1 

## NO. 12

- 20

- 00123

- CV

IN THE COUR T OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS

JOE MARLIN GILMER , APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , APPELLEE §

§

§ APPEAL FROM THE

COUNTY COURT AT LAW

VAN ZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORA NDUM OPINION Joe Marlin Gilmer appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to rescind an order
to withdraw funds from his inmate account. Gilmer raises ten issues on appeal. We vacat e and
remand

.

B ACKGROUND Gilmer is an inmate , who is serving a thirty

- year s entence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a family or household member. He was convicted in the 2 94th Judicial District Court of Van Zandt County (the District Cour t) , Texas on December 20, 2016 , and
sentenced on January 19, 2017 . T h at same day, the D istrict C ourt rendered an order to withdraw
funds from Gilmer’s inmate account in the amount of $16,495.90. On September 25, 2019, Gilmer received notice that the Te xas Department of Criminal
Justice had received a withdrawal order for Gilmer’s inmate account. On October 19, G ilmer
filed , in the District Court , a motion to rescind the withdrawal order and requested that the amount collected as of September 18, 2019, the date of the notice, be refunded . On January 29, 2020, the County Court at Law for Van Zandt County, Texas (t he County Court at Law or the trial court) denied Gilmer’s motion by written order. T his appeal followed.2 S UBJECT M ATTER J URISDICTION In his first issue, Gilmer argues that th e trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider and deny the moti on to rescind he filed in the district court , which originally rendered
the withdrawal order

. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a ca se. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Ass ’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air
Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law , whic h we review de novo

. City of Dallas v. Carbajal , 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex. 2010) ; see Juarez v. Tex. Ass’n of Sp orting Officials El Paso Chapter , 172 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. App.

– El Paso 2005, no pet.). If we determine that the trial court lacked jurisdict ion, then we only have jurisdi ction to set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the cause. See Juarez , 1 72 S.W.3d at 278. Here, Gilmer’s motion challenged the district court’s authority to collect costs pursuant to Texas Government Code, Section 501.014 , which authorizes inma te account withdrawals for

costs

. See Harrell v. State , 286 S.W.3d 315 , 318 (Tex. 2009) ; see also T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 501.014 (West Supp. 2020 ) . The procedure at issue is a civil , post judgment , collection action , akin to a garnishment action

. See id. at 319

. A garnishment proceeding is ancillary to and a part of the principal ac tion and must be brought in the court of the principal action

. See King & King v. Porter , 252 S.W. 1022, 102 2 (Tex. 1923 ) ; In re Gen. Motors A cceptance Corp. , No. 13

- 08

- 474

- CV, 2008 WL 4822227, at *3 (Tex. App.

– Corpus Christi Nov. 3, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). As a result, the principal court’s j urisdiction extends to all issues raised in the enforcement of that judgment and controls the appell ate jurisdiction of such issues. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 2008 WL 4822227, at

* 4. In the instant case, the district court’s withdrawal order is a post judgment order, which Gilmer may challeng e. 1 See Harrell , 286 S.W.3d at 319. However, simila r to garnishment proceedings, Gilmer was required to raise his challenge to the withdrawal order in the court tha t rendered it. Cf. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 2008 WL 4822227, at *4. Indeed, the decision
to rescind an order logically should be present ed t o the court which rendered the same because t o

1 Gilmer may challenge this order to th e extent such a c hallenge rel ates to the convicting court’s authority to collect costs as opposed to its authority to assess costs. See Harrell v. State , 266 S.W.3d 31, 318 (Tex. 200 9).3 allow otherwise would enable litigants to make an “end

- run” ar ound the trial court which
rendered the order

. Id. Here, Gilmer properly sought to file his motion with the district clerk to be pres ented t o the District Court for a ruling. Yet t he order denying Gilmer’s motion appears to have been issued by the C oun ty C ourt at L aw. We recognize that the C ounty C ourt at L aw can have

concurrent civil jurisdiction with the D istrict C ourt

. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN

. § 2 5.2362(b) (West Supp. 2020 ). Further, we ackno wledge that a c ounty court at law judge may hear and
det ermine a matter pending in any district court in that county. See id

. § 74.094 (West 2013 ). Further still, we surmise that V an Zandt Coun ty m ay have local rules or administrative orders
which allow the C ounty C ourt at L aw to act on behal f of the District Court in certain
circumstances. B ut there is nothing in the record before us to support such a conclusion , and the
Sta te has not file d a brie f which potentially could have elucidated the issue . Ultimately , t he
record reveals only that a n order was rendered in the C ounty C ourt at L aw ruling on a motion
file d in the D istrict Court to contest a post judgment withdrawal order whic h originated in t hat

court. The jurisdiction to rule on a challenge to this type of post judgment order lies with the
D istrict C ourt wh ich issued the order

. Cf. Gen . Motors Acceptance Corp. , 2008 WL 4822227, at
*4

. Whether the C ounty C ourt at L aw judge w as acting on his own behalf or sit t ing for the judge
of the District Court is unclear to us. Accordingly, since the order identifies the C ounty C ourt at
L aw as the i ssuing court, we must conclu de the C ounty C ourt at L aw acted on i ts own behalf
rather than for the District Court

. Therefore, we hold the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Gilmer ’s motion. Id. Gilmer’s first i ssue is sustained. 2

D ISPOSITION Having sustained Gilmer’s first issue, we vacate the trial court’s order den ying Gilmer’s

mot ion to rescind and remand the cause to the District Court for further consideration of the
issue consistent with this opinion.
G REG N EELEY Justice Opinion delivered June 30, 2021.

2 Because we conclude that th e trial court lacked jurisdiction t o c onsider G ilmer’s motion, we d o not consider Gilmer’s nine remaining issues. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.1.4 Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J

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## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 30 , 2 021

NO. 12

- 20

- 00123

- CV

JOE MA RLIN GILMER , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

Ap peal from the County Court at Law
of Va n Zandt County, T exas (Tr.Ct.No. CR

- 15

- 00226 ) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, an d the same being considered, beca use it is the opinion of this Court that the court below
was without sub ject matter jurisdiction , it is ORDERED, AD JUDGED , and DEC REED by this
Court that the order denying Appellant JOE MARLIN GILME R ’ S motion to rescind
wit hdrawal order be vacated and the cause remanded to the 294 th Judicial District C ourt of Van Zandt County, Texas, for further procee dings in accordan ce with the opinion of this Court; and
that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
Gr eg Neeley , Justice

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyl e, J., and Neeley, J.