issued an ultimatum to President 

Diem demanding formation of a new national government. The dissatisfaction 

of the sects focused on plans for the Vietnamese Nationa l Army, which called 

for relatively small numbers of sect troops to be integrated into new army 

units and the rest to be disbanded . The sects had also been angered when, 

in February, the French had abruptly terminated subsidies paid the sect 

forces. The sect leaders, whose political power rested largely in their troops, 

demanded that their private armies be integrated intact into the South Vietnamese Army and stationed in their home territories and that the government 

provide financial assistance to any of their soldiers who might be forced to 

leave the military. 

As early as January 1955, the American embassy in Saigon had warned 

that the problem of the integration of the sects and splinter group armies into 

the Vietnamese armed forces could prove a highly explosive issue. 55 In March 

General O'Daniel had met with leaders of the sects and explained that the 

S:.! Lansdale, III ti,e Midst of WI/rs, pp. 232 - 33. Gene ral Lansdal e observed: "Civic action was 

essentially the brotherly behavior of troops along lines taught by M ao and Ciap to their troops. 

Admitted ly the Americans neve r succeeded in teaching this to the Vietnamese Army. Up to the 

very end of the Vietnam war the army was still stealing from the population. We sure tried 

though." Ur, Lansdale to Chief of Military History, 6 Jun 79. 

5JUSACGSC, Staff Study on Army Aspects of Mil itary Assistance, p. F- 9; Lansdale, /1/ tile 

Midsf of Wars, p. 236. 

!i-lTRIM Rpt No.4, sec. III, Nationa l Secu rity, Inel to MAAG Rpt No. 30 for May 55, 370.2, 

records of MAAG Indochina, RG 334. 

""Charge, Saigon (Randolph Kidde r), to State Dept, 26 Jan 55, 751G.OO/l - 2655, records of Dept 

of State . 

243 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Vietnamese Army Troops figllt tile Billil XI/yell ill Snigoll. 

training mission planned to integrate some 20,000 of their troops into the 

Vietnamese Nationa l Army, but the leaders were not reassured 5 6 Their basic 

concern, it developed, was that President Diem was trying to isolate them 

politically and to destroy the basis of their power. 

The Binh Xuyen had most to lose. Having fought with the Viet Min h after 

the British and French reoccupied Saigon in 1945, the Binh Xuyen had rallied 

to the Bao Dai government in June 1948. With their leader, Bay Vien, 

appoiPted a colonel in the Vietnamese National Army, Binh Xuyen ba nds 

took over responsibility for local military operations in some sectors. By 1952 

Bay Vien, then a brigadier general, had obtained a lease on all gambling 

operations in the Cholon section of Saigon, including the Grand Monde 

casino, the largest in the city. Three years later, the Binh Xuyen controlled 

virtually all of Cholon as well as the Saigon police force (reportedly sold to 

them by Bao Dai to pay his gambling debts). 57 These were gains not to be 

lightly surrendered. 

After the French stopped their subsid ies in February Diem began to put 

pressure on the Binh Xuyen and win factions of the sect forces to his 

56John W. O'Daniel, Footsteps to Freedom, eh. 2, p. 6, manuscript of chapter in O'Daniel 

Papers. 

57Binh Xuyell, Attachment to USARMA to ACSI, 8 Aug 53 (5 - 18 - 53) OARM A, records of 

ACSI. 

244 
The Col/ills Missioll 

• ' . 

-II( 

. . . . ~ ! ! 

-.. II " 

~ ::;, .... 

\ 

I • 1 \ . lI. -....... ... ~ 

Cao Dai Troops parade ill 5aigoll. 

side through bribery and persuasion. Cao Da i Generals Trinh Minh The, 

Nguyen Than h Phuong, and Tran Van Soai and Hoa Hao General Nguyen 

Giac Ngo were all richly rewarded for "ra llying" to the government with 

their troops. 58 (Diem complained to Lansdale that he had to pay "millions" 

to General The alone.)59 These bribes could prove a double-edged sword, 

however, since the sect generals sometimes used part of their subsidies 

to suborn government troops.60 Diem also moved aga inst the Binh Xuyen 

by refusing to renew their license to operate the Grand Monde gambling 

casi no. The Binh Xuyen responded by forming the United Front of Nationalist 

Forces. At first even the sect leaders who had previously ra llied to Diem 

joined the United Front, but under pressure from Lansdale and Collins 

Generals Phuong and The publicly broke with the front when it issued the 

manifesto and reaffirmed their loya lty to Diem61 

StlUr, Lt Joseph J. Redick to L..,nsdale, 19 Mar 55, Collins Papers; Collins, Liglltll;lfg Joe, p. 397. 

'WMcmo, L1nsdale for Ambassador Colli ns and General O'Daniel, 21 Mar 55, sub: Highlights 

on Sect Problems, Collins Papers. 

6()Ltr, Redick to Lansdale, 19 Ma r 55. General Lansdale commented: "] neither offered nor gave 

money or other favors, but did explain the realities of the situation to the [sect] leaders and 

urged them to make a choice." Ltr, L.1.nsdale to Chief of M ilitary History, 6 Jun 79. 

'Memo. L'msdale for Ambassador Collins and General O'Daniel, 23 Mar 55, sub: Meeting 

With Ngo Dinh Diem; ibid. for Collins, 29 Mar 55, sub: Cao Dai Division in Sect United Front; 

both in Collins Papers. Lansdale, III ti,e Midst of Wars, pp. 252 - 54. 

245 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

-.-

.. 

I 

[ 

President Diem With General Ely 

In the wee ks following the formation of the front General Collins worked 

to head off a confrontation between Diem and the sects. A joint FrenchAmerican team of twenty officers was hastily formed to study the sect problem. Brig. Gen. Fernand Gambiez, who headed the French part of the team, 

argued that the sects did not trust Diem and could not be expected to give up 

their arms as long as Diem was head of government. Gambiez insisted that 

the French were using their influe nce to placa te th e sects and that most 

individual Frenchmen who had been supplying arms to the sects had been 

identified and stopped. He believed the sect problem could be brought under 

control only after the integration or resettlement of the sect soldiers had been 

completed. Until then it was unrealistic to expect the sect leaders to give up 

their arms and recognize the Vietnamese Nationa l Army as the sale legitimate 

armed force. 62 

Diem was in no mood to wa it patiently as Gambiez suggested. He replied 

to the sects' ultimatum with an offer to negotiate, but he refused to resign 

and moved army units from Tonkin, loya l to him, into the city·3 On 29 

March he ordered the replacement of the Binh Xuyen chief of the National 

blMcmo, Counselor of Embassy (or Ambassador, 16 Mar 55, sub: Discussion With General 

Gambicz, Collins Papers. 

f»Collins. Lightllill ~ Joe, p. 398. 

246 
The Col/ills Missioll 

Police, La i Van Sang, by one of his own appointees. That night a band of 

about eighty Binh Xuyen attacked the police headquarters in Cholon which 

had been occupied earlier by Vietnamese National Army troops. Other Binh 

Xuyen units attacked army headquarters in Cholon and shelled the presidential palace. The attacks were repulsed, and General Ely arranged a shaky 

truce the following day. 

In the clash in Saigon, Genera l O'Daniel was "convinced that the Vietnamese military were fired on first by the enemy [the Binh Xuyen] and 

that the Vietnamese military had conducted itself in a creditable manner," 

and Colonel Lansdale would later call the action a Binh Xuyen ambush .... 

O'Daniel, Lansdale, and their staffs were outraged that the troops they were 

painstakingly training to combat the Viet Minh should be obliged to battle it 

out in the streets of Saigon with the ga ngsters of the Binh Xuyen 6 S When 

Genera l Ely moved quickly with French troops to halt the fighting, O'Daniel 

and Lansda le concluded that the French had acted to protect the Binh Xuyen. 

They suspected that the French were supporting the Binh Xuyen and the 

sects in an attempt to sabotage the Diem government's efforts to establish its 

authority, possibly even with the goal of bringing it down. 66 

Although General Ely had little faith in Diem, he wou ld later maintain 

that his only concern was to prevent bloodshed in the capital and to protect 

the lives and property of French colonials. Ely assumed that Diem could 

defeat the Binh Xuyen in Sa igon, but thought that he would be unable to 

defeat them and the forces of the sects outside the city. Civil war might ensue 

and " throw Viet Nam into chaos .. . playing into the hands of the Viet 

Minh, who were only waiting for this to happen to send their revolutionary 

forces into action."67 

Mea nwhile, after a period of uncertainty, Genera l Collins had concluded 

that Diem should be replaced. He had first become concerned in December 1954 when Diem refused , despite recommendations from Collins, Ely, 

Lansdale, and the visiting Senator Mansfie ld, to appoint as minister of 

defense a respected politician, Dr. Phan Huy Quat. This action led Collins to 

believe " that Diem does not have the ca pacity to unify the divided factions in 

Vietnam,"68 Yet a month later Collins had come to a more optimi stic view, 

observing that Diem's "strong nationalism, tenacity, and spiritual qualities 

MMsg, O'Danie l to ClNCPAC, 30 Mar 55, records of MAAG Indochina, RG 334; Lansdale. 111 

tile MitlSI of Wars, p. 263. 

bSLansdale, III tlte Midst of Wars, pp. 263 - 64. 

66Q'Daniel, Footsteps to Freedom, ch. 2, p. 3; Llnsdale, III the Midst of Wars, p. 264. 

b7Ely. L'llIriochille da1/S In TOllrmente, p. 171. A high-ranking Communist defector told Jeffrey 

Ra ce that the party made a serious error by not taking advantage of the Binh Xuyen crisis. "We 

should have supplied men and provided support. ... But the responsible cadres failed to seize 

the opportunity and take full advantage of the situation . .. . If we had done so the armed 

conflict between the Binh Xuyen and the Diem regime would have been expa nded and prolonged and so produced grettt benefit for the Party . ... the cadres who were responsible were 

reprimanded for their 'mechanical interpretation' of the provisions of the Geneva Accords forbidding military activity." Jeffrey Race, War ComL'S to Long All: RL'VO/lltiol/ary COllflicl ;11 a Vietllamese 

Provill(f (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 36. 

6HCollins to Defense Dept, 16 Dec 54, 75 1G.OO112 - 1654, records of Dept of State. 

247 
Adv ice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

render him the best available Prime Min ister to lead Vietnam in its struggle 

against Communism.,,69 

The trouble with the sects aga in changed General Collins' mind. By early 

April he was urging the Sta te Departmen t to thin k in terms of alte rnatives to 

Diem. "The major portion of responsibility fo r the critical situatio n in w hich 

Diem now finds himself," no ted Collins, "must, in all fa irness, be laid at 

Diem's door. " He had had "a fa ir chance to establish an effective government" but had " produced little, if anything, constructive.,,7o Collins proposed 

replacing Diem w ith a coa lition government under Foreign Minister Tran Van 

Do. 

In Washington the Defense Department agreed that "alte rnati ves to the 

Diem government should be given adequate consideration," Some advisers 

within the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna tional 

Security Affairs even went so fa r as to s uggest that the with drawa l of U.S. 

sup port from South Vietnam "should no t be sta ted as a clearcut negative" 

and suggested courses of action w hich the Uni ted Sta tes might take to 

"minimize the effects of a Communist take over in South Viet-Nam.,,71 

Long under pressure from the French government to consider alternatives 

to Diem, Secretary of State Dulles had consistently refused to set a dead li ne 

for replacing Diem or even to discuss possible replacements?> Dulles admired 

Diem pe rsonally and afte r a visit to South Vietnam in late February had 

advised President Eisenhower that Diem was "much more of a personali ty 

than I had antiCipated . He is not without defects but his me rits seemed 

greate r than I had thought. ,,73 Even had Dulles been inclined to d ispense 

with Diem, he might have hesitated, for infl uen tial Democratic leaders, particularly Senato r Mansfi eld, had made clear that they would not agree to 

support any other regime in Vie tnam.

74 Dulles cautioned Collins that any 

change in the gove rnment mig ht be fo r the worse. The Diem government, he 

said, had a right to assert its auth ority against "a ga ng w hich exploits its 

p rivileges to protect vice on a vastly profitable sca le," even if that required 

the use of fo rce .

75 

Collins remained adamant; Diem had to gO?6 Wh ile reluctantly agreeing to 

conside r replacing Diem, Dulles insisted that Collins return to Was hington to 

confe r with the president and the Na tio nal Security Council on futu re plans 

6'JCollins, Rpl on Vietnarn for the National Security Counci l, 20 Jan 55, U.S, -Victl/(/III RelatiollS, 

10:866. 

7oCoil ins to State Dept, 3 1 Ma r 55, 751G.OOI3 - 3 155. records of Dept of State; Telg, Collins to 

Sec?: of Stale, 9 Apr 55, U. S.-Viet/1alll Relatiolls. 10:894 - 96. 

1 Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Towards South Viet-Nam, Inel to Ur, 1-1 . 

Struve H ensel to Walter S. Robertson, 22 Apr 55, U .S.-Vief//all/ Rela/iolls, 10:931. 

12Dulles to Am Emb.lssy, Paris, 18 A pr 55, 75 1G.OO/4 - 1855; State Dept Briefing Paper, 19 Jan 

55, 75IG.OO/l - 1955; U r, Douglas MacArth ur II to Theodore Achilles, 20 Jan 55, 751G.OO/l - 2055. 

All in records of Dept of State. 

13Interv with John W. Hanes, Dulles Oral History Collection; quote from Dulles to Acting Secy 

of State for President, 1 Mar 55, 75 IG.OO/3 - 155, records of Dept of State. 

14Memo of Conversation, Kenneth T. You ng with M ike Mansfield, 8 Apr 55, 75 1G.OO/4 - 855, 

records of Dept of State. 

1SOul1es to Am Embassy, Saigon, 9 Apr 55, U.S.-Vietnam RdatiUlls, 10:908. 

7b'felg, Collins to State Dept, 20 Apr 55, U. S.-Vietllfllll Relatiolls, 10:918 - 22. 

248 
The Collins Mission 

for Vietnam." [n a conversation with his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, 

the secretary unhappily observed that " it looks like the rug is coming out 

from under the fe llow in Southeast Asia." [n that event, the brothers agreed, 

"the gangsters will have won.,,7. 

Arriving in Washington on 21 April, General Collins repeated his oftvoiced objections to Diem: the prime minister lacked good judgment, was 

unable to work with other men of ability, and was isolated politically.79 Two 

days later, he bluntly told President Eisenhower that no solution was possible 

in South Vietnam "as long as Diem remains.,,80 When the president later 

expressed the view that it was essentia l for the South Vietnamese Army to 

destroy the power of the Binh Xuyen or no government cou ld exist, General 

Collins replied that to attempt to destroy the Binh Xuyen a nd the sects would 

produce a civil war, that the Binh Xuyen might become guerrillas and "raise 

hell for years."B' By late April it seemed apparent in Washington that Diem's 

days were numbered. Secretary Dulles informed Ambassador Dillon in Paris 

that "after full consultation here with General Collins, it appears that some 

change in political arrangements in Vietnam may be inevitable."S2 

But by then, a change in political arrangements quite different from anything envisioned in Washington was already under way in Saigon. On 28 

April fig hting again erupted between the Binh Xuyen and South Vietnamese 

troops, with the Binh Xuyen shelling the presidential palace. By that time the 

sect front had broken up after most of the Cao Dai forces, a portion of the 

Hoa Hao, and even some Binh Xuyen troops came over to Diem. When 

French forces failed to intervene, the Vietnamese Army troops in a few hours 

routed the Binh Xuyen forces and drove them into Cholon. 

Now Bao Dai attempted to step in, summoning Diem to Paris for "consultations" and placing command of the army in the hands of a known 

enemy of the Diem regime, Genera l Nguyen Van Vy. Diem and his brother 

Nhu countered by organizing representatives of defunct poli tical parties, 

government functionaries, and sect leaders friendly to Diem in a General 

Assembly of the Democratic and Revolu tionary Forces of the Nation. Stagemanaged by Nhu, the assembly ca lled for Bao Dai's abdication and a new 

government under Diem's leadership.8.3 Army forces in the Sa igon area under 

Colonels Tra n Van Don and Duong Van Minh (who soon became generals) 

backed Diem, and General Vy fled to Dalal. By 2 May the South Vietnamese 

Army had driven the Binh Xuyen from the capital. 84 

77Dulles to Collins, 16 Apr 55, 751G.OO/4 - 1655, records of Dept of State. 

John Foster Dulles Tclccon with Allen Dulles, 11 Apr 55, Dulles Papers. 

7'1Mcmo for ASD (ISA), 25 Apr 55, sub: Department of State Debriefing of General Collins, 

U.S.-Vietllam Relatiolls, 10:937 - 40. 

I\()Mcmo, William J. Sebald for Seey of State, 23 Apr 55, sub: President's Conversa tion With 

General Coilins, 75 I G.QO/4 - 2355, records of Dept of State. 

MIMin, 2461h Meeting of the NSC, 28 Apr 55, Eisenhower-as-President Papers, Eisenhower 

Library. 

tl2Dulles to Am Embassy, Paris, 27 Apr 55, 75 1G.OO/4 - 2755, records of Dept of State. 

K..1Buttinger, Vietll"m; A Dm:i!oll Emoottled, 2:880 - 83. 

K-I lbid., 2:883 - 85. 

249 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The French Withdraw 

The crisis days of late April and early May served to exacerbate furth er the 

animosity and suspicion of the Americans in Sa igon toward their French 

counterparts. Returning to Sa igon at the beginning of May, General Collins 

was "shocked at the strong an ti-French feeling among. . staff officers as a 

result of the incidents of the past week. ,,85 Americans in Saigon believed that 

the French were deliberately hindering Diem's attempts to crush the Binh 

Xuyen, whose troops were permitted to take refuge in French Army "security 

zones" in the ca pital. The South Vietnamese Army also claimed to have 

ca ptured French officers serving as advisers to the Binh Xuyen and to have 

discovered a French ambulance ca rrying concealed arms to them. /;!6 When 

General Ely complained that Charge d' Affaires Kidder, Colonel Lansdale, and 

other Americans had "failed to restrain Diem and even encouraged him," 

Counselor IGdder, who never conceived it as part of his mission to restrain 

Diem, replied that Ely's "almost hysterical" dislike of Diem had rendered him 

incapable of evaluating the situation objectively87 To the Americans it seemed 

that "some elements among the French had undertaken a deliberate anti-U.S. 

campaign." When someone planted bombs in several embassy vehicles and 

tossed a thermite grenade through the open window of an American officer's 

car, many Americans suspected the French .... 

Echoes of the Franco-American d isputes in Saigon found their way into 

America n-British-French talks which opened in Paris on 8 May 1955. Secretary 

Dulles entered the talks buoyed by Diem's surprising success aga inst the Binh 

Xuyen and convinced, as he told General Collins, that there was no longer a 

question of replacing Diem, for recent events had made Diem "in the U.S. 

and the world at large ... a symbol of Viet nationalism struggling aga inst 

colonialism and backward elements." 89 The French, on the contrary, saw the 

Binh Xuyen affa ir as demonstrating that Diem was "not only incapable but 

mad."90 At the talks French Foreign Minister Edgar Faure predicted that a 

continuation of the Diem regime would widen the breach between the United 

States and France and result in a Viet Minh victory. Under those circumstances, he sa id, France could not continue in Vietnam. "What would you 

say," asked Faure, " if we were to retire entirely from Indochina and call back 

the FEC [French Expeditionary Corps] as soon as possible?,,91 Calling for a 

brief recess to consider the French proposal, Dulles told Washington that 

Faure had, in effect, issued an ultimatum. If convinced that replacing Diem 

was no longer admissible, the United States fa ced the choice of withdrawing 

85Collins to Dept of State, 3 May 55, 751G .OO/S-355, records of Dept of Stale. 

A('Buttinger, Vie/ llum: A Dmgoll Embattled, 2:886 . 

H7C. Douglas Dillon to State Dept, 2 May 55, 751G.OO/S - 255, and Kidder to State Dept, 28 Apr 

55, 7S1C.OO/4 - 2855, both in records of Dept of Slate. 

&lQ' Daniel, Footsteps to Freedom, ch. 2, pp. 4 - 5. 

89Dulles to Am Embassy, Saigon, 3 May 55, 75 IG.OO/5-355, records of Dept of State. 

'll:rrclg, Pa ris to Secy of State, 8 Ma y 55, U.S.+Vielllnm Relnliolls, 10:963. 

91Ibid., 10:964. 

250 
The Col/ills Missioll 

from Vietnam or of precipitating a French withdrawal by continuing to s upport him. 92 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented that, wh ile continued support for 

Diem was a matter of policy to be decided by the president, in their view 

Diem's government showed "the greatest promise of achieving the internal 

stability essential for the future security of Vietnam." Although a precipitate 

withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps would make South Vietnam 

less stable, they suggested that "possible United States action s under the 

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty cou ld ultimately afford security to 

South Vietnam equa l to that provided by the continued presence of the 

French Expeditionary Corps."93 The National Security Cou ncil Planning Board 

had even fewer doubts. A French withdrawal, the planners believed, would 

remove the United States from the "taint of Colonialism" and end the danger 

that the French might make a dea l with the Viet Minh 94 

Americans in Saigon viewed the prospect of a sudden French withdrawal 

with no such equanimity. Counselor Kidder had already advised Washington 

that "saving this cou ntry from Communism ... will require wholehearted 

agreement and coordination between Vietnamese, Americans and French. 

If this tripartite approach is not secure, we should withdraw from Vietnam.,,9s 

General Collins pOinted out that a French withdrawal would have devastating effects on the logistical and training support programs for the South 

Vietnamese armed forces. 96 

Secreta ry Dulles apparently found the arguments of the National Security 

Council's Planning Board more convincing. Meeting with Faure again on 11 

May, he observed that the problem in South Vietnam "did not lend itself to a 

contractual agreement." It would be best if the United States and France were 

to proceed independently while keeping each other fully informed of what 

they were doing 9 ? Although face-saving agreements and formulas followed, 

the trilateral talks in reality marked the end of Franco-American collaboration 

in Vietnam and the end of American support for the French presence there. 

The decision of the French and American governments to go their separate 

ways made the tasks of the Training Relations and Instruction Mission and 

the Military Assistance Adv isory Group more difficult. Following the engagements in April and May between South Vietnamese troops and the Binh 

Xuyen, the French ceased to take any active part in the training mission; in 

Lansdale's Na tional Security Division some French officers never appeared at 

their desks 98 As the French accelerated their withdrawal, they cut drastically 

the number of officers assigned to the training mission. By fall 1955, French 

'nU.S.-Viei IUlII/ l~eJ(/tioIlS, 10:974. 

'J'Mcmo, JCS for Seey of Defense, 9 May 55, sub: Indochina (Vietnam), U.S.-Vietnlllll Relations, 

10,971 - 73. 

9'!Memo, C. H. Bonesteel II I for Dulles, sub: Possible French Withdrawal From Vietnam, 

U.S.-VietHlIlII Rela/iolls, 10:975. 

'J~a gon to Seey of Statc, 5 May 55, U.S.-Vie/nam Reilltiolls, 10:970. 

%Collins to State Dept. 9 May 55, 7SIC.OO/S- 95S, records of Dcpt of State. 

'J7The Joint Chiefs of Sta ff and the Wa r in Vietnam, pp. 120 - 21. 

'lHlnterv, author with Phillips, 24 Mar 76. 

251 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

General O'Daniel Confers With President Diem 

strength was reduced by more than 70 percent while American strength 

remained almost sta tic until March of the next year. 9t) 

Diem's determination to destroy completely the power of the Binh Xuyen 

and to eliminate the private armies of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects delayed 

the training of many South Vietnamese Army units. Over the next yea r, Diem 

used the army to rout the remnan ts of the Binh Xuyen from the swamps 

south of Saigon, to crush hosti le factions of the Cao Dai, and to defea t the 

Hoa Hao during the winter and spring of 1955-56.' 00 The campaigns against 

e following table shows TRIM strength from Milrch 1955 to March 1956. 

Dn te U.S. Officers 

March 1955.. 68 

Ma y 1955 ..... ...... ..... 121 

July 1955. ..... ........ 124 

September 1955... 125 

November 1955 .................... 142 

January 1956.. 149 

March 1956. .. .. 189 

Frellclt Officers 

209 

225 

108 

66 

58 

53 

SOl/rce: USACGSC, Staff Study on Army Aspects of Mili tary Assistance, p. 

o 

D - 4. 

IOI)rhe Joint Chie fs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, pp. 134 - 35; Buttinger. Vietllnm: A Drngol/ 

Emoottled, 2:888-89. 

252 
The Col/ills Missioll 

the sects also prevented officers from attending staff or specia list schools and 

delayed a planned deployment of units to various parts of the country and 

their concentration into divisional formations. 101 Although Q'Daniel protested 

that "it would be a mistake to allow a few bandits to hold large numbe rs of 

troops away from training," Diem was more concerned with eliminating the 

last vestiges of sect opposition than with training schedules and redeployments. 102 

Q'Daniel had no more success in persuading D iem to ease his relentless pressure for a speedy and complete withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps from South Vietnam. Should a major Viet Minh attack develop, 

O'Daniel said, "two or three French divisions would look mighty goOd.,,'03 

An early French pullout would leave a military vacuum w hich the Sou th 

Vietnamese Army could not hope to fill before 1956. Diem replied that the 

French were not to be counted upon in a major battle; they "would be more 

of a hindrance than a help," and the Viet Minh were exploiting their stay 

for propaganda purposes.104 O'Daniel cou ntered by suggesting that the 

French remain in Vietnam under the auspices of the Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization, making them subject to the SEATO high comma nd. Yet Diem 

clung stubborn ly to his decision. In early June when ta lks opened in Paris 

between th e French and Diem's representative, Nguyen Puu Chau, he told 

the French that if they wanted to keep any military forces or insta llations in 

South Vietnam, they wou ld have to submit to South Vietnamese command. 105 

That kind of arrangement obviously had no appea l for the French, but since 

the negotiations also involved the nature of future political and economic 

relations between Fra nce and the Republic of Vietnam, they dragged on 

through the summer. Diem finally cut them off by terminating un ilatera lly th e 

special economic and financial agreements that had been signed with France 

in 1954 and by withdrawing South Vietnam from the French Union. The 

following October in a national refe rendum in which the ba llots cast exceeded 

the number of names on the electoral rolls, the citizens of South Vietnam 

voted to abolish the monarchy and elected Diem president of a Republic of 

Vietnam, officia lly established on 26 October 1955. '06 

Throughout that period the size of the French military in Vietnam had 

lO 'Memo for General O' Daniel, 28 Aug 55, sub; Record of Conversation at Meeting with 

President Diem; Memo, O'Daniel (or Ambassador Reinhardt, 7 Sep 55, sub: Meeting With 

General Ty and General Minh,S Sep 55; ibid., 10 Sep 55, sub: Meeting With President Diem on 9 

SeR 55. All in O'Da niel Papers. 

(l2M emo, O'Daniel for Ambassador Reinhardt, JO Sep 55, sub; Meeting With President Diem 

on 9 Sep 55. Lansdale's civic action specialists, on the other hand, considered that the war 

against the sects at least had the advantages of keeping the army in the countryside and in touch 

with the people. ]ntcrv, author with Phillips, 24 Mar 76. 

103Memo, Lt Col Rolland W. Hamelin for O'Daniel, 13 Ju l 55, sub: Confe rence With Mr. Tran 

Trung Dung, Deputy M inister of Defense; Memo, John M . f-inn for Ambassador Reinhardt, I 

Aug 55, sub: Record of Conversa tions, President Diem and General O'Daniel; both in O'Daniel 

Pa~ers. 

n.llbid.; quote from Memo, Finn for Ambassador Reinhardt, 11 1u1 55, sub; Meeting With 

President Diem, O'Daniel Papers. 

losMemo, Finn for Ambassador Reinhardt, 11 1ul 55, sub; Meeting With President Diem. 

1MButtinger, Vietnalll: A Political History, pp. 414 - 15. 

253 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

continued to shrink. Even had the French been inclined to submit their fo rces 

to South Vietnamese command, they needed all ava ilable troops to put down 

insurrection in North Africa. By February 1956 only 15,000 French troops 

remained in South Vietnam, and on 26 April 1956 the French high command 

for Indochina was officially abolished. The Franco-American partnership in 

developing the South Vietnamese a rmed forces had lasted just over a yea r. 

Long before the last French soldiers sailed, the authors of that partnership 

had gone. Genera l Collins left Saigon on 14 May 1955, to be replaced by a 

new ambassador, G. Frederick Reinhardt, and two weeks later General Ely 

also ended his lo ng and often stormy tour of d uty in Vietnam. The experiment of crea ting a South Vietnamese Army had become an entirely American 

en terprise. 

254 
14 

Picking Up the Pieces, 1955-1956 

American leaders had begun 1955 confident that France would at last cooperate with the United Sta tes (on American terms) in building a stable government and an effective military establishment in South Vietnam. The sect crisis 

and Diem's subsequent triumph over the forces of the Binh Xuyen and the 

sects had dashed those expectations. Diem's open hostility to a continued 

French presence in South Vietnam and his unswerving insistence on removal 

of the last vestiges of the French Expeditionary Corps would have made 

continued Franco-American military collaboration virtually impossible even 

had France been inclined to continue it. In fact, France had no such inclination. General Pierre Jacquot, who succeeded General Ely in May 1955 to 

oversee the French withdrawal, found that in Paris "no one wanted to hea r 

about it [Vietnam] ." The French considered it a lost ca use and preferred to 

discuss means of salvaging their interests in North Africa. 1 They were bitter 

and disillusioned over what they considered Diern's treachery and irresponsibility toward them and angry at what they saw as the ill-concealed eagerness 

of many American technical and military advisers to shoulder them aside. 

The South Vietnamese Army's abrupt adoption of America n-type uniforms 

and the American sa lute and a ceremonial burning by South Vietnamese 

officers of their French-style insignia of rank were galling to French pride and 

indicative of the mood of the Diem regime.' 

In Washington the U.S. Army staff took a complacent view of the imminent French withdrawal, noting that exclusive American responsibility for 

training the South Vietnamese would make that training more effective and 

efficient, " not only because of the superiority of U.S. methods but also 

because of differences in French and American doctrine.',3 Genera l O'Daniel 

INoles of Con ference With Pierre Jacquot, 14 Dec 55, and M emo of Conversa tion, Capt Judson 

C. Spence with Cen Jacquot, 24 Feb 56, both in Folder 3, Williams Papers. 

2Record of Conversation, Lt Gen Sa muel T. Williams with Gen Pierre Jacquot, II Jan 56, in 

Folder 3, Williams Papers. 

3Memo, DCSOPS for CofSA, 14 May 56, sub: U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam, CS 091 Vietnam, 

RC 319. 

255 
Advice alld Slipport: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

was less assured. He knew that at its 

existing strength his Military Assistance Advisory Group was woefu lly 

inadequate to assume the entire burden of training. The group could be 

expanded beyond the 342 officers 

and enlisted men in Vietnam at the 

time of the signing of the Geneva 

Agreemen t only if some way could 

be found to circumvent its restrictive 

terms. To provide some reinforcement, O'Daniel asked that neither personnel not physically present (on 

leave or otherwise), nor replacements 

whose tours overlapped with the 

men they were relieving, nor personnel assigned on temporary duty be 

counted against the advisory group's 

ceiling. He specifically wanted to 

bring in fifty-one mobile training 

General Williams 

teams for temporary duty tours of three to six months' 

Ambassador Reinhardt and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral 

Felix Stump, endorsed O'Daniel's proposals, as did the Defense DepartmentS But the State Department demurred, insisting on strict adherence to 

the agreement's provisions. Although Defense Department lega l experts 

advanced many arguments as to why Article 16 of the cease-fire agreement 

was not intended to apply to U.S. personnel, the State Department remained 

firm. A few months later the International Control Commission informed the 

United States that its members interpreted "military personnel" to mean all 

those subject to military law regardless of their status or function in South 

Vietnam'" 

The issue of reinforcing the advisory group was still under discussion 

when General O'Daniel left South Vietnam, succeeded on 24 October 1955 by 

Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams. Sin ce a sepa rate advisory group had been 

established for Cambodia, on 1 November Williams' group dropped Indochina from its name and became the Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

Vietnam. 

"Ur, O'Daniel to C1NCPAC, 23 May 55, sub: Guide Lines Relating to Space Ceiling for MAAG 

Indochina, 1- 139915, records of ISA, RG 330. 

5Memo, Director, Mil Asst Programs (Brig Cen J. K. Wilson), for ASO (ISA), 22 Aug 55, sub: 

Personnel Policy, MAAG Indochina, 1- 1457815, records of ISA, RG 330. 

6Memo, Directo r, Office of Foreign Mil Affairs, for ASD (ISA), 6 Dec 55, sub: Personnel 

Ceiling, MAAG Vietnam, 1- 16399/5, records of ISA, RG 330. 

256 
Pickillg Up the Pieces 

U.S. Tanks, Trucks, and Gun Carriages alialldolled by the French, 1955. 

The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission 

A t the time of Williams' arrival, the need to expand the advisory group 

~took on new urgency as the French withdrawal precipitated a major 

logistical crisis. During the four yea rs that the United States had supported 

the French military effort, immense quantities of military equipment- from 

tanks and aircraft to small arms, ammunition, and spare parts-had poured 

into Vietnam. Under the terms of the Pentalatera l Agreement of 23 December 

1950 between the United States, France, and the Associated States, title to 

that equipment, va lued at more than $1.2 billion, was to revert at the conclusion of hostilities to th e United States? Despite that requirement, American 

officials had made no plans or preparations for return of the equipment, and 

during the war the understrength advisory group had kept no accurate 

records or inventories of material delivered to the French. There was thus 

no recourse but to rely on the French for that information. The lack of 

records also made it impossible to determine which items of American equip7ASD (ISA) to Seey of Defense, 25 Jan 56, 1- 12377/6, U.S.-Vic//lam Relatiolls, 10:1045. The 

following discussion is based, in pari, on Vincent H. Demma, The TunlOver ill SOllth Vietl/alll After 

the II/dochilla War, CMH Monograph, 1969. 

257 
Advice mId SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Axles and Engines ill olltdoor storage. 

ment the French had purchased and which had been supplied under the 

Mutual Defense Assistance Program. 

The Collins-Ely agreement of December 1954 provided that the United 

States and France would jointly survey military equipment of America n origin 

in South Vietnam to determine which items wou ld be returned to the United 

States, transferred to the South Vietnamese, or reta ined by the French. 

American inspectors were to be allowed to examine French depots and 

embarkation points, and losses incurred in combat or through wear were to 

be charged off equally to French- and American-owned equipment. Faced 

with a growing military crisis in North Africa, the French proceeded to 

implement those provisos so as to allow them to retain the best equipment of 

whatever origin. French officials sometimes refused to permit American 

inspection of their depots, and members of th e advisory group reported that 

the French tried to remove assistance program markings from equipment th ey 

wanted to take with them8 

However disturbing that policy for the American taxpayer, the consequences for the South Vietnamese were catastrophic. Crea ted originally as a 

kind of combat auxiliary to the French Exped itionary Corps, the Sou th VietIIDcmma, Turnover, p. 10; sec <llso USACGSC, Sta ff Study on Army Aspects o f Military 

Assistance, p. 0 - 7; MFR, Cen M. O. Perry, I Feb 56, Folder 3, Williams Papers. 

258 
Pickillg Up the Pieces 

namese Army had almost no logistical capability and was singularly unprepared to cope with huge amounts of deteriorating and inoperable equipment. 

Yet the French "literally dumped mountains of equipment" upon the South 

Vietnamese 9 At the central maintenance depot near Saigon, thousands of 

tons of equipment lay scattered in disorder over thirty-two acres of open 

fields; at the Chi Hoa sa lvage yard, American advisers found vehicles with 

rotted tires and vital parts missing; at Go Vap collecting point, vehicles the 

French described as in good condition had fenders, sides, or roofs dented in 

and parts removed. 10 Throughout the cOllntry, stores of American ammunition had been abandoned during the final months of the war- the French had 

found it easier to have ammunition shipped directly from the United States to 

combat zones than to move if from place to place within Vietnam. 

The lack of spare parts made the situation even more intractable. On their 

unilatera l inventory of equipment, not completed until March 1955, the 

French failed to list spare parts. To make a n equal division of spare parts 

possible, the deputy chief of the advisory group, Brig. Gen. Miller O. Perry, 

pressed the French to sa nction a joint inventory; they agreed only in February 

1956. By that time most records had been removed "or were virtually useless 

for inventory purposes." II 

The South Vietnamese received quantities of weapons and equipment far 

beyond the needs of the modest, 100,000-man army that the United States 

had agreed to support. In spite of the deluge, Diem and his army commanders, anticipating further trouble from the sects or a possible invasion by 

North Vietnam, were relucta nt to part with any of it. That reluctance placed 

still further strain s on the army's inadequate logistical system. 

The 342 members of the advisory group, already trying to train and advise 

the South Vietnamese, had little hope even of coping with an estimated $100 

million worth of equipment returned directly to U.S. control by the French. 

By the end of 1955 most American officials in South Vietnam and elsewhere 

had concluded that the logistical crisis had made an increase in the advisory 

group essentia l, whatever the political risks involved. Admiral Stump argued 

that the United States should be able to replace departing French troops with 

Americans, for th e Geneva Agreements specified only that there would be no 

increase in foreigll troops.'2 Both the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense 

Wilson agreed that it would be more realistic to interpret the provisions of the 

Geneva Agreements to permit replacement of French military personnel by 

U.S. military personnel. 13 

<JUSACGSC, Staff St:Jd y on Army Aspects of Military Assistance. p. 0 - 8. 

lOMe mo. Capt]. M. Schultz for Cen Williams, 23 Mar 56, sub: Report of Visits to Local Depots, 

Folder 3, Williams Papers. 

llLtr, Ch, MAAG, Vietnam, to Ch, MAAG, France, 28 May 56, sub: Disposal of MDAP Excess, 

Attachment to IJrig Gen D. S. Campbell to Seey of Defense. 30 Jul56, 1- 650116, records of ISA; 

MFR, Perry, I Feb 56. 

12ClNCPAC to CNO, 2 Nov 55, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48) (2), sec. 15, lCS records. 

l;'iMemo, lCS for Secy of Defense, 9 Dec 55, sub: RaiSing U.s. Military Personnel Ceiling of 

MAAG Vie tnam, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48) (2), sec. 16, lCS records; Ltr, Secy of Defense to Secy 

of State, 3 Dec 55, records of Dept of State. 

259 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Two interagency survey missions to South Vietnam in late 1955 had a lso 

recommended augmenting the advisory group with additional logistics personnel. The missions found an estimated $500 million worth of u.S. equipment, 

nominally in the custody of the Vietnamese but actually in unprotected 

dumps without proper maintenance. Most of this equipment was unidentifiable because of the inadequate inventory method the French and Vietnamese 

had employed. The surveyors reported that if the United States could rega in 

accounting control of this property an estimated $150 million or more might 

be saved. The immediate need was for U.S. assistance to Vietnam in the 

identification, storage, and repair of equipment and the proper training of the 

Vietnamese in American supply management procedures. Unless the State 

and Defense Departments acted promptly tens of millions of dollars of U.S. 

property would be lost.' 4 

The prospect of such a loss had a prevailing influence on the delibera tions 

in Washington. Lt. Col. Robert Evans, an officer from the advisory group sent 

to plead the case for more logistics personnel, noted that th e Department of 

Defense had "built a considerable fire under the problem of protecting U.s. 

equipment in Vietnam" and that nobody in the State Department wanted "to 

be responsible for the loss of 700 [sic] mill ion dollars worth of equipment 

passing into Vietnam hands."" Secretary of Defense Wilson assured Secretary 

of State Dulles that the immediate dispatch of a team of 150 to 200 America ns 

skilled in supply and logistics would save the United States not less than $100 

million worth of material. 16 

The State and Defense Departments discussed various courses of action. 

The United Sta tes rejected a French offer to leave some 1,000 logistics personnel in Vietnam for about one year, probably because the Fre nch also wished 

to keep their high command there for the same length of time and beca use, 

in American eyes, French supply management left much to be desired . President Eisenhower suggested that the Defense Depa rtment investigate using 

civilian contractors to recover its equipment; this idea was rejected because 

military personnel would be needed to identify the equipment. 17 

In the meantime Secretary Dulles had broached with Britain and France 

the sending of a temporary U.S. mission to recover the equipment. Both 

countries vigorously objected that sending additional American troops under 

whatever guise would violate the Geneva Agreements. Only after determin -

ing that two of the three members of the Internationa l Control CommissionCanada and India-would have no objection did they acquiesce. 

With Dulles' approval, in early February 1956 the State and Defense 

Departments jointly developed a plan for a temporary U.S. mission to super-

'''ASO (lSA) to Seey of Defense, 25 Jan 56, U.S. -Vietnam Rela/iolls, 10:1045; Sta ff Study: U.s. 

Policy Toward Vietnam, 25 Apr 56, ACSI 092 Vietnam, records of ACSI; Memo, Director of 

Opns, DCSOPS (Orig Cen David W. Gray), for DCSOPS, 1 Mnr 56, sub; Utiliza tion of Additional 

U.s. M ilitary Personnel for Vietnam, G - 3 091 Vietnam, RG 3 19. 

15MFR, Lt Col Robert Evans, 21 Feb 56, Folder 3, Williams Pilpcrs. 

'lYJ"he Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, p. 196. 

17MFR, Col W . H. Brucker, 3 Mar 56, sub: U.S. Personnel Requirements for Vietnam, G - 3 091 

Indochina, RG 319. 

260 
Pickillg Up tile Pieces 

U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Headquarters 

vise recovery and shipment of excess equipment and to assist the South 

Vietnamese Army in improving its logistical capability. 'B Although the Army 

staff wanted its component of the mission to consist of standard technical 

units----ordnance, engineer, signal- that plan would have required a minimum of 2,800 men, a figure far in excess of what the State Department had in 

mind. 19 

The plan finally agreed upon was one submitted by Colonel Evans on 

behalf of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam and the Commander in Chief, Pacific. It ca lled for the Temporary Equipment Recovery 

Mission, known by the acronym TERM, to have 350 officers and enlisted 

men, who were to arrive in increments over a 120-day period. In add ition to 

the members of the mission, which was to be separate from but subordinate 

to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, the advisory group was to gain 48 

spaces to allow for personnel in transit, on leave, or otherwise temporarily 

out of South Vietnam. Of the total of 740 spaces in both groups, 535 were 

allotted to the U.S. Army20 To allow a reasonable time for the International 

ItlDull es to Saigon, 9 Feb 56, 320.3, records of MAAC Indochina. 

'<JMcmo, DCSors for CofSA, 14 May 56, sub: U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam; Memo, Director of 

Opns, DCSOPS, for DCSOPS, I Mar 56, sub: Utilization of Additional U.S. Military Personnel for 

Vietnam. 

2°Msg, Stale Dept to Sa igon, 12 Apr 56, as quoted in Williams to ACSI for Seey of Army, 19 Jan 

60, Folder 71, Williams Papers. 

261 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Control Commission to approve the recovery mission, none of the members 

was to arrive before the end of May. Although the State Department through 

the South Vietnamese government informed the commission on 20 May 1956 

of plans for the recovery mission, it had received no reply when the first 

officers and men began to arrive in early June. In the event, neither approval 

nor disapproval was ever received from the International Control Commission. 

The State Department specified that even though the mission would have 

to perform some training functions in connection with recovery and shipment 

of equipment, "training should in no case be allowed to become the single or 

even the primary duty" of the mission. In addition, a substantial amount of 

equipment would have to be actually recovered and shipped out of the 

country "so as to implement in good faith the promises made to other 

governments whose benevolent acquiescence to the operation we have 

obtained."21 

Yet from the first the Military Assistance Advisory Group viewed the 

equipment recovery mission as a means of fleshing out its very limited 

training capability. Members of the mission were regularly assigned as advisers on logistical matters to South Vietnamese Army units and all major South 

Vietnamese lOgistical installations, and training courses were established for 

South Vietnamese logistics personnel. Despite the admonitions of the State 

Department, logistical training soon became the recovery mission's major 

activity, freeing members of the advisory group for operational and staff 

training. By the end of 1957, only 7 of the 350 personnel assigned to the 

equipment recovery mission were working full time on the recovery and 

disposition of American equipment. 

As a clandestine reinforcement for the advisory group, the equipment 

recovery mission nevertheless had certain disadvantages. Few officers and 

men assigned to the mission had previous advisory experience, nor were they 

graduates of the Military Assistance Institute. Since their tour of duty lasted 

only eleven to twenty-three months, officers and noncommissioned officers of 

the mission barely had time to develop a feel for the country and for the 

peculiar problems of their assignments before they were replaced with other 

novices. To maintain the subterfuge that its primary mission was different 

from that of the advisory group, the equipment recovery mission operated as 

a quasi-separate organization with its own staff, which caused wasteful duplication and administrative problems for both organizations. Despite those 

shortCOmings the mission was reasonably effective as a logistics training 

agency until eventually absorbed by the adv isory group in 1959. 

South Vietnamese Force Structure 

A !though the logistics crisis was the most critical and most visible result of 

.l"'\.the rapid French withdrawal, there were other far-reaching effects. The 

21Ur, Robert D. Murphy to Seey of Defense, 1 May 56, U. S.-VieflwlII Rela/iolls, 10:1058 

262 
Pickillg Up the Pieces 

entire force plan for the South Vietnamese Army was now ca lled into question. Genera ls Coll ins and Ely had p lanned for an army of some 100,000 men 

by the end of 1955. They had arrived at this fi gure based on the limited 

financia l support the United States was willing to furnish and on th e assumptions that France would continue to retain a sizable force in South Vietnam 

and that the Sou th Vietnamese Army's primary role wou ld be to preserve 

internal security.22 The 100,000-man figure had disturbed South Vietnamese 

officials from the start, for they saw their army primarily as an instrument of 

defense against external aggression. 23 Minister of Defense Nguyen Van Vy 

had declared that his government could see no reason to cut the size of its 

army at the same time that the North Vie tnamese were increasing theirs. 24 

Many American observers doubted that the 100,000-man fi gu re could ever 

be reached given the total lack of proper administrative machinery to demobilize efficiently and the manifest opposition of Vietnamese politicians and sect 

leaders to any further reductions. There was also a well-founded fear of the 

economic consequences of forcing large numbers of former soldiers onto the 

already strained civilian economy. The French withdrawal ga ve considerable 

force to these objection s, as did reports of the con tinu ed expansion and 

improvement of the Viet Minh Army to the north.

25 

By May 1955 Washington leaders had recognized that a larger force was 

unavoidable, and the Department of Defense asked the advisory group to 

devise a more realistic force structure for the Vietnamese Army without 

primary reference to cost restrictions. General Q'Daniel responded with a 

recommendation for a new force level of 150,000 men. He suggested some 

6,000 additional support troops, with th e remaining increase almost equally 

divided between infantry and territorial, that is, internal security, troops and 

1,000 added men each for the Air Force and the Navy. Washington approved 

these recommendations in August. (Table 1) 

Contrary to the views of Washington officials, Genera l O'Daniel from th e 

first had wanted a South Vietnamese Army that could both maintai n internal 

security and resist a North Vietnamese invasion.'6 With the withdrawa l of th e 

French Expeditionary Corps, the development of some capability to resist 

external attack became an obvious necessity, and the organiza tion of the army 

came to reflect O'Danie!'s concept of its dual mission. He planned to set up 4 

field divisions and 6 light divisions with 13 territorial regiments for regiona l 

security. The territorial regiments were to be ca pable of consolidation into 3 

or more light divisions if necessary. 

O'Daniel designed both the field and light divisions to meet the peculiar 

needs of warfare in Indochina. About one-third the size of a standard U.S. 

infantry division, the light division was conceived as a small "mobile striking 

22Rpt of Visit of Clarke to Western Pacific and Sou theas t Asia, vol. III , p. 6. 

2.3Msg, Q'Daniel to ee, USARPAC, ]0 Aug 55, records of MAAG Indochina. 

24Min, Conference a t MAAG, 29 Nov 54. 

2!iLtr, Q'Daniel to ClNCPAC, 9 Aug 55, records of MAAG Indochina; The Joint Chiefs of Sta ff 

and the War in Vietnam, p. 143; Rpt of Visit of C1<1rke to Western Pacific and Sou theast Asia, vol. 

III, gp. 6 - 7. 

2 Rpt of Visit of Clarke to Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. 

263 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years , 1941 - 1960 

TABLE I - SOUTH V IETNAMESE A RMY FORCE BASIS AS PROPOSED 

BY O'DANIEL, MAY 1955 

Categories 

Army 

Central command ...... ......................• 

Field div isions ............... ' . 

Light divisions 

Airborne brigade ...... .... ........................... ,. 

Support troops. 

Territorial commands. 

Territorial regiments ..... . 

Territorial support troo ps .. 

Schools and camps ........................... . 

Pipeline . . ........... . 

Redu ced pay trainees ............. . . 

Total, Army 

Navy .. 

Air Force ................ . 

Total, armed forces ..... 

'Actually 93,5(X); figul\' uS"d ruund.' d off by MAAC 11> 94,000 

Existing 

Strength 

2,500 

25,()()() 

15,675 

4,()()() 

13, 275 

4,600 

0 

8,450 

6,()()() 

4,()()() 

10,()()() 

94,{)(){}' 

3,()()() 

3,()()() 

lOO,()()() 

~(II/1 (,·: Rpl " ,. V".I.,( Cl.H\':., I" Wl' ~I "rn I'., .. if,.. .Ind s.,,, II,,,. '~1 A~I.I. ""I Ill. 1'1'. 7. III. 

Proposed 

Strength 

2,400 

34 ,()()() 

31,350 

4,()()() 

19,700 

4,800 

21, 125 

9,()()() 

6,()()() 

9,625 

0 

142,000 

4,()()() 

4,()()() 

I SO,()()() 

force unencumbered by unnecessary equipmen t but with conside rable firepower for close-in fig hting." Designed for "action in the jungles, paddies and 

mountains where roads were non-existen t," it had over 30 pe rcent more light 

machine guns than an America n division, 10 percent more Browning automatic rifles, and the same number of 60- and 81-mm. morta rs. At the same 

time it had no organic artillery, ordnance, and quartermaster units and o nly a 

fraction of the transportation equipment of an American division. The fi eld 

divisions were about one-half the size of a U. S. Army div ision but had 50 

pe rcent more a utomatic rifles and one-third ma rc 81-mm. mortars. Un like the 

ligh t division, the field division had company-size sig nal, enginee r, transportation, ordna nce, quartermaster, intell igence, and medica l support units. 27 

(Charts 1 mId 2) 

Throughout most of 1955 th ese divisional formations ex isted on pape r 

o nly. The Vietnamese Army wa s still the heterogeneous collection of units, 

battalion size or smaller, which it had been at the end of the Ceneva 

Conference. Although many of these small units wou ld be inactiva ted as the 

divisions were formed, other logistical and service units which did not yet 

exist wou ld have to be created . None of this could be accomplished wh ile 

27Ibid. , pp. 21- 22. From the perspective of the 19705, Gene ral O'D,l nici still believed this was 

an a ppropriate type o f combat force for Viet nam. "Some people had the idea that armor and 

other heavy stuff would be needed in Vie tnam, but [ never did." Intcrv, autho r wit h O'Daniel. 3 

Feb 75. 

264 
Pickillg Up fhe Pieces 

General O'Daniel visits Vietllamese Nationa l Army Trai l/ illS Cel/fer. 

Vietnamese A rmy units were scattered throughout the country on security 

duties or campa igns against the sects. 28 

O'Daniel repeatedly urged President Diem to concentrate the scattered 

battalions into regiments and then into divisions so that proper training could 

commence and the divisions could deploy to locations where they wou ld be 

of greatest strategic benefit. The president and his advisers, however, viewed 

such steps with anxiety, frequently complaining that if troops were pu lled out 

of certain areas people who supported the government would be exposed to 

intimidation by the remnants of the sects and the Viet Minh. Diem repeatedly 

reminded O'Da niel of the need for the army to guarantee in ternal security. 

The general responded that the regroupment wou ld, in the long run, provide 

better internal security as well as the capability to meet external aggression 29 

By the fall of 1955 concentration of the troops had begun, and a four-week 

orientation course for division commanders, staff, and regimenta l commanders 

2/lMemo, Cell O 'O;miel for Ambassador Reinhardt, 29 Jun 55, sub: Meeting With President 

D iem on 28 Jun 55, O'Daniel Papers. 

29Memo, Col1ohn M . Finn for Cen O'Daniel, 5 Aug 55, sub: Minutes of Meeting With M inister 

of Defense on 4 Aug 55; Memo, Cen O'D,lIliel for Ambassador Rei nhardt, 26 Aug 55, sub: 

Meeting With President Diem on 24 Aug 55; ibid., 10 Sep 55, same sub, 9 Sep 55; ibid ., 30Sep 

55, same sub, 28 Sep 55. All in O'Da niel Papers. 

265 
CHART I - SOUTH V IETNAMESE ARMY LICHT DIVISION, 1956 

LIGHT 

DIVISION 

5,225 

1 1 1 HO & HQ Intelligence Signal Ordnan<..e 

Company Company Company Company 

Infanlty 

Rog imont 

Hoavy 

Infantry Weapons 

Battalion Company 
CHART 2-S0UTH V IETNAMESE ARMY FIELD DIVISION, 1956 

FIELD 

DIVISION 

8,500 

I 

105·mm. 1 I I 

Howitzer HQ & HO Engineer Signal Quartermaster 

Battalion Company Company Company Company 

Medical Transportation Ordnance Intelligence 

Company Company Company Company 

Infantry 

Regiment 

I 

Infantry Hoavy 

Weapons Battalion Company 
Advice alld S"pporl: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

had been instituted. Still, it was to be many months before the divisional 

formations were fully manned and equi pped. 

Q'Daniel believed that a well-trained Vietnamese force organized and 

equipped in the recommended fashion could delay an atta ck from North 

Vietnam long enough for the Southeast Asia Treaty Orga niza tion or American 

forces or both to come to the aid of South Vietnam. In case of invasion, 

O'Danie!'s plans called for the forward defensive forces to fall back slowly to 

Da Nang, where the enemy wou ld meet a strong defensive force of two field 

divisions and one light division. These blocking and delaying tactics would 

" force him off the roads into the mountainous untracked areas w here, if 

civilians are evacuated from these areas, the enemy will be in dire straits.,,30 

While the enemy was being delayed at Da Na ng, a South Vietnamese force of 

two field divisions and one lig ht division would make an amphibio us land ing 

behind the enemy lines in the vicinity of Vinh . 

Dealing With the Threat From the North 

A lthough O'Daniel was naive in believing that the North Vietnamese 

Army would be seriously hindered by being forced off th e roads and 

that it could not opente effectively in mountainous jungle (which was, in 

fact, its normal supply and staging area), his ideas were in many respects in 

consonance with the genera l trend of U.S. thinking about possible threats to 

the security of South Vietnam. In Washington plan ners we re taking a long 

second look at possibilities for th e defense of the shaky young Vietnamese 

republic now that the assistance of the French Exped itionary Corps cou ld no 

longer be relied upon. They gene ra lly agreed th at an offensive aga inst South 

Vietnam wou ld follow three primary routes of attack: south down the na rrow 

coastal plain of central Vietnam; south through the Centra l Highlands of 

Vietnam and eastern Laos along the so-ca lled Ho Chi Minh Trail; and southwest from Vinh through Laos to Thakhek and Sava nnakhet, thence south 

through the Mekong River va lley to Sa igon. 3I (Map 6) Although opinions 

varied as to which of these routes would be used or which would prove most 

important, there was little doubt that South Vietnam wou ld be hard pressed 

to defend itself aga inst such thrusts. 

In August 1955 th e National Security Council Planning Board asked the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine what U.S. military operations wou ld be 

required, with and w ithout atomic weapons, in the event of a renewal of 

aggression in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs were to decide w hat operations 

would be needed to " repulse and punish overt Viet Minh aggression" and to 

JOMemo, O'Da niel for Ambassador Reinhardt, 1 Aug 55, sub: Conversation With President 

Diem, O' Daniel Papers; O'Daniel, An Estimate of the Situation, 16 Nov 55, Folder 6, Williams 

PaRers. 

iHQ, Far East Command, Rpt of Joint Intelligence Conference, 17 - 20 Apr 56, p. 4; Intell igence Estimate to Limited War Capabilities Study. 12 Jun 57, ACS138 1; both in records of ACSI. 

268 
LAOS 

/ 

~ .1--- L/~.vIENTIANE 

THAILAND 

BANGKOK 

• 

TIIfHl~ f-/ Orl 

CAMBODIA 

\ 

PHU «) 

Quoe )j 

PROBABLE ATTACK ROUTES 

1956 

o 200 M ILES 

~~-.--'--r-TI 'L-2-'b-o--'~-1 L-O-M---'E~ERS 

MAr6 

CHINA 

HAINAN 

• KOlilul/J Qrli 

·Pltik,l Nllon 

VIETNAM·~ 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

"destroy the Viet Minh forces and take control of North Vietnam." Since the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific, and other unified and specified commanders 

had not yet developed plans to meet these contingencies, the Joint Chiefs 

assigned the study to an ad hoc committee in which the Army participated .'> 

The committee concluded that the armed fo rces of South Vietnam would 

be capable of only limited resistance to a North Vietnamese attack. Unless 

warning of such an attack came early enough to allow the United States to 

take effective countermeasures, a portion of South Vietnam would probably 

be overrun and part of the South Vietnamese Army destroyed. The committee plan called for initial reliance on Vietnamese ground forces to slow 

the enemy advance, immediate air and naval strikes against the North 

Vietnamese forces, and "early movement forward of mobile U.S. Forces for 

joint operations" with the South Vietnamese as well as increased logistical 

support. Forces required included two to four army divisions and supporting 

air elements. To destroy the North Vietnamese Army and defeat the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would require up to 8 U.S. divisions and 2 to 3 

tactical air w ings, a carrier task force, a Marine landing force, and additional 

Vietnamese forces, and a major local security campaign. Like O'Daniel the ad 

hoc committee called for an amphibiOUS attack against North Vietnam to cut 

the enemy supply lines and seize major bases. O'Danie!'s attack was aimed at 

Vinh, but the committee preferred to target the Red River Delta. 33 

The chances for success in such operations would depend on the military 

effectiveness of the South Vietnamese, the degree of wa rning, and the nature 

of the restrictions placed on U.S. military operations by Washington. Merely 

to check aggression and push the invaders back to the 17th Parallel wou ld 

take up to a year- longer if atomic weapons were not used . A prohibition on 

the use of atomic weapons would also prevent " the most effective employment of U.S. armed forces and require greater forces than justified from the 

overall point of view."34 

In the following weeks the Army staff contin ued to examine the feasibility 

of the second option of the ad hoc committee's study: an assault on North 

Vietnam and the destruction of the North Vietnamese Army. The Army 

staff's Campaign Plan- North Vietnam assumed that U.s. and Vietnamese 

forces had pushed the invaders back to the armistice line by the end of the 

first twelve months and developed bases adequate to support U.S. and allied 

forces. During the thirteenth month, six U.S. and fi ve Vietnamese divisions 

would cross the demarcation line in conjunction with an amphibious landing 

at the town of Thanh Hoa on the coast of the South China Sea d ue south of 

Hanoi. The amphibiOUS attack force of two reinforced divisions would then 

link up with the main U.S.-Vietnamese force coming north from the 17th 

32U.S. Policy in Event of Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam, leS 19921479, Incl to Memo, )eS 

for Secy of Defense, 9 Sep 55, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48) (2), leS records, RG 218; Memo for 

CofSA, 26 Mar 56, sub: U.S. Policy in Event of Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam, G - 3 091 

Vietnam, RG 319. 

3JUS Policy in Event of Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam, leS 19921479. 

34fbid. 

270 
Picking Up the Pieces 

Parallel. Together they would attack and seize Haiphong and then take the 

Red River Delta with another amphibious assault in the vicinity of Haiphong. 

These last two tasks would take about three months, with another eight 

months to clear the rest of North Vietnam. If atomic weapons were not 

employed, the campaign would be longer and require larger forces. 35 

The Army staff developed the Campaign Plan- North Vietnam primarily 

to provide a concept of operations against which military planners could 

evaluate the feasibility of and requirements for successful operations by 

American forces in defense of South Vietnam.36 To the Army the implications 

of these plans were clear. Any effective response to aggression in Vietnam 

would require large numbers of ground troops and an effort comparable in 

size and scope to the Korean War. 

Yet such a commitment of ground forces was precisely what the Eisenhower administration and its New Look policy aimed to avoid. Thus, in June 

1956 JCS Chairman Radford presented to the National Security Council an 

alternative concept for U.s. action in the event of aggression in Southeast 

Asia. Radford abandoned the idea of subduing North Vietnam in the event of 

a Communist attack and concentrated on stopping the attack south of the 

17th Parallel. Operations into North Vietnam would be undertaken only if it 

appeared that with U.S. naval, air, and limited U.S. Army combat and 

logistical support, the Vietnamese had the capability of retaking North 

Vietnam.37 He also assumed that Chinese Communist military forces would 

not intervene except to provide supplies and advisers to the North Vietnamese. Radford theorized that if the North Vietnamese launched a surprise 

attack across the 17th Parallel, "The Vietnamese Army. . will carry the 

main burden of the defeat of the aggression" supported by U.S. air and naval 

forces. The U.S. Army support would be limited to assistance in the defense 

of a few vital areas and the provision of advisers. A hard fight was anticipated around Quang Tri after which the South Vietnamese were expected to 

fall back to Da Nang. Like O'Daniel, Radford saw defense of the Da Nang 

area as the centerpiece of the campaign, but he provided for no amphibiOUS 

strike behind North Vietnamese lines. Instead U.S. forces, equipped with 

atomic weapons, would be airlifted from Japan or Korea to Da Nang to assist 

in its defense. "If concentration of Viet Minh troops provide atomic targets 

the use of such weapons might end the aggression very rapidly.,,3. By limiting U.S. objectives to the defense of South Vietnam, by assuming that China 

would fail to intervene, and by specifying the early use of atomic weapons, 

Radford was able to justify the reduction of the ground force requirements 

from the 2 to 4 U.S. Army divisions called for in the earlier plans to 1 or 2 

regimental combat teams. 

3SMemo, Chief, Psy War Plans Br, for Chief. Plans Div, 26 Sep 55, sub: Campaign Plan- North 

Vietnam, PSYWAR 091 Vietnam, RG 319. 

36Min, Staff Conference Held on 28 Oct 55, PSYWAR 337 Staff Conf (1955), RG 319. 

37Plan for U.S. Participation in Event of Viet Minh Aggression in Vie tnam, Appendix to Memo, 

leS for CINCPAC, 11 Jul 56, sub: Development of a Contingency Plan for U.S. Military Participation in Event of Viet Minh Aggression in Vietnam, CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48), sec. 24, RG 218. 

38Ibid. 

271 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

The National Security Council discussed and generally approved Radford's 

approach to dealing with local aggression in Vietnam. President Eisenhower, 

who was present at the meeting, also directed that the appropriate U.S. 

military authorities encourage Vietnamese leaders to plan for defense 

against aggression along lines consistent with American concepts and policies 3 • A few weeks later the joint Chiefs of Staff furnished copies of Admiral 

Radford's plan to the commanders of the Pacific, Far East, and Strategic Air 

Commands and directed them to supplement their plans with a contingency 

plan for Vietnam incorporating the main features of the Radford concept'o 

Pacific Command responded with Operation Plan 46 - 56, which closely followed Radford's outline. 

Army planners found little of va lue in Radford's ideas as embodied in 

Operation Plan 46 - 56. They considered it unrealistic to assume that China 

would not intervene and that North Vietnamese aggression could be defeated 

merely by holding at the 17th Parallel. Moreover, the plan failed to consider 

the near certainty that the North Vietnamese would attack through Laos and 

Cambodia as well as fronta lly through centra l Vietnam. The plan also overestimated the capabilities of the South Vietnamese Army and of American air 

and naval forces, with the result that insufficient U.S. Army ground forces 

were allocated to accomplish the tasks called for. 41 

Although the Army, the joint Chiefs, and Pacific Command planners 

differed about how to meet a threat of North Vietnamese invasion, all agreed 

that this was not the most immediate danger. In their September 1955 study 

of U.S. courses of action in the event of a North Vietnamese attack, the 

joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that "at this time the major threat [to 

South Vietnam] continues to be that of subversion. "" The National Security 

Council Planning Board had reiterated that view when Radford presented his 

outline plan, and estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency in the fall of 

1955 provided added support·) The CIA predicted that "should the Viet 

Minh initiate large-scale guerrilla operations supported by substantial infiltration from the north, the South Vietnamese government would be hard 

pressed .... If the operation were prolonged, the government probably could 

not survive without military assistance from outside."M 

Yet General O'Daniel and his successor continued to make preparation for 

a conventional military attack by North Vietnam the cornerstone of their 

advisory effort. Their reasons were many. O'Daniel believed that an army 

organized and equipped in the manner he prescribed would also be capable 

39Note by Secy to the leS on Capability to Deal With Local Aggression, Inc! to jeS 19921555, 

CCS 092 As;. (6 - 25 - 48) (2), sec. 24, RG 218. 

4OMemo, jeS for C1NCPAC. 11 lui 56, sub: Development of a Contingency Plan, CCS 092 Asia 

(6 - 25 - 48) (2), sec. 24, RG 218. 

41 0F, Col R. L. Kolb, 23 Nov 56, sub: CINCPAC Operation Plan 46 - 56, ACSI 381.01 Pacific 

Area, records of ACSI. 

42U.5. Policy in Event of Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam, leS 19921479, sec. 11. 

43Draft Statement of Policy by NSC Planning Board, 11 Jul 56, sub: U.s. Policy in Mainland 

Southeast Asia , CCS 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48) (2), RG 218. 

44NIE 63. 1 - 3 - 55, 11 OC155, U. S.-Vietnnm Relntions, vol. 2, pI. IV.A.5, Tab 4, p. 9. 

272 
Pickillg Up the Pieces 

of performing internal security duties. The territorial regiments, he believed, 

were well equipped to suppress any uprising in their areas, and the light 

divisions could serve as a general reserve to reinforce them when necessary. 

The field divisions would not generally engage in internal security operations 

but would act as a strategic force, ready to combat any possible aggression· 5 

General Williams on the other hand believed strongly that internal security 

functions were best left to specially trained paramilitary organizations. Both 

men were probably influenced by the fact that many of the measures for 

combating Communist subversion were political and economic in nature and 

consequently the primary concern of civilian agencies. Finally, neither genera l 

believed, in the mid-1950s, that the Communists were capable of organizing 

an insurgency so formidable as to threaten the existence of South Vietnam. 

As General Williams wrote, "Communist guerrillas have been destroyed in 

Greece, Korea, the Philippines and Iran. They can be destroyed in Vietnam."" 

Williams' views on the problem of combating guerrillas were fairly representative of Army thinking in the 1950s. Counterinsurgency (the term itself 

was almost unknown at that time) was little studied or understood. 47 Army 

training and doctrine in the area of counterguerrilla warfare were primarily 

oriented toward preventing or defeating enemy raids behind the lines or 

enemy infiltration. The guerrillas were usually envisioned as troops of the 

enemy's regular forces who had been cut off or had infiltrated or been 

inserted behind friendly Iines·8 Few officers or enlisted men had had any 

practical experience in actual counterguerrilla operations. Whereas the conduct of guerrilla warfare was a specialized skill restricted to U.s. Army 

Special Forces units, the Army considered counterguerrilla training to be 

adequately covered in the four hours of instruction provided for all troops.49 

It was understandable then that General Williams should continue 

O'Danie!'s emphasis on preparation to meet a conventional North Vietnamese 

attack. As an officer in the adviSOry group recalled, General Williams "was 

certain that that was the way that the war was going to go ... and that was 

the way he trained and organized the Vietnamese forces .... I don't recall 

anybody ever trying to talk him out of it because that was one of those things 

you just didn't do with General Williams."so Williams saw insurgency within 

South Vietnam as a problem principa lly beca use it might divert the army from 

45Rpt of Visit of Clarke to Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. 

%Notes Handed to President Diem by Cen Williams, 28 Dec 55, Williams Papers. 

47Ltr, Lt Col Jack Shannon to Lt Cen James A. Gavin, 22 Nov 57, sub: Army Special Warfare 

Ca,gabilities, CS 370.64, records of eSA, RG 319. 

Army Subject Schedule No. 21 - 16, Anti-infiltra tion and Antiguerrilla Warfare Training, 29 

Sep 55; ibid. No. 33 - 11, same title, 22 Jun 56; USCONARC Memo No. 22, Preparation of Army 

Training Programs, 3 Jul 58. All in Tab F to Incl 6 of Memo, SGS (Orig Gen C. H. Bonestecl Ill) 

for DCSOPS, 10 Jul 58, sub: U.S. Army Guerrilla Warfare Activities, CS 370.64, records of CSA, 

RG 319. Department o f Army Field Manual 31 - I S, Operatiolls Agaillst Airbome Attack, Guerrilla 

Actioll, and jll/iltratioll , ch. 6; ibid . 31 - 21, Guerrilla Warfare , eh. 5, 6. 

49Ur, Shannon to Gavin, 22 Nov 57, sub: Army Special Warfarc Capabilities; Summary Sheet, 

U.S. Army Guerrilla Warfare Activities, 31 Jul 58, CS 370.64, records of CSA, RG 319. 

SOlnterv, autho r w ith Col James M. Muir, U.s. Army (retired), Hilton I-lead, S.c., 27 Aug 79, 

Historians files, CMH. 

273 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

undertaking the dispositions and preparations necessary to repel an invasion. 

As he explained to President Diem: 

Communist guerrilla strategy is simple. By using a small amount of arms and 

equipment and a few gooa military leaders, they force [their opponents] to 

utilize relatively aq~e military forces in a campaign that is costly in money 

and men. In Korea In 1950, the South Koreans were using three divisions to 

fight less than 7,000 guerrillas in the Southeast. When the North Koreans 

attacked, the South Korean Army suffered from this diversion as their arn1X 

was not strategically or tactically deployed to meet the North Korean attack. 

Guided by such beliefs Williams prepared to embark upon the difficult task of 

creating an effective South Vietnamese Army. 

51Notes Handed to President Diem by Gen Williams, 28 Dec 55. 

274 
15 

Building a Vietnamese Army, 1956 -1959 

A veteran of both world wars, Lt. Gen . Samuel T. Williams had risen from 

the ranks after enlisting as a priva te in the Texas National Guard and had 

commanded a division during the last year of the Korean War. He had built a 

reputation for working well with Korean troops and had served for a time as 

deputy commander of the II Republic of Korea Corps. Between the wars he 

had acquired the nickname "Hanging Sam" because of his insistence on stern 

punishment for a child rapist in a regiment he commanded. It was an 

appropriate nickname in another sense as well, for Williams was a disciplinarian, outspokenly intolera nt of slackness, incompetence, or boodling. 

Williams was a man who inspired strong feelings in all who knew him- in 

some, of deep admiration, in others, of intense dislike. "He believed you 

were there to put out and that was it," recalled one of his associates. " In that 

sense he was a wonderful commander." J 

Despite a fi ery personal style and plain-spoken manner when he disagreed 

with one of Diem's policies or decisions, Williams quickly established a close 

relationship with the president, who came to trust and to confide in Williams 

to an unusual degree. He was equa lly successful in winning the confidence of 

senior South Vietnamese officers, who often went so far as to discuss their 

intimate personal and family problems with him 2 

The president's conversations with Williams often lasted several hours, 

with the president doing most of the talking. "Sometimes the general was 

able to get in some important points but most of the time it was a case of 

General Williams making small talk while the president just plain rambled." 

Diem always received Williams at a small table in the richly furnished protocol office of the palace. General Williams and his interpreter sat on the 

president's right, opposite the table which was laid with a tea service and a 

tray of Vietnamese cigarettes. During the meeting the president would pick 

up one cigarette after another-the interpreter would light them- take a puff 

llnterv, autho r with Maj Cen John F. Ruggles, 24 - 25 Feb 77, Historians files, CMH. 

2lnterv, Charles 8. MacDonald and Charles V. P. von Luttichau with Lt Cen Samuel T. 

Williams, San Antonio, Tex., 13 Nov 70; Interv, author with Col Nathaniel P. Ward, 16 Aug 79; 

both in Historians files, CMH. 

275 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

or two, and immediately take up 

another brand, while the harried 

interpreter attempted to take notes, 

translate, and keep his lighter 

handy3 

In addition to the embassy, the 

advisory group, and the equipment 

recovery mission, the U.s. mission in 

South Vietnam included the U.S. 

Information Agency, the Central 

Intelligence Agency- known euphemistically as the Office of the Special 

Assistant to the Ambassador-and 

the U.S. Operations Mission, a field 

agency of the International Cooperation Administration. Together with 

the deputy chief of mission, the 

heads of the various agencies constituted a country team headed by the 

ambassador. Although Ambassador 

Reinhardt was the nominal coordinator 

Ambassador Durbrow 

and director of all these American 

agencies and activities, he chose to exercise little detailed supervision. Accordingly, the agencies tended to proceed with their programs in their own way 

and to maintain their own channels of communication with their parent 

agencies in Washington. 

General Williams justified his personal relationship with President Diem 

on the theory that since Diem acted as his own minister of defense he had 

close day-to-day involvement with the military assistance program.

4 That 

relationship and Williams' tendency to run the advisory group with little 

reference to the embassy caused trouble when Reinhard t was succeeded in 

March 1957 by Elbridge Durbrow, who was more inclined to assert his 

authority as head of the mission. "There was never any doubt in my mind 

that the ambassador was the head of the country team," recalled one officer, 

"but Williams sure didn' t believe it, d idn't like it, and wouldn't put up with it 

anymore than he had to. "s The situation was further exacerbated by a personality clash between Williams and Durbrow. There were "frequent shouting 

matches" between the two at country team meetings. 6 According to one of 

Williams' principal deputies, "Relations with the ambassador were about as 

poor as they could be. ,,7 

3lnterv, author with Lt Col Edward M . Dannemiller, U.S. Army (Retired), Augusta, Ga., 10 

Mar SO, Historians files, CMH. 

4MFR, Williams, 10 Dec 59, Incl 3, Country Team Coordination for (Senator Albert) Core and 

(Senator Gale) M cGee H earings, W illiams Papers. 

5lnterv, author with M uir, 27 Aug 79. 

6lbid. 

7Jn terv, author with Lt Cen Samuel L. Mye rs, 22 - 23 Feb 77; confirmed in Interv, author with 

Elbridge Durbrow, 9 Dec 76; both in Historians files, CMH. 

276 
Buildillg a Vietllalllese Arllly 

Relations between the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the service 

attaches were often little better. General Williams professed to see no value 

in having attaches in countries which also had advisory groups. He believed 

that he would be compromising his special position of trust with the Vietnamese government and armed forces if he passed information he received to 

the Army attaches who might, in turn, share it with their British or French 

counterparts. Well aware of their chief's attitude, other advisory group officers were reluctant to share information or even to associate with the service 

attaches.

s 

Bureaucratic rivalries and suspicions w ithin the country team intensified 

this thinly veiled hostility. Members of the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group complained that the country team was " loaded against the military"; 

they believed that although the military assistance program was by far the 

most important and expensive American project in South Vie tnam, those 

responsible were given "only one voice out of fi ve ."') 

Many officers considered Durbrow a poor administrator and worried that 

his lack of understanding of even elementary military matters impeded their 

efforts. 10 Others in the country team were just as unhappy with the advisory 

group, believing that General Williams wa s maneuvering to get a larger 

military mission and that the military in general were keeping important 

information from the other agencies. By the end of Durbrow's first year, some 

members of the country team were barely on speaking terms with General 

Williams. I 1 

A single individual or orga niza tion in Washington charged with issuing 

guidance to the field might have helped, but there was no one authorityother than the president himself- responsible for overall direction of the 

American effort in South Vietnam. The National Security Council's Operations Control Board was supposed to provide the necessary coordination, but 

the studies it p roduced were vague and general. As a result, the State and 

Defense Departments were left to compete for authority over programs while 

the U.S. Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. 

Operations Mission maintained their ow n counsel in their more restricted 

fi elds. Even within the Defense Department, both the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff had responsibilities for South Vietnam. The interdepartmental Foreign 

Military Assistance Coordinating Committee, chaired by the secretary of state, 

flUr, Col L. B. Woodbury to ACSI, 11 Sep 57, sub: Study of MAAG Role in the Worldwide 

Collection Efforts, 5 - 31 - 57, OA RMA 350.09, records of ACSI. See also Intervs, author with Brig 

Cen Charles A. Symroski, U .S. Arm y (Retired), Williamsburg, Va., 16 Aug 79, and with Col 

Richard H. Comstock, Ithaca, N.Y., 14 Sep 78, copies in Historians files, CMH. Colonel Co ~ 

stock believed "Williams was jealous that he didn't command the attache office and that the 

attaches came, in protocol, somewhat above MAAG. Also he didn't want anybody sending 

adverse information to Washington." Comstock Interv. 

9lnterv, author with Myers, 22 - 23 Feb 77. 

1Olbid. with Col Ernest P. Lasche, U.S. Army (Retired), M arianna, Fla., 30 Aug 79, Historians 

files, CMH. 

11 Ibid . with Leland Barrows (AID), 27 Jul 76, and with former CIA Station Chief, Saigon, 30 Jul 

76, both in Historians files, CMH. 

277 
Advice alld Support: Tlte Early Years, 1941-1960 

still presided over the collection of rival interests but had no real authority to 

impose order. Thus neither in Washington nor in Saigon was there much 

unified direction of American policy toward South Vietnam. 

The State of the Vietnamese Army 

General Williams inherited the mission of advising an army that was far 

from capable of effective military operations of any type. The army 

suffered from an acute shortage of officers, particularly those qualified for 

higher command, and after his experiences with General Hinh and the sects, 

President Diem tended to value political reliability in senior officers far more 

than military expertise. The officer corps was riddled with favoritism and 

corruption. Officers who had failed to manifest personal loyalty to the president often fell victim to secret denunciations by jealous or ambitious rivals.' 2 

At the beginning of 1956 the South Vietnamese Army was "essentially a 

heterogeneous collection of separate battalions." Many of its divisions existed 

largely on paper; even those which had begun to function lacked their full 

complement of men and material. Virtually all the divisional and regimental 

commanders were new to their units and did not know their men or their 

subordinate officers. Few had ever commanded anything larger than a battalion. All lacked experience in the use of artillery and other supporting 

arms. 13 

The continued dispersion of small units in mopping-up operations against 

the sects and other dissidents created the most serious difficulties. These 

operations often achieved only minimal results, but their cost to unit training 

and general readiness was enormous. The division commander and his staff 

had no opportunity to practice command or even to get to know their 

component units. Training schedules were disrupted, and even simple target 

practice had to be postponed. 14 

The 1st Field Division, the only division with a full complement of troops 

and equipment, had never trained as a unit or even reached its assigned 

station area. The Vietnamese Army staff described two other field divisions as 

virtually "paralyzed" because of dispersal for local operations and lack of 

equipment. In the 12th Light Division morale was "too low for the unit to 

have any value." The army staff was obliged to "admit in all Sincerity that we 

do not have all the necessary elements to contain [the enemy] much less 

defeat him."ls 

12Ltr, Col James Evans to ACSI, 22 May 56, sub: Politics in the Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam, 5 - 6 - 56, OARMA 350.05. records of ACSI. 

13Ibid., 11 Apr 56, sub: Vietnamese Document Entitled "Reorga nization of the Battle Corps to 

Meet the Threat of Invasion," 5 - 4 - 56, OARMA 350.05, records of ACSI. 

14lbid. See also Annex C to Quarterly Rpt of 4th Field Div Advisory Gp. Incl to Ltr, Col L. B. 

Woodbury to ACSI, 21 Feb 57, OARMA 350.05, records of ACSL 

1sLlr. Evans to ACSI, 11 Apr 56, sub: Vietnamese Document Entitled " Reorganization of the 

Battle Corps to Meet the Threat of Invasion." 

278 
Bllilding a Vietnamese Army 

With his brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president's confidential adviser, 

and Ngo Dinh Can, the political boss of central Vietnam, Diem controlled a 

network of Catholic refugees, government officials, and relatives called the 

Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang, or Can Lao, a secret pOlitical party wh ich 

dominated most government operations.'6 Within the Defense Ministry, for 

example, the director of personnel, the director of military security, and the 

director general of the Office of Accounting, Budget, and Control, as well as a 

number of division and corps commanders, were all Can Lao members handpicked by Ngo Dinh Can.17 Cells or committees of the Can Lao existed at all 

echelons of the army, frequently without the knowledge of the unit commanders. The staffs of senior commanders were so riddled with Can Lao 

operatives and informers that some generals like Duong Van Minh hesitated 

to plan any real operations with their staffs. Minh kept his large G sections 

busy with training lessons and exercises while he actually carried out operational planning in the privacy of the general's quarters or on drives in his 

jeep with only his American adviser and a trusted aide present.'s 

During the elections for the National Assembly of South Vietnam in early 

1956, the Vietnamese Army officially permitted and tacitly encouraged its 

soldiers to participate in political meetings and rallies, although officers were 

prohibited from becoming candidates. 19 "Whenever we saw them [Can Lao] 

misusing our vehicles for political purposes I'd push the minister of defense 

until he went to the preSident," recalled one adviser. The minister always 

returned to report that Diem flew into a rage at his complaint and there was 

nothing more to be done. 20 

The command structure in the South Vietnamese forces accurately mirrored the president's obsession with controlling the army. The Department of 

National Defense appeared designed primarily to increase confusion with 

"conflicting, duplicating chains of command and communication and ... 

various major agencies . .. installed in widely separated areas so as to hamper coordination, rapid staff action and decision making."" The result was an 

administrative situa tion in which a general commanding a division had to 

obtain written authorization from the army chief of staff to requisition a 

jeep.22 In the field, a battalion commander often received orders from both 

the commander of his regiment or division and the commander of the military region in which he was operating. President Diem not infrequently sent 

orders directly to battalions and regiments over his own radio net, bypass16Dennis J. Duncanson, Govemmellt (jud Revolulioll ill Vietllam (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1968), pp. 217- 18; Am Embassy, Saigon, to State Dept, 2 Mar 59, 751G.OOJ3 - 259, records 

of Dept of Sta Ie. 

17Memo, Col James Mui r for Chief, MAAG, 19 Mar 59, sub: A ppointments of Vietnamese 

Personnel. Folder 68, Williams Papers. 

18lnte rv, autho r with Lt Cell George Forsythe, U.S. Army (Reti red), Beaufort, S.c., 20 Apr SO, 

Historians files, CMH . 

l'.1Ur, Eva ns to ACSI, 22 May 56, sub: Politics in the Army of the Republic of Vie tnam. 

2°lnterv, author w ith Lasche, 30 Aug 79. 

21USACGSC, Staff Study o n Army Aspects of Military Assistance, p. C - 20. 

221nterv, MacDona ld and Luttichau with Williams, 13 Nov 70. 

279 
Advice and Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

ing the Department of National Defense, the general staff, and the fie ld 

commanders. 

In an ea rly meeting with Diem, General Williams was amazed to learn that 

the president intended to select a permanent chief of staff and general staff 

only "after war had begun." Williams explained to Diem that this idea was 

"not militarily feasible," and the president reluctantly agreed to appoint 

General Le Van Ty as permanent chief of staff. 23 

General Ty, who had spent some thirty years in the French Army and had 

risen to the rank of captain before transferring to the Vietnamese Army in 

1948, "spoke better French than Vietnamese and preferred to drink champagne over anything else." Cautious and unimaginative, he was exactly the 

type of safe personality the Ngos desired. One senior American adviser 

thought that "Ty would have made a real good sergeant."24 The chief of 

staff's performance was also conditioned, at least in part, by his recognition that exercising strong control over his commanders had less chance of 

achieving the results he sought than of "causing him difficulty with the 

President. ,,25 

American advisers were also concerned by the South Vietnamese Army's 

lack of national feeling. Many senior officers, such as Tran Van Don, Le Van 

Kim, Duong Van Minh, and Le Van Ty, had fought in the French forces in 

the first Indochina War and some had even been French citizens. There were 

virtually no senior officers in Diem's army identified with resistance to French 

colonialism, the principle upon which the Diem regime was supposedly 

founded. General Ty was "certain that many of our units wou ld disappear 

into the countryside at the very start of the reopening of hostilities. ,,26 Insubordination was rampant; orders were freely disobeyed, and senior officers 

were reluctant to punish subordinates who might have powerful political 

connections. 27 

A former adviser recalled, "One day I went to the Minister of Defense and 

said 'Look, I just passed one of your sentry towers and I saw a couple of feet 

sticking up there and a guitar. Obviously that sentry's asleep. Let's go out 

and get my jeep and we' ll straighten it ou!.'" The minister demurred, explaining that all he could do was to go to the chief of the Joint General Staff who 

would go to the chief of staff of the army who would go to the corps 

commander and so forth until the appro~riate noncommissioned officer might 

be found to disCipline the drowsy sentry. 8 

Many officers and noncommissioned officers regarded their service in the 

23MFR, LI Col Vincent Usera, 14 JuJ 56, sub: Conversa tions Between President Diem and Chief, 

MAAG, Folder 4, Williams Papers. 

24lntervs, author with Ruggles, 24 - 25 Feb 77, and with Genera l Trail Van Don, 20 Dec 76, 

Historians files, CMH; Croizat Intcrv. 

25Memo, Liaison Officer, DOD, for Chief, MAAG, 12 Nov 59, sub: Personal Views Expressed 

by Dr. Oieu, Folder 68, Williams Papers. See also Tn terv, author with Don, 20 Dec 76, and 

Croizat Interv. 

26Maj Gen Le Van Ty, Evaluation of the Vietnamese Army, 19 Mar 56, Folder 10, Williams 

Papers. 

17lbid. 

2l1Interv, author with Lasche, 30 Aug 79. 

280 
Building a Vietllamese Army 

army as an opportunity to enrich themselves. By Asian standards, the pay of 

the South Vietnamese armed forces was extraordinarily high. A master sergeant in the South Vietnamese Army, for example, received $161.00 a month 

compared to $14.00 a month for a master sergeant in the Army of the 

Republic of Korea; a South Vietnamese second lieutenant received $208.00 a 

month compared to $18.00 for his South Korean counterpart. The pay system 

was a legacy of the French era when many French officers and noncommissioned officers had been transferred to the Vietnamese Na tional Army. To 

induce them to serve, it had been necessary to pay them at the same rate as 

that of the French Expeditionary Corps, so that the pay of th e Vietnamese 

had also been increased . South Vietnamese officers and officials nevertheless 

appea led frequently to their American sponsors for even higher pay and 

allowa nces. [n the summer of 1955, Minister of Defense Tran Trung Dung 

had asked General Q'Daniel to try to secure a pay raise for enlisted personnel 

"to cut down on desertions," a rationale that Q'Daniel must have found 

strange, since, as he pOinted out, the South Vietnamese Army was approximately 50,000 men overstrength and desertion hardly a pressing problem 29 [n 

1958, when the South Vietnamese Navy requested an increase in the amount 

of money allocated for sea pay, it became apparent that the "sea pay" was to 

go to everyone, whether or not they were actually assigned to sea duty. 

According to the transcript of the meeting, "General Williams said he thought 

navy officers stayed in the navy because of love of the sea and for service to 

their country, just as other officers do .... The Chief of Staff said those 

officers unfortunately are a minority. That when Vietnam was mobilized, 

students tried to get in the navy as a refu ge from fighting in the army .... 

That it was not love of the sea but desire for a superior position.,,30 

Many senior offi cers routinely supplemented their income by selling on 

the black market, embezzling official funds, exploiting prostitution, and dealing in drugs. The lower ranks committed extortion and sometimes even 

outright robbery against the local population, particularly in outlying districts?' In those remoter areas, regional commanders occasionally attempted 

to establish themselves as local warlords, in some instances even trying to 

collect taxes.32 

[n Saigon contractors doing business with the Defense MiniStry were 

routinely assessed 5 to 10 percent of the contract price as a "contribution" to 

the Can Lao Party.33 "Few business transactions occur in Vietnam," reported 

the American embassy in 1959, "without some benefit to the Can Lao.,,34 

For long General Williams remained unaware of or unconcerned about the 

29Memo of Meeting Between General Q'Daniel and Defense Minister Dung, 4 Aug 55, Q'Daniel 

Pa~ers. 

Gen Williams - President Diem Conversation, 8 Jan 58, Williams Papers. 

31 Min, USARPAC FARELF (Far East Land Forces) Intelligence Conference, 16 - 20 Ma y 60, p. 5, 

USARPAC records. 

321nterv, author with Myers, 22 - 23 Feb 77. 

33Memo, Col E. W. Taylor for Chief, MAAG, 26 Mar 59, sub: Discussions of 24 Mar 59, Folder 

68, Williams Papers; Interv, author with Lasche, 30 Aug 79. 

).jAm Embassy, Saigon, to Slate Dept, 2 Mar 59. 

281 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

fundamental economic, social, and political conditions underlying most of the 

South Vietnamese Army's problems. He appeared to look upon the South 

Vietnamese Army as simply a less sophisticated and less experienced version 

of the U.S. Army and refused to take seriously the existence of political 

cliques in the army, comparing the feuds between factions with the rivalry 

between the U.S. Marines and the Army or between the Navy and the Air 

Force. Nor d id he appear to appreciate the central role that the generals 

played in South Vietnamese politics. 35 

Schools and Training 

The "greater majority of Americans in Vietnam," observed a French journalist based in Saigon, "very sincerely believe that in transplanting their 

institutions, they will immunize South Vietnam against Communism."36 That 

was particularly true of the advisory group. Like his predecessors, General 

Williams believed that exposure to American training schools and methods 

would solve man y of the problems of the South Vietnamese Army. 37 He 

wanted a maximum number of South Vietnamese officers to attend U.S. 

military schools and courses in the Philippines, Japan, and the United 

States. During the first half of 1956, for example, over three hundred South 

Vietnamese officers and enlisted men completed courses at those schools. 38 

Senior generals such as Duong Van Minh and Le Van Kim, attended the U.s. 

Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. 

It is difficult to assess the net effect of the overseas training effort. Some of 

the senior officers selected by Diem for training in the United States were 

incompetent or marginal performers who spent most of their time shopping, 

Sightseeing, and socializing. 39 A problem for even the most conscientious 

Vietnamese student was the language barrier. All instruction at Leavenworth 

was, of course, in English. With sufficient time potential students could be 

given accelerated English courses, but sufficient time was seldom available. 

Diem did not select the officers to attend the Leavenworth short course 

commencing in January 1957, for example, until late November 1956.

40 

Although company grade officers were in general better performers, once 

they had undergone advanced training they were in such demand that they 

lSMemo, Williams for Ambassador Durbrow, 5 Mar 58, sub: Conversation With President 

Diem, Williams Papers. General Williams listed as one of his major problems the "failure to 

wean Vietnamese officers from French politica l habits." Interv, MacDonald and Luttichau with 

Williams, 13 Nov 70. 

36Mende Tibor, "Ies Deux Vietnams," Esprit, 6June 1957. 

37First Draft Report of the Draper Study Committee, ]7 Feb 59, Folder 102, p. 44, Williams 

Pa:eers. 

Memo, Chief, TERM, for Chief, MAAG, 27 Sep 56, sub: Review and Analysis of MAAG 

Programs, Williams Papers. 

39Memo, Muir for Chief, MAAG, 19 Mar 59, sub: AppOintments of Vietnamese Personnel; 

Interv, author with Myers, 22 - 23 Feb 77. 

40Interv, author with Dannemiller, 10 Mar BO. 

282 
Recruits at Quallg Tnlllg Basic Trainillg Cellier. 

_______ .C. a.d. e.t.s.a.t_Da/at Mi/ita rY1 ~~~L ________ -. 
Vietnamese Army Trainees on obstacle COllrse, Nha Trang Commalldo School. 

2d Division Gunners fire 105-mm . howitzer. 
Buildil1g a Vietllalllese Army 

were often absorbed into headquarters staff work or administration in Saigon 

rather than being returned to field commands" Many company grade officers 

also appeared to believe that what they had learned in the United States 

could not easily be applied in Vietnam. As an American adviser recalled, 

One day during practice in firing the 60 mm. mortar I was rather appalled at 

the complete lack of organiza tion of the class. For example there would be 

ladies, in their large straw conical hats, out selling bowls of soup and other 

things to nibble on right in among the class ... that type of thing. The 

lieutenant in charge had a 45 automatic stuck in his back pocket, no belt, no 

holster or anything of that nature. And finally at the conclusion of the day I 

went to this 1ieutenant and asked him, "You're just back from Fort Benning 

aren't you?" and he said, "Yes, sir." "You had mortar instruction at Fort 

Benning?" "Yes, sir." And I said, "Well, what do you think? How do you 

compare the instruction you just fin ished giving with that which you received 

at Fort Benning?" and his answer was "Oh, it was much better at Fort 

Benning." So I said, "Why?" and he said, "Well, sir, that was Fort Benning 

and this is Vietnam.,,42 

By the end of 1956, there were four major school systems in operation 

within South Vietnam. The army's basic training center at Quang Trung, near 

Sa igon, was then capable of handling over 9,000 recruits in its standard 

sixteen-week course, and there was also an eight-week course for reservists. 43 

The school for senior officers, the Military College in Saigon, offered a "staff 

course" for junior officers and a "command course" for field grade officers, 

while the Dalat Military Academy provided basic officer training for about 800 

students. 

The Thu Due School Center, a few miles northeast of Saigon, housed the 

major branch schools: armor, infantry, transportation, signal, adm inistration, 

engineer, ordnance, artillery, and quartermaster. All together they were capable of training about 1,700 officers and senior noncommissioned officers in 

their respective specialties. In addition to reorganizing and expanding that 

major training complex, the advisory group established a physical training 

and ranger school at the coastal town of Nha Trang for 75 to 100 students and 

an intelligence and psychologica l warfare school in Saigon.44 

The school system was sound in concept, but its actual effectiveness 

varied according to the ability of the instructors and students assigned, the 

resources available, and the capacity of the school. The commanding general 

of the Quang Trung Training Center, for example, was described by the U.S. 

Army attache as a "pompous, fat, stupid man ... who will do anything to 

increase his personal fortune." He was reportedly financing a brothel run by 

his mistress, an act that allegedly scandalized the general's fellow officers 

"not so much because of his interest in a business venture but because he 

41Interv, author with Ru ggles, 24 - 25 Feb 79. 

42lnterv, author with Dannemiller, 10 Mar 80. 

43Briefing by Brig Cen Tran Van Don for Australian Parliamentary Delegation, 6 Dec 56, Folder 

5, Williams Papers. 

44 Ibid.; Training Directorate, HQUSMACV, History of the U.S. Training Effort: Development of 

the Training D irectorate, May 1970, pp. 18 - 20, copy in Historians files, CMH. 

285 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

was personally interested in the madam. ,,45 In the case of the Military 

College, a well-run, well-staffed institution, many of the students simply 

lacked the capacity to absorb the material offered in the command and 

general staff course because they had never been exposed to officer training 

courses dealing with the more basic aspects of command 46 Some schools, 

such as the Artillery School at Thu Due, did a satisfactory job in teaching 

students to maintain, clean, load, and aim their weapons but provided little 

information about the practical employment of artillery in modern, combined 

arms warfare. Although most advisers considered the Ranger School at Nha 

Trang first class, its capacity was limited to little more than a hundred 

students 4 ? The small size of the advisory group limited its ability to influence 

the school system. In general only one or two advisers could be assigned to 

each school, and often their time was taken up in selecting suitable material 

from American training manuals and overseeing its transiation. 48 

The prevalent American view of the Vietnamese as primitive and uneducated may have had some effect on training. Americans routinely referred to 

the South Vietnamese as " the natives" until the term was officially banned in 

1957. In studying the military assistance program, the U.S. Army's Command 

and General Staff College attributed the deficiencies of the South Vietnamese 

Army to "the long-standing nature of the Vietnamese people: passive, submissive, fatalistic, accustomed to being led ... pastoral and non-mechanical. ,,49 

The Language Barrier 

Alack of advisory personnel with Vietnamese language skills clearly had 

an effect. While thousands of South Vietnamese took English language 

courses between 1956 and 1959, the Military Assistance Advisory Group 

averaged less than a dozen officers and enlisted men possessing any facility 

in Vietnamese. Few were ever assigned advisory or training duties; instead, 

they were usually retained in Saigon in a translator pool. 50 General Cao Van 

Vien, later chief of the Joint General Staff, could recall no instance "in which 

a U.S. adviser effectively discussed professional matters with his counterpart 

in Vietnamese,"S1 

That the language barrier could create unexpected problems was illustrated by the experience of one American instructor who was attempting to 

teach basic facing movements to a group of recruits. 

4SU r, Lt Col L. B. Woodbury to ACSJ, 1 Mar 58, sub: ARVN Key Personnel Changes, 5 - 8 - 58, 

ACSI 350.09, records of ACSI. 

In te v, autho r with Myers, 22 - 23 Feb 77. 

47Ibid. 

'ISUr, OARMA to ACSI, 28 Feb 57, AC51350.09, records of ACSI. 

49USACGSC, Staff Study on Army Aspects of Military Assistance, p. C - 19. 

soMemo, Williams for Ambassador Durbrow, 7 Apr 59, sub: Personnel of MAAG·TERM Who 

Speak Vietnamese, Will iams Papers. 

5 1 General Cao Van Vien el aI., Tile U. S. Adviser, Indochina Monographs Se ries (Washington: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 31 - 32. 

286 
15th Light Division Cantonment Ilear Dlle My. 

U.S. Advisory Detachment Buildings at Ball Me Thllot. 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

He instructed the interpreter to tell the men "About Face!" The interpreter 

looked at the major rather quizzically, then spoke rapidly to one of the 

trainees. The man broke from the ranks, went over to a pail of water, washed 

his face and then returned to the formation. Each time the advisor would 

attempt to teach this facing movement the same act would be repeated. 

Finally after the third attempt the trooper broke down. He told the malor that 

there was nothing wrong with his face, that it was clean because he had 

washed it three times. 52 

At the end of General O'Danie!'s tour of duty, he had recommended that the 

U.S. Army train some officers in Vietnamese before sending them to Saigon, 

but the Army had no Vietnamese language school at the time, and the staff 

considered that, in view of the number of officers in the advisory group, 

"such a program would be extremely expensive.,,53 

The shortage of Vietnamese-trained officers was in part a reflection of a 

larger, Army-wide problem with language training. During the 1950s no 

single individual or agency had responsibility for the Army language program. The deputy chief of staff for military operations was responsible for 

training most military linguists; the deputy chief of staff for personnel 

selected, tested, and assigned officers to language training; and the assistant 

chief of staff for intelligence conducted his own Foreign Area Specialist Program. Officers in the agencies involved often had other duties, and the 

language program tended to take a backseat to more pressing concerns. 54 As 

a result of such inattention and divided responsibility, sizable numbers of 

individuals were trained in languages without subsequently being assigned to 

jobs that called for their use. This problem was all the more serious because 

during the late 1950s the Army as a whole remained about 20 percent short of 

its requirements for language-trained officers. 55 

Vietnamese-trained officers were rare items even in the defense attache's 

offices until the end of the 1950s. In Saigon, however, many officers assigned 

to government agencies found that facility in French was far more useful in 

dealing with the highly Westernized elite of the government and army whose 

own knowledge of colloquia l Vietnamese was sometimes rudimentary. When 

the first Vietnamese-speaking Army attache was presented to General Ty, he 

attempted to carryon a discussion in Vietnamese. The general smiled and 

nodded his way through the attache's fluent exposition in Vietnamese, then 

privately requested that the embassy send him a French-speaking officer. 56 

Officers and enlisted men newly assigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Group received little orientation in Vietnamese culture either before or 

52Short History of MACV AdviSOry Teams, 1971 , 228 - 0P, Organizational History files, MACV 

records. 

s3Memo, Brig Ceo David W. Grey, DCSOPS for CofSA, 5 Mar 56, sub: Contents and Disposition of a Report by Lt Cen J. W. O'Daniel Relating to Situation in Indochina, G - 3091 Indochina. 

SA Memo, Maj Cen Robert A. Schow for CofSA, 31 Oct 58, sub: Comments o n the Intelligence 

Activities of the U.S. Army, 020 ACSI, records of ACSI. 

55lbid. 

56lnterv, author w ith Comstock, 14 Sep 78. Few officers spoke French either. In 1957 there were 

four officers in the advisory g roup with "good knowledge of military French." Interv, author 

with Dannemiller, 10 Mar 80. 

288 
Buildillg a Vietllamese Army 

after arrival. Through 1960 all incoming officers received a standard fourhour briefing on some dozen subjects, none touching directly on the government, politics, or recent history of South Vietnam. 57 The Army frequently 

"expressed concern about officers going ' Asiatic,' losing their professional 

ethos, and conceivably their personal morals when immersed in the culture of 

Southeast Asia for prolonged periods."SB 

In addition to these handicaps the Military Assistance Advisory Group in 

Vietnam labored under a number of rigid restrictions imposed by Washington. The number of advisers was strictly limited, and no serious thought was 

given to raising the limitation until the end of the 1950s. The size of the 

Vietnamese armed forces and the availability of equipment were likewise 

circumscribed by the level of aid agreed upon in 1956. The sort of open-ended 

support for Vietnam made available by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations was quite unknown during General Williams' day, when every dollar 

spent had to be painstakingly justified and cuts in aid levels seemed far more 

likely than increasess , 

The heart of the American advisory effort was the Combat Arms Training 

Organization (CATO), formed after the demise of the Training Relations and 

Instruction Mission in April 1956. 60 The Combat Arms Training Organization 

functioned as a kind of operations staff for the chief of the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group and also controlled all the MAAG field detachments assigned 

to Vietnamese schools and commands. The chief of the Combat Arms Training Organization was the rating officer for all advisers except those senior to 

him, a somewhat unusual arrangement since, as a staff officer, the CATO 

chief had only infrequent opportunities to observe the advisory detachments 

in the field. 61 

There were, until 1960, four major advisory commands serving with South 

Vietnamese units in the five military regions. They included I Corps and 2d 

Military Region with headquarters at Da Nang, a command which also comprised the advisory detachments assigned to the 1st Field Division at Da 

Nang and the 2d Field Division at Hue. The II Corps and the 4th Military 

Region, with headquarters at Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, and 

the 3d Military Region headquartered at Pleiku included the advisory detachments with the 12th Light Division at Kontum, the 14th Light Division at Qui 

Nhon, the 15th Light Division at Duc My, the 3d Field Division at Song Mao, 

and miscellaneous units stationed in the region. The 1st and Ca pital Military 

Regions included detachments with the 4th Field Division at Bien Hoa and 

S7Briefing Orientation- MAAG, Vie tnam, Incl to L1 r, Williams to Brig Cen Henry G. Newton, 6 

Jan 60, Folder 73, Williams Papers. 

58Ltr, Maj Cen Paul Gorman to Chief of Military History, 1975, sub: Comments on Proposed 

Monograph: the U. S. Adviser, copy in Historians files, CMH. "I would have loved to have had 

an orientation in Vietnamese history," one former adviser stated. " ) have no doubt that many 

people CQuid have been far more effective had they had this background training." Intcrv, author 

with Lasche, 30 Aug 79. 

S'Jlnlerv, author with Forsythe, 20 A pr 80. 

6O'y'ra ining Directorate, HQUSMACV, History of the U.S. Training Effort, pp. 17 - 18. 

611ntcrv, author with Symroski, 16 Aug 79. 

289 
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--v(~S-""'V\ Korrlum 

• J llh Ught Vi~iO ~ 

• PI,iku _~ 3d MR Hq • IIi Nhon 

MAP 7 

l MR 

CAMBODIA \ • BlUr Me TIrUDI 

II Curps Hq 

41h MR Hq .-1 -J 'i~ _~ MRI 

\ 

{ • Tny Ninll • $()n Mao '-v lUh &: 131h ligh t Divi5ion~ 

./'"'\. .8im HOIl t \........ • 41h Held Division 

.,/ SAIGON \ CAPITAL MR 

MR yAPTAt I 

e mr Tho • 

ADVISORY COMMANDS 

(BEFORE 1960) 

o 100 MILES 

f-I .--'-r-/-'I -'1_ ---'1 

o 100 KILOMETERS 

Note: Different units were rotaled inlo MR V 10 perform 

assigned missions. Miscellaneo us units we re assign ed in .111 MR's. 
Bui/dhlg a Viet"amese Army 

the two or three light divisions stationed at Tay Ninh. The 5th Military 

Region in the Mekong Delta, with headquarters at the town of My Tho, 

usually included the 16th Light Division and frequently one or two other light 

divisions drawn from the II and, later, the III Corps areas. (Map 7) 

The light divisions each had a lieutenant colonel of infantry or artillery 

assigned as senior adviser; an infantry major assisted by two noncommissioned officers served as adviser to each of the three infantry regiments of the 

division. The field divisions had a colonel of infantry as senior adviser, three 

infantry majors as regimental advisers, and an artillery major as artillery 

adviser; they were assisted by two or three noncommissioned officers. 

Advisory detachments at the I and" Corps headquarters consisted of 

about a dozen officers and enlisted men with a colonel of infantry as senior 

corps adviser, and two lieutenant colonels to advise the corps engineer, 

armor, ordnance, and Signal units. The other military regions each had an 

armor, artillery, or infantry colonel as senior adviser and a varying number of 

other advisers, usually less than half a dozen, depending on the number and 

size of units operating in the region.

62 

Other advisory detachments assigned to the various schools and training 

centers reported to the Combined Arms Training Organization through its 

Operations and Training Division, while those at the technical service schools 

and depots reported to the chief of the Temporary Equipment Recovery 

Mission. 63 In Saigon advisers were also assigned to various sections of the 

Vietnamese Ministry of Defense and the general staff. 

The Adviser's Role 

A pproximately forty U.s. military personnel of all ranks and services were 

~p rmitt d to have th eir families accompany them to Vietnam on a twoyear tour of duty. The remaining 700-odd members of the advisory group 

served for one year, the maximum time which the Department of the Army 

thought reasonable for an unaccompanied tour in an unhealthful and distant 

country. Their actual tour as advisers seldom exceeded eleven months."' 

Military Assistance Advisory Group personnel in Saigon lived in comfortable bachelor officer or enlisted quarters with good common messing facilities 

and the entertainment and recreational opportunities of Saigon close at hand . 

In the field advisers occupied more primitive, although seldom uncomfortable, quarters with few diversions except for a nightly movie in the mess hall. 

They also suffered fewer distractions and demands for paperwork than their 

62The foregOing information is ba sed upon a short paper entitled "Some Recollections of the 

U.s. Advisory Program of MAAG-Yietnam" that was prepared especially for the Center of 

Military H istory by Col. Nathaniel P. Ward III, U.S. Army (Retired), former Senior Adviser, II 

U.S. Corps, and later (1959) Chief of Staff, MAAG, Vietnam. Copy in Historians files, CMH. 

6.1Training Directorate, HQUSMACY, History of the U.s. Training Effort, p. 19. 

Mlntervs, author with Lasche, 10 Aug 79, with Ward, 16 Aug 79, and with Symroski, 16 Aug 

79. 

291 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 -1960 

General Williams receives briefillg 011 amphibiolls exercise. 

counterparts in the capital. The Vietnamese Army provided quarters, offices, 

vehicles, guards, and drivers; most advisers hired and paid their own cooks 

and orderlies. 

As a general rule the lower the rank of the adviser and the farther from 

the capital, the closer his relationship to his unit and his counterpart. 65 The 

regimental, division, or corps adviser spent a good deal of his time consulting 

with his Vietnamese opposites and observing and inspecting the components 

of his unit, either alone or with the unit commander. Nor did the field 

adviser completely escape the demands of paperwork. His immediate superiors and advisory group headquarters required frequent periodic reports, and 

the U.S. adviser often had to aid his counterpart in dealing with Vietnamese 

paperwork. The adviser was also likely to spend a good deal of his time 

traveling since the area assigned to his division or regiment was frequently 

large and its subordinate units scattered. One officer spent almost all of his 

time in travel. He was the deputy chief of the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group, a major general, who regularly visited and inspected all units in the 

field to keep General Williams informed and to ensure at least some uniformity in the training effort. 

65Ward, "Some Recollections of the U.S. Advisory Program"; Interv, author with Ward, 16 Aug 

79. 

292 
Blli/ding a Vietnamese Army 

A good deal of the adviser's effort was directed toward persuading his 

counterpart of the wisdom of certain policies, procedures, or assignments he 

wished the Vietnamese to adopt. Aided by an informal system of communications, advisers at the higher echelons would pass the word on what measures 

had been applied and in some cases aid the lower ranking adviser by persuading their Vietnamese opposites to direct their subordinates to take the desired 

action. Yet in an army where orders of superiors were frequently ignored or 

evaded, such methods were far from completely effective. 66 

At the higher policy levels the advisory group was also able to exert 

leverage through the budget review committee. Chaired by the deputy chief 

of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, the committee included the chief 

of the Combat Arms Training Organization, the heads of the advisory group's 

air force and navy sections, a representative of the ambassador, and the 

chief of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission. It conducted an annual 

review of the Vietnamese military budget in concert with Vietnamese officials. This process consumed several weeks and was sometimes used as a 

mea ns of influencing the armed forces to adopt policies favored by the 

advisory groups 67 

There was, one senior adviser recalled, much speculation over advisory 

styles. 

One of the major issues was the degree of intimacy which should exist 

between the advised and the adviser. One school of thought held that the 

American should seek to cultivate as warm and as personal a friendship with 

his counterpart as their respective personalities permitted. Another school of 

thought, usually articulated unofficially, held that the adviser should keep 

some maneuver distance between himself and his counterpart so that he 

could exercise leverage when the Vietnamese seemed reluctant to take action, 

or move in the proper direction. Obviously, such interpersonal distance was 

also useful when the American had reason to believe that his counterpart was 

involved in some shady transaction or other. Those who have argued the 

latter view, point out that an American pursuit of intimacy might lead to 

disrespect- achieve exactly the opposite of the effect intended, by causing the 

Vietnamese to regard his counterpart as less than wholly serious, or in some 

other sense, not to be taken seriously. 68 

The eleven-month tours tended to militate against adviser effectiveness. 

As one officer recalled, "A Vietnamese division commander would have an 

adviser for eleven months, and then he'd get a new one. The new one would 

have to start from the zero point again. [The Vietnamese commander] had 

heard everything before and he knew that the adviser didn't understand the 

language and that the adviser couldn't be everywhere all the time to see what 

was going on.. . He knew all about how to handle advisers.,,69 

Because the short tour separa ted an officer from his family, advisers often 

66lnterv, author with Symroski, 16 Aug 79. 

67lbid. 

6SLtr, Gorman to Chi ef of Military History, 1975, sub: Comments on Proposed Monograph: The 

U.S. Adviser. 

69lnterv, author with Symroski, 16 Aug 79. 

293 
Advice and SlI pport: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Vietnamese and U.S. Instructors 011 rifle mllge, Nila Tmllg Tmillillg Cellter. 

considered it a hardship and a nuisance. "One consequence of the short tou r 

was that we had a number of people who merely wanted to get through," 

observed one former senior adviser. "They'd spend three months getting 

oriented into their jobs and the last three months getting ready to leave.,,7o 

General Williams' principal means of evaluating and controlling the advisory effort was the Senior Advisers' Conference. This quarterly (later 

bimonthly) meeting brought together all senior advisers down through the 

division level and all school advisers. The officers sat in a U-shaped arrangement with General Williams and his deputies at the open end. Beside the 

deputy chief of the advisory group sat the Vietnamese chief of staff. An 

agenda was published in advance, and the meeting proceeded logically. The I 

Corps adviser reported first, followed by the division advisers in the corps, 

then the II Corps adviser followed by his division advisers, and on down the 

list with General Williams frequently interrupting to ask questions or share 

information.

7 1 

A former chief of the Combat Arms Training Organization observed of 

these meetings: "Looking back, I have the feeling there was a tendency to 

report things optimistically. I believe that, in a number of cases, people held 

7OIbid. with Lasche, 30 Aug 79. 

1i lbid . with Symroski, 16 Aug 79. 

294 
Bllildillg a Vietnamese Army 

back a little bit in reporting anything wrong because they feared that it wou ld 

reflect on them adversely."n Another former adviser recalled that at his first 

visit to a Senior Advisers' Conference in late 1959 he was 

shocked to hear some advisers reporting on a world I had never seen. A man 

from Mars listening to it would have believed that everything was going quite 

well. When it came Col. Miner's [Col. Russell M. Miner, senior adviser to [ 

Corps, 2d Military Region) turn to report, [ had drafted his report and in 

substance we reported that while the unit we were working with was probably as good or better than comparable units, it couldn't really punch its way 

out of a paper bag. . .. Col. Miner's report blew the lid off, General Williams was absolutely incensed. And his reason, I feel, was that since he had 

been there from the very beginning he felt any criticism was a failure on his 

part .... People were scared to death of General Williams .... People were 

afraid to speak. 73 

A more serious obstacle to obtaining an accurate picture of the Vietnamese 

Army's progress was the lack of any standard method for rating the morale 

and combat effectiveness of Vietnamese units. Each reporting officer used his 

own descriptive adjectives in eva luating his unit's effectiveness. In periodic 

reports the words excellent, exceptionally high, very high, high, good to 

excellent, fair to good, poor, fair to poor, low, lower, and average all 

appeared. No attempt was made to establish the relationship between the 

words, their order of ranking, or their precise meaning. Was satisfactory 

better than average? Was fair to poor worse than somewhat low? To complicate matters still further each adviser defined his unit differently for rating 

purposes. Some attempted to rate the unit as a whole, while others rated 

each of the component commands separately.74 

The Army Reorganizes 

The advisory group under General Williams continued to try to organize 

the scattered units of the South Vietnamese Army into division-size units 

so that divisional training and fi eld exercises could get under way. Yet few 

divisions were able to complete the entire MAAG training cycle, for the 

demands of security operations, warfare against the sects, and guard duty 

frequently intervened. 75 General Williams was even less tolerant than 

O'Oaniel of those distractions, but there was little he could do about them. 

Williams saw the organization of the South Vietnamese Army as "weak 

and inadequate" for the tasks it would have to perform. An inexperienced 

South Vietnamese general staff was attempting to control directly all separate 

n lbid. 

7:1 lbid. with Lt Col Bergen B. Hovell, 22 Apr 80, Historians files, CMH. 

74Ltr, Col L. B. Woodbury to ACSI, 12 Sep 57, sub: Morale and Combat Effectiveness of 

Vietnamese Army, OARMA 350.09, records of ACSI. 

7SMemo, Chief, TERM, for Chief, MAAG, 27 Scp 56, sub: Review and Ana lysis of MAAG 

Programs. 

295 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

battalions and regiments and all ten divisions, for there were no intermediate 

headquarters. Dividing the country into military regions, each under an army 

officer as regional commander, merely increased the confusion, for in addition to commanding military forces assigned to the regions, the regional 

commanders often attempted to assume control of other units temporarily 

operating in their areas. 76 

General Williams also disliked the structure of the divisions as devised by 

his predecessors. In particular, he wanted to do away with the territorial 

regiments and light divisions, which Generals Trapnell and O'Daniel had 

seen as valuable for maintaining internal security. Because they lacked artillery and had exceedingly austere combat service support, Williams saw no 

pOSSibility of quickly upgrading them for a regular combat role should the 

North Vietnamese launch a conventional invasion. 77 

A start on reorganization was made in the fall of 1956. The primary 

objective was to increase the effectiveness of the logistical and support elements while leaving the l50,000-man force level unchanged. To this end most 

of the territorial regiments were dissolved, and an ordnance company was 

added to each of the light divisions. Two corps headquarters were also 

created and the number of military regions increased from three to five. A 

l55-mm. howitzer battalion was formed to provide corps artillery for the two 

corps areas. The remaining spaces released by the abolition of the territorial 

regiments were used to strengthen the combat support units and to provide 

small increases for the navy and the air force. 78 

By early 1957 the advisory group was conducting studies to determine the 

most feasible type of division organization. Diem, to whom larger and more 

heavily armed units had always appealed, encouraged the advisory group to 

think in terms of heavier U.S.-type formations. Ignoring the role played by 

Trapnell and O'Daniel in creating light divisions, he declared that the French 

had been the sole influence behind their introduction "with a view toward 

making the Vietnamese military effort seem insignificant."'" 

Although Diem wanted to reorganize the army immediately into divisions 

of a single type of about 10,000 men each, General Williams insisted on first 

conducting extensive studies and field tests to determine the optimum size 

and organization for a standard division. Actual reorganization of the South 

Vietnamese Army, which began in early 1959, was not completed until the 

following year. Both the light and field divisions and most of the territorial 

regiments were abolished. In their place seven standard infantry divisions of 

10,450 men were formed, each consisting of three infantry regiments, two 

artillery battalions (one with 4.2-inch mortars), and a number of combat 

support and combat service support units. (Chart 3) 

'OUr, Williams to Adm Felix Stump, 23 Aug 57, Folder 16, Williams Papers. 

n lbid. Lt Cen Arthur G. Trudeau, 25 1u157, Williams Papers. 

78Ltr, Lt Col L. B. Woodbury to ACSI, 25 Sep 56, sub: Proposed Reorganization of the 

Vietnamese Army, 5 - 10 - 56, OARMA 350.09, records of ACSI. 

79Memo of Conversa tion Between President Diem and Cen Williams, 19 Jan 57, Williams 

Papers. 

296 
CHART 3-REORGANIZED SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY INFANTRY DIVISION, 1959 

INFANTRY 

DIVISION 

10,450 

I I I 

Pioneer HQ & HQ Transportation Signal 

Battalion Company Company Company 

Medical Ordnance Reconnaissance Quartermaster 

Company Company Company Company 

I I 

Division Infantry 

Artillery Regiment 

I 

I I 

lO5-mm. 

Howitzer 4.2" Mortar 

Battelion Battalion 

lI rc : Information compiled from U5ACGSC, Staff Study on Army Aspects of Military A5sis tan . 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

In the reorganization the 1st and 2d Field Divisions became the 1st and 2d 

Infantry Divisions, the 3d Field Division became the 5th Infantry Division, 

and the 4th Field Division became the 7th Infantry Division. The lIth and 

l3th Light Divisions were disbanded and their personnel and equipment 

assigned to the new 21st Infantry Division; the commander and staff of the 

lIth Light Division became the commanding general and headquarters elements of the new unit. The old headquarters of the l3th Light Division in Tay 

Ninh became the rear headquarters of the 21st Infantry Division. Similarly the 

14th Light Division was redesignated the 22d Infantry Division, acquiring the 

personnel and equipment of the old 12th Light Division. The final new 

division, the 23d Infantry Division, was formed from the 15th Light Division 

with elements of the 16th Light Division added. so When questioned about the 

high numeric designations of some of the new divisions, General Williams 

explained that he hoped they would "fool General Giap for a little while and 

keep them guessing up north" as to the army's true strength.

B) 

General Williams considered the new divisions to be capable of resisting a 

conventional attack from the north while maintaining internal security, able to 

fight either conventional forces or guerrillas, and well suited to the terrain 

and weather of South Vietnam. Establishing a single type of combat unit 

would also simplify maintenance, logistics, and planning for operations and 

for future military assistance requirements S2 

Although the new divisions were specifically designed to be superior in 

firepower to the units of the North Vietnamese Army, they were intended to 

fight primarily on foot in mountains, swamps, and jungles. General Williams 

maintained that "contrary to much fallacious reasoning," the soldier of the 

division had " the same foot mobility" as a guerrilla. "His individual equipment is light, extremely durable, and most effective.,,83 While the new divisions possessed a number of trucks and prime movers, those vehicles were 

intended for the divisional "tail," not for employment in operations.84 

To assertions that the new division was a carbon copy of an American 

infantry division, General Williams reacted with annoyance, denying any 

significant similarity.8S Because the American infantry division during the late 

1950s was also undergoing testing and reorganization, it would be difficult to 

make a precise comparison. The very nature of a division and the requirements for accomplishing its combat mission foreordained certain similarities. 

Thus all the technical services (engineer, Signal, medical, ordnance, quartermaster) were represented in both the American and the South Vietnamese 

SOShort Historical Sketches of the Eleven Infantry Divisions, the Airborne Division, and the 

Marine Division, Incl to Msg, Am Embassy, Saigon, to CINCPAC, 6 Feb 73, copy in Historians 

fi les, CMH. 

81Marginal comme nts by Col Nathaniel P. Ward on draft manuscript of this volume. 

82Ur, Williams to U.S. Ambassador, 1 Jun 60, sub: Training of the Republic of Vietnam Armed 

Forces, Folder 77, Williams Papers. 

83Jbid. 

84lbid. See also Interv, author with Myers, 22- 23 Feb 77. 

ssef. U.S .-Vietunm Relatious, vol. 2, pt. IV.A.4, p. 26. The authors concluded that "there were 

more similarities than differences." 

298 
Blli/ding a Vietnamese Army 

divisions, although in less strength in the latter. The American division had 

2,672 more men, and although the overall strength of the basic maneuver 

units in both divisions was almost identical, they were organized differently. 

The South Vietnamese division had three regiments of 2,450 men each, while 

the American division had five battle groups (roughly reinforced battalions) of 

1,420 men each. The South Vietnamese regiment contained three battalions of 

four compa nies each. There was no American battalion, but the battle group 

also had four companies. American artillery strength was considerably larger: 

the U.S. division had a total of seventy 4.2-inch mortars and 105-mm. howitzers as well as twelve 155-mm. howitzers. The South Vietnamese division had 

only twenty-four 4.2-inch mortars and 105-mm. howitzers. Unlike the South 

Vietnamese division, the American division had two reconnaissance troops 

(light armored vehicles), an aviation company (helicopter), two transportation 

companies with fifty armored personnel carriers each, and a medium tank 

battalion. 

Whatever the similarities or differences, the inescapable fact was that 

the new Vietnamese Army, like the old French Expeditionary Corps, 

remained a road-bound force. The soldiers themselves moved on foot, as 

General Williams emphasized, but their artillery could not; and as time 

passed Vietnamese comma nders became less and less inclined to operate 

beyond supporting range of their 4.2-inch mortars and 105-mm. howitzers.66 

In addition to seven infantry divisions, the reorganized South Vietnamese 

Army had four separate armored battalions, an airborne brigade, a marine 

group, and a helicopter squadron. The South Vietnamese Air Force had a 

fighter-bomber squadron, two C - 47 transport squadrons, and two light aircraft observation squadrons. The South Vietnamese Navy comprised 7 subchasers, 3 minesweepers, and 18 amphibious craft. 

The logistical support system of the army, also reorganized, corresponded 

closely to the U.S. general staff system with the logistics section exercising 

general supervision over the technical services in matters of logistics. The six 

technical services--engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signat and 

transportation-were generally similar to their American counterparts in function and organization but often had additional responsibilities and restrictions 

unusual to their branch of service. For example, the Quartermaster Corps had 

responsibilities for financial management; the Transportation Corps handled 

only highway transport and had no role in overall planning and coordination, 

tasks often neglected entirely.67 

In the area of logistics, members of the equipment recovery mission were 

able to bring considerable improvement in the near chaotic conditions prevailing in the wake of the French withdrawal. By late 1957, the amount of 

materiel in outside storage had been reduced to a minimum, consolidation 

and rewarehousing had been completed, shipping and receiving procedures 

along American lines had been introduced, and the spare parts and tools 

I!6lntervs, author with Dannemiller, 10 Mar 80. and w ith Forsythe, 20 Apr SO. 

87USMAAG, Vietnam, Country Statement for Vietnam as of 30 Jun 57, records of MAAG 

Vietnam. 

299 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

received from the French had been identified and inventoried. Yet at the 

beginning of 1958 American advisers still considered the South Vietnamese 

Army's logistical system "incapable of supporting the Vietnamese armed 

forces." Maintenance of equipment at all levels was below minimum U.S. 

standards, regulations were not enforced, and inspections were infrequent. 

Both officers and enlisted men lacked necessary technical training. 88 Advisers 

considered the Transportation Corps poorest of all because its organization 

and mission precluded centralized control of transportation means. The other 

technical services were considered generally adequate for peacetime, but their 

lack of trained personnel made their wartime effectiveness questionable B9 

As part of the reorganization the two corps headquarters were given 

operational control of most of the divisions, removing them from the direct 

control of the general staff. Headquarters of the I Corps, responsible for the 

area from Da Nang on the coast north to the 17th Parallel, had been activated 

on 1 June 1957, and headquarters of the II Corps, responsible for the Central 

Highlands and the coastal region from southern Quang Nam Province south 

to the town of Phan Thiet, the following October. The II Corps headquarters, 

originally at Ban Me Thuot, was moved to the town of Pleiku in the summer 

of 1959. A third provisional corps headquarters was being formed for southern Vietnam and would be activated as the 1lI Corps in September 1959. 

Between the general staff and the corps was a field command consisting of a 

commander and a small staff.90 

Williams hoped the reorganization would alleviate some of the command 

and control problems that had plagued the South Vietnamese Army from the 

start. Yet many South Vietnamese commanders and officials simply ignored 

the new chain of command as they had the old. Superiors continued to 

bypass subordinates; subordinates continued to go over the heads of superiors; and all commanders continued to issue orders to units not under their 

control. 91 

The new divisional organization reflected the advisory group's view that 

the most likely threat to South Vietnam was a North Vietnamese invasion. 

Pacific Command's Operation Plan 46 -56 provided that the chief of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group would, in the event of such an invasion, 

assume command of a new unified command, the Vietnam Defense Command, under the Commander in Chief, Pacific·2 As a subordinate commander, General Williams had prepared a supporting plan detailing measures 

for the defense of South Vietnam. Williams' plan, called CINCPAC Operation 

Plan 46A, differed from the parent plan mainly in emphasizing the importance of the high plateau in the vicinity of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me 

Thuot. The Pacific Command plan called for an all-out defense of Da Nang 

88Country Statement Report, 22 Jan 58, p. 19, records of MAAG Indochina. 

89USMAAG, Vietnam, Country Statement for Vie tnam as of 30 Jun 57. 

90First Draft Report of the Draper Study Committee, 17 Feb 59, Folder 107, p. 36, Williams 

Pa~ers; interv, author with Ward, 16 Aug 79. 

'USACGSC, Staff Study on Army Aspects of Military Assistance, p. C - 20. 

<J2See ch. 14, p. 272. 

300 
Building a Vietnamese Army 

but Williams, supported by other Pacific Army commanders, argued that 

while the Da Nang area should be held as long as possible, its defense should 

not jeopardize the high p lateau area. This difference became academic in 1959 

when the 46-series plans were superseded by others, yet throughout his 

tenure General Williams advised stationing plans for Vietnamese Army units 

which would provide the best dispositions to implement his concept for 

defense of the highlands. 93 

As fo r the Vietnamese, the reorganization and redispositions of 1956 

through 1959 had long since made their single war plan of August 1956 

obsolete, but they produced no other despite the urgings of American 

advisers. 94 President Diem's principal concern in the war planning was to 

provide for an amphibious counterattack against North Vietnam. Diem 

insisted the assault be carried out by South Vietnamese troops with allied 

forces in supporting roles. Foreign troops in North Vietnam, he said, would 

only "alienate the population ."9s 

Diem's interest in an attack on North Vietnam was more political than 

military. His plan called for South Vietnamese airborne troops to seize a 

position on the North Vietnamese coast to disrupt the enemy's adva nce but, 

more importantly, to " hold on long enough to permit the withdrawal of some 

two or three million" people into South Vietnam. He thus hoped to reenact 

his political and p ropaganda triumph of 1954 when large numbers of North 

Vietnamese had moved south . He was confident that the people of North 

Vietnam were eager to be liberated, and " in this way the Viet Minh regime 

will lose human resources which will surely affect the morale of the population.,,96 

Even after reorganization, the South Vietnamese Army still suffered from 

rampant politicization and corruption in the officer corps. "All too frequently," 

General Williams observed, "officers who are performing their duties efficiently are relieved and transferred to other duties. . the general impression 

is that the officer has incurred the ill-will of some high official. " Such practices contributed to lack of stability in key assignments throughout the army, 

lowered morale, and gave rise "to the opinion that one must have friends or 

influence in high places in order to succeed."97 

Although the readiness and effectiveness of South Vietnamese units were 

much improved over 1954, some were still unsatisfactory. After an inspection 

of the 16th Light Division in 1958, for example, an American officer reported 

93Memo, Col R. P. Davidson for ACSI, 15 Nov 57, sub: CiNCPAC Operation Plan No. 

46A 57, 381 CINCPAC - OP - 46 - A - 57, records of ACSI; PACOM MAP Country Inspecti on 

Trips, Vietnam, lncl 22A to HQ, USARPAC, ACofS G - 3, Quarterly Historical Summary, OctDec 58, copy in Historians files, CMH. 

94Ltr, Woodbury to ACSI, 25 Sep 56, sub: Proposed Reorganiza tion of the Vietnamese Army; 

interv, author with Lasche, 30 .Aug 79. 

95Record of Conversations, Ambassador Durbrow and Cen Williams with President Diem, 26 

Oct 57, Williams Papers. 

96Memo of Conversation Between President Diem and Cen W illiams, 15 Jan 57, Williams 

Pa,Eers. 

7Memo, Williams for Tran Trung Du ng, Asst Seey of State for National Defense, 31 Jul 58, sub: 

Long-Range M ilitary Planning, Folder 35, Williams Papers. 

301 
Advice m,d SlIpport: The Early Yenrs, ] 94 ] - ] 960 

that the division was 21 percent understrength and lacked half of its medical 

personnel. Leadership ability of the key command and sta ff officers was 

" relatively low." The status of training was " unsatisfactory," and only 40 

percent of the division's radio equipment was operational. 9B In the l3th Light 

Division " half the division strength is on TDY [temporary duty] or ineffective, 

overage etc." The enlisted men "wore tattered uniforms, needed hair cuts, 

lacked military bearing even when marching, and many of their weapons 

were rusty inside and OU!.,,99 

Despite these continued problems almost all American observers were 

nevertheless convinced by the late 1950s that the effort to crea te an effective 

South Vietnamese Army had succeeded . Reporter Jim G. Lucas of the ScrippsHowa rd newspapers described the army as "a crack, combat-ready force" 

with " top military schools, a small navy and air force and a tiny but rough 

Ma rine Corps." 'oo A study by the U.S. Army Command and Genera l Staff 

College in 1960 commended the advisory group for "profiting from the lessons of 1946 - 1954" and "emphasizing aggressive, hard-hitting mobile divisions with high fire-power organized to ensure close mutual suppor!. " 'o, An 

investiga tion in 1959 of the aid program in South Vietnam by the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Sta te Department Orga nization and Public Affairs blasted the American mission as " the weakest country 

team that we have met" but singled out the adviSOry group for special 

praise. 102 It was possible, declared the Arllly Tillles, that General Williams' 

advisory group was "the finest there is."'O) 

Yet within a year American leaders were to be confronted with irrefutable 

evidence of the inability of the South Vietnamese Army to assure the internal 

security of South Vietnam and a clear demonstration that it was not a reliable 

instrument of the Diem government. 

9KLtr, Col Rolin B. Durbin to Williams, 14 Feb 58, Folder 34, Williams Papers. 

~Lt , Maj Cell Samuel L. Myers to Williams, 10 Sep 57, Inel to Williams to Cen Ly Van Ty. to 

Sefc 57, Williams Papers. 

OOScripps-Howard Dispatch, 14 Dec 59, Clipping file , Williams Papers. 

101USACGSC, Staff Study o n Army Aspects of Military Assista nce, pp. 6 - 7. 

102U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on State Department 

Orga ni za ti on and Public Affairs, Silua/iol1 ill Vietl1alll, Hearings, 30 lilly 1959 (Washington, 1959). 

Williams' deputy, Maj. Gen. Sa muel L. M yers, told the committee the South Vietnamese Army 

was /lnow able to main ta in internal security and . .. should there be renewed aggression from 

the north they can give a really good account of themselves./I Ibid., p. 171. 

I03"Congress Praises Army Job," Army ThilL'S, 23 Apr 60. 

302 
16 

Roots of a New War, 1957 -1959 

By 1957 the United States appeared well on the way to achieving its aims in 

South Vietnam. The government of Ngo Dinh Diem had vanquished the 

armies of the sects a nd the Binh Xuyen and had successfully defied North 

Vietnam on the issue of national elections. In July 1955 Diem had refused 

even to consult with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the subject. 

The Republic of Vietnam, said Diem, was in no way bound by the Geneva 

Agreements. His government had declined to adhere to them and, while 

eager for a " reunification in freedom," would consider no proposals 

from a regime which subordinated the national interest to the interests of 

communism . I 

The United States had never had much enthusiasm for the elections, 

believing that North Vietnam would never permit a rea lly free expression of 

political views. 2 Privately, many American officials also acknowledged that 

even a relatively "fair" election would almost certainly result in a lopsided 

victory for North Vietnam. Its larger population and superior political organiza tion and control wou ld weigh heavily in favor of the North, as would the 

personal prestige of Ho Chi Minh and a continuing popular identification of 

the Viet Minh with nationalism.' As a State Department expert on Vietnam 

observed, the Diem government would " be campaigning against the massive 

fact of Viet Minh victory, against ubiquitous Viet Minh infiltration, and 

against the knowledge, shared even by illiterate coolies, that there would be 

no such independence as now exists had it not been for the Viet Minh. "4 

1 Tile Selin/or Grauel Editio/l of tile Pel/lagon Papers, 1 :287. 

2Sccy of State to Am Embassy, Saigon, 6 Apr 55, 7S1C.OO/4 - 655, records of Dept of State. 

3Memo, Edmund Gullion, 15 Feb 55, sub: What Next in Indochina?, Attachment to Memo, 

Jacob Beam fo r Li vingston Merchant, 17 Feb 55, same sub; Memo, Richard M. Scammon for 

Douglas MacArthur II , 21 Apr 55, sub: II Viet Nam Elections. Copics of all in Collins Papers. 

"'Memo, Gullion, 15 Feb 55, sub: What Next in Indochina? Other contemporary observers 

confirmed Gullion's view. AP Correspondent William L. Ryan estimated that !-io would get 75 

percent of the votes if elections were held. The French expert Philippe Devillers put the figure at 

80 percent. Franklin B. Weinstein, Vietnall/'s U"held EJectiolls, Data Paper no. 60 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 

Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1966), pp. 13- 14. 

303 
Advice mId Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Nevertheless, the United States could hardly oppose or openly obstruct the 

holding of nationwide elections. To do so would contradict the traditional 

American stand that nations divided against their will, such as Germany and 

Korea, should be reunited through free elections supervised by the United 

Nations. This position had been reiterated by the American representative at 

Geneva, Walter Bedell Smith. There was also the possibility that the Communists might again resort to arms if elections were denied or postponed S 

Eisenhower and his advisers never adopted a firm policy on the question 

of elections. In general, Washington leaders saw them as something to be 

delayed rather than eliminated. They counseled Diem to consult about elections, as required by the Geneva Agreements, but then to stall by insisting 

that elections be held only when, as the agreements specified, "all necessary 

conditions obtain for a free expression of national will." In the meantime the 

Diem government would presumably build up the popular support necessary 

to win the elections, should they take place 6 When Diem instead opted 

simply to have nothing to do with elections, the United States, impressed 

with his recent successes, went along with little protest. Although the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam appealed to the cochairmen of the Geneva 

Conference--Britain and the Soviet Union-and hinted at renewed military 

action if the elections were not held, the July 1956 deadline for opening 

consultations passed without incident? 

Early in 1957 Diem came to the United States aboard President Eisenhower's 

personal plane to be hailed everywhere as the savior of Southeast Asia. The 

South Vietnamese president addressed a joint session of Congress and paid a 

ceremonial visit to New York, where Mayor Robert F. Wagner pronounced 

him "a man history may yet adjudge as one of the great figures of the 

twentieth century." Senator John F. Kennedy referred to South Vietnam as 

"the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the 

arch, the finger in the dike. ,,8 The Saturday Evening Post called Diem the 

"mandarin in a sharkskin suit who's upsetting the Red timetable.',9 

Yet even while Diem was receiving those accolades in the United States, 

members of the country team in Saigon were reaching different conclusions 

about the achievements of the South Vietnamese government. During the 

fall of 1957 Ambassador Durbrow, U.S. Operations Mission Chief Leland 

Barrows, Embassy Counselor Thomas D. Bowie, and Economic Affairs Officer 

Wesley Haroldson prepared a report sharply critical of the character and 

policies of the Diem regime. They described Diem as a man unable to 

delegate responsibility: "He overrides most of his Ministers, reduces their 

5Jbid, 

6NSC 5519, U.S. Policy on All Vietnam Elections, 17 May 55, records of National Security 

Council, National Archives; Memo, Brig Cen William C. Westmoreland to Cen Maxwell Taylor, 

16 May 56, sub: U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam, CS 091 Indochina, RG 319. 

7Weinstein, Vietnam's U,,/,eld Electio"s, pp. 31 - 33. 

8Both as quoted in Frances fitzGerald, Fire in the lAke: The ViehJQmese and the Americans ;" 

Vietllam (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19n), pp. 73 and 84, respectively. 

9"The Bright Spot in Asia," Saturday Eve"illg Post, 15 September 1956, p. 4. 

304 
Roots of a New War 

authority, and assumes personal responsibility for the smallest details of 

government. He is inclined to be suspicious of others; he lacks an understanding of basic economic principles."lo Economic development and agrarian 

reform had been neglected while the president concentrated on pet projects 

related to security. In the countryside, discontent with the government was 

increasing, and internal security was expected to decline. In the more sophisticated urban areasl there was considerable resentment and fear of Diem's 

covert Can Lao Party, which, the officials noted, had managed to infiltrate 

almost all political, social welfare, journalistic, cultural, and other public 

activities. 11 

Other members of the country team including the CIA station chief and 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force attaches endorsed the report in general, but 

Williams dissented. He believed that in order to retain Diem's confidence and 

cooperation it was imperative to avoid associating with his critics and enemies. "Otherwise we would go the way of the French."12 General Williams 

also doubted that the situation was as serious as the report indicated. "The 

receipt [in Washington] of the proposed dispatch," he warned Ambassador 

Durbrow, "would unquestionably cause alarm and unnecessary concern . .. 

the reports I have seen do not indicate a state of considerable concern 

regarding internal security, the economic situation, or the executive ability of 

the government of Viet Nam:d3 In a lengthy and heated discussion with 

other members of the country team, Williams insisted that he was unable to 

"subscribe to the idea that the president was on the way to failure." Even 

after persuading the foreign service officers to moderate the tone of their 

report, he refused to conCur in its conclusion. 14 

The months to come were to show that the country team had been, if 

anything, too mild in its criticism of the Diem government. From observing 

Diem on numerous trips and inspection tours, General Williams had become 

convinced that the president was extraordinarily popular, but that popularity 

turned out to be largely a sham. 15 The American consul at Hue, for example, 

observed that the villagers who were often paraded out to participate in 

ceremonies honoring Diem and to make appropriate responses to slogans 

"have virtually no concept of what they are doing. ,,16 As a British journalist 

noted, "Diem holds the fort through the Army and the police force provided 

by U.S. [money]. It is not that the communists have done nothing because 

Diem is in power, rather Diem has remained in power because the communists have done nothing.,,17 

IOCountry Team Report, 8 Jan 58, Williams Papers. 

!lIbid. 

'21nterv, MacDonald and Luttichau with Williams, 13 Nov 70. 

t3Ltr, Williams to Ambassador Durbrow, 9 Oct 57, Folder 16, Williams Papers. 

l41bid. to Adm George W. Anderson, 9 Dec 57, Folder 16, Williams Papers. 

15lnterv, MacDonald and Luttichau with Williams, 13 Nov 70. 

16 Am Consul, Hue, to State Dept, 6 May 58, 751G.OO/5 - 658, records of Dept of State. 

17David Hotham, "South Vietnam, Shaky Bastion," New Republic, 25 November 1957. 

305 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Vietnamese Army Convoy ill the Celltml Highlands. 

The Uses of American Aid 

By the late 1950s, South Vietnam was receiving about $190 million annually in American aid, more per capita than any other country in South 

and Southeast Asia except Laos .• 8 Recently torn by war and with a primitive, 

mainly agrarian economy, Vietnam was incapable of financing any substantial 

military program. Expenditu res of the size specified in the U.S.-approved 

force levels would have constituted about 9 percent of the total gross national 

product.· 9 In 1955 the Vietnamese government collected revenues amou nting 

to only one-third of its expenditures. Even without defense spending the 

Vietnamese budget would have been in deficit; with it's massive amounts of 

foreign aid were required. Of the total of $207 million projected for the 1957 

defense budget, $187 million would have to come from the United States. [n 

1958, 84 percent of the military and 44 percent of the nonmilita ry expenditures of the Diem government were paid for by some form of American aid.'o 

Over 80 percent of the tota l aid funds went into a "commodity-import pro18Some Facts About American Aid, 1958, Incl to M emo, Chester H. Opul for Cen Williams, 10 

Sep 58, sub: USIS-USOM Material, Folder 37, Williams Papers; Robert Scigliano, Soutll Vietllflll/: 

Na /ioll VI/der Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 112. 

19Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs, 3 Aug 56, copy in 

ODCSOPS 091 Vietnam, DCSOPS records. 

2OSome Facts About America n Aid. 

306 
Roots of a New War 

gram" w hose purpose was to prevent that aid from having an inflationary 

effect on the South Vietnamese economy. Under this program the United 

States purchased various foreign cornmodities for South Vietnamese importers, using dollars o r other forei gn currencies. The importers paid fo r the 

goods in piasters, which were deposited in a "counterpa rt fund" and used to 

su pport governmental programs. More than three-quarte rs of all the aid 

received from the United States was allocated directly to the military and 

security forces 2 1 Almost 70 pe rcent was needed simply to pay the inflated 

salaries of the South Vietnamese armed forces. 22 Of the nonmilitary aid, 

agricu ltural improvement and land reform projects received only 17 pe rcent; 

hea lth, education, and industrial development received about 7 percent each; 

and social welfare and housing received 3 pe rcent. 

The bulk of the no nmilitary aid was devoted to two of Diem's favorite 

projects: developing South Vietnamese settlements in the Central Highlands 

and building a secondary road system to connect the highlands with the more 

populous coastal a reas and the cities of central Vietnam with those in the 

south . Diem believed that roads in the highland s wou ld open remote areas to 

development, which in itself might dete r g ue rrillas from establishing base 

areas in the region, but which would also fa cili tate his own military ope rations aga inst gue rrilla forces. He was especially in terested in linking the town 

of Kontum in the hig hla nds with the town of Pakse in Laos and connecting 

Kontum with Da Nang and Hue alo ng the coast, thereby openi ng up areas 

whe re residual elements of the Viet Minh we re thought to be active. South 

Vietnamese Army engineers were almost continuously occupied in the roadbuilding projects throughout the late 1950s. 23 

General Williams supported the road-building program into the highlands 

beca use it fit Ame rica n military contingency plans. Operation Plan 46A envisioned the Mekong va lley as the main enemy route of invasio n and the 

Central Hig hlands as the critical theater of war. '" Pakse and the Platea u des 

Bolovans inside Laos, Williams noted, constituted a "stoppe r that controls the 

whole Mekong Valley." In the event of a war between North and South 

Vietnam, holding that area would be a first step in preventing movement 

down the Mekong. 25 Williams also felt that road construction provided va luable training for the army's engineer unit. 

Members of the U.S. Operations Mission were skeptica l of the value of 

Diem's " bunch of low-grade milita ry roads into the bus h." Viewing the 

question from the perspective of economic rather than mili tary requirements, 

the Operations Mission wa nted to concentrate on rebuilding Route 1, the 

main no rth-south coastal highway, and particularly on providing it with 

first-class bridges. 26 The road-building program thu s became anothe r source 

21Scigliano, SOlltll Vietlllllll, pp. 112 - 13. 

22First Draft Report of the Draper Stud y Committee, 17 Feb 59, Folder 107, Williams Pape rs. 

2:'1Memo, Acting Chief, MAAC (Maj Cen S. L. Myers), for Lela nd Barrows, 30 Jan 58, sub: 

Confe re nce With the President, Folder 37, Williams Papers. 

24See ch. 12. 

2sFirst Draft Repo rt of the Draper Study Committee, 17 Feb 59. 

26lnterv, author with Barrows, 27 Ju176. 

307 
Advice alld Support: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

of controversy between the Military Assistance Advisory Group and other 

elements of the country team, a controversy complicated by the fact that the 

members of the advisory group felt constrained for security reasons not to 

discuss the military implications of the road system with their colleagues. 

Diem's second project, settling lowland South Vietnamese in the Central 

Highlands bordering on Cambodia and Laos, was also motivated in part by 

considerations of national security. He hoped to develop a network of fortified villages or "development centers" along the border to bar guerrilla 

infiltration from Laos and Cambodia. At the same time he expected the 

hlghland settlements to provide opportunities for landless peasants from the 

lowlands and refugees from North Vietnam to become small proprietors. 

Diem even had visions of the settlements raising a cash crop, such as rubber, 

for export. By the end of 1959 about 210,000 people had been resettled in 147 

centers scattered throughout the Central Highlands. 27 

While Diem was intensely interested in the highlands, he cared little about 

the native highlanders, ethnically distinct tribes who had long inhabited the 

region. Called Montagnards by the French, the tribal peoples were to the 

lowland Vietnamese little better than savages (IIIOi) . (Diem confided to General Williams that " mountain people are very lazy and don't like to work.,,)2s 

The Montagnards in turn felt a strong animosity toward the Vietnamese. 

Except in such towns as Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot, few ethnic 

Vietnamese had ever lived in the highlands; when they began to arrive under 

Diem's program, the Montagnards strongly resented the incursion . Aside 

from what the Montagnards saw as Vietnamese condescension and heavyhanded attempts to "civilize" them, they objected to large-sca le land-grabs by 

the South Vietnamese government to provide land for the settlers. By late 

1958 the CIA was reporting "mounting discontent among tribal groups in the 

highlands.,,29 The Vietnamese settlers were almost as unhappy. They often 

found that the land granted them was infertile or difficult to cultivate, and 

they suffered severely from an especially virulent form of malaria, faiciparlllll, 

which was prevalent in the highlands and against which the lowlanders had 

built up no immunity.30 

Land Reform 

Although Amerian civilian officials were critical of both the road-building 

.ftand resettlement projects, they pointed with pride to another South 

Vietnamese program: land reform. In the summer of 1959, for example, 

Ambassador Durbrow told a U.S. Senate subcommittee that the South Viet27Scigliano, Soulll Vietllam , p. 105. 

28WilIiams, Memorandum of Conversati ons With President Diem, 11 Oct 58, Williams Papers; 

Interv, author with Gerald C. Hickey. former member of Michigan State University Advisory 

Team, 21 Apr 76, Historians files, CMH . 

29Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 16 Oct 58, pt. 2, p. 12, copy in CMH; Ward, marginal 

comments on draft manuscript. 

JOBernard B. Fall. "South Vietnam's Internal Problems," Pacific Affairs. February 1958, p. 252; 

Intcrv, author with Hickey, 21 Apr 76. 

308 
Roots of a New War 

namese government was carrying ou t " the largest land reform program in 

Asia. ,,31 

Land reform was clearly a subject of importance in a country where 75 to 

80 percent of the population lived in rural areas and large land holdings by 

absentee landlords were commonplace. The problem was most acute in the 

Mekong Delta region, where a majority of the rural population owned no 

land and a small but extremely wealthy class of absentee landlords held much 

of the fertile land. Most peasants rented land on a sharecropping basis, 

with the drawbacks attendant to such a system. To a landlord who provided 

no credit, seed, or fertilizer, the peasant paid one-third to one-half of the 

expected yield; in the event of crop failure, the landlord still had the right to 

demand his share of the normal yield. 32 

During the long war against the French, the Viet Minh had driven away 

or killed many landlords and turned over their land to the poorer peasants. 

Instead of accepting that situation, the Diem government restored land to the 

landlords and then tried to regulate the extent of their landholdings and the 

landlord-tenant relationship.33 In 1955 the Diem government passed an ordinance setting a maximum of 15 to 25 percent of a crop as the lawful rent, and 

the following year limited individual landholdings to 247 acres. Acreage 

exceeding that maximum was to be purchased by the government and sold in 

small parcels to tenants, laborers, and other landless persons. Whether or not 

this constituted " the largest land reform program in Asia," it was certainly 

one of the most conservative. Landlords were allowed to select the lands to 

be retained, and the 247-acre limit was far greater than that allowed in Japan 

or Korea . In many provinces peasa nts were granted the right to purchase 

land that they had already been given by the Viet Minh. Although the 

government established loans to enable penniless peasants to buy land, its 

rigorous enforcement of repayment provisions often resulted in hardship. In 

Kien Phong Province, for example, farmers were forced to sell their rice at 

slump prices to meet loan payments. One farmer was reportedly " placed in a 

cage too sma ll to stand up in and had to remain there until his wife sold their 

oxen" to pay the 10an. 34 

The implementation of the land reform program was so ensnarled in red 

tape and legalisms that in many areas relatively little land actually changed 

hands. In one province in the Mekong Delta, the first land redistribution took 

place only in 1958, almost two years after the land reform law was established. 35 A 1960 census showed that only 23 percent of the farmers in the 

31Testimony of Elbridge Ourbrow, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 

Slate Department Organization and Public Affairs, Situation ill Vietllam, Hcarill8s, 30 - 31 III/59, p. 

7. 

32Roy F. Prosterman, "L1nd Reform in Vietnam," Curren t History 57 (December 1969):330 - 31; 

Jeffrey Race, War Comes to LOllg All: Revolutiol/ary COllfliet ill a Vietllamese Provillce (Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1972), p. 7. 

33Prosterman, "Land Reform," p. 332. 

3-'ClA Field Intel Rpt, CS 3/405,784, 22 Jul 56, sub: Security Situation in Kicn Phuong Province, 

cops\' ;n CMH . 

Race, War Comes to Lollg All, p. 59. 

309 
Adv ice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Mekong Delta owned any land at all, and about 56 percent of those lived on 

two-acre farms, one acre of w hich was rented. 36 

Communist Strategy After Geneva 

Aside from the government's failure in land reform, rural residents were 

also affected adversely by a strongly promoted "anti-Communist campaign" mounted during 1955 and 1956 against known and suspected members and ex-members of the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh leaders had left 

Geneva confident that Vietnam would soon be unified under their control 

either through the scheduled elections or through the precipitate collapse of 

the South Vietnamese government. 37 Following the Geneva Confe rence the 

Communist leadership began actively to prepare for a campaign of politica l 

agitation and propaga ndizing in the South. They summoned many former 

Viet Minh soldiers and cadres to regroup in North Vietnam while those who 

remained behind, an estimated 10,000 active agents, began to agitate for 

elections and reunion with the North. Mass meetings in the villages were 

organized by Communist cadres who harangued the crowds about " the victory of Geneva." In many villages in the south and southwest, photos of Ho 

Chi Minh and copies of the Geneva Agreements appeared on the wa ll of 

every house. In Saigon and other large cities the insurgents made a determined effort to win over non-Communist leftists, students, and intellectuals 

through such ostensibly patriotic orga nizations as the Saigon-Cholon Peace 

Movement. 38 

The Diem government responded with the Anti-Communist Denunciation 

Campaign and with armed action against Viet Minh - led organ izations and 

demonstrations. Although the campaign did considerable damage to the Viet 

Minh's civilian infrastructure, it was conducted in such a brutal, corrupt, and 

capricious manner that it aliena ted large segments of the population .'9 Even 

.36Prosterman, "La nd Reform," p. 131. 

37Carl yle A. Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary O rganizations and the Vietnam 

Workers' Party: Continuity and Change, 1954 - 1974," in Joseph J. Zasloff and McAlister Brown, 

COllllIIUllislII ill II/doellillfl (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975); Weinstein, Vietllam's Ullheld 

Electiolls, pp. 17 - 18. P. ]. Honey believed that the Vietnamese Communist leade rship never 

expec ted elections to occur and were "bitterly disappointed at the outcome of the Geneva 

Conference" but later asserted that the Communist leaders "based their hopes fo r national 

reunification upon the collapse of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime." "North Vietnam's Model of 

Strategy and Tactics for Revo lution," in George Pisnenny and Alexei Akimenbro, eds., St/ldies Oil 

the Sovief Ullioll, 1966, vol. 6, no. 2, p. to. All agreed that neither the North Vietnamese nor any 

of the other conferees at Geneva foresaw the emergence of a rela tively strong, stable, and unified 

government in the south so soon after the close o f the conference . 

38Situation in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam Provinces, 20 Sep 54, ibid . in Thua 

Thien and Quang Na m Provinces, 16 Oct 54, and Vietminh Impla ntations and Administration in 

South Vietnam, 17 Dec 54, all in OARMA to ACSI, 28 May 55, 5 - 6 - 55, records of ACSI; New 

York Times, 29 Sep 54 and 13 Mar 55; Expe ri ences of the South Vietnam Revoluti onary Movement During the Pa st Several Years (document captured by U.s. 1st lnf Div, Jan 66), copy in 

Historians files, CM H, pp. 1 - 4; Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations," 

pp.34 - 36. 

39David Ho tham estimated that over 14,000 persons we re nrrcsted in a single year in the central 

provinces "without evidence and without tria!." Hotha m, "South Vietnam, Shaky Ba stion ." 

310 
Roots of a New War 

former members of the Communist Party w ho were inactive or no longer 

loyal to the Viet Min h and former Viet Minh who had never been Communists were harassed, arrested, and in some cases executed . In some areas, 

families with sons who had gone to North Vietnam following the Geneva 

Agreements or who had relatives involved in insurgent activities were also 

affected. "Not only were local officials and police agents frequently incompetent at singling out the active Viet Minh agents, but many were also 

arrogant and venal in the execution of their tasks and by their offensive 

behavior generated sympathy for the Viet Minh. "4o In one province, villagers 

could be jailed simply for having been in a rebel district. The people especially resented a curfew, which hampered fishermen and farmers, and a 

compulsory unpaid labor program to improve roads and perform other public 

works. 41 

Despite the disruption to Communist Party orga nizations in many hamlets 

and districts, party cadres and innocent victims of the purges could often 

make their way to jungle, swamp, or mountain areas where they easily 

evaded government forces42 By alienating large numbers of non-Communist 

and neutral peasants, the heavy-handed campaign also made it easy for the 

Viet Minh to rebuild the ir organizations and recruit new members. 

Nevertheless, the campaign's short-run impact on the Communist apparatus in South Vietnam was severe. By ea rly 1955 most Viet Minh cadres who 

had escaped arrest had been driven underground, and Communist-organized 

demonstrations had become infrequent. 43 With many of its military forces 

regrouped in the North the party was in a poor position to meet the vigorous 

onslaught of the South Vietnamese government. 

Pressure from the Diem government, combined with disappointment at 

the cancellation of the hoped-for elections, probably led to a decline in 

membership and morale in the party. At a meeting of top party leaders in the 

South in March 1956 Le Duan, Secretary of the Central Committee's Directorate for South Vietnam, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the North Vietnamese government's policy, which emphasized political agitation in the 

South and diplomatic pressu re on the former Geneva conferees. The only 

way to achieve reunification, said Le Duan, was to wage armed struggle 

against the Diem regime. 44 

Yet in 1956 many North Vietnamese leaders were reluctant to become 

40J. J. Zasloff, Origills of tlie Illsurgency ill SOllth Viefnam, 1954 - 1960: Tile Role of lite SOlltilem 

endres, Rand Memorandum, RM 5163/Z*ISAJA RPA (Santa Monica: Rand, 1968), pp. 9 - 10. 

"ICIA Field Intel Rpt, CS 3/405,784, 22 Jul 56, sub: Security Situation in Kien Phuong Province, 

c0.f!. in CMH . 

IbId., p. 17; Race, Wnr Comes to LOllg All, p. 4l. 

4JSituation in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam Provinces, 8 Jan 55, Inel to OARMA to 

ACSI, 28 May 55, 5 - 6 - 55, records of ACSl; Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary 

O~a ni 7. ation s," p. 36. 

Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Orga nizations," p. 37; U.s. Department of 

State, Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam, item 18: 

Interrogation of a Former Vie t Minh Cadre, and item 19: Translation of a Docu ment Found on 

the Person of a Political O fficer With the Communist Forces in Zone 9, copies in H istorians files, 

CMH . 

311 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

involved in a renewed war, wanting first to "build socialism" in North 

Vietnam. War wou ld retard development and would carry with it a risk of 

American intervention. Communist leaders in South Vie tnam continued to 

object to that policy, preferring to proceed with overthrowing the Diem 

regime before Diem became fu lly established ." 

Finally Le Duan offered a compromise. In a pamphlet entitled On the 

Revolution ill Sou th Vietnam he argued for a long-term approach to the problem 

of South Vietnam which, while continuing political agitation and subversion, 

would also lay the groundwork for a future armed uprising against Diem. Le 

Duan's arguments were favora bly received at the Eleventh Plenum of the 

Central Committee in December 1956. 46 

By 1957, when Le Duan was reca lled to fill a senior party position in 

North Vietnam, a campaign of terrorism and subversion had begun in the 

South without direct support from the North. During much of this time, 

Communist units consciously avoided contact with government forces, concentrating instead upon tnt gian ("the extermination of traitors"), a systematic 

program of assassination of government officials and anyone considered an 

obstacle to the movement. 47 In some provinces special assassination squads of 

about half a dozen men were formed solely for this purpose." Any village 

official or government fun ctionary was considered a legitimate target for tnt 

gian. " In principle,"explained a former party leader in Dinh Tuong Province, 

" the Party tried to kill any [government] official who enjoyed the people's 

sympa thy and left the bad officials unharmed in order to wage propaganda 

and sow hatred against the government. "49 At times the insurgents terrorized 

or executed even persons known to be innocent of any pro-government activity to encourage anxiety and distrust among the villages. 50 

In many regions tnt gian took the form of a three-phase campaign. First, 

village notables and officials would be subjected to propaganda attacks and 

warned to cease "oppressing the people" (that is, obey the party). Those who 

proved recalcitrant would then be kid napped or intimidated, while those 

judged most dangerous were murdered .'l In some areas threats or a single 

4'sOA Intel Rpl, No. 04870 0, 2 Feb 70, sub: Hanoi's Leaders and Ihe Divisions Over War 

Policy, 1956 - 1968, copy in CMH. 

46Experiences of the South Vietnam Revolutionary Movement, pp. 4 -5. William J. Duiker, Tile 

COlI/ lI/ul/ist Road to Power ill Viet1lam (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 177 - 80. Du iker 

believes that Le Duan's pamphlet was in tended not onl y to convince members of the Central 

Committee in the North bu t also some segme nts of the southern leadership who still believed in 

"the validity of the line o f peaceful struggle and the pOSSibility of reu nification elections." See 

palie 180. 'Race, War Comes to umg All, pp. 81- 84. 

48ARVN Intel Rpt, 3 Apr 57, Attachment to Lt r, OARMA to ACSI. 23 Jun 59, records o f ACSI. 

49WiIliam R. Andrews, Tile Village War: Viet llam Communist Revolutionary Activities ill Oillil Tuong 

Provillce, 1960 - 1964 (Columbia: Unive rsity of Missouri Press, 1973), p. 59. 

5OIbid ., pp. 57 - 58; Ru ssell H. Bates, Viet COIIg Village COlltrol (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 

pp. 25 - 26; W. P. Davison, Some Observatiolls Oil Viet Cong Operatiolls ill the Villages, Rand 

Memorandum, RMS 267/2 - 5A (Santa Monica: Rand, 1968), pp. 24 - 37. 

5lLtr, OARMA to ACSI, 30 Mar 57, sub: ARVN Intel Rpts, Feb-Mar 57,5 - 12 - 57, OARMA 

350.09, records o f ACSI. 

312 
Roots of a New War 

murder was sufficient to bring villages under party control. In others the 

party ruthlessly murdered entire families to achieve its aims. 52 

Along with assassination and intimidation went continued political organization and agitation. The party set up all-embracing groups such as the 

Farmers' Liberation Organization, the Vietnam-Cambodian Buddhist Association, the Association of Ten Year Combatants, and various youth movements 

to spread propaganda and act as a cover for its activities.53 The Communists 

also attempted to subvert or neutralize the government's military and paramilitary forces. Antidraft demonstrations were organized, false rumors circulated, and new recruits encouraged to desert. Occasionally entire squads or 

platoons of local militia went over to the Communist side, bringing their 

weapons with them. 54 

In keeping with Le Duan's policy the party emphasized rebuilding and 

consolidating its political and military apparatus in preparation for a future 

showdown with Diem. In the interim much of the actual fighting was undertaken by armed remnants of the sects. 55 Some of these bands had long since 

surrendered or come over to the government, but the remainder had been 

effectively infiltrated by the Communists who reportedly assigned scores of 

cadres to rearm, resupply, and retrain the sect forces. 56 Although they continued to operate under their old names, most sect units were effectively under 

Communist control by early 1957. 57 In Tay Ninh Province, for example, 

several hundred former Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen armed partisans had been 

formed into a force called Binh Doan ("Inter-Army"), ostensibly led by a Binh 

Xuyen chieftain but actually controlled by the chieftain's " political adviser," a 

Communist. 58 In An Xuyen Province an uncooperative Hoa Hao battalion 

commander was reportedly assassinated by the CommunistsS9 By May 1958 

Vietnamese Army intelligence analysts considered all remaining armed sects 

to be Communist led. 60 

During 1957 and 1958 the sect bands were among the most aggressive 

Communist forces. In July a Hoa Hao battalion became involved in a battle 

with contingents of a South Vietnamese division, and later in the month a 

Hoa Hao band raided the town of Chau Duc, killing seventeen persons in the 

ensuing skirmish 6 ! Other clashes occurred in Ha Tien Province and in Binh 

Hoa, where a Binh Xuyen battalion of about a hundred men raided an 

52Andrews, Tile Village War, pp. 56 - 57. 

5Jlbid.; USMAAG, Vietnam, Country Statement for Vietnam, 30 Jlln 57. 

54ARVN Intel Rpt for Jan-Feb 57, Attachment to OARMA to ACSI, 28 Feb 57, 5 - 6 - 57, 

OARMA 350.09; ibid. for Mar 57, Attachment to Ltr, OARMA to ACSI, 30 Mar 57, sub: ARVN 

Intel Rpts, Feb-Mar 57,5 - 12 - 57, OARMA 350.09. Both in records of ACSI. 

55'J'hayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations," p. 35. 

56ARVN Intel Rpt for Jan-Feb 57, Attachment to OARMA to ACSr, 28 Feb 57, 5 - 6 - 57, 

OARMA 350.09, records of ACSL 

57Ibid.; Race, War Comes to Long All, p. 36. 

58CIA Field Intel Rpt, CS 3/380,436, 11 Dec 58, sub: Armed Communists and Dissidents in Tay 

Ninh, copy in CMH. 

59Msg, USARMA, Saigon, to Dept o f Army, 071038z Mar 58, records of ACSI. 

6OIbid., 091040z Mar 58, records of ACSl. 

61Memo of Conversation, Williams with President Diem, 15 Nov 57, Williams Papers. 

313 
MApS 

• Ball Mt T/ruol 

MAJOR VIET CONG ACTIVITY 

.-

1957-1959 

Military Regions 

Firefight 

o 100 MILES 

!--.,----'-r-,.J-' I -,-....L' I _~I 

o 100 KILOMETERS 
Roots of a New War 

agricultural center and captured some small arms with little resistance from 

government forces. Another Binh Xuyen battalion with over 300 uniformed, 

well-armed men raided the Minh Thanh Rubber Plantation in southern Binh 

Long Province, causing the government to divert two entire army divisions to 

operations again st ith2 (Map 8) 

The most spectacular military action of the period occurred on the night of 

10 August 1958, when a force of about 400 men raid ed the large Michelin 

Rubber Plantation north of Saigon. The site was defended by local security 

forces and a company of Vietnamese Army troops-over 200 men. Nevertheless the raiders, led by a Binh Xuyen commander with Communist advisers, 

achieved complete surprise and made off with over a hundred weapons and 5 

million piasters (some $143,000) from the plantation's sa fes. Subsequent investigation revealed that the army company had failed to take even the most 

elementary security preca ution s and had been unable to call for reinforcements beca use between 2200 and 0600 the radio net was inoperative63 The 

Communists also achieved a significant psychological success by paying their 

own visit to a plantation the president had inspected less than a week before 

and struck a heavy blow at the government's efforts to step up rubber 

production. The president was reported to be "deeply perturbed" over the 

raid. 64 

Incidents involving insurgents increased throughout 1957 and into 1958. 

During January 1957, Communist guerrillas clashed with South Vietnamese 

Army troops seven times in the Mekong Delta provinces. The following 

month a Viet Cong force of about thirty men attacked a government civic 

action team in the village of Tri Binh, fifteen miles south of Tay Nin h; the 

entire team was killed or wounded, and the loca l government militia force 

took no action against the raiders6s During a single month in the autumn of 

1957, 22 village notables and other loca l government officials were killed or 

wounded by the Viet Cong, 6 village chiefs were killed , and 11 members of 

local militia were killed and 14 kidnapped. 66 During the last quarter of 1957 

some 140 armed attacks and terrorist acts were reported throughout the 

country in addition to more than 50 skirmishes initiated by government 

troops or security forces. Terrorists wounded, assassinated, or killed at least 

74 persons, including 20 government officials and 31 police and security 

personnel. 67 

The Communists concentrated the ir armed activities in the southern provinces, mainly in the more rugged and inaccessible region along the Cambo62ARVN Jn tel Rpt for Feb 57, Attachment to OARMA to ACS1, 28 Feb 57, 5 - 6 - 57, OARMA 

350.09; Msg. USARMA, Saigon, to Dept of Army, 100921z Feb 58; ibid ., 120316z May 58. All in 

records of ACSI. 

&JUr. Williams to Col Elisha Peckham, 28 Aug 58, Folder 35, Williams Papers; Am Embassy, 

Sai~o , to Seey of State, 13 A ug 58, copy in records of ACSI. 

f>' Am Embassy, Saigon, to Seey of State, 14 Aug 58, records of Dept of State. 

65M sg, Chief, MAAG, to ClNCPAC, 28 Feb 57, Williams Papers; Ltr, OARMA to ACSL 28 Feb 

57,5 - 6 - 57, OARMA 350.09, records of ACSI. 

66Memo of Conversation, Williams with President Diem, 15 Nov 57, Williams Papers. 

67Nationallntelligence Survey, South Vietnam, N IS 430, sec. 57, pp. 11 - 12, copy in Historians 

files, CMI-I. 

315 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

dian border where the terrain favored concea lment and ambush. Toward late 

1957 and ea rly 1958 an increasing number of incidents were also reported on 

the outskirts of medium-sized towns such as Tan An, Can Tho, My Tho, Soc 

Trang, Rach Gia, and Ca Mau .

68 Although the insurgents were either new 

recruits to or veterans of the Viet Minh, the Diem government for propaganda purposes renamed them Viet Cong, a derogatory term meaning Vietnamese Communists. By mid-1957 the name had come into general use. 

Problems of Intelligence 

Despite those developments and other signs that the tempo of insurgent activity was quickening, General Williams saw no reason for alarm. 

"There are no indications of a resumption of large-scale guerrilla warfare at 

this date," he told Ambassador Durbrow at the end of 1957. "They [the Viet 

Cong] lack sufficient strength, do not have a popular base and are faced with 

a central government whose efficiency to deal with the subversion threa t has 

gradually improved since its inception ." He estimated the Viet Cong's combat 

strength in the central provinces at no more than 1,000 including sect forces, 

plus around 200 political and propaganda cadres·9 Williams made this assessment of the situation based on the limited information available to him. The 

Military Assistance Advisory Group had no intelligence unit, so that in the 

main General Williams had to depend on South Vietnamese sources for 

information about the insurgents?O 

The whole matter of intelligence in Vietnam was a complicated and vexing 

one and, like so many other problems, was closely related to bureaucratic 

rivalries within the country team and to the peculiarities of the Diem regime. 

As in other areas of Vietnamese government activity, intelligence functions 

were divided among a number of agencies. The Central Intelligence Agency 

identified six major and several lesser intelligence-collecting groups within 

the Diem government "competing, duplicating, thrusting and nullifying 

each other's efforts through lack of centralized co-ordination. ,,71 Within the 

Vietnamese military, regional and division commanders frequently operated 

their intelligence systems with little or no operational coordination or control 

by the army general staff or Ministry of Defense. American advisers suspected that some of these numerous intelligence networks were actually 

exploiting the same informants, but since the Vietnamese lacked an informant 

control system it was impossible to be suren 

bSIbid ., p. 12. 

69Ltr, Williams to Ambassador Durbrow, 10 Dec 57, Folder 18, Williams Papers. 

7OInte rv, MacDonald and Luttichau with Williams, 13 Nov 70. 

710eputy D irector of CIA to ACSI, 23 Jun 60, sub: Coordination of U.S Army Plans (or 

Vietnam, ACSI 6249VN, records of ACSI. 

72Memo for CO, U.S. Army Assista nce Group, 22 Sep 60, sub: Intelligence Community in 

South Vietnam, Incl 2 to CO, 902d CFC Cp, to Chief, Security Div, OACSI, 29 Sep 60, sub: 

te ct n Rpt, Vie tnamese Army Training, ACSI 6249VN, records of ACSI. 

316 
Roots of a New War 

The National Security Act of 1947 had given the newly created Central 

Intelligence Agency responsibility for coordination of all U.S. clandestine 

intelligence activities abroad. During the 1950s the National Security Council 

progressively strengthened CIA control over clandestine operations until, by 

1958, the agency had " primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities 

abroad." Other departments were permitted to conduct "supplementary" 

operations as required but only subject to coordination by the CIA?) 

Army commanders in the Far East, at all levels, were unhappy with this 

state of affairs. They believed that the Central Intelligence Agency was not 

providing the detailed military information about their potential antagonists 

that they needed to carry out their mission. 74 Pacific Command contingency 

planning ca lled for General Williams to head a unified command in Vietnam 

in the event of war. He was therefore eager to obtain accurate and timely 

information on the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, such 

as detailed orders of battle, tables of organization and equipment of divisions, 

and data on training methods, logistics, and key personalities. These intelligence requirements had been levied on the CIA's Saigon station, but Genera l 

Williams complained that the station was failing to furnish him with the 

desired information?5 

Since 1954 CIA attempts to conduct effective clandestine intelligence operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had met with only indifferen t success. North Vietnamese security forces had quickly neutralized the 

"stay behind" agents planted after the Geneva Agreements and had thwarted 

a high percentage of penetration efforts directed against North Vietnamese 

targets. The lack of any legal trade or travel between the two Vietnams 

severely limited the opportunities to put agents in the North. The preoccupation of South Vietnamese intelligence agencies with local Communists and 

dissidents also militated against penetrating North Vietnam?6 

While General Williams' complaints were focused on the lack of information about North Vietnam, the CIA's lack of success in this regard also 

hindered efforts to acquire an accurate picture of Communist insurgent operations. General Isaac D. White, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, 

described CIA intelligence on Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam as " inadequate in almost all areas of command interest" particularly in rega rd to 

strength, dispositions, leadership, equipment, and tactics?? Generals Williams 

and White were also concerned about the need to provide the Vietnamese 

general staff G- 2 with a ca pability to conduct cland estine intelligence opera73Memo fo r ACSI, 6 Feb 60, sub: Centralization of Clandestine Intelligence, ACSI 570, records 

of ACSI. 

14Msg, ClNCUSARPAC to ACSI, 102225z Aug 60, Vietnam Training file, records of ACSI. 

7SMemo, Ch, MAAG, for ClNCPAC, 1 Oct 59, sub: Field Operations Intelligence Training for 

ARVN G - 2 Personnel, ACSI, 6249VN, records of ACSI. 

76MFR, Maj J. Buffkin, 11 Aug 59, sub: Discussions With CIA Representatives Regarding 

Vietnam; MFR, Lt Col W ,C. Silva, 10 1ul 58, sub: Conference With CAS Representatives, Incl to 

Memo, ACAS G - 2, USARPAC (Brig Cen Paul H. Draper), for ACSI, 23 Jul 58, sub: 

USACRAPAC-CIA Coordination on Vietnam Intelligence Training. All in ACSI 6249VN, records 

of ACSI. 

" M'g, CINCUSARPAC to ACSI102225z Aug 60. 

317 
Advice alld S"pport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

tions in wartime. Personnel had to be trained for those operations, usually 

ca lled fi eld operations intelligence, during peace time?" 

As early as 1956 the assistant chief of staff for intelligence had been 

aware of the need to improve intelligence capabilities in countries adjacent to 

the Communist nations. His solution was to establis h intelligence training 

teams in these countries to provide planning assistance, training, and operational guidance to the host country's armed forces in the conduct of clandestine intelligence activities. Army intelligence planne rs had proposed such a 

program for Vie tnam in Decembe r 1956 and even sent Gene ral Williams a 

sample letter that the government of Vietnam might use in requesting such 

assistance. But General Williams was unsuccessful in pe rsuading President 

Diem to sign the le tter, and efforts to broach the subject with the Vietnamese 

head of state during his 1957 visit to Washington also had fail ed. 79 

The matter was not raised again until January 1958 when the problem of 

providing better intelligence cove rage for Vietnam was discussed at a U.S. 

Army, Pacific, Commander's Conference. Genera l Williams and other conferees agreed that sending a U.S. Army field operations intelligence team to 

Saigon would be the best way to meet that requirement. Such a team could 

function in two capacities, training the Vietnamese Army in clandestine 

intelligence and improving the intelligence "take" for both the Milita ry Assistance Advisory Group and the U.S. Army, Pacific. General Williams intend ed 

to provide three to five personnel spaces for a field operations intelligence 

team within the advisory group's already existing Combat Intelligence Training Unit. If President Diem agreed to the program, the U.S. Army would 

train selected Vietnamese Army intelligence personnel in clandestine operations in Okinawa, Hawaii, or Japan.

80 

As a start Williams suggested that Diem send two key South Vietnamese 

Army intelligence officers to Japan for a ten-day orientation on plans to 

develop the army's clandestine intelligence capability. The president appeared 

receptive to this idea, and in late April two Vietnamese officers arrived in 

Japan for discussions and orientation in the functioning of a field operations intelligence unit 8 1 While the Vie tnamese officers were in Japan plans 

proceeded for establishment of a U.S. field operations intelligence team in 

Vietnam. But these plans came to an abrupt halt when Central Intelligence 

Agency officers in Vietnam and Japa n protested that clandestine intelligence 

training was a CIA responsibility and that Williams' invitation to the two 

officers had disrupted their own efforts in Saigon. 

78Ibid.; 10 CQU5ACRAPAC, 0800lOz Nov 59, ACSI 6249VN, records of ACSI. 

79Memo, Brig Gen William R. Frederick for Ch, MAAG, 19 Dec 56, inclosing Draft Copy of 

Letter Presented to President Diem, ACSI 6249VN; M sg, USARMA, Saigon, to Dept of Army for 

ACSI, 070248z Dec 56, ACSI 6231 Indonesia; Memo, Maj Cen R. A. Schow (or Acting ACSI, 13 

May 57, sub: Intelligence Training (or Vietnam Armed Forces, ACSI 6231 Indonesia. All in 

records of ACSI. 

fIOMsg, C1NCUSA RPAC to Dept of Army for ACSI, 220259z Feb 58, ACSI 6249VN, records of 

ACSI. 

'U lbid.; sa me to ACSJ, 23 1902z Apr 58, ACSI 6249VN, and to Dept of Army, OHJ036z May 58, 

ACSI 6231 Indonesia, both in records of ACSI. 

318 
Roots of a New War 

The CIA claimed that it had been negotiating for a number of months with 

the Vietnamese government about the establishment of a clandestine training 

program for the Vietnamese Army. The main point of dispute concerned 

control of covert operations, with the Vietnamese desiring to direct their own 

opera tions and the CIA insisting on joint control. Just when it appeared to 

the CIA that the Vietnamese were willing to compromise, the U.S. Army, by 

its proposal for intelligence training, had offered the Vietnamese the opportunity to bargain and to playoff one U.S. agency against anotherS2 The Central 

Intelligence Agency had no objection to a fi eld operations intell igence training 

team in the Military Assistance Advisory Group, prov ided that any actual 

operations were coordinated in detail with the CIA Saigon station.

83 

General Williams and U.S. Army, Pacific, intelligence officers doubted 

that the CIA had really had an alternative training program near fruition; 

they expressed annoyance that the CIA station chief had failed to contact 

the advisory group before the two Vietnamese officers departed for Japan 

even though he had been fu lly aware of their plans. They noted that Vietnamese officers complained that CIA intelligence advisers spent most of 

their time operating rather than instructing and pointed out that, as designated area commander, Genera l Williams had a right to try to ensure that 

the Vietnamese Army had the resources to ca rry out its assigned wartime 

mission.

S4 

Whatever the merits of the case, a request from President Diem for Army 

field operations intelligence training fa iled to materialize, and in August 1958 

the CIA station chief informed Genera l Williams that he had concluded a 

satisfactory arrangement w ith the Vietnamese government for clandestine 

training and operations. Yet for many months Generals Williams and White 

continu ed to express dissa tisfaction with the quality and quantity of intelligence they were receiving from the CIAsS 

By mid-1959 General Williams had concluded that the CIA could not fulfill 

his requirements for intelligence. He was therefore prepared to reopen the 

subject of clandestine intelligence training with President Diem, but only if 

"action has been taken at the national level to preclude repercussions frorr: 

the CIA. ,,86 Tha t September Chief of Staff Le Van Ty formally requested that 

the adv isory group prov ide training for the South Vietnamese Army's intelligence staff in clandestine collection of strategic and tactical military intelligence in enemy territory. After more months of negotiation between the 

Army and the Central Intelligence Agency, this time at the Washington level, 

H2MFR, Col Silva, 10 Jul 58, sub: Confe rence With CAS Representatives. Inc! to Memo, ACAS 

G- 2. USARPAC, for ACSI, 23 }ul 58, sub: USACRAPAC-C1A Coordination on Vietnam Intelligence Training. 

8JMsg, CiNCUSARPAC to ACSI, 06 1840z Jun 58, ACSI 6249VN, records of ACSI. 

iW lbid.; Memo, AeofS G - 2, USARPAC, for ACSI, 18 Aug 58, sub: USACRA PAC-CIA Coordination of Vietnam Intelligence Trai ning, ACSI 353VN, records of ACSI. 

85Memo, ACofS G - 2, USARPAC, for ACSI, 18 Aug 58, sub: USACRAPAC-ClA Coordination; 

Memo, Ch, MAAG, for CINCPAC, t Oct 59, sub: Field O perations Intelligence Training. 

116Memo, ACofS C - 2, U5ARPAC, for ACSI, 9 Sep 59, sub: Intelligence Training for Vietnamese 

Army, ACSI 6249VN, records of ACSI. 

319 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

in October 1960 the CIA finally agreed to the establishment of an Army 

combat intelligence and counterintelligence team in South Vietnam trained 

and equipped to conduct clandestine operations87 Yet this concession came 

far too late to aid General Williams or the advisory group on charting the 

course of the ballooning Viet Cong insurgency during the critical period from 

1957 through 1959. With the intelligence then available, it was easy to underestimate the strength of the insurgents and to dismiss the murders as isolated 

acts of terrorism or banditry. 

Forces for Internal Security 

A bove all, General Williams' misreading of the nature and seriousness of 

ft.the Viet Cong threat was due to his persistent belief that guerrilla 

warfare was merely a diversionary tactic to degrade the South Vietnamese 

Army's readiness to fight a conventional war. Williams observed that the 

increase in Viet Cong activity raised the " possibility that military units will 

again have to be diverted to this primarily police-type task thus depriving 

them of the opportunity of continuing orthodox military training. This will in 

turn delay the Vietnamese government in its endeavor to develop a deterrent 

well-trained armed force in being. "ss President Diem largely agreed with 

Williams' analysis of Viet Cong activities. In December 1957 he told a group 

of American visitors that the "terrorism that the communists are now waging 

is essentially directed against the Army's training program ... . They want to 

get the Army dispersed on security missions to prevent training."s9 

While insisting that the South Vietnamese Army not be diverted to local 

security duties, General Williams was nevertheless conscious of the need for 

internal security, especially in the more remote areas of the Mekong Delta 

and the Central Highlands. The advisory group's proffered solution was to 

create efficient and well-equipped forces which could relieve the army of the 

burden of local security duties. 

There were a number of police and paramilitary organizations in South 

Vietnam in the mid-fifties, many a legacy of the French period. A survey in May 1957 had revealed that there were 54,000 men enrolled in the 

paramilitary Civil Guard; 7,000 in the municipal police; 3,500 in the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation, or Surete; an undetermined number in the 

Gendarmerie; and about 50,000 in the Self-Defense (militia) Corps. Impressive in size only, these forces generally were poorly equipped, ill-trained, 

and poorly disciplined. The Self-Defense Corps was particularly weak, with 

approximately two weapons for every three corpsmen. Those weapons were 

mostly obsolete French rifles for which the ammunition was limited and so 

87Memo, Deputy Director (Plans), CIA, for ACSI, sub: Coordination of U.s. Army Plans for 

Vietnam, copy in CMH. 

88Ltr, Williams to Ambassador Durbrow, 10 Oec 57. 

IWRecord of Conversa tions, Cen Williams and President Diem, 13 Dec 57, Williams Papers. 

320 
Roots of a New War 

old that only about one round in seven was likely actually to fire. 90 A survey 

by American police experts found that corpsmen usually came from the lower 

levels of viIlage society, had scant education, and received little or no training. The experts estimated that " the capability of the SDC [Self-Defense 

Corps] to withstand assaults by armed and organized Viet-Cong units is 

virtually nil. " The advisory group believed that in most areas of the South the 

Self-Defense Corps was thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists; in some 

provinces it even reportedly " covers up more information than it furnishes."·! 

The most important organizations from the point of view of regional 

security and counterguerrilla operations were the Civil Guard and the SelfDefense Corps. A static, part-time, militia force, the Self-Defense Corps was 

intended to protect viIlages " against the subversive activities of dissident 

elements."92 The Civil Guard was a more mobile unit organized to patrol the 

rural districts and was composed of armed, uniformed, full-time personnel 

responsible for maintaining law and order and collecting intelligence. 

Since May 1955 a group of police and public administration specialists 

from Michigan Sta te University under contract to the U.S. Operations Mission 

had been working on a number of projects to improve the training and 

operations of the security forces. The group established a six-week basic 

training course, which had trained 14,000 Civil Guardsmen by mid-1957, and 

also set up a national police academy. The Michigan State University advisers 

saw the Civil Guard as a civilian police force similar to the Pennsylvania State 

Police or the Texas Rangers. 

President Diem had different ideas about the guard. Since the entire South 

Vietnamese Army wou ld be needed in the event of invasion to defend along 

the 17th Parallel, he maintained that a strong internal security organization 

was crucial to control the high platea u region and the Mekong Delta. Thus 

the Civil Guard should be "capable of assisting the army in rear areas in time 

of wa r.,,·3 The president wa nted the Ministry of Defense to assume responsibility for training, disciplining, and supplying the guard, but in peacetime it 

would remain under the operational control of the interior minister. 94 He 

wanted the Civil Guard's officers to be graduates of the military academy and 

to have an additional year of training in jurisprudence and traffic control. 

Since Diem saw the Civil Guard as a kind of second-line army, he wanted it 

to be unusually well armed and equipped with helicopters and armored cars. 

While Diem spoke of internal security and military defense, his rea l 

interest in the Civil Guard was political. Most members of the guard were 

90Michigan State University (MSU) Advisory Group Rpt, Civil Police Administration, May 57. 

copy in CMH; Msg, Williams to ClNCPAC, 29 Nov 57, Williams Papers; MAAG Country 

Statement, 22 Jan 58, p. 16, records of MAAC Indochina; Michigan State University Vietnam 

Advisory Group, Review of Self-De fense Corps, 31 OC157, p. 3, copy in CMH . 

91 lbid ., pp. 10 - 11 ; MAAG, Vie tnam, Country Statement on MAP, Non-NATO Countries, 22 

Jan 58, p. 16, records of MAAC Vietnam. 

92MSU AdviSOry Group Rpt, Civil Police Administration. 

9JM sg, MAAG to CINCPAC, 140755z Oct 57, Williams Papers. 

9.JNotes of Protocol Visit of General I. D. White, CGUSARPAC, to President Diem, 16 Jan 58, 

Williams Papers. 

321 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

former militiamen from the Ca tholic regions of North Vietnam who had fled 

south after the Viet Minh victory in 1954 and were among Diem's most 

loyal supporters·5 The president wanted to develop the Civil Guard into a 

strong force to counter the power of a possibly disloyal army. When the 

advisers from Michigan State University insisted that a lightly armed but 

well-trained territorial police force was more appropriate to the needs of 

South Vietnam, Diem was contemptuous. "This is not Brazil, Argentina, 

France, or Michigan," he told General Williams. "They do not know the 

country or the language and are at the mercy of their interpreters."o6 

Although General Williams was aware that Catholics and northerners 

were heavily represented in the Civil Guard, he was less interested in the 

political dimensions of Diem's proposal than in the fact that an upgraded 

Civil Guard would " release the Army from guard and pacification duties and 

enable them to concentrate on training under their division commanders. ,,97 

General Williams saw the advisers from the Michigan State University group 

as "police types who don't see the big picture."os He also viewed Diem's 

concept of transferring responsibility for the training, discipline, and supply 

of the Civil Guard to the defense minister as logical and efficient, although 

slightly unorthodox. He explained that the Defense Ministry was "an up-andcoming organization which is becoming more efficient every month" and was 

thus in a better position than the Interior Ministry to supply and administer 

the Civil Guard. In addition, the Defense Ministry's "control of promotions 

would ensure that incompetents, grafters, etc., would be weeded OUt."99 Both 

President Diem and General Williams knew that as long as the Civil Guard 

and the Self-Defense Corps remained under the control of the Ministry of the 

Interior, they would continue to receive arms and equipment from the Michigan State University advisory group working through the U.S. Operations 

Mission rather than from the military assistance program. The Operations 

Mission's resources were more limited than those of the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group and its array of military hardware far less opulent. It was 

unlikely that the Operations Mission would ever be able to obtain funding for 

rearming the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps on the scale that Diem 

envisioned. 

Most of the other country team members were dubious about Diem's 

plans for the Civil Guard. Ambassador Durbrow and Operations Mission 

Chief Barrows insisted that the Civil Guard was a civilian police force, not a 

paramilitary body, and thus ought to remain fully under control of the 

Ministry of the Interior. Its work in peacetime would normally be closely 

linked with other police agencies regulated by that ministry. In addition, 

Congress had already appropriated certain American aid funds for the Civil 

Guard under the assumption that it was part of the regular civil police 

95First Draft Report of the Draper Study Committee, 17 Feb 59, p. 33. 

96M emo of Conversations, President Diem with Cen Williams, 8 OCI 57, Williams Papers. 

97Msg, Chief. MAAG, to C1NCPAC, 14 Mar 57, Williams Papers. 

98Memo of Conversations, Williams with Diem, 3 Dec 57, Williams Papers. 

99Ltr, Williams to Brig Cen Edward Lansdale, 1 Mar 58, Folder 34, Williams Papers. 

322 
establishment; it would be hard to 

justify use of those fund s to support 

a large military force . 100 Durbrow also 

believed that Washi ngton would probably view a heavily armed, 50,000-

man Civil Guard as an attempt to 

circumvent the 150,000-man ceiling 

on the South Vietnamese armed 

forces. 101 Indeed, both Durbrow and 

Barrows believed that the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group had 

always wa nted a larger army and 

that Williams, with Diem's encouragement, was simply using the Civil 

Guard issue as a device for covertly 

expanding the size of the armed 

forces. The U.S. Operations Mission 

and officials of the Michigan State 

Roots of a New War 

University advisory group argued Director Barrows 

that, however important a larger 

army might be, it would be a mistake to ruin the country's rural police 

system- the Civil Guard- in order to get it. 102 

General Williams and other American officials were even farther apart on 

the question of the Self-Defense Corps. So notoriously ineffective and so 

heavily infiltrated by Communists was that organization that many members 

of the country team, including Ambassador Durbrow, favored dropping it 

entirely from the U.S. aid program. Others such as Barrows favored a support program for a reduced corps of not more than 30,000 men. Those 

differences in late 1957 produced a lively debate on the future of the SelfDefense Corps. General Williams argued forcefully for U.S. support of a 

Self-Defense Corps of at least 43,500 men. With strong support from Admiral 

Felt, he was eventually able to obtain cou ntry team approval for fundin g an 

expanded Self-Defense Corps if a "clea rly defined chain of command" could 

be established for the corps, an effective training program could be undertaken, and Viet Cong infiltrators could be weeded out through fingerprinting 

and improved background checks. The Military Assistance AdviSOry Group 

wou ld be the agency advising the corps. 103 

Despite conti nued bankrolling, the Self-Defense Corps over the next three 

years improved little. In the fall of 1958, General Williams complained to the 

South Vietnamese Defense Ministry that training of the Self-Defense Corps 

lO°Ltr, Ourbrow to Diem, 26 Feb 58, copy in Folder 36, Williams Papers. 

10lMemo of Conversations, Ambassador Durbrow, Cen Williams, President Diem, 27 Feb 58, 

W illiams Papers. 

102lnte rv, author with Barrows, 27 Ju1 76. 

10JMsg, W illiams to CJNCPAC, 29 Nov 57; Memo of Convers<1tions, Williams with President 

Diem, 23 Sep 58; Ur, Williams to Lansdale, 1 Mar 58. All in Williams Papers. 

323 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

could proceed smoothly only if numerous "faults which handicap training" 

could be corrected . Those included inadequate firing ranges, deficient training 

aids, unserviceable ammunition, and inadequate housing. He urged officials 

of the Self-Defense Corps to borrow training aids and equipment from the 

army and offered to make available American advisers to assist training camp 

commanders. 104 Yet the officials apparently failed to avail themselves of those 

opportunities. 

The status of the Civil Guard, meanwhile, continued to divide the advisory group and the U.s. Operations Mission. At the beginning of 1958 

the Operations Mission had available about $3.5 million for equipping the 

guard, which, Williams estimated, was sufficient to arm about 10,000 men 

with Ml's, carbines, Browning automatic rifles, and submachine guns. Yet 

Barrows refused to release those funds as long as Diem insisted on transferring any functions of the guard to the Defense Ministry. l OS The debate continued for weeks. General Williams urged the country team to adopt a pragmatic 

approach and begin immediately to use the available funds to arm and equip 

the Civil Guard without worrying over the "academic" questions of its ultimate size and mission. I06 Although Barrows agreed at that point that fun ds 

on hand cou ld be used, he and Ambassador Durbrow insisted that requests 

for future funds would have to be based on a firm and definite plan for the 

Civil Guard's development. 

These deliberations were still under way when the South Vietnamese 

government presented a startling proposa l for the orga niza tion and equipment of the Civil Guard . The plan called for a force of 55,000 men organized 

into companies: 225 light infantry, 15 armored, 21 horse, 26 riverine, and 13 

mobile infantry. They were to be armed with artillery, light tanks, scout ca rs, 

half-tracks, and helicopters, 07 

General Williams was appalled at those figures. "Whoever sold Diem this 

idea was nuts!" he wrote to a friend in Washington. 108 Incredulous, Williams 

asked the presiden t whether he really believed he needed such weapons as 

tanks and helicopters. Diem replied complacently that he needed them fo r 

"subduing riots," that he "just wants tanks to disperse a mob."I09 General 

Williams later learned that a Vietnamese Army general officer had been 

aSSigned to draw up a table of organization and equipment for the guard . 

That unfortunate general, findin g himself completely overwhelmed, had 

attempted to "come up with something that looked professional by copying 

sheet after sheet out of the U.S. Army armored division tables." lIo But the 

10-1Ltr, Williams to Nguyen Dinh Thuan, 19 Sep 58, Williams Papers. 

IOSLtr, W illiams to Lansdale, 1 Mar 58; Memo of Conversa tions, Williams, Barrows, President 

Diem, 3 Dec 57, Williams Papers. 

I06Comments by Cen Samuel T. Williams at Meeting at U.S. Embassy, 3 Mar 58, Williams 

Paroers. 

07Ltr, Williams to Lansdale, 1 M ar 58. 

loslbid . 

I09Memo of Conversations, President Diem, A mbassador Durbrow, Barrows, Cen Williams, 

Chan, 5 Mar 58, Will iams Papers. 

lIOU r, Lt Cen Samuel T. Williams to Chief of Military History, 26 Apr 79, copy in Historians 

files, CMH. 

324 
Roots of a New War 

damage had been done. The fantastic proposal confirmed the suspicions of 

the Operations Mission that Diem simply intended to use the Civil Guard as 

a private army. 

Although General Williams advised the South Vietnamese Defense Ministry to withdraw the ambitious plan and submit a more reasonable proposa l, 

the impasse over the Civil Guard continued. Not until January 1959 was there 

a possibility of a solution when Diem agreed to allow a newly formed Public 

Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission to assume responSibility for 

training the Civil Guard.'" But General Williams, who doubted that Americans with police rather than military backgrounds could successfully reorganize and train the Civil Guard, continued to advocate training by the Defense 

Ministry with advisers from the Military Assistance Advisory Group. 112 

The Situation Deteriorates 

W hile Americans and Vietnamese in Saigon argued over the question of 

paramilitary forces, the security situation in the countrySide continued 

to deteriorate. Because travel through most parts of South Vietnam was safe 

and because Viet Cong units continued to avoid South Vietnamese Army 

units and fortified government positions of any strength, American officials 

long failed to detect the full extent of the deterioration. Yet signs were there. 

Early in 1958 South Vietnamese officials notified the adviSOry group that there 

were extensive Viet Cong supply trails in the western parts of the northern 

provinces of Quang Nam and Thua Thien, and along the Laotian border. 11 3 

During a single week in February in An Xuyen Province at the southern tip of 

South Vietnam, a Viet Cong company of about a hundred men attacked a 

government post in the town of Thoi Binh; a force of equal size attacked 

the town of Hung My; and a small South Vietnamese Army patrol was wiped 

out in an ambush near the town of Ganh Hao l 14 The American embassy 

observed that " in many remote areas the central government has no effective 

control." 115 

The Viet Cong were reportedly most active in the region of the Plain of 

Reeds adjoining the Cambodian border, which included portions of Kien 

Phong and Kien Tuong Provinces; the old sect strongholds of Tay Ninh, Binh 

Long, Phuoc Long, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Tuy 

Provinces; and the Ca Mau peninsula at the southern tip of the country. The 

CIA estimated that, together with the remnants of the sect forces, the Viet 

Cong by early 1958 had an armed strength of some 1,700 men. 116 By the 

IIlU.S.-Vietllam ReIntiolls, vol. 2, pt. IV.A.4, p. 23. 

11 2Ltr, Williams to Diem, 3 Ju1 59, Williams Papers. 

113Memo of Conversation, Cell Williams and President Diem, 16 Feb 58, Williams Papers. 

114C1A Field Intel Rpt, CS 3/350,691, 3 Apr 58, sub: Activities of Communists in Ca Mau Area, 

co~~; n CMH . 

I Am Embassy to Slate, 25 Ju1 58, 751G.OOI7 - 2558, records of Dept of State. 

116C1A Field Intel Rpl, CS 3/352,788, 30 Apr 58, sub: Activities of the Communists in South 

Vietnam, copy in CMH . 

325 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

spring there were reports of Viet Cong units operating out of small posts in 

heavily wooded areas north of Sa igon. In June a Viet Cong force of from 

twenty to fifty men attacked a government detention center at Pleiku in the 

Central Highlands, releasing some fifty prisoners, many of them "known 

communists," while incurring no casualties. Diem attribu ted the failure to the 

fact that many of the prison guards were Montagnard tribesmen. '17 

Although Genera l Williams could hardly have been unaware of increasing 

Viet Cong pressure, he remained convinced that countering insurgency was 

not the primary business of the South Vietnamese Army. "A division on 

pacification duty goes to pieces fast," he observed. "The guerrillas go underground and soon the troops start sitting around on bridges and in market 

places and go to po!.""· When Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho warned 

Diem that the wave of terrorism and assassination was demoralizing the 

country, Williams insisted that using army units for security operations 

"is exactly what the communists want us to do." With division maneuve rs 

scheduled to begin in the early spring of 1958, he observed: "If I were 

Giap, the first thing I would try to do would be to try to prevent these 

division maneuvers.,,119 

Despite Williams' misgivings the South Vietnamese government responded to the increased Viet Cong activity with a major military effort. For the 

first time Vietnamese Army units penetrated trad itional Communist base 

areas in the Plain of Reeds, in the Ca Mau peninsula, and in War Zone D, the 

area northeast of Saigon. Many of these operations were slow and ponderous. In the Ca Mau peninsula a battalion of Vietnamese marines was able to 

capture some Viet Cong suspects and locate hidden caches of food but soon 

discovered that the Viet Cong had withdrawn to a strongpoint in the vast 

swamp and salt marsh immediately behind the western tip of the peninsu la. 

The attackers could approach the enemy strongpoint only by a water route 

that would lead them directly along the line of fire of the defending Viet 

Congo At that point the operation ground to a halt while the battalion 

commander negotiated with the military region commander and the South 

Vietnamese Air Force for air strikes. 120 

Although slow and indecisive, the government's operations certainly dealt 

a heavy blow to the Viet Congo Party membership in the South, which had 

stood at some 5,000 in mid-1957, fell to about one-third that level by the end 

of the year. '2' Officia l party histories refer to the period of late 1958-early 

1959 as "the darkest period" of the struggle in the South, a period when "the 

enemy .. truly and efficiently destroyed our Party .... The political struggle movement of the masses although not defeated was encountering increas1l 7Memo of Conversations, Cen Williams and President Diem, 24 May 58 and 12 Jun 58, 

Williams Papers. 

118Ltr, Williams to Brig Cen Philip H. Draper, Jr., 18 Aug 58, Folder 35, Williams Papers. 

1l9Memo of Conversation, President Diem and Cen Williams, 5 Mar 58, Williams Papers. 

120Msgs, ALUSNA to eNO, 051134z Dec 58, 190807z Oct 58, and 301019z Dec 58, copics of all 

in records of ACSI. 

I2IOuiker, The Commullist Rood to Powe" ch. 7; Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary 

Orga nizations," p. 42. 

326 
Roofs of a New War 

ing difficulty and increasing weakness, the party bases, although not completely destroyed, were significa ntly wea kened and in some areas quite seriously.,, 122 In Cia Dinh Province pa rty membershi p declined from more than 

1,000 in mid-1954, to 385 in mid-1957, to about 6 in mid-1 959. 123 

By the end of 1958 surviving party cad res in many parts of South Vietnam 

had appare ntly decided , on their own initiative, to escalate the struggle 

beyond a rmed propaga nda and assassinations even though this violated the 

party line. Armed units were fo rmed into compa nies or battalions usually 

numbering less than one hundred men, armed with rifles, grenades, light 

machine guns, and sometimes merely pikes. 12

' 

The renewed Viet Cong activity was most intense in War Zone D, a 

heavily forested region about fifty ki lometers northeast of Sa igon. Here Viet 

Cong units no longer always retreated from South Vietnamese Army forces of 

equal or inferior strength. During March 1959 there were at least ten firefi ghts 

between army troops a nd the Viet Cong in which thirteen government soldiers were killed, wounded, or reported missing; five rifles, two automatic 

weapons, and a jeep were destroyed. 125 In May 1959 a Viet Cong force 

occupying high ground in War Zone D, northeast of the town of Bien Hoa, 

successfu lly stood off attacks by an entire army battalion, then disengaged 

before the government troops could bring up artillery. 126 

The Party Central Committee had meanwhile convened its fifteenth plenum in January 1959. At the urging of Le Duan, who had just completed an 

inspection tour of the South, and of other southern Communist leaders the 

Central Committee adopted a resolution endorsing the use of armed force to 

overthrow the Diem regime. 127 By May 1959 new directives were on their way 

from Hanoi to party leaders in the South. Insurgents, specially trained in the 

North, were infiltrated back into South Vietnam. A new Central Committee 

Directorate for South Vietnam was established, and communication routes 

into the South through Laos were improved and expanded . 12' A new stage in 

the long struggle for South Vietnam had begun . 

122Tilllt '-iiI/II Naill 80 Til 5(111 /-fan B;"/I Lnp La Dell Hiell Nay ("The Situatio n in Na m 60 From the 

Restoration of Peace to the Present"), p. 32, cited in Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations," p. 42; Experiences of the South Vie tna m Revolutionary Movement During 

the Past Several Yea rs, p. 9. 

l2.3-fhayer, "Sou thern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations," p. 42. 

124 Ibid.; ARVN Intel Rpts, 10 Apr 57. and 3 Apr 59, Allachments to OARMA to ACSI, 25 May 

59, records of ACSI. 

125ARVN Monthly Intel Su mmary, M ar 59, loel to OARMA to ACSI, 9 Jul 59, R511 - 59, records 

of ACSI. 

126Memo of Conversation, W illiams with President Diem, 11 May 59, Williams Papers. 

127 All 01lliille Hislory of ti,e Vielllalll Worker's Parly (H anoi: Foreign La nguages Publishing House, 

1970), pp. 108 - 09. 

12l1Duiker, Till: Comlllllllisl Road '0 Power, pp. 187 - 90. 

327 

17 

Things Fall Apart, July 1959-June 1960 

In the early evening of 8 July 1959, a Viet Cong squad attacked the quarters 

of the American detachment advising the South Vietnamese 7th Infantry 

Division at Bien Hoa, about seventeen kilometers north of Saigon. The quarters were located about a hundred yards from a river in a grassy field 

surrounded by a two-strand barbed-wire fence which had no alarm devices 

attached. Two South Vietnamese Army guards were posted in front of the 

quarters, facing a road on the side away from the river. The members of the 

detachment watched a movie each night at seven o'clock, a practice apparently well known in the division area. Two young women from the nearby 

town had occasionally attended the movie as guests. (It was later alleged that 

the two were Viet Cong agents.) The Vietnamese guards also frequently 

watched the movie through the windows of the dining hall. I It was thus 

relatively easy for a Viet Cong squad of 6 men to slip through the barbedwire fence on the river side without detection. Three men took station at the 

windows and raked the mess hall with au tomatic weapons fire. In the brief 

but bloody action the 13-man detachment lost 1 man wounded and 2 killed, 

the first advisers to die by enemy action (Maj. Dale R. Buis and M. Sgt. 

Chester M. Ovnand)2 The attack exemplified the transition from the serious, 

yet scattered and sporadic, Viet Cong activities of 1958 and early 1959 to a 

sustained campaign of terrorism and military action which was to increase 

steadily in size and intensity through the early 1960s. 

A New Viet Cong Strategy 

A Ithough the Viet Cong had been rebuilding their armed units and incorl"\..porating armed sect elements since early 1957, they had usually kept 

'Interv, author with La sche, 30 Aug 79. 

2USARPAC Weekly Intel Summary, 13 Ju159, pp. 8 - 9; CIA Current Weekly Intel Summary. 16 

Ju1 59. Copies in CMH. 

329 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 -1960 

well out of the path of government fo rces and attacked only occasionally to 

achieve some special purpose. A number of armed propaganda units did 

opera te in the lowlands of central Vietnam and the delta, but they were no 

match fo r the well-a rmed South Vietnamese troops. Meanwhile the scattered 

full-time armed units in the swamps and jungles, according to a Communist 

history, " became idle and during these inactive periods their main elements 

could not develop but deteriorated spiritually as well as organizationally.,,3 

The increasing dissatisfaction of southern cadres with this situation had probably contributed to the January 1959 resolution of the 15th Party Congress 

which sanctioned armed struggle to overthrow the Diem government' 

Following the passage of that resolution the Nam Bo Regional Committee, 

the Viet Cong high command for South Vietnam headed by Le Duan and 

Pham Heng, devised a number of new policies. Political agitation was to 

continue, but armed activities were to be stepped up. These activities would 

not, as in the past, be limited mainly to propaganda conducted by armed 

units but would also include "motivating the people to take up arms and 

fight so as to lower the enemy's prestige, overthrow the enemy administration [and] resist the enemy."s Bases were also to be consolidated and control 

expa nded . The committee established three classifica tions for areas of South 

Vietnam. The first was "cities and weak rural areas," where party presence 

was slight or the geographical situation was unfavorable. In those regions the 

party's program would still emphasize politica l agitation and subversion, with 

armed activities playing a supporting role. However, in "strong rural areas" 

where party influence was great and in "base areas," inaccessible jungle or 

swamp, cadres were to make the transition to armed resistance. 6 About this 

same time highly trained southern Communists who had regrou ped in the 

North in 1954 bega n to slip back into the South. Traveling in groups of forty 

or fifty they made their way by truck into Laos and then on foot into 

South Vietnam ? 

By late 1959 the results of the new Viet Cong strategy were everywhere 

appa rent. During the last six months of 1959 assassinations of government 

officials, police, and village notables, which had averaged eleven a month 

during late 1958 a nd early 1959, more than doubled. Kidnappings reached an 

all-time high of 343 in that period compared to 236 during all of 1958. During 

November 1959 alone, eighty-nine people were kidnapped, almost as many as 

had been kidnapped during the entire first half of that yearS In parts of the 

lower Mekong Delta and the Centra l Highlands the Communists arranged 

"spontaneous uprisings" in contested hamlets and vi llages. Riots and mass 

c Situation in Nam Bo Since the Restoration of Peace to the Present (document, apparently 

written in 1961, seized by U.S. forces in PhuO( Long Province, Apr 69), copy in CMH , pp. 

58 - 59. 

4See eh. 16. 

5-fhe Situati on in Nam 60 Since the Restora tion of Peace, p. 57. 

' Ibid., pp. 57 - 58. 

70 uiker, Tile Comlll l/nisl Rood 10 Power, p. 40. 

tlCountry Team Study Group Report on Internal Security Situation in Vietnam, Incl to Ltr No. 

I, Joint U.s. A rmy-Navy Attache, 12 Feb 60, records of ACSI. 

330 
Things Fall Apart 

demonstrations organized by the Viet Cong spread disorder and often provoked harsh government suppression . At the same time, small units of 

guerrillas would attack isolated government posts and watchtowers, driving 

out the government security forces and arming themselves from captured 

weapons 9 During the last half of 1959 Viet Cong- initiated ambushes and 

attacks on government posts averaged well over 100 a month. 10 

In this intensified campaign the South Vietnamese Army suffered a number of reverses. In September, six army companies totaling over 360 men plus 

a company of Civil Guard troops began operations aga inst a Viet Cong 

battalion in a heavily wooded sector of flooded marshland in Kien Phong 

Province close to the Cambodian border. Traveling in sampans and large 

launches, the lead company was rounding a bend in a stream when about 100 

insurgen ts concealed on a patch of high ground opened fire. Most of the men 

jumped overboard in panic; an eventual tally showed 12 men killed, 14 

wounded, and 9 missing or captured. The South Vietnamese battalion commander was subsequently court-martialed. II Two weeks later, in the same 

province, a group of forty-five South Vietnamese troops, when attacked by a 

small group of Viet Cong, su rrendered en masse. 12 

In other parts of Military Region V, the southern and southeastern provinces of Vietnam, government troops during October and November twice 

attempted to conduct sweeps, only to be ambushed and forced to retreat. In 

one engagement the Viet Cong su rrounded and captu red an entire company. 

After disarming the survivors, the insurgent leaders boasted that they could 

defeat the South Vietnamese Army at will, then forced the soldiers to watch 

while they ambushed a second company coming to the rescue of the first. 

Only one of the captive army soldiers tried to escape or warn his comrades, 

and his attempts were u navailing because his fellow captives hesitated to 

make any try at resistance. 13 In November in Quang Ngia Province, a detachment of 25 to 50 Viet Cong, which had been destroying bridges and sabotaging communications, attacked and captured a squad of army engineers. Bands 

of Communists sometimes boldly entered district towns and remained for 

several hours, haranguing the population before departing unmolested. In 

October a group of 80 to 100 Viet Cong entered the town of Kien An in Kien 

Phong Province, attacked the district office, killed the district chief and 

6 members of the Civil Guard, released 70 prisoners, and made off with 

twenty-three rifles. 14 

Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Can, who ran the northern provinces of South 

"Duiker, The Commllnist Rood to Power, pp. \91 - 93. 

lUCIA Current Weekly Intel Summary, 17 Mar 60, pt. II, p. 9, copy in CMH . 

llMsg, CHMAAG to CINCPAC, 7 Oct 59, Williams Papers; USARPAC Intel Bulletin, Oct- Nov 

59, p. 32, copy in CMH; Col James O. Kent for Cen Williams, 2 Oct 59, sub: Ambush of 

Elements of 43d Regiment, Folder 69, Williams PClpers. 

12Country Team Study Group Report on Internal Security Situation in Vietnam, p. 17. 

13Memo, Col James O. Kent for Williams, 12 Oct 59, sub: Conference of General Officers, 

Folder 69, Williams Papers. 

14 Ibid.; USARPAC Intcl Bulletin, Oct - Nov 59, p. 8; Country Team Study Group Report on 

Internal Security Situation in Vietnam, p. 4. 

331 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

Vietnam, told a group of provincial administrators that the internal security 

situation in the Mekong Delta was "worse than in 1954," and Diem himself 

told the National Assembly that the southern provinces were in a "state of 

siege." IS The CIA reported that in the marshy Ca Mau region at the southern 

tip of the country the Communists had "achieved virtual control over whole 

villages and districts." 16 

Disturbed by the disappointing performance of the South Vietnamese 

forces, General Williams proposed to revoke a long-standing practice whereby 

American advisers were forbidden to accompany South Vietnamese units 

into combat. Williams considered that the army's marginal achievements 

were attributable to poor planning and lack of aggressiveness, both of 

which he believed could be at least partially corrected by the presence of 

America n advisers.

I7 Up to this time MAAG advisers had been assigned 

principally to South Vietnamese Army corps and division headquarters, training commands, and logistic agencies. Advisers posted to regiments and separate battalions had remained at the division headquarters whenever their 

units were assigned a combat mission or one likely to result in combat. On 25 

May 1959, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, informed 

General Williams that American advisers assigned to Vietnamese Army regiments and separate battalions could go along on operational missions " provided they do not become involved in actual combat. ,, 18 

The Diem regime responded to the increased insurgency with a variety of 

expedients. The National Assembly passed a stringent new internal security 

law, generally referred to as Law 10 - 59; it empowered the government 

to try suspected terrorists through special roving military tribunals which had 

authority to impose the death penalty. The provinces of An Giang, Kien 

Giang, and An Xuyen in the western part of the Mekong Delta, traditionally a 

Viet Cong stronghold, were placed under the direct control of the chief of 

Military Region V, who was given emergency powers including command of 

all military units in the area and indirect authority over civil functions. 19 Yet 

within a month the commander was complaining of his inability to govern 

the provinces. He estimated that it would require a field division plus a 

territorial regiment to restore some semblance of government control. 20 

In May Diem and his brother Nhu announced that they were planning to 

regrou p isolated peasant households into fortified villages that could be 

protected more easily. Under that program, begun in late 1959, the widely sca ttered rural population was to be relocated in "prosperity and density centers"-soon called agrovilles-situated along major roads and canals, 

where they could more easily be reached by security fo rces and protected 

(and watched) by the government. The intent was to separate the population 

15USARPAC Inte l Bulletin, Oct- Nov 59, p. 27. 

16CIA Current Weekly Intel Summa ry, 9 Apr 59, pt. II, p. 5, copy in CMH . 

17Ltr, Williams to ClNCPAC, 31 Mar 59, Williams Pape rs. 

18Ltr, CINCPAC to Williams, 25 Ma y 59, and Memo of Conversation, Williams with President 

Diem, 4 Jun 59, both in Williams Papers. 

19U5ACGSC, Staff Study o n Arm y Aspects o f Military Assistance, p. 6. 

2°Memo of Conversation, Williams with President Diem, 5 Ju n 59, Williams Papers. 

332 
Tllil/gs Fall Apart 

I: 

Agroville Under Construction at Vi Tllal/II, PllOl/g Oil/II Provil/ce. 

from the Viet Cong, thereby eliminating the insurgents' source of supplies, 

recruits, and intelligence. To make the new centers more attractive to those 

forced to relocate, they were to have such amenities as schools, electricity I 

and medical c1inics. 21 

Various factors combined to foredoom the agroville program, chief among 

them the Vietnamese peasants' traditional attachment to their ancestral homes 

and fam ily tombs. The peasants resented the uprooting, particularly the move 

to undeveloped locations sometimes far from their rice paddies and gardens. 

They were a lso incensed at having to provide the labor to construct communal facilities. Although the president's technica l advisers assured him that the 

government had the resources to pay for the labor, Diem refused to authorize 

compensation. The peasants also had to build their own houses, and the 300 

piasters provided by the government were rarely sufficient to cover costs. The 

resentment occasioned by the disruption facilitated Viet Cong support and 

recruiting. Far from improvi ng security, the agrovilles produced such an 

increased tempo of Viet Cong countermeasures that by early 1961 the program had virtua lly ground to a halt. 

The sudden upsurge of Viet Cong activity came as a surprise to Americans 

21For il detailed account, sec Joseph J. Zasloff, Ruml Reset l/emelll ill Vietnflll/: All Agroville ill 

Developmellt, Michigan Slate University Advisory Group. (Saigon, 1961). 

333 
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 194 1 - 1960 

both in Saigon and Washington. In April 1959, Maj. Gen. Samuel L. Myers, 

General Williams' deputy during 1957 and 1958, had expressed the view of 

the Military Assista nce Advisory Group that " the Viet Minh guerrillas [have] 

ceased to be a major menace to the government. ,,22 In July General Williams 

had remarked that "although the internal security situation in South Vietnam 

continues decidedly unstable, there has been no alarming deterioration so fa r 

as assassinations and kidnappings are concerned. " He agreed with President 

Diem's observation that "the security situation in the [Mekong] Delta has 

greatly improved. "" A conference of U.S. Army intelligence officers in 

Hawaii in September concluded that the Viet Cong posed no serious threat 

and that "the general security situation in the South Vietnam countryside 

shows a steady improvement in comparison with the position twelve months 

ago.,,2' As late as January 1960, General Williams noted that " the internal 

security situation here now, although at times delicate, is better than it has 

been at any time in the last two or three years.,,2S 

Based on those assessments, many Americans viewed the upswing of 

insurgent activity as evidence that the government's programs and security 

measures were proving effective and that the increased assassinations and 

raids were simply the last desperate ex pedients of an insurgent organization 

that had failed in all its attempts to subvert the Diem regime and found itself 

on the brink of defeat. As Diem explained to General Williams, " the strategic 

battle against the VC [Viet CongJ has been won; now remains the tactica l 

battle, which means the complete cleaning out of the many small centers of 

Viet Cong activity.,,26 That was essentially the interpretation Ambassador 

Durbrow and other members of the country team presented to the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee in July 1959. 

The " Iast gasp" interpretation soon gained wide currency around Washington. "Vietnam's Gains Spur Red Terror" read the headline of an article 

in Business Week in Ju ly 1959. 27 Ernest K. Lindley explained to readers of 

Newsweek that " Viet Minh infiltrators have just launched a new campaign of 

terrorism and sabotage-- probably because economica lly South Vietnam has 

far outstripped the 'workers paradise' to the North.,,28 There was much 

evidence for that viewpoint. The Viet Cong were indeed suffering considerably from the counterinsurgency measures of the South Vietnamese government. Wholesa le arrests under Law 10- 59 and continuing counterinsurgency 

operations served to deplete the ranks of the hard-core Communist faithful 

and their sympathizers. The 1959 decision of the Central Committee to initiate 

armed insurrection was a tacit admission by the Communists of their inability 

to overthrow the Diem government through p ropaganda, sabotage, agitation, 

22Scnatc, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcomm ittee on State Department Orga nization 

and Public Affairs, 5il1lalioll ill Viet/Will , Hearillgs, }1I1 59, p. 27. 

2JLtr, Williams to CINCI' AC, n Ju l 59, Folder 52, Williams Papers. 

2.IMin, USARPAC·FARELF Intel Conference, ] - 4 Sep 59, record s of ACSI. 

2!iBrucker I3ricfing Papers, 7 Jan 60, Williams Papers. 

26M cmo of Conversa tion, President Diem with Cen Williams, 30 Sep 59, Williams Papers. 

27BIlsilless Week, 18 July 1959, p. 2. 

2!1Ernest K. Lindley, "An Ally Worth Having," Newsweek. 25 Junc 1959. 

334 
Tllil/gs Fall Apart 

and subversion. Indeed Diem's strong countermeasures threatened the very 

existence of the party in the South. Viet Cong documents speak frankly of 

"encountering difficulties, obsta des and losses ... under the enemy's cru el 

terrorism.,,29 A Viet Cong history asserts, "By mid-1959 the party's structures 

had severely disintegrated . There were only a few party chapters left in each 

province .... The majority of party members were known, and being illegal 

li ved in the jungle or in underground tunnels all year 10ng.,,30 

Yet both Diem and his American advisers failed to recognize the extent to 

which the measures aimed at suppressing the Viet Cong increased antigovernment sentiment in the countryside and created a reservoir of potential recruits 

for the Viet Cong. 3 1 To Diem Communist insurgency was primarily a military 

and administrative problem to be solved by more roads, more and better 

agrovilles, more security forces. Noting that he had begun a program to train 

village militia in guerrilla and antiguerrilla tactics, he said that recently captured prisoners were already reporting that " the Communists have now given 

up hope of controlling the countryside because of the presence of young men 

trained in guerrilla tactics. ,,32 

General Williams agreed that security forces were the key. " I believe 

the task facing the government of Vietnam," he said, "is primarily one of 

achieving greater effiCiency in the Army, Civil Guard and Self-Defense Force 

through centralized direction, coordination and motivation. I' American advisers saw "no evidence of rumored peasant discontent with the government of 

Vietnam." Wh en officials of the American embassy proposed assigning an 

officer who spoke Vietnamese to try to ascertain conditions in rural areas, 

Williams predicted that the project would produce " only marginal results.,,33 

Williams discounted views that the insurgency was caused by fundamental economic and social conditions in Vie tnamese rural society . The Diem 

government, he believed, was fa ced with a " hard core [of] Viet Cong agents 

left in the south at the armistice, augmented from time to time by new blood 

shipped in from the north. ,,34 Those agents coerced the peasants into cooperating by threats, sabotage, and terrorism. According to Williams, 

The Vietnamese farmer . . if secure from threat, would li ve as he has for 

thou sands of years in the past, content with his lot on his rice paddy . ... The truth is that the population of South Vietnam, like any other, is more 

responsive to fea r and force than to an improved standard of living. The 

conclusion is clea r: The paramount consideration is to gain and maintain a 

superiority of force in all parts of the cou ntry. This is done by developing the 

'29Experiences of the South Vietnam Revolutionary Movement, p. 10. 

3O'fhe Situation in Nam 00 Since the Restoration of Peace, pp. 56 - 57, passim . See also Race, 

War Comes to LOllg All, pp. 97 - 104, 183 - 84. 

:J' John C. Donnell, Viet OI/~ Recruitll/ellt: Why (lml I-low Mell /oil/, Rand Memorandum, RM -

5486 - ISA/A RPA (December 1967), pp. 41 - 44; W. P. Davison and J. J. Zaslo ff, A Profile of Viet 

COllg Cadres, Rand Memorandum, RM-4983-ISNARPA Uune 1966), pp. 8 - 11 . 

32Memo of Conversation, President Diem with Adm Radford, 4 Jan 60, Williams Papers. 

33Msg, Williams to ClNCPAC, 131227z Ju1 59, Williams Papers. 

34 lbid.; Ltr, Williams to Senator Mike Mansfield, 20 May 60, Folder 73, Williams Papers. 

335 
Advice and Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

military and police Ps0tential as the most urgent objective of our national 

program in Vietnam.' 5 

What both General Williams and the proponents of economic development 

fa iled to rea lize was that South Vietnam was no longer a traditional society." The long war against the French and the various programs and "reforms" of the Diem regime had fundamentally disrupted the trad itiona l social 

and economic structure of the Vietnamese village .

37 Duri ng the long struggle 

against France thousands of people in the Ca Mau peninsu la, in the central 

provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Nga i, and in the heavily 

wooded areas northwest of Sa igon had lived for years under the rule of the 

Viet Minh. In those areas land was redistributed and traditional authori ty 

figures, such as large landowners and village notables, were displaced and 

positions of prestige and responsibility rea llocated. "The peasantry had 

seell . the village councils forced to sleep in outposts and to move in the 

countryside with armed escorts.. . The Viet Minh .. had destroyed the 

sense of inevitability which had kept the 'contented peasa nts' quietly farming 

the fi elds.,,'8 

The Diem government merely added to the social dislocation of the war 

years. The most powerful organized non-Communist groups, the Hoa Hao 

and Cao Dai, had been destroyed. The large landowners and village notables 

had returned but fe lt threa tened by the sweeping, albeit ineffective, land 

reforms of the Diem regime39 Of even grea ter consequence, Diem abolished 

the elected village councils and replaced many local officials with outsiders, 

either Catholic refugees from the North or supporters of the regime from the 

country's northern provinces. The new officials were as arrogant, corrupt, 

and venal as their predecessors and carried the additional onus of being 

strangers with alien accents and no local ties. 

All of these factors combined to create an unusually fertile environment 

for the Viet Congo Contrary to General Williams' analysis, "stay behind" 

agents and " new blood shipped from the north" constituted only a portion of 

the Viet Congo By late 1959 the insurgents included large numbers of former 

Viet Minh- some of them non-Communists-who had ceased to be active 

politically until Viet Cong persuasion and the real or imagined injustices of 

the Diem regime brought them back into the resistance. There were also 

many young recruits, w ho had never been connected with the Viet Minh. 40 

35Mcmo, Williams for Ambassador Durbrow, 25 Feb 60, sub: Balance Between Security and 

Development in Newly Emergi ng Countries, Folder 77, Williams Papers. 

36-'J"he following su mmary is ba sed primarily on the work of Paul Mus and John T. McAlister. 

Their ana lysis in its main points is now genera lly accepted by students of Vietnam. John T. 

McAlister, Jr. , and Paul Mus, The Vie/ llalllese alld Their Revolu/ioll (New York: Harper and Row, 

1970); see especially Mus, "Vietnam: A Nation Off Ba lance," pp. 524 - 38. 

37Paul Berman, Revollltiollary Orgallizatioll: J/lstiflltioll Bll ildillg Witlli" Ille People's Liberatioll Armed 

Forces (Lexi ngton, Mass.: O. C. Heath, 1974), p. 44 . 

.)BRace, War Comes 10 LOllg All, pp. 39 - 40. 

39Robert L. Sa nsom, Tile Ecollomics of Illsurgellcy ill tile Mekollg Della ill Vietllam (Cambridge: MIT 

Press, 1970), p. 58. 

4°Donnell , Viet COl/g Recruitlllenl, pp. v - vi; Zasloff, Origills of Ille Illsurgellcy ill SOlllh Vietl1am, 

pp. 1 - 6, passim. 

336 
Tilillgs Fall Apart 

As in the earlier insurrections against the French, the Viet Cong leadership 

placed strong, indeed overwhelming, emphasis on ga ining the acceptance 

and support of the local population. Viet Cong cadres often spoke of the 

"Three Togethers" that were part of their rules of conduct: eating together, 

livi ng together, and working together with the people. Viet Cong soldiers or 

civilian functionaries were severely disciplined for stealing from or otherwise 

molesting vilIagers or even for being rowdy or disorderly' I In contrast, a 

report prepa red for the assistant secretary of defense described Vietnamese 

government officials as displaying "arrogance, capriciousness, dishonesty and 

cruelty. ,,42 

Proselytizing and recruiting for the Viet Cong armed forces were carried 

on incessa ntly in any area where the party could ga in a foothold by cadres 

who were thoroughly familiar with the locality and its people. " If a man was 

experiencing family problems, had gone badly into debt, was in trouble with 

the law, was about to be drafted into the Army or had been mistreated by the 

government officials," he could expect a visit from Viet Cong recruiters who 

would commiserate with him, direct his anger or anxiety at the Saigon 

government, and persuade him to join their movement.''' Other li kely recruits 

were men who had served in the Viet Minh resistance against the French or 

were relatives of those who had. When necessary the Viet Cong did not 

hesitate to employ coercion, most often blackmail or kidnapping, and these 

methods were to become more common after 1961 as the level of conflict in 

South Vietnam escalated rapidly. In the earlier period, however, persua sion 

and propaganda predominated. 44 

The Viet Cong Take the Offensive 

Both the Americans and the South Vietnamese were slow to grasp the 

significance of these developments. Although U.S. intelIigence analysts 

were aware that the Viet Cong were actively proselytizing, organizing, and 

carrying on terrorist activities in certain provinces, it was difficult to appreciate how broad and deep the sou rces of support for the Viet Cong were a nd 

how quickly the Viet Cong might shift from propaganda, intimidation, and 

assassination to effective military action."s 

'''Davison, Some OlJsenmtiOlIS 011 Viet COI/~ O,Jeratiolls ;/1 the ViI/ages. pp. 39 - 41 ; John C. Donnell, 

Guy J. Paukcr, and Joseph J. ZHloff, Viel COII{< Motivatioll miff Mornle, Rand Memorandum, 

RM - 4507 - ISA (Macch 1965), pp. 38 - 39. 

420avison, Some Observatiolls 011 Viet COII,,< Gperntiolls ill the Villages, p. 41. 

° Ibid., p. 2. 

44Berman, Revolutionllry Orglmizatioll, pp. 50 - 76; Donnell, Pauker, and 2.,sloff, Viet COII,,< 

Motivatiol1l1l1(/ Mornle, p. 18. 

4<;By the fall of 1960 the Vietnamese A rmy intelligence staff had a fi le containing the names of 

over 100,000 known Viet Cong or Vie t Cong sympathizers; Msg, CINCU5ARPAC to ACSI, 

23D242z Nov 60, records of ACSI. Scholars arc still uncertain as to how the Viet Cong attained 

their extraordinary success in the 1960 - 63 period. Two major schools of interpretation exist. one 

of which tends to stress the dominant role of organization, indoctrination, and technique in the 

337 
Advice nlld Slipport: The Enrly Yenrs, 1941 - 1960 

The event which signaled that shift occurred on 26 January 1960 in Tay 

Ninh Province in the town of Trang Sup, northeast of Saigon. In the early 

morning four Viet Cong companies, totaling about 200 men, attacked the 

headquarters of the South Vietnamese Army's 32d Regiment. Quickly overrunning outlying sentry posts before the alarm could be given, they penetrated the bivouac area, destroyed two large barracks and the battalion headquarters building with shaped charges, damaged four other buildings, and 

killed or wounded sixty-six South Vietnamese troops. Having thoroughly 

reconnoitered the area in advance, the Viet Cong made off with about 350 

rifles, 30 Browning automatic rifles, 150 carbines, 40 pistols, 2 machine guns, 

2 mortars, and quantities of ammunition."6 A member of the Viet Cong Tay 

Ni nh Province Committee, Vo Van An, later revealed that "the purpose of 

the attack wa s to launch the new phase of the conflict with a resounding 

victory and to show that the military defeat of [the South Vietnamese Army] 

was easy, not difficult. ,,47 

If that was the enemy's intention he succeeded admirably. The attack at 

Trang Sup shocked the Diem government and its American advisers. It was, 

said General Williams, a "severe blow to the prestige of the Vietnamese 

Army and [an] indication of the VC ability to stage large-size well-planned 

attacks."'8 It " really put the Vietnamese in a tizzy."'9 

Many Americans were " in a tizzy" as well. Reports of the Tay Ninh fight 

brought requests from the State Department for a detailed assessment of the 

internal security situation in South Vietnam. 5O Completed by a study group of 

the country team in early February 1960, the assessment concluded that the 

South Vietnamese government was "active ly engaged in an internal war 

which is constan tly debilitating its armed forces at all levels"; vigorous action 

growth of the Viet Cong insurgency while the olher emphasizes economic, political, and social 

grievances and disruption. Examples of the first school are Douglas Pike, Viet COlIg: Tile Orgnlliw· 

fioll alld Techlliques of tile Natiol/al Liberatioll Fron t (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); Charles 

Wolf, Jr., "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: New Myths and Old Realities," Yale Review 50 

(Winter 1967): 225 - 41; and Berman, Revoilltiollary Orgallizatioll, Representative of the second 

school arc Sansom, The ECOl/omics of JI/sllrgel/CY ill the Mekollg Deltn of Vietllam; and Bernard Fall, 

"Viet Nam in the Balance," Foreigl/ Affairs 45 (October 1966). The numerous Rand studies of the 

Viet Cong reflect both viewpoints. Neither school would altogether deny the existence of genuine 

social and economic grievances or discount the Viet Cons's superb organiza tional techniques. No 

writer of either school has suggested, as General Williams did, that the Viet Cong could be dealt 

with by "gaining and maintaining a superiority of force in all parts of the country"; Lir, Williams 

to Mansfield, 20 May 60. 

#>Msg, Chief, MAAG, to CINCPAC, 29 Jan 60; L1r, Williams to Maj Gen Samuel L. Myers, 20 

Mar 60. Both in Folder 75, Williams Papers. 

4"Race, Wllr Comes to Lollg All, p. 107. In a letter to the Chief of Military History, General 

Williams has suggested that at the time of the raid the bulk of the battalion was attending a civil 

affairs function in a nearby town; L1r, Lt Gen 5amuel T. Williams to Chief of Military History, 17 

May 79, Historians files, CMH . However, the chief of the Combined Arms Training Orga ni za tion 

clearly stated that the attack occurred "after litalics added) members of the regiment returned 

from 2I sl Div memorial service"; Memo, Chief, CATO, for Chief, MAAG, sub: Final Rpt, 32d 

~i nt Incident, 26 Jan 60, file 250115, records of MAAG VN, RG 334. 

M sg, Williams to CINCPAC, 261015z Jan 60, Williams Pa pers. 

49Ltr, Williams to M yers, 20 Mar 60. 

SOU r, ARMA to AC5L 25 Apr 60, sub: Conversations Rega rding Vietnamese Army Programs, 

S- 14 - 600USARMA, records of AC51. 

338 
Thillgs Fall Apart 

was imperative to cope with the deteriorating security situation. Paying scant 

attentio n to economic, socia l, and psychological fac tors, the country team 

report stressed administrative and organizational changes. A clear-cut chain 

of command was necessary to direct the ope rations of government forces 

aga inst the Viet Cong, and the grou p recommended establishing a strong 

centrali zed military command in threa tened areas w ithout regard to province 

bo unda ries. The commande rs of those a reas should be provided up to two 

full army divisions to assist in reestablishing control. 

While recognizing that the use of army d ivisions would inte rfere with 

conventiona l training, the study group believed that total commitment of two 

full divisions to internal security operations was better than piecemeal commitment of individual battalio ns and regiments, which had been the procedure 

during the preceding yea r. The two di visions committed to "the in ternal 

security command could and should be trained fo r the role they a re designed 

to play, i. e., guerrilla warfare, and also relieved of current conventional 

unit tra ining prog rams."Si The study group also emphasized that the South 

Vietnamese government should recognize "abi lity rather than politica l 

loya lty" as the criterion for appointment of government offi cials in o rde r to 

develop a " ha rd core" of dedicated public serva nts. 52 

General Williams generally concurred with the country team's report. 

Soon after the attack at Trang Sup, Williams had "a very frank conference" 

with President Diem and strongly urged that he adopt a number of longoverdue corrective measures. 53 He stressed strict adherence to the chain of 

command, an end to political interference in the assignment of commanders, 

cen tralized control of the va rious in telligence agencies, and establishment of 

an inspector gene ral's division in the gene ral staff modeled on that of the 

U. S. Army.s" Williams nevertheless took exception to the view that the situation was out of control, and he strongly opposed the study group's recommenda tio n that more a rmy units be diverted to internal security. Even in the 

wake of the Trang Su p attack, Williams conside red the number of troops 

assigned . to " pacifica tio n d uties. . beyond all reason. " About a third of the 

infantry battalions, he noted, had been on continuous internal security du ty 

during 1959 and had received no forma l training of any kind. In concert with 

the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, the troops alread y assigned to 

security operations were more than ample to ha ndle the Viet Congo The 

problem lay in rectifying the chain of command and in improving methods 

used by the Civil Guard. 55 

Throug h at least the first half of 1960, General Williams con tinued to 

believe that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the South Vietnamese Army that reform and elimination of favoritism could not cure. 

51Country Team Study Croup Report on Internal Security Situation in Viet nam. 

52Jbid. 

5.JM sg, CHMAAC to ClNCPAC, 040931z Feb 60, Will ia ms Papers. 

5-I lbid.; Memo of Conversation, Cen Williams with President Diem, 1 Feb 60, Williams Papers. 

55Memo, Cell Williams for u.s. Ambassador, 2 Feb 60, sub: Conference With Mr. Thuan, 

Folder 78, Williams Papers. 

339 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Despite the burst of Viet Cong activities, he thought South Vietnamese commanders should be ca pable of " rega ining control in due time.. if let alone 

and given proper help by civilians." He pOinted out that wh ile the Viet Cong 

appeared able to "hit Civil Guard Posts and grab off officia ls with apparent 

ease," they usually "give the Army and Marines a wide berth."s6 In May he 

reassured Senator Mike Mansfield that it would probably be possible to begin 

scaling down the size of the Military Assistance Advisory Group by about 15 

percent in 1961 and by an add itional 20 percent in 1962. 57 

Although Williams was correct in observing that the Viet Cong more often 

attacked Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps posts, their clashes with army 

troops sometimes proved disturbing. In Kien Giang Province in the Mekong 

Delta, for example, a portion of a battalion, while engaged on a sweep, was 

attacked by about 200 Viet Congo Two officers, including the battalion commander, were captured; 24 men were killed or wounded, and the unit lost 

fifteen rifles and its radio. Not far away on 2 March an estimated 100 Viet 

Cong ambushed a South Vietnamese company, and when two other companies tried to move forward to assist, a force of about 300 Viet Cong ambushed 

them. Total South Vietnamese casua lties were 4 ki lled, 9 wounded, and over 

30 missing. Three days later, in neighboring Kien Phong Province, a Viet 

Cong battalion ambushed another company, and in a matter of minutes 5 

South Vietnamese troops were wou nded and 8 killed. 58 

In their new war against the government the Viet Cong employed many 

of the methods and tactics that had served the Viet Minh so well against the 

French. Viet Cong tactics stressed speed- rapid concentration and quick d ispersal of forces-and mass-numerical superiority in the immediate area of 

action--<:ombined with thorough preparation, surprise, and deception. The 

most common large-scale Viet Cong action was the ambush, normally laid at 

ca refu lly selected points along well-traveled roads or trails. Frequently a 

platoon would dig pits in a semicircle on one side of the road. After two or 

three men entered the pit, a fourth wou ld cover it with bamboo wattle and 

grass and remove all traces of digging. He then would take a concealed 

position with an automatic weapon to cover a charge or withdrawal. At the 

attack signal the men would leap from their pits to assa ult the surprised 

enemy on the road. 

When conditions were favorabl e the Viet Cong also staged surprise attacks 

against small South Vietnamese Army military posts. These were usually 

thoroughly reconnoitered, often with the aid of civilian sympathizers. Occasionally the Viet Cong were able to subvert or intimidate individual soldiers 

or more frequen tly Civil Guardsmen and Self-Defense Corpsmen, who would 

help the Viet Cong to infiltrate a post before an attack, sabotage a rad io, or 

fail to give the alarm when the attack began. 

5('Ltr, Williams to M yers, 20 M(lf 60; ibid. to Lt Col Robert B. Jilccard, 25 May 60, Williams 

Paf,ers. 7Ltr, Williams to Ma nsfield, 20 May 60. 

58CJA Field Intel Rpt, CS 31437,025, 12 May 60, sub: Vietnamese Communist Activities in Soulh 

Vietn<l m, copy in CMH. 

340 
Thillgs Fall Aparl 

Vietnamese Navy Patrol Boats 011 Ihe 50llg Be River. 

In their guerrilla warfare the Viet Cong employed an array of mines and 

booby traps, ranging from grenades rigged to trip wires, to concealed trenches 

filled with sharpened bamboo stakes, to large mines capable of wrecking a 

truck. The Viet Cong often used mines as the first stage of guerrilla action in 

areas where they had recently established their presence. Only a short period 

of instruction was required to familiarize new recruits and part-time partisans 

with simple mines, and the devices could later be used in raids and ambushes 

as the guerrillas gained strength and experience s9 

Some of the more serious guerrilla incidents occurred along the roads, 

rivers, and cana ls, control of which President Diem considered so vital to 

defeating the insurgency. On 25 March 1960, a South Vietnamese company 

patrolling the Cai Nuoc River in An Xuyen Province about two kilometers 

from the town of Cai Ngay was ambushed by severa l companies of Viet Cong 

concea led on the riverbanks. Over fifty soldiers were killed or wounded; 

twenty-five were reported missing. The company lost 27 rifles, 6 submachine 

gun s, 7 Browning automatic rifles, and a 60-mm. mortar. 60 A few days later 

5'JMAAG Translation, ARVN Monthly ~evicw. "Know Your Enemy," Issue Nos. 1, 2, and 6, 

copies in Williams Papers. 

f>llCiA Field Intel Rpt, CS 3/438,613, 19 May 60, sub: Communist Attacks in the Southern 

Provinces of South Vietnam, copy in CM H . 

341 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

South Vietnamese troops traveling in junks on the Vam Xa ng Ca nal in Ba 

Xuyen Province spotted other soldiers in South Vietnamese uniforms moving 

along the sides of the canal. The troops on the banks suddenly opened fire 

with rifles and automatic weapons. Two junks were sunk and over a hundred 

South Vietnamese soldiers killed 6 1 

The South Vietnamese often performed poorly even when surprise was 

absent. [n an operation in War Zone 0, South Vietnamese forces completely 

surround ed a Viet Cong force guarding a large supply of rice, but du ring the 

night "practica lly the entire VC force was able to slip through the cordon 

ca rrying the rice on their backs. ,,62 A more revea ling episode occurred in Kien 

Giang Province. A Vietnamese Army company commander rece ived advance 

warning that the Viet Cong were planning to attack his unit at a sma ll hamlet 

in [(jen An district. He immediately ordered his troops to dig in and prepared 

fields of fire and sa nd bag emplacements for his machine gu ns. That night a 

Viet Cong band surrounded the post and fired a few bursts of automatic 

weapons fire into the company positions, followed by megaphone appea ls to 

surrender. The Viet Cong force was inferior to the army compa ny in both 

numbers and weapons but was accompanied by about 100 unarmed civilians, 

who rushed the post with the Viet Cong shouting "Forward l Forward l" This 

tactic compl etely unnerved the government troops, many of whom " f1 ed in 

disorder and did not fire a single shot. ,,63 The South Vietnamese Army 

company sustained twenty-eight casualties; the Viet Cong, who leisurely 

sea rched the post collecting weapons, clothing, ammunition, and signal equipment, came away with at least two-dozen rifles and two submachine guns. 64 

Few reports of army setbacks ever reached Sa igon through normal channels. Despite the deteriorating security situation, South Vietnamese commanders continued to report increasing success against the Viet Congo At a conference of senior American advisers to South Vie tnamese divisions in April 1960, 

all but one officer rated the morale of his division as high, excelle nt, or very 

high, its responsiveness to American advice as good or very responsive. 65 A 

few weeks later, General Williams told an American news correspondent that 

the South Vietnamese Army was doing "quite well" in operations against the 

insurgents. "00 you think the forces in being are capable of handling the Viet 

Cong?" asked the reporter. "The armed forces in being are whipping them 

right now," Williams replied66 

The South Vietnamese high command reported 931 Viet Cong killed and 

almost 1,300 captured from mid-January to mid-April 1960. Yet the governuL lbid. 

62CJA Field Intet Rpt, CS 3/402,599, 22 Jan 59, sub: Additional Information on NVA Action in 

War Zone D, copy in CMH; MAAG Translation, ARVN Monthly Review, "Know Your Enemy," 

Issue N o. 3, copy in Williams Papers. 

6:lM AAG Tra nslation, ARVN Monthly Review, "Know Your Enemy," Issue No.8, copy in 

Williams Papers. 

64Jbid. 

65Senior Advisers Conference Notes, 27 - 29 Apr 60, with Attachments, in r older 80, Williams 

a~e s. 

M rR, Interv of Cen Williams by Tilllc-Lifc, 2 JUIl 60, Williams Papers. 

342 
Th;IIgs Fall Apart 

ment forces reported only 150 weapons captured. 67 At the same time, weapons lost by South Vietnamese troops exceeded 1,000: 660 Ml rifles, 400 other 

rifles, 82 pistols, 90 su bmachine guns, 8 mortars, and various other weapons. 

To General Williams it appeared that the Viet Cong were "arming themselves 

from ca ptured weapons.,,68 A Ministry of Defense official estimated that in a 

single month the South Vietnamese troops lost enough weapons to a rm a 

battalion. 69 

"Too often," General Williams pointed out, "reports of engagements show 

large losses of weapons without corresponding personnel 10sses."70 When he 

brought that fact to the attention of the president, Diem explained bla nd ly 

that " the arms were usa lly lost when th e soldiers went to retrieve the bodies 

of dead comrades."71 Williams found it difficult to " understand how a welltrained and properly indoctrinated soldier feels it necessary to throw his 

weapons away.,,72 

The Breakdown of the Army 

The answer, as was becoming increasing ly plain , was that South Vietnamese forces were in no way well trained and indoctrinated. Reports of 

successes were delibera tely manufactured to sa tisfy the demands of President 

Diem and to protect the reputation of the commanders involved . A field 

grade officer assigned to the general staff told a representative of the 

American embassy that reports from the provinces were routinely doctored 

" to make it appear that they were continually conducting successful anticommunist operations." One report cla imed that South Vietnamese forces in 

Phuong Dinh Province had captured sixty members of the Viet Cong Tay Do 

Battalion; investiga tion revealed that the prisoners were all civilians and that 

the Tay Do Battalion did not exist." "Concealment of the existing situation 

has become so ingrained in some officials," noted a CIA report, "that they 

tend to reject any facts which do not fit their optimistic eva luations.,,74 

As two senior officials of the Ministry of Defense explained to their 

American advisers, Diem "refuses to listen to unpleasant fa cts and . . 

becomes furious with individuals who tell him such th ings." His brother, 

('7Six Minute Reports, Senior Advisers Conference Notes, 27 - 29 Apr 60, Inel to Memo, Col 

Sam J. Ra sor for Chi ef, CATO Div, 18 Apr 60, sub: Senior Advise rs Conference Specia l Report, 

cOEl in Folder 80, Williams Papers. 

Memo, Williams for Cols Rasor and Barrett, 23 May 60, sub: Loss of Weapons, Folder SO, 

Williams Papers. 

""'Memo of Conversation, Col C. P. Kent with Mr. Chiell, 8 Aug 60, Folder 90, Williams Papers. 

7UM emo, Williams for Rasor and Barrett, 23 May 60, sub: Loss of Weapons. 

71Memo of Conversa tion, Williams with Diem, 23 May 60, Will iams Papers. 

72Memo, Williams for Rasor and Barrett, 23 May 60, sub: Loss of Weapons. 

73C1A Field Intel Rpt, CS 3/450,29 1, 22 Scp 60, sub: Attitude of High Command Toward VNA 

Field Reports, copy in CMH. 

74CIA Field Intel Rpt, IS Apr 60, sub: Ca uses of Deterioration of Security in Southwest 

Provinces, copy in CMH. 

343 
Advice nlld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Ngo Dinh Nhu, the only individual to whom Diem might have listened, was 

as isolated as the president and " never leaves his office to learn by first hand 

observation what the situation is.,,75 Instead, both Nhu and Diem relied on a 

network of informants from the Can Lao Party, who, like the field commanders, told them mainly what they wanted to hear. 

A story making the rounds of the Saigon bureaucracy told of an army 

captain who, upon being appointed province chief, made a thorough inspection of his province and concluded that the security situation was very 

serious and that he had insufficient means and authority to accomplish 

anything. When he reported his find ings to Diem, the president summarily 

reduced him to the rank of private and returned him to his unit ?6 Whether or 

not the story was apocryphal, it accura tely reflected the hazards of honest 

reporting. 

The delibera te fa lsification of operational reports plus the lack of any 

reliable and precise method for advisers to assess the effectiveness of their 

units may accou nt for the fa ilure of Americans in the advisory group to 

recognize the progressive breakdown of South Vietnamese units. More d ifficult to explain is the breakdown itself. Why, after more than three years of 

training and operations, should the army prove incapable of coping with 

relatively small bodies of generally less well armed and equipped Viet Cong 

forces? 

One reason for the disparity between the impressive appearance of South 

Vietnamese troops in training schools and on parade and their mediocre 

performance in combat was simply that the well turned out troops on the 

parade ground were not the soldiers who normally did battle with the Viet 

Congo After a short period of basic training, most new recruits or draftees 

were sent directly to tactical units while more experienced enlisted men, 

noncommissioned officers, and officers served in rear area headquarters or in 

agencies of the Ministry of Defense." Combat units were seriously short of 

officers and noncommissioned officers and had as many as 50 percent new 

men in the ran ks. In the 43d Infantry Regiment, for example, sixteen of 

sixty-two officers were on detached duty outside the regiment; only 60 percent of authorized strength in noncommissioned officers was assigned, a third 

of whom were on detached duty. "A combat rifle company," General Williams pointed out, "cannot be successful ... with only 50 or 60 percent or 

less of its NCOs present for du ty.,,78 

The most freq uent explanation for army failures heard in Sa igon was that 

the troops were receiving improper or inappropriate training.'" General Williams and his officers usually responded that the problem was not improper 

75Memos, Col Ernest P. La sche fo r CHMAAG, 26 Jul 60, sub: Summary of Conversation at 

DOD, and 14 Ma r 60, sub: Conversation With Dr. Diem. Bolh in Williams Papers, Folders 89 and 

60, respecti vely. 

76lbid. 

n LtT, ARMA to ACSI, 25 Apr 60, sub: Conversa tions Regarding Vietnamese Army Programs. 

7HLtT, Williams to Than Thuat Diem, 9 Apr 60, Williams Papers. 

NMemo, Williams for Senior Advisers, 26 Feb 60, sub: Acti vities, Folder 80, Williams Papers. 

344 
Thillgs Fall Apart 

training but ra ther la ck of train ing. Throughout 1959 an average of 25 battalions was constantly assigned to security operations; by 1960 the number had 

risen to 34, with an additional 20 battalions assigned to static defensive 

duties. 80 Individual training was frequently superficial or incomplete. The 

basic training cycle at the Quang Trung Training Center was only eight weeks 

long, and "the hours devoted to various subjects were not sufficient for the 

draftee to properly absorb the instruction." That was particularly true of 

marksmanship. In theory I the recruit was to receive additional basic training 

after he joined his unit, but the pressure of operational requirements usually 

precluded such training8 • In fact, some soldiers were assigned to operations 

without any training whatever. 

The three-phase unit training program was also seriously retarded. Phase 

one, basic unit training for platoons, companies, and battalions, was an 

eleven-week cycle emphasizing movement exercises over various types of 

terrain. Phase two consisted essentially of command post exercises. Phase 

three included actual field maneuvers, but many un its failed to progress that 

far. 82 One adviser rated the state of training of many units as so poor that "I 

wou ldn't have trusted most platoon leaders to go out on their own with their 

platoon. . . They'd be lucky to be able to march down a straight road."8) 

Fu rthermore, many Vietnamese officers failed to appreciate the value of training. Peacetime traini ng, said the director of the Command and General Staff 

School, General Pham Xua n Chieu, was unimportant and lacked "realism." 

In a combat situation the troops could in effect teach themselves because they 

would be "motivated and learn fast."" 

Few South Vietnamese officers shared, or even understood, the American 

officers' belief in coordination, teamwork, loyalty to superiors and subordinates, skill, and delega ti on of authority. Yet these ideas were fundamental 

to the U.S. style of military operations. Nor did the Vietnamese officers see 

th eir government or the army as an entity; they viewed each in terms of their 

own particular burea u, agency, or battalion, independent of, and usually in 

competition with, other agencies and units. As one American adviser noted, 

"Coordination among agencies to achieve unity of effort and effect for the 

common good is almost unknown: more than this, it is zealously avoided as 

an undesirable encroachment on individual agency prerogatives.. . There is 

much to lead one to believe that, given freedom to do so, the [South) 

Vietnamese would quickly scrap the military organization so carefully developed by [the advisory group) and revert quite happily to what they were 

familiar with in the past."ss Another adviser reported that South Vietnamese 

KOLtr, Williams to Ambassador Du rbrow, 19 Apr 60, Folder 77, Williams Papers. 

IMemo, Col Charles A. Symroski, 9 Oct 59, sub: Training Matters; Ltr, Williams to President 

Diem, 12 Aug 60. Both in W illiams Papers, Folders 76 and 74, respectively. 

IULt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, Ti,e RVNAF, Indochina Monograph Series (Washington: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 189. 

1I3lnterv, author with L.,sche, 30 Aug 79. 

IWMemo, Col James R. Kent for CHMAAG, 19 May 60, sub: Training, Williams Papers. 

MSUr, Col E. P. Lasche to Gen Williams, 27 Ju l 60, sub: Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Williams 

Papers. 

345 
Advice mId SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

officers were uninterested in training above the battalion level because they 

had no notion of ever operating with larger units. 86 

The communications gap between U.S. advisers and their counterparts 

also posed problems. Not only were most American military advisers unfamiliar with the society, culture, and language of South Vietnam, but the advisory role itself was unfamiliar. A senior American adviser described that 

role as "entirely new and challenging to most American soldiers. They have 

spent most of their lives giving and executing orders. As advisers to South 

Vietnamese counterparts, they neither give nor take orders; they have a much 

less positive role--that of giving advice, providing guidance and exerting 

influence."s7 Separated by a wide gulf of culture and language, the American 

adviser could have only the vaguest idea of the effect his guidance and 

suggestion s were having on the unit he advised. Advisers found their counterparts affable, highly accessible, and always willing to listen to advice. But that 

advice seldom produced significant results, for even when South Vietnamese 

commanders issued new orders or directives, they were reluctant to compel 

their subordinates to comply with them. 88 

One American adviser set himself the seemingly modest goal of discouraging the soldiers in his regiment from carrying their boots and even an 

occasional chicken slung from their rifles, a practice common in Vietnam. 

After much preaching and expostulating, the adviser had nearly eliminated 

the practice by the time of his departure. On his final day of duty he was 

pleased to observe not a single boot or fowl suspended from any soldier'S 

weapon. Delayed a few days at the airport, the triumphant adviser decided to 

return surreptitiously to view his unit on the march . Much to his chagrin he 

found that the boots and chickens had already resumed their time-honored 

places"9 

Even had the Vietnamese commanders wanted to follow the suggestions 

of their American advisers, it is doubtful whether they could have done so. 

The Americans routinely referred to the officers they advised as their "counterparts." In fact, they were in no way the counterpart of the American 

captains, majors, and colonels assigned to the advisory detachments. "It may 

not be exaggera ting at all to observe," a senior adviser remarked, "that 

almost every American junior officer has a better understanding of method, 

procedure and initiative, than does the average senior Vietnamese official, 

civilian or military."90 

Politicization of the army was rampant. Politically approved officers or 

those with relatives in high places rose quickly to command wh ile others 

languished. CIA informants reported that in some units command was actu86M emo, Kent for CHMAAG, 19 May 60, sub: Training. 

117Rcports, Senior Adviser, 2d Inf Div, 11 Apr 60, and Senior Adviser to Corps and 2d lnf Regt, 

27 Apr 50, Incl 2 to Senior Advisers Conference Notes, 27 - 29 April 50, Folder 80, Williams 

Pagers. 

Ur, Laschc to Williams, 27 Jul60, sub: Lessons Learned in Vietnam. 

8'Jlnterv, author wi th Symroski, 16 Aug 79. 

9OMemo, Col Ernest Lasche for CHMAAG, 3 Mar 60, sub: Conversation With Mr. Dung, Folder 

89, Williams Papers. 

346 
Thillgs Fall Aparl 

ally exercised not by the nominal commanders but by "political officers" of 

the Can Lao Party yl A common joke among Vietnamese officers was that 

promotion was based on the "Three Os," which stood for the Vietnamese 

Oallg ("party," that is, the Can Lao), Oao ("religion"- Catholicism), and 0 11 , a 

vu lgar expression for Diem's native region of central Vietnam."2 Viet Cong 

leaders presented a striking contrast to the officers of the Vietnamese Army. 

Unlike Communist functionaries in Europe, who were usually regarded as 

ruthless opportunists out to enjoy the benefits of party membership, Viet 

Cong officers had few privileges and much responsibility. Former South 

Vietnamese Army sold iers who deserted to, or were captured by, the Viet 

Cong were " impressed by the lack of insignia on the officers' and noncommissioned uniforms and the fact that the officers li ved under the same 

hardships in the field as do the men."93 

It was also apparent that the army was heavily infiltrated by agents and 

sympathizers of the Viet Congo The precise extent of the penetration will 

probably never be known, but that it was extensive there can be little doubt. 

During the first half of 1960, for example, the army conducted five major 

operations in fi ve separate areas of the Mekong De1ta: in each case "there was 

every evidence that the Viet Cong knew in advance" the tactica l plan, route, 

and timing of the ope ration."4 The Central Intelligence Agency believed that 

as early as the spring of 1958 the Viet Cong had penetrated the South 

Vietnamese general staff, and in June 1959 the Slirele arrested Cpl. Nguyen 

Van Sau, w ho had been the personal bodyguard to the assistant chief of staff 

for more than three years, as a Viet Cong agent. It was also estimated that 

the Viet Cong had agents in the engineers, the Center for Aerial Photograp hy, the First Military District Recruiting Burea u, and the Ministry of 

Defense 95 At the end of 1959 a captain commanding a communications 

compa ny in the Sa igon area and one of his offi cers were arrested for espionage; as company commander, the capta in had had access to all classified 

messages as well as to cipher books and eq uipment. Even Diem's Can Lao 

Party was thoroughly penetrated by the Viet Cong, and in January 1960 two 

officers in the operations section of the genera l staff, both members of the 

party, were discovered to be Viet Cong agents."6 

Whether due to espionage, poor leadershi p, lack of communication, or 

inadequate training, in the early months of 1960 the South Vietnamese Army 

'JICorruption in the Diem regime is discussed in Dispatch 267, Durbrow to State Dept, 16 Mar 

60, sub: Internal Security and Corruption, 751G.OO/3 - 1660. records of Dept of Siale. 

<lzKhuyen, rite I~VNAr, pp. 53 - 54. CIA Field Intel Rpts, CS 3/372,690,7 Oct 58, sub: Discontent Among Senior Officers, and CS 3/363.933, 28 Ju l 59, sub: South Vietnamese Dese rte rs. 

"ODonnell, Pa ukc r, and Zlsloff, Viet COIIg Motivatiol/ (ll1d Momle, p. 61. 

'1-1CIA Field Intel Rpt, CS/433,419, 14 Apr 60, sub: Speculation on Existence of High Level VC 

A~e t. 

'SCIA Field Intel Rpts, CSOB 3/636,057, 29 May 58, sub: Information Available to VN Communists Through Penetration of VNA General Staff, and CS 3/357,m, 10 Jun 58, sub: Organization 

of VN Communist M ilitary Espionage Committee in Saigon-Cholon Area. 

96CIA Field Intel Rpt CS 3/424, 172, 14 Jan 60, sub: Further Information on Communist Net in 

VNA. 

347 
Advice mid SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

had shown itself clearly unequal to the task of coping with the steadily 

growing insurgency. A search for some new solution had already begun. 

348 
18 

"Something Extra and Special" 

As the seriousness of the insurgency became more apparent during the early 

weeks of 1960, American and South Vietnamese leaders bega n to consider 

what new measures might be adopted to dea l with the deteriorating security 

situation. President Diem had his own ideas. On IS February 1960, without 

consulting Genera l Williams or any other American, the president bega n a 

new program by ordering commanders of divisions and military regions to 

form ranger companies composed of volunteers from the army, the reserves, 

retired army personnel, and the Civil Gua rd. Trained in antiguerrilla warfare, 

each company was to have 131 men- an II -ma n headquarters and three 

40-man platoons. The military regions and divisions were expected to organize 50 companies by ea rly March. Of these, 32 would be attached to the 

various military regions and 18 to the divisions. I 

The Counterinsurgency Controversy 

General Williams first learned of the project on 20 February from Nguyen 

Dinh Thuan, Under Secretary of State for Na tional Defense, who 

explained that the new units were to train at Nha Trang during March, April, 

and May. Thuan requested that the Military Assistance Advisory Group 

arrange for U.S. Army Special Forces teams to be assigned to Vietnam to 

assist in training. 2 The idea of forming ranger or commando units was not 

new to the advisory group. As ea rly as 1958 the Vietnamese general staff had 

proposed setting up special units variously called scout, commando, or ranger 

1000 Temporary Instructi on No. 760 - QP/BB/jlM. 16 Feb 60; RVNAF Instruction, 24 Feb 60, 

sub: Commandos. Copies in Williams Papers. 

lMemo, Williams for Ambassador, 20 Feb 60, sub: Conversations With Mr. Thuan; Msg, 

Williams to C1NCPAC, 2203 17z Feb 60. Both in Williams Papers. 

349 
Advice alld SlIpport: Tile Early Yenrs, 1941 - 1960 

companies, but General Williams had always firmly opposed such a course ] 

His deputy fo r training, Genera l Myers, reca lled that the small Commando 

School at Nha Trang " had been sta rted by the French . The French Army has 

commandos and the American Army doesn't have commandos; it never has 

had comma ndos and he [Williams] didn't thin k very much of having that 

school and that's probably ... the reason it was so sma ll and its efforts never 

got expa nded.'" 

Williams and his staff saw the president's newest project as "hasty, illconsidered, and destructive to overall instruments of power," and argued 

that it wou ld be necessary to can niba lize three or four existi ng army companies to provide the personnel for a single commando company. They questioned how the program could be legally supported under the current manpower ceiling for the military assistance program, and added that it would 

prove a serious drain on already limited supplies of such critical items of 

eq uipment as radios. What was needed to conquer the Viet Cong, Williams 

believed, was not specialized units but a reorganized, well-equipped, and 

revitalized Civil Guard; intensive training for units between operations; an 

improved counterintelligence system; and a clear chain of command s 

Williams also questioned how the companies, once created, could be 

employed. Recent experience in the delta had shown that it was risky to 

employ units sma ller than a battalion in counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, the commando companies would have to be attached to some larger 

unit. "A young ARVN battalion commander has his hands fu ll with his 

[regular] companies. . .. To plan fo r and control one or two add itional and 

attached ranger companies complicates his planning and control and any 

mission given his command to execute."6 

Diem was unimpressed with these objections. To the visiting commander 

of the U.S. Army, Pacific, General I. D. White, he explained that since the 

guerrilla th rea t to in ternal security had been added to the long-standing 

external threat posed by North Vietnam, 20,000 rangers were needed above 

and beyond the regular army to deal with the new threat. If funds were not 

available to support 20,000, he would propose starting with half that number. 7 

General W hite was as unenthusiastic as Williams about the ranger companies. Even a 1O,000-man force was unnecessary, he believed, and wou ld 

represent an unwarranted financial burden on the government of Vietnam, 

one wh ich it would eventually try to pass on to the United States. White 

believed that regu lar army forces operating as small uni ts would be adequate to cope with the Viet Congo Although recognizing that such small-unit 

operations would interfere with the normal traini ng program, he believed that 

J.Memo, Williams for Chief, CATO, 15 Sep 58, sub: Mobile Operations, Folder 42, Williams 

Pa.r.ers. 

Interv, author with Myers, 22 - 23 Feb 77. 

SAttachmenl to Ltr, Williams to Ambassador Durbrow, 11 Mar 6(}, sub: Com mandos, Folder 77, 

Williams Papers. 

6Memo, Williams for u.s. Ambassador, I Ju n 60, sub: Training of the RVNAF, Folder 77, 

Williams Papers. 

7MFR. 23 Feb 60, sub: Visit of Cen I. D . White to President Diem, Folder 73. Williams Papers. 

350 
"Somethillg Extra alld Special" 

the South Vie tnamese government was unable to afford "an army to be 

organ ized, trained, and loca ted primarily to resist external a ttack and also 

raise a special security force----€specially when the guerrillas are by far the 

grea ter threat. "s The Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Felt, agreed that 

commando units were unnecessary and pointed out that while antiguerrilla 

training for army units was essential, "equal attention must be given to 

economic, political and social aspects of the problem.,,9 

Although General Williams had long opposed withd rawing a rmy units 

from training to conduct antiguerrilla operations, he appa rently now concluded that to do so would be fa r less disturbing than to create the ranger 

force. The new standard South Vietnamese division, he noted, had been 

specifically designed for two missions, not one, so that divisions could be 

easily broken down into regiments, battalions, or even company-size units. 10 

In the face of President Diem's continuing refusal to abandon his plan for 

ranger companies, however, Williams decided that "the best we can do is to 

try and get the fi gure of 10,000 reduced." In tha t he succeeded, for Diem 

finally agreed to sta rt w ith 5,000 men on a " trial and error basis."" 

To many Ame rica n observers in Saigon and Washing ton, the ranger project appeared to be simply a device to enable Diem to add more troops to the 

army beyond the 150,000-man ceiling that the United States had agreed to 

support. 12 Some also wondered whether the demand for ranger units was not 

evidence of serious shortcomings in the American training program, particula rly of a failure adequa tely to train and prepa re the South Vietnamese 

Army for antiguerrilla warfare. 13 Civilian officials in the Defense Department's Ad vanced Resea rch Projects Agency argued tha t the fact that South 

Vietnamese forces, fa r supe rior numerica lly to some 3,000 to 5,000 Viet Cong, 

had been unable to control the insurgency demonstrated that "conventionally 

trained , conventionally organized and conventionally equipped military organizations are incapable of employment in anti-guerrilla operations." 14 

Gene ral Williams vigorously contested such reasoning . As early as September 1958, he pointed out, the Military Assistance Advisory Group had 

prepa red a paper on " basic principles of anti-guerrilla operations" based 

on U.S. doctrine and had distributed it to senior South Vietnamese commanders and their advisers. All relevant U.s. Army fi eld manuals had also been 

translated into Vietnamese and made available by early 1957. In addition, a 

limited amount of instruction in antiguerrilla tactics had been given to 

~Lt , White to Williams, 5 Mar 60, Folder 73, Williams Papers. 

9Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG, 4 Mar 60, Williams Papers. 

lO Ur, Williams to I. D. W hite, 14 Mar 60, Folder 73, Williams Papers. 

"Memo, Wiltiams for Ambassador Durbrow, 10 Mar 60, sub: Commando Force, Folder 77, 

Williams Papers. 

!2Ltr, Williams to Ma; Cen Samuel L. Myers, 20 Mar 60, Folder 75, Williams Papers; Ltr, 

Durbrow to Secy of State, 10 Ma r 60, 751G.OO/3 - 1060, records of Dept of State. 

13Memo, Ambassador Durbrow for Cen Williams, 19 Apr 60, sub: Antigu e rrilla Tra ining, Folder 

77, Williams Pape rs. 

I"Memo, Di rector, Policy and Planning Div, ARPA (W. H. Codel), for Asst Secy o f Defense, 

ISA, 15 Sep 60, sub: Vietnam, ISA 092VN, RG 330. 

351 
Advice m,d Support: Tile Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

students at the Vietnamese Staff College and at noncommissioned offi cer 

schools. 's 

In answer to this line of argument the Advanced Research Projects Agency 

observed that the United States wou ld ultimately have to " recognize the 

similarity between Ith e Viet Cong insurgency] and that of its own French 

and Indian, revolutiona ry and banana wars of history. Despite the statement . that the tactics and training for this kind of warfa re can be derived 

from a field manual, it is suggested that this particular field manual has long 

been out of print in U.S. and French military circles." The agency preferred 

to see the formation of lightly equipped, self-sustaining paramilitary orga niza tions at the village level. "These forces should be provided not with conventional arms and equipment requiring third and fourth level maintenance 

but with a capabili ty to be farmers, or taxi drivers during the da y and 

anti-guerrilla forces at night."I. 

General Williams rejected th e contention that the advisory group had 

created a conventional army built around divisions too large and unwieldy to 

be effective against guerrillas. The new standard division, he argued, had 

been designed to conduct combat operations against either conventional or 

guerrilla forces. The South Vietnamese soldier had the same mobility as the 

Viet Cong guerrilla, and his equipment was lighter and better. 17 Antiguerrilla 

training, said Williams, was a supplement to and not a substitute for individual and small-unit combat train ing. Only when soldiers mastered the latter 

fundamentals could they effectively go on to learn the more open and fluid 

style of warfare cha racteristic of counterguerrilla operations. 

As an example, if two fire teams of a squad have not learned to adva nce each 

other by extremely well-coordinated fire and movement, with each man doing 

his job ... they cannot be expected to perform effectively in attempting the 

same task with the extremely limited observation, the obstacles, and the far 

greater control problems that characterize jungle or swamp operations against 

a guerrilla enemy. 18 

The entire question of antiguerrilla or, as it was coming to be called, 

counterinsurgency warfare was complicated by the fact that the U.S. Army 

had paid little attention to the need to develop counterinsurgency training 

and doctrine during the 1950s.19 If the field manuals on antiguerrilla warfare 

made available by General Williams to the South Vietnamese Army were 

inadequa te, as th e Advanced Research Projects Agency contended, this inadequacy reflected an Army-wide deficiency rather than one peculiar to the 

advisory group. The cou nterinsurgency controversy, morever, was another 

instance in which personal and bureaucratic rivalries within the country team 

15Memo, Williams for All MAAG Advisers, 4 Apr 60, sub: Notes on Antiguerrilla Operations, 

Williams Papers. 

16Mcmo, Director, Policy and Planning Div, A RPA, for Ass! Sec)' of Defense, ISA. 15 Scp 60, 

sub: Vic!nam. 

17Memo, Williams for U.S. Ambassador, 1 Jun 60, sub: Training of the RVNAF. 

181bid. 

1"See eh. 14, p. 273. 

352 
"Sollleth illg Extra alld Special" 

complica ted what should have been a technical question. General Williams 

had long been at odds, both personally and professionally, with the ambassador, the military attaches, and the U.S. O pera tions Mission, and it is hard 

to escape the impression that these individuals derived a certain amou nt of 

bitter satisfaction from the fact that the general's training methods were now 

being called into question. 20 

Yet both Williams and his critics missed the central fact that the ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese Army was not something that could have been dealt 

with simply through finding a more effective training program. Much more 

basic were the problems of corru ption, incompetence, low morale, poor leade rship, and lack of security. These intrinsic weaknesses, in turn, were merely 

refl ections of the weaknesses of the Diem regime and its manifest inability to 

cope with what was by now a growing social revolution. But since wea pons 

and training were far more amenable to inf1uence than political and social 

problems, Ame rican leaders continued to concentrate on the former and 

neglect the latter. 

The belief that the military had to be concerned with the political and 

social aspects of combating insurgency was held by few U.5. officers before 

the early 1960s. It was only in 1961 that the Army's Special Warfare School at 

Fort Bragg introduced a course of lectures, largely at the insistence of the 

State Department, on " the economic, social and political and psychological 

factors which create revolutionary conditions in a country.,,21 As the Army's 

chief of resea rch and development observed, the traditional "wall of separation between politics and the military . . does not work against communistsupported guerrillas where politica l and military actions are one."" Within 

the country team the problems went even deeper than the "wall of separation" between the military and politics, for by consistently and vigorously 

discouraging serious criticism of the Vietnamese government, as Genera l 

Williams had done since 1957, the advisory group had exerted a negative 

influence on efforts by other elements of the U.S. mission to come to grips 

with the underlying social and economic conditions fueling the Viet Cong 

insurgency . 

While Diem experimented with commando units, Washington for the first 

time since the sect crisis of 1955 was becoming seriously concerned about 

developments in Vietnam. This concern was fu eled by reports from the 

American embassy in Saigon . These reports stressed the growing d iscontent 

with the Diem regime in the countrysid e; the arbi trary, apathetic, corrupt, or 

2°Both General Williams and Ambassador Durbrow spoke quite frankly about their personality 

conflicts in their interviews with CMH historians. 5ee also Interv with Mr. Leland Barrows, 12 Jul 

76, Historians files, CM H. On attachc*MAAC relations, see Msgs, ARM A to AC51, 11 5ep 57, 

5 - 31 - 57, OARMA 350.09, and 25 Apr 60,5 - 14 - 60, OARMA, both in records of AC51. 

21 Memo fo r Walt W. Rostow, 23 Jan 61, sub: Adequacy of Proposed U.s. Army Program of 

Instruction at Fort Bragg and Fort Gulick on Counte rguerrill a Ope rations, Nationa l Security files: 

Meetings and Memos, Box 325, John F. Kennedy Library. 

llMemo, Lt Cen Arthur G. Trudea u for Director's Office and Division Chiefs, Office, Chief of 

R&D, 20 Mar 61, sub: Gue rrilla Warfare, National Secu rity fil es: Meetings and Memos, Box 325, 

John F. Kennedy Library. 

353 
Advice mId Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

inefficient manner in w hich many government officials carried out their 

duties; and the stepped-up guerrilla activities of the Viet Congo Communist 

guerrillas no longer operated in squads of 3 to 12 but in bands of 30, 50, or 

100 men. Total insurgent armed strength by March 1960 was estimated at 

more than 3,000 men. Ambassador Durbrow could only offer the hope that 

Diem now realized the gravity of the situation and was prepared to eliminate 

corruption, select ca pable administrators, and take other steps to win the 

confidence of the loca l population .

23 

In Washington Army Chief of Staff Lyman L. Lemnitzer was reading 

Durbrow's reports and becoming impatient with what he considered the 

"routine way" in which the State and Defense Departments were dea li ng 

with the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. General Lemnitzer directed the 

Army staff to recommend actions which might be taken both to foc us attention on the situation and to provide increased help to Vietnam. 2

' 

One obvious measure would be to ma ke available the Army's specialists 

in guerrilla warfare, the Special Forces, to help develop Diem's commando 

forces. General Williams favored such a plan but worried that the introduction of Special Forces personnel would cause the total advisory strength 

in the country to rise above the allowable maximum. This difficulty was 

met by assigning them to Vietnam on temporary duty. 25 In May, at the 

invitation of President Diem, 3 u .S. Army Special Forces training teams of 

10 men each from the 77th Special Forces Group on Okinawa arrived in 

Vietnam, along with 13 U.S. Army intelligence specialists and 3 psychological 

warfare specialists. 

Although Special Forces rep resentatives had recommended to Genera l 

Williams a minimum training period of 7 weeks (9 weeks was the norm for 

U.S. troops), the Vietnamese ranger course was restricted to 4 weeks. Emphasis was placed on training officers and noncommissioned officers of commando and rifle companies. 26 The teams established courses at Nha Trang 

and at the headquarters of the 5th Division at Song Mao. After two or th ree 

four-week courses had been completed, the Americans were to revert to the 

status of advisers, and South Vietnamese graduates of the course were to 

become the instructors. 27 

Williams continued to hope that the Vietnamese ranger project could be 

phased ou t after a time, but Diem was determined to continue. In June the 

South Vietnamese general staff unanimously recommended that the new 

ranger companies be incorporated into the TOlE strength of the regular army. 

Accepting the inevitable, the advisory group began plans to eliminate a rifle 

23 A m Embassy, Saigon, to Dept of Sta te, 2 Mar 60, 751 k.OO/3 - 260, 10 Mar 60, 751 k.OO/3 - 1060, 

and 7 Mar 60, 7S1k.OO/3 - 760. Copies in Historians files, CMH . 

24Memo, CofSA for DCSOPS, 12 Mar 60, sub: Antiguerrilla Training for Vietnam, CS 091 

Vietnam . 

25M emo, Col Edwin F. Black, 11 Mar 60, sub: Special Forces Personnel for South Vietnam; Fact 

Sheet, 19 May 60, sub: Counterguerrilla Training Assistance for South Vietnam. Both in CS 09 1 

Vietnam . 

261bid.; Ltr, Williams to Tran Van Don, 1 May 60, Folder 73, Williams Papers. 

27Ibid .; Durbrow to Slate Dept, 19 Apr 60, 75 1G.OO/4 - 1960, records of Dept of Stale. 

354 
"SOlllelhing Exira and Special" 

company from each battalion of the standard division, leaving three companies per battalion; the spaces thus made available would th en be used to 

absorb the ranger companies within the divisional force structure. 28 

Although the ranger program con tinued, like other activities of the South 

Vietnamese Army it was rendered largely ineffective by inefficiency, corruption, and apa thy. Of 311 officers and enlisted men who attended the first 

course, 218 graduated; in the second class of 364, 63 students dropped out 

within the first two weeks. The high attrition rate was attributed to absences 

without leave, desertion, malingering, sickness, and simple resignations. 29 

Adding to these difficulties were the usual problems of poor leadership 

and lack of attention by higher command. MAAG advisers complained that 

instructions by the Vietnamese general staff setting forth the criteria for 

selection of officers for the ranger units were being ignored by field commanders and that, beyond issuing follow-up instructions, the chief of staff felt 

unable to take any furth er action. The officer selected as chief of rangers, with 

responsibility for organizing and administering the new units, was in fact 

fu lly occupied with an operational command in Military Region V and had 

little time for other matters. 3O 

All the while the situation in South Vietnam worsened. As the Viet Cong 

routinely attacked installations and routed government security patrols, a 

senior South Vietnamese government official confided to a member of the 

American embassy that the security situation in the southwestern provinces 

was so bad that unless drastic action were taken, the government wou ld 

probably lose control of Kien Tuong and Kien Phong Provinces and the entire 

Ca Mau peninsula .

3l Also disturbing were reports that Viet Cong activity in 

the heretofore relatively quiet north central provinces had begun to increase. 

[n September, for example, a band of 60 to 100 Viet Cong attacked a district 

headquarters in the town of Dong An in Quang Nam Province. The district 

office, the Civil Gua rd posts, and the SlIrele offices were burned to the 

ground, and most of the guardsmen were killed or wounded. When a survivor managed to call for help by rad io, an army unit arrived on the scene and 

made contact with the Viet Cong a t the nearby village of PhuDc Son, but the 

Viet Cong quickly brushed aside the government troops and escaped. Casualties among the government forces were nine killed and fourteen wounded . 

Although Diem described the action to Durbrow as "a striking victory" and 

claimed that the Viet Cong had incurred at least equal casualties, American 

observers were less sure. 32 

Given the increased emphasis on counterinsurgency, attention inevitably 

turned to the recent example of British success in suppressing Communist 

28Ltr, Williams to Adm Felt, 18 Jun 60, Folder 74, Williams Papers. 

29Maj Albert Robichaud, Memo of Conversations with Cen Williams, 24 Jul 60, Williams 

Pa£ers. 

Memo, Maj Cen John F. Ruggles for CHMAAG, 8 MClY 60, sub: Conversation With Gen 

Chiem. 

31C1A Field Intel Rpt, CS 31439,186, 3 Ju n 60, sub: Deterioration of Security Situation and 

Strength of Communist Guerrillas; Current Intel Weekly Summary, 17 Mar 60, pp. 9 - 10. 

32Am Embassy to Stale Dept, 10 Oct 60, 75 1k - M SP/ IO - 1060, records of Dept of State. 

355 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Yenrs, 1941 - 1960 

insurgency in Malaya. 33 Many America ns hoped that the lessons, tactics, and 

techniques learned in Malaya could be applied to Vietnam. During a visit to 

Malaya in 1960 President Diem received a briefin g on counterguerrilla operations there, and he subsequently invited a British officer to visit Saigon and 

make suggestions for improving the Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort. 34 

When the British government invited the South Vietnamese to send officers 

to attend their course at the Malayan Jungle School, however, the experience 

proved to be short and unhappy. The first class of Vietnamese officers, 

"poorly selected" in General Williams' view, made a marginal showing and 

returned to complain that the British " trea ted them like colonials." General 

Ty subsequently visited the school and announced that it had little to offer 

that was not available in South Vietnam." 

The U.S. Defense Department's principal expert on guerrilla warfare, Brig. 

Gen. Edward Lansda le, also doubted the usefulness of the British experience. 

The Malayan insurgency was "sharply different, in many areas," he said, 

from the problems in South Vietnam. The Malayan Communist rebels were 

ethnic Chinese who were easily identified. The British and Malayans had 

been fighting the Communists for eight years at a cost which the Vietnamese 

government could hardly afford. "There can be a subtle sapping of the 

Amencan characte r in this trend toward reliance upon others," Lansdale 

believed . rhe American experience in dealing with the Huks in the Philippines had demonstrated that U.5. advisers were perfectly capable of helping 

Asians to achieve success in a guerrilla war. "All we have to do is remember 

the lessons we lea rned in the recent past."'" 

Lansdale's views on how to dea l with developments in Vietnam were set 

out in a memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs James H. Douglas. The memorandum called attention 

to many of the problems which had been troubling officers of the advisory 

group: overlapping lines of authority and the lack of a clear-cut chain of 

command; the serious interruptions to South Vietnamese Army training 

caused by the commitment of inexperienced units to active operations; the 

continuing stalemate on jurisdiction over, and support for, the Civil Guard; 

and the complications raised by the formation of the new ranger companies. 

Lansdale also went beyond these questions to stress the fundamental importance of constructing " a sound political basis first" to give meaning to the 

330 n the Malayan insurgency, see Lucien Pye, Gllerrilla Communism ill Malaya (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1956); Richard C1utterbuck, The umg Lollg War (New York: Frederick 

A . Praeger, 1966); Noel Barber, TIle War of ti,e Runnillg Dogs (New York: Weybrighl and Tolley, 

1971); and Robert Taber, Ti,e War of /l,e Flea (Charleston: The Citadel Press, 1970). 

3-'M emo, Brig Cen Edward Lansdale for Cen Bonesteel, 25 Apr 60, sub: Third Country Doctrine, Internal Security, CS 091 Vietnam, RG 3 19, and Folder 74, Williams [lapers. 

J5U r, Williams to Adm Felt, 6 Aug 60, Folder 74, Williams Papers. 

J6Memo, La nsdale (or Hayden Willia ms, 14 Apr 60, sub: Cou nterguerrilla Training; ibid. for 

Gen Bonesteel, 19 May 60, sub: Third Country Doctrine, Internal Security. Copies in Folder 74, 

Williams Papers. 

356 
"Someth illg Extra alld Special" 

other required actions. Accomplishing this task "will require something extra 

and special by both Vietnam and the United States."37 

Lansdale's ideas received a favorable reception at an interdepartmental 

conference on Vietnam held in Washington in March 1960. Although the 

problems relating to training, command and control, and the Civil Guard 

would have to be dealt with, the conference concluded, "military operations 

without a sound political basis will be only a temporary solution. " The 

United States by its advice and support to the Diem regime had helped to 

create and perpetuate the unsatisfactory political and administrative characteristics of that regime; the United States therefore was obliga ted to advise the 

Vietnamese regarding solutions to their present problems. The most expeditious means of assisting the Vietnamese government would be to establish a 

corps of U.S. advisers at the provincial as well as the national level to alert 

the Saigon government to deficiencies and to advise local government personnel on means to overcome those shortcomings. 38 

Crisis Planning 

Although the conference proposals presaged many of the viewpoin ts and 

measures of the mid-1960s, they had little immediate impact. The path 

of U.S. policy during the last months of the Eisenhower and the first months 

of the Kennedy administrations was more clearly foreshadowed in April 1960 

when senior officers of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and its equivalent in Laos, the Programs Evaluation Office, met with the CINCPAC staff at 

a Pacific Commanders Conference. 

In addition to considering the deteriorating security of Vietnam, the commanders gathered on Okinawa also confronted the situation in neighboring 

Laos. Most American commanders believed that Laos was critically important 

to the defen se of Vietnam and all mainland Southeast Asia. Its rugged 

mountain terrain and heavy jungle offered ideal concealment for infiltration 

routes into South Vietnam and Thailand; the best known of these was the 

so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which leads down the Annamite mountain chain 

into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.'9 The Mekong valley between 

Laos and Thailand had long been considered another likely invasion route for 

Communist forces striking at Saigon or Bangkok.'o 

The independence of the small mountain kingdom had been confirmed by 

the Geneva Agreements, and the Laotian government, led by Sou vanna 

37lbid. for Deputy Seey of Defense James H. Douglas, 17 Mar 60, sub: Security Situation in 

Vietnam, CS 091 Vietnam, RG 319. 

38M FR, Lt Col Joseph M. Flesch, Asst to Dir, Far East Region, OASD/ISA, 25 Mar 60, sub: 

Con ference on internal Security in Vietnam and Related Problems of Civil Administration, March 

18,1960, 1- 13187/W ISA 092, records of [SA, RG 330. 

39Memo, CHMAAG, Vietnam, for C1NCPAC, 1 Sep 61, sub: First Twelve-Month Report of 

Chief MAAG, Vietnam, copy in CMH. 

4°Msg, ClNCPAC to 050, 282258z Mar 56; HQ, Far East Command, Rpt of Joint Intelligence 

Conference, 17 - 20 Apr 56. Both in records of ACSI. 

357 
Advice mId SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

Phouma, had pledged to refrain from joining any milita ry alliances or accepting military aid "except for the purpose of its effecti ve te rritorial defence."41 

Under that broad exception the Laotian government agreed to allow the 

United States to finance and equip the 25,000-man Royal Laotian Army and to 

establish a disguised military advisory group, the Programs Eva luation Office, 

to train and advise it. At the same time, Prime Minister Sou vanna Phouma 

had pursued a tortuous policy of negotiation, maneuver, and accommodation 

in regard to the Communist- and North Vie tnamese-dominated Pa the t Lao. 

In 1958, followin g national elections, a coalition government had been established, and the Pathe t Lao had agreed to integrate their troops into the Royal 

Laotian Army. 

When Souvanna's government fell in July 1958, it was replaced by one 

headed by Phoui Sananikone, an advocate of " pro-Western neutrality" who 

had the wholehea rted backing of the United States. Phoui took a hard line 

against the Pathet Lao, demanding that the remaining Pathet Lao battalions 

immediately integrate into the Roya l Army. When one of the batta lions 

slipped through the surrounding government troops and fled across the 

border to North Vie tnam, Phoui retaliated by arresting the Pathet Lao representatives in Vientiane. By mid-summer 1959 the Pathet Lao and government 

forces were again at war, with North Vietnam providing arms, equipment, 

and cadres to the Pathet Lao and the United States stepping up its aid 

to the Phoui government and helping to expand the Royal Army from 25,000 

to 29,000 men. In August Phoui's government proclaimed a state of emergency in five provinces and complained to the United Nations that North 

Vietnamese soldie rs were fighting in Laos. Fighting had died down somewhat 

by ea rly 1960, but there was little ground for optimism about the future. 

The conferees on Okinawa were well aware that contingency planning for 

Indochina had long been sketchy and confined mainly to the problem of 

countering a large-sca le North Vietnamese or combined Chinese and North 

Vietnamese invasion. Until early 1959 Pacific Command Operations Plan 46 

had formed the basis for planning in regard to Indochina. This plan, with its 

emphaSis on primary dependence on indigenous ground forces backed by 

U.S. air and naval support possibly using a tomic weapons, had always been 

heartily disliked by Army strategists. 42 Under Plan 46 the Army's combat 

contribution to the defense of Vietnam would be limited to elements of a 

sing le division plus support forces, a missile unit, and a helicopter company.'3 In 1957, General White had pointed o ut that the plan was unrea listic 

in that it failed to pay sufficient a ttention to g ue rrilla warfare, w hich he 

believed undoubtedly would be employed by enemy forces. Since the enemy 

in a guerrilla war could be expected to disperse, infiltra te fri endly forces, and 

present no conventional front, there would be few lucrative ta rgets for the air 

and naval bombardment emphaSized in Operations Plan 46. 

4lDepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the Ullited Sla tes, 1952 - 1954, vol. 16, Tile Gel/eva 

Co"lerellce (Washington, 1981), p. 1544 . 

.. See ch. 14, p. 272. 

4JAnnual History, USARPAC lsi Half FY 59, Ju l-Dec 58, pp. 78 - 79, copy in CMH. 

358 
"Something Extra and Special" 

The Army was also un happy abou t the relatively small role assigned to its 

ground forces in the plan . As early as 1955 Army planners had complained 

that the othe r services, in stressing U.S. air and naval action in any in tervention in Southeast Asia, were ignoring th e fact that "once battle is joined by 

the Communists and indigenous armies on the periphery of Communist 

China unless stabilizing elements of U.S. infantry, artillery and armor are 

present the U.S. Navy and Air Force will be unable to distinguish between 

fri end and foe in the resulting confusion. ,,44 

These Army misgivings had not been resolved by the new general contingency plan for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia introduced in 1959. 

Operations Plan 32, developed at Headquarters, Pacific Command, was intended to counter the entire span of Communist activity from subversion 

through overt aggression . The plan was divided into phases. Phase I was an 

alert phase. Phase II extended from the time the United States decided to take 

Inilitary action against a Communist insurgency until the friendly government 

regained control or the conflict esca lated into a full-scale local war. Phase 1II 

dealt with an external attack by North Vietnam, while Phase IV dea lt with an 

attack by the People's Republic of China ." 

Pacific Command had intended to develop detailed and separate plans for 

action in both Laos and Vietnam. Given the sense of urgency, however, the 

Laos plan received far greater attention, and was developed far earlier, than 

the Vietnam plan, and it was the Laos portion of Operations Plan 32 which 

bothered Army commanders most. The plan called for airlifting a joint task 

force composed of a Marine division, a Marine air wing, an Army logistics 

command, and elements of the 25th Infantry Division to Laos in Phase II 

operations. The Army took strong exception to the fact tha t the projected 

joint task force was to be under Marine Corps command. General White 

argued that since Laos was a landlocked country, operations there should 

primarily be the mission of the Army rather than the Marines'6 The Army 

also objected to having to supply logistical support for units of another 

service, a situation that potentially could lead to administrative and bud getary 

problems. 

Admiral Felt replied to Army objections in 1959 by announcing that if and 

when he was convinced that the Army had "the capability to move into SE 

Asia as fast as required he will reconsider the use of Marine Forces and 

command relations."" General White was well aware that the presence of a 

complete, readily deployable Ma rine division and air wing on Okinawa provided Felt with a ready source of ground comba t units which the Army, 

44Tab A to Summary Sheet, Acting ACofS G - 3, 27 Apr 55, sub: Pattern of Service Opposition 

to the Army, CS 320TS, RG 319. 

45C1 NCPAC Command History, 1961, pp. 20 - 21; An nual History, USARPAC, Jan-Jun 59, p. 

87. Copies in CMH. 

'

16Memo, CINCUSARPAC for C1NCPAC, 18 lui 59, sub: Draft ClNCPAC Orlan 32 - 59, copy 

in CMH; Ltr, Cen L D. White to Cen Lyman Lemnitzer, 6 Jun 59, DCSOPS TS - 59 - 325, 

DCSOPS records. 

47Msg, ClNCUSA RPAC to Dept of Army for CSUSA, 2[2324z Jul 59, DCSOPS TS 190 1042, 

DCSOPS records. 

359 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

whose nearest available forces were in Hawaii and the continenta l United 

States, wou ld find hard to match. White therefore recommended that deployable Army forces be permanently stationed on Okinawa as soon as possible's 

An Army airborne battle group was subsequently deployed to Okinawa in 

1960, and planning began for upgrading logistical facilities in the Western 

Pacific and Southeast Asia to support the forward deployment of other Army 

combat forces'9 These small steps marked the beginning of an Army buildup 

in the Western Pacific that wou ld rapidly gain momentum during the first 

years of the Kennedy administration. 

Logistical facilities in South Vietnam itself were also inadequate to support 

any significant deployment of U.S. troops. Planners in the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group estimated, for example, that because of the state of South 

Vietnam's airfields, it would take thirty to forty days to bring in a large 

number of troops by air. 50 Although the advisory group had developed plans 

to enlarge and improve airfield facilities at strategic locations, so long as the 

United States continued to abide by the Geneva Agreements no construction, 

other than to improve existing airfields at Saigon and Da Nang under the 

gu ise of meeting the needs of commercia l aviation, could be accomplished.5I 

The restrictions of the Geneva Agreements also had continued to limit the 

number of American officers and men in the advisory group. The strategem 

of reinforcing the advisory group through the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission had begun to wear thin with members of the International 

Control Commission. As early as 1957 the ICC, under the pressure of continued protests from North Vietnam, was "seriously questioning the status and 

the work done by the TERM. ,,52 

The commission began to insist on receiving periodic reports on the 

mission's activities and on inspecting its insta llations. During 1957 and 1958 

Genera l Williams repeatedly warned that the mission's cover as an equipment 

retrieval operation could hardly be maintained indefinitely. Although he 

urged the ambassador and other members of the country team to take steps 

to legitimize the equipment recovery mission's status to protect its important 

training function, the State Department considered that recommendation to 

be "politically unfeasible."SJ 

By December 1958, when the ICC asked that the Temporary Equipment 

Recovery Mission be closed out by mid-1959, something clearly had to be 

done to avoid a crippling decrease in the advisory group. Pointing out that 

the total number of American and French advisers in Vietnam at the time of 

4SLtr, White to Lemnit zer, 61un 59. 

-I'JSurnmary Sheet with Incls, DCSOPS, I Sep 59, sub: Additional Battlc Group for Pacific 

Command, DeSOI'S TS 1901042, and Msg. CINCUSA RPAC to CSUSA, 220920z Aug 59, both in 

DCSO I:>S records; Llr, I. O. White to (of SA , 3 Aug 60, CS 334 SEATO, RG 319; Summary Sheet, 

Brig Cen L. J. Lincoln, 17 Sep 60, sub: Establishment of Forward Stockagc Points in Support of 

Contingency Plans. OCSLOC TS 0263 - 60, DCSOPS records. 

5OMemo of Conversa tions, Williams with President Diem, 19 Mar 60, Williams Papers. 

slMemo for Record, prepared by Gen Williams as a commentary on and guide to documents 

concerning the problem of air base construction, Mar 71, Williams Papers. 

52Ambassador Durbrow to State Dept, 22 Jan 58, copy in Folder 30, Williams Papers. 

'i3Ltr, Williams to Mansfield, 20 May 60. 

360 
"Sometllillg Extra atld Special" 

the agreements was 888, the State Department intimated to the control commission that the United States might increase the advisory group to that 

figure. It then requested an increase only to 685, 7 spaces less than the 

combined total of the advisory group and TERM. This reduced figure, noted 

Genera l Williams, was intended "as a sop for the [ICC] to make it easier to 

convince the Indians that we are not violating the Geneva Accords. ,,54 The 

International Control Commission on 19 April 1960 approved the increase. 

The Counterinsurgency Plan 

While Laos, comma nd arrangements, deployments, and logistical problems thus had occupied much attention in the late 1950s, the problem 

of what might be done in Vietnam short of military intervention remained. 

Out of the discussions of this problem in Okinawa in 1960 emerged a study 

on counterinsurgency operations in Laos and South Vietnam. The authors of 

the study believed that "the majority of the population in South Vietnam and 

Laos live in rural areas and have little or no interest in political ideologies. 

They are neither extreme nationalists nor dedicated Communists but rather 

they are apathetic toward each, willing to support whichever side is in 

momentary local control but only to the degree necessary to avoid inciting the 

wrath of the other side toward them."ss This view of the people of Vietnam 

as apathetic, pliable, and willing to obey any authority which held superior 

power could have been written by an American consular officer in Indochina 

during the 1920s and 1930s or by a French colonial administrator. It totally 

overlooked the political and social upheava ls in Vietnam since World War II 

and the revolutionary nature of the Communist insurgency. 

Yet these ideas about Vietnam were not confined to Pacific commanders. 

General Lansdale, an acknowledged expert in Washington on the subject of 

Indochina, wrote a few months later that "damn few" Vietnamese farmers 

could be "talked into believing that Diem is no good and that the Vietcong is 

the wave of the future." Most farmers, he believed, helped the Viet Cong 

either because of anger at the government-mostly attributable to the misbehavior of troops on counterinsurgency operations--or because of fear of Viet 

Cong terrorism. Misbehavior by the troops could be countered by "an alert 

commander and constant supervision to ensure the proper behavior of troops 

under the vexing conditions of counter-guerrilla operations. The VN Army 

has been by and large, rather good at this in the past.,,56 

Given such views it is scarcely surprising that the Okinawa study regarded 

the Communist threat in South Vietnam as a problem to be dealt with 

S4Memo, Williams for Ambassador Durbrow, 14 May 60, sub: O fficial U.S. Personnel in 

Vietnam, records of MAAG Vietnam. See also LIT, Williams to Mansfield, 20 May 60, and lntcrv, 

author with Durbrow, 9 Dec 76. 

5sMemo, ClNCPAC for leS, 27 Apr 60, sub: Counterinsurgency Operahons in South Vietnam 

and Laos. 1- 13796160 ISA 092. RG 330. 

56Memo, Lmlsdale for Lt Gen Lionel C. M cGa rr, It Aug 60, sub: Vietnam, copy in CMH. 

361 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

through military and administrative remedies. The study did note the need 

for a program " to win the peoples' confidence and cooperation for their 

government and security forces," but, as outlined, this program consisted 

mainly of such measures as trial and punishment of terrorists, indoctrination 

of the people and security forces, low-cost self-help projects, and relocation 

and resettlement of former Communists. The main thrust was placed on 

"gaining control of the population on a continuing basis." 

To attain this object, the study, drawing heavily on what the authors 

believed to be the lessons learned in Malaya and the Philippines, emphasized measures to ensure centralized contro l of the counterinsurgency effort; 

improved intelligence collection and identification and apprehension of terrorists; better training of the self-defense forces; and the reestablishment of 

governmental authority at all levels of society. SpeCifica lly, the study recommended reorga nizing the South Vietnamese government at the national level 

to improve command and control. This effort might include the establishment 

of a national security council with various subcouncils at the regional, district, 

and village levels; the appointment of a director of security operations; and 

other measures. The study also incorporated the long-standing recommendation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group that the Civil Guard and all 

other interna l security forces be transferred from the Ministry of the Interior 

to the Ministry of Defense, and declared that the South Vietnamese government s hould establis h operational control systems to integrate its civil, military, and police efforts in accordance with a coordinated national plan. The 

United States, for its part, should be prepared to support such a plan through 

reorganizing the advisory group and providing more funds. 57 

There is no evidence that anyone at CINCPAC headquarters was aware 

that the situation bore an ominous resemblance to that of late 1953 and ea rly 

1954. Once again America's ally in Indochina seemed in danger, aga in the 

situation was perceived as "a n emergency," and again the solution offered 

was a plan- not the Letourneau-Allard plan or the Navarre plan this time, 

but what came to be called the counterinsurgency plan. As before, far more 

attention was focused on the details of the plan than on the likelihood that it 

could be carried out successfully. 

Admiral Felt forwarded the Okinawa study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

with a recommendation that it be used as a basis for future actions and that it 

be submitted to the country team for further development, including cost 

estimates. 58 The Joint Chiefs and the secreta ry of defense concu rred in Admiral Felt's recommendation and forwarded the study to the State Department 

with the suggestion that the State and Defense Departments work together in 

developing appropriate implementing instructions for the country team.'9 

By this time leaders in Washington had ceased to treat Indochina in 

'i7Counterinsurgency Opera tions in South Victnil m ilnd Laos, Inel to Ur, ClNCPAC (Adm Felt) 

to JCS, 27 Apr 60, sub: CINCPAC Study to Combat Insurgency, JCS records. 

SilLtr, CINCPAC to Jes, 27 Apr 60, sub: CINCPAC Study to Combat Insurgency; Note by 

Secretaries to Holders of lCS 1992182: Counterinsurgency Operations in South Vietnam, 20 Jul 60, 

JFM 906013360 (27 Ap' 60), JCS ,eco,ds. 59Memo, lCS for Secy o f Defense, 6 lun 60, sub: Cou nterinsurgency Operations in South 

362 
"Solllel"iIl8 Exira alld Special" 

the "routine manner" that had bothered General Lemnitzer a few months 

before. The National Security Council reviewed the situation in Laos and 

Vietnam at its meeting of 24 May 1960, and Secretary of State Christian A. 

Herter warned that the United States should be prepared for the possibility of 

new aggression by the People's Republic of China as well as stepped-up 

Communist guerrilla efforts in Southeast Asia. In a letter to Secretary of 

Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. , he asked whether additional measures could be 

taken to improve the counterguerrilla capabili ties of the governments of Laos 

and Vietnam. 60 

The Defense Department replied that the current military assistance program for Vietnam was adequate but that we "should be sure that the country 

team is exerting appropriate efforts to aid the administration in effecting 

needed political reforms," an interesting comment in light of the fact that 

the Military Assistance AdviSOry Group had usua lly opposed as impolitic and 

unwise efforts to bring about political reform in the Diem regime. The 

Defense Department also emphasized the need for better coord ination 

between the United States and Vietnamese agencies in training, equipping, 

and adviSing the South Vietnamese Army and paramilitary forces---thus 

obliquely calling attention to the long-sta nding opinion of the military that 

the Ministry of Defense should coordinate and control all interna l security 

forces. 6 1 

Through the summer of 1960 State and Defense Department represen tatives at various levels discussed the venerable question of the Civ il Guard. By 

early 1960 the guard consisted of some 53,000 men still organized, after the 

French fas hion, into stationary, mobile, and border companies. These units 

were scattered throughout South Vietnam, with the national headquarters in 

Saigon exercising no effective control. Within each province, command of 

Civil Guard units was assigned to the province chiefs, who in some cases had 

no mili tary experience"2 Since 1959 the guard had been the res ponsibility of 

the Public Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission in Saigon. The 

Operations Mission had agreed with the Vietnamese government to support 

32,000 men, who were to be trained by civilian contract employees; however, 

by late 1960 the details were still being negotiated, and most Civil Guard 

units had received little or no training. Members of the Military Assistance 

AdviSOry Group argued that the Public Safety Division plan, even if implemented in a timely fa shion, would still fail to provide the guard with the type 

of organization and equi pment necessary to enable it to cond uct sustained 

combat operations against the Viet Congo The Civil Guard companies wou ld 

still lack control headq uarters in the field as well as the required logistical 

Vie tnam and Laos, JCSM - 232 - 60, JFM 9060/3360 (27 Apr 60); Note by Secre taries to Holde rs o f 

leS 1992182: Counterinsurgency Operatio ns in South Vietnam, 20 Ju l 60; U ri James H. Douglas 

(Acting Seey of Defense) to Christian He rte r, 16 Sep 60, JFM 9060/3360 (27 Apr 60). All in leS 

records. 

fIOLtr, Herter to Seey of Defense, 11 Jun 60, 1- 14397/60, ISA 381, RG 330. 

6LLtr, Acting Secy of Defense to Secy of Stale, 9 Sep 60, 1- 14397/60. ISA 381, RG 330. 

62lt r, HQ, MAAGV, to ClNCPAC, 20 Sep 60, sub: Status Rpt on Ranger Companies, Civil 

Guard, and Self Defense Corps, file 250/6, records of MAAG Vietnam, RG 334. 

363 
Advice and Slipport: The Early Years, 1941- 1960 

support units. Whatever plan was adopted, moreover, the problem of assembling the units fo r training would remain formidable since guard un its on 

operational missions would first have to be relieved by Vietnamese Army 

fo rmations, and th en training areas and equi pment, of which there was very 

little, would have to be found for them63 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Defense Department strongly supported the advisory group's recommendation that the operational control of the Civil Guard and its training be 

assigned to the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense for the duration of the 

emergency.64 Yet State and Defense representatives in Saigon were unable to 

reach a fin al agreement on the question65 

Mea nwhile, the situation in Vietnam continued to deteriorate. A Special 

National Intelligence Estimate on South Vietnam published in August 1960 

noted that Viet Cong activities were becoming more widespread and intense, 

that support for insurgents from North Vietnam appeared to be increasing, 

and that senior North Vietnamese cadres and military supplies such as communications equipment were moving south through Laos and Cambodia and 

by junk along the eastern coastline. The estimate rejected the earlier contention that the increase in Viet Cong activity was a desperate last-ditch effort 

prompted by the success of the Diem government's programs; instead , it 

suggested that " indications of increasing dissatisfaction with the Diem government" in the countryside had probably encouraged the North Vietnamese to 

step up their support for the Viet Cong guerrillas. 66 

The estimate also took into account growing hostility to the Diem regime 

among non-Communist urban groups such as intellectuals, businessmen, and 

civil serva nts. "Criticism by these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, 

especially the roles of the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame 

Nhu, the pervasive influence of the Can Lao. ., Diem's virtual one man 

rule; and the growing evidence of corrup tion in high places." The estimate 

concl uded that if " these adverse trends ... remain unchecked, they will 

almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime.,,67 

In September 1960 the Third National Congress of the Vietnam Workers 

Party, the first since 1951, convened in Hanoi to discuss the decision of the 

Central Committee to support an armed insurgency in South Vietnam. In a 

report to the congress, Le Duan called fo r the formation of a broad National 

United Front in the South . The number of southern-born members of the 

Politburo was increased to four, and the congress adopted a resolution calling 

for the liberation of the South " from the rule of the American imperialists and 

their henchmen" and for national reunification.68 Although the congress still 

6llbid. 

MMemo, Rear Adm E. J. O'Donnell for M r. Irwin, 6 Jun 60, sub: Training of Civil Guard in 

Vietna m, 1- 14269/60, ISA 092, RG 330. 

(,';lbid. for Ass! Seey of State (ISA), 4 Oct 60, sub: Actions, Civil GU<1rd Vietnam, 1- 1606/60, 

ISA 324 - 5VN, RG 330. 

txsNIE 63. 1 - 60, 23 Aug 60, U.S.-Vietllnm Relations, 10: 1298 - 1301. 

67Ibid., 10: 1298 - 99 and 1301. 

6&fhayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations," pp. 44 - 45; Duiker, COII/munist 

Rood to Power, pp. 193 - 95. 

364 
"Somefilillg Exfra alld Special" 

accorded top priority to the socialist revolu tion in North Vietnam, the meeting marked a significa nt shift toward greater emphasis on the stru ggle for the 

South . 

With these developments in mind, Secretary Herter readily concurred in 

the dispatch of a joint State-Defense message directing the country team in 

Saigon to develop an overall plan to support the Diem government in a 

"national emergency effort" to defeat the Viet Cong and restore order and 

stability to the country. When worked out in detail, the plan was to be 

submitted to Washington for coordination and approva l. 69 These instructions 

simply transferred back to the country team the long-sta nding State and 

Defense debate about the best mea ns for dealing with the Vietnam situation. 

The debate was further complicated at the end of August when General 

Williams was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr. 

General McGarr had carefully prepared for his assignment while commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Like General 

Williams, McGarr recognized the importance of basic individual and smallunit combat training. He acknowledged the South Vietnamese Army's need 

to be able to repel a North Vietnamese attack, yet it seemed to McGarr 

that insurgency was the most immediate danger. To deal with that danger, 

McGa rr believed that it would be necessary to increase the size of the South 

Vietnamese Army sufficiently to permit rotating units between combat operations and training, to straighten out the Vietnamese chain of command, and 

to " redirect .. training and operations emphasis towards a grea tly improved 

counter-guerri lla posture. ,,70 

To a much greater extent than Williams, McGarr viewed counterinsurgency as a distinct species of warfare requiring development of special doctrine and techniques. The contrast could be seen in McGarr's reaction to the 

ranger companies. As General Williams had predicted, these hybrid units 

were making a poor showing in operations against the Viet Cong, yet General 

McGarr's approach was not to question the need for the ranger units but to 

advocate more effective training for them and an increase in their number.?1 

As commandant of the Command and General Staff College, McGarr 

had overseen studies of counterinsurgency I and after assuming command of 

the Military Assistance Advisory Group he d irected preparation of "Tactics 

and Techniques of Cou nter-Insurgent Operations," a comprehensive study 

intended as the tactical military section of the country team's overall counterinsurgency plan. The advisory group planners called for such measures as 

reorga nizing and strengthening the South Vietnamese Army's chain of command (a measure which all American officials had urged since 1957); improving its intelligence capability; increasing its authorized force levels by 20,000 

men, to include additional ranger companies; transferring the Civil Guard to 

69Joint State-DOD Msg. Seey o f State to Saigon, 19 Oct 60, 75 1.5M SP/ 1O - 1960, records of Dcpt 

o f State . 

70First Twelve-Month Report of Chief MAAG, Vie tnam, Sep 61, copy in Lionel McGarr Folder, 

Historians files, CMH. 

,.llbid . 

365 
Advice nlld Support: The Enrly Yenrs, 1941 - 1960 

General McGarr (right! illspects Vietllnlllese hOllOr gunrd with Gellemls 

Willinllls nlld Ty. 

the Ministry of Defense; improving the army's civil affairs and civic action 

programs; and increasing border and coastal surveillance operations. 

Ambassador Durbrow agreed with some of the advisory group's recommendations but emphasized that combating the Viet Cong guerrillas was 

only part of th e problem fa cing the Diem regime. The ambassador beli ev ed 

that the Vietnamese government was confronting "two separate but related 

dangers": the threa t of a coup originating with non-Communist opponents of 

the regime in Saigon, and the gradually expanding Viet Cong threat in rural 

areas. Military and security measures would be important in meeting the Viet 

Cong threat, although they would not, in themselves, be sufficient. "Politica l, 

psychological and economic measures" wou ld also be necessary to meet the 

"Saigon danger. ,,72 

Durbrow felt that Diem wou ld have to take drastic and far-reaching action . 

The State Department agreed with Durbrow's analysis, and on 14 October 

1960 the ambassador met alone with Diem to read him a forma l memorandum suggesting measures to " broaden and increase his popular support. " 

These measures included appointing a full-time minister of defense, add ing 

one or two members of the non-Communist opposition to the cabinet, restrictn Ourbrow to Seey of State, 16 Sep 60, 75 1k.OO/9 - 1660, records of Dcpt of Stale. 

366 
"Solllethillg Extra alld Special" 

ing or abolishing the secret Can Lao Party, empowering the Na tional Assembly to introduce bills on the initiative of the deputies and to investiga te any 

department or agency of the government through public hearings, relaxing 

controls over the press, conducting elections for village officials, increasi ng 

the lega l price of rice, paying a modest sum for compulsory labor in the 

agrovilles and on other government public works, and initiating a system of 

limited subsidies to the residents of the agrovilles during the initial period of 

readjustment. 

Durbrow's suggestions were no more than what reform-minded South 

Vietnamese, such as Vice President Tho, had been urging for some time.

73 

Yet Diem could not broaden the base of his support for the simple reason 

that except for his relatives, some elements of the Catholic commu nity, and a 

handful of burea ucrats and officers, mostly tied to him by kinship, support 

for his regime did not exist. He felt he could not bring additional men into 

power or give responsibility to new organizations unless they could be controlled a nd therefore trusted. 

President Diem did not, and perhaps could not, explain this situa tion to 

Durbrow. Instead, he responded, as usual, that although most of the measures were desirable, the "stepped up activities of the Viet Cong made [their 

implementation] difficult. " Durbrow replied that it was precisely for that 

reason that he had urged that the measures be carried out. Referrin g discretely to growing criticism of the president's brother, Ngo Di nh Nhu, and 

his wife, the ambassador suggested that perhaps they might be sent abroad 

temporarily on some important mission; Diem replied that unfavorable 

rumors about the Nhus were the work of the Communists. 74 

These problems with Diem influenced Durbrow's approach to the preparation of the counterinsurgency plan. He believed that some of the measures 

proposed by the advisory group and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, were 

unnecessary and that others ought to be used as bargaining chips to induce 

Diem to make the necessary changes in his government and administration. 

His main points of difference with the MAAG draft plan concerned raising 

the Vietnam force levels by 20,000 men, increasing support to Vietnam's 

military budget, and shifting control of the Civil Guard to the Ministry of 

Defense. More troops could be found to man counterinsurgency operations 

and to facilitate rotati ng units between operations and training, Durbrow 

believed , simply by drawing on some of the divisions assigned to guarding 

the northern border. Although recognizing that doing so would be a calculated risk, Durbrow pointed out that "any threat of external aggression 

seems fairly remote, particularly in view of the moral deterrent represented 

by the International Control Commission and physical deterrent represented 

by SEATO." He believed that to increase the Vietnamese force level "would 

73Durbrow to State Dept, 10 Oct 60, 75 1k.OO/ JO - 1060; Llr, Dang Van Su ng to 1. William 

Fulbright. Incl to Llr, Carl Marcy to J. Graham Parsons, 7 Oct 60, 7S1k.OO/lO - 760. Doth in 

records o f Dept of State . 

7.IStalc Dept to Am Embassy, 7 Oct 60, 751k.OO/ IO- 760; Durbrow to Seey of State, 15 Oct 60, 

7S1k.OOI10 - 1560. Both in records of Dept of State. 

367 
Advice nlld SlIpport: The Earllf Years, 1941 - ] 960 

be to play to Diem's proclivity for thin king in terms only of security and 

surviva l and increase his tendency to neglect adequate politica l and 

psychological measures. ,,75 

Although Durbrow and his staff no longer questioned the need for the 

advisory group to train the Civil Gua rd- in view of the level of insurgency, 

the United States O perati ons Mission and the advisers from Michigan State 

University were clea rly unequal to that task- the amba ssador still obj ected to 

tra nsferring the Civil Guard from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry 

of Defense. If that were done, Durbrow said, the guard would soon be 

virtually amalgamated with th e army and "eventually [all) hope that [it) will 

serve as a provincial police force will be lost. " The ambassador also believed 

that the South Vietnamese government could fairly be asked to ca rry more of 

the financial burden of a stepped-up securi ty program?6 

General McGarr, to the contrary, believed that the insurgency had reached 

such a leve l that an enlarged military force was vital, as well as be tter 

coordination within the South Vietnamese government. Under current conditions, he believed , social and political reforms were of secondary importance, 

and pressuring Diem to unde rtake them might undermine Diem's confidence 

and trust in the United States. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the 

Department of Defense held a similar view. Speaking for John N. Irwin II, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, General 

Lansdale noted that " while criticism of Diem's government in metropolitan 

areas adds to his problems and interacts with Viet Cong plans, the Viet Cong 

remains the primary threat to security. ,,77 

In a sense both Durbrow and Lansdale were "right." Durbrow was correct 

in pointing out tha t if Diem did not undertake energetic measures of politica l 

and economic reform , his government was headed for disaster. Yet La nsdale 

was equally correct in pointing out, in a late r report, that to treat Diem "as an 

opponent to be bea ten to his knees" would be fruitl ess and coun terproductive . The unhappy fa ct was that, pressure or no pressure, Diem was not 

likely to change. Nevertheless, Lansdale argued, Diem remained the only 

chance for stability in South Vietnam. While he should be " info rmed as soon 

as possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which the US 

government view s the internal security situation," he should also be assured 

"of Ollr intent to provide material assistance and of our unswerving support 

to him in this time of cri sis. ,,78 

75Durbrow to Secy of State,S Sep 60, 751k.SMSP/9- 560, records of Dept of State. 

7f'Ibid. See also Llr, Williams to Adm Felt, 8 Ju n 59, Folder 54, Williams Papers; Memo of 

Conversations, President Diem, Nguyen Dinh Thua n, Frank E. Walton, Donald Q. Coster, 24 Jun 

60, Inel to USARMA to ACSI, 14 }ul 60, records of ACSJ. 

7lMsg, ClNCPAC to CHMAAG, Vietnam, Oct 60, 1MF 9155.313410 ( 18 Jan 61), JCS records; 

Memo, La nsdale for Adm E. J. O'Donnell, 13 Sep 60, sub: Possible Courses of Action in Vietnam, 

U.S.-Vietllam Relatiolls, vol. 2, pt. IV.A. 5, Tab 4, p. 52. 

7t1Memo, La nsdale for Regional Director, Far East, ISA, 13 Scp 60, sub: I)ossible Courses of 

Ac tion in Vietnam, U.S.-Vie/llam Rela tiolls, 10: 1308 . 

368 
"So/1/elhillg Exira alld Special" 

General McGarr visils MOlllagllard village lIear Dalat. 

The Coup Attempt 

l

ust how unswerving American support of Diem was came into question a 

few weeks later. At 0300 on 11 November 1960 three battalions of the 

outh Vietnamese Army's elite paratrooper group surrounded the presidential 

palace and issued a manifesto ca lling for political reforms, the formation of a 

new government, and more effective prosecution of the war against the 

Communist insurgents. 79 Although there had been persistent reports of disaffection within the armed forces-Lt. Col. Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander of 

the elite army airborne brigade, had openly boasted of his ability to achieve a 

coup-the rebellion nevertheless came as a surprise to most Americans, civil 

and military.so As recently as the previous March General Williams had 

declared that "a coup is no nearer now than it was in 1955" and that Diem's 

opponents had "no following in the country at large."SI The leaders of the 

coup, Col. Nguyen Chanh Thi and Lt. Col. Vuong Van Dong, had been 

numbered among Diem's most loyal supporters (Thi had helped Diem defeat 

7'>1 For a good account o f the incident, sec Sta nley Karnow, "Diem Defeats His Own Best 

Generals," Tile RelJOrter, 19 January 1961, pp. 24 - 29. 

tIO Ltr, ARMA, Col B. B. Cheston, to ACSI, 22 Oct 60, 5 - 34 - 60, records of ACSI; USARPAC 

Intel Summary, Oct 60, records of USARPAC. 

SlUr, Williams to Brig Ceo Edgar C. Doleman, 4 Mar 60, Folder 73, Williams Papers. 

369 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

the Binh Xuyen in 1955), and the paratroopers were considered to be the 

most effective and well-disciplined force in the army. 

Diem, his brother Nhu, and Madame Nhu barricaded themselves in the 

wine cellar of the palace and began sending calls for help over Diem's private 

radio net to loyal army units in the countryside. To gain time, the president 

pretended to parley with the rebels, agreeing to a long list of reforms including a coalition government, free elections, freedom of the press, and a more 

effective campaign against the Viet Cong o 

During those uncertain hours, General McGarr and Ambassador Durbrow 

attempted to remain neutral. This stance differed conSiderably from the 

American position in 1954 during the crisis with Genera l Hinh, when Washington had made it unequivocally clear that the United States stood firml y 

behind Diem. In 1960, Durbrow's action s indicated that the State Department, 

if not actually welcoming a change, was prepared to accept one. As the 

ambassador described it, "we did all in our power to prevent bloodshed and 

urge [the] rebels when they had power to oust Diem that he should be given 

[an] active role in any government established.,,82 Durbrow urged Diem to 

negotiate with the rebels, an action which General Lansdale later criticized as 

" badly-timed and demoralizing meddling in Vietnam's affairs."s3 

From the beginning, the uprising was amateurish and disorganized. The 

leaders had failed to set up roadblocks, seize the radio stations, or take 

over the communications network. 84 During the early stages the palace was 

defended by only thirty men. The rebels easily could have killed or captured 

Diem, but they preferred to parley and thus played into the president's 

handss5 When loyal troops arrived, the paratroopers surrendered, and the 

leaders fl ed to Cambodia . 

Despite the comic opera qualities of the attempted coup, it had serious 

and far-reaching repercussions. As J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of 

State for Far Eastern Affairs, noted , the attempt had "proven that there is a 

serious lack of support among the military and other elements for many 

aspects of the government's policies."" It also demonstrated that the army 

was far from being the highly professional, nonpolitical body that O'Daniel, 

Williams, and later McGarr hoped it would become. 

To Diem, there were lessons to be learned from the attempted coup, but 

he still did not see among them any necessity for far-reaching social and 

politica l reform. Instead, the incident reinforced the president's already well82Teig, Durbrow to Seey of State, 4 Dec 60, U.S. -Vie t/wm Relatiolls, 0: 334 36 . 

83See J. Graham Parsons for Herter to Am Embassy, Saigon, 11 Nov 60, and Memo, Lansdale 

for Oep Seey of Defense, 15 Nov 60, sub: Vietnam, both in U.S. -Vietllam Relatiolls, 10:1327 and 

1330 - 31, respectively. The author later asked Ambassador Ourbrow if it was true that "some 

members of the American mission believed it would not be a bad thing for Diem to step down at 

that point." Durbrow replied that that was a view held mainly by "Iiberil ls" who "did not 

understand the situation in Vietnam or how the Communists operate ." lnterv, author with 

Durbrow, 9 Dec 76. 

84Karnow, "Diem Defeats His Own Best Generals," p. 26. 

I:IS-felg, Durbrow to Secy of Sta te, 4 Dec 60, U.S. -Vietllnm Relntiolls, 10:1336. 

86S tate Dept to Saigon, 12 Nov 60, 751k.OO/11 - 1260, records of Dept of State. 

370 
"Something Extra and Special" 

developed paranoia. Since he felt his disregard for the chain of command and 

his insistence on personal command of army troops had been a major element in his sa lvation, he was now less incl ined than ever to agree to any 

conventional military command arrangement, to delega te authority, or to 

appoint "outsiders" to positions of authority. At the same time, urban opponents of Diem, such as the Saigon professional and business classes, were 

disappointed by his failure to implement the reforms he had promised during 

the crisis, and senior army officers concluded that Diem and Nhu could not 

be bargained with . Next time, there would be no compromises. 

The attempted coup failed to produce any noticeable change in American 

planning or policy in regard to South Vietnam except that Ambassador 

Durbrow withdrew his opposition to the proposed 20,000-man increase in the 

strength of the South Vietnamese Army.87 He did so under pressure from 

General McGarr and the Defense Department and in the face of obvious 

escalation of insurgency by Communists in Laos as well as South Vietnam. A 

few days later, at the beginning of january 1961, Durbrow cabled the completed draft of the counterinsurgency plan to Washington. 

The plan was based on the assumptions that "at the present time the 

Diem government offers the best hope" for defeating the Viet Cong, that the 

Diem government had " the basic potential to cope with the Viet Cong threa t 

if necessary corrective measures were taken, " and that the most vital task for 

the United States in Vietnam was to aid in the eradication of the Communist 

insurgency.S8 The plan provided fo r a 20,000-man increase in the South 

Vietnamese Army, finan ced by the United States at a cost of about $28 

million. The Civil Guard was to be expanded to 68,000 men, with slightly less 

than half trained , equipped, and supplied at American expense. In return for 

this increased assistance, the South Vietnamese government was expected to 

implement a large number of measures designed to achieve and main tain 

politica l and economic stability and bring about the defea t of the Viet Congo 

These measures included organiza tional and administrative reforms such as 

the establishment of a National Emergency Council and the appointment of a 

director of operations for counterinsurgency, transfer of th e Civil Guard to 

the Ministry of Defense, and implementation of a coordinated intelligence 

and counterintelligence program and an effective program of psycholOgica l 

warfare and civic action. At the end of january, ten days after his inauguration, President john F. Kennedy approved the counterinsurgency plan and 

authorized the necessa ry funds to implement it. 

While the counterinsurgency plan was being discussed, the Defense 

Department had done what it could unilaterally to aid the Vietnamese government in combating the insurgency. In April 1960 Diem had requested and 

had received more modern portable radio communicators (ANIPRC - lOs) to 

replace World War II - era signal equipment in the Vietnamese Army in ven87D urbrow to State Dept, 29 Dec 60, 751k.OO/t2 - 2960, records of Dept of State. 

iIIIU.5. Plan for Counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, p. 4, Incl to Am Embassy, Saigon, to 

State Dept, 4 Jan 61. A copy of the plan is in Historians fi les, CMH . All quotations are from the 

plan and its annexes. 

371 
Advice alld SlIpport: The Ea rly Years, 1941 - 1960 

tory.M'J At the same time, the Vietnamese, with General Williams' endorsement, had requested eleven H - 34 helicopters to provide the means for rapid 

movement of army forces to points under attack by the Viet Congo Since 

the H - 34 was the standard U.S. Army helicopter and the eleven aircraft 

would have to be taken from opera tional inventories, th e request was at first 

refu sed by Washington . Some months later, under repeated urging from both 

McGa rr and Durbrow, the Defense Department dispatched the helicopters to 

Vietnam.

90 Neither this additional material nor the cou nterinsurgency plan 

itself had much lasting impact. 

The counterinsurgency plan would never be fully implemented, yet it 

represented a significant milestone in the long evolution of American 

policy in rega rd to South Vietnam. It was a tacit recognition that the American effort, begun by General O'Daniel and ca rried on primarily by General 

Williams, to create an army that could provide stability and internal security 

as well as defense against external aggression had fail ed and that new measures would be required if insurgency wa s to be suppressed . 

But the counterinsurgency plan, while doubtlessly viewed as innovative 

by its authors, was really not a new departure. On the whole, the plan 

represented a culmination of the traditional American approach to Vie tnamese problems. Its provisions for an expanded force structure, a better 

trained and better armed Civil Guard under the Defense Ministry, a clear, 

simplified, and rationalized chain of command, and an improved in telligence 

network were an amalgam of the major reforms which Americans in the 

advisory group had been urging since 1956. With the drastic deterioration of 

the securi ty situation, American military leaders feU back on orga niza tional, 

technical, and bureaucratic measures as the most appropriate devices to combat the Viet Congo 

Once again American leaders decided that added increments of military 

aid and organiza tional reforms were the proper solution and disrega rded the 

advice of those who, like General Ridgway in 1955 and Ambassador Durbrow 

in 1960, had warned that the fundamental problem was primarily political 

and psychological. Most America n leaders continued to believe that corruption and incompetence in the Vietnamese government and army, the rigidity 

and oppressiveness of the Diem regime, and the lack of effective social and 

economic reforms were problems that could be resolved simply by persuading 

or pressuring our ally into adopting the appropriate " programs" or administrative remedies. It was a pattern that was to be repeated on a greater and 

more tragic scale in the 1960s. 

From the viewpoint of th e new America n president, the crisis in South 

Vie tnam came at a critical time for the United States in international affairs. 

S')M emo, William T . M cCormick for Seey of Army, 29 Apr 60, sub: Signal Equipment for 

Emergency Situation in Vietnam, 1- 13735/60, ISA 413.44, RC 330. 

'JOClNCPAC Command History, 1960, pp. 142 - 43; Msg, CHMAAC, Saigon, to C1NCPAC, 

01 128 Nov 60, and S.,igon to Secy of State, No. 956, 4 Nov 60, both in records of MAAC 

Vietnam, RG 334; Memo, Lt Col John S. D. Eisenhower for ASD, 12 Dec 60, 1- 17621160, ISA 

452. 1 Vie tnam, RG 330. 

372 
"Somethillg Extra alld Special" 

By mid-1961 the Soviet Union was putting pressure on Berlin; an Americansupported invasion force at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba had surrendered; and the 

United States and the Soviet Union had agreed in principle to a cease-fire in 

Laos and a neutral coalition government, an agreement that conceivably could 

lead to a Communist takeover. Lest what was happening in Laos cause the 

South Vietnamese to lose hea rt, Kennedy directed a sweeping reappraisal of 

the American position in South Vietnam. A new era in America's relations 

with Southeast Asia was beginning. 

373 

19 

Assessment 

Many people have come to regard the French Indochina War (1946 - 1954) as 

a rehearsal for the Vietnam War (1965 - 1973). Similarly, the early advisory 

period (1955- 1960) to a degree foreshadows the period of Vietnamization 

during the Nixon and Ford administrations. True, there were important 

differences. The Military Assistance Advisory Group under Generals O'Daniel 

and Williams labored under advantages and disadvantages unknown to its 

successors in the 1960s and 1970s. The adva ntages were relative peace and 

ca lm in the cou ntryside, especially from 1956 to 1958, and a relatively strong, 

stable civil government in Saigon. The disadvantages were the restrictions 

imposed by the Geneva Agreements on the size and activities of the military 

advisory effort, the strong budgetary constraints of the Eisenhower era, and 

the lack of attention and interest on the part of Washington leaders to the 

problems of Vietnam between 1956 and 1960. Another important difference 

was that in the Vietnamization years the United States was phasing down its 

military and civilian involvement.' During the late 1950s, the degree of 

American involvement was relatively stable. 

Yet despite the differences the two periods share a common overriding 

theme. In both the early advisory stage and the later period of Vietnam ization, American leaders were attempting to help the Vietnamese armed 

forces attain an ability to hold their own against their enemies without the 

assistance of large numbers of U.s. or other allied ground forces. In the 1950s 

this policy was precipitated by the rapid withdrawal of French combat forces 

from Vietnam and the inability of American forces to replace them because of 

limitations imposed by the Geneva Agreements and the New Look defense 

policy of the Eisenhower administration. 

'Vietnamization had a wide number of definitions, but generally was taken 10 mea n the 

assumption by the government and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam of all aspects of the 

war effort, together with the policies and techniques employed to expedite this assumption of 

responsibility. For a fuller discussion of Vietnamization, see OF, Col Howard W. Keller, MAC 

J - 3, 9 Nov 69, sub: Definition and Meaning of Vietnamization, copy in CMH. 

375 
Senior Advisers' Conference Participants, January 1960 

I. Col. P. T. Boleyn 

2. Brig. Gen. J. B. Lampert 

Deputy Chief, MAAG, Logistics 

3. Lt. Col. Lu Lan 

4. Brig. Gen. Pham Xuan Chieu 

Chief of Staff, ARVN 

5. Col. E. J. Ingmire 

6. Lt. Gen. S. T. Williams 

Chief, MAAG, Vietnam 

7. Col. C. A. Symroski 

8. Col. S. G. Brown, Jr. 

9. Maj. Gen. J. F. Ruggles 

10. Col. J. T. Barrett 

Deputy Chief, MAAG, Training 

11. Col. N. P. Ward III 

12. Col. A. P. Rollins 

Chief of Staff 

l3. Capt. J. J. Flachsenhar 

14. Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Nhan 

15. Col. R. R. Pa t1erson 

16. Col. E. P. Lasche 

17. Col. E. J. Stann 

18. Col. R. M. Miner 

19. Col. R. E. Daehler 

20. Col. J. E. Robb 

21. Col. S. J. Razor 

22. Col. L. E. Wellendorf 

23. Col. J. J. Butler 

24. Col. A. L. Leonard 

25. Col. L. D. Fargo 

26. Col. W. W. Stromberg 

27. Lt. Col. B. B. Caulder 

28. Col. M. C. Taylor 

29. Col. D. M. Witt 

30. Col. J. c. Speedie 

31. Col. J. A. Ulrich 

32. Maj. Dang Van Khuyen 

33. Lt. Col. F. R. Wilkinson 

34. Lt. Col. W. W. Roberts 

35. Lt. Col. D. C. Wade 

36. Comdr. J. P. Wicks 

37. Lt. Col. W. F. Tucker 

38. Lt. Col. T. J. Farrell, Jr. 

39. Lt. Col. E. C. Davis 

40. Lt. Col. C. P. Sirles 

41. Lt. Col. A. G. Johnson 

42. Col. G. R. True 

43. Lt. Col. J. P. Sheffey III 

44. Lt. Col. M. Kusiv 

45. Lt. Col. E. H. Thomas 

46. Maj. R. H. Bolan 

47. Lt . Col. J. E. Olson 

48. Col. J. R. Kent 

49. Lt. Col. W. L. Willey 

50. Lt. Col. E. D. Fitzpatrick 

51. Lt. Col. C. H. Cole, Jr. 

52. Lt. Col. M. P. Stockton 

53. Maj. T. P. Carroll 

54. Lt. Col. D. R. Rose 

55. Maj. C. W. Thomas 

56. Lt. Col. J. R. Michael 

57. Maj. J. c. Marschhausen 

58. Maj. M. Barszcz 

59. Lt. Col. W. T. Drake 

60. Maj. F. H. Serafini 

61. Maj. K. J. Miller 

62. Maj. J. H. Selden 

63. Maj. L. A. Brown 

64. Maj. W. Mule 

65. Maj. Nguyen Phu Sanh 

66. Lt. Col. D. E. MacDonald 

67. Maj. Nguyen Vinh Nghi 

68. Lt. Col. N. Dunlap 

69. Maj. R. H. Oestreich 

70. Maj. F. A. Mu lroney 

71. Lt. Col. R. Kinnes 

72. Lt. Col. W. R. Bond 

73. Lt. Col. C. E. Burner 
UNITED STATES 

MILITARY 

I ASSISTANCE 

ADVISORY GROUP 

CO VAN 

QUA 

MY 

Senior Advisers' Conference Participants, January 1960 
Advice alld S"pport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

In both cases the Vietnamization effort ended in failure. The reasons for 

the failure of the second Vietnamization are still being assessed; the reasons 

for the failure of the first are easier to delineate. In the 1950s American 

military aims in Vietnam were never clearly defined. Although many Washington leaders believed that Communist subversion was a greater threa t to 

South Vietnam than an overt, large-scale inva sion, U.S. contingency planning 

tended to emphasize the latter. The chiefs of the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group therefore understandably tended to concentrate on building an army 

geared to resist attack from the North. In doing so they were merely following contemporary thinking, for in the 1950s, in contrast to the 1960s, there 

was little interest in, or knowledge of, counterinsurgency warfare within the 

U.S. armed forces. 

The need for a capable security force to deal with the threat of in ternal 

subversion was not ignored . Yet responsibility for the training and equipping 

of paramilitary force s such as the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps was 

vested not in the advisory group but in other agencies of the U.S. country 

team, agencies which differed radica lly in their view of the proper mission, 

composition, and employment of these forces. This disagreement was further 

complicated by delays, bureaucratic infighting, and persona lity clashes. The 

result was that when insurgency once again became a serious threat in 1959, 

the paramilitary forces were still unprepared, untrained, and unequipped to 

cope with it . 

. Consequently, the Vietnamese Army had to be directly committed against 

the Communist insurgents. Its indifferent performance in combat against 

the Viet Cong even after four years of U.S. support and training can be 

attributed to two sets of factors. The first involved weaknesses inherent in the 

Vietnamese Army as an institution. The rampant politiciza tion in the higher 

ranks of the officer corps had enabled incompetent but politica lly reliable 

officers to attain and retain positions of responsibility and high comma nd . An 

absence of unify ing national spirit, motivation, or patriotism on the part of 

most Vietnamese soldiers reflected the lack of any widespread popular support for the Diem regime. Another factor was the poor security system of the 

army and its penetration at all levels by Viet Cong agents. Still another 

important element was the system of divided authority, routine insubordination, and overlappi ng responsibility deliberately fostered by Diem within 

the army's comma nd system to ensure that no military leader became too 

powerful. Added to this pattern was the inadequate technical competence 

of the Vietnamese combat soldier, who was often a recent conscript whose 

training had been interrupted or never started. Contemporary critics also 

pointed to the lack of s pecific training for guerrilla warfare, yet the Vietnamese Army's level of proficiency in basic combat skills was often so low as 

to make the question of specialized training irrelevant. 

At the same time, the very organization, composition, and outlook of 

the Military Assistance Advisory Group ensured that the American advisers 

would remain either unaware of these inherent deficiencies or powerless to 

change them. The so-ca lled short tour limited most U.S. advisers to less than 

378 
Assessment 

eleven months in which to win the confidence of their Vietnamese counterparts and influence them to take needed measures to increase the effectiveness of their units. A wide gap in customs and culture also separa ted the 

advisers from their counterparts, a gap made wider by the small number of 

American officers able to communicate in any language other than English. 

The limited ability of u.s. advisers to influence their counterparts holds 

true even for General Williams. He enjoyed President Diem's trust and confidence to an extent probably equaled by few other Americans, yet Williams' 

remark that " I can't remember one time that President Diem ever did anything of importance concerning the military that I recommended against" is 

surely an exaggeration.

2 Genera l Williams was unable to induce Diem to 

aba ndon favoritism in the appointment of officers, to rationalize the chain of 

command, or to abandon the project to create ranger battalions out of existing 

army formations. Moreover, Williams' closeness to Diem inclined him, in the 

view of some observers, to identify so closely with the president that he 

resisted and attempted to blunt all criticism of Diem, whether well founded 

or otherwise. 

The success of an adviser was measured by his ability to influence his 

Vietnamese counterpart. Few were willing to report forthrightly that they had 

been unable to bring about needed reforms and improvements in the units to 

which they were assigned . Since the whole system of rating the performance 

of the Vietnamese Army was built upon the subjective, nonstandardized 

eva luations made by the advisers and their superiors, Saigon and Washington 

were gua ranteed a superficial assessment. The dogged "Can Do" attitude of 

most officers and noncommissioned officers who tended to see all faults in 

the army as correcta ble, all failures as temporary, only furth er contributed to 

overoptimistic reports. 

Considering the sma ll size of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and 

the many limitations imposed upon its activities, its accomplishments with 

the weak, demoralized , divided, and disorganized army it inherited in 1955 

represent a rema rkable achievement. The complete reorganization of the 

Vietnamese Army, the establishment of a well-conceived and comprehensive 

school and training system, and the introduction, at least on paper, of a 

rationalized chain of command were only a few of the advisory group's solid 

contributions. Yet the subsequent failure of the South Vietnamese Army as an 

effective fighting force can only underline the warning which the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff gave to Secretary of State Dulles in 1954: that strong and stable 

governments and societies are necessary to support the creation of strong 

armies. That the reverse is seldom true would be clearly and tragically demonstrated in the years to follow . 

2"Why u.s. is losing in Vietnam," U. S. News atld World Report, 9 Novembe r 1964. 

379 

Bibliographical Note 

Official Records 

Official records used in the preparation of this work fa ll into two broad 

categories: those that have been accessioned by the National Archives and are 

identifiable by record group (RG) number, and those still in the custody of 

various government agencies that have not been evaluated or processed by an 

archivist. The latter only occasionally have identifying numbers; since these 

numbers will lose their identifying function once the records have been 

processed by the Archives, they have not been included in citations. Copies 

of many of the documents cited in the footnotes have been collected and are 

on file in the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), from which they 

will be retired for permanent retention. 

Of fundamental importance for this volume are the records, in the 

National Archives, of the War Department general and special staffs (RG 165) 

and the succeeding records of the Army staff (RG 319), particularly the files of 

the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (ACofS G - 3) and the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS). Also of 

special interest are the files of the Office of the Chief of Psychologica l Warfare 

(PSYWAR), a subordinate agency of G - 3. Records (RG 334) of the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indoch;na (later Military Assistance 

Advisory Group, Vietnam), are spotty for most of the 1950s. They are supplemented by the excellent and extensive records of the Office of the Assistant 

Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), which contain reports and messages by 

attaches in Southeast Asia and intelligence material passed to the United 

States by the French and Vietnamese governments. Of particular value are 

the so-called G-2 10 files (RG 319), a reference collection incorporating not 

only intelligence documents originated by the Army but info rmation received 

from foreign governments, the State Department, and other U.S. intelligence 

agencies. 

The files of the Department of State frequently provide the best record of 

American activities and policies in regard to Indochina, particularly for the 

period prior to the 1954 Geneva Conference. The most important are the 851G 

and 751G decimal files, which contain State Department messages and memorandums and also messages and reports by the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group that have not been preserved elsewhere. Also significant are the files 

of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, which contain valuable material on policy discussions within the State Department and between 

381 
Advice alld Slipport: The Early Years, 1941 - 1960 

the department and other agencies. The State Department Historical Division's Documentary History of u.S. Policy Toward Indochina, prepared in 

1954, also contains many useful items not easily found elsewhere in the 

records. 

The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218) are another valuable 

source for the study of high-level policymaking. In addition, the JCS Historical Division has prepared two manuscript histories--History of the Indochina 

Incident, 1940 - 1954, and The Joint Chiefs of Sta ff and the War in Vietnam, 

1954 - 1959- which are excellent guides to the jCS records. Files of other 

agencies of the Defense Department relating to Indochina are thin for most of 

the 1950s. However, some materials may be found in the records of the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD, 

ISA) and the Office of Military Assistance (OMA), both in RG 330, Nationa l 

Archives. 

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, holds the minutes 

of National Security Council (NSC) meetings during 1953 - 60 and other significant documents relating to the policy of the Eisenhower administration 

toward Indochina . The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made available 

records relating to OSS (Office of Strategic Services) activities in Southeast 

Asia during and immediately after World War II and uneva luated field intelligence reports, mostly relating to the political situation in South Vietnam and 

internal security problems there during the late 1950s. 

Finally, the records of two important field commands are of significant 

value in tracing the evolution of U.S. policy and action during World War II: 

the records of the China theater (RG 332, National Archives), particularly 

Genera l Albert C. Wedemeyer's personal files, and the records of Southeast 

Asia Command (WO 203, Public Records Office, London). British Foreign 

Office records regarding Indochina in FO 371 were also consulted. Also of 

interest is the History of u.S. Forces in the China Theater, a manuscript in 

the Center of Military History. 

Personal Collections 

By tar the most important collection of personal papers for this volume 

were the files generously made available by Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams. 

Comprising the personal and official correspondence, message files, and 

memorandums of General Williams during his tour of duty as chief of the 

Military Assistance AdviSOry Group in Vietnam, they constitute almost a 

documentary history of that organization. Also of primary significance are the 

papers of former Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins pertaining to his 

special mission to Vietnam, 1954 - 55, and the papers of Lt. Gen . John W. 

O'Daniel concerning his several visits to Vietnam and duty as chief of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group. The Collins Papers have been deposited 

in the Nationa l Archives; the O'Daniel Papers are in the Center of Military 

History. 

Through the kind ness of Madame la Marechale de Lattre de Tassigny, the 

author was permitted to examine a portion of the papers of Marshal de La ttre 

382 
Bibliographical Note 

relating to Indochina, a valuable source for the French view of the conflict. 

The papers of Maj . Gen. Philip E. Gallagher in the Center of Military History 

are important for an understanding of the U.S. Army role in Vietnam during 

the period of the August Revolution. Other papers examined include the 

Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Arthur W. Radford and Milton E. Miles 

Papers at the U.S. Nava l Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 

Interviews 

Many individuals with firsthand experience of the events described in the 

volume generously agreed to provide oral history interviews. Many also read 

and commented on the manuscript in draft form. These individuals include 

Maj. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher, Kenneth P. Landon, Maj. Gen. Robert B. 

McClure, Abbot Low Moffat, Archimedes L. A. Patti, Reginald Ungern, Col. 

R. F. C. Vance, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Frank White, and james R. 

Withrow, who discussed the World War II period. Col. Donald Dunn, Lt. 

Gen. james M. Gavin, Ambassador Edmund Gullion, Lt. Gen. john W. 

O'Daniel, Charlton Ogburn, Genera l Matthew B. Ridgway, and His Excellency M. jean Sainteny discussed the period of the Franco - Viet Minh War. 

Lt. Col. Edward M. Dannemiller, Lt. Gen. George Forsythe, Col. james Muir, 

Lt. Gen. Samuel L. Myers, Col. john E. Robb, Maj. Gen. john F. Ruggles, 

Col. Eugene Stann, Brig. Gen . Charles A. Symroski, and Col. Nathaniel P. 

Ward, all former officers in the Military Assistance Advisory Group, contributed their recollections as did General Williams himself. Ambassador Leland 

Barrows, Christian A. Chapman, Col. Richard H. Comstock, Ambassador 

Elbridge Durbrow, Gerald C. Hickey, and Rufus Phillips provided other 

perspectives from within the U.S. mission. 

Generals Williams and O'Daniel were interviewed by Charles B. MacDonald and Charles V. P. von Luttichau of the Center of Military History. All 

other interviews, as well as a second one with O'Daniel, were conducted by 

the author. Transcripts of most of these in terviews are on file at the Center of 

Military History. The au thor also consulted summaries of interviews conducted by the jCS Historical Division in 1954 with former officers of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. 

The Dulles Ora l History Collection at Princeton University contains a 

number of interviews which shed light on the Eisen hower policies toward 

Indochina, especially the Dien Bien Phu crisis. However, their value is limited 

by the fact that the interviewers apparently had little or no specialized knowledge of this subject. The interviews therefore need to be carefully checked 

against the documentary records now becoming available. Other oral history 

interviews of value a re those of General Graves B. Erskine and Col. Victor j. 

Croizat in the U.S. Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Mar·ine Corps 

Historical Center. 

Memoirs 

A number of individuals who figured prominently in this work have 

383 
Advice alld Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 

written their own account of events. The most important are Dean Acheson, 

Presellt at the Creatioll: My Years ill the State Departmellt (New York: W. W. 

Norton, 1969); J. Lawton Collins, Lightllillg Joe: All Autobiography (Baton 

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979); Tran Van Don, Our Elldless 

War: Inside Vietnam (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio, 1978); Edward G. Lansdale, 

III the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Paul Ely, Clndoc/line 

dans la Tourmellte (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1964); Henri Navarre, L'Agonie de 

L'lndochine (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1956); Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs 

of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956); and Jean Sainteny, 

Histoire d'lllle Paix Mallquee (Paris: Fayard, 1967). 

The memoirs of Admiral Arthur Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The 

Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, ed. Stephen Jurika, Jr. (Stanford, Calif.: 

Hoover Institution Press, 1980), and Archimedes L. Patti, Why Vietnam: Prell/de 10 America's Albalross (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 

appeared too late to be used in this work. However, Mr. Patti generously 

called the attention of the author to the documents on which his account is 

based. Likewise the Radford memoirs are based, in large part, on the JCS 

records to which the author had access. 

Printed Works 

In addition to the diplomatic documents published in the Department of 

State Foreign Relations of the United States series, now available through 1954, 

two other documentary collections are of special value. The first is the famous 

Pentagon Papers, a documentary history of the war up to 1967 prepared by 

the Department of Defense, Of the various editions, that published by the 

U.S. Government Printing Office (United States - Vieinam Relatiolls, 1945 - 1967: 

A Study Prepared by the Departmellt of Defellse, 12 vols. [Washington, 1971]) is 

by far the most extensive. However several documents which do not appear 

there may be found in The Sella tor Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers, 

4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), The second collection of note is Gareth 

Porter, ed ., Vietnam: The Defillitive Documelltatioll of Humall Decisiolls, 2 vols. 

(Stanfordville, N.Y,: Coleman Enterprises, 1979) which, while far from definitive, contains a large number of hard-to-Iocate and not previously published 

items. 

Some Significant Secondary Works 

On the rise of nationalism and communism in Vietnam two works are 

indispensable: John T, McAlister and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese alld Their 

Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), and John T. McAlister, Vietnam: 

Tile Origills of Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971). Of equal 

importance are studies by two scholars familiar with Vietnamese sources: 

Alexander B. Woodside, Coml1lllllity alld RevolutiDlI in Modem Vietnam (Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1976) and William J, Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism in 

Vietllam: 1900- 1941 (Ithaca: Cornell UniverSity Press, 1976). Also useful is 

David G. Marr, Vietllamese Allticolollialislll, 1885-1925 (Berkeley: University of 

384 
Bibliographical Note 

California Press, 1971). Of the older works, Joseph Buttinger's Vietllalll: A 

Dragon Elllbattled, 2 vols. (New York: Praeger, 1967), remains a mine of 

information, especially on French policy. The various works by Bernard B. 

Fall-The Two Vietllallls: A Political allri Military Allalysis, 2d ed. rev. (New 

York: Praeger, 1967), Last Reflectiolls on a War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 

1967), and Viet-Naill Witness: 1953- 66 (New York: Praeger, 1966)- must be 

used with caution because of their strong pro-French bias. 

On the military aspects of the First Indochina War, Bernard Fall, Street 

Withollt fay , 4th ed . (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1967) and Edgar 

O'Ballance. T7ze Indochina War. 1945- 1954: A Studll in Guerrilla Warfare (London: 

Faber & Faber, 1964) remain the only general works in English, although they 

are inadequate and sometimes inaccurate as to details. Ronald E. Irving, The 

First lllriochilla War: Frellch alld Alllerican Policy, 1945-54 (London: C. Helm, 

1975) is very good on French domestic politics and policymaking. There is no 

general history of U.S. policy toward Indochina during the 1940s and 1950s. 

George C. Herring's America's Longest War: Tile United States and Vietnalll, 

1950- 1975 (New York: Wiley, 1979) is the most recent narrative based on 

primary sources, but it is brief and superficial concerning these years. 

Communist policies and actions for this period are even more poorly 

documented . Most of the serious studies of Viet Cong organization and 

operations between 1954 - 60 rely on the same handful of captured documents, most of them of unknown reliability. The best guides through this 

maze are Jeffrey Race, War COllies to LOI/g An (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), Robert L. Sansom, The Econolllics of I1lsurgency in the Mekong 

Delta of Vietllam (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), Carlyle A. Thayer, 

"South Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations and the Vietnamese Workers 

Party" in Joseph J. Zasloff and McAlister Brown, ed., Comlll/mislll in [ndoel/ilza 

(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971), and William J. Duiker, Tile COIIIIll/mist Road 10 Power ill Vieillalll (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981). 

Professor Duiker kindly made available to the author portions of his draft 

manuscript, which are cited in this work. 

385 

Index 

Abbot, George M., 92- 93 

Acheson, Dean, 84, 93, 94-95, 96, 98, 101, 

103,110, ·151 

Advisory Train ing and O rga nization Mission. Su Tra in ing Relations and 

Instruction Mission 

Agrovill e program, 332-33 

Alessa ndri, General Ma rcel, 63 

Alsop, joseph, 139 

Anderson, Robert B., 203, 210 

Associated States of Indochina, 127-28 

A TLANTE, Operation, 211 

Bane, Lt. Col. john c., 60-61 

Bao Da i, 42, 55-56, 90-97, 126, 249 

Barrows, Le la nd, 304, 322-24 

Berkey, Vice Adm. Russell S., 108 

Bernard, Harry, 27 

Berry, Lt. Col. C. Radford, 69 

Bidault, Georges, 45, 210 

Sin h Dinh Province, 242, 243 

Bin h Xuyen, 65, 243-47, 249, 252, 313- 15 

Bird, Col. W illis H., 40 

Bluechel, Capt. Herbert J., 66-67 

Blum, Robert, ] 41-42, I SS 

Bohlen, Charl es E., 94- 95 

Boll aert, Emile, 87, 90-91 

Bolling, Ma j. Gen. Alexander R., 139 

Bonnet, H e nri, 33, 103, 235 

Bonsa i, Phil ip W., 163 

Borod in, Michael, 15 

Bowie, Thomas D., 304 

Brad ley, General of the Army Omar N., 

152- 53 

Briggs, Ellis 0., 198 

Brink, Brig. Gen. Francis G., 116, 126, 135, 

151, 155, 157 

Brohon, Col. Raymond, 204 

Bruce, David K. E., 94-95, 110- 11, 141 

Buckmaster, Rea r Adm. Elliott, 69 

Buis, Maj. Dale R., 329 

Bu tterworth, W. Walton, 101 

Ca Mau peninsula, 242 

Caffery, jefferson, 77, 84, 87 

Caldara, Brig. Gen. joseph D. c., 205-06 

Cam Ra nh Bay, 18 

Can, Ngo Din h, 279 

Cao Bang, 125 

Cao Da i sect, 243-47, 252 

Caraway, Brig. Gen. Paul W., 33, 39- 40, 181 

Ca rney, Ad mira l Robert B., 177 

Carpentier, General Marcel, 101, 108, 13] 

Chamberl ain, W illiam H., 19 

Chambe rli n, Lt. Gen. Stephcn L 84 

Chang Fa Kwei, 37-38 

Chau, Nguyen Puu, 253 

Chavigny, Henri, 14 

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L., 26, 31- 32 

Chiang Ka i-shek, 23, 29, 32, 46-47, 49, 184 

Ch ief of Nava l O perations. Set' Ca rney, 

Admira l Robe rt B.; Stark, Admira l 

Harold R. 

Chief of Staff, Un ited States Air Force. Sf'l' 

Va ndenbe rg, General Hoyt S. 

Chief of Sta ff, United States Army. Str 

Collins, General j. Lawton; Ma rsha ll, 

Gcneral of the Army George c.; 

Ridgway, Genera l Matthew B. 

Chinese Training Comba t Command, 53- 54 

Civil Guard, 320- 25, 363-64, 371, 378 

Co Am, 13 

Coch inchina 

end of separa te colo ny, 93- 95 

fo rmation of republic, 79 

Cog ny, Maj. Gen. Rene, 182, 212 

Coll ins, General }. Lawton, 99, 126, 129, 

145, 171, 232, 236-39, 245-49, 251, 254 

Collins mission to South Vietnam, 232- 33, 

236-39 

Comba t Arms Training O rgan ization 

(CATO),289 

Commander in Chief, Pacific. Sff Radfo rd, 

Admira l Arthur W.; Stump, Admiral 

Felix ; Felt, Admira l Harry D. 

Connasse, 1st Lt. Emile R., 66 

Coolidge, Capt. joseph, 67 

Coste Flo ret, Pa ul, 87 

Cum mings, Lt. Col. S. Fred, Jr., 118 

Cutler, Robert, 197 

D'Argenlieu, Admiral Georges Thierry, 79 

Dariden, jean, 235-36 

387 
Adv;ce (!lid S"ppor/: The fnrly Yellrs, 1941- 1960 

Davis, Vice Adm. Arthu r c., 152 

De Castries, Col. Christian, 182, 186- 90 

De Gaulle. General Charles, 22-23, 34 

De Ja Chevrotier, Henri. Se, Chavigny, 

Henri. 

De Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean, 

119- 20, 135-36, 140-47, 149 

De Linares, Maj. Gen. Francois Gonzalez, 

168-69 

Decoux, Admiral Jean, 30 

Denning. Esler, 29 

Devereux, Lt. (jg.) George, 25- 27 

Dewey, Lt. Col. A. Peter, 66-67 

Diem, Ngo D inh, 224- 25, 242, 244- 49, 253, 

275-76, 279- 80, 296, 304-05, 307-08, 

321-22, 367-72 

Dien Bien Phu, 182- 83, 186- 90, 211 

Dillon, C. Douglas, 172, 199 

Dong, Lt. Col. Vuong Van, 369-70 

Dong Khe, 125 

Dong Minh Hoi, 37-38 

Donovan, Maj. Gen. William }., 39 

Duff, Col. E. A., 106 

Duff, Maj. Gen . Robinson E., 100, lOS 

Dull es, John Foster, 167, 203, 206-07, 228, 

231- 32, 248- 49, 250-51, 260 

Dung, Tran Trung, 281 

Dung, Maj. Gen. Van Tien, 124 

Durbrow, Elbridge, 276-77, 366, 367-68, 

370, 371 

Eden, Anthony, 209 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 167, 170, 172- 73, 

199, 206, 235 

Ely, General Paul, 191- 94, 222, 237, 239-40, 

247, 250, 254 

Elysee Agreements, and U.S. reaction to, 

93- 95 

Embankment project, 65-68 

Emerson, Gertrude, 7 

Ennis, Thomas E., 15 

Erskine, Maj. Gen. Graves B., 111- 12, 

114- 15,131,199 

Evans, Lt. Col. Robert, 260 

Faure, Edgar, 250- 51 

Felt, Admiral Harry D., 332, 359, 362 

Flood, Peter, 18 

Fourteenth Air Force, United States, 27, 

31-34 

French Indochina. See Indochina, French 

Gallagher, Brig. Gen. Philip E., 54, 59-64, 

68-72 

388 

Ga mbi ez, Brig. Gen. Fernand, 246 

Ga tes, Thomas J., Jr., 363 

Gauss, Clarence E., 38 

Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 208-09, 230 

GBT gro up, 27, 28, 38 

Geneva Agreements, 219-21 

Ge rhart, Maj. Gen. John K., 196 

C IAI PHONG, Operation, 243 

Giap, Vo Nguyen, 82-83, 85-86, 124, 150 

Gibson, William H., 98 

Gillespie, Col. P. J., 116 

Gordon, Laurence, 27 

Gorman, Maj. Frank, 234 

Gracey, Maj. Gen. Douglas, D ., 59, 64-65, 

67 

Greene, Marc T., 15 

Grew, Joseph c., 43 

Griffin, Robert A., 105, 108, 109 

Griffin mission to Vietnam, 105- 06 

Gross, Brig. Gen. Me lvin E., 30, 40 

Gullion, Edmund, 108, 109, 133- 34, 137 

Ha Long Bay Agreement, 91- 92 

Halaby, Najeeb, 100 

Halifax, Lord, 46 

Handy, General Thomas c., 33 

Harris, Col. Lee V., 115 

Heath, Donald R., 112, 119, 125-26, 127, 

147, 170,233-35 

Helliwell, Col. Paul E., 38 

Henderson, Loy W ., 96-97 

Herter, Christian A., 363, 365 

Hinh, General Nguyen Van, 233-35, 237 

Hisaichi, Field Marshal Terauchi, 65 

Ho Chi Minh, 13, 37-38, 42-43, 64, 78, 95 

Hoa Binh, 149- 50 

Hoa Hao sect, 243-47, 252 

Holland, Capt. Charles M., 42 

Hull, Lt. Gen. John E., 72 

Humphrey, George M., 197 

Hunter, Lt. William H., 98 

Hurley, Maj. Gen. Patrick J., 27, 46, 49-50 

Huu, Tran Van, 97 

Indochina. See Associated States of Indochina; Vietnam, Democrati c Republic 

of. 

Indochina, French, 5- 17 

Inte rnational Control Commissionn (ICC), 

219, 260- 62, 360 

Irwin, John N. III, 368 

Ja ckson, Charles D ., 172 

Jacquot, General Pierre, 255 

Jenkins, Maj. Gen. Reuben E., 164 
jessup, Philip c., 109 

Johnson, Louis A" 98- 99 

Kidder, Randolph, 233 

Kim, Tran Trang, 55 

Kyes, Roger, 197- 98 

Land reform in South Vietnam, 308- 10 

Landon, Kenneth P., 44 

Laniel. joseph, 175, 210, 212- 13 

Lansdale, Maj. Gen. Edward G., 240-41, 

356-57, 361, 368, 370 

Le Duan, 311- 13, 364 

LEA, Operation, 89 

Leahy, Admiral William D., 33- 34 

Leclerc, General Jacques, 68 

Lemn itzer, General Lyman L., 100, 115, 354 

Letourneau, Jean, 151, 170 

Letourneau p lan, 170- 72 

LIIlERTY, Operation, 242-43 

Lind ley, Ernest K., 334 

L ORRAINE, Operation, 159 

Lovett, Robert A., 44, 92- 93, 145 

Lu Han, Lt. Gen., 53- 54, 60-61, 63-64, 

68- 71 

Lucas, Jim G., 302 

Lung Yun, Genera l, 52 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 

126 

McClintock, Robert, 169, 172, 221 

McClure, Maj. Gen. Robert S., 31- 33 

McCormack, John W., 178 

McGarr, Lt. Gen. Lionel c., 365- 66, 368, 

370, 371, 372 

Mansfield, Mike, 235 

Mao Khe, 137 

Marshall, General of the Army George c., 

49, 84, 87, 93 

Masse, Col. Andre, 240 

Matthews, H. Freeman, 34 

Mayer, Rene, 170 

Melby, john F., l11, 114 

Melby-Erskine mission to Vietnam, 111- 15 

Mendes-France, Pierre, 235, 238-39 

Merchant, Livingston T., 107, 142 

Meynier, Comdr. Robert, 25 

Michelin Rubber Plantation raid, 315 

Michigan State University advisers in South 

Vietnam, 321- 23 

Miles, Commo. Milton E., 24- 25, 26- 27 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

Indochina, 115- 21, 146- 47, 155, 168, 

182- 83, 223, 256. See also Military 

Assista nce Advisory Group, Vietnam. 

M ilitary Assistance Adv isory Group, 

Vietnam, 256, 259- 62, 277, 289, 

291- 95, 375, 378- 79 

Moch, jules, 126- 27 

Moffat, Abbot Low, 44, 79- 80, 84 

Morton, Thruston B., 203 

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 23, 29, 

45- 49 

Mullins, Maj. F. M., 61 

Murphy, Robert, 21 

Myers, Maj. Gen. Samuel L, 334, 350 

Na San, 159- 60 

Nam Din h, 169 

Navarre, Lt. Gen. Henri, 173, 182- 86 

Ngh ia Lo, 157 

Ngo, General Nguyen Giac, 245 

Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 279 

Nixon, Richard M., 210 

Nord linger, CoL Stephen, 56, 58- 61 

O'Daniel, Lt. Gen . john W., 173- 75, 

179- 80, 184- 87, 211, 221- 23, 226, 

233- 35, 239- 40, 243- 44, 247, 253, 

255- 56,263,265,268,272-73,281,288, 

375 

Q'Dan iel mission to Vietnam, 173- 75 

Office of Strategic Serv ices (055), 39-43 

cooperation with Viet Minh, 41-42 

and Embankment project, 65- 68 

Ogburn, Charlton, 95, 109 

O hly, john H., 129 

O'Su llivan, James L , 79, 86, 94 

Ovnand, M. Sgt. Chester M., 329 

Pace, Frank, Jr., 164 

Parodi, Alexandre, 108 

Parsons, J. Graham, 370 

Partridge, General Earle E., 205 

Pathet Lao, 358 

Patti, Maj. Archimedes LA., 56-57, 59 

Pau Conference, 127- 28, 133- 34 

Penta lateral Mutual Defense Assistance 

Pact, 116 

Perry, Brig. Gen. Miller 0., 259 

Petain, Marshal Henri Philippe, 22 

Phouma, Souvanna, 358 

Phu Doan, 159 

Phu Yen Binh, 159 

Phuong, General Nguyen Thanh, 245 

Pignon, Leon, 106 

Piroth, Col. Charles, 190 

Plans and Operations Division, U.S. Army, 

102 

389 
Advice IIlId 5111'11orl: The Enrly Y",rs, 1941 - 1960 

Pleven, Rene, 191 

Postgate, Raymond, 15 

Potsdam Conference, 51 

Powell, William, 29 

President, U.S. Set> Eisenhower, Dwight D.; 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry 

S. 

Quang Nga i Province, 242, 243 

Q uang Trung Training Center, 285- 86, 345 

Q ua t, Phan Huy, 108 

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., 177, 192- 94, 

202, 203, 231, 271- 72 

Ramadier, Paul, 97 

REDLAND Plan, 222 

Reed, Charles E., 87, 94 

Refugees from North Vietnam, 225- 27 

Reinhardt, G . Frederick 254, 256, 276 

Rendall, Edwin c., 89 

Rhee, Syngman, 198 

Ridgway, General Matthew B., 177, 181, 

202, 209, 210, 221, 223- 24 

Roberts, Q uincy, 16 

Roosevelt, Frankl in D., 4- 5, 22- 24, 28, 30, 

33, 43, 47 

Rosson, Lt. Col. Wi ll iam R., 222 

Rusk, Dea n, 100 

Sa battier, General Gabriel, 40 

Sabin, Rear Adm. Lorenzo 5., 226 

Sainteny, Maj. Jean, 56- 57, 68, 70, 71, 78, 

236 

sa lan, General Raoul, 162 

San Francisco Conference, 45 

Schuman, Robert, 103, 110 

Secretary of Defense, U.S. See Gates, 

Thomas 5., Jr.; Jo hnson, Louis A.; 

Wi lson, Charl es E. 

Secretary of State, U.S. See Acheson, Dean; 

Dulles, John Foster; Herter, Ch risti an 

A.; stettinius, Edward R. 

Self-Defense Corps, 320- 24, 378 

s haughnessey, Col. Leo W . H., 181 

Shepherd, General Lemuel c., Jr., 202 

Smith, Robert Aura, 19 

Smith, Walter Bedell, 184, 189 

soai, General T ran Van, 245 

South Vietnamese Army, 258- 59, 263-68, 

278- 86,295- 302,331- 32,338,371,378. 

See a/so Vietnamese Army. 

breakdown, 343- 48 

and con troversy over counterinsurgency 

training, 349- 57 

ineffectiveness, 353- 55 

infiltrated by Viet Cong, 347 

390 

South Vietnamese police and parami litary 

units, 320- 25 

Southeast Asia Coll ective Defense Treaty, 

229 

Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), 23, 45, 

64 

Southeast Asia Trea ty Organization 

(SEATO), 229 

Special Committee on Indochina, 184- 85, 

199 

Special Technical and Economic M ission 

(STEM), 120- 21 

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 18 

Stassen, Harold E., 45 

State, War, and Navy Coord inating 

Committee, 43- 46 

stettin ius, Edward R., Jr., 33, 45 

Stevens, Robert, 210 

Sti lwell, Lt. Gen . Joseph W., 29 

Stump, Admiral Feli x, 180- 81, 231, 256 

Tabe r, Lt. Col. Robert C, 187, 189 

Tan, Frank, 27 

Temporary Equipment Recovery M ission 

(TERM), 261-62 

Thai, Maj. Gen. Hoang Van, 124 

The, General Trinh Minh, 245 

Thi, Lt . Col. Nguyen Ch anh, 369- 70 

Thomas, Maj. All ison K., 41- 42 

Thompson, Virginia, 10, 17 

Thorne, Capt. Nick, 112 

Thu Duc School Center, 285 

Thuan, Nguyen Dinh, 349 

Tonkin, Viet Minh offensives in, 136- 37 

Training Re lations and Instruction Mission 

(TRIM), 240, 252 

Trang Sup, 338 

Trapnell, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. H., 157, 161, 

162-64,171, 176- 77, 182- 83, 187- 89 

Truman, Harry S., 45, 77, 84, 96, 103- 04, 

126, 127, 144, 152 

Twining, Gene ral Nathan F., 202 

Ty, General Le Van, 280, 319 

United States Ambassador at Large. See 

Jessup, Ph ilip C 

United States Ambassador to China. See 

Gauss, Clarence E.; Hurley, Maj. Gen. 

Patrick J. 

United States Ambassador to France. Sfe 

Bruce, David K. E.; Caffery, Jefferson; 

Dillion, C. Douglas; Murphy, Robert. 

Va ll u y, Lt. Gen. Jean E., 172 

Van Fleet, General James A., 222 
Va ndenberg, General Hoyt S., 171 

V AUTOU R, O peration, 204- 07 

Vi en, Brig. Gen. Bay, 244 

Vi en, General Cao Van, 286 

Viet Cong, 315, 316, 325-27, 355, 364 

attack on America detachment at Bien 

Hoa, 3 29 

development of new strategy, 329- 37 

take the offensive, 337- 43 

tacti cs, 340-41 

Viet Minh, 37-38, 41-43, 55-56, 310-11 

attack French in Hanoi, 82 

extent of control of Indochina, 113-14 

founding of, 37 

growth of armed forces, 124- 25 

invasion of Laos, 172 

offensives in Tonkin, 136- 37 

organiza tion of company unit, 86 

turn to guerrilla warfare, 86 

Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi. Sff Viet 

Minh . 

Viet Nam Q uoe Dan Dang (VNQDD), 

11-14 

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 

recognition by China, 96 

recognition by France, 78 

recognition by Soviet Union, 96 

Vietnam, early history of, 3-5 

Vietnamese Army, 221- 23, 225, 237- 38. See 

a/so South Vietnamese Army. 

II/dex 

Vietnamese National Army, 153-55, 169, 

243 

Vietnamese Na tionalist Party. See Viet Nam 

Q uoe Dan Dang (VNQDD). 

Vincent, John Ca rter, 44, 83 

Vinh Yen, 136- 37 

Wang, Genera l Gaston, 61- 62 

War Zone 0 , 327 

W arder Capt. W ., 106 

Waterman, Henry I., 9, 14- 15 

Weckerling, Brig. Gen. John, 151 

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert c., 27, 30, 

32- 34, 45- 50, 52 

Welles, Sumner, 21 

Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Raymond A., 23 

White, General Isaac D., 317, 350-51, 360 

Williams, Lt. Gen . Samuel T., 256, 273-78, 

280,281- 82,294- 98,300-302,305,307, 

316-20, 322- 25, 326, 332, 334, 335- 36, 

338- 40, 342- 43, 344- 45, 349-54, 375, 

379 

Wilson, Charl es E., 176 

Withrow, Lt. James R., Jr., 67- 68 

Yang, Admira l Hsuan Chen, 27 

Yen Bay, 12 

Yen Bay rebellion (mutiny), 12- 13, 15 

Yin, General, 71 

391