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i 

20–080 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–120] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

THE MISSILE DEFEAT POSTURE AND 

STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES— 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 PRESIDENT’S 

BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 14, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Cashman, RDML Edward, USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Organization 

Gortney, ADM William E., USN, Commander, North American Aerospace 

Defense Command, U.S. Northern Command 

McKeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, Department of Defense 

Pike, Barry J., Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, U.S. Army 

Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cashman, RDML Edward ................................................................................ 98 

Gortney, ADM William E. ................................................................................ 39 

McKeon, Hon. Brian P. .................................................................................... 29 

Pike, Barry J. .................................................................................................... 89 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ........................................................................... 27 

Syring, VADM James D. .................................................................................. 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 109 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 128 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 113 

(1) 

THE MISSILE DEFEAT POSTURE AND STRATEGY OF THE 

UNITED STATES—THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 PRESIDENT’S 

BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 14, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the 

subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROGERS. I call this hearing of the House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. Welcome everybody 

here today. Today we are holding an oversight hearing on the missile defeat posture strategy of the United States, the fiscal year 

2017 President’s budget request. 

And, unfortunately, votes are going to be called on the House 

floor between 3:00 and 3:30. So in order to make sure we can get 

to the meat of the hearing, which is the Q and A period, the ranking member and I have agreed that we are going to dispense with 

our opening statements and the witnesses’ opening statements, so 

they will be submitted for the record in their entirety, and we will 

go straight to questions. 

[The prepared statements can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 27.] 

Mr. ROGERS. We are very fortunate today to have a very distinguished panel. The witnesses we have are the Honorable Brian 

McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Policy, Department of Defense; Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander, North 

American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Northern Command; 

Vice Admiral James Syring, Director, Missile Defense Agency; Mr. 

Barry Pike, Principal Executive Officer, Missiles and Space, U.S. 

Army; and Rear Admiral Edward Cashman, Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization. 

And Lieutenant General Mann is here somewhere. Or maybe not. 

I think—well, that is for the closed session. That is right. We will 

have Lieutenant General Mann here for the closed session. 

All right. And with that, like I said, we will dispense with the 

opening statements and I will go directly to recognizing myself for 

the first series of questions. 

This will be for Admiral Syring and Admiral Gortney. Is the Iran 

ballistic missile threat to the region, including Israel or the United 

States, slowing in any respect since last year? Admiral Gortney, 

would you like to go first? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, we have seen, as a result of JCPOA 

[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the nuclear issue temporar-
2 

ily, potentially permanently, taken off the table, but we see them 

to continue to develop the propellent, the rocket motor, and we assume they are continuing to develop a reentry vehicle. So we see, 

of the three pieces that they need, a nuclear weapon miniaturized 

to put on it, a delivery-capable booster, and a reentry vehicle. We 

don’t see the latter two being slowed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Syring, did you want to offer anything in 

addition to that? 

Admiral SYRING. I agree. I do not see it slowing in any way. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Admiral Syring, we often talk about the combatant commanders and military services for the unfunded requirements list. Do you have an unfunded requirements list? 

Admiral SYRING. So there are gaps in the BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System], but our—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Please pull the microphone closer. 

Admiral SYRING. Sure. There are gaps in the BMDS currently 

that are not funded, and they include advanced technology, a space 

layer, and additional sensor capability as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. What funding do you require to meet the combatant 

command requirement for THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense] and SM–3s [Standard Missile 3]? 

Admiral SYRING. I am building seven THAAD batteries. The stated requirement from the Army is nine. So I have a two-battery gap 

today to the stated requirement. I am building at a rate to fill out 

the seven batteries by the end of the FYDP [Future Years Defense 

Plan]. 

Mr. ROGERS. What about the Aegis system? 

Admiral SYRING. The Aegis system, 33 BMD [ballistic missile defense] ships today, going to over 40 by the end of 2020, 2021; SM– 

3s, IAs and IBs, about 170 on path to 415 through the FYDP. I do 

not have an end inventory objective yet for Aegis. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Are you funded to develop and deploy defense against boost-glide missiles like those being developed by 

Russia and China? How much would such development cost? 

Admiral SYRING. I am not funded. 

Mr. ROGERS. How much would it cost to do that? 

Admiral SYRING. I have asked for $23 million to begin a lowpower laser demonstrator this year to demonstrate the feasibility 

by 2021. 

Mr. ROGERS. And let’s see. Mr. Pike, I would like to call your attention to the screens. You will see red, yellow, and green highlighted areas which represent different decades of key systems to 

the current Patriot radar employed by the U.S. forces. I note these 

are the systems employed by the U.S. and not our partner nations 

in the Patriot program. 

[The graphics referred to are retained in the subcommittee files 

and can be viewed upon request.] 

Mr. ROGERS. If the green represents the radar hardware that is 

with 1990s vintage, which are expected to be obsolete in 2010, and 

it is now 2016, of course, would I be correct to say that even under 

your radar digital processor programs, some of the newest equipment in the radar, in this radar, the green shaded area, will be 

older than any air defender who uses it? 
3 

Mr. PIKE. Sir, I haven’t done the math on that, but it is aging 

technology, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. So if I am correct, and we are to assume that 2028 

initial funding of a new Patriot radar will occur, we will have a 

radar system with components, in some cases, that are 58 years 

old? 

Mr. PIKE. Sir, we are continuing to modify and request funds to 

modify the existing Patriot radar until we are able to field the 

lower tier air missile defense sensor. The schedule is not really established yet. It is 2028. The Army is meeting this afternoon as a 

part of the Army Requirements Oversight Council to establish the 

actual operational requirement. And once that operational requirement is established, we will be able to assess the maturity of the 

technology against the requirement. And so that schedule that you 

have seen is not set in stone. 

Mr. ROGERS. But you see what I have described. It is completely 

unacceptable. Aren’t there systems that we have available that 

have been developed already that could meet the needs that this 

system should be meeting that are available for us to access from 

the private marketplace? 

Mr. PIKE. Sir, the Army conducted an analysis of alternatives. It 

was a very broad analysis across all the department, assessed all 

the available radars within the Department of Defense, modifications to those existing radars and the new radars all together. That 

analysis of alternatives is complete through the Army. However, it 

is within OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] for a sufficiency 

evaluation. And, again, once that analysis of alternatives is complete and delivered to the Congress as a part of the law, then we 

will be able to go forward with an acquisition strategy, and a formal schedule, and a materiel solution, none of which we have currently today. 

Mr. ROGERS. I just want to be clear. Speaking only for myself, 

I am not turning loose of this one. It is going to have to be remedied. 

Admiral Syring, if MDA [Missile Defense Agency] was developing 

and procuring these radars with the missile—with the acquisitions 

authorities you have, how much time would it take for you to take 

care—or take care of this problem? 

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Chairman, I haven’t—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Please pull the mike. 

Admiral SYRING. I haven’t looked at their specific technology, 

their specific schedule, but I can talk to what we did with LRDR 

[Long Range Discrimination Radar], which is the current radar 

that is under contract today, where we had a very defined requirement from the Joint Staff and had that under our umbrella, had 

the technology proven actually through the Navy’s AMDR [Air and 

Missile Defense Radar] competition. So we didn’t have to go 

through any of the Milestone A to B activity. It is going to take us 

61⁄2 years from start to finish. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. With that, I yield to the ranking member for 

any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Syring, the level of funding for MDA is lower than in 

previous years. Can you explain this reduction for fiscal year 2017? 
4 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, it is lower and it is part of the overall DOD 

[Department of Defense] top line reduction as well. My share of 

that has lowered, you know, not an equal percentage, but a similar 

percentage. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral, do you support successfully flight testing 

the redesigned kill vehicle before making a final production decision? 

Admiral SYRING. Completely. 

Mr. COOPER. Again, Admiral Syring, is the schedule-driven requirement of deploying 44 ground-based interceptors driving undue 

risk in concurrency for acquiring and upgrading the interceptors? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. We will flight test the last configuration 

that will complete the 44 by 2017 in a very complex ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] intercept test later this year. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Gortney, do you remain confident in the 

national missile defense system’s capability? The Government Accountability Office stated in its February 2016 report that, quote, 

‘‘several key aspects of missile defense have not been demonstrated 

through flight testing,’’ end of quote. Do you agree? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, I am confident of the systems that I am 

responsible for, the ballistic missile defense for the homeland, and 

that—— 

Mr. COOPER. Is your mike on? 

Admiral GORTNEY [continuing]. And that—the ballistic missile 

defense for the homeland that I work with MDA, and also the National Capital Region-Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, 

high confidence in its ability to engage the threats that it is designed to go against. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Gortney and Admiral Syring, how many 

successful flight intercept tests are needed to demonstrate that 

interceptors work as intended and are reliable? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, going forward, we have scheduled and it is 

funded in the program to test before we field. For example, the 

version that will go in next year will be flight tested later this year. 

For the redesigned kill vehicle, we have a nonintercept flight test 

and then an intercept flight test followed by a second intercept 

flight test in 2020 before that configuration will be fielded. 

Mr. COOPER. So two successful flight tests make it reliable? 

Admiral SYRING. It will be one nonintercept test, which we will 

learn a lot, and then two intercept tests. And based on the engineering that we get from the flight tests, along with the ground 

testing that we will do, it will be a complete body of evidence that 

will give us confidence in a decision to go to full production. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Syring, what is the appropriate level of investment for boost phase missile defense? 

Admiral SYRING. I don’t know, is the answer, sir. And I don’t 

know because I need to get to a technology feasibility demonstration with some confidence in the next 4 to 5 years to go prove that 

it is, one, technically feasible and, two, the cost estimates that I am 

getting from industry for a long-term program are affordable. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Pike, it is kind of shocking that the plan for 

Patriot modernization is expected to take 12 years, and that is assuming, I guess, you get approval this afternoon from your com-
5 

mittee. I join in the chairman’s assessment we need to do what we 

can to make that much faster. 

All witnesses, should we start building an east coast missile defense site? 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Cooper, we are aware of the requirement in 

the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to look at this and 

have something for a radar by 2020, and we have done the work 

on environmental impact statement [EIS] for a possible east coast 

site pursuant to a prior NDAA. It is not where we would spend our 

next dollar in this budget, but it is something we will be postured 

to do after the EIS, if a decision is made to do that. 

Mr. COOPER. Any other opinions? 

Admiral SYRING. I will speak before the commander. 

Not at this time. Not this year, is the way I would respond. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Syring, a final question. Would upgrading 

the Hawaii-based Aegis Ashore testing facility to a fully operational site improve U.S. missile defense in the region? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir, potentially. Any sensor improvement 

for Hawaii and, frankly, in the kill chain for the BMDS, you know, 

east and west will improve our sensor and discrimination capability. 

Mr. COOPER. But you are talking sensors, not missiles? 

Admiral SYRING. Sensors first, sir, yes. 

Mr. COOPER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LAMBORN [presiding]. Representative Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of 

you. Thank you those that are wearing uniform for your commitment to protecting America and human freedom. I never want to 

miss that moment to tell you how much we appreciate you. 

Admiral Syring, I for one am very grateful that a man of your 

acumen is in the position that he is in. In 2011, the Institute for 

Defense Analyses conducted a study, and in it, it concluded a 

space-based interceptor layer would help defend against the more 

challenging missile threats, including direct ascent antisatellite 

missiles and antiship missiles. Now, I know that it is imperative 

that at the right times we time the development of these things. 

It is always good to be looking at them and being potentially aware 

of the challenges that we may face. But can you explain to this 

committee why this capability might someday be important and it 

might be helpful to defend not only our satellites, but potentially 

against antiship missiles? 

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Franks, we have not in the recent years 

studied that in great detail. We have done some costing analysis 

of what a program may take and have some idea of the technical 

challenges to the said interceptor layer. Obviously, fielded interceptors in space worldwide from 20, 30 years ago, work had been done 

to show that that could help, but, sir, we haven’t looked at it in 

the Department other than costing it against the range of alternatives. And, frankly, the cost has been overwhelming on what it 

would take and the technical challenges. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. Well, I guess that might be part of why some 

of us would kind of like to begin to reorient at least our awareness 

in that direction. 
6 

As detailed in a 2014 ‘‘Defense One’’ article, in both 2007 and 

2014, China, as I know you well know, tested rockets to launch kinetic kill vehicles against satellites in low and high orbits respectively. And both of these tests appear to indicate that they have the 

capability to attack our space assets. And in defending U.S. space 

assets against those direct ascent antisatellite weapons, is that 

something that defending these assets is ultimately included in the 

MDA mission? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if we can defer the answer to classified session, I think we would—— 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. 

Admiral SYRING [continuing]. Have a very constructive discussion 

on that point. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. Would it be appropriate to ask if any other 

agency has any concurrent mission in research and development 

against to—the means to defend against these types of weapons? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if I can defer that to a classified session as 

well. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. So let me rephrase this here a little, because 

I think you are absolutely right. But it is appropriate in this setting to suggest that a ballistic missile defense layer in space would 

provide not just the U.S. the ultimate high ground, it could provide 

a means to defending our space systems from these ballistic ASATs 

[antisatellite weapons]. Is that correct? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if it could—if it was technologically feasible 

and affordable, which I think both, in my mind—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Important question. 

Admiral SYRING [continuing]. At this point are no; the answer 

would be yes to your question. I have serious concerns about the 

technical feasibility of interceptors in space, and I have serious concerns about the long-term affordability of a program like that. 

Admiral GORTNEY. But, sir, that does not mean that the Department is not looking at another alternative to go after that problem 

set. There may be another mechanism, another way to do that, and 

I know the Department is working on that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Would you suggest that there is some efficacy in 

maintaining an eye on that possibility? 

Admiral GORTNEY. It is a little bit out of my lane here, but, of 

course. We are going to look at what is the requirement and then 

what is the way, the mechanism that gives us the best value that 

is the most effective in order to solve that particular problem set. 

And sometimes one overarching system may be technically very 

hard and very expensive. But we can talk to the other mechanisms 

we are using when we go classified, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. And at this time—well, yeah. Perhaps I 

would be running into the same challenge. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back here. And thank you 

all. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Representative Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. And first, I apologize for not being 

here for the opening statements. So I may be covering some turf 

already handled. 

Missile defense can be done in a couple of different ways. The 

one I want to really focus on is directed energy. We have talked 
7 

about that in both classified and in open hearing. In this open 

hearing, can you bring me up to date on where we are with the directed energy issue? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. Working on two primary technologies 

within MDA, the DPALs [diode pumped alkali laser] technology 

that is being risk mitigated out at Livermore and fiber combined 

laser technology at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]. 

And, frankly, industry has been brought in over the last year to 18 

months in a big way in terms of what they could potentially do 

with laser technology. We have asked this year for funding support 

for a low-power laser demonstrator to start this year to test in the 

2020, 2021 timeframe to go prove directed energy in a boost phase 

mode. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How much money have you asked for? 

Admiral SYRING. $23 million in fiscal year 2017 budget. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you miss some zeros? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. The—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And what will the $23 million do? 

Admiral SYRING. The 5-year program is $278 million; $23 million 

is the initial increment of funding required to get concepts and contractors awarded. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And that is requested for this year’s budget? 

Admiral SYRING. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I recall something—didn’t we do that last year 

also? 

Admiral SYRING. Last year as well, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you get it? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It was in—— 

Admiral SYRING. It was not appropriated. It was supported by 

this committee and the authorizers, both House and Senate, but 

was not appropriated. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did the House appropriate it? 

Admiral SYRING. I will have to take that for the record in terms 

of what their mark was before conference, but in the end, it 

was—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I guess I am looking for names. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Who killed it? 

Admiral SYRING. So, sir, part of this is this is new, it was new 

last year, and I think there has been an education required on our 

part to go explain to people exactly what this demonstrator will do 

and that it is not a new airborne laser 747 project, which actually 

had benefit. But this is a very much smaller scale demonstration 

to inform a future program, and that is all. There is nothing more, 

nothing less. And I believe industry is capable of competing and 

fielding a technology demonstrator. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We have a classified session. I will wait till that 

point. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 
8 

Mr. LAMBORN. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral Syring, I would like to ask you about foreign military sales [FMS] of an advanced THAAD system to United Arab 

Emirates [UAE], and then get the Department’s perspective on 

that afterwards. But is that something, if they are willing to front 

some of the cost of that, that we can afford? And are there people 

on record, and including yourself, perhaps, that would be in favor 

of this project? 

Admiral SYRING. Sure. Right now in the budget, we are at the 

beginning concept feasibility level in terms of funding. I don’t have 

a complete program even in my budget yet for THAAD–ER [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense-Extended Range]. The—or a follow-on THAAD. There is industry concepts on it and, frankly, some 

good thinking on that, and that, you know, there would be policy 

involvement with this question as well in terms of either a cooperative development on it or a full FMS case on a development program. But I don’t have a stated requirement yet from the UAE for 

this capability. But certainly if we got it, we would consider that 

along with policy. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Yeah, Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Lamborn, as a matter of general policy, our regional missile defense approach is to seek cooperative partners. So 

in theory, we certainly would want to encourage that kind of cooperation, and as Admiral Syring said, we don’t have a program to 

go market with the Emirates, and nor have we gotten a request 

from them for this. So if we got to that stage, we would obviously 

need to look at some technology releasability issues and the funding issues on each side. But in theory, it is something we would 

certainly be open to. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. That is helpful. Thank you both for saying 

that. 

And, Admiral Syring, let me shift gears and ask about concurrency. Both the MDA and special forces have some unique capabilities in terms of rapid acquisition processes, and I believe concurrency is part of that. And can you talk about how that has been 

helpful to the MDA and what your perspective is? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, there has been some great examples recently that the agency has delivered in terms of meeting both policy and State Department requirements and combatant commander 

requirements. The example that comes to mind is Romania and 

how quickly we were able to design, build, produce, test, and field 

a system from an announcement that was back in 2009. And to do 

that in a foreign country with the cooperation of the Romanian government, and all of the work that went in not just with MDA, but 

whole-of-department approach on this, including the Army Corps of 

Engineers, including many parts of OSD, OSD Policy, it was remarkable in terms of us being able to do that quickly with contracts—requirements, contracts, award, and production and fielding. And I believe our authorities enabled that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I for one will go on record and say that I 

think this is something we need to examine to make broader than 

just MDA and special forces as we talk about acquisition reform, 

which the chairman of the full committee, to his credit, is very 
9 

much wanting to push. So I think that this is something we need 

to look at and expand it within the Department of Defense. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if I can just—you had also asked about concurrency. I think that is an important point. I think that is the risk 

of what I talked about, to make sure that we are managing concurrency as we go fast properly and not taking excessive risk with 

either technology or funding. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Very good. 

Does anyone else want to comment on that concept? 

Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Admiral Syring, you are very popular 

this afternoon, but I will warn Secretary McKeon, I have a question for you, so—— 

The first question, though, for admiral is back to Mr. Cooper’s 

question on RKV [redesigned kill vehicle]. And I understand how 

you answered it, but I want you to take a little bit different approach on this and I want to ask you how are you reducing acquisition risk itself for the RKV? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. Great question. The first—the first 

part of acquisition of risk starts with design and system engineering. And if we rush the cycle we are in now without proper maturity and without meeting the proper technology or design gates in 

terms of deliverables at certain points in the design, you will fail 

in the end. 

So this foundation that we are building with rigor and depth on 

the system engineering that are going into the design of the RKV 

is, in my view, the most important part. And what my direction 

has been to the team that is working this, which is a fantastic 

team, cross-industry team working this, is that we will not proceed 

past major design review points if the deliverables have not been 

met, and not been delivered, and do not meet our entrance and exit 

criterias. And, sir, I can get this to you. There is a very lengthy 

entrance and exit criteria list for all of our design reviews and all 

of the gates that this design has to pass through. 

And the design maturity in the end, sir, will drive when this 

thing is ready for test. I am planning for an end of 2018 test, but 

if the design maturity is not such, I will not test in 2018. And to 

me, that is where we need to hold the line here, is early on. And 

rushing programs through the design phase, they are absolutely 

doomed to fail. 

Mr. LARSEN. Also, we had a conversation earlier. And just help 

me understand this issue on THAAD and South Korea from a technical operational perspective. 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. I will leave the policy and the State 

Department discussion to the Secretary. I will speak to it from a 

materiel standpoint. There is no doubt that the system can provide 

fantastic coverage capability for not only our ally there, but our 

U.S. deployed forces. And I am confident in the design of that system and its intercept record. And if the decision were to be made, 

I stand by that it is the right materiel solution. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Great. Well, then the follow-up is on the policy, especially now in light of the National Assembly election yes-
10 

terday where the president’s party lost the majority and what the 

implications are. And so where are we from a policy perspective 

with the South Koreans? 

Mr. MCKEON. As you know, Congressman, I think even we discussed it last time I was here, we have made a decision to begin 

the formal consultations with our Korean partners. And I know 

there have been some meetings out in Korea looking at the siting 

and the funding issues. I am not an expert on Korean politics. I 

don’t think this changes things for President Park and her approach to this. So I think we are optimistic we will get to a decision. I just don’t have a timeline for you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Okay. All right. 

GAO [Government Accountability Office]? Is GAO here? No. 

Okay. So we just have a report from GAO on this. Okay. I have 

it right here. That is fine. 

Who can answer the question for me, the difference between 

what used to be called spiral development and now seems to be 

called concurrency? Are those the same things? 

Admiral SYRING. Let me take that, and then maybe Mr. Pike can 

add. When we talk of—when I think about—I will give you my 

view. When I think about spiral development, I think about fielding a capability and then improving the capability over time. 

Concurrency is the initial problem in developing that initial capability, in terms of assuming too much technical or cost risk as 

you develop an end item. And to me, they are two different things. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Pike. 

Mr. PIKE. Sir, I absolutely concur. 

Mr. LARSEN. You concur with concurrency? 

All right. Well, I just—with the few seconds, I just don’t believe 

we had a very good experience with spiral development. Others 

may disagree with me on that. It sort of became a moniker for getting things in the ground before they were ready. That is my definition of it. And so I guess I would differ with a few folks here that 

concurrency is something that is different than that. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if I can just comment on that. That we have 

testified, I have testified in this committee that the direction was 

given to field this system quickly, and that very foundation that I 

talked about in terms of maybe doing another design turn or two 

before it was fielded, everybody says would have benefited that program. And everything that we are doing now is to work to improve 

what has been fielded, and I believe we are on the right path. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Gortney and Admiral Syring, am I correct that under 

the current plan for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense [GMD] 

system, there are no operational spare ground-based interceptors 

and that there will not be for at least 5 or 6 years? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, we are—that is a correct statement. We are 

using everything that has been put under contract in terms of materiel buys to make our 44 by 2017, and to have enough interceptors to do the testing that we need to do over the next 3 or 4 years. 
11 

Again, the new design, Mr. Brooks, is paramount to buying additional interceptors. I do not want to buy more of the same—of the 

old design. 

Mr. BROOKS. In your judgment, when exactly will there be operational spares based on whatever is best designed? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, as part of this budget, our first priority is 

to get the redesigned kill vehicle tested and get the older interceptors, the CE–1 interceptors, recapped with that new design. And 

then as we work through that upgrade and fielding path, there will 

be spares that are generated in procurement to have some margin 

against the current inventory. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you have a judgment as to what calendar year 

we are talking about before we start building up the inventory and 

have operational spares? 

Admiral SYRING. It will be in the 2025 timeframe most likely, 

with our priority being fixing what is in the field first. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is there anything that we in Congress should be 

doing to expedite the availability of operational spares over the 

next 9 years? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I would ask you to wait until we prove the 

new kill vehicle design and the new booster design and test it, and 

then we can talk about buying beyond what is in the budget today. 

Mr. BROOKS. Admiral Gortney, do you have anything to add to 

what Admiral Syring has just stated? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir. Again, the priorities that Admiral 

Syring has put in place, I fully support. We need to make that 

which we have as good as we can possibly make it while we then 

go to the next stage, and those are the proper investments. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Back to Admiral Syring. Yesterday you 

mentioned in the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that 

MDA made the decision to pivot back to the GMD program and to 

increase the capacity and capability of the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense system. With a decrease of $75 million for fiscal year 2017, 

what aspect of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system will 

assume the most risk? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, if I can, we pivoted back to 44 by 2017, the 

Secretary of Defense made that decision, and we are implementing 

it as MDA. That was a 2013 announcement by Secretary Hagel in 

March. The 70, I think it was $79 million, in terms of less funding 

than what we requested in 2017 for GMD, there are no components 

of that that are going to accept any appreciable risk because of that 

reduction. 

We requested a large amount of funding in 2016 to get many of 

the efforts that had not been started in GMD started, and you have 

been very supportive of that request. And then over time, some of 

those estimates have been refined. In addition, the cut that we took 

in the endgame, based on the budget agreement, in late 2015 had 

some effect on the GMD program carrying part of that cut. 

Mr. BROOKS. North Korea has been testing ballistic missiles at 

an unprecedented rate. And with a projected $800 million reduction 

to Future Years Defense Program, what capabilities are we delaying into the future with respect to the ground systems and fire control on the one hand and the program operations on the other? 
12 

Admiral SYRING. We are not delaying anything that we planned 

for or programmed in 2016, based on that reduction. What we are 

delaying is—or taking a risk with specifically was increasing the 

SM–3 procurement. Nothing associated with the GMD system in 

terms of the planned modernization of the ground system, operations and support, safety, any of those aspects that are mission 

critical, have not been affected by that. Sir, I was planning in fiscal year 2016 for $7.8 billion in 2017. 

And based on the budget agreement that came down in the end, 

at the end of 2015, my number in the President’s budget was reduced to $7.5 billion as my share of the Department cut. So it is 

really not 8.3 to 7.5. My President’s budget request in 2016 was actually 8.1. What was enacted was 8.3. So it was—my request was 

8.1, 7.8. It was enacted at 8.3. I would have been 7.8 without the 

budget agreement. Budget agreement kicked me down $300 million, kicked us down $300 million. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral Syring and Admiral Gortney. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Admiral Syring, what are the risks of legislating or setting in 

stone a requirement to conduct a set number of tests before the 

RKV final production decision? 

Admiral SYRING. Obviously, in this budget, we have a proposal 

and in our acquisition strategy that was signed by Mr. Kendall 

that there will be one nonintercept and one intercept test conducted to inform a production decision by him, not me. There will 

be another intercept in 2020 that will happen before really anything is fielded. 

I would ask that you let us go through where we are in the early 

stages of design and some of the testing of the components, all of 

it very methodical and very laid out in terms of the ground testing 

that will accompany our confidence before a flight test, before we 

legislate that it needs to be three or four or five flight tests. 

I think what will happen, sir, is that certainly at a minimum of 

two, the third flight test will give the warfighter the final confidence that the configuration is ready to be fielded. And I would 

say the third flight test, although not necessary for an acquisition 

decision, will be an important point for us before we go start pulling CE–1 interceptors out of the ground with new RKVs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. 

Takai, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral Syring, it 

is great to see you. 

I have questions for you, Admiral. The first is, alarmingly, this 

year North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and also 

launched a satellite into orbit using long-range ballistic missile 

technology. From your perspective, is there a gap when it comes to 

missile defense for Hawaii right now due to this threat? 

Admiral SYRING. If I can ask the commander to speak to that, 

sir. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir, I do not think there is a gap to that 

particular threat. We are prepared to engage and protect Hawaii, 
13 

Alaska, and all the rest of the States with the existing system, and 

have high confidence in its success. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. Thank you. 

An Advanced Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR, prototype is 

being tested at PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] in 2016. The 

AMDR radar would provide significant capability to detect and 

track advanced long-range ballistic missile threats. The prototype 

will be moved from PMRF for combat systems integration in 2017 

unless a replacement radar is funded. I have submitted an amendment for advanced funding for planning and design to get a discriminating radar to Hawaii faster. 

Are you, Admiral Syring, supportive of this effort? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, as you know, Admiral Harris has been open 

about the need for additional sensor capability in Hawaii. And we 

are obviously very well aware of that requirement and are looking 

at what the sensor options could be. But right now it is a test site, 

and it has been a very effective test site. I think it is fair to say 

that we in the Department will look at options, to include sensoring, to see if there is a way to answer the combatant commander’s 

requirement in this area. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. Thank you. 

And my final question has to do with the transitioning of this 

test site from a testing facility to an operational one. So in order 

to operationalize the PMRF, and specifically the Aegis Ashore facility at PMRF in Kauai, a capability already in place, it must first 

be certified against the very ICBMs and the long-range missile 

technology that North Korea is developing and testing. What are 

the plans to do this? 

Admiral SYRING. Right now there are no plans to do it, sir, simply. And I would just characterize it a little differently, if I can, sir, 

in terms of the sensor sort of options in that part of the discussion 

with Admiral Harris is what additional sensor capability can we 

provide the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense system in 

terms of more capability against a more complex threat for Hawaii 

specifically. And that is the discussion that I think needs to happen. And right now there are no plans moving forward outside the 

Department to do that. Not that we haven’t heard and don’t understand the combatant commander’s desire; it is a matter of what 

materiel solutions are available and when, and how much do they 

cost, frankly. And then what are the operational impacts, what are 

the secondary effects. Operationalizing an Aegis Ashore site is no 

easy step. There would be many parts of that in that equation. 

And, sir, I don’t know if you want to add. 

Admiral GORTNEY. We cover Hawaii today with the sensors that 

we have. But one of our key investment strategies in the way 

ahead is sensors improvement, because if we get sensor improvement, not just for Hawaii, but for the entire system, for the east 

coast as well, then we drive our effectiveness up, which drives our 

reliability way up, which drives our costs down, when we get that 

sensor discrimination that we need to continue to outpace the 

threat. So where the threat is today, with the investments that we 

have, we are confident we can continue to protect all of the States. 

And should that change, then we will adjust fires on that investment strategy. 
14 

Mr. TAKAI. Right. So for us in Hawaii, as well as discussions occurring in the media, and I think Admiral Harris has been part of 

those discussions, there is some indication of support and interest 

in operationalizing the facility on Kauai, number one, and, number 

two, to use the Aegis Ashore platform as the way forward. 

I guess my question is—oh. I don’t have—let me just say this. 

I think we can’t wait until North Korea launches something that 

has precision that can detect and hit something similar to Hawaii. 

We have got to be a little bit more proactive. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, let me just add to finish, if I can, Mr. 

Chairman—— 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. 

Admiral SYRING [continuing]. That there is an ongoing sensor 

analysis of alternatives, that is extensive, looking at all sensor gaps 

around the world for not just us, but for other agencies and services, and certainly the Hawaii sensor capability is part of it. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Chairman 

Turner, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, when you were asked about whether or not we need an 

east coast missile defense site, your answer was, ‘‘not at this time,’’ 

meaning we don’t need it now, which is a good thing we don’t need 

it now, because we can’t possibly have one, because there is a long 

lead time within which we need to construct one. 

I would like to work with you to clarify your answer, because I 

think there are those with your answer of ‘‘we don’t need it at this 

time’’ or ‘‘we don’t need it now,’’ who might use that as an answer 

to indicate that the preparation that this committee has undertaken for an east coast missile defense site is needless or unnecessary. You don’t mean that, right? You don’t mean that the work 

that Congress has done to prepare for an east coast missile defense 

site is needless or unnecessary? 

Admiral SYRING. Absolutely not. 

Mr. TURNER. Secondly, as you have articulated, I think, very, 

very well, the rising threats from North Korea and Iran are increasing threats that we are seeing that are happening at just almost a frightening pace. Do you foresee a time at which we might 

need the capability to respond to these threats of an east coast missile defense site? 

Admiral SYRING. If I—— 

Mr. TURNER. I was asking you, Admiral, because, again, they 

were asking in a manner, I think, to utilize—— 

Admiral SYRING. Okay. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Your statement—— 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. To indicate that it is not necessary. 

Admiral SYRING. Let me take that. We have a very systematic 

investment plan, which we have talked about, in terms of how we 

are improving the current fielded interceptors, and that is extensive and has required funding and budget this committee has supported, sir. And you are—— 
15 

Mr. TURNER. Well, you are looking out for the future—— 

Admiral SYRING. Absolutely. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. You are looking out, and you do see a 

time—— 

Admiral SYRING. I do. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Where that additional capability would 

be? 

Admiral SYRING. I see a time when additional capacity will need 

to be talked about—— 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Admiral SYRING [continuing]. Depending on where Iran goes with 

their threat development. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. McKeon, this committee is charged with the responsibility of 

looking at our architecture to be able to see what our adversaries 

are doing and also respond to what our adversaries see we are 

doing. One of the areas that we are concerned with, obviously, is 

the Open Skies Treaty and Russia. General Stewart, head of the 

DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], testified that Russia gets, 

quote, ‘‘incredible foundational intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of our facilities. So my perspective,’’ again 

being his, ‘‘it gives them a significant advantage, and I would love 

to deny the Russians having that capability.’’ 

Mr. McKeon, is Russia permitting overflights of Kaliningrad, 

which of course are permitted under the treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. No. They have placed restrictions on flights over 

Kaliningrad. 

Mr. TURNER. Is that a violation of the Open Skies Treaty? 

Mr. MCKEON. We have raised that as a compliance concern, Mr. 

Turner, and I believe it is highlighted a little differently in the 

compliance report we have just submitted to you. 

Mr. TURNER. Have you personally advocated that, as in your role, 

you make a recommendation that Russia be found in violation? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, I hesitate to talk about what I recommend to 

my Secretary in internal deliberations. What I can say to you here, 

and I would be happy to discuss in a little more detail in the closed 

session, is we have expressed concern as a government about Russia’s compliance with Open Skies. We have taken a view within our 

government that while we have obligations under the treaty, we 

will perform under those obligations and no more; that is, we will 

not give them any extra benefit. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, Mr. McKeon, obviously the concern that we 

have is if there are those who believe, perhaps yourself even—because our indication is that we are hearing that you do believe that 

they are violating the Open Skies Treaty, and there are others who 

do believe so as a result of issues like Kaliningrad and overflights—that by our continued compliance, especially in light of 

General Stewart saying that it puts it as a distinct advantage, that 

we are in fact, you know, showing all of our cards while we are allowing them to restrict our capabilities. I mean, isn’t that a significant concern, is we are letting somebody else see what we are 

doing and we are not getting to see what they are doing, supposedly that was permitted under a treaty? 
16 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, Congressman, we are overflying the Russian 

Federation territory. In fact, we have more Open Skies flights over 

Russia than Russia does over the United States. There are restrictions, as you—— 

Mr. TURNER. I think it isn’t an issue just of number of flights, 

but isn’t it an issue of advanced sensors? I mean, hasn’t the Supreme Allied Commander indicated he has concerns over the advanced sensors that might be used in overflights over Europe? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes. As you will recall, Congressman, a couple of 

years ago, the Russians sought to certify an electro-optical sensor 

on the plane they used to fly over Europe. It is a digital rather 

than using wet film. And we went through the certification process 

on that and learned a lot of lessons from that for possible certification of a plane that would overfly the United States with a similar capability. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. McKeon, obviously since we have concerns that 

Russia may be violating the Open Skies Treaty, and from the testimonies we have been receiving, there are serious concerns about 

what Russia learns in the Open Skies Treaty. And also the administration now, although it took forever, is finally acknowledging 

Russia’s violating of the INF Treaty. 

Shouldn’t there be a concern for a pause in extending the START 

[Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty for an additional 5 years? And 

could you please tell us if you believe it is premature of the administration? I understand that they are pushing for a 5-year extension of the New START Treaty. Is there concern that we might be 

needing to evaluate Russia’s actions, especially in their aggressiveness that we are seeing in Ukraine and the overflights? We all just 

watched the news and watched their planes buzzing us. Is there a 

point where we might—should be pausing? 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman, as an administration, we have not 

made a decision about whether to seek the extension of the New 

START Treaty, which does not expire until 2021. I think—— 

Mr. TURNER. Would your recommendation be that it is premature 

to do that now? 

Mr. MCKEON. Again, sir, I don’t want to give you what my recommendation would be in internal deliberations. What I would say 

is that one of the factors that we need to take into account is the 

concerns that you have identified and—— 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. McKeon, I just want you to know that—— 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. We share. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. I think it is really difficult for us as 

policymakers to have people like yourself that have such important 

positions as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy to say that you don’t want to tell us what your recommendations are with respect to policy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Fleming, for 5 minutes. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admirals Gortney and Syring, this question is for you. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon reported that 

North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. And does 
17 

North Korea, in fact, have such capability and is it testing solid 

rocket motors for such a missile? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Sir, the Intel [Intelligence] Community assesses the probability of North Korea fielding a successful road-mobile ICBM with a miniaturized nuclear device that can range the 

homeland as low. 

As the commander accountable for defending the homeland, I 

choose to assess that he does have that capability. And I think it 

is the prudent course of action, it is what I think the American people would like me to base my readiness assessment on, to be prepared to engage it. So we are prepared to engage it today, 24 hours 

a day, 365 days out of the year. 

As it progresses, the real key piece here is he hasn’t tested the 

end-to-end capability in order to do it. He has displayed the ability 

through the TD–2 space launch to put that in there, but the reentry vehicle that needs to go with it, the solid rocket fuel, we need 

to see that test, that end-to-end test. But I am not waiting for that 

end-to-end test on my assessment. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. And sort of an extension of that question, 

can North Korea’s KN–08 road-mobile ICBM target all of the 

United States if indeed—or I guess a better way to put it based on 

your response is, are you assuming that it can target anywhere in 

the United States, including the continental United States? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. I assess that it can range the homeland that I am tasked to defend, and we are prepared to engage 

it for the area that we assess it to be able to reach. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. And can you remind this committee why 

road-mobile missiles are a defense challenge for us? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Because they are mobile and they are very 

easy to conceal. Previously, you know, when North Korea assembles a rocket, we have intel that we can detect through all forms 

of intel. When you get into a road-mobile target, it is very, very difficult to be able to track, quickly set up, and shoot. Most of my career, I dropped bombs for a living, and mobile targets are what always caused me pause. And that is exactly why this is a tough 

challenge for us. 

Dr. FLEMING. So while it may be difficult to detect, you suggested 

a little earlier that its payload may not be as significant as something that would be ground based. Would that be fair to say, or 

what is your opinion on that? 

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir. We assess that they have the ability 

on the KN–08 to—I assess that he has the ability to miniaturize 

a nuclear weapon and range to homeland with that warhead. 

Dr. FLEMING. I see. Okay. 

Admiral GORTNEY. Again, but we have not seen the end-to-end 

test of that. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. Okay. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKeon and Admiral Gortney, in your written statement, 

you both mentioned, quote, ‘‘left-of-launch,’’ unquote, capabilities. 

Can you elaborate? Are you talking about destroying ballistic mis-
18 

siles on the ground before they are launched at us? Is that the 

point? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I can go into some detail at the unclass [unclassified] level and I will go into much greater detail for you in 

the classified level. But the current path that we are on with both 

theater ballistic missile defense and ballistic missile defense for the 

homeland against the ICBM threat is a very expensive approach. 

We are shooting down with very expensive rockets, potentially very 

inexpensive rockets, and we are only engaging it in midcourse. For 

both types of threats it is midcourse as we go forward. 

What we need to be able to do is engage it throughout its particular kill chain, so keep them from getting on the rails, detect 

them, and get them on the rails, hit them while they are still on 

the rails before launch, provided we have the rules of engagement 

to do that; boost phase engagement, which is why the laser designation—laser approach that MDA is doing is so important, multiple times, knock down the raid count; and then continue to engage it in midcourse, but with more warheads in space, smarter, 

more reliable multi-object kill vehicle, maybe five warheads in 

space that are actually communicating with each other to drive the 

raid count down significantly. And those are the investments that 

MDA, with your all’s full support, have put in place to see which 

of those technologies throughout a flight of the missile is so important for us. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. What kind of intelligence would we need for 

the President to order a preemptive attack against a state preparing to launch a missile against the United States? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I am going to have to take that at the classified level. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. How well are we postured to execute leftof-launch operations? Could we execute left-of-launch operations 

today if we had to? 

Admiral GORTNEY. I will defer to the classified session and answer you there, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. What more can Congress do to ensure our military 

forces have the capabilities and intelligence they would need to 

execute left-of-launch operations? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Continue to make the investments from the 

MDA realm, support those investments that we are asking for, particularly the—make what we have the best as what we possibly can 

make it, and then those investments in R&D [research and development]. 

Now, there is another avenue that we can talk about in classified 

for those same sorts of investments are absolutely critical. But I 

also think it is important to highlight that what Admiral Syring 

has put in the budget is research and development to see what 

technologies will play out. Once we make a decision of which of 

those are going to give us the best value, then we will be having 

to come to your committee again for investments to actually field 

those capabilities. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 
19 

Admiral Syring, how much longer would it take and how much 

more would it cost for you to develop, test, and field a long-range 

discrimination radar in the 5000 series in a redesigned kill vehicle? 

Admiral SYRING. If I can just clarify, Mr. Chairman, in DOD 

5000? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I haven’t done that analysis, but I would 

be happy to. We were able to—and I will just reiterate this. We 

were able to, with Mr. Kendall’s help, Admiral Winnefeld’s help at 

the time, turn our requirement through the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] process in about 6 weeks, 6 weeks, and 

that is giving me the top cover for this radar. 

And our decision to use existing technology, I thought, was huge 

in terms of not having to go through the risk reduction phase between Milestone A and B, where we chose—and I think I got a 

question over here—the similar GaN [gallium nitride], S-band technology that is in the AMDR [Air and Missile Defense] radar. So 

there were some decisions that we made both in the requirement 

and in the technology that we chose that enabled us to go to contract award in less than 2 years. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Admiral, recently the press reported that 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said he had obtained an agreement with Secretary Kerry to launch a dialogue about the U.S. 

missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Moscow argues the system is a threat to its security. 

As the director of Missile Defense Agency, what do you know 

about this dialogue and what has the United States signed up to 

discuss? 

Admiral SYRING. I am not aware of the dialogue, and my answer 

is, nothing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. McKeon, what can you tell us about that, if 

anything? 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, we have been talking to the Russians on and off since 2009 about what the EPAA [European 

Phased Adaptive Approach] is and is not. And I think they have 

a pretty clear understanding of the system, but they continue to 

make various arguments that it is a threat to them or a violation 

of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, or other 

statements that we don’t agree with and find unacceptable. Just in 

the last couple of days, there was an assertion made by some senior Russian security official that we were going to put nuclear warheads on missiles at the site in Romania and threaten Russia, 

which is just nonsense. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. McKeon, do you understand that in any way 

that the United States is willing to depart from its current position 

on the EPAA, what we will have laid out to happen with that? 

Mr. MCKEON. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Admiral Syring, Secretary Kerry has been 

spending quite a bit of time focused on missile defense lately. He 

has also invited the People’s Republic of China to receive technical 

briefings on the capability of THAAD, including if deployed in 

South Korea. What do you know about the briefings the Secretary 

has offered, if anything? 

Admiral SYRING. Nothing, sir. We haven’t been asked. 
20 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Admiral, you are aware of MDA or MDA 

contractors being targeted or, quote, ‘‘hacked,’’ by groups or entities 

linked to China or the Chinese military? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. You are. Can you tell us anything about that in 

open session? 

Admiral SYRING. Let me just give you the answer unclassified, 

and then we can go deeper classified, if that is okay, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Admiral SYRING. I testified yesterday that I viewed the cyber 

threat that I specifically faced with MDA and the systems that we 

are fielding on par with any intercontinental ballistic missile threat 

that either Iran or North Korea possess. We have taken inordinate 

steps to protect both our classified and unclassified networks from 

attack, constant 24/7 monitoring with teams in place, plus good 

materiel protections of those systems. 

My biggest concern remains in our cleared defense contractor 

base and their protections. I think my view is, is that they are continuing to try to attack my government networks every day, classified and unclassified, but where they are going next, and we have 

gotten examples of this, is to my cleared defense contractors with 

the unclassified controlled technical information. And what we 

have got to do is get them up to where we are in terms of our protection levels. And I view it as a very near term, very real requirement across the BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System]. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The ranking member is recognized for any additional questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the expeditious nature of this public portion of the hearing. I am going to 

hold my further questions to the classified session. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there any other members that have questions 

in this open session? 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I could address the question you 

gave to Admiral Syring about—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Please do. 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. Secretary Kerry and China and 

THAAD. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please. 

Mr. MCKEON. Similar to the Russians, we have offered to explain 

to them what THAAD is and is not and why it is not a threat to 

their deterrent were we to deploy it in the Republic of Korea. They 

have not taken us up on this offer. We have a firm view, as expressed previously, this is about protecting our deployed forces and 

our Korean partners, and has nothing to do with China or China’s 

deterrent, and they shouldn’t worry about it. 

Mr. ROGERS. But we are going to talk more about that in the 

classified session, but I appreciate that comment. 

We are supposed to be called for votes at any minute, so I think 

what I will do is rather than get us into the classified setting and 

then have to be pulled away, we will just adjourn until 10 minutes 

after the next vote series concludes. If they call us in the next 5 

or 6 minutes, you are looking at about 45 minutes after that, so 
21 

it will be around 3:45 to 3:50 when we reconvene for the classified 

portion of this hearing. 

And with that, this hearing is suspend—no, it is not adjourned. 

We are not—— 

Admiral GORTNEY. Recessed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Recessed. There you go. I knew you was good for 

something. 

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 14, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 14, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 14, 2016 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, the House Appropriations Committee supported MDA’s 

PB16 Request of $19.9 million for Directed Energy Prototype Development in the 

Technology Maturation Initiatives program element. [See page 7.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 14, 2016 

(113) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the United States willing to depart in any way from the EPAA 

as laid out and planned today? 

Mr. MCKEON. Our commitment to EPAA remains firm. The approach is specifically designed to be able to adapt to the ballistic missile threat posed to our deployed forces and allies in Europe. That said, we have no plans to depart from the 

deployment and sustainment of the missile defense sites in Europe, or any other 

part of the EPAA, as it is planned today. 

Mr. ROGERS. As the ranking DOD witness here today, does the Department support a partnership between the UAE and the U.S. to develop a missile defense capability to respond to emerging threats (e.g., an evolved extended-range THAAD system)? 

Mr. MCKEON. DOD does support a partnership between UAE and the United 

States to develop or acquire missile defense capabilities to respond to emerging 

threats. It is premature to speculate on the specific systems that might be appropriate for addressing those threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand the U.S. is discussing a Foreign Military Sales case 

with Qatar for THAAD. Why is this case important for Qatar and THAAD? Can we 

work together to accelerate this case to make sure Qatar has these critical missile 

defense systems prior to the World Cup in 2022? How? 

Mr. MCKEON. Qatar is an important partner in missile defense activities in the 

Gulf region that has demonstrated its commitment to acquiring a layered missile 

defense architecture by purchasing PATRIOT PAC–3 systems and exploring the possibility of buying the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system and an 

early warning radar. Qatar has expressed a desire to phase acquisition of these elements. Qatar signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case with the United States 

Army for PATRIOT PAC–3 and is in ongoing discussions concerning an early warning radar. The Department will continue to support Qatar’s acquisition of ballistic 

missile defense capabilities. Additionally, we will continue working with Qatar within the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council to increase interoperable regional 

missile defense capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is it important that the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

reach its Initial Operating Capability, especially the Romania Aegis Ashore Site, at 

the Warsaw Summit this summer? Why is that important for the United States, our 

allies, and the NATO alliance itself? 

Mr. MCKEON. NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) remains critical to U.S. and 

Allied security. As long as Iran continues to develop and deploy ballistic missiles, 

the United States will work with our allies and partners to defend against this 

threat. The aim of NATO BMD is to provide full coverage and protection of all 

NATO European populations and U.S. forces in Europe from ballistic missiles originating from the Middle East. Moreover, NATO’s declaration of BMD Initial Operational Capability (IOC) at Warsaw sends three important messages: first, that the 

United States is committed to the defense of our deployed forces and Allies by increasing the capability of NATO BMD; second, that Allies recognize the importance 

of this contribution; third, that NATO follows through on its commitments to field 

a missile defense command and control capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is left-of-launch capability? In other words, you’re talking 

about destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before they’re launched at us? 

Mr. MCKEON. Left-of-launch capabilities contribute to defeating or degrading ballistic missiles before they are launched. These capabilities may be non-kinetic or kinetic; they span a wide range of tools developed across the Department, and include 

both active and passive activities. These capabilities provide U.S. decision-makers 

additional tools and opportunities to defeat missiles across the entire kill-chain. 

This reduces the burden on our ‘‘right-of-launch’’ ballistic missile defenses. Taken 

together, ‘‘left-of-launch’’ and ‘‘right-of-launch’’ capabilities will lead to a more effective and resilient approach to defeat adversary ballistic missile threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or war games you 

have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was observed that policy guidance was re-
114 

quired to successfully carry out such capability? If so, please identify and describe 

such observed areas needing policy guidance from OSD. 

Mr. MCKEON. Although I have not personally participated in a policy wargame 

involving left-of-launch missile defense, the recently-completed NIMBLE TITAN 16 

wargame examined left-of-launch missile defeat, to include the circumstances under 

which several partners and allies would support left-of-launch efforts. 

I believe we have sufficient policy guidance at this time to carry out left-of-launch 

ballistic missile defeat successfully. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can the KN–08 road-mobile ICBM target all of the United States, 

including the continental United States? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your 

response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral GORTNEY. DIA assesses at the unclassified level that the KN08 ICBM 

has a maximum range of over 12,000 kilometers, which would enable it to strike 

all of the continental United States if successfully deployed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon has reported 

that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. Does North Korea have 

a new road-mobile ICBM? Is it testing solid-rocket motors for such a missile? Please 

reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent 

possible. 

Admiral GORTNEY. During a parade in October 2015, North Korea displayed a 

multi-stage missile that differed in design from the KN08 ICBMs that were featured 

in previous parades. However, we don’t know how the new missile is configured, 

what propulsion system it uses, or whether it represents a workable missile design. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you remind this committee why road-mobile missiles are a defense challenge for us? And what about such missiles with solid fuel? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Mobile missiles increase an adversary’s operational flexibility 

and survivability. This complicates active defense planning. Changes to fuel types 

indicate some level of programmatic advancement, potentially increasing their reliability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Who is integrating the homeland cruise missile defense program for 

the DOD? We have Army systems, Air Force systems, Navy systems. Who is in 

charge? Is there a single acquisition authority? 

Admiral GORTNEY. NORAD conducts aerospace warning and control of North 

America and, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, determines the operational requirements for defense against aerospace threats, to include cruise missiles. In turn, 

the Services provide the capabilities to meet the approved defense requirements, 

and NORAD operationally integrates the homeland cruise missile defense capabilities for the U.S. and Canada. Recommend your acquisition authority questions be 

addressed to OUSD (AT&L). 

Mr. ROGERS. Is JLENS important? Why? Is there a gap in our security architecture without it? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified 

to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral GORTNEY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Am I correct that under the current plan for the ground-based midcourse defense system, there are no operational spares GBIs for, is it 5 or 6 years? 

It’s well into the 2020s, right? What happens if there is an unplanned failure? 

Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum 

extent possible. 

Admiral GORTNEY. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is leading this effort and 

thus we recommend contacting VADM Syring for sparing specifics. MDA remains 

on track for 44 GBIs emplaced and available by 2017, in accordance with Secretary 

of Defense direction. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is this reality (the lack of operational spares referenced in the previous question) an artifact of years of under-investment in the GMD system? What 

is the best way to mitigate this risk? 

Admiral GORTNEY. This question is specific to Ballistic Missile Defense System 

programmatics; recommend contacting the Missile Defense Agency regarding investments in the GMD system. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is left-of-launch capability? In other words, you’re talking 

about destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before they’re launched at us? 

Admiral GORTNEY. Left-of-launch capabilities encompass all military efforts to 

deny the adversary the ability to launch ballistic missiles. The development of leftof-launch capabilities provides the U.S. decision-makers additional tools and opportunities to defeat ballistic missiles before they are launched. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or war games you 

have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was observed that policy guidance was re-
115 

quired to successfully carry out such capability? If so, please identify and describe 

such observed areas needing policy guidance from OSD. 

Admiral GORTNEY. USNORTHCOM participated in the Joint Staff-hosted NIMBLE STAR II TTX (March 2015), as well as the PACAF-hosted NEPTUNE HAWK 

TTX (July 2015). For execution of our homeland Ballistic Missile Defense mission, 

we have sufficient policy guidance. 

Mr. ROGERS. What kind of intelligence do we need to possess in order for the 

President to order a preemptive attack on a state possessing nuclear weapons? 

Admiral GORTNEY. The President would likely need timely and reliable intelligence on the adversary’s intentions, as well as persistent tracking of the adversary’s strategic assets to ensure preemptive attack success and also to mitigate risk 

of retaliation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are we outpacing the threat? How do you evaluate ‘‘outpacing’’ the 

threat? Based on what criteria? Please provide a detailed list of adversary developments regarding ballistic missile capability that affected our ability to ‘‘outpace’’ the 

threat. What developments by adversaries, if any, have surprised you? Please reply 

in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral GORTNEY. The Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system is capable of defeating the ICBM threat currently posed by North Korea. However, the 

North Korean threat continues to mature, while developments within the Iranian 

missile program could lead to the emergence of an ICBM threat from that country 

in the coming years as well. We believe that continued funding of programs, such 

as the Re-designed Kill Vehicle, Long Range Discrimination Radar, two/three-stage 

selectable Ground-based Interceptor, and the Space-based Kill Assessment experiment, is necessary to maintain our strategic advantage. 

Mr. ROGERS. It has been widely asserted that one of the most likely ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces would be a raid scenario involving several enemy ballistic 

missiles fired near simultaneously. How is the MDA preparing for this scenario and 

what testing is planned to validate our BMDS capabilities against this threat? 

Admiral SYRING. The BMDS and each of the elements (including Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD); Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); Aegis; 

and Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)) 

are designed and tested to provide performance against raids with multiple ballistic 

missile threats in the air simultaneously. The BMDS Specification includes raid requirements that are allocated to element-level specifications. 

MDA has demonstrated raid defense capability in both ground tests and flight 

tests at the system and element levels. MDA has successfully conducted testing for 

homeland and regional defense against raids in numerous integrated ground tests 

that incorporate hardware-in-the-loop assets and threat injection, as well as distributed ground tests that incorporate deployed operational assets. MDA has conducted 

Flight Test Standard Missile (FTM) 13, demonstrating Aegis against two near simultaneous missile launches. For the THAAD system, MDA conducted Flight Test 

THAAD (FTT) 12, successfully demonstrating THAAD against multiple near simultaneous missile launches. At the system level, MDA conducted Flight Test Integrated (FTI) 01 in 2012 with Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot engaging three ballistic 

missile targets and two cruise missile targets. MDA conducted Flight Test Operational (FTO)-01 in 2013 with Aegis and THAAD each engaging a ballistic missile 

target. MDA conducted Flight Test Operational (FTO) 02 Event 2a in 2015 with 

Aegis and THAAD engaging two ballistic missile targets and one cruise missile target. 

MDA will continue to validate BMDS capabilities against raids in future ground 

testing. In addition, MDA has planned several flight tests in the Integrated Master 

Test Plan version 17.1 that involve ballistic missile raid scenarios. FTO 03 Event 

1 will test Aegis and Aegis Ashore against two ballistic missiles. FTO 03 Event 2 

will test Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot against three ballistic missiles and two cruise 

missiles. FTO 04 will test GMD simultaneously engaging two long-range ballistic 

missiles. 

Mr. ROGERS. We know that the MDA has utilized several low cost target options 

to meet schedule and testing requirements against short-range and medium-range 

range threats in recent years. What steps is the MDA taking to identify and develop 

new low cost target options to meet emerging testing requirements for intermediaterange (IRBM) and inter-continental (ICBM) ballistic missile threat scenarios. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is coordinating with the Intelligence Community to understand assessments related to emerging threats in 

order to establish requirements for all target development and testing needs using 

intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) class targets. Regarding lowering the costs of the current IRBM and ICBM 
116 

targets, MDA has implemented innovative solutions to address near-term threat 

changes by leveraging previously incurred non-recurring engineering and making 

incremental upgrades to meet target requirements related to evolving missions and 

threat. Additionally, MDA is conducting market research through a request for information to determine interest and capability to design, develop, produce, and 

launch multiple range-class targets. The market research will shape future target 

acquisition decisions to reduce the cost of flight tests. 

Mr. ROGERS. We understand that the MDA has successfully flown low cost, 

subscale targets utilizing surplus solid rocket motor assets to meet specific mission 

requirements and critical schedule milestones. Is the MDA taking steps to assure 

that solid rocket motors will continue to be available to be used for low cost targets 

in support of BMDS testing? 

Admiral SYRING. Current Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Integrated Master Test 

Plan baseline includes low cost targets utilizing surplus solid rocket motors through 

fiscal year 2022. As a part of the MDA objective to reduce the cost of targets, the 

program continually monitors U.S. Government surplus and solid rocket motor industry production for applicability to meet MDA’s testing requirements to meet current and future acquisition needs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please identify and summarize the studies MDA has conducted or 

participated in evaluating missile defense options and limitations against boost-glide 

systems and maneuvering systems. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you funded to develop and deploy a defense against boost-glide 

missiles, like those being developed by Russia and China? What are the anticipated 

ranges of potential defensive options that have been considered? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Please identify each CAPE review of an MDA program or proposed 

program over the past five years and the length/duration of such review and its cost 

to MDA. 

Admiral SYRING. The CAPE reviews from 2006 through 2014 are listed below. The 

total cost to MDA is approximately $430,000. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are current requirements for CAPE AOAs of MDA programs 

or proposed programs? What document, memoranda, or regulation requires such 

CAPE AOA review of an MDA program? 

Admiral SYRING. There are no requirements that require CAPE led Analysis of 

Alternatives (AOA) for MDA programs. However, MDA and CAPE periodically receive guidance, and mutually agree to conduct analysis of MDA programs. In addition, Congress periodically mandates CAPE led studies of MDA programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. How much do GAO reviews cost MDA each year? 
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Admiral SYRING. The total approximate annual amount that MDA spends on GAO 

reviews is $1,754,008. This calculation is based on total man hours needed to support varying requirements for audits, including activities such as composing answers to numerous questions, locating and transmitting previously approved documentation, and supporting various meetings and reviews. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there duplicative reporting requirements that could be consolidated or eliminated? If yes, please identify. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) does not currently have any 

duplicative congressional reporting requirements. However, proposed language in 

the House FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4909, Section 1664, 

would place significant duplicative reporting requirements on MDA. This provision 

requires semi-annual reporting on the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test 

plan, costs and test plan changes and rationale, which duplicates existing reporting 

accomplished through annual submission of the Integrated Master Test Plan and 

BMDS Accountability Report, the BMDS Quarterly Update briefings and annual 

Staffer Day presentations. 

Mr. ROGERS. We often ask the combatant commanders and military services for 

their unfunded requirements list. Do you have an unfunded requirements list? What 

capabilities were requested in the cocom IPLs for FY13–FY17 that didn’t appear on 

the coordinated PCL or ACL? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response 

is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What would be the total funding required, by system, to meet the 

combatant command requirement for THAAD and SM–3s and Aegis BMD software 

and hardware sets? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there program gaps in ballistic missile defense? Are there gaps 

you have not yet focused on? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is 

unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. If MDA was developing and procuring these new Patriot radars with 

the acquisition authorities you have, how much time would it take you to do it? 

Admiral SYRING. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary considerably depending on the maturity of the components being developed and the amount 

of integration and testing required prior to deployment. It is difficult to predict acquisition schedules without a prior knowledge of these variables. For example, Long 

Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is developing and integrating relatively mature 

technology. The LRDR program plan for development and integration is less than 

five years from contract award to Initial Fielding. 

Mr. ROGERS. During a recent hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Under Secretary Sean Stackley testified that, because of the MDA’s unique 

acquisition authorities, you were able to successfully deploy in almost record time 

the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Do you agree with this assessment? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, MDA’s streamlined acquisition authorities contributed to 

the rapid development, installation, and deployment of the Romania Aegis Ashore 

site. Another significant contributor to the shortened timeline is the close collaborative relationship between the MDA Aegis Ashore program office and Navy, including leveraging existing Navy contracts for acquisition of Aegis Ashore weapon system equipment common with Aegis BMD ships. 

Mr. ROGERS. How much longer would it take and how much more would it cost 

to develop, test and field Poland Aegis Ashore site on the planned timeline in the 

normal 5000 series rules and regulations? Would MDA be able to meet the President’s 2018 goal? 

Admiral SYRING. It is difficult to assess the additional cost and schedule required 

to field the Poland Aegis Ashore site under standard 5000-series ‘‘rules.’’ Poland-specific activity is estimated to be completed within four years. Initial hardware components were procured in 4th quarter fiscal year 2014 (4QFY14) and first fabrication 

on site was 1QFY16 with planned operations in 1QFY18. Fielding the Poland site 

is accelerated because of lessons learned from developing and deploying Aegis 

Ashore sites at the Hawaiian Pacific Missile Range Facility and Romania. Without 

this advantage and MDA’s streamlined processes and decision making authority, it 

would be difficult to maintain the aggressive timeline to meet the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach Phase 3 requirement of December 2018. 
118 

Mr. ROGERS. How much longer would it take and how much more would it cost 

to develop, test and field Long-Range Discrimination Radar in the normal 5000 series and the Redesigned Kill Vehicle? 

Admiral SYRING. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary considerably depending on the maturity of the components being developed and the amount 

of integration and testing required prior to deployment. It is difficult to specify the 

exact differences but MDA estimates development programs such as LRDR and 

RKV would take at least 25 percent longer without the streamlined and tailored 

MDA acquisition processes. 

In the case of RKV, the formal OUSD(AT&L) gated reviews required by DOD 

5000 series acquisition requirements are estimated to add approximately one year 

and $200M to the development effort and initial deployment costs. The RKV Acquisition Strategy signed by USD(AT&L) in October, 2015 accounts for streamlined acquisition processes. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think you’re aware of the planned radar modernization of the Patriot system, which will take as long as 12 years to provide an improved radar to 

our soldiers; how long would a comparable effort take MDA? I ask you to answer 

this using in your role as the technical integration authority for IAMD. 

Admiral SYRING. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary considerably depending on the maturity of the components being developed and the amount 

of integration and testing required prior to deployment. It is difficult to predict acquisition schedules without a prior knowledge of these variables. For example, Long 

Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is developing and integrating relatively mature 

technology. The LRDR program plan for development and integration is less than 

five years from contract award to Initial Fielding. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please provide a detailed explanation of changes to MDA AQ processes with respect to the 5000 series AQ regulations or JCIDS process in your tenure as Director. 

Admiral SYRING. MDA’s processes are completely consistent with the principles of 

DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02, but tailored to match Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS)-unique acquisition and requirements characteristics. 

The BMDS warfighter requirements generation is explicitly exempt from JCIDS 

(SecDef memorandum dated January 2, 2002). The BMDS requirements generation 

process is the USSTRATCOM-led Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) (ref: 

STRATCOM Special Instruction 538–1). The WIP is focused on BMD and Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense. 

No significant changes were made to MDA’s acquisition or requirements generation processes during my tenure; however several improvements and tailoring updates have been implemented the past several years to include: 

• Incorporation of guidance from the recent Defense Acquisition of Services Instruction (DOD Instruction 5000.74, dated January 5, 2016) into MDA acquisition policy and processes. 

• Validated that same streamlined processes outlined in the recent update to 

DOD Instruction 5000.02 (January 7, 2015) are incorporated in MDA processes. 

For example, the new DOD Instruction 5000.02 describes several acquisition 

‘‘models’’ or ‘‘tracks’’ that development programs may follow. Several of these 

tracks have been in MDA acquisition policy and process since 2009. 

• STRATCOM increased frequency of updates to the Prioritized Capability List 

(annual vice biannual) to better synchronize with the POM cycle. 

• Generation of a BMD Homeland Defense Capability Document (CD) which was 

endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The VCJCSsigned JROC Memorandum (October 28, 2014) acknowledged that MDA is not 

bound by JCIDS. This CD specifically addressed Long Range Discrimination 

Radar (LRDR) and redesigned kill vehicle capability. The CD will be periodically reviewed for update. 

• Incorporation of LRDR program reporting in the Defense Acquisition Executive 

Summary (DAES) on-line reporting system. LRDR is a pilot program for BMDS 

reporting in DAES. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please provide the full list of NDPC-approved BMDS information 

and sharing with Russia and China? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) submitted three requests for 

Exception to United States National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) from 2007–2011 

seeking authority to disclose classified information to the Russian Federation (RF) 

relating to three ballistic missile defense flight test events. In each case, authority 

granted by the NDPC was limited to oral and visual disclosure only under controlled 

conditions. The RF sent attendees to two of the three test events (in 2007 and 2010). 
119 

No invitations were extended for the third event (in August 2011), and no disclosure 

occurred. MDA has not submitted any further requests for ENDP for the RF. 

MDA has not sought ENDP for release of any information to the People’s Republic 

of China. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the Russian Federation, under current NDPC policy, permitted to 

receive any FOUO, ITAR, UCTI, SECRET or TOP SECRET information about any 

U.S. missile defense system? If your answer is other than ‘‘no,’’ please reply in detail. 

Admiral SYRING. No. National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) policy prohibits the release of classified information with a foreign government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an information sharing agreement. No such agreement exists with the Russian Federation (RF). 

We are not aware of any policy permitting the release of any controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified information to the RF on any U.S. 

missile defense system. We defer further response to the Defense Technology Security Administration. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the People’s Republic of China, under current NDPC policy, permitted to receive any FOUO, ITAR, UCTI, SECRET or TOP SECRET information 

about THAAD? Any U.S. missile defense system? If your answer is other than ‘‘no,’’ 

please reply in detail. 

Admiral SYRING. No. National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) policy prohibits the release of classified information with a foreign government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an information sharing agreement. No such agreement exists with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

We are not aware of any policy permitting the release of any controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified information to the PRC on THAAD 

or any other U.S. missile defense system. We defer further response to the Defense 

Technology Security Administration. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you support providing the People’s Republic of China with any 

detailed technical information on THAAD, including classified information? Please 

reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent 

possible. 

Admiral SYRING. We have not approved release of any controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified information to the Peoples Republic of China 

on THAAD or any other missile defense system. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you aware of MDA or MDA contractors being targeted or 

‘‘hacked’’ by groups or entities linked to China or the Chinese military? Please reply 

in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. If a loss, theft, or spillage of MDA Unclassified Controlled Technical Information (UCTI) occurs, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reviews whether the contractor was in compliance with the contract terms and conditions established for cybersecurity. If the review determines the contractor is non-compliant, 

they are assessed penalties based on the performance assessment tools defined by 

the contract. Penalties have ranged from award fee reductions to contract termination based on the severity of the incident. MDA has also utilized the Contractor 

Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) to rate contractors who do not 

manage in accordance with their contract terms and conditions. CPARS is the Government-wide repository of contractor performance information. A CPAR, required 

at least annually during contract performance per Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) 42.1502, provides an official record of both positive and negative contractor 

contract performance during a specific period of time. Past performance information 

(including the ratings and supporting narratives) is relevant information, for source 

selection purposes (FAR Part 15), regarding a contractor’s actions under previously 

awarded contracts or orders. 

MDA is teaming with our industry partners to strengthen network protections 

and associated business practices to improve protection of UCTI. MDA is working 

with industry to implement multiple cyber-related efforts that will improve both the 

government and our industry partners safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System 

information. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the capability gaps that could be filled by a space sensor 

layer for the BMDS? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 
120 

Mr. ROGERS. Please identify the studies MDA has carried out on its own or with 

other agencies or entities on space-based missile defense sensors? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the options MDA has studied or is studying to host a missile defense payload on a USG, allied, or commercial space vehicle? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it practical to expect MDA to develop and deploy a missile defense-only space-based sensor architecture? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please describe for me why we see reductions in SM–3 procurement quantities in your budget request for fiscal year 2017. Is this budgetary 

maneuver or is there something else this committee should be aware of? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) PB16 input contained an 

SM–3 Block IB Multi-Year Procurement plan. The decision was made in PB17 to 

transition back to single year procurement as the Agency completed Third Stage 

Rocket Motor (TSRM) Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) verification and testing, 

and quantities were reduced to remain within the Department’s overall funding limits. To address SM–3 manufacturing quality to ensure readiness for continued procurement, a comprehensive quality, safety, and mission assurance assessment was 

recently conducted. This assessment supported continued production of SM–3s. 

In addition, PB16 included procurement of 8 SM–3 Block IIA guided missiles in 

FY17. Included in PB17 is a revised completion plan for SM–3 Block IIA, and under 

this plan the 8 rounds planned for FY17 were deferred to FY18 to match development milestones. FY17 funds were realigned from Defense Wide Procurement to Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in support of remaining SM–3 Block IIA 

development to meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3 timeline. 

Mr. ROGERS. What liability does the contractor bear for quality control failures? 

Does that liability include costs of failed tests? How much do those cost the taxpayer? 

Admiral SYRING. Specific liability is dependent on individual contract terms and 

conditions including incentive structure. Most BMDS testing is part of developmental tests conducted under cost plus-type contracting vehicles. Tests failed as a 

result of contractor performance or quality control issues reduce contractor award 

fee and/or incentive fee and potentially impact Contractor Performance Assessment 

Report ratings. Additionally, MDA has delayed acceptance of Contractor-produced 

hardware due to known quality issues. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the current DOD regulation and policy concerning MDA’s 

role to develop and maintain BMD capability and its transfer to the military services? Please detail what systems have been transitioned to the military services and 

what systems are currently undergoing transition study with the military services. 

Admiral SYRING. The Department is using the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s September 25, 2008, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Life Cycle Management 

Process (LCMP), and June 10, 2011 memorandum on ‘‘Funding Responsibilities for 

BMDS Elements’’ to guide program planning and the transfer process. 

Under the BMDS LCMP, DOD continues to transition BMDS capabilities to the 

lead Military Departments. The lead Military Departments are responsible for doctrine, organization, training, leadership, education, personnel and facilities associated with those elements. MDA retains the materiel acquisition responsibilities, unless a decision is made to transfer all responsibilities (full Title 10 Transfer) to the 

Military Department. 

Figure 1 lists the fielded BMDS elements, lead Military Departments and the 

dates elements entered the transition phase. The Department uses the following 

terms and definitions to clarify the process, roles and responsibilities: 

Entered Transition Phase: The BMDS element normally enters the transition 

phase when the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or delegated authority, designates 

a lead Military Department. If not previously approved, entry into the transition phase is coincident with the completion of the lead Military DepartmentMDA overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA). 

Capability Transfer: The BMDS element capability is transferred to the lead 

Military Department once the Military Department accepts operational responsibility. After the capability transfer, the Military Department and MDA will 

assume responsibilities as agreed in the Military Department-MDA overarching 

MOA and respective element annexes. Normally, MDA will retain materiel responsibilities, including Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, produc-
121 

tion, and sustainment of BMD specific equipment. The lead Military Department normally assumes responsibility for military pay and allowances, base operations and operations, and sustainment of common support equipment. 

Title 10 Transfer to Lead Service: BMDS element responsibilities are transferred from MDA to the lead Military Department. Unless otherwise specified, 

the lead Military Department assumes all doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities responsibilities. The 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, or a delegated authority, approves the transfer. 

Figure 1: BMDS Element Transition and Capability Transfer Status, October 2016 

Element or Capability Lead 

Service 

Entered 

Transition 

Phase 

Capability 

Transfer 

Title 10 

Transfer to 

Lead Service 

Patriot Advanced Capability-3 

(PAC 3) 

Army N/A N/A February 2003 1

AN/TPY–2 (Forward Based Mode) Army February 2006 October 2013 Study ongoing 2

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Army November 2006 October 2014 Study ongoing 2

Ground Based Mid-Course Defense (GMD) Army November 2006 N/A 3 Not planned 3

Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) Navy November 2006 October 2008 Not planned 

Aegis BMD 3.6.X Navy November 2006 October 2008 Not planned 

Aegis BMD 4.0.X Navy March 2007 March 2012 Not planned 

Aegis BMD 5.0 (Capability Upgrade) Navy January 2008 December 2015 Not planned 4

Aegis BMD 5.1 Navy January 2008 FY 18 Not Planned 4

Aegis Ashore (Romania) Navy January 2010 December 2015 Not planned 

Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX) Navy December 2008 December 2011 Not planned 

Cobra Dane Air Force February 2006 February 2009 N/A 5

Upgraded Early Warning Radars 

(UEWR) 

Air Force November 2006 September 2008 N/A 5

Command and Control, Battle 

Management and Communications (C2BMC) 

N/A 6 N/A N/A N/A 6

Notes: 

1PAC 3 was already fielded by the Army when MDA was established in 2002 and was immediately transferred back to the Army by mutual agreement. 2 Army and MDA have completed a study on the merits of a Title 10 Transfer. DOD is reviewing the study results. 3The GMD will not be transferred in the foreseeable future. Army and MDA will coordinate 

on terms of transition and transfer when the program is technically mature. 4 BMD 5.0CU and 5.1 software packages are integrated into Navy’s Aegis Baseline 9 combat 

system suite. MDA retains materiel developer responsibilities for the BMD software. 5 Not applicable. Cobra Dane and the Upgraded Early Warning Radars are previously fielded 

U.S. Air Force assets that were upgraded and adapted by MDA for use with the BMDS. A Title 

10 transfer is therefore, unnecessary, 6The C2BMC Tri-Service Structure was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 

March 2014. 
122 

Mr. ROGERS. Virtually every part of DOD has been the subject of cyber attacks, 

whether for espionage or other purposes. Is MDA any different? Can you describe 

what you’ve done to keep MDA ahead of this threat? Please reply in detail. Please 

ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been targeted for cyberattack like the rest of DOD; however, MDA has successfully defended or mitigated 

cyber threats against our internal government networks and systems. Similar to 

other DOD programs, persistent cyber threats directed against defense industry 

base operated or owned unclassified networks are a continual vulnerability. MDA 

is very cognizant of the growing cyber threat and is aggressively working to ensure 

the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) information is protected, and that missile defenses can operate in a highly contested cyber environment. To keep MDA 

ahead of the threat, we have implemented a rigorous cybersecurity program as described below. 

MDA is using and sharing cyber intelligence to reduce our vulnerabilities. We use 

cyber intelligence to tune our cyber defenses and focus our information protection 

efforts. These efforts are accomplished in concert with DOD cyber forces (especially 

U.S. Strategic Command’s USCYBERCOM), intelligence community assets, and law 

enforcement authorities. 

MDA is improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the latest security upgrades and patches. 

MDA continually assesses our systems, suppliers, and overall acquisition processes. 

We are ensuring robust and secure configurations of our critical software and hardware to reduce the risk of malicious activities. MDA also has a rigorous cyber and 

Supply Chain Risk Management inspection program to examine everything about 

our systems from the trusted supply chain to the fielded capability. This ensures 

the highest possible levels of compliance. 

MDA is instituting the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan to 

mitigate risks for the information systems we own and manage. MDA’s program implements the DOD four Lines of Effort campaign: Strong Authentication (to degrade 

the adversaries’ ability to maneuver on DOD information networks); Device Hardening (to reduce internal and external attack vectors into DOD information networks); Reducing the Attack Surface (to reduce external attack vectors into MDA 

information networks); and Alignment to Cybersecurity/Computer Network Defense 

Services (to improve detection of and response to adversary activity). These efforts 

run across all facets of MDA and the BMDS mission systems and general services 

infrastructures. 

MDA has established an Insider Threat Program in accordance with the DOD Directive 205.16, ‘‘The DOD Insider Threat Program.’’ MDA is leveraging computer 

network defense capabilities, in addition to other information streams, to proactively 

detect, mitigate, and defeat potential insider threats. This program also ensures 

that only trusted individuals have access to MDA program information and systems. 

The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) continues to provide 

Computer Network Defense (CND) services as an accredited Tier II CND Service 

Provider to MDA Programs of Record. The MDA CERT executes a battle rhythm 

that includes daily monitoring and collaboration with USCYBERCOM, Joint Force 

Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Networks (JFHQ–DODIN), and 

other sources for the latest threats to DOD and MDA. As a result MDA CERT 

tracked and managed 109 cyber taskings in fiscal year 2015 and approximately 77 

cyber taskings to date in fiscal year 2016, contributing to the overall cybersecurity 

posture of MDA networks and resources. 

MDA is incorporating cybersecurity requirements early into our acquisition 

lifecycle. We are designing and building cybersecurity into missile defenses, rather 

than adding it after the fact. MDA is ensuring that we build cyber resilience into 

our systems and verifying cybersecurity protection of deployed systems through realistic cybersecurity testing. 

We are working closely with our industry partners in the Defense Industry Base 

(DIB) to ensure they can protect both classified and unclassified information stored 

on their systems to prevent exposure to potential adversaries. MDA knows that malicious cyber actors are constantly attempting to exfiltrate information from U.S. Industry. We will continue to work with our DIB partners, the FBI, and other associates, to identify these issues and reduce the chances of success for those responsible, 

in coordination with U.S. National Authorities and in accordance with U.S. National 

Policy. 

MDA continues to execute a rigorous cybersecurity controls validation testing program on MDA networks and the BMDS in compliance with the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800–53, Revision 4, ‘‘Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.’’ We 
123 

recently established a mandatory baseline set of technical cybersecurity controls for 

implementation within the BMDS system specification. 

Moreover, MDA is supporting BMD Warfighters with the joint development of the 

Cyber BMD Concept of Operations (with Joint Functional Component Command– 

Integrated Missile Defense and Joint Functional Component Command–Space) to 

ensure cyber threats can be rapidly detected, contained, and defeated. These efforts 

ensure the Agency remains a strong mission partner, protects and defends MDA information systems and networks, and optimizes cybersecurity management and 

processes at a level commensurate with our critical national defense mission. 

Mr. ROGERS. What consequences have there been for contractor responsibility for 

such data loss/theft/spillage? 

Admiral SYRING. Available tools to address Contractor liability include reducing 

award and incentive fee, negative Contractor Performance Assessment Report ratings, decision to not exercise contract options, and potential debarment from receiving Government contracts. MDA has used these tools recently to hold Contractors 

responsible for data lost/theft/spillage. MDA mandates the inclusion of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement clause 252.204–7012 (Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical Information) in existing and future contracts and 

other MDA-specific requirements 

Mr. ROGERS. How concerned are you that it is too easy for the bad guys to get 

access to ‘‘unclassified controlled technical information’’ about our missile defense 

systems? Have you seen examples of where they have improved their systems 

thanks to this sort of U.S. data? If yes, including if based on your suspicion, please 

provide as much detailed information as possible concerning such examples. 

Admiral SYRING. We are very concerned about protecting Unclassified Controlled 

Technical Information (UCTI). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working to ensure our Critical Covered Defense information is appropriately protected and working Defense contractor supply chain to implement oversight of defense contractor 

unclassified and development, manufacturing, and administrative networks. 

The Department issued a new Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clause in August 2015 to protect UCTI, which MDA is incorporating into every 

new contract we award. 

We have held an MDA Industry Day to discuss protection of UCTI and appropriate program protection and cybersecurity controls. MDA has formed an alliance 

with our key prime contractors and government partners to assess both technical 

and non-technical protection countermeasures that can be implemented to reduce 

the risk of information loss and to help mitigate the risks of potential for cyber exploitation. 

A key part of this effort is the requirement to implement the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800–71 security requirements by 

December 2017 and to implement appropriate supply chain risk management countermeasures throughout our Defense Industrial Base. These efforts should assist in 

providing enhanced protection measures that are both cost-effective and reduce the 

risk of critical information loss. MDA is leading an effort with our primes and subcontractors to identify where MDA specific covered defense information (CDI) has 

the greatest protection risk and ensuring additional security protection measures 

are implemented where appropriate to provide better protection for both MDA and 

our industry partners’ critical information. 

MDA defers to the Intelligence Community on how other countries improve their 

systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. In a response to a request for information, MDA indicated that 

planned Patriot-THAAD integration will consist of being able to pass planning data 

between units via compact disc. It is understandable that the document describes 

this as ‘‘very limited THAAD integration with IBCS’’. Is that correct? Is that acceptable? Does this demonstrate the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s vision of integrated 

air and missile defense? 

Admiral SYRING. MDA’s response was accurate in that THAAD battle plans are 

currently passed via compact discs to Army units. The capability MDA and the 

Army are building for future increments does not use CDs. The Army and MDA 

have jointly developed an initial integration plan to provide shared defense design/ 

battle planning and situational awareness improvements by 2020. 

The first integration step includes modification of THAAD software; adding the 

Common Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) XML Schema (CIXS) 3.6 interface to the THAAD Portable Planner; modification of the IBCS Integrated Defense 

Design algorithms and user interface; and remoting of THAAD workstations into a 

collocated IBCS Engagement Operations Center functioning as the THAAD Battery 

command post. 
124 

Subsequent integration steps will be defined as part of the requirements analysis 

in conjunction with the development of the Army IAMD System of Systems Increment 3 Capabilities Production Document in 2018. This plan supports the Chairman 

of the Joint Chief’s vision of integrated air and missile defense. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand the United Arab Emirates has indicated its willingness 

to make a considerable investment in development of an evolved extended-range 

THAAD system. Can you afford an extended-range THAAD given your current 

budget profile? 

Admiral SYRING. The Department recently received a letter from the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE) expressing interest in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

(THAAD) Extended Range (ER) concept. In response, the Department clarified that 

while THAAD ER is not currently a program of record, the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) is conducting a THAAD follow-on study to assess alternative future capabilities to further enhance the THAAD weapon system against current and future 

threats. The Department committed to continue to keep the UAE informed through 

ongoing dialogue. MDA is assessing affordability as part of the THAAD follow-on 

study. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it the case the Army Vice Chief of Staff and STRATCOM have 

both stated that they need such a capability (e.g., an evolved extended-range 

THAAD system)? What capability gaps have they identified to MDA? Please reply 

in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you support such a partnership between the UAE and the U.S. 

(e.g., to develop an evolved extended-range THAAD system)? 

Admiral SYRING. The United Arab Emirates is an important partner in ballistic 

missile defense and leader in the region as the first country to purchase THAAD 

batteries and interceptors through the Foreign Military Sales program. While the 

Department of Defense is not currently pursuing THAAD ER as a program of 

record, we are conducting a THAAD follow-on study to assess alternative future capabilities to further enhance the THAAD weapon system. As the Department evaluates findings from the THAAD follow-on study, we have committed to keeping the 

UAE informed and ensure that dialogue remains open. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand the U.S. is discussing a Foreign Military Sales case 

with Qatar for THAAD. Why is this case important for Qatar and THAAD? Can we 

work together to accelerate this case to make sure Qatar has these critical missile 

defense systems prior to the World Cup in 2022? How? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon has reported 

that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. Does North Korea have 

a new road-mobile ICBM? Is it testing solid-rocket motors for such a missile? Please 

reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent 

possible. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department of Defense 

Intelligence Community. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you remind this committee why road-mobile missiles are a defense challenge for us? And what about such missiles with solid fuel? 

Admiral SYRING. Mobile ballistic missile technology advances and associated proliferation poses a growing threat to United States, our allies, and partner forces and 

territory including the homeland. Road mobile launchers enable potential adversaries to launch missiles from unexpected locations. Solid fuel provides more flexibility to the threats we face by reducing the time required to prepare and launch 

these missiles 

Mr. ROGERS. Am I correct that under the current plan for the ground-based midcourse defense system, there are no operational spares GBIs for, is it 5 or 6 years? 

It’s well into the 2020s, right? What happens if there is an unplanned failure? 

Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum 

extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will not have operational 

spare Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) until 2020. In President’s Budget 2017, 

MDA plans to deliver three initial production Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) units 

in fiscal year 2020 (FY20) and two initial production Configuration 3 (C3) boost vehicles in FY23. One of the RKVs and one of the C3 boosters will be designated as 

an operations/test spare. 

In the event of an unplanned failure for one of the operational GBIs, Groundbased Midcourse Defense Program Manager for Readiness would task the GBI con-
125 

tractor to repair the interceptor. During the timeframe for the repair, the warfighter 

would lose one interceptor from inventory. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is this reality (the lack of operational spares referenced in the previous question) an artifact of years of under-investment in the GMD system? What 

is the best way to mitigate this risk? 

Admiral SYRING. The lack of operational spares is due to significantly increasing 

the amount of operational Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs). To achieve the 

SECDEF mandate of fielding 44 GBIs by the end of calendar year 2017, MDA is 

emplacing all previously planned spares in the operational fleet. The following table 

illustrates the current program plan and the utilization of GBIs to meet operational 

and test requirements. 

Total Legacy contract (-0001) 

Deliveries 47 

Total Development and Sustainment 

Contract (DSC) Deliveries 

11 

Total Deliveries 58 

Subtract Flight Tests and Stockpile 

Reliability Program (SRP) 

(12) FTG–06, BVT–01, FTG–06a, CTV–01, 

CTV–02+, FTG–07, FTG–06b, FTG–11a, 

FTG–11b, SRP (2), FTG–15 

Total Available 46 

Emplace 30 (Original GM Plan) 

IF: 30 are emplaced; THEN: Subtract 

30 from 46 total 

available; 

46¥30=16 

RESULT: 16 GBIs available to support 

future Flight Tests, Spares and SRP. 

Provides 10 Flight Test assets for fiscal 

year 2020 (FY20) through FY28 and 6 for 

Spares and SRP 

Emplace 44 (March 2013 SECDEF Mandate) 

IF: 44 are emplaced; THEN: Subtract 

44 from 46 total 

available; 

46¥44=2 

RESULT: 2 GBIs are available to support 

flight tests in FY20 and FY21 

Our President’s Budget 2017 plan mitigates this risk by providing redesigned kill 

vehicle spares beginning in FY20 and Configuration 3 spares in FY23. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or war games you 

have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out such capability? If so, please identify and describe 

such observed areas needing policy guidance from OSD. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s) wargame and exercise 

support is primarily limited to providing modeling and simulation focusing on rightof-launch ballistic missile defeat for Warfighter-sponsored wargames and exercises. 

MDA defers to the respective combatant commands for specific details or questions regarding policy guidance observations or requirements for executing Left-ofLaunch activities. 

Mr. ROGERS. What kind of intelligence do we need to possess in order for the 

President to order a preemptive attack on a state possessing nuclear weapons? 

Admiral SYRING. This question would be best addressed by the U.S. Strategic 

Command. 

Mr. ROGERS. What do potential adversaries like Russia, China, Iran and other 

states know about THAAD and PATRIOT? Do they know more than they should? 

What does that tell us about the security of data about U.S. missile defense? Please 

reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent 

possible. 
126 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department of Defense 

Intelligence Community. 

Mr. ROGERS. How much do the TD–2 and KN–08 have in common, in terms of 

technology and systems? How much of the KN–08 is it safe to say has been tested? 

Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum 

extent possible 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department of Defense 

Intelligence Community. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are we outpacing the threat? How do you evaluate ‘‘outpacing’’ the 

threat? Based on what criteria? Please provide a detailed list of adversary developments regarding ballistic missile capability that affected our ability to ‘‘outpace’’ the 

threat. What developments by adversaries, if any, have surprised you? Please reply 

in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. How much control do you have over LCMD? How much insight do 

you have over something that will go into a system for which you are responsible? 

Admiral SYRING. Since 2015, the Missile Defense Agency has provided technical 

support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Sandia National Laboratory Low 

Cost Missile Defeat team, to include systems engineering, Terminal High-Altitude 

Area Defense system design, sensors, and cost estimating. We have also provided 

technical deep dives and guidance on the Ballistic Missile Defense System architecture, system requirements, concept of operations, safety and mission assurance, and 

integration information. We will continue to provide technical support through 2016 

in support of a Systems Requirements Review in July and activities leading to a 

Preliminary Design Review. We participate in all of the major reviews and weekly 

tag up meetings. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there any other missile defense capabilities you are aware of 

that are being developed outside of MDA? For example, by the Strategic Capabilities 

Office? What is your level of insight and technical authority over such capability developments. 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is an active team member 

of the Hypervelocity Gun Weapon System (HGWS) Project sponsored by the Office 

of Secretary of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). MDA supports the 

HGWS systems engineering efforts and is developing a Prototype Fire Control 

Radar to support system level demonstrations in the fiscal year 2018–2019 time 

frame. MDA actively participates in Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture 

and requirements development, ballistic missile defense mission performance analysis, and HGWS system-level test planning, as well as 3-Star-level Sensor Steering 

Committee meetings. 

In addition, MDA is partnering with SCO on other projects at higher classification 

levels. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to give you an opportunity to clarify a response to a 

question during the 14 April hearing, are you funded to develop and deploy defense 

against boost-glide missiles like those being developed by Russia and China? How 

much would such development cost? 

Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Am I correct that, if we assume a 2028 initial fielding of a new Patriot radar, we will have a radar system with components, in some cases, that are 

58 years old? 

Mr. PIKE. The average age of all Patriot ground equipment including the radars 

and their components across the U.S. Army fleet is 7.5 years. This average age is 

achieved through the Patriot recapitalization program and the Patriot modification 

efforts and is cost-effectively enabled by new radar production for foreign partners 

and continuous obsolescence management. The Patriot recapitalization program is 

a complete depot overhaul effort that returns one battalion set of Patriot ground 

system equipment per year (including radars) to like-new (zero miles/zero hours) 

condition. The recapitalization program is conducted at the Letterkenny Army 

Depot in Pennsylvania and is funded with Operations and Maintenance Army funding. While the original design heritage of Patriot goes back to the 1970s, the Army 

has implemented a continuous and robust hardware and software modification effort 

over the years to address performance, readiness, and obsolescence. These modification efforts not only replace older components, but also leverage the substantial investment of our foreign partners and most recently included the new Radar Digital 

Processor, new Modern Adjunct Processor, and the new Modern Man Station. These 
127 

† PACOM failures were in radar, heavy and medium wheeled vehicles, and trailers. There 

were three separate months that affected the PACOM Operational Readiness rate. Radar faults 

occurred in August 2015 and were corrected by the end of the month. Issues with vehicles occurred in October 2015 and were corrected by the end of that month. Radar faults and trailer 

issues occurred in APR 2016 and were corrected later that same month. The most recent 

month’s (May 2016) Operational Readiness rate for PACOM was reported as 96 percent. 

components also enable adaptation to the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). 

The materiel solution for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor 

(LTAMDS) has not been determined nor has a program baseline (cost, schedule, performance) been established. The LTAMDS effort could result in an upgrade to the 

current Patriot radar or a new radar to replace the Patriot radar. The Army’s plan 

is to conduct a full and open competition to allow industry to propose and demonstrate materiel solutions that address the approved LTAMDS requirements. 

While LTAMDS is being developed and fielded, Patriot readiness and performance 

will be maintained through the recapitalization, modification, and obsolescence management efforts described above. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many requirements or objectives can Patriot not meet today 

due to obsolescence or adversary threat developments? Please provide me the complete list. Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the 

maximum extent possible. 

Mr. PIKE. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. When you testified, you stated the Army Requirements Oversight 

Council was meeting that week to establish an actual operational requirement for 

the LTAMD radar. Did it? Please provide such AROC-approved requirement if so. 

Mr. PIKE. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Please provide the operational availability information for each Patriot battery for the most recent year for which it is available. Please reply in detail. 

Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Mr. PIKE. Over the last twelve months, Operational Readiness was the driver of 

availability of Patriot units. Operational Readiness is reported monthly for the 

worldwide U.S. Army Patriot fleet and is also broken out by the following regions: 

Korea, Pacific Command (PACOM), Continental United States (CONUS), Europe 

(USAREUR), and Southwest Asia (SWA). 

The Army’s Operational Readiness goal for Patriot is 90 percent. The most current Operational Readiness data available for the last twelve months is provided 

below ending May 2016: 

Worldwide 92.67% 

Korea 97.75% 

PACOM 79.83% † 

CONUS 93.42% 

USAREUR 91.17% 

SWA 93.25% 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the risk that, due to obsolescence, the Army will not be able 

to keep the Patriot radar fully functional to your planned 2028 initial fielding plan? 

Please explain your answer in detail and cite Army analysis/analyses that has been 

conducted to inform your answer. Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Mr. PIKE. Due to the recapitalization program, the modification efforts, and continuous monitoring as well as the extensive new production for our foreign partners, 

the Army categorizes the risk to Patriot radar functionality (performance and operational readiness) as low. 

The Army continuously monitors component obsolescence in all Patriot end items. 

Commercially-available databases are utilized to assess the availability of electronic 

components used in the manufacture, modification, and recapitalization of the 

radar. The modification efforts to maintain performance and readiness against the 

evolving threat (functionality) produce the latest configuration of the Patriot ground 

system (including radars) for the U.S. Army fleet called Configuration 3+ (C3+). The 

C3+ modification effort results in a 49.3 percent reduction in obsolete parts associated with the Patriot radar compared to the previous radar configuration. The overall obsolescence percentage of the C3+ radar is assessed at 4.3 percent of the total 

radar parts. The Army also monitors field failure data to ensure that spare and repair programs are not affected by obsolescence issues. 

Although the U.S. Army does not currently plan to procure any new Patriot radars, there is an extensive C3+ production program for our foreign partners. The 
128 

new production enables a cost-effective supply chain to support performance, readiness, and sustainment of the U.S. Army capability, resolves certain obsolescence 

issues, and provides opportunity to reduce obsolescence even further. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please tell me, if you begin fielding the new radar in 2028, 

when will it be fully deployed to our Army air defenders? 

Mr. PIKE. The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor effort has not yet been 

established/approved as an acquisition program. Therefore, the program baseline 

(cost, schedule, performance) has not yet been established. The program baseline 

will be informed by results of the full and open competition using the Army’s approved operational requirements. 

Mr. ROGERS. As the acquisition lead for the Army for Patriot, can you please assure us that at the end of the Lower Tier Army Missile Defense radar modernization program that all, all, capability and objective requirements gaps will be closed 

so that they are covered for our soldiers and joint warfighters who depend upon this 

system? If not, what capability and requirement gaps will not be met? Please reply 

in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible. 

Mr. PIKE. The Army’s approved operational requirement for the Lower Tier Air 

and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) addresses all of the known capability gaps 

based on current threat projections for future years. The LTAMDS program will be 

structured to achieve the Army’s operational requirements which will close the gaps. 

However, threat projections are simply that—today’s predictions of the future threat 

which may or may not accurately reflect the threat in the future. Threat projections 

and capability gaps are updated on a recurring basis. As the threat evolves, additional capability gaps and objective requirements may be identified during development, production, fielding, and/or sustainment of LTAMDS. Any necessary improvements to address the updated threat projections/emergent gaps will likely be implemented through evolutionary software development and hardware modifications (or 

product improvement programs) if required based on operational risk assessments. 

This is the same process that has been successfully accomplished in Patriot for decades. 

Mr. ROGERS. In a response to a request for information, MDA indicated that 

planned Patriot-THAAD integration will consist of being able to pass planning data 

between units via compact disc. It is understandable that the document describes 

this as ‘‘very limited THAAD integration with IBCS’’. Is that correct? Is that acceptable? Does this demonstrate the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s vision of integrated 

air and missile defense? 

Mr. PIKE. Planned Patriot-THAAD integration does not consist of passing planning data between units via compact disc. Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) response 

was accurate in that THAAD battle plans are currently passed via compact discs 

to Army units for non-real time planning purposes. Near real-time target data and 

engagement status is currently shared between THAAD and Army mission command elements automatically via tactical data links. Additionally, the Army and 

MDA are building capabilities for future increments of non-real time battle planning 

that eliminates the need for compact discs. The Army and the MDA have jointly developed an initial integration plan to provide shared defense design/battle planning 

and situational awareness improvements by 2020. The work includes modification 

of THAAD software; adding the Common IAMD Extensible Markup Language Schema 3.6 interface to the THAAD Portable Planner; modification of the IBCS Integrated Defense Design algorithms and user interface; and remoting of THAAD 

workstations into a collocated IBCS Engagement Operations Center functioning as 

the THAAD battery command post. Subsequent integration steps will be defined as 

part of the requirements analysis in conjunction with the development of the Army 

IAMD System of Systems Increment 3 Capabilities Production Document in 2018. 

This plan supports the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s vision of integrated air and 

missile defense. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Please give us your views on the efforts to change the decades-long 

missile defense policy of defending against a limited missile defense attack. Would 

expanding this policy to defense against all missile defense attacks, including largescale attacks from China or Russia, be possible and cost-effective? What would the 

strategic stability implications be of such a change in policy? Is there an operational 

requirement for this? How do we deter Russian and Chinese attacks? 

Mr. MCKEON. It has been long-standing U.S. policy not to seek to build missile 

defense capabilities that could threaten China’s or Russia’s strategic deterrent. 
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1 Note: Delta 180 (Vector Sum) did demonstrate in 1986 the principle of intercepting in space 

a target during powered flight 

Every U.S. Administration has instead relied on our nuclear Triad to ensure credible deterrence against Chinese and Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM) attack against our homeland. Changing this policy would raise profound 

questions about whether the United States is now pursuing the development and 

deployment of large-scale, advanced missile defense capabilities to negate either 

Russia’s or China’s strategic deterrent. This development could undermine strategic 

stability with regard to both countries, and could lead them to respond by accelerating and expanding their strategic nuclear forces, or by developing a more advanced asymmetrical response capability. 

Furthermore, the technical challenges and interceptor inventories associated with 

building missile defenses to cope with a large-scale, sophisticated Russian or Chinese missile attack would make the project cost-prohibitive. 

DOD continues to believe that the most effective and reliable means to deter an 

attack on the United States by a major nuclear power is to sustain and modernize 

our strategic nuclear Triad. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Syring, you noted that Space Based Interceptors are neither 

technically nor financially feasible. Please explain these feasibility concerns. 

Admiral SYRING. At a conceptual level, Space Based Interceptors (SBI) could provide on-demand boost and early post-boost access against certain classes of threats 

even in places where terrestrial weapons would be geographically constrained or politically precluded. However, the basic feasibility of an SBI layer with operational 

utility has not yet been shown in the relevant environment of space and on the compressed engagement timelines required.1 Essential SBI technologies have been 

worked only sporadically over the years and consequently are not feasible to procure, deploy, or operate in the near- to mid-term. 

Cost has traditionally been a barrier to space based defenses. Feasible solutions 

would depend upon aggressive incorporation of light-weight technologies, low-cost 

access to orbit, and selection of a mission that is bounded enough to be affordable 

and at the same time militarily useful. The 2011 IDA report showed costs ranging 

from $26B for a limited mission, to greater than $60B for a ‘‘medium’’ capability system that could perform against near-term threats, to over $200B for a full global 

defense. 

Mr. COOPER. Please give us your views on the efforts to change the decades-long 

missile defense policy of defending against a limited missile defense attack. Would 

expanding this policy to defense against all missile defense attacks, including largescale attacks from China or Russia, be possible and cost-effective? Is it technologically feasible? What would the cost be? 

Admiral SYRING. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy is the most appropriate organization to respond to questions concerning a change in missile defense policy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. We understand that the Department of Defense is considering deploying JLENS in the Mid-Atlantic region. Would Wallops Island, Virginia, be a 

suitable location to deploy JLENS in support of NORTHCOM/NORAD missions? 

Admiral GORTNEY. A number of sites were considered when planning for the 

three-year JLENS Operational Exercise (OPEX) from FY15 through FY17. Wallops 

Island was one of the sites considered; however, due to a number of variables, including current availability of restricted airspace and the timeframe required to develop new restricted airspace, Wallops Island was not deemed suitable to support 

the OPEX in the given timeframe. The objective of the JLENS OPEX was to assess 

JLENS contribution to cruise missile defense within the National Capital Region 

and inform an enduring mission decision. If the OPEX results had supported an enduring mission requirement, an assessment of optimal JLENS locations, including 

additional site surveys if necessary, would be part of the JLENS enduring mission 

decision. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. It is my understanding that you are on schedule to ensure that 44 

Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) are fielded by the end of 2017. Can you describe 
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for the committee how many back-up boosters and kill vehicles MDA plans to acquire to support the 44 GBI fleet? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency is on track to field 44 GBIs by the 

end of 2017. The Agency plans to acquire three spare redesigned kill vehicles and 

two spare Configuration 3 boosters from calendar years 2020–2025 to support the 

44 GBI fleet. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you believe that you are on schedule to ensure that the upgraded 

booster, known as C3, will be able to support the new Redesigned Kill Vehicle 

(RKV) fielding in the 2020–2022 time frame? How much funding in FY17 is requested to begin C3 development? 

Admiral SYRING. No, the Configuration 3 (C3) booster will not be delivered to support RKV fielding from 2020–2022. In order to maximize system reliability as quickly as possible and to meet the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act requirement 

to replace all Capability Enhancement-1 (CE–I) exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV) 

by 2022, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will initially recap C1 boosters with 

RKVs. Beginning in 2023, MDA will deliver C3 boosters with RKVs and continue 

until all CE–2 EKVs are replaced. Beginning in 2024, the first 18 RKVs that were 

placed on C1 boosters will receive their C3 booster. This strategy focuses resources 

on the highest priority GBI component (replacing all CE–I kill vehicles) while phasing in the C3 booster in an efficient manner. In PB17, the Agency has requested 

$20.8 million in fiscal year 2017 to begin C3 development. 

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