TRADOC

HISTORICAL

MONOGRAPH

SERIES

AMERICAN ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR THE

POST-COLD WAR

19961121 122

John L. Romjue

MILITARY HISTORY OFFICE

UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
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American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War

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This historical study treats the development of the Army's first doctrine for the post-Cold War. Raised to new prominence

in the modernization and reform of the United States Army of the 1970s-1980s, Army operational doctrine was rendered

obsolescent in the early 1990s by the Cold War's end and by the advanced military-technological capabilities demonstrated

in the Persian Gulf War. The new doctrine formulated under General Frederick Franks, Commanding General of the Army

Training and Doctrine Command, sprang from the assumptions of a new strategic era. In the process of rethinking war

fighting, a new dynamics of battle emerged, and a new operational doctrine was formulated. This study is intended to

present a critical documented record of that important event in late-20th century American Army history. Treated are: its

historical antecedents, strategic context, study and formulation, finished results, propagation, and the mechanics of the

effort. This monograph is additionally intended to provided, in its ideational detail, a case-study of the intellectual and

institutional processes involved, for use by future doctrine planners.

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TRADOC

HISTORICAL

MONOGRAPH

SERIES

AMERICAN ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR THE

POST-COLD WAR

Approved tor pucxic rsieos«

DTIC QUALrry INSPECTED O

By John L. Romjue

Military History Office

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

1996
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

General William W. Hartzog Commander

Major General Joe N. Ballard Chief of Staff

Dr. James T. Stensvaag Chief Historian

Mr. John L. Romjue Chief, Historical Studies and Publication

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Date

Romjue, John L., 1936-

American Army doctrine for the post-Cold War/ by John L. Romjue.

p. cm. - (TRADOC historical monograph series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States. Army. 2. Military doctrine-United States-

-History--20th century. 3. World politics-1989- I. Title.

II. Series.

UA24.A7 1996

355'.033573'09049--dc20 96-34548

CIP

TRADOC HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH SERIES

James T. Stensvaag and John L. Romjue, General Editors

TRADOC Historical Monographs are published by the Military History Office, U.S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command. These studies of training and leader

development, and doctrinal and combat developments subjects provide historical

perspective to support the Command's mission of preparing the Army for war and

charting its future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword Vl

Preface viii

Introduction 1

Chapter I

ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT 5

Doctrine and Its Levels 6

Doctrine and the American Army 10

AirLand Battle Doctrine 16

Revolution and War, 1989-1991 21

AirLand Operations 23

Preliminary Revision 27

Chapter II

RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING 33

Directive for Change 35

Franks, VII Corps, and the Gulf War 37

Organizing a Writing Team 38

A Consensus-Building Campaign 42

A Precis 46

Views of the Army's Senior Leaders 48

Issues and Planning 51

Chapter III

A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE 57

Digesting Theory and Practice: The Writing Team 57

Franks and the Changing Dynamics of Battle 61

Desert Storm Lessons 65

Developing Battle Dynamics 70

Battle Laboratories 73

The Way Ahead 77
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Chapter IV

CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE 79

Distilling Ideas 80

Emerging Doctrine 88

The Army Thinks It Over 91

Crystallizing the Doctrine 96

Final Formulation 104

Chapter V

DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME 113

Full Dimension Operations 114

Fundamentals of Army Operations 115

Force Projection 119

Joint and Combined Operations 120

Planning and Executing Operations 121

Offense and Defense 124

Logistics 125

Operations Other Than War 126

The Combat Environment 127

Implementing the Doctrine 128

Chapter VI

AN ASSESSMENT 131

The Ideas of 1993 131

Doctrine Writing: the TRADOC Paradigm 133

Doctrine and Strategic Circumstance 135

Toward the 21st Century Force 136

List of Acronyms 142

A Note on Sources 145

Index 147

About the Author 159
CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr x

Fort Monroe, Virginia, Headquarters Army

Training and Doctrine Command 15

General William E. DePuy 17

General Donn A. Starry 18

General William R. Richardson 19

General John W. Foss 25

General Gordon R. Sullivan 34

Franks directing VII Corps operations, 25 February 1991 37

Colonel James R. McDonough 39

Major General Wesley K. Clark 43

United States Army Command and General Staff College 59

M1 AbramsTank 68

Mulitiple Launch Rocket System 69

Brigadier General Timothy J. Grogan 83

Lieutenant General Wilson A. Shoffner 87

Command Building, Headquarters TRADOC 89

Franks at a Fort Monroe ceremony 107

Brigadier General Lon E. (Bert) Maggart 111

Troops of the 1990s Army 127

Photographs courtesy TRADOC Public Affairs Office,

TRADOC Photo Lab

Cover illustration, Brigade in the Attack, Persian Gulf,

Mario Acevedo, 1991, courtesy U.S. Army Center of Military History
FOREWORD

Americans who look back on the 20th century's record of war,

conflict, and uneasy peace will not dismiss lightly the need for a vigilant

defense and a strong Army. For those who share responsibility for the

future preparedness of the United States Army, it is vital that we

constantly modernize our doctrine, organizations, training, leader

development, materiel, and soldier capabilities.

In the early-1990s, the Army and its Training and Doctrine

Command were acutely aware of the geopolitical shift that, in 1989-

1991, ended the Cold War and introduced a new strategic era.

Responding to the consequences ofthat change, TRADOC developed a

new military operational doctrine, published in June 1993 as the Army's

first doctrine for the post-Cold War. Spanning the requirement for a

leading-edge, cohesive framework to guide how we think about tactics,

operational art, and the strategic challenge, the 1993 doctrine established

the intellectual basis and battle dynamics of the smaller force-projection

Army that was to be the primary land component of American joint

forces in the 1990s.

Doctrine is at the heart of everything we do as an Army. How

we formulated that doctrine is of central concern. TRADOC historian

John Romjue's study of the development of the U.S. Army's post-Cold

War doctrine provides a documented record of that significant thinking

and planning process. I urge our Army, joint-service, and allied friends

to read it for the American Army perspective it offers. And I urge

TRADOC readers, as the Army's educators, trainers, and doctrine and
FOREWORD

combat developers, to use it as a documentary aid in support of the

evolving vital doctrine we will need to prepare us for warfighting in the

21st century.

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG

General, United States Army

Commanding

Fort Monroe, Virginia, April 1996
PREFACE

This historical study treats the development of the Army's first doctrine for the post-Cold War. Raised to new prominence in the modernization and reform of the United States Army of the 1970s-1980s, Army operational doctrine was rendered obsolescent in the early 1990s by the Cold

War's end and by the advanced military-technological capabilities demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. The new doctrine formulated under General Frederick Franks, Commanding General of the Army Training and

Doctrine Command, sprang from the assumptions of a new strategic era.

In the process ofrethinking war fighting, a new dynamics of battle emerged,

and a new operational doctrine was formulated. This study is intended to

present a critical documented record of that important event in late-20th

century American Army history. Treated are: its historical antecedents,

strategic context, study and formulation, finished results, propagation, and

the mechanics of the effort. This monograph is additionally intended to

provide, in its ideational detail, a case-study of the intellectual and institutional processes involved, for use by future doctrine planners.

I would like to thank General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., U.S. Army,

Ret,, principal author of the 1993 doctrine, and Colonel James R.

McDonough, former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies,

his chief doctrine writer, for the full interviews and document assistance

with which they both were more than generous. This study could hardly

have been completed without the further interviews granted and documents

furnished by numerous other key individuals, who included Maj. Gen.

Wesley K. Clark, General Franks' combat developments deputy; Brig. Gen.

Timothy J. Grogan and Brig. Gen. Lon E. Maggart, the TRADOC doctrine
PREFACE

deputies; Colonel Ricky Rowlett who headed the FM 100-5 writing team;

Colonel Fred Berry, Army doctrine director; and Lt. Col. Bobby McCarter,

the chief action officer in the doctrine office throughout the period, and his

assistant Capt. Michael Whetston. My thanks as well to Ms. Fran Doyle,

Headquarters TRADOC Librarian, and Ms. Karen Lewis and Ms. Judith

McKimmey of the library for their valuable assistance. The skilled design,

layout, and camera-ready preparation of this book all owe to the highly

professional talents of Mr. Robert Beaman of the Fort Monroe Multimedia

Services Division. My thanks also to the chief of that division, Mr. Will

Moffett, for his support, and to Mrs. Diane Johnson of the Directorate of

Information Management for her most efficient publication processing.

In the Military History Office, I wish especially to thank the former

TRADOC Chief Historian, Dr. Henry O. Malone, Jr., who fully supported

the assignment and development of this study. My thanks also to his successor, Dr. James T Stensvaag for schedule adjustments permitting the

history's completion, and to my colleagues Dr. Susan Canedy whose efficient processing made important documents accessible, Dr. Charles H.

Cureton for illustrations advice, and Dr. Anne W. Chapman for bearing

many office research burdens while I was completing the manuscript. It

has been my special privilege to prepare this record of the Army's postCold War doctrinal shift, for the armed service with which I have been

associated most of my professional life and whose post-Vietnam reform

and resolute readiness were an important factor in the winning of the Cold

War. I wish also to thank my wife, Inge, for her full support. The author

assumes all responsibility for what appears in the following pages, including any errors of omission or commission.

JOHN L. ROMJUE

Fort Monroe, Virginia, April 1996
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
INTRODUCTION

A new order ofpower was evolving

in the early 1990s thatforcedArmy planners

to a basic doctrinal reformulation.

Between August 1991 and June 1993, the United States Army

formulated and published a fighting doctrine recast to fit the power demands

of a new strategic world. The Army's earlier "AirLand Battle" doctrine,

first issued in 1982, had provided a central element of the NATO deterrent

through the 1980s against the threat posed by the Soviet-dominated Warsaw

Pact. That doctrine had also furnished the war-winning operational

maneuver in the GulfWar ofJanuary-February 1991. A new order of power

was evolving, however, in the early 1990s that forced Army planners to a

basic doctrinal reformulation.

The new power-order arose from the world-changing historical

events of 1989-1991. In rapid succession in those years occurred the Revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the ensuing collapse of communism, the treaty reduction of military conventional

force levels in Europe, and the end of the Warsaw Pact. Thereon followed
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

the political disintegration of the Soviet Union and, with it, the termination

of Soviet Russian sponsorship of worldwide socialist revolution. Accompanying that historic train of events was the U.S.-led defeat by United Nations forces ofthe hegemonic move ofIraq upon the emirate of Kuwait that

had threatened the globe-dependent Persian Gulf oil supply. Profoundly

altering the bipolar world in place since the first power moves by the Soviet

Union at the close ofthe Second World War, the events of 1989-1991 spelled

the end of the Cold War.

The strategic ramifications of the new power constellation were of

first-order consequence. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the reduction and withdrawal of significant U.S. and former-Soviet forces from Central Europe. A smaller U.S. Army emerged in the early 1990s, structured

primarily as a United States-based power projection force newly focused to

support national military policy throughout the globe. In addition, out of

the 1990-1991 Gulf War came the suggestion of a new technological face

of war. Resting on radically altered security assumptions, those developments signified a new strategic world which demanded, for the Army, a

revised and broader doctrine by which American land forces could respond

to the global and diverse military tasks assigned to them.

The task ofrevising Army doctrine, together with much ofthe Army

component ofjoint-service doctrine, was the mission responsibility of the

Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, the major command headquarters established at Fort Monroe, Virginia in 1973 as the Army's trainer

and overall developer for doctrine, force design, and weapon requirements.

How TRADOC developed the Army's first post-Cold War doctrine is the

subject of this study.

In a profound sense, the effort to define fundamental Army doctrine for the new strategic world was the redefining of the Army itself. That

2
INTRODUCTION

was the conscious aim of Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan,

who assumed the Army's leadership post in June 1991. Sullivan's early

directive to TRADOC was to develop doctrine as the "engine of change" in

an effort that would be both "process and product." Sullivan charged

TRADOC to lead the Army through the intellectual change required in the

altered circumstances of the early 1990s.

For the new chief ofstaff, the Army was doctrine-based, and Sullivan

hand-picked as TRADOC commander the Army general he wanted to carry

out the task, Lt. Gen. Frederick M. Franks, Jr., commander of the VII Corps

in the Persian Gulf War. Franks assumed TRADOC command in August

1991. The primary author of the distinctive ideas of the new doctrine published in June 1993, Franks made the project his premier concern, producing a new fundamental body of doctrine that situated the U.S. Army firmly

in the changed strategic world.

What were the questions and issues revolving around the rapid

replacement, less than two years after its resounding success in the desert

war, of the Army's recognized and successful fighting doctrine—the well

known AirLand Battle? Why was a new doctrine needed, and what was its

focus in the new international world?

Many other questions posed themselves. What were the germane

lessons and indications of the GulfWar and recent U.S. and United Nations

operations at political and ethnic flashpoints around the globe? In the cumulative doctrinal experience of the American Army, what was permanent

and what was changing? Further, what was the mechanism of the process

itself? How did the Army at large view the need to revise, and how did it

view the result?

Still other important questions may be asked. Did the new doctrine

issued in 1993 decisively shape the U.S. Army of the 1990s as intended,

3
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

and how was it implemented? To what extent was it the yeast of further

significant change? We will examine these several questions after turning

briefly to a discussion of the roots of American Army doctrine and the antecedent developments leading to the U.S. Army's recasting ofits key battle

doctrine to fit the realities of the post-Cold War world.
CHAPTER

ARMY DOCTRINE AND

THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

Not only the history and heritage of

the United States Army but its way offighting bound it

together as an institution and profession. In the

maxim ofBritish military theorist J.F.C. Fuller,

doctrine was the "central idea" that at a given time,

as affected by strategic circumstance, actuated an army.

Though oriented to a new strategic world, the 1993 doctrine of the

United States Army had roots in the doctrinal past. Its direct and close

antecedent was the 1980s AirLand Battle doctrine so recently and successfully demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. But it also traced back to

earlier military principles and experience. The 1993 doctrine grew in addition out ofthe greatly altered strategic position and assumptions ofthe United

States that followed from the political events of 1989-1991. Those unfolding changes had inspired a preliminary start on a revision in the summer of

1990 under General Franks' predecessor at TRADOC headquarters, General John W. Foss. General Foss had at the same time pressed his staff to

the development of a mid-future AirLand Operations concept. While

TRADOC supporting actions to the U.S. and United Nations force buildup

to counter the August 1990 Iraqi seizure of Kuwait forced the interruption

of the the FM 100-5 revision, coordination of the mid-future concept went

forward. The 1991 Persian Gulf War would significantly alter U.S. Army

doctrinal thinking. We will briefly examine in this chapter the structure of

doctrine and its American evolution, together with the doctrinal background

and late influencing events and studies that led first to a preliminary start

and then to a reactivated project during 1991-1993 to revise the Army's key

war fighting doctrine.
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Doctrine and Its Levels

Any study of war demonstrates that while there is in warfare no

one system—there is indisputably system. Truisms of military experience

tell us that although every battle is unique, warfare is governed always by

select methods and principles. Yet warfare in any age is various and constantly subject to change. System and enduring principles—but also variety and new concepts—characterize the agreed body ofthought about military operations that at any given time in an army is called doctrine.

Not "doctrine," but strategy and tactics, were traditionally the nomenclature and focus familiar to military commanders. Divisible into three

parts, strategy since Napoleonic times had commonly been seen to consist,

in its first element, of grand strategy—integrating political objectives with

military means to determine broad war plans. Below that level, strategy

proper denoted the concentration and movement of armies and navies.

Lastly, grand tactics described the maneuver of armies to create the conditions for battle.1 However, strategy—though it was an important element

of the instruction of senior officers at higher levels—lay beyond the usual

reach of U.S. Army war fighting instruction in the branch schools and at the

Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The common purview of most Army doctrinal teaching and writing was

tactics and their derivative techniques and procedures. Tactics were the

focus of the Army's key doctrinal text, Operations, in its successive field

service regulations and field manual editions down to the final two decades

of the 20th century.

Missing from broad Army doctrine during most of the century was

the grand-tactical or operational level—the planning and execution of

campaigns by which to move and concentrate large units to create the

conditions of battle. American Army Expeditionary Forces in World War I

were locked in a largely immobile front until the end of hostilities and had

scarce occasion to employ a concept of operational campaign. Command

and general staff instruction in the 1920s and 1930s did treat large-unit

operations in some degree. The Leavenworth school instruction recognized

three levels: conduct of war (today's strategy), strategy (today's operations),

and tactics. The Leavenworth teaching of the operational level mirrored

the doctrine work at the Army War College of Lt. Col. Charles Andrew

Willoughby, whose text, Maneuver in War, appeared in 1935 and 1939.

1. As presented in Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana and

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 54-55.
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

Willoughby would serve as a general officer on the staff of General Douglas

MacArthur in the Pacific.2 World War II in its global reach was replete

with examples of large-unit operational maneuver and campaign, from

MacArthur's island-hopping to General George Patton's eastward

dispositions into the heart of Europe.

However, large-unit operational experience together with any integrated teaching of it would fade after 1945. Partially responsible was the

segmenting of service roles that resulted from the 1947 National Security

Act's establishment of separate service departments, followed by establishment of a new Department of Defense in 1949. At the same time, the

Unified Command Plan of 1948 and its subsequent editions placed the conduct of theater operations by land, naval, and air forces under regional unified commanders. For the Army, the effect of those changes was to focus it

away from planning and conducting campaigns—activities subsequently

termed officially, the operational level of war—to a tactical orientation. In

the American wars of the 1950s and 1960s, national strategy and theater

topography foreclosed most open warfare and operational maneuver. The

Korean and Vietnam Wars were fought, with notable exceptions including

the Inchon landing and the 1970 incursion into Cambodia, almost wholly at

the tactical level.3 The tactical ceiling for broad Army doctrine prevailed in

NATO Europe as well. NATO defensive linear strategy, resting upon insistent West German disinclination to trade land for maneuver, imposed a tactical doctrine without a vision of large-unit operational campaign. That

was the case until the final period of the Cold War. What was needed was

a re-recognition of, and focus upon, the critical level of operational art.

In 1982, that re-recognition took place in the edition of Operations

written by TRADOC and published that year. The 1982 edition added, to

the tactical focus, war's operational level. Tactical doctrine acquired thereby

a wider and deeper visualization for reader-commanders of Operations.

Echoing traditional grand tactics and already recognized in 20th century

German and Soviet Army doctrine, the operational level was for the first

2. The Principles of Strategy for an independent Corps orArmy in a Theater of Operations, Command and

General Staff School, 1935-1936 (reprint by the Art of War Colloquium, Army War College, July 1983). (2)

Charles Andrew Willoughby, LtCol, USA, Maneuver in War (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing

Co., 1939), reprint by the Art of War Colloquium, Army War College, November 1983.

3. Lt Col Clayton R. Newell, U.S. Army Ret., "On Operational Art," in On Operational Art, Newell and

Michael D. Krause, general editors (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army 1994), pp. 10-13.
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

time named in the key doctrinal manual of the U.S. Army.4In addition, the

manual of 1982 and the 1976 edition immediately preceding it stirred a

new and wide Army interest in doctrine, raising it to a new level of

prominence.5

Because of its new prominence and broader vision, doctrine in the

U.S. Army had thus acquired by the early 1980s a connotation beyond its

encompassing generic meaning. Army doctrine connoted, at its heart and

center, the operational level and vision of war—the operational art. That

expansion of its Operations doctrine by the U.S. Army into the realm of

corps and larger units lifted the vision of commanders from the tactical

battle alone to the battle's context and larger purpose: the campaign. In

1993, fundamental Army doctrine was further broadened when it was extended and linked to the strategic level of war.

Army doctrine in the late 20th century additionally extended in

lateral directions. Cooperative Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps studyventures produced multiservice doctrinal manuals and other publications

that presented single-volume, agreed doctrine in relatable fields such as

low intensity conflict.6 Beginning in the mid-1980s and as a result of

concerted joint-service doctrinal and other developmental efforts arising

from passage ofthe Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,

a program to produce a series ofjoint doctrine manuals additionally began.

In that program, TRADOC and its subordinate centers and schools were

assigned authorship of many of the manuals for which the Army had

responsibility. Thus, while Department of the Army, TRADOC-written

4. The operational level was added in the 1982 doctrinal manual by General Glenn K. Otis, then TRADOC

commander, as advocated by Brig. Gen. Donald R. Morelli, the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine.

(1) John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development ofArmy Doctrine, 1973-1982

(TRADOC Historical Monograph Series), hereafter AirLand Battle (Ft. Monroe, Va.: Historical Office, Headquarters TRADOC, 1984), p. 61. (2) Interview of Brig. Gen. Donald R. Morelli by John L. Romjue, Historical

Office, HQ TRADOC, 12 Jan 83. See the several essays in On OperationalArt, Newell and Krause, gen. eds.,

for discussions of aspects of the operational level of war. In that volume, Professor James J. Schneider,

'Theoretical Implications of Operational Art," offers an interesting distinction between Napoleonic concentrated maneuver and "distributed free maneuver" introduced into the new warfare of the industrial age in the

American Civil War by the greatly expanded military requirement to protect national economic resources.

Colonel Richard M. Swain, "Reading About. Operational Art," provides an annotated bibliography on the subject.

5. See Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition

of FM 100-5 (Leavenworth Papers No. 10), hereafter: DePuy (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: USACGSC Combat

Studies Institute, 1988) for a discussion of the development of that manual. Romjue, AirLand Battle describes

the doctrinal debate of the period and the formulation of the Army's 1980s AirLand Battle doctrine.

6. FM 100-20/AF Pam 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters

Departments of the Army and Air Foce, 5 Dec 90).
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

Army field manuals (with FM 100-5, Operations, as the keystone) remained

the basis ofArmy doctrine, selected multiservice doctrinal manuals were in

use, together with a burgeoning, comprehensive body ofjoint doctrinal texts,

the first of which were appearing by the early 1990s.7

Beyond the multiservice and joint doctrinal programs stood the related individual doctrine-writing programs ofthe other armed services. Each

of the services fielded, in the mid-1990s, an Operations equivalent, oriented to its respective physical purview—air, sea, and littoral. The successive editions of Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine for the

United States Air Force, stressed technological preeminence and dominant

airpower in its basic missions of strategic power projection, counterair and

counterspace operations, and close air support of ground forces.8

By contrast, the Navy had not formally stated its operational doctrine

in recent years and traditionally had no such doctrine as commonly

understood.9 U.S. Navy orientation through the end ofthe Cold War was to

the strategic maritime role and the applicable tactics of sea battle. But with

the demise of the Soviet Union and Soviet naval threat came a fundamental

shift of U.S. Naval strategy from open-ocean war fighting on the sea toward

naval operations conducted from the sea in support of land forces. Naval

Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, published in March 1994, stated

and symbolized a new orientation to the joint doctrinal realm of sea-airland force action.10

7. For a brief summary of Army doctrinal activities in the joint-service realm, see John L. Romjue, Susan

Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman, Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and

Doctrine Command, 1973-1993 (Ft. Monroe, Va.: Office of the Command Historian, Headquarters TRADOC,

1993), pp. 65-73.

8. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine for the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters

U.S. Air Force, March 1992). The four Air Force categories spelled out in AFM 1-1 were: aerospace control

(counterair and counterspace operations); force application (strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support); force enhancement (airlift air refueling, electronic combat, surveillance, and reconnaissance); and

force support (base operability and logistics). Air Force doctrine in the early 1990s was strongly influenced by

a strategic planning framework published in June 1990, Global Reach-Global Power.

9. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA Ret., The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's

Future (New York: Touchstone, 1995), p. 115.

10. (1) Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 28 March 1994). The term "doctrine" was bannered

prominently on the flyleaf. (2) Lt Cdr William J. Toti, "Sea- Air-Land Doctrine," Naval Institute Proceedings,

September 1992, pp. 70-74. Informing the Navy's post-Cold War doctrinal shift was the Navy-Marine Corps

September 1992 White Paper, From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Services for the 21st Century. In March

1993 the Navy established a new Naval Doctrine Command at its Norfolk, Va. naval base, expressly choosing

that location for its proximity to the Army Training and Doctrine Command. (Information from marginal note by

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. on review ms.)
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Naval Warfare was a co-publication of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps and, as such, the co-doctrine of the sea services. But the Marine

Corps as an amphibious land force had been active earlier in the doctrine

realm. Cooperative Army-Marine Corps efforts between TRADOC and

the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia

had produced multiservice doctrine manuals and other products. In land

operations doctrine and in much of its armament, the Marine Corps followed the Army lead. Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, Warfighting, provided

Marine fundamental service doctrine.11

Doctrine and the American Army

Not only the history and heritage of the United States Army but its

way of fighting bound it together as an institution and profession. In the

maxim of British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller, doctrine was the "central

idea" that at a given time, as affected by strategic circumstance, actuated an

army. Doctrine provided guides, methods, and agreed-on concepts. It furnished a framework of combat and a common language and understanding.

Doctrine was also what was officially approved for instruction. It additionally influenced the design of organizations and forces and the development

of weapons.

The historical evolution of American Army doctrine in the broad

reach of its tactical elements is beyond the scope of this discussion. We

may only note that evolution here in brief summary. Army tactical doctrine

had developed early on as the adaptation of European war fighting tactics

and methods to the vastly different and varied physical conditions of the

North American continent. The specific requirements and conditions of

each ofthe wars in which the Americans were involved additionally shaped

evolving Army tactical doctrine. So, too, did the rapid technological and

weapon developments of the industrial age.

Doctrine would be further influenced from the close of the 19th

century on by the historical forces of the international world. Dominant

were the political currents of alliance and threat that the United States would

encounter and, as a world power, increasingly direct and confront in the

20th century. From the tactics ofmoving and maneuvering organized bodies

of infantry supported by cavalry and artillery, doctrine was revolutionized

by the new universals of warfare, which this section can only touch upon.

Foremost among them were the developments in mechanized, armored,

11. FMFM 1, Warfighting (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 6 March 1989).

10
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

artillery, aerial, airmobile, communications, and information technology.12

We will note here briefly how basic American doctrine was

promulgated historically. Army doctrine texts traced their first American

origins to the Blue Book of General George Washington's Prussian volunteer

aide and inspector general, Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, the professional

trainer of the Continental Army. Von Steuben's Regulationsfor the Order

and Discipline ofthe Troops ofthe United States prepared American troops

to face British regulars and remained in force into the early 19th century.

No official doctrine literature system in the modern sense existed

until the early 20th century. For the American Army, the dominant influence on 19th century tactical thinking came from writings derived from the

experience ofthe Napoleonic Wars. Primary in influence were the writings

of Major General Antoine Henri Jomini, whose Precis de I 'Art de la Guerre

was published in 1838. Jomini's intent was a systematic search for principles in Napoleon's mastery of battle and campaign. Jomini's work not

only became the chief French interpretation of Napoleonic warfare. It also

inspired the school of 19th century American military literature. The influence of the preeminent doctrinal theorist Carl von Clausewitz did not reach

the American Army until late in the 19th century, when his work, Vom Kriege

was first translated into English in 1873.13 On War was to have renewed

impact on U.S. Army doctrine one hundred years later.

Influential for Civil War tactics, North and South, was a translator

of Jomini, Henry W. Halleck, later general in chief and chief of staff of the

Union armies. Halleck's Elements ofMilitary Art and Science, published

in 1846 and thence further updated, was the first comprehensive study of

the military art by an American author.14Strongly influenced by Jomini

was West Point professor Dennis Hart Mahan, the author of a comprehensive

work on tactics and strategy first published in 1847. Mahan's An Elementary

12. For discussions of U.S. Army tactical developments, see Russell F. Weigley, A History of the United

States Army (enlarged edition) (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984). The same author's The

American Way of War: a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing

Co., Inc., 1973) treats the evolution of American strategic thought. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 provides a cogent overview of changes in tactical doctrine from the end of World War

II to the advent of the renaissance in doctrine introduced by promulgation of the Active Defense doctrine of

1976. That development and its paternity are described in Herbert, DePuy. The doctrinal debate and development of AirLand Battle doctrine are discussed in Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle,

13. (1) Weigley, History of the United States Army pp. 148, 273. (2) Weigley, The American Way of War,

pp. 210-11.

14. Dictionary of American Military Biography, ed. Roger J. Spiller (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,

1984), Vol. II, pp. 421-25.

11
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Treatise etc. together with Halleck's work laid the foundation ofAmerican

professional military literature.15 The primary tactical manual of the Civil

War was Rifle and LightInfantry Tactics, published in the 1850s by William

Joseph Hardee, later a commander of cadets at West Point and Confederate

general. Another manual, Infantry Tactics, was prepared by Union Brig.

Gen. Silas Casey in 1862 to avoid the embarassment of having to use

Hardee's book, but raising the tactical scope from battalion to brigade-level

and higher.16

Other privately authored textbooks followed in the late 19th century,

the work of proteges of William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding general

between 1869-1883. Developer ofthe General Service and Staff College at

Fort Leavenworth and a founder ofthe Army War College, Arthur L. Wagner

published a tactics study, Organization and Tactics, in 1895. John Bigelow's

textbook, Principles of Strategy, and his campaign writings were

influential.17 Branch journals came to prominence in the 1880s and 1890s,

their contributions acting to cross-fertilize the tactical ideas and studies of

the rising Army school system. Emory Upton, Civil War tactician and the

most prominent and influential military intellectual of the late 19th century

American Army, developed tactical concepts from his studies, including

innovative skirmish tactics, but was best known for his reform treatise, The

Military Policy ofthe United States. Upton's work fathered the ideas of a

modern general staff and a system of military schools.18

An important departure was a set of three tactical manuals, for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, developed by a Fort Leavenworth board, which

were authorized by Secretary of War William C. Endicott and approved by

Commanding General of the Army Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield in 1891.

The Leavenworth manuals were the Army's first official and true manuals

15. Ibid., pp. 714-17. Mahan's 1847 work, his most important, was An Elementary Treatise on Advanced

Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in

Presence of an Enemy, With a Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of Tactics, etc.

16. Ibid, pp. 441-44; Vol. I, pp. 160-64.

17. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 27A.

18. Ibid., pp. 275-80. It is interesting to note that Upton did much of his theoretical writing while serving at

Fort Monroe, Virginia as Artillery School superintendent between 1877-1880. He completed his famous trip

report for General Sherman, The Armies ofAsia and Europe, published in 1878, and a major portion of The

Military Policy of the United States, published posthumously by the War Department in 1904. Richard P.

Weinert, Jr. and Colonel Robert Arthur, Defenderofthe Chesapeake: The Story ofFort Monroe (Shippensburg,

Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co., Inc., 1989), pp. 166, 168.

12
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

of tactics that transcended drill and the movement of formations to actually

instruct troops how to fight. Infantry Drill Regulations of 1891 introduced

extended-order tactics and new organizations below the level of company,

including platoons and squads.19

Emory Upton's ideas were carried out under Secretary ofWar Elihu

Root during 1901-1903, establishing the first high-level coordinating

agency—the War Department staff—for creation, development, and control of doctrine. The Root reforms also established a coherent system for

the Army's service schools, thereafter primary sources of branch and applied tactical doctrine. The first Field Service Regulations—the first official manual of general doctrine—was published by the War Department in

1905, appearing in frequent successive editions to incorporate the lessons

of the Great War of 1914-1918, and continuing into the 1920s.20

Significant also was the first listing and elaboration of "Principles

of War," which appeared in War Department Training Regulations No. 10-

5 of 1921. The nine-item list included all the current Principles—Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity, with Movement and Cooperation as forerunners of the current Maneuver and Unity of Command, respectively. The Principles came from the

work of British Major General and 20th century theoretician J.F.C. Fuller,

who had developed them during World War I.21 Influential in the interwar

period was Colonel George C. Marshall's handbook of World War case

studies, Infantry in Battle, published in the 1930s. That work disparaged

the idea of rigid system in doctrine, stating "The art of war has no traffic

with rules....in battle, each situation is unique." But Marshall's examples

did admit of Principles, illustrating among others, simplicity and surprise.22

The Army's key manual of tactical doctrine was retitled in 1930

Manualfor Commanders ofLarge Units (Provisional), Vol I, Operations.

In 1939, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations, FM 100-5, followed. Further editions of Field Service Regulations: FM 100-5 appeared

19. Perry D. Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa

and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1994), pp. 99-112.

20. (1) Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 313-25. (2) Military History Institute, Reference

Bibliography, US Army Basic Operational Doctrine, 1821-1986.

21. Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 213.

22. Infantry in Battle (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, Inc., 2d edition, 1939), reprinted by

USACGSC, p. 1.

13
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

in 1941 and 1944, embodying tactical lessons of the ongoing Second World

War. The succeeding 1949 Field Service Regulations codified the primary

tactical lesson of World War II: the requirement for integrated combined

arms operations. Subsequent editions of 1954, with changes, and 1962 reflected the firepower-heavy experience of the Korean War, the concepts of

the theoretical pentomic battlefield of the late 1950s, and the advent of the

flexible new ROAD divisions of the early 1960s. In 1968, the Field Service Regulations designator was dropped from FM 100-5 Operations beginning with the edition of that year, Operations ofArmy Forces in the

Field, which wrote into broad doctrine the airmobile, unconventional warfare, and other tactical experience of the Vietnam conflict.23

Each of the post-World War II editions of Operations updated the

previous doctrinal exposition with wartime lessons or with revisions based

on changes wrought by the introduction of new weapons and weapon systems, new war fighting concepts, or new strategic concerns. Though changes

in national security policy always underlay the changes in doctrine, Operations was almost wholly tactically focused until the advent ofthe AirLand

Battle editions of the 1980s. In the postwar series, the 1976 manual, succeeding that of 1968, stood out, both for its inauguration of an Army-wide

debate of doctrine but also for its explicit orientation to the critical major

theater, NATO Europe.24 The ensuing doctrinal debate of the late 1970s

and early 1980s led to the more flexible and initiative-oriented, deep attack

doctrine of AirLand Battle, to be discussed below.

Issuing from the Army colleges and service schools and the War

Department General Staff, doctrine fell to the major responsibility of major

subordinate headquarters when the War Department first established

functional major commands in 1942. Headquarters Army Ground Forces,

organized in March of that year, was assigned doctrinal responsibilities,

which it retained upon relocation from Washington, D.C. to Fort Monroe,

Virginia in 1946. That mission continued when the Army Ground Forces

was redesignated Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) in March

23. (1) See Doughty, Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine for discussions of post-World War II tactical

thinking and developments. (2) Military History Institute Reference Bibliography, US Army Basic Operational

Doctrine, 1921-1986.

24. See Herbert, DePuy, for an account of the formulation of the NATO-centered Active Defense doctrine.

See also William E. DePuy, Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, U.S. Army,

Retired, interview by Lt Col Romie L. Brownlee and Lt Col William J. Mullen III (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S.

Army Military History Institute); and Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, compiled by Colonel Richard M. Swain, edited by Donald L Gilmore and Carolyn D. Conway (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies

Institute, USACGSC, 1994).

14
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

'V^SSiJüt.'"'"''"

m-A59*JL ä^*1^

:

*' i'-"-a;'^Ä- - %j^rtfc7':t

'''^^

Fort Monroe, Virginia, Headquarters Army Training and Doctrine Command

1948. When OCAFF was in turn reorganized to command the numbered

Army regions in the United States and redesignated Headquarters

Continental Army Command (CONARC) in February 1955, doctrine

responsibilities passed to that headquarters, as retitled U.S. Continental Army

Command in January 1957. The development of doctrine merged

increasingly into the Army's new mission of combat developments under

OCAFF and CONARC in the 1950s. Doctrine fell to the province of a new

major headquarters, the Combat Developments Command, situated at Fort

Belvoir, Virginia, between 1962-1973. But in July 1973, that command

and CONARC were disestablished, and TRADOC was organized to reunite

again the Army's combat developments-doctrine and individual training

missions, which had been bureaucratically split between CONARC and the

Combat Developments Command in the preceding 11-year interim with

problematic results. Established with TRADOC in 1973 was the new Forces

Command, which assumed the CONARC mission of command and

readiness of corps and divisions in the continental United States.25

25. See Jean R. Moenk, A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United

States, 1919-1972 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Historical Office, Headquarters CONARC, 1972), pp. 22-55, for a summary of major Army command missions from the close of World War II to the 1973 major Army headquarters

reorganization.

15
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

AirLand Battle Doctrine

The broad doctrine in force between 1982 and 1993, AirLand Battle

was the American Army doctrine of the final period of the Cold War. One

of the most significant intellectual developments in the history of the U.S.

Army, AirLand Battle had provided, to a dispirited profession returning

from the United States' strategic defeat in Southeast Asia, a credible and

initiative-oriented war winning doctrine to confront a menacing Soviet threat

to the Western Alliance.26 With that recast doctrine, the Army reassumed an

explicitly offense-oriented readiness posture that compelled Soviet political and military leaders to the realization that, should they move on NATO,

their armies could and would be attacked at great depth by Air Force and

Army systems. The historic, generational modernization of U.S. Army

weaponry that took place in the late-1970s to mid-1980s was an earnest of

that doctrinal intent.27

AirLand Battle had grown out of a vigorous debate and rethinking

of fundamental Army doctrine between 1977-1981. The debate focused on

the Europe-centered 1976 Operations manual and the so-called "Active

Defense" doctrine it presented, the work ofTRADOC commander General

William E. DePuy. Recognizing the advent in the 1970s of a new order of

weapon lethality, that doctrine emphasized heavy firepower, concentration

tactics, and exacting training to enable U.S. units to wear down the

numerically superior Warsaw Pact echelons. Critics, however, soon

appeared. Asserting that the 1976 doctrine overemphasized firepower and

the defense, allowed for inadequate reserves, and slighted maneuver, they

found that the Active Defense was far too dependent on high-risk

concentration tactics and too closely tied to the single Soviet operational

maneuver of massive breakthrough on a narrow front. Those criticisms

stirred an internal and external debate that led to new thinking. Out of the

debate came the distinguishing ideas of a new operational view and tactics

of battle tagged AirLand Battle in the FM 100-5 of August 1982.28 The

26. This theme is developed in Romjue, AirLand Battle.

27. The deterrent effect of AirLand Battle was noted by former TRADOC commander and a principal developer of the 1982 doctrine, General (Ret) William R. Richardson: Interview, Richardson by John L. Romjue,

Office of the Command Historian, Bethesda, Md., 24 Feb 93. Concerning the "decade of modernization and

reform," see Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (hereafter. Army of

Excellence (Fort Monroe, Va.: Office of the Command Historian, HQ TRADOC, 1993), pp. 2-4, 126-27.

28. Romjue, AirLand Battle, pp. 13-21, presents a documented digest of the debate.

16
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

General William E. DePuy

1982 doctrine introduced a deeper view of the battlefield.29 It aimed not

only at hitting the enemy's attacking force but also simultaneously striking

his follow-on echelons to delay and disrupt their arrival into the main battle.

AirLand Battle thus confronted the central operational dilemma the NATO

armies faced: a numerically far superior and technologically advanced

29. The deep-battlefield thinking of the TRADOC commander, General Donn A. Starry, had important origins in Starry's consultations in 1977 with Mr. Joe Braddock of the U.S. defense firm Braddock, Dunn, and

McDonald, whose nuclear deep-targeting studies for the Defense Nuclear Agency suggested similar conventional application, once properly-ranged conventional weaponry became available. Closely associated with

BDM in an advisory capacity was the British historian of Red Army and Soviet Army operations, Prof. John

Erickson, whose studies of Soviet deep battle and operational penetration theory influenced this U.S. Army doctrinal

development. (1) Interview of General Donn A. Starry by John L Romjue, 19 Mar 93, Fairfax Station, Va. (2)

Memorandum for Record ATMH, TRADOC Military History Office, 1 Apr 96, subj: Deep Battle/AirLand Battle.

17
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

General Donn A. Starry

Soviet/Warsaw Pact front. Though focused on Central Europe, AirLand

Battle doctrine took cognizance of U.S. global contingencies.

Related deep battle studies worked out the requirements of operations on an integrated conventional-nuclear-chemical battlefield, and it integrated air-land operations. A broader vision was constructed that extended

beyond the physical dimension of battle to the human and moral dimensions of combat. Emphasizing maneuver and the fundamentals of war,

TRADOC doctrine writers under DePuy's successor General Donn A. Starry

and his deputy commander at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at

Fort Leavenworth, Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, distilled fundamentals into tenets of depth, initiative, agility, and synchronization as

the heart of AirLand Battle doctrine. The basic idea, applicable to offense

18
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

General William R. Richardson

and defense, was to throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow

from an unexpected direction and to seize and retain the initiative and exercise it aggressively to defeat the enemy force.

Other significant ideas included adoption ofthe German Army concept ofAuftragstaktik: the inculcation in battle leaders of the ability to act

independently as exigency required based on thorough training and a clear

understanding of their commander's intent. Also of highest importance

was AirLand Battle's new delineation ofthe levels of war—the inclusion of

the operational level between the strategic and tactical. That inclusion clarified, for tactical and operational commanders alike, the campaign aim to

which the tactical battles were keyed.

While embedded in operational doctrine by the 1982 and 1986

19
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

"keystone" manuals, operational art in practice required a full joint-service

commitment and was conditional on a theater's specific strategic

circumstances and service structure. AirLand Battle and its NATO reflection

"Follow-on Forces Attack" presented a new operational vision in theater

terms. At the same time, U.S. Army corps in Europe were the elements of a

multinational force that necessarily was oriented to a strategic-linear

defensive vis-a-vis a very powerful Warsaw Pact adversary throughout most

ofthe 1980s. Within the multi-echeloned NATO structure, the Europe-based

corps were operationally oriented but tactically disposed, with joint-service

interaction not fully exploited at that level. Where a corps was contingencyfocused, as was the Stateside-based XVIII Airborne Corps, a strongerjoint,

campaign-plan environment might prevail. In the 1980s, practical experience

at the operational level lagged behind the theoretical.30

While correcting the deficiencies of the Active Defense doctrine

preceding, AirLand Battle retained its training strengths. It placed new

emphasis on the fundamentals and imperatives of combat and restored the

role of strong reserves. Significant was the stronger fusing of air and land

battle into closely concerted operations of air power and ground forces. In

1986, AirLand Battle was adjusted by General Richardson, by then

TRADOC commander, in a new FM 100-5 edition. The refinement expanded the idea of the operational level of war, put in better balance the

offense and defense, and highlighted the synchronization ofthe close-deeprear battles of the deep, extended battlefield.

Unlike the Active Defense doctrine of 1976, which had been written at Fort Monroe by General DePuy and selected commandants and staff,

AirLand Battle doctrine was written by a team in the Department ofTactics

at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth working

intimately with Starry and Richardson to translate and develop their ideas.

As noted, AirLand Battle was an element of the restoration of American

strategic perspective in the early 1980s. It provided the conceptual basis

for the force of the 1980s to mid-1990s, the "Army of Excellence" built

upon organizational designs developed during 1983-1984. Thus, it was the

Army doctrine of the final period of the Cold War and the actuating basis

30 These views draw upon observations of General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Ret.) in a letter to the author,

8 Apr 96. Maj Gen LD. Holder, Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in 1993, and earlier

an AirLand Battle doctrine writer, noted in 1993 that officer instruction in the operational art had remained

general and ill-defined in detail. Holder recommended theater campaign exercises and the re-creation of

large-scale theater exercises in command post scenarios employing well thought out, improved simulation.

(Holder, "Education and Training for Theater Warfare," On OperationalArt (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military

History, United States Army, 1993), pp. 171-87.

20
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

for the highly successful U.S. military operations carried out in Panama

and the Persian Gulf during 1989-1991.31

Revolution and War, 1989-1991

A watershed in modern history, the events of 1989-1991 in Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union transformed the political and military power

constellation of the world and ushered in a new strategic era. Within that

period, the United States fought a major regional war in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. Army doctrine, tied directly to American policy and military strategy,

underwent a significant shift as a result of those combined events. What

was the sequence and meaning of those occurrences, and why did they

trigger an important revision of doctrine?

In brief, the decline and collapse of Soviet power that ended the

Cold War owed to a combination of long range factors and more immediate

causes.32 The Soviet satellites' desire for national independence, the appeal

of the free market and democratic institutions, the information revolution,

and Western policies of containment and deterrence all were factors acting

to meet and precipitate the historic change. The Polish free-union Solidarity movement, the 1980s U.S. military buildup and matching of Soviet intermediate range SS-20 missile deployments, together with the challenge

of the Strategic Defense Initiative and an economic decline and crisis that

brought to the Soviet leadership a more flexible and reform-minded president, Mikhail Gorbachev, were the immediate causes. Those events and

policies created and set in motion a new Soviet openness to arms accommodation, resulting in agreement in 1987 to eliminate U.S. and Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe, and in 1989 to the opening of

talks to reduce conventional forces.

Against the stream of shifting political and ideological currents,

the persevering Solidarity movement forced the first free elections in Poland in June 1989, bringing to power a noncommunist government. The

defection of Poland from communism was soon followed by a growing

mass exodus of East German refugees to the West, toppling the communist

31. See Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, pp. 51-57 for a short digest of the

"doctrinal renaissance," which this account follows. Romjue, AirLand Battle, pp. 23-66 gives a documented

description of the evolution of AirLand Battle under General Starry's guidance by Headquarters TRADOC and

Combined Arms Center analysts and writers. The same author's Army of Excellence documents the design

and development of the organizations of the 1980s Army. Lieutenant Colonels Huba Wass de Czege and L.D.

Holder, assisted by Lt Col Richmond Henriques, were the primary doctrine writers of the 1982 manual.

32. See Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, pp. 115-23, for a summary of events.

21
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

regime ofthe East German state and, in November, opening the Berlin Wall

and intra-German border. Actions by democratizing forces in Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria ended communist rule in those

Soviet satellites by the end of December 1989. The breakup of communism in the six Warsaw Pact satellites led to the effective dissolution of the

pact (formalized in 1991), and the beginning dismantlement ofthe strategic

force line-up in Central Europe.

In 1990 followed further democratic parliamentary victories in the

Eastern European nations, the reunification of Germany under the free West

in October, and the signing of a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

in November, reducing and equalizing east-west forces. During 1990-1991,

democratic and free market reforms and mass demonstrations in the Soviet

Union led to the dismantlement and deconstitution of communist party authority and popular elections. In December 1991, the Soviet state structure

itself splintered into the autonomous nations of a Commonwealth of Independent States.

The collapse of communism and the breakup of the totalitarian superpower that was the ideological and military sponsor of worldwide revolution was a momentous turning point in 20th century history that recast

the world strategic picture. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe permitted reductions in NATO, leading to a one-third cut of U.S. Army

troop strength both in Europe and the United States, ultimately to a level of

under 500,000 by the mid-1990s. The geopolitical change impelled American policymakers to a shift in strategic orientatation for the Army—from

forward deployment and forward defense in Europe to a smaller Army projecting land power primarily from the continental United States. Secondary was the maintenance of a forward presence in smaller contingents of

forward deployed forces in Europe, Korea, and elsewhere. The focus of

the new U.S. strategic outlook was no longer an overriding Soviet threat,

but a range of less ominous regional security threats and problems.

In the major strategic shift precipitated by the events of 1989-1991,

significant implications for Army doctrine and force structure were apparent. Down the road lay the prospect offorce design changes as well, changes

that had further implications for training and equipment requirements.33

In the midst of the democratic revolution and power shift in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union occurred crises in Panama and the Persian

Gulf. Both those conflicts would significantly affect the development of

Army doctrine. Operation Just Cause, involving U.S. Southern Command

33. Ibid.

22
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

and military units deployed from the United States, secured the overthrow

and capture of the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and installment of

a legally elected government. That action of December 1989-January 1990

had particular influence on subsequent joint service war fighting and simultaneous-attack doctrinal notions.

Operation Desert Shield followed from the invasion and annexation by Iraq of Kuwait in August 1990 and the major regional security

threat to world oil supply that that aggression portended. The subsequent

U.S. and United Nations buildup eventuated in Operation Desert Storm of

January-February 1991. In that operation, prepared by an intensive and

destructive air force and naval air campaign, 2 U.S. Army corps and 7 divisions and 2 Marine divisions transported from the United States and Germany, together with NATO, Arab, and other U.N. allies, defeated and expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The major deployment and conflict would

have profound impact on subsequent doctrinal thinking.34

AirLand Operations

Conceptual work by TRADOC toward a doctrine for the mid-1990s

had preceded the revolutionary events of 1989-1991. As the architect by

mission of the Army's future, planners in TRADOC were of necessity focused on concepts and ideas for future doctrine, weapon needs, and force

design. The periodic revision of doctrine drew on that evolving body of

conceptual work, which continued after new doctrine was published. Thus,

much conceptual activity preceded the formulation and writing ofthe Army's

post-Cold War doctrine.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, TRADOC planners had worked

with an overall concept for future doctrine. In 1986 they had settled on an

"architecture of the future" approach, the main element of which was an

evolutionary concept looking to a mid-future point 15 years ahead. The

34. For documented surveys of U.S. Army actions in the Persian Gulf War, see: (1) Brig Gen Robert H.

Scales, Jr., Lt Col Terry L. Johnson, and Maj Thomas P. Odom, Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf

War (Washington, D.C.: Office Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993). (2) Richard M. Swain, "Lucky War": Third

Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, n.d.

[1995]. (3) Susan Canedy et. al., TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study (Fort Monroe, Va.: Office of the Command Historian, Headquarters TRADOC, 1992) offers a

sketch of TRADOCs role. See pp. 1 -9 for a brief description of the invasion and response. (4) For a strategic

and operational analysis of the Gulf War, see Col Harry Summers, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, On Strategy II: A

Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992). Colonel Summers' study also dealt with the psychological recovery and doctrinal renaissance of the military services following Vietnam, through their respective

development of new strategic and operational doctrine.

23
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

thrust of the project was a set of continuing studies titled AirLand BattleFuture. Begun in 1987, those studies had subsequently divided into two

parallel efforts. One was an "umbrella" concept applicable worldwide. The

other was a "heavy" concept focused on NATO Europe.35

The strategic and political changes of 1989 and the ensuing period

significantly altered the future doctrine and force structure picture. The

reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces signalled the end of the continuous operational-strategic front presented by the NATO armies against

the long standing eastern threat. With the thinning-out and eventual disappearance of the strong-echeloned attack-ready Warsaw Pact armies opposite, the doctrinal stance shifted upon the assumption of an open, nonlinear

front. Though the heavy concept of AirLand Battle-Future was rendered

obsolete by that change, the umbrella concept, approved by the Chief of

Staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono, in August 1989, provided a fortuitous future plan. Focused on destroying the enemy force rather than

holding land, it fit the strategic forecast for Europe and, generically, for

worldwide application.

In TRADOC workshops, map exercises, and other meetings

sponsored by the TRADOC commander General John W. Foss during 1990

and early 1991, futures planning centered on the requirements of a nonlinear

battlefield featuring greater mobility and employing farther-ranging weapon

and intelligence systems. Those systems included two potentially

revolutionary capabilities that were entering the Army's doctrinal inventory.

The first ofthose was the ability to know, through intelligence means, where

the enemy was almost all the time. The second was the capability to engage

him with ground-based systems at long range with very accurate and lethal

fires. Such late-1980s generational breakthroughs as the Joint Surveillance

Target Attack Radar System, or JSTARS, and the Army Tactical Missile

System, or ATACMS, thus extended the battlefield to much deeper

dimensions. The advent of those systems would permit initial attack of

enemy formations by long range fires, followed by rapidly moving combined

arms teams.

Many tactical, logistical, and organizational ideas followed from

the AirLand Battle-Future concepts. They included divisions "unweighted"

by the shift of their support elements to brigade and corps, and anticipatory

rather than reactive logistics. The concept both informed and was endorsed

35. This section is based on documented accounts in TRADOC Annual Command Histories (ACH), FY 90,

pp. 27-36; FY 91, pp. 54- 60. See also paper, The AirLand Operations Process, Vol. I—Overview and

Chronology, The Road to AirLand Operations, 1986-1991, by Robert L. Keller, Director, Force Design Directorate, CAC-CD, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. n.d.

24
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

General John W. Foss

by a White Paper issued by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl E.

Vuono, in January 1990. "The US Army: A Strategic Force" declared the

future Army to be a strategic force with a strategic view. As envisioned, the

force would in the 1990s shift to operate across the operational continuum

of war, conflict, and peacetime competition.36 Thus, the AirLand BattleFuture concept acted to join the operational level of war to the strategic

realm, an unprecedented departure in Army concept development.

A four-part cycle of detection characterized the concept. Detection,

primarily by advanced sensor technology, was followed by long-range fires

36. Chief of Staff of the Army White Paper, The US Army: A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, Carl

E. Vuono, General, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, January 1990.

25
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

and aviation attack to set conditions for decisive operations. Those

operations featuring maneuver ensued, terminating in redispersal and

reconstitution. TRADOC planners believed AirLand Battle-Future had

worldwide application. They saw it as germane both to the more open

European battlefield theorized in the wake of the Warsaw Pact collapse,

and to the whole contingency world.

Late in 1990, as the force buildup was reaching its peak in the Persian Gulf, TRADOC became fully occupied with the training of reserve

component brigades, operating troop replacement centers, and activation

and training of individual ready reservists. With work on FM 100-5 revision set aside, the command continued to brief the mid-future concept to

commanders-in-chief in Korea, Hawaii, and Europe. In February 1991,

General Foss held extensive discussions with the Air Force Chief of Staff.

Those interchanges flowed into the mid-future concept thinking, as well as

into conceptual work with the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command.37

In March 1991, General Vuono endorsed a go-ahead with the concept as a vehicle to properly shape Army doctrine. But he noted the influence that Operation Desert Storm, the battles of which had ended just weeks

earlier, could be expected to have. Vuono ordered incorporation into the

concept of the Gulf War lessons and implications. Wide review by the

Army, its sister services, and U.S. allies led to adding into the concept an

increased emphasis on force projection and operations short of war. The

concept was published on 1 August 1991 as TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand

Operations: A Conceptforthe Evolution of AirLand Battleforthe Strategic

Army ofthe 1990s and Beyond?*

AirLand Operations presented the overarching idea of how Army

forces would operate in the future as a land component of air, land, and sea

power in joint, combined, and interagency operations. Co-signed by the

commander of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, it furnished a

basis for development ofjoint operational procedures and doctrine. As its

subtitle signalled, the concept was seen as a basis for continuation ofAirLand

Battle doctrine, though oriented to several new things. Those new focuses

were the full operational continuum, power projection on short notice, decisive U.S. technological advantage, a versatility to tailor force packages

37. Ltr, Foss to author, 8 Apr 96.

38. (1) Msg, HQ DA (General Vuono, CSA) to distr, 111237Z Mar 91, subj: Shaping the Army and AirLand

Battle-Future. (2) TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle

and the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond, 1 Aug 91. The publication repeated the number of the

significant and influential TRADOC Pam 525-5, The AirLand Battle and Corps 86, 25 Mar 81, which had

served as a major basis of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine published in 1982.

26
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

appropriate to the emerging situation, high lethality and quick action with

minimal casualties, and force expansibility. AirLand Operations envisioned

all Army action as part of a joint U.S. force and sometimes as part of a

combined command.

Preliminary Revision

As we have seen, the year 1989 introduced a new period of doctrinal ferment. The advancing concept of AirLand Battle-Future posited a

battle characterized by early, destructive deep fires on the enemy. The prospect of smaller armies and nonlinear combat opened up by the Conventional Forces in Europe talks and the political Revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, together with widening U.S. Army roles in the global contingency sphere—all were developments of first-order significance with major doctrinal implications. Assuming command of TRADOC in August

1989, General Foss had soon set about studies of nonlinearity as part of

the ongoing AirLand Battle-Future project. In January 1990, the Army

Chief of Staff had enunciated, as we have seen, the Army's role as a

strategic force.

In the spring of 1990, those events and concerns moved Foss and

his doctrinal planners at Headquarters TRADOC and in the School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS, in the Command and General Staff

College to put thought to the revision of key Army doctrine. Discussions

by General Foss with General Vuono about the scope of the next FM 100-5

edition brought agreement that it should focus, more strongly than before,

on the operational level of war as the level at which campaigns were designed and executed by a joint force of air, land, and sea commanders—the

chief interaction being air-land. The Chief of Staff supported doctrine's

proper linking to the strategic level, and affirmed the requirement to maintain close operational-tactical ties.39

A major preliminary issue was apparent. In the radically shifting

doctrinal picture, how much change should the revision attempt to embrace?

Just how far ahead should new doctrine try to reach? Headquarters planners

supported continuing the basic thrust of AirLand Battle, but they believed

it needed expansion in several areas. Those areas were: joint, contingency,

and heavy-light-special forces operations and the operational continuum of

peacetime competition, conflict, and war. Planners believed the revision

39. Ltr, Foss to author, 8 Apr 96.

27
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

should reach toward, but not encompass, the AirLand Battle-Future

concept.40

In June 1990, General Foss directed the doctrine be written primarily

at the Combined Arms Center, or CAC (the parent command of the

Command and General Staff College and SAMS). The TRADOC

commander would be the doctrinal "driver." Following discussions with

General Vuono, he issued in mid-July further basic instructions. AirLand

Battle was sound, and its tenets held up. However, it needed more

operational overtones as well as more joint and combined overtones. It

needed more nonlinear development, more depth in contingency operations,

and further work on low intensity conflict (LIC). Foss also instructed that

LIC doctrine would be subsumed under the overarching FM 100-5

Operations. He assigned the project formally to CAC commander Lt. Gen.

Leonard P. Wishart III on 27 August 1990, specifying Headquarters

TRADOC as the review and approving authority, with its Assistant Deputy

Chief of Stafffor Concepts and Doctrine to define guidance. Lt. Col. Thomas

Mitchell in the SAMS organization was named at this time as primary

author.41

General Foss told his staff principals that doctrinally the time had

come for a fundamental shift. The new "base case" for U.S. military action

would resemble Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield (and soon, Desert

Storm), rather than a campaign to reinforce forward-deployed forces having

a good logistics base. Deployability had a greatly increased importance.

The TRADOC commander also stressed the need for and difficulty of

accommodating low intensity conflict, with its many variables, force

requirements, and political implications.42

Foss also had a distinct view of command. Only strong command

fostered initiative in subordinates, acceptance of risk, and rapid seizure of

opportunities on the battlefield. Strong command was based on the

commander's intent and his subordinates' freedom of action in exercise of

40. Paper, ODCSDOC, no subj [point paper to determine optional location for proponency of FM 100-5],

n.d. [10 Apr 90].

41. (1) Msg, Cdr TRADOC to Cdr USACAC (General Foss to Lt Gen Wishart), 032000Z Aug 90, subj: FM

100-5 Revision Study, RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC, SAMS 002/016. (2) Briefing slides, ODCSDOC Dir Army

Doctrine for DCSDOC, Brig Gen Grogan, 6 Sep 90, subj: FM 100-5, Operations 1991 Revision. (3) Memorandum for Record, John L. Romjue, Office Command Historian, 30 Aug 90, subj: FM 100-5 Revision. (4) Msg,

Cdr TRADOC to Cdr CAC, 271312Z Aug 90, subj: FM 100-5 Revision. (5) Msg, Cdr USACAC to Cdr TRADOC,

311349ZAug90, SAB.

42. Briefing slides, ODCSDOC Dir Army Doc for DCSDOC, Brig Gen Grogan, 6 Sep 90, subj: FM 100-5,

Operations 1991 Revision.

28
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

mission tactics that were cognizant of that intent and that fully grasped the

priority of the main effort. By contrast, Foss regarded the control path

fostered by technology and electronic devices, as dangerous. Control, communications, and computers—the other three "C's" of the fused C4 acronym—were subordinate to and supported command. For Foss, command

was personal, face-to-face and voice-to-voice, and not through the staff.

Command meant not only responsibility. It meant authority, and it extended

only one level down, thus promoting subordinate initiative.43

In the fall of 1990, many of the assumptions that would underlie

the 1993 doctrine had been initially drawn by Army doctrinal planners.

Those assumptions included reorientation to a primarily contingency force;

the challenge of deployment to "immature" theaters; and the requirement

to treat more fully combined operations and campaigns and theater operations. They also included the AirLand Battle-Future concept and closedeep-rear battlefield framework as bases, with a countervailing appreciation that neither would always be applicable to future operations. Assumptions further included the prospective inclusion of the full operational continuum, joint operations, and strategic-operational-tactical balance.

Not only those assumptions regarding a new doctrine, but some leading ideas of the 1993 doctrine were also present. Important were the centrality

of command and the view that the C4 composite slighted the critical command

function per se. Also present was the notion of flexibility—a flexible adaptation to changing operational circumstances—as a new, fifth tenet.44

During September-October 1990, TRADOC headquarters solicited the

Army schools for general views about the upcoming project. Most responded

positively that some changes were indeed needed. Suggestions included the

melding ofFM 100-5 and low intensity conflict doctrine in one manual. There

was a general recognition that the manual needed to go beyond the operational

level of war to engage operations short of war and the strategic level.45

In September 1990, TRADOC planners also met with Headquarters Tactical Air Command (TAC) to signal the start-up. TAC at that point

urged a detailed setting-out of Air Force doctrine in the new FM 100-5.

43. (1) General John W. Foss, "Command," Military Review, May 1990, pp. 2-8. (2) Memo ATCD-A, Maj

J.M. Ritter, Doctrine Staff Officer, ODCSDOC through Col Stephenson to Brig Gen Grogan, 12 Sep 90, subj:

Visit by Lt Col Mitchell, Principal Author FM 100-5.

44. MemoATCD-A, Maj J.M. Ritter, Doctrine Staff Officer through Col Dillon to Brig Gen Grogan, 12 Sep 90,

subj: Visit by Lt Col Mitchell, Principal Author FM 100-5, w/attached slides on revision guidance.

45. Ltr ATZL-SWV, Col William H. Janes, Dir SAMS [individually to school commandants], 7 Sep 90, subj:

FM 100-5 Operations Revision. RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 002/018.

29
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

TAC also wanted to set clear the roles of the joint force commander and the

commander's campaign. Such clarity was imperative to balancing the two

services' respective ground and air roles. For the Army, the balance problem

meant the need for air support as a first priority. The meeting thus pointed up

the perennial dilemma of the need for fully synchronized AirLand Battle, but

the difficulty ofsecuring it. In any case, planners agreed that the manual had to

present an accurate picture ofjoint operations in general and in detail.46

Headquarters TRADOC guidance went to the CAC commander in

October 1990. A principal guideline was to link the Army's strategic role,

as laid out both in FM 100-1, The Army, and in the Chief of Staff's White

Paper, with the operational and tactical levels of war. Other directives were

to underscore the Army's dual mission to deter war and to fight and win

when deterrence failed, and to build on the 1986 doctrine. Instructions

were to retain the tenets, review the imperatives, and examine the role of

flexibility. The new doctrine was to lay the foundation for operational art

and tactics, expand the discussion of campaign planning, describe the Army's

role in joint actions, discuss considerations governing actions across the

operational continuum, and treat operations in developed and undeveloped

theaters. CAC was directed to synchronize the doctrine with joint, combined, and other Army doctrine and with the AirLand Operations concept.

TRADOC wanted the incorporation of a strong command philosophy, while

maintaining the human dimension of doctrine. The manual revision additionally was to describe integrated heavy, light, and special operations forces,

address mine warfare, and be oriented to maneuver.47

Early work plunged the project directly into the strategic realm and

the peacetime end ofthe continuum of operations. Difficulties and dilemmas

were evident. How did AirLand Battle tenets, imperatives, dynamics of

combat power, battle dimensions, and command and control apply or not

apply in the realm of non-war fighting or "deterrence" operations? How to

treat those operations discretely and not lose the unity of war fighting

doctrine? The extension of basic Army doctrine to the strategic level and

into the full panoply ofArmy operations presented difficult tasks of doctrinal

definition, delineation, and organization. Briefed on the project in December

1990, General Foss affirmed that the new manual would be refocused from

the NATO mid-intensity, linear battlefield to global operations across the

whole continuum and to nonlinear warfare. Foss affirmed the 525-5

46. Memo ATACD-A, Maj J. Murray Ritter to Lt Col Mitchell, 17 Sep 90, subj: Air Force Role in FM 100-5,

Operations.

47. Memo ATCD-A, Brig Gen Timothy J. Grogan, ADCSCDD to Cdr CAC, 12 Oct 90, subj: Guidance for

Revision of FM 100-5, Operations. RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 002/020.

30
ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE STRATEGIC SHIFT

battlefield framework noted earlier. Further, FM 100-5 would absorb low

intensity conflict operations. The new doctrine would advance Air ForceArmy cooperation into true joint force operations. It would examine closely

the measurably different tenets and considerations of deterrence operations.48

The SAMS effort led by Lt. Col. Mitchell looked toward writing

and completing the doctrine by late 1991. That timetable was soon to be

interrupted by the advent of the Persian Gulf War, many of the events and

lessons of which were being viewed by television watchers worldwide during

January-February 1991. Reviewing the project in mid-February, General

Foss scrapped the notion of deterrence operations in favor of "military

operations short of war" to conceptualize the expanded area of the manual.

Foss also advised inclusion of the 4-part AirLand Operations concept and

elimination ofthe segmented close-deep-rear structure of combat operations.

Not only the war's interruption of the project but the quick, successful outcome of Operation Desert Storm, acted to slow doctrine revision

temporarily. Among the Gulf War commanders, Army school commandants, and the Department of the Army Staff and leadership, the conviction

was strong that revision would not fit well with a great victory by proven

doctrine and that, in any case, the Army's performance might act to stop,

even reverse, the interrupted force downsizing. The immediate consequence

was a slowing of the revision effort, with ideas for change placed into the

mid-future concept document, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Even so, it was

General Foss's belief, stated soon to the incoming Chief of Staff, General

Gordon R. Sullivan, that a new FM 100-5 edition would be needed by 1992.49

By late March, SAMS had completed the draft of a key chapter,

"Army Doctrine for Operations." It presented the dynamics of combat and

operations short of war, the Principles of War, precepts for both operations

and operations short of war, the AirLand Battle tenets, the dimensions of

operations based on the 4-partAirLand Operations schematic, and command

and control considerations.50

48. (1) MFR ATMH, John L. Romjue, Office Command Historian, 30 Oct 90, subj: FM 100-5 Working Conference, 23-24 Oct 90, Ft Leavenworth, Kan., w/encl. (2) HQ TRADOC Form 30, ADCSCD, 3 Dec 90, subj:

Readahead for 10 Dec Briefing [on FM 100-5]. (3) MFR, Dr. Daniel J. Hughes, CAC Historian, 15 Dec 90,

subj: SAMS Briefing to TRADOC Commander, 14 Dec 90, on FM 100-5.

49. Ltr, Foss to author, 8 Apr 96.

50. (1) Memo, Lt Col Thomas E. Mitchell, SAMS through DC CGSC to Cdr CAC, 22 Feb 91, subj: FM 100-

5 Brief to General Foss, 1430-1730, 19 Feb 91. (2) CAC Routing Sheet, ATZL-SWV, LtCol Mitchell to Asst

DepComdtand Dep Comdt CGSC, 28 Mar 91, w/encl draft Chapter III. (3) Draft Chapter III, 5 Apr 91. (4)

Memo, Col William J. Shuegrue, Dir Army and Combined Doc, ODCSDOC to General Foss, subj: FM 100-5

IPR (2 Apr 91). RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 002/020, 002/019, 002/024, 002/034.

31
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

On 2 April 1991, General Foss and the TAC commander, General

John M. Loh met to discuss issues relative to the AirLand Operations concept

that both would sign in August. It was recognized that the place where the

air and land campaigns came together on the battlefield was the primary

point of emphasis for Army-Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures,

and that that matter needed TAC and TRADOC priority treatment. The

two commanders agreed that TAC needed to develop a tactical air doctrine

that complemented AirLand Operations, leading to complementary tactics,

techniques, and procedures. Also emphasized was the retention of current

Air Force apportionment and allocation procedures and the Air Force

necessity to establish air superiority in offensive and defensive counter-air

operations. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

was reviewed as a central future doctrinal element, based on its productive

performance in providing near real-time intelligence in Desert Storm. Forced

entry was another agreed focus. Battlefield targeting in joint operations

was understood as a critical need, for which the right tactics, techniques,

and procedures still were required. This meeting touched the critical points

of the needed Air Force-Army synchronization of operations, a major area

that would see continuing attention.51

The interrupted preliminary FM 100-5 effort thus laid important

groundwork. It proceeded from a full appreciation of the strategic and

operational ramifications of the fundamentally altered power situation in

Europe and the freer U.S. contingency role in a world in which the retreat

of Soviet power permitted more open opportunities to respond militarily to

regional crises. Doctrinal planners in 1990 had laid down the basic

implications that would reshape the project revived in the summer of 1991.

Foremost was the concept of a greater strategic role for the Army across the

entire continuum ofArmy operations. Just as important was the reorientation

to a smaller force primarily projectable from North America, with overseas

U.S. elements constituting a smaller forward presence. Adapting AirLand

Battle to a nonlinear, more open battlefield, doctrinal planners at

Headquarters TRADOC and in SAMS viewed the mission as dual: war and

operations short of war. Also adapted, as earlier noted, was the deeper

vision and four-part schematic for action of the AirLand Battle-Future/

AirLand Operations concept.52

51. MFR, General John W. Foss, Cdr TRADOC, and General John M. Loh, CdrTAC, n.d., subj: Four Star

Meeting Between General Foss and General Loh, 2 April 1991.

52. TRADOCACH,CY91,p. 65.

32
TT

CHAPTER

RETHINKING

WAR FIGHTING

The current doctrine was not deficient—the issue

was accommodating change. While AirLand Battle had

worked well, "gaping holes" in FM100-5 were

becoming evident in light ofthe new strategic situation.

Powerprojection would dominate the new strategy, freeing

FM 100-5 onto broader terrain intellectually.

The sense that the Gulf War, one of the major regional wars of the

late-twentieth century was—in its stepped-up battle tempo and the lethal

reach of its weaponry—rewriting doctrinal formulas, had effectively

sidelined Army doctrine revision in the early months of 1991. Though the

effort continued in the School ofAdvanced Military Studies, the new SAMS

director Col. James McDonough, reporting in the early wake of the desert

war, believed that undue haste to complete the doctrine during 1991 would

not serve the purpose well.1 The Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl

Vuono's instruction in March 1991 that the futures concept, AirLand

Operations, should encompass the GulfWar lessons, stated and reflected a

general consensus in that same view. Indeed, AirLand Operations and not

the doctrinal manual was, as we have seen, the focus of the TRADOC

commander General John Foss's work in the final period of his command,

which terminated on his retirement in late August. As it happened, both

TRADOC command and, in June, the senior Army billet saw scheduled

turnover in the summer of 1991. Those changes brought into their key

1. Interview with Col James R. McDonough, Director SAMS, by John L. Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93,

Ft Leavenworth, Kan.

33
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

General Gordon R. Sullivan

roles the individual whose decisive stamp the 1993 doctrine would bear,

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., and the Army chief ofstaff General Gordon

Sullivan, who selected him and who would see doctrine as the engine of

change for the Army in the new era emerging.

The revision of FM 100-5, Operations, undertaken to formulate a

doctrine for the new post-Cold War era, proceeded over the next two years.

As a body of doctrine decisively altered from preceding notions, it owed

paternity chiefly to the doctrinal decisions of the commander of the agency

responsible for Army doctrine revision and promulgation. Franks contributed and sharpened many of its leading ideas. His decisions molded the

heart of the doctrine and its new and old principles and concepts into a

convincing framework valid for the changed conditions of the new era.

34
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

But the paternity of the body of ideas brought to completion by early 1993

was broadly shared. That process of contribution proceeded out of Franks'

own method ofsoliciting and gaining wide internal-Army participation and

debate. It also owed to his use of the resources of a select writing team of

high intellectual quality in the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Directive for Change

General Sullivan's view of the doctrinal and institutional way ahead

was stated in a memorandum he gave to Lt. Gen. Franks on 29 July 1991,

almost a month before the latter arrived at Fort Monroe. The Chief of

Staff's memo was both visionary and direct. Charged with the maintenance and growth ofthe fundamental programs upon which the Army rested,

the new TRADOC commander would, Sullivan said, set the course for the

Army that would endure for the next generation. Sullivan believed that

more than anything else, Franks shared with him the responsibility ofmaintaining Army momentum and continuity while accommodating change. The

project he expected General Franks to undertake with Sullivan's own support and involvement had "the potential to be a major turning

point...[and]...enduring legacy" for the Army.

Sullivan saw the Army at a watershed comparable to that which

Ulysses Grant viewed in 1864 as architect of the first American Army

campaign of the industrial age. The Chief of Staff similarly saw the Gulf

War as the first major conflict of the post-industrial era. Warfare in the

early 1990s was at a point at which raw industrial might and manpowerintensive armies were neither necessary nor supportable and had been

displaced by the effects of computer technology. Needed was doctrine that

retained the winning principles and fundamentals but that accommodated

change, "a doctrine for today and tomorrow." Sullivan noted the high state

the U.S. Army had reached following the modernization and reform begun

at TRADOC headquarters fifteen years earlier by the "Boathouse Gang."2

Franks' challenge was to create a similar intellectual environment. The

new doctrine TRADOC wrote would be the foundation and drive for the

Army's organizational design, training focus, leader development, and

combat developments and acquisition process. "The writing of this doctrine

2. The Boathouse Gang was a group of young staff officers employed by General William E. DePuy

at Fort Monroe during the mid-to-late 1970s to assist in the development of the 1976 FM 100-5 and

related doctrinal and organizational concepts. Their workrooms occupied the second floor of the Fort

Monroe boathouse adjacent to the headquarters buildings. See Herbert, DePuy, pp. 85-88.

35
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

is to be an informed process which in its most ultimate sense is our Army

thinking and codifying itself," Sullivan believed, and the TRADOC

commander was "the catalyst." General Sullivan looked forward to a

"vigorous and informed discussion amongst seasoned professionals." The

Chief of Staff believed that, in the new era and with remarkable successes

behind it, the Army was at an historic juncture as it faced its simple and

straightforward mission to defend the Constitution of the Republic. The

task was "to put down in writing how we think we will accomplish this

mission to standard."3

Sullivan's belief that reformulation of the key operations doctrine

would itself be an engine of change had two important implications. Externally, the new doctrine would affect defense strategy and the defense budget. It would define the Army role in the national security structure and

how the Army would carry out security aims. And Army operations doctrine would influence doctrinal developments in the joint field. Internally,

Sullivan believed, the impact of the new doctrine would be fundamental. It

would be the motor of force design, materiel development, training, and

leader development for the whole or "Total Army." The revised doctrine

would clearly communicate both method and intent to the institution. It

would refine and expand operational art and campaign planning. It would

weave into the doctrinal body four fundamental war fighting qualities: the

Army's deployability, lethality, expansibility, and versatility.4

General Sullivan's vigorous support of doctrine as the basis for the

Army in the new strategic era laid the foundation for doctrinal change. In

the shrinking American defense establishment of the post-Cold War, much

was at stake. In the change of political administrations following the elections of 1992, even deeper reductions would be made. Was doctrine the

right basis for the Army, which so well understood its unchanged role and

responsibility in the undefined era just beginning? A clear vision, both of

warfare's new strategic assumptions and the Army's right disposition and

role was critically needed, rather than budgetary campaigns for shrinking

defense dollars or ungrounded weapon or force decisions without a solid

doctrinal framework for the new era at hand. Doctrine was the ground.

Sullivan's judgement would be borne out in the ensuing period.

3. (1) Memo, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army to Lt.Gen. Frederick M. Franks,

Jr., 29 Jul 91, subj: Reshaping Army Doctrine. (2) Interview of General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. by

Henry O. Malone, Jr., 2 Jan 92, HQ TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Va.

4. (1) Memo, Sullivan to Franks, 29 Jul 91. (2) Interview of General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., by

John L. Romjue, 27 Nov 94, Pentagon, Washington, D.C

36
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

Franks, VII Corps, and the Gulf War

The TRADOC commander to whose responsibility it fell to develop

and bring to publication the Army's first doctrine for the post-Cold War,

Frederick Franks had done apprenticeship both in related TRADOC positions

and high-level command. Franks had worked as combat developments

planning group chief during 1980-1981 under General Donn Starry, as

executive officer to both Starry and to General Glenn Otis in 1981, and as

deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College during

1985-1987. Like Starry and his own immediate predecessor John Foss,

Franks had commanded an Army corps. Corps command was decisive for

Franks' thinking, as it had been for that of Starry, the originator of AirLand

Battle doctrine. Starry's analysis of the Soviet challenge to the critically

placed V Corps had led him to find the key—deep attack—to stop the

Franks directing VII Corps operations, 25 February 1991

37
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

juggernaut threat of an echeloned and overwhelming Soviet thrust through

the Fulda Gap to the Rhine. Franks' experience with corps command was

peacetime—and wartime—and thus twofold. It had encompassed

deployment of the U.S. VII Corps from Germany via the North Sea ports to

Saudi Arabia between November 1990 and February 1991. Once there, it

had been Franks' role to position and maneuver a 5-division command as

the strongest corps component of the allied encircling thrust on the Iraqi

right flank in the "100 hours" ground war of 24-28 February 1991.

Franks' own Gulf War experience of organization and maneuver

on an empty, almost featureless desert, with a force equipped with the most

advanced technology from the United States' historic 1980s arms buildup,

had profound impact on his views. It influenced his thinking on projection

of strategic force, on operational command, on the "blurring" of the levels

of war, and on the space and time dimensions of battle. Whereas AirLand

Battle—with its stress on depth, maneuver, and the Principles ofWar—met

the test of the conditions of the Gulf conflict, that doctrine's emphases on

the simultaneous close-deep-rear fight and on disruption of oncoming echelons were relics of Cold War Europe. Nor did AirLand Battle treat the

trans-regional force projection that the deployment of the VII Corps itself

represented. Franks saw that experience as an indicator of what the whole

Army would have to be able to do.

Secondly, there were for Franks "glimmerings" of significant

changes in warfare. An example was the tactic, which the new weapon

systems permitted, of simultaneous attack on the enemy in depth. A third

immediate lesson for the VII Corps, which began upon its notification to

deploy from Germany, related to the need to re-tailor forces with a resultant

different task organization that would permit transfer out of one operational

environment and placement on the ground into another that was far different. A last lesson was a new requirement that warfare in the 1990s appeared to be imposing on combat leaders: the need for rapid mental and

doctrinal adjustment and adaptation to sudden, radically different operational circumstances presented by sudden theater change.5

Organizing a Writing Team

Alerted in July 1991 by the new Chief of Staff of the Army to his

principal task as TRADOC commander, and fresh from an operational command in a war that demonstrated new facets and rules, General Franks early

set about restarting the revision of FM 100-5. He directed that that effort,

5. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Franks Interview by Malone, 2 Jan 92.

38
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

Colonel James R. McDonough

which would extend over most of the next two years, be accomplished primarily through two TRADOC agencies. Following recent precedent, Franks

renewed the writing assignment of the School of Advanced Military Studies in the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He charged his own headquarters staff doctrinal deputy and Army

Doctrine Directorate to manage the project.

The individual who had been selected for the key SAMS director position in early 1991 by Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono

was Colonel James R. McDonough, military assistant to the Supreme

Allied Commander Europe, General John R. Galvin. McDonough, a

credentialed military intellectual, was author of the Vietnam War memoir Platoon Leader, a widely read account of day-to-day junior officer

39
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

combat leadership.6 As the designated SAMS director and supervisor of

the doctrine writing effort focused on the FM 100-5 revision, McDonough

faced the fundamental problem of how to proceed with that interrupted task

in the doctrinally turbulent wake of the Gulf War.

Arriving at Fort Leavenworth in early March 1991, the new SAMS

director was instructed by the Combined Arms Center commander that a

new edition of FM 100-5 was required by July that year. Believing that no

Army consensus then existed for the direction U.S. Army doctrine should

take, McDonough argued for a more deliberate approach, based on the unfolding lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. McDonough felt that

his view accorded with a rising number of voices opposed to a rapid conclusion of the revision. Though his institutional instructions were to continue to press the writing effort earlier begun and continuing under Lt. Col.

Thomas Mitchell, McDonough viewed that effort as a conceptual mirror of

the 1986 edition. He believed the approach inadequate to accomplish the

scope of the doctrine revision needed.

A complicating factor was the complementary progress of the nearto-mid-future conceptual document TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand

Operations, the ideas of which Lt. Col. Mitchell's focal FM 100-5 draft

chapter incorporated, as we have seen. Widely briefed by TRADOC in

recent months, that document had raised suspicions in the minds of corps

and division commanders that it would legitimize a restructuring of combat

to the "center," that is, a restructuring to the command echelons above corps

and to consequent "stovepiping" arrangements, and away from the operational centrality of corps and divisions.7

In early June 1991, General Vuono

advised that it was not imperative to rapidly produce the revised FM 100-5,

but to proceed with the AirLand Operations concept. Foss brought to

completion the work on the future mid-range vision, and TRADOC published it on 1 August 1991. As we have seen, the preliminary FM 100-5

action would shortly be superseded by the Sullivan-Franks plan.8 Although

6. Well read in military theory and military history, McDonough was also the author, besides Platoon Leader (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), of The Defense of Hill 781: An allegory of Modern

Mechanized Combat (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), an account of unit experience at the simulated-warfare National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. McDonough was also the author of a historical novel, Limits of Glory, set in the events of the battle of Waterloo. Except where otherwise

noted, this section is based on interview of Colonel James R. McDonough by John L. Romjue, 22-23

Nov 93, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

7. Ibid.

8. Personal journal of Col James R. McDonough relating to FM 100-5 project, THRC (hereafter:

McDonough Journal).

40
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

the August 1991 document, a composite of many ideas, would influence

the 1993 doctrine, it did not do so decisively. Its stages-of- battle framework was discarded, and it was not destined to play a similarly influential

role in future doctrine formulation that its AirLand Battle predecessor had

in 1981. Instead, an eclectic approach cognizant of the era and its military

lessons and not locked to systemized development would mark the formulation

of the U.S. Army's 1990s doctrine. Colonel McDonough organized a permanent 6-man FM 100-5 writing team, naming, upon his arrival in June, Lt. Col.

Ricky Rowlett as team chief. Work on new draft chapter outlines soon began.9

General Franks met with his chief doctrine writers at Fort

Leavenworth in early August, shortly before assuming command on 23 August. Colonel McDonough presented the logic train for a deliberate revision to General Franks and, later that month, to the new Army Chief of

Staff upon request. As we have noted, General Sullivan's close interest in

the doctrine as the Army's engine of change and in a doctrine of structural

balance were evident early on. The Chief of Staff indicated his desire for

involvement in each step. In late August, the team began work on chapter

outlines, a consensus-building plan, and a "precis."10

To launch the project conceptually, General Franks chose the vehicle of the precis, a precise digest of ideas laying out the reasons why a

new doctrine was needed and suggesting what lines that doctrine should

pursue. At meetings at Fort Leavenworth with Lt. Gen. Wilson A. Shoffner,

who had taken command of the Combined Arms Center in August 1991;

Brig. Gen. William M. Steele, newly arrived in July as deputy commandant

of the CGSC under Shoffner; Colonel McDonough; and his own headquarters doctrine staff, Franks told his planners to pursue what had changed in

warfare. Mindful of his own experience, Franks focused early on the notion of simultaneity of fire effects, which he himself had witnessed. That

notion ran directly counter to the AirLand Operations 4-stage concept, which

would soon vanish from doctrinal consideration.11

9. Other members of Rowlett's team, arriving in August and September, were Lieutenant Colonels

Ed Thurman, John Reitz, Nate Power, Gary Steele, and Major (later Lt Col) Michael Rampy. Rowlett

was promoted to colonel in January 1992. FM 100-5 Chronology of Events, prepared by SAMS (hereafter: SAMS Chronology). Franks had the opportunity personally to select the writing team. He cleared

the choices personally with the ARSTAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lt. Gen. William A. Reno,

following consultation with the Combined Arms Command commander, Lt. Gen. Leonard P. Wishart

III. Franks review ms. marginal note.

10. (1) MFR ATZLI-SWV, Col James R. McDonough, Director SAMS, 20 Aug 91, sub): FM 100-5

Concept Brief to CSA, THRC. (2) SAMS Chronology.

11. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue. (2) Interview of Brig Gen Timothy J. Grogan, DCSDOC,

by John L. Romjue, 22 Jan 93.

41
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

General Sullivan seconded the precis approach. It would supply

the vehicle to alert and involve the Army's senior leaders. Sullivan urged

inclusion of disaster assistance as an Army doctrinal mission, while cautioning against overshadowing the main, operational mission. Sullivan also

stressed the Army's values and traditions as the institution's driving force.

He stated that doctrine, as the engine of change, was a key to the Army's

focus and balance. In the future period, the nation would demand decisive

victories, with little patience for protracted conflicts of attrition warfare.12

A Consensus-Bulding Campaign

At Headquarters TRADOC, General Franks placed the management of the effort in the hands of his Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts,

Doctrine, and Developments, Maj. Gen. Wesley K. Clark, who arrived to

that assignment at Fort Monroe in early October 1991. General Franks

personally selected Clark to take the combat developments-doctrine post at

this juncture. Though he would depart for division command in July 1992,

Clark's involvement was close and significant for the initial development

of the battle dynamics of the 1993 doctrine.13 Clark was aided by Brig.

Gen. Timothy J. Grogan, the assistant deputy for concepts and doctrine

and, after July 1992, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine.14Supervising the

headquarters Army Doctrine Directorate under Clark and Grogan were Col.

Stephen Cork, who was succeeded in July 1992 by Colonel Fred Berry.

The chief action officer for the campaign through the duration ofthe project

was Lt. Col. Bobby McCarter.

Main ideas and issues seen by doctrine planners at Headquarters

TRADOC as the effort began were: to expand FM 100-5 to cover the operational continuum, to treat and emphasize contingency operations and

power projection, to increase treatment of combined and joint operations,

12. MFR ATZL-SWV, Col James R. McDonough, Director SAMS, 20 Aug 91, subj: FM 100-5 Concept Brief to CSA, THRC.

13. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 95. Franks obtained Clark's brief 9-month assignment

personally from General Sullivan, in the interim immediately prior to Clark's assignment to division

command. Notes on discussion with General Franks, 16 Feb 95, Fort Monroe, Va., by John L Romjue.

(2) Interview of Maj Gen Wesley K. Clark, DCSCDD, by Anne W. Chapman and John L. Romjue, 8 Jul

92, HQ TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Va.

14. The separate combat developments and doctrine offices at HQ TRADOC were briefly combined

under the DCS for Concepts, Doctrine and Developments between August 1990 and July 1992. Clark

departed in the latter month, at which time the reestablished Office of the DCS for Doctrine assumed

primary doctrinal responsibilities at the headquarters under the commanding general.

42
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

Major General Wesley K. Clark

to increase treatment of operational art and campaign planning, to balance

treatment of linear and nonlinear operations, and to keep the focus on the

operational level of war.15In addition, headquarters planners originally

expected the revision to encompass the concepts ofAirLand Operations as

well as the lessons of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

With a doctrinal precis as a starting point, General Franks' approach

was to seek and build Army debate and discussion and ultimately an Armywide consensus for the doctrine as it developed. He wanted to involve the

Army and to gain its considered views, but also in the process to inform the

15. Briefing, HQ TRADOC n.d. [ca. August 1991], subj: Doctrinal and Related Issues, Tab D, Doctrine Briefs, Frederick M. Franks, Jr. Notebook, FM 100-5 Operations, Book 1.

43
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Army in this way about the changed doctrine. Early on, he directed his

headquarters staff to set the mechanism for obtaining that consensus, essentially through two recurring forums. The first forum was TRADOC's

own commanders conferences, bringing together the Army school commandants and commanders. The second forum consisted of the periodic

Army commanders conferences and other Army-wide meetings, at which

the developing doctrine was presented and intensively discussed. Franks'

approach to "maturing" the ideas he and his planners developed was thus to

do so publicly.16 He employed that involvement and consensus-seeking

method throughout the project.

Of significance was the wider-public aspect ofthe consensus-building effort. The advertisement and wide briefing ofAirLand Battle doctrine

during 1980-1981 by TRADOC spokesmen, in particular by the doctrine

deputy, Maj. Gen. Donald R. Morelli, to defense and congressional circles

had been a key factor in its acceptance.17The writing team's consensus

building plan was developed in September 1991. While FM 100-5 was an

applicable change vehicle internally for the Army, the SAMS writers considered and proposed that an extensive effort was needed to explain and

draw support with opinion leaders outside the Army for the doctrinal shift.

As the National Security Strategy, dated August 1991, stated, a firm grasp

of the "extraordinary trends at work today" was required.18

The plan focused on five groups influential in shaping national security aims and in bringing change to the Army itself. Those groups were:

the reserve and retired Army leadership; defense industry; other military

organizations in the Defense Department, including the unified and specified commands; other nations bound by treaty or bilateral relationship; and

influential entities and individuals including Congress, influential academics, the media, opinion leaders, think tanks such as RAND and the Center

for Strategic and International Studies, and other government agencies,

particularly those with a stake in operations short of war. TRADOC planners believed that by the time the media had raised an issue, the media's

own viewpoint and agenda was set. The Army needed to fully inform media writers and other opinion makers before uninformed opinions formed

and were propagated. The proper course of action instead would be to help

16. Notes on discussion with General Franks, 16 Feb 95, Fort Monroe, Va., by John L. Romjue.

17. Romjue, AirLand Battle, p. 66.

18. Briefing slides, SAMS Consensus Building Campaign Briefing for FM 100-5, n.d. [September

1991].

44
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

set a responsible issue agenda beforehand. That might be accomplished by

analyzing emerging issues from the perspective of the involved groups and

identifying divisive issues early. At the same time, the reaching out could

draw in valuable ideas and perspectives. TRADOC needed to start dialogues with key congressmen and other opinion makers, rather than wait

for things to happen.19

General Franks assigned responsibility to carry out the plan to his

Army Doctrine Directorate. That agency coordinated the overall effort of

building consensus, internally through the series of conferences earlier noted

as well as externally. Ambitious, the plan would score general success.

Internally, it was smoothly executed. Staffing of the precis, followed by

FM 100-5 drafts, and frequent internal TRADOC and wider-Army conferences kept the Army informed and well-involved. Briefings were presented

to the other services and allies and formally to Congress. A systematic

wider outreach received much less emphasis in the press of time. However, General Franks consulted widely on the many points of doctrine involved and at issue. Such contacts were also pursued extensively by the

SAMS director. McDonough contacted the wide net of 100-5 draft reviewers comprehensively, those inside and those outside the Army. Both

McDonough and the team and the headquarters doctrine staffreviewed drafts

with British Army Staff College officers at Camberley, England, contacted

and visited the German Army Staff College, and kept other interested allied

armies abreast.20 The external contacts yielded valuable advice and perspective to General Franks and the writing team.21 The campaign also included TRADOC-written articles in several publications, including Army

Times, Armed Forces Journal International, Defense News, Military Review, Army, Parameters, and branch school bulletins.

19. (1) RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS-005: FM 100-5, Consensus Building Campaign, including Folder Note. (2) FM 100-5 Process and Product Chronology, Tab E, Consensus Building Campaign, 18 Sep 91. (3) MFR ATZL-SWZ, Lt Col John W. Reitz, SAMS, 1 Oct 91, subj: Trip Report to

DCSCDD, TRADOC, Ft Monroe by Lt Col Reitz and Maj Rampy, 24-26 Sep 91. Lt Col Reitz was

author of the comprehensive consensus-building plan, portions of which HQ TRADOC pursued.

20. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93. (2) Grogan Interview by Romjue,

22 Jan 93.

21. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue. (2) McDonough's links with General RisCassi, Brig Gen

Holder, Brig Gen Wass de Czege and, on tactical points, with General Cavazos, were especially

close. McDonough also made use of SAMS students to read and comment on drafts. Ltr, McDonough

to John L. Romjue, 24 Dec 93.

45
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

A Precis

Directed by General Franks, the SAMS writing team encapsulated

the gist of the revision's rationale and direction in the precis, which went to

the TRADOC commander in early September 1991. Franks ordered it revised and shortened to a succinct several-page statement of what had

changed external to the Army that affected doctrine, what TRADOC

believed had changed doctrinally, and where the Army would use force

to achieve national strategic aims as a versatile, lethal, deployable, expansible force.

General Franks presented the precis to the Army's senior leaders at

the annual Total Army Analysis conference in Washington, D.C. on 19 September 1991. Franks also presented a three-item outline of the primary

doctrinal categories of concern as he saw them. These were: strategicoperational-tactical links and implications; joint, combined, and interagency

concerns; and mobilization and deployment. These areas were explored in

terms ofthreat, intelligence, logistics, environment, and technology. Franks

argued that the current doctrine was not deficient—the issue was accommodating change. He pointed to the composite nature of the VII Corps in

Desert Storm as evidence of doctrine's power to give the Army operational

and strategic flexibility. (The Germany-based corps had incorporated Stateside divisions as well as the British 1st Armored Division). While AirLand

Battle had worked well, "gaping holes" in FM 100-5 were becoming

evident in light of the new strategic situation, Franks said. Power projection would dominate the new strategy, freeing FM 100-5 onto broader

terrain intellectually.

The aim of the TRADOC precis, titled "The Evolution of Doctrine

for the Strategic Army ofthe 1990s and Beyond," was to open the discussion,

clarify key issues, and serve as a means for the Army to decide the doctrinal

route ahead. It thus launched the all-important internal coordination process.

At the same time, TRADOC printed in Military Review companion articles

signalling the rationale, basic approach, and initial ideas to the wider military

audience.22 The precis called for building upon the fundamentally sound

and battlefield testedAirLand Battle in a revision that faced new international

reality, as set forth in the National Military Strategy. Key elements of that

early-1990s strategy were a regional strategic orientation, the provision of

22. (1) General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., "Continuity and Change: Discussing Our Evolving Doctrine," Military Review, October 1991, p. 1. (2) Colonel James R. McDonough, "Building the New FM

100-5: Process and Product," ibid, pp. 2-12.

46
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

more options for decision makers, flexible and adaptable plans, the

application of overwhelming force, and a framework of arms control. The

shift placed a premium on mobile power projection, strategic agility, crisis

response, technological superiority, and force reconstitution.

The precis took AirLand Operations as a point of departure. The

thrust was a movement of doctrine into the strategic realm. Doctrine pertained not only to the commitment of force in battle. It pertained also to

"the use of forces in whatever role they are assigned, whether under conditions of peace, crisis, or war," across the broader operational continuum.

Also emphasized was the post-hostilities state. In both Panama and Iraq,

U.S. forces had improvised to meet post-conflict needs. But now doctrine

was needed to cover such significant outcomes as the need for the no-fly

zones established over northern and southern portions of Iraq after hostilities there had ceased.

Franks' precis presentation to the senior leaders outlined the three

doctrinal concerns he envisaged. Future operations would have to be fully

integrated—joint, combined, and interagency. The U.S. Army needed a

strong and executable mobilization and deployment doctrine, as the U.S.

military base shifted to the continental United States, and a forced entry

capability was a focal concern. Beyond the significant achievement of

AirLand Battle, which tied tactics to operational art, the new doctrine needed

to link operational art solidly to theater and national strategy.

TRADOC, in its precis of the doctrinal path ahead, judged current

tactical and intelligence doctrine to be already well in order, but spelled out

new needs and emphases, such as the tailoring of forces and multinational

concerns. Needing attention were the great changes observed in battlefield

tempo, weapon lethality, and deep operations. The command-control-communications-intelligence or C3I arena required close examination of the

right balance between offense and defense and fire and maneuver.

Further focal areas were the changed threat—now regional rather

than bipolar; intelligence that expanded into the theater realm and that recognized the evolution of near-real-time target acquisition capabilities; a

fully integrated logistics chain; an "environment" of operations that needed

to address in a much fuller way the entire diverse spectrum of conflict and

operations short of war; and the powerful factor of new technological capabilities, not only American but that which was procurable with increasing

ease by potential adversaries.23

23. (1) Precis, "FM 100-5 AirLand Operations," presented for Total Army Analysis Conference of 19

Sep 91, RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 009, FM 100-5, The Precis.

47
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Views of the Army's Senior Leaders

Though the presentations at the Total Army Analysis Conference

had elicited little immediate reaction, in subsequent responses solicited by

General Franks in late September 1991, the senior leaders endorsed

TRADOC's view of a manual both broader to encompass operations other

than war, and deeper to integrate joint operations.24 Agreement was general that the old threat concept had lost its applicability. The commanders

also believed that mobilization and deployment had changed from their

traditional meaning. They noted war termination as an area of doctrinal

deficiency, and logistics-reconstitution and command and control as needing doctrinal exploration.25 There was additionally a clear signal from the

commanders that, with full attention to operations other than war and to

joint considerations, FM 100-5 needed to remain a war fighting manual.

Operations doctrine should not lose that emphatic and undiluted focus, not

"water down the essence," General Crosbie Saint, the commander-in-chief

of U.S. Army Europe responded. General Saint also urged attention to

command control of extended movements, how to focus fire on the enemy,

how to sequence deploying forces, the intelligence downward flow, and

other concerns.26 General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., the commander of Forces

Command, seconded Saint's emphasis on retaining an undiluted war fighting doctrine, and urged the steady exploration of the impact of advanced

technology on doctrine.27

Improving the "closure" of forces upon their military objective

was an ongoing Forces Command effort in 1991. FORSCOM saw it as

a strategic concern and one that doctrinally involved the reserve components as well. Themain idea was: the quicker and more effective the

force closure, the shorter the war's duration and the smaller its eventual

scope. Airlift and sealift capabilities and legislative improvements to

reserve component dispositions and readiness were involved. The keys

were well planned force generation models at both the FORSCOM and

Department of the Army levels, and in doctrine, the emerging concept of

force projection. Marginal improvements could bring disproportionately

24. (1) Franks Interview by Rom]ue. (2) McDonough Interview by Romjue. (3) Msg, Cdr TRADOC

to senior commanders, 262400Z Sep 91, subj: Input for FM 100-5 Revision.

25. ARSTAF Notes, DACS-ZAA, 20 Sep 91, subj: "TAA-91" Informal SSC, 19 Sep 91.

26. Msg, CINCUSAREUR to Cdr TRADOC, 082130Z Oct 91, subj: Comments on Revising

FM 100-5, Operations.

27. Msg, Cdr FORSCOM to Cdr TRADOC, 132100Z Nov 91, subj: FM 100-5 Precis Review.

48
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

good consequences.28

Saint's and Burba's involvement typified that of other senior leaders as the doctrine progressed. General Robert W. RisCassi, commanderin-chief of Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea, recommended a primary emphasis on coalition warfare. The Army had to be

ready doctrinally and structurally to provide instantaneous unity of operations with the other services and allies, which he considered "a 'mindset'

change." RisCassi, a steady contributor to the project as it advanced, also

questioned the need for lines of distinction between low, mid, and highintensity conflict in the operational continuum. He affirmed Franks' belief

that the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war would in the future

be blurred. He also cautioned against a doctrinal confusion between operations short of war, and doctrine for prosecuting force. RisCassi suggested

that, in the new era, all forces would be contingency forces; previous distinctions were erased.29 Lt. Gen. Jimmy D. Ross, the ARSTAF logistics

deputy, and Lt. Gen. Leon P. Salomon, the Combined Arms Support Command commander, urged full attention to logistics concerns, recommending a system providing a logistics continuum from the industrial base to the

forward battle and from mobilization to redeployment.30 General Carl W.

Stiner, the commander-in-chief ofthe Special Operations Command, urged

the full integration of special operations forces in all areas of the new

manual,31 while General George A. Joulwan, the commander-in-chief of

U.S. Southern Command, made the case for equal doctrinal emphasis on

the low end of the conflict spectrum.32

The strong reaction to the precis was also a reaction to the

mechanistic, operations-by-stages concept of the AirLand Operations

pamphlet, with its emphasis on the operational continuum ofmilitary actions.

That approach had tended to blur the distinction between war fighting and

other operations. After reading the pamphlet, Brig. Gen. Don Holder, a

former doctrine writer and an advisor of Franks, wrote the TRADOC

commander to argue for keeping continuity in the doctrinal principles and

tenets. Holder believed that AirLand Operations nomenclature was

28. FORSCOM briefing, Improving Force Closure: A FORSCOM Perspective, Tab T, Franks Papers,

Book No. 1.

29. OCH files.

30. Ltr, Lt Gen Leon P. Salomon, Cdr CASCOM to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., n.d. [Nov 91].

31. Msg, CINCSOC to Cdr TRADOC, 4 Oct 91, subj: Revisions of FM 100-5.

32. Briefing slides, Franks briefing to Fall Army Commanders Conference, 16-19 Oct 91.

49
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

misleading and might act to deemphasize the tactics sector of doctrine.

Holder also found that August 1991 concept too dependent on lethality at

the expense of combat agility and mobility.33

In a separate communication, Holder held that doctrine was traditional, not revolutionary. Doctrine was by nature incomplete, yet internally

consistent. It was applicable at all levels, in all theaters. It was non-prescriptive, non-formulaic. Operational art had to have a clear relationship to

strategic ends. Operations would be joint and usually allied or combined in

nature. Operations were dependent on tactical success. Operational art was

not sequential; it preceded, accompanied, and followed tactical action.34

Franks' doctrinal precis thus served its purpose of stimulating thinking about doctrine in the new era. General Franks' own work in the formulation process was central. His discussions with General Sullivan, Lt. Gen.

Wilson A. Shoffner, Maj. Gen. Clark, Colonel McDonough, and others, as

well as with retired senior Army commanders including Franks' predecessors at Fort Monroe, drew in fruitful ideas.35 Franks viewed the manual,

more strongly than before, as a document that should reflect the Army's

shared professional culture. An early decision was that the new and broader

doctrine would drop its AirLand Battle identifier and become simply "operations." In late October 1991, Franks reissued a revised and final precis

to senior officers for further review and comment.36

On 4 October 1991, General Sullivan communicated to his

commanders his view of the way ahead. Agreement was general that the

revision should span the operational continuum more broadly and more

jointly. The Army Chief of Staff told the commanders he expected them to

participate in the substance and process of the enterprise. He wanted their

experience and influence in it.37

33. Ltr, Brig Gen L.D. Holder, DCS, Support, CENTAG to General Franks, 27 Sep 91.

34. Holder notes on doctrine and FM 100-5, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 002/003, FM 100-5: Historical File

1986 Version Background ot 1992 edition.

35. Former TRADOC commanders Generals Donn A. Starry, Glenn K. Otis, William R. Richardson,

Carl E. Vuono, and John W. Foss met with Franks at Fort Monroe on 25 November 1991. Franks met

several times with selected former commanders during the ensuing year. MFR, Maj Gen Donald M.

Lionetti, CofS, 27 Nov 91, subj: Former TRADOC Commanders Conference, 25 Nov 91.

36. (1) Precis, as revised 23 Oct 91, RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 009, FM 100-5, The Precis,

with marginal notes. (2) Precis II, 8 Nov 91, RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS 009, FM 100-5, The

Precis, with folder notes.

37. Note on msg DACS-ZA, CSA to MACOM cdrs, 042105Z Oct 91, subj: TAA 99, Informal Senior

Commanders Conference 19 Sep 91, Tab Mc, Franks Notebook No. 1.

50
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

Issues and Planning

As the SAMS writing team set about its expansion of the precis

into outlines and early drafts, TRADOC headquarters planners carried

through the consensus-building campaign. As earlier noted, it proceeded

primarily by vehicle of presentation and discussion at major conferences

through the period. At all these meetings, the SAMS team made notes for

translation into the drafts.38 Numerous briefings, both by TRADOC

headquarters and the SAMS team, supported the conference methodology.

Doctrinal points were further discussed at the Fall Army Commanders

Conference in Washington, D.C. on 16-19 October 1991, at an Army-Air

Force "4-Star summit" at Fort Leavenworth on 14-15 November, and at a

Senior Leaders Warfighting Conference at Fort Leavenworth on 20-21

November 1991.39 Franks also met regularly with his doctrine assistants

and travelled to discuss his ideas with the writing team. These meetings,

public and private, assisted in the process of drawing together and grouping

key doctrinal concerns and notions in the early months of the effort. By

early October, the TRADOC commander was firmly positing the construct

of three categories or groupings of thoughts, briefed with the precis and

earlier noted, that he saw as critical areas for focus: strategic-operationaltactical links and their ramifications; joint, combined, and interagency

doctrinal concerns along the whole operational continuum; and the key

functions of mobilization and deployment. Certain major issues were

apparent in the fall of 1991.

A central issue was the doctrinal relationship and treatment of war

fighting—the Army's raison d'etre and emphasis of all operations doctrine

heretofore—and the non-war and short-of-war or low intensity conflict

operations in which the Army had often been involved and promised increasingly to be. Here were two distinct if overlapping entities. What was

the nature of the balance? In the fall of 1991, TRADOC planners were

working with the graphic model introduced by the August AirLand Operations concept. That model dispensed with the old low-medium-high intensity categories in favor of an operational continuum with overlapping elements of peacetime operations, conflict, and war. The 1993 FM 100-5 would

be the first keystone operations manual to seriously attempt to encompass

38. Interview of Col Ricky Rowlett by John L Romjue, 4 and 15 Feb 94, HQ TRADOC, Fort

Monroe, Va.

39. MemoATCG-P, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to distr, 23 Sep 91, subj: Future ConferencesShaping the 100-5 Discussion.

51
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

war and operations short of war fully and to integrate the two.

Separate from the major issue of including operations short of war

in operations doctrine was the special treatment of the neglected post-conflict period. What were the significant points? A new world of regional

power ambiguities and an increased U.S. freedom of action had replaced

the historic ideological, superpower contest. What was needed was to define clearly what the Army's role was in the unresolved wake of conflicts,

frequently characterized by turmoil: how to arrive at the desired strategic

end state.40 The ambiguous aftermath of the Gulf War offered a ready example of that doctrinal necessity.

Logistics—combat service support—was seen early as a critical

doctrinal area in the new time. There were two major questions. How

should the logistics system be structured so that it would provide support

all the way from initial deployment to the end of the campaign, and from

theater to the lowest tactical level? Should the focus change from supply

point to unit distribution, and what was the impact? What were the force

structure changes needed? Planners saw need for a new flexibility in the

corps support command commander: he had not only to know how to improvise, but how to shift to anticipation of combat service support requirements. Logistics had to be flexible, continuous, and fully integrated.

The second major logistics issue was the question of a need to

modify the wholesale and retail aspects of the current system. How did the

two interact in the force-projection world? Involved here was the question

of centralized versus decentralized logistics. Should wholesale logistics be

"pulled forward" by the field units while simultaneously a "push system"

provided the retail logistics of combat consumables? In any case, planners

saw the need for a system that would furnish a continuum from the U.S.

production base to the forward line of troops.41

Other apparent doctrinal issues were numerous. The mobilization

issues of a power projection Army included industrial base startup, call-up

mechanisms, and reserve component roles. Deployment issues included

the question of the right organization for contingency corps, transportation

40. A dedicated advocate of the doctrinal point of conflict-termination on the basis of a clearly conceived end-state was Lt Col Michael Rampy of the writing team, who canvassed widely in the Army for

viewpoints and support for this important concept in the 1993 doctrine. McDonough Interview by Romjue,

22-23 Nov 93.

41. Briefing slides, "Power Dinner," SAMS presentation to General Franks, 28 Oct 91. A side issue,

which continued through the ensuing year, was the contested use of the unifying and encompassing

term, logistics, rather than combat service support. Suggestions for separate personnel, medical, etc.

chapters were attached to the CSS preference.

52
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

requirements, and the sea forces' roles. Intelligence issues focused on the

impact of technology and the need to treat theater intelligence.

Battlefield "constructs" were an issue: the AirLand Operations schematic with its battlefield "shaping" area and close battle area vis-a-vis the

deep-close-rear notion of AirLand Battle. Also involved was the viability

of the concept's 4-part operational cycle. Roles and missions—complementary and competing—between the services were another set of issues;

involved here were the extent of Air Force airlift, Air Force close air support, Navy sealift, Marine Corps forced entry, and contingency response

missions. The conflict resolution stage following combat operations was

an important question involving civil-military operations, prisoners of war,

and coalition concerns.

Evolving missions constituted still another set of issues not limited

to the peacetime operations of countering contraband drug traffic, disaster

relief, nation assistance, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The evolving

role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War was an important question to

address. Technology—its impact in the Gulf War, maintaining the technological edge, and cybernetics presented a further set of doctrinal questions.

Joint, combined, and interagency matters bulked large—the issues of multinational corps, already in formation in Europe, and multiagency organizations, particularly in operations short of war. The doctrinal matter of

balance was important—between maneuver and firepower, offense and

defense, and linear and nonlinear battle. Key operational concepts to be

treated included center of gravity, lines of operations, culmination, decisive points, phasing, branches and sequels.42

Another focal issue of the new doctrine was the ultimate decisiveness of landpower. In 1991, that military truism of land warfare was seeing

a rechallenge from Gulf War disciples of the Douhet thesis. Landpower

decisiveness was a corollary of the strategic doctrine claim of the force

projection Army. Had the devastating effectiveness of the air campaign

over Iraq changed anything fundamental? Was landpower still ultimately

decisive in an era of increasingly precise air-delivered munitions? If so,

Franks and his planners asked, why and how?

The SAMS writers noted that 20th century wars had highlighted

for the United States the importance of a ready ground force. Only land

force could conquer forces, populations, and resources. Only armies could

42. (1) Memo ATZL-SWZ, Lt Col John W. Reitz, SAMS to Lt Col McCarter, Army Doctrine, ODCSCDD,

TRADOC, 4 Oct 91, subj: Senior Fellows Dinner for General Franks, 2 Oct. (2) Briefing slides, SAMS

briefing to General Franks, "Power Dinner," 28 Oct 91. (3) Memo for Director SAMS ATZL-SWV, Col

James R. McDonough, Dir SAMS, 4 Oct 91, subj: Summary of Senior Fellows Warfighting Forum.

53
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

terminate major conflicts successfully. No service could fight a war alone.

The U.S. Army had unique capabilities in deterrence, forcible entry, low

intensity conflict, theater logistics structure, and security assistance. Massive airpower was not necessarily decisive—as it had not been in the

Luftwaffe assault on Britain. Nor for American security interests was

seapower decisive by itself.43

Army-Air Force concerns thus continued as a set of questions

needing strong doctrinal probing. Those concerns were if anything

exacerbated by the newly demonstrated longer ranges of Army weapons.

On 14-15 November 1991, an Army-Air Force Summit meeting convened

at Fort Leavenworth to take up key questions. What were the proper roles

of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and the Army corps

commander? Other critical issues included the forward support coordinating

line (FSCL), Army air in the theater of operations, control of the Army

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), air defense coordination, close air

support during rapid maneuver, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack

Radar System (JSTARS), the new Air Force composite-wing concept,

strategic and tactical intratheater airlift, and the Army and Air Force in

special operations.

Especially pertinent to the new doctrine was the FSCL question.

The nub of the issue was that advances in Army weaponry (the ATACMS

with 120 kilometers range and the tank-killing Apache ranging to 150 kilometers) had stretched the ground commander's operational reach and horizon beyond the relatively shallow line bounding the "close" area, beyond

which lay the traditional Air Force/Naval air and missile operational sector.

Combined with long-range intelligence and electronic warfare equipment

including the JSTARS, the new Army systems gave the ground commander

the ability to strike deeply beyond the traditional FSCL. The November

1991 Army-Air Force meeting raised but did not resolve this major bi-service issue.44

A strong idea discussed by General RisCassi that came out of the

important Army-Air Force meeting adapted the battle space concept of naval fleets to the idea of protective "umbrellas" free of enemy missiles under

which Army units could move. RisCassi advanced the idea of a moving

space of the land-commander's dominance. Another important idea was

43. Briefing slides, "Power Dinner," SAMS presentation to General Franks, 28 Oct 91.

44. (1) Briefing slides, Franks brief to Fall Army Commanders Conference, 16-19 Oct 91. (2)

Grogan Interview by Romjue, 22 Jan 93. (3) John G. Roos, "Army's Future War Fighting Ideas: New

Weapons Alter Basic Principles," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1992, p. 12.

54
RETHINKING WAR FIGHTING

the mutuality of Army-Air Force dependence: Army ground action also

served to support the Air Force.45

Significant developments followed on 20-21 November 1991 at

the Senior Leaders Warfighting Conference, convened by General Sullivan

at Fort Leavenworth. Agreement was achieved on the scope of the manual

and the course ahead. Day-long panel discussions on General Franks' three

groupings or "baskets" of thoughts preceded plenary presentations and discussions. For doctrinal perspective, presentations included comparative

definitions on basic terms such as command and control, strategy and surprise, and friction, from the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, and

the current FM 100-5.

The result of this meeting was the Army leaders' consensus on the

need for change and how to do it. It was agreed that the Army needed to go

beyond the limited scope of battle, while retaining war fighting as its central focus, and to treat the strategic aims of military operations, mobilization and deployment considerations, war termination, and post-hostilities

and peacetime operations. Logistics, intelligence, and the changing nature

of warfare itself all were explored. An important contribution at the November conference was the FORSCOM commander General Burba's construct for a force projection doctrine that tied the total Army to a contingency based Army that met objectives across the operational continuum.

Also important was the USAREUR commander General Saint's promotion

of a future dynamics of the battlefield.

Planners posited several idea-sequences as tentative bases for the

ongoing work: depth-tempo-lethality; mobilization-deployment-redeploymentdemobilization, and precrisis-lodgement-stabilization-restorationredeployment—the latter, the Burba model. Planners felt prepared to extend

Army doctrine all the way across the operational continuum from the

strategic to the tactical. The model helped link the strategic theater situation

and decisions with the operational campaign. Avoided thereby was a

nonproductive, echelon-based debate as to the doctrine's proper focus—

corps or echelons above corps. Significant also was the conference's

stimulus to exploring fully the changing nature of war, marked by a greater

depth, tempo, and lethality that suggested a simultaneity of operations.

Planners additionally believed that, through these considerations, low

intensity conflict had been successfully integrated into the overall doctrine.46

45. McDonough Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 93.

46. (1) Briefing slides, FM 100-5, Operations, SAMS brief to SLWC, 20-21 Nov 91. (2) Franks Interview by Romjue. (3) Briefing slides, Panel Briefings to SLWC on Operational Continuum, StrategicOperational-Tactical, and Mobilization and Deployment, 21 Nov 91, THRC. (Continued).

55
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

By December 1991, the vehicle of the precis and the reactions it

evoked had for General Franks set the basis of the new doctrine. Franks by

this time saw the concept contained in the August 1991 AirLand Operations

as premature, a bold, deductive leap for which the Army was not ready.

Instead, he intended to base the revision in great part on the experience of

Just Cause and Desert Storm, the lessons of which, however, he believed

the Army had not yet internalized. Writing these impressions to the Army

Chief of Staff on 5 December, Franks highlighted the three groupings of

thoughts in which he believed doctrinal change would be worked out.

Doctrine was how to think about military operations. Franks and Sullivan

were agreed on the Army's need for versatility in the new strategic

environment. They were clear that the revision had foremost to treat force

in war, but also operations to deter war. Finally, doctrinal change was needed

on the application of force, a larger task, however, that might well extend

beyond the 1993 revision.47

46. (Continued). (4) Memo, Lt Gen Wilson A. Shoffner, DCG for Combined Arms to General

Frederick M. Franks, Jr., n.d. [27 Nov 91], subj: After Action Report (AAR) on SLWC (Doctrine Phase),

THRC. (5) SLWC graphic comparing Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, FM 100-5 terminology, THRC. (6)

Franks Interview by Malone, 2 Dec 92.

47. Letter, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the

Army, 5 Dec 91, no subject

56
ANEW

DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

At the heart ofthe right doctrine forforce projection

in the post-Cold War andpost-Gulf War world were the

dynamics of battle itself. The desert war of 1991 had revealed

new potencies in a strategic world where the rules seemed to

have changed. Franks and his doctrine planners

needed to distill to their essence the most significantpoints in

the changing dynamic.

During the early months of 1992, General Franks, his staff, and

his doctrine writers worked their way toward a new battlefield dynamics.

That work, originating in Franks' own thinking, would evolve as the heart

of the change presented in the new post-Cold War doctrine. It would also

lead to the creation and institutionalization within the Training and Doctrine Command of battle laboratories to develop the dynamics further. The

battle dynamics work began in parallel to, but soon merged with, the efforts

of Franks' writing team in the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort

Leavenworth.

Digesting Theory and Practice: the Writing Team

The initial approach of Colonel McDonough and the writing team

in the School of Advanced Military Studies was to develop the doctrinal

manual through "modules". These were tightly written digests of doctrinal

topics or "think-pieces" of 8-15 pages to be subsequently fleshed out and

fitted into chapters of a first draft of the manual. The idea was to bring an

intensity of focus on new doctrinal points and emphases. Thus, they

constituted a "pre"-first draft. They consisted of two sections: potential

text, and the intellectual background and thought process. About 30 modules

57
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

were planned, of which more than 20 were drafted between November 1991

and February 1992.'

Early chapter outlines heavily emphasized theater operations and,

in keeping with a mainspring of change, placed operations short of war

chapters ahead of those for war fighting operations. Designated modules

and writing assignments were fitted to the 18 chapters of the early outline.2

Colonel McDonough additionally solicited, from majors enrolled in the

1991-1992 SAMS program, essays and papers on doctrinal subjects, which

the team read and used.3

The SAMS modules addressed among other topics the continuum

of military operations, conflict termination and post-conflict activities,

mobilization and deployment, operational fires, logistics preparation of the

theater, the strategic environment, and the American way of war. The team

sent individual modules to doctrine planners at the headquarters for review

and comment. Maj. Gen. Clark, who at General Franks' behest had assumed an intensive role in the project, did not fully agree with the module

approach, thinking it mistaken. Clark issued vigorous criticisms, focused

on what he saw in the module packages as excessive political science terminology and a lack of soldier's perspective.4

Franks responded to the

initial think-pieces and their scholarly framework similarly, adding the need

for clear vigorous language.5

Despite objections to the pre-draft pieces, or to their methodology,

the modules approach enforced a deep and exacting informed inquiry by

the SAMS writers into doctrinal points and issues and in the end served

1. (1) Memo, LtGen Wilson A. Shoffnerto General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., n.d. [27 Nov91], subj:

After Action Rept (AAR) of SLWC (Doctrine Phase), THRC. (2) RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS

008: FM 100-5 Calendar, Module Development, incl Note, Rick Rowlett to Seminar Leaders, 2 Dec 91.

(3) MFR ATZL-SWV, Colonel James R. McDonough, Dir SAMS, 19 Dec 91, subj: Process Report on

FM 100-5. (4) Rowlett Interview by Romjue, 4 and 15 Feb 94.

2. (1) Module Development Plan, End A to FM 100-5 Process and Product Chronology, FM 100-5

Writing Team, THRC. (2) RC CAC/LVN, SG CGSC 91, SAMS-004: FM 100-5, Operations Chapter Outline, folder note.

3. McDonough Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 93. The SAMS director also brought the next year's

students into the critiquing process later in 1992.

4. (1) Maj Gen Clark handwritten notes on enclosed slides to Memo, Col Rick Rowlett, SAMS to

Col Cork [Dir, Army Doc, HQ TRADOC], 21 Jan 92, subj: FM 100-5 Discussions at TSLC. (2) Memo

ATCD-XA, Maj Gen Wesley K. Clark, DCSCD to General Franks, 10 Feb 92, subj: First Chapter FM

100-5. (3) Modules Handbook, Army Doc Dir.

5. Franks handwritten note to [Maj Gen] Wes [Clark], 26 Jan 92, on Form 30, 24 Jan 92, subj: FM

100-5, Operations, Outline Review.

58
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

. f?i- " .' il!|||!],l«n,ll'^i|

■■"*" ■■■ " «1 ilJ 'Hill

United States Army Command and General Staff College

well General Franks' intent for fullest intellectual engagement ofsignificant

doctrinal shifts. In the end, many of the modules did go into the book,

some as full chapters.6

Such inquiries by both Franks and his doctrine writers had led them

by early January to the position that the whole construct of discrete parts of

the battlefield—close, deep, and rear—was no longer applicable.7 General

Franks, however, in late January did change the timetable to speed up preparation, advising Lt. Gen. Shoffner in late January that he wanted first-draft

chapters to review the next month.8

6. Rowlett Interview by Romjue, 4 and 15 Feb 94.

7. E-mail msg, Lt Col J.T. Goodloe, Ch, Cons Div, CDD, CGSC, 8 Jan 92 w/notes on conversation

on warfare, 3 Jan 92 with Col Kempt, Col Baerman, and Col McDonough.

8. SAMS Chronicle.

59
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

In late January, the CGSC planners briefed the Army Chief of Staff

on the progress of the revision. They described the project's developing

potential to go beyond the November 1991 consensus for expanded doctrine and adjustment to accommodate lessons learned, new joint doctrine,

and the new strategic situation. Significant war fighting changes engendered by the impact of advanced technologies on linear warfare, disperson,

simuntaneity of action, depth, artillery, and versatility, lay on the horizon,

capturable in a late-1990s revision. Planners at that point felt that the time

was not ripe to exploit that potential for the 1993 edition. General Sullivan

momentarily acceded to this argument.9 Much, however, would change in

the course of 1992, as planners at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Monroe further developed central doctrinal points.

While fitting modules to chapters, the writing team developed a

15-chapter outline. It included a 4-chapter discussion of a doctrine for

peace, crisis, and war (the Army in the strategic environment, the environment of war, fundamentals of Army operations, and the Army's role in crisis response); six chapters on theater operations (theater structure and control, designing campaigns and major operations, conflict termination, intelligence, logistics, and operations short of war); and five final chapters on

wartime operations subjects (theater wartime operations, tactical operations,

tactical offense, tactical defense, and retrograde).10Two initial draft chapters went to General Franks on 3 March 1992. The TRADOC commander

distributed the first three draft chapters (those for the Army in the strategic

environment, the Army's role in crisis response, and operations short of

war) at the Army Senior Commanders' Conference held at the end of March

at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. All chapters would be drafted by midApril. Most had been edited by late May 1992."

In the meantime, on 6 March General Franks met with his writers

to issue several guidelines, some of them the fruits of the battle dynamics

effort, which we will discuss in the next section. Franks told the SAMS

team to incorporate the three groupings of thoughts earlier noted:

mobilization and deployment, the operational continuum, and strategicoperational-tactical linkage. The TRADOC commander wanted to move

9. Briefing slides, CGSC briefing to General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA, FM 100-5 and DC/ADC

Program Update, 28 Jan 92, w/CSÄs handwritten notations.

10. Chapter Review Plan, End I to FM 100-5 P&P Chronology, 21 Jan 92, THRC

11. (1) Memo, Col Jim MoDonough to Maj Gen Wesley K. Clark, 4 Mar 92, subj: Chapters 1 and 2 of FM

100-5, w/encls. (2) Handout to 1992 SSCC, FM 100-5 Operations, The 1993 Revision. (3) Fact

Sheet, Lt Col Bobby MoCarter, Army Doc Dir, 17 Apr 92, subj: FM 100-5, Operations, Revision. (4)

Briefing slides, [FM 100-5 Briefing], ADCSCDD to Lt Gen Peay, 21 May 92.

60
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

the manual's focus to the third area. Both current doctrine and recent Army

experience would influence that focus. Franks also wanted the manual to

give major attention to five elements of discussion in the linkage: early

deployment, lethality, and survivability; the notion of increased depth;

increased battle space; command and control and tempo; and combat service

support. The five "battle dynamics," Franks had come to believe, would be

the heart of the manual, and he wanted full dialogue toward capturing their

ideas. Not to cut off discussion prematurely, the plan for a first full draft by

the spring was postponed to later in 1992.12 Army reaction to the three

early-1992 chapter drafts was strong, due in part to the limited topics they

covered, hence to what was not covered. Keeping the war fighting focus of

operations doctrine above all, was the principal concern of the responding

field commanders, troubled on this point.13 As it happened, the initial draft

would soon be restructured. A significant additional component ofthe 1993

doctrine was in formulation in early 1992, to which we will now turn.

Franks and the Changing Dynamics of Battle

Along with the reorientation to force projection operations from

the continental United States and the requirements of operations short of

war, the thrust of the 1993 doctrinal change was its new battle dynamics.

The distillation into clear notions of those critical doctrinal areas where

significant change was in progress in the early 1990s was the TRADOC

commander's outstanding contribution to the doctrinal reordering. Franks'

move to focus on what he first saw as "glimmerings" of new battlefield

realities came from two sources. First was a deductive grasp ofthe requirements levied upon the U.S. Army by the advent of the new strategic world.

Second were Franks' own observations as commander in a corps campaign

in the Gulf War and in his subsequent thinking. Franks regarded these

indications as glimmerings of changes in land warfare first seen in Desert

Storm. He was convinced that the Army needed to pay attention to those

12. (1) E-mail msg, Ma] Gen Wesley Clark to Maj Gen Lionetti, Brig Gen Steele, Col McDonough,

Brig Gen Grogan, Lt Gen Shoffner, Col Cork, 7 Mar 92, subj: FM 100-5 Recap of CG's Guidance at 6

Mar 92 Session at SAMS. (2) SAMS Chronicle. (3) Briefing slides, Franks FM 100-5 briefing to

SSCC, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 31 Mar 92. Additional Franks instructions at this time were for a pocketsize manual, and a reduction of FM 100-5 "lists".

13. As expressed by all three major troop commanders: General Burba, CG FORSCOM; General

RisCassi, CINC CFC/USFK; General Saint, CINCUSAREUR. (1) OCH files. (2) Memo, Col Boyd to

General Franks, 20 Apr 92, subj: 100-5 Writing team Visit with General Saint Feedback. (3) SAMS

Chronology. (4) Memo, Col James R. McDonough through Dep Comdt CGSC to Cdr CAC, 5 May 92,

subj: Senior Commanders' Review of FM 100-5.

61
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

areas, where warfare was changing. He called them collectively "battle

dynamics." In the period from late 1991 to early 1992, these thoughts would

jell into hypotheses, then into areas for further concentration after Franks

became convinced that they had merit for the whole Army.

Force projection as the new order of the day placed a premium on

requirements of early entry into war theaters close and distant.14 Combat

service support, or logistics, did not pose new requirements for the nation

that had waged a global war during 1941-1945, but logistics in the Gulf

War had revealed a marked transformation arising from the use of new

automation and communication technologies. In addition, both for Franks

and for other observers, the Gulf War demonstrated a new capability to

strike the points of an enemy's defense simultaneously throughout its depth.

Franks' further impressions of changed battle dynamics centered on the

idea of command and control on the move. That idea was tied to a time

dimension that was determined by command decisions, by perceptions of

enemy actions, and by a wider more imaginative commander's vision of

the larger battle space involved with his operations.15

Franks' belief that these "glimmerings" pointed toward new battle

concepts led him to address them intensively, even as the doctrine writing

team was in the midst of formulating a first draft. However, the TRADOC

commander seated the inquiry into these five "baskets" of ideas, as he called

them, in his own headquarters combat developments-doctrine staff under

Maj. Gen. Clark. As with the revision project in general, Franks' method

was to air and develop those baskets at successive TRADOC and Army

conferences, focus a working group on them, and analyze them in scenarios.

Through these means, the baskets were pared to sharper definition, emerging as the battle dynamics heart of the new doctrine. In that process, both

public and private, Franks called fully on the thinking of his planners and

the SAMS writers.

In the battle dynamics inquiry, doctrine planners defined dynamics

as the interaction of the elements of combat power, as applied at the operational and tactical levels of war. The starting point was to identify those

factors that were changing the firepower-maneuver-protection-leadership

interaction, and then to set clear the meaning of each such change. What

factors were in the formula, and how did they relate? What did the Gulf

14. The emphasis on early entry was recommended to General Franks by Maj Gen D.W. Christman,

commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood. Clark Interview by Chapman

and Romjue, 8 Jul 92.

15. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue. (2) Clark Interview by Chapman and Romjue, 8 Jul 92.

62
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

War battlefield reveal about speed, lethality, space, the information age,

tempo, time, and other factors?16

Drawing the Army school commandants directly into the effort,

General Franks prepared and convened a TRADOC senior leaders' conference at Fort Rucker, Alabama on 28-29 January 1992. This conference was

the formal genesis of the battle dynamics ideas. In briefings, the Field

Artillery School commandant, Maj. Gen. FredF Marty, and theArmor School

commandant, Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Foley, respectively explored operational

and tactical battlefield dynamics, supported by panels. These sessions examined the AirLand Operations concept of maneuver by fires, the new technology, the doctrinal impact of changes in lethality and time, the need for versatile

logistics, and other topics.

In the context of a Southwest Asia scenario set at the year 2004,

penetrating questions were asked at the Fort Rucker meeting. Did the Gulf

War represent a fundamental change in the nature of warfare? Did the new

technology alter the principles of war, or merely change their relationship?

What was now the nature, for example ofthe principles of mass and economy

of force? Was technology the most significant vector, and what technology

offered the most significant gains—target acquisition and engagement? information processing and dissemination? Did the AirLand Battle tenet of

synchronization alone define the evidently changed space-time dynamic?

What were the ramifications of the allies' demonstrated "decisive overmatch" of combat power? Was versatility a significant new operational

requirement?17

General Franks originated the notion of versatility early on. Agility as a tenet captured a lot of the requirement, but not all. Franks felt

doctrine needed a way to describe the commander's need—in the postCold War world—to go easily from one set of strategic circumstances to

another quite different, and to be ready for any strategic circumstances.18

In late January 1992, Franks asked Colonel McDonough for a paper on

16. (1) Discussion slides for General Franks for TSLC, n.d. [Nov 91], HQ TRADOC. (2) Slides,

Briefing, HQ TRADOC [Lt Col McCarter] to Lt Gen Peay, n.d. [10 Dec 91], subj: FM 100-5. (3) Msg,

Cdr TRADOC to distr, 191450Z Dec 91, subj: TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference I (TSLC I) (4) Briefing slides, Maj Gen Clark briefing, 15 Jan 92, FM 100-5. (6) Grogan Interview by Romjue, 22 Jan 93.

17. (1) MFR ATCG-P, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Cdr TRADOC, 29 Jan 92, subj: TRADOC

Senior Leaders Conference "Hotwash." (2) Briefing slides, Briefing, Tactical Dynamics in the AirLand

Battlefield, presented by Armor Center, TSLC I, 28-29 Jan 92, Ft. Rucker. (3) Briefing slides, briefing

conference update, Army Doc Dir to Maj Gen Clark, 4 Feb 92. (4) Franks Interview by Malone, 20 Apr

92.

18. Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

63
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

versatility as a possible fifth tenet of doctrine. Responding, McDonough

argued for the importance of a versatile Army, but did not recommend versatility as a central doctrinal tenet per se. The SAMS director did, however, present a convincing metaphor for the notion—that of a decathlon

athlete who had to compete in ten disparate events, just as would the U.S.

Army with its globe-spanning security responsibilities. McDonough initially viewed versatility as a strategic, not an operational-tactical, concept.19

Versatility as a major doctrinal notion significant enough to pose

as a fundamental tenet had headquarters support. The existent four tenets

were in part undergoing change, in particular depth, as a result of the technological advances of the information age, together with extended weapon

ranges, and the potential for simultaneous rather than sequential engagements. Tactical agility, headquarters planners felt, was not enough. The

shift to power projection would require tailoring to other aims on short

notice, as the sudden mission change in Desert Storm from combat to handling refugees had demonstrated.20 The arguments would lead to a decision by General Franks to expand the concept as a fifth tenet of Army operations doctrine.

In early February 1992, Franks and Clark were also working with

the idea of increasing the commander's "battle space" by applying longrange stand-offfires. Battle space was a term the U.S. Navy employed as it

related to surface warfare. Franks, who introduced the idea, was influenced by the notions of the British writer, Paddy Griffith, on the increasingly "empty" battlefield of dispersed units. Franks also called on his earlier experience in concepts work under TRADOC commander Donn Starry.

He found applicable Starry's notion of an advantageous battle space between a commander and his opponent, created by the commander's longerranged detection and engagement capabilities. Franks corresponded with

Starry on the concept in its direct fire context, but he also added to that

notion the idea that the commander needed to think of his battle space in

terms of all the factors that influenced it—and not just the linear factors.21

19. Note, Col James R. McDonough, Dir SAMS to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., n.d. [10 Feb 92],

w/encl: Paper, "Versatility's Value as an Operational and Tactical Concept."

20. These arguments were made by Maj Mark P. Hertling, a special assistant to Franks, in Memo

ATCG-P, Hertling to CG, 2 Mar 92, subj: Thoughts on Versatility as a Doctrinal Tenet.

21. (1) Memo ATCD-ZA, Maj Gen Wesley K. Clark, DCSCDD to Comdts, TRADOC Service Schools,

10 Feb 92, subj: FM 100-5 Battlefield Dynamics (Latest Thinking). (2) Franks Interview by Romjue,

17 Nov94.

64
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

Desert Storm Lessons

On 2-3 March, Franks convened a second significant conference of

the early-year. Held at Fort Monroe, and introduced by General Sullivan,

the "Desert Storm One-Year Later Conference" was attended widely by

many ofthe principal U.S. Army GulfWar commanders.22 Franks' purpose

was to garner for the doctrine the best experience from the Desert Storm

operation. The TRADOC commander focused the meeting on two things:

What had the Army learned and what corrective actions were under way?

What battle dynamics insights were apparent?

In recapitulation, important U.S. doctrinal shortcomings were revealed. Deficiencies were present in joint fire coordination measures, logistics, intelligence, doctrine for liaison officers, post-conflict measures,

mobilization and deployment doctrine, and redeployment and demobilization.23 What were key Desert Storm lessons? The Gulf War commanders

agreed that AirLand Battle had indeed worked. U.S. military technology

was a clear-cut advantage. Political imperatives were critical to holding a

coalition together—a sensitivity to other cultures, a strong liaison organization, and host nation support. Static defensive positions were susceptible

to "top attack" precision munitions, over-the-hill reconnaissance, and nonlinear warfare. The existence of a precision-munitions revolution was evident, and it made forces vulnerable throughout the battlefield. It also indicated that no army could afford to go to war outgunned or outranged. Any

firing system in place could be detected, engaged, and destroyed within

minutes. It was also clear that the commander with firepower superiority

possessed the initiative, and that meant joint fire support. Future artillery

systems that could not operate autonomously and move freely between

missions would probably be destroyed. Consequently, a trained and ready

Army was essential. The U.S. Army had to avoid the weakening of its

capabilities and readiness in the build-down occurring. Highly capable and

22. Attending were the two U.S. corps commanders General Franks (VII) and Lt Gen Gary E. Luck

(XVIII Airborne), as well as Lt Gen John J. Yeosock the ARCENT commander, and Lt Gen Gus Pagonis

ARCENT Suport Command. Seven division commanders were present: Lt Gen Ronald H. Griffith (1st

AD), Lt Gen James H. Johnson, Jr. (82d Airborne), LtGen J.H. Binford Peay III (101st Airborne), Maj

Gen Paul E. Funk (3d AD), Maj Gen John H. Tilelli, Jr. (1st Cavalry), Maj Gen Thomas G. Rhame(1st

ID(Mech), Maj Gen Barry R. McCaffrey (24th ID(Mech). Also attending were Desert Storm command

sergeants major, the TRADOC commandants, and others.

23. At the one-year later point, Army and joint field manuals and concepts were in development to

deal with those deficiencies: FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations; FM 100-16,

Army Operational Support; FM 100-17, Mobilization-Deployment- Redeployment-Demobilization; Joint

Pub 3-09, Joint Fire Coordination Measures.

65
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

available reserve forces were also essential, and early deploying combat

support and combat service support units were critical.

TRADOC planners considered that, unlike Iraq, the nation's next

opponent in war would likely rise to meet any U.S. forced entry into the

theater. Having also learned from the GulfWar, that opponent would better

understand tactical ballistic missile operations. He would not allow time

for a build-up of force. He would have better air defense and would use

more mines, land and sea. He would realize that U.S. space links were

vulnerable. He would likely have available at least some elements of the

most advanced "world-class" military technology.24

At the heart of the right doctrine for force projection in the postCold War and post-Gulf War world were the dynamics of battle itself. The

desert war of 1991 had revealed new potencies in a strategic world where

the rules seemed to have changed. Franks and his doctrine planners needed

to distill to their essence the most significant points in the changing dynamic.

The battlefield's "deeper depth," the near-instantaneous effects of

information technology, battle tempo, simultaneity of attack, new and

pathbreaking military technology—all these and other notions furnished

general identifiers as to the changing nature of war. New factors seemed to

be apparent in the mix of modern battle. Aided by the Desert Storm conference, planners sought to pinpoint those factors and think through their impact and implications. The JSTARS system, united with unmanned aerial

vehicle technology, offered real-time intelligence. The impact was a capability for real-time targeting and for continuous target development. What

were the implications? The impacts ofthe new factor of global "connectivity" through satellite communications, the Global Positioning System,

Mobile Subscriber Equipment, and other systems were both good and bad—

real-time command and control and a compressed decision cycle on the

one hand, data overload on the other. Implications were: streamlined control mechanisms, but also the notion of command separate from control.

Planners at the early-March conference set up a number of such sequential

"thought-grids" of these types.

Factors could also conjoin. Factors such as global connectivity,

jointness, together with new weapon, acquisition, and visualizing capabilities added up to the particularly significant impact of simultaneous operations. Simultaneity created a synergism of effects. How did that affect the

24. (1) Briefing slides, HQ TRADOC briefing for Desert Storm One-Year Later Conference, 2-3

Mar 92. (2) MFR ATCD-P, Col William T. McCauley, Dir Cons Dir, 11 Mar 92, subj: Desert Storm

Conference After Action Report. (3) (3) Briefing slides, "Hotwash" from Desert Storm Conference of

2-3 Mar 92, 3 Mar 92.

66
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

decentralized execution of a commander's intent—a centerpiece ofthe current doctrine? New doctrine would need a new emphasis on mission tactics and orders. While the battlefield was definable and usefully so as "closedeep-rear," was it not also a battlefield bounded in its depth by the capability of simultaneous attack throughout that depth?25

Following the Desert Storm conference, comprehensive lessonslearned information was assembled. For doctrinal purposes, it fit into four

categories: those things that worked in Desert Storm and that should be

kept and sustained; things that worked, to be kept but improved; things

requiring further correction; and lastly, Desert Storm-unique lessons.

Assessing the doctrine-implicating lessons following the Desert

Storm meeting, planners considered that tactical intelligence and intelligence preparation of the battlefield were excellent. While the JSTARS and

Hawkeye systems were highly proficient, improvements were needed toward such capabilities as "seamless" intelligence dissemination. Army

aviation performed well, in particular attack helicopters. The helicopter's

night capability was a major advantage. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle

proved its lethality, reliability, and survivability, though the Improved TOW

Vehicle was too slow. The Abrams tank was highly lethal, but air filters

and fuel consumption were problems. The SINCGARS radio provided

highly reliable communications, but many communications improvements,

such as better strategic links and an "eavesdropping" capability for commanders to tap nets were needed. The Multiple Launch Rocket System

demonstrated its excellence. The Patriot missile countered the Scud theater missile threat within its design limitations, but air defense at corps and

division generally needed modernization.26

Altogether, the scores of observations and lessons from Desert Storm

pointed to the significant synergistic effects of modern U.S. intelligence,

communications, and weapon systems concertedly employed by a welltrained force to produce a higher battle tempo, deep and simultaneous attack capabilities, and the habit of command and control on the move. Still

another lesson was evident by its absence. Preparations for the Gulf War

had had the luxury of uncontested buildup. Most future operations would

not. The art of early entry with force was the lesson/non-lesson.

25. Briefing slides, HQ TRADOC briefing for Desert Storm One-Year Later Conference, 2-3 Mar 92.

(2) A contributor to the grid-sequence method and to the vision of simultaneous fires in depth, as well

as other notions, was Col Robert A. Doughty, Head of the Department of History at West Point. Ltr,

Doughty to Maj Gen Wesley K. Clark, 11 Feb 92, no subject, w/encl including factor-impact-implication matrix.

26. Briefing slides, Desert Storm Lessons Learned, HQ TRADOC, n.d. [ca. 10 May 92],

67
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

jljljljitjp

W*k*<P*J#—I*

kyiv:v> A"*"^ ^^vfc''k*~*.<*s»

^tM- . - ,: . *_<.'. . . "•» « «I im" f Ji-lm

M1 Abrams Tank

68
Multiple Launch Rocket System

Operation Just Cause, the U.S. invasion in 1989-1990 to restore

democratic government to Panama, also would have significant influence

on the new doctrine. A short-notice coup-de-main, it nonetheless had important lessons for joint operations and for conflict termination and postconflict activities. Just Cause with its many concerted actions all at once

was an example, too, of the emerging concept of depth and simultaneous

attack. The doctrine would include Just Cause illustrations.27

At the March 1992 Desert Storm conference, Franks and his planners settled on the five baskets of thoughts as the critical change-points of

battle dynamics for the 1993 doctrine. The TRADOC commander regarded

the conference as a validation of the five battle-dynamics hypothesis, and

he set to work to make them doctrinal realities.28 Through the spring, these

notions were further developed in meetings and discussions. Franks again

27. Rowlett Interview by Romjue, 4 and 15 Feb 94.

28. Franks Interview by Romjue and review ms. marginal note.

69
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

drew the commandants into battle dynamic scenario work at a TRADOC

commanders' conference on 10-12 March at Fort Lee, Virginia, supplemented by a staff ride to the Chancellorsville battlefield. He updated the

Army senior commanders at their spring conference at Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, the end of that month.29

Developing Battle Dynamics

Concerned that the battle dynamics needed a more organized approach and more substantive school and commandant involvement, Franks

directed Maj. Gen. Clark, on 15 March, to set up a "committee" at the

headquarters for that purpose, with CGSC and SAMS participation.30 Thus

to concentrate the battle dynamics work, General Franks assembled a

special working group from the branch schools. It met at Fort Monroe in

late April-early May and again in late May 1992. A scenario developed by

the TRADOC Analysis Command supported this work. The Battle Dynamics Working Group completed, in mid-May, battle dynamics concept

papers for early entry and lethality; depth and simultaneous attack, battle

space, command and control and tempo, and combat service support. The

papers were also pitched to a planned doctrine development seminar to

convene at the end of May. Views were at this point mixed on the choice

and clarity of the battle dynamics.31 Maj. Gen. Clark distributed the completed battle dynamics concept papers in mid-June. At his behest, group

members also prepared papers on several related topics, including deep

operations, versatility, victory, and battle command, which were distributed to planners in July.32

29. (1) MFR ATCD-A, Army Doc Dir, HQ TRADOC, 13 Mar 92, subj: TCC Doctrine After Action Report. (2) Briefing slides, Franks FM 100- 5 briefing to SSCC, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 31 Mar 92. (3)

Franks Interview by Malone, 20 Apr 92.

30. (1) E-mail msg, Maj Gen Wesley Clark to [Lt Gen] Shoffner, 15 Mar 92, subj: Battlefield Dynamics. (2) Interview of Lt Col Bobby McCarter, Army Doctrine Directorate, ODCSDOC, by John L. Romjue,

16 Mar 93, HQ TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Va.

31. (1) E-mail msg, Lt Col Don Stevenson, Armor Cen to [Col] Cork, Dir Army Doc, HQ TRADOC, 15

May 92, subj: Feedback-Battlefield Dynamics Task Force. (2) Paper, Col McDonough, Dir SAMS to

Col Cork, (Dir Army Doc),DCSCDD, n.d. [15 May 92], no subj [BDWG], (3) E-mail msg, Brig Gen

Ernst to Maj Gen Clark, 19 May 92, subj: BDWG Project Review.

32. (1) Msg, Cdr TRADOC to distr, 172236Z Apr 92, subj: TRADOC Doctrinal Working Group. (2)

Msg, Cdr TRADOC to distr, 172235Z Apr 92, subj: Battle Dynamics Working Group. (3) Fact Sheet

ATCD-A, Lt Col Bobby McCarter, Army Doc Dir, 12 May 92, subj: Doctrine Development Seminar

(DDS), 28 May 92. (4) Msg, Cdr TRADOC to distr, 211530Z May 92, subj: Doctrine Development

Seminar Preparations. (Continued).

70
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

Because the intensive battle dynamics work at TRADOC headquarters proceeded in parallel with but substantially independently from that of

the SAMS writing team at Fort Leavenworth, General Franks revised the

group's chartering directive to specify that its work would flow into the

work of the team. Franks employed his deputies at Fort Leavenworth and

Fort Lee, Lt. Gen. Shoffner and Lt. Gen. Samuel Wakefield, as an oversight

group.33

Held at Fort Monroe on 27-28 May, the next major meeting, a

Doctrine Development Seminar, brought the commandants directly into the

formulation of the battle-dynamics heart of the emerging doctrine. Employing the Battle Dynamics Working Group's concepts and a Southwest

Asia scenario prepared by the TRADOC Analysis Command, commandant

groups, including other service and joint command representatives, evaluated the five battle dynamics. The focus succeeded in advancing several of

the concepts, while others needed further work. Franks was now prepared,

however, to incorporate them all into the new doctrine.

Early entry was defined as the initial projection of forces or capabilities into a theater, whether opposed or unopposed, in order to gain lodgement and access rapidly to a vital area in the theater. It set the stage for

initial and subsequent actions, though in instances it could be forcible and

decisive in itself. The TRADOC commandants believed the concept had to

be clear about the joint, interagency, and combined components of such

operations. Success was linked directly to the intelligence and logistics

preparation of the theater. Considerations of task-organizing and tailoring

the deploying force packages, depending on their size and echelon, were

paramount. Future projected force mix required modular packages of combat forces and tailoring of intelligence and support systems. Key required

characteristics were the lethality, survivability, versatility, sustainability, and

mobility of the early entry force. Commanders-in-chief needed to understand the desired end-state of any action begun.

Depth and simultaneous attack was, at this juncture, defined as

32. (Continued). (5) E-mail msgs, Capt Whetston, Army Doc Dir to distr, 14 May and 24 Jul 92. (6)

Bklt, Generic 1.0 Scenario, TRAC-SC-0592, May 92. (7) Memo ATCD-ZC, Brig Gen Timothy J. Grogan,

ADCS Cons and Doc to TSLC II Participants, 21 Jul 92, subj: Doctrine Discussions. Other concept

papers covered the following topics: tempo, extending the range at which soldiers exchange direct

fire, the Army's umbilical to space, blurring of strategic-operational-tactical levels of war, how deep

must the Army fight, victory: a perspective, and versatility. (8) Memo ATCD-ZAD, Maj Gen Wesley K.

Clark, DCSCDD, 18 Jun 92, subj: Battle Dynamics Definitions and Concept Papers.

33. Msg, Cdr TRADOC to distr, 172236Z Apr 92, subj: TRADOC Doctrinal Working Group, and this

message in draft, with Franks' handwritten emendations.

71
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

simultaneous application of combat power against an enemy throughout

the depth of the battlefield. Attack needed to be simultaneous and

synchronized with joint and combined capabilities. Capabilities now at a

commander's disposal had the effect of blurring the levels of war. Further,

a difficulty lay in the concept of simultaneous attack in depth, in the

consideration of fire and maneuver. Did fires "maneuver"? Still another

aspect of simultaneity was the reminder that, despite a capability to

disseminate intelligence to increasingly lower levels, Army forces could

not assume perfect intelligence of the future battlefield. Planners noted

that while Soviet theory had described attack on the enemy's combat order

throughout its whole depth, the American notion added the application of

emerging technology and the massing of effects to that principle. A parallel

idea of the SAMS doctrine writing team at this time was that attack in

depth presented the enemy with more situations that he could react to or

counter.

Recognized in the logistics, or combat service support, definition

at the May 1992 doctrine seminar was that planners had to consider "splitbased" logistics. That phrase signified combat service support operations

split between the war theater and elsewhere, as information processing technology facilitated that more efficient principle. Doctrine had to address the

mobilization of the industrial base in times of crisis, identify what form the

logistics system should take, identify civilian contract issues, and determine who would run the strategic base. The concept sought "seamless"

distribution-based and "anticipatory" logistics. Multifunctional logistics,

integrated automation, "total asset visibility" at any given moment, logistics preparation of the theater, and highly responsive distribution were key

ideas. In May 1992, this area had considerable work remaining.

Battle space had not been well formulated by late May. It was

initially defined as the range at which combat actions began between opposing combined arms maneuver forces at brigade and below. However,

the direction of seminar discussion was that the concept should not be restrictive to any specific echelon. Battle space also dealt with spatial relationships of forces and formations. This concept was related to operational

tempo, space communications, and the dramatic increase in target acquisition and engagement ranges. Much work still lay ahead to clarify and distill the engaging and imaginative notion of the commander's battle space.

Command and control, or C2, and tempo, soon to jell into battle

command, was defined in late May as the rate or pace of combat activities

over time requiring effective command and control. Discussion suggested

that C2 and tempo should be separated. Planners considered that command

was the art, involving the commander and the what; control was the science,

72
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

involving the staff and the how. Much more work was needed here to

examine the relationships of command post concepts, the decision making

cycle, command group dynamics, joint-combined-interagency influences,

requirements for strategic and theater assets, and command post mobility.

This concept drew on a 1992 Army Science Board Study on command and

control on the move.34

At the doctrine development seminar of late May 1992, General

Franks noted the lack of adjustment in infantry tactics during the bloody

exchanges of the American Civil War, when the minie ball and the Spencer

rifle were available but not exploited. He also noted a document in the

Armor School museum ofthe Bundeswehr: a patent, dated 1888, for a tracklaying vehicle. Franks asked how "leaps" to new capabilities occurred when

the signs were present but not seen. "It's all around....you don't see it." But a

further result of Franks' battle dynamics work was a move to harness such

capability leaps, the concept of "Battle Laboratories," which the TRADOC

commander announced and which he had taken steps to establish in TRADOC

the previous month. The new laboratories would provide a way of looking at

the implications of things, "decidedly different than in the past."35

Battle Laboratories

At the end of March 1992, General Franks wrote his Combined

Arms Command commander and combat arms commandants a significant

message related to two of the emerging battle dynamics: battle space and

command and control. Franks signalled his belief that the Army was on the

verge of a quantum improvement in command and control of battle space at

the brigade level and below. He based his conviction on technological

improvements to key functions: the tactical commander's situational

awareness, and automated target designation and hand-off. The specific

technology consisted of the Intervehicular Information System, or IVIS,

and the Global Positioning System. Once the concept could be realized,

tanks and other attack systems could team against an enemy formation almost

34. (1) MemoATCD-A, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to Chief of Staff of the Army, n.d. [ca. 29

May 92], subj: Exec Sum of Doc Dev Seminar, THRC. (2) Bklt, Cdrs Confer Battlefield Dynamics SWA

Theater, SWA BDG [scenario], developed for TRADOC DCSCDD by TRAC, May 1992. (SECRET—

Info used is UNCLASSIFIED) (3) Memo ATACD-A, Col Stephen D. Cork, Dir Army Doc through Brig

Gen Grogan to DCSCDD, 1 May 92, subj: Battle Dynamics Working Group (BDWG) Update and Proposed Doctrine Development Seminar Plan, w/Tabs B through F. (4) Memo ATZL-SWD, Brig Gen

William M. Steele, Dep Comdt, USACGSC to Brig Gen Grogan, ADCS for Concepts and Doctrine,

USATRADOC, n.d. [May 92], subj: Battle Dynamics scenario and draft papers.

35. OCH Notes, John L. Romjue, Doctrine Development Seminar, 28 May 92.

73
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

instantaneously and even do so while physically dispersed. Franks charged

his subordinates, with the Armor School to lead, to begin work on the

doctrine and on an experimentation program to validate it. As early as fall

1991, he had expressed concern to General Sullivan, in an informal meeting

in the Chief of Staff's office, that the Army lacked an institutional means to

experiment with the changing methods of land warfare, such as the Army

had earlier done well in the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers and the 11th Air

Assault tests of 1963-1964.36

General Franks laid out his plans for Battle Laboratories at a meeting with his deputy for combined arms and the SAMS director at Fort

Leavenworth on 15 April 1992. Discussing plans for structuring the future

force with Lt. Gen. Shoffner, he noted the need for TRADOC to do its own

experimentation and laboratory work at places where firing ranges, troops,

units, and airspace could be combined with the simulation microprocessor

to replicate the battlefield. Franks noted that several TRADOC Army schools

had those facilities, and he recalled a recent suggestion by General Sullivan

that Franks employ the 194th Armored Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky,

similarly to the formation and use of the 11th Air Assault organization in

the 1960s, as a test-bed. "We got to get the dirt, wind, and rain and the

troops and units and the real gear out there and the simulations hooked up,"

Franks said. He thought such institutionalized facilities could do major

work for the Army in the post-Cold War period. He saw these schoolbased agencies, initially termed "task forces," as the way to start. They

would furnish a new means, Franks believed, to implement the whole development system, as well as a way for TRADOC to capture the field experimentation leadership and the future battlefield leadership.37 Franks'

primary action officer for the initiative was Colonel William Hubbard, who

headed a newly formed Battle Laboratory Integration and Technology Directorate in Maj. Gen. Clark's combat developments office. Clark worked

the preliminary battle space command and control and IVIS concept into a

video planning conference on 20 April.38

36. (1) Msg, Cdr TRADOC to Cdrs CAC and Armor, Infantry, Aviation, Field Artillery, Engineer, and

Air Defense Artillery Centers, 312240Z Mar 92, subj: Battle Space Command and Control. (2) Franks

review ms. marginal note.

37. Tape transcript of meeting, General Franks-Lt Gen Shoffner, 15 Apr 92, THRC. TRADOC had

lost its test and experimentation organizations in November 1990, when they were transferred to the

U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command as part of a services-wide review aimed at

consolidation. Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, p. 106.

38. Briefing slides, briefing by Maj Gen Wesley Clark, video conference, FM 100-5, New Battlefield

Dynamics, 20 Apr 92.

74
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

During this mid-April 1992 planning period, Franks advised that

TRADOC headquarters would manage the establishment. He wanted six

laboratories formed at selected TRADOC posts. A battle space laboratory

for mounted combat at the Armor School at Fort Knox, formed in midApril, was the pilot effort, with a battle space laboratory for dismounted

combat at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and one at the

Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, involving notions of depth

and simultaneous attack to follow. Associated with the Fort Sill Battle Lab

were the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, and the Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. There would be a command and

control and battle tempo (later battle command) laboratory at Fort

Leavenworth, supported by the Intelligence School and the Signal School

at Fort Gordon, Georgia. At Fort Monroe, planners established an early

entry, lethality, and survivability laboratory, to work closely with geographically contiguous or nearby service headquarters—U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the

Air Force Tactical Air Command (later Air Combat Command), and the

Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Later planning added the

sixth laboratory, for combat service support, at Fort Lee, Virginia. Franks'

immediate guidance to the Armor commandant at Fort Knox was to use

advanced technology demonstrations and experimentation as well as theory

and tinkering. Franks talked personally with each commandant concerned.

He told them to lay out their program to execute. The battle dynamics concepts to be developed by the Battle Dynamics Working Group meeting at

Fort Monroe would support the labs. General Franks announced the Battle

Labs publicly in an industry leaders conference on 21 April in Atlanta,

Georgia.39

TRADOC fleshed out the Battle Laboratories rationale and purpose

in a White Paper issued in early May 1992.40 With the Soviet threat absent

as the definer of U.S. Army requirements, what was needed was an

"organized, institutional way to focus on competing ideas and technologies,

experiment with them, and find the best combinations to maintain the

technological edge...." The laboratories were based on the idea that

technology perpetually changed the nature of warfare and that, in the focused

39. (1) MFR ATCG-P, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 15 Apr 92, subj: Fort Knox and Fort

Leavenworth Trip Reports (14-15 April 1992). (2) E-mail msg, Maj Gen Wesley Clark to Lt Gen

Shoffner and Maj Gens White, Marty, Foley, 10 Apr 92, subj: Implementation of New Battlefield Dynamics. (3) E-mail msg, Brig Gen Grogan to Col Cork, Dir Army Doc, 21 Apr 92, subj: Battle Labs. (4)

Msg, Comdt Armor School to distr, 162300Z Apr 92, subj: Battle Space Battle Lab. (5) McCarter

Interview by Romjue, 16 Mar 93. (6) Franks review ms. marginal note (the "Atlanta XVIII" Conference, 21 April 1992).

40. HQ TRADOC White Paper, Battlefield Laboratories: The Road to the Post Cold War Army, 4 May 92.

75
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Battle Labs, that change could be recognized and subjected to immediate

test.41 They would be "a focal point for developing the concepts related to

the emerging understanding of battlefield dynamics in...post-industrial

warfare." Located at the TRADOC schools, they were situated to experiment

quickly and informally with emerging insights toward doctrinal and

technological applications.

What was distinctive about Franks' Battle Laboratories was the

combination of computer-based simulations with the training areas, ranges,

and troop units at branch school locales—the ultimate decentralization of

analytical and test capability to the source of branch and cross-branch expertise. The development of computer simulations by the early 1990s permitted battlefield replication with great fidelity as well as the play of a wide

variety of factor combinations. Just as important, once a simulation-measured war fighting concept had proved out, was its quick testing in rain,

mud, and airspace by real soldiers in troop units.

By concept, all the TRADOC centers and schools provided expertise

and support to the Battle Labs, some detailing school staff representatives

to those locations. In the technological sector, the laboratories also reached

out to the Army Materiel Command, as well as to the Defense Advanced

Research Proj ects Agency and theAssistant Secretary ofthe Army (Research,

Development, and Acquisition) and to industry at the prototypal stage of

new equipment development. The Battle Labs drew on the ideas and insights

of major exercises and on the work of the Combat Training Centers. Battle

Laboratory results were additionally expected to be analyzed by the Chief

of Staff ofthe Army's new Modern Louisiana Maneuvers group, to be noted

below.42

In the Battle Laboratories, General Franks thus created an

entrepreneurial and structured doctrinal tool, one which focused on all the

development concerns—doctrine, organization, training, leadership,

materiel, and soldiers. Franks saw the laboratories as loosening up the

whole Army development system. He believed that that lengthy process

41. The Battle Laboratory idea had World War II historical precedents. Following the German Army's

revolutionary use of close air support in the defeat of France, General George Marshall had directed

experimentation with doctrine and technology. Based on a General Headquarters G-3 concept study,

experimentation by the 17th Bombardment Wing working with the 4th Motorized Division, 2d Armored

Division, and 501st Parachute Battalion, examined tactical combinations of equipment and techniques

for support and attack of ground forces. The ultimate product of this peacetime pre-Pearl Harbor

experiment was a new Army manual, FM 31 -85, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, which set U.S.

close air support doctrine for World War II. HQ TRADOC White Paper.

42. HQ TRADOC White Paper, Battlefield Laboratories. For a discussion of the Modern Louisiana

Maneuvers, see below, p.77.

76
A NEW DYNAMICS OF BATTLE

had to be cut down, more agility was needed.

As the commandants set about developing the Battle Laboratories,

the TRADOC commander, on 23 May, institutionalized them by establishing a Battle Laboratories Board of Directors, consisting of his three deputies: the commanders of the Combined arms Command and the Combined

Arms Support Command, and the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of

Staff. The three were to co-chair a Battle Laboratories working group,

while the Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine, and Developments

would continue to develop the organization and furnish staff to the board.

Franks directed establishment of a charter that would fit into the current

Army development and programming systems and make more efficient and

reorient the corresponding TRADOC development system.43 The six Battle

Laboratories were established during May and June 1992. The laboratories

would, as noted, further support a simultaneous Department of the Army

initiative, the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, an organization established

by the Chief of Staff of the Army in March 1992 to assist the Army's transition into the post-Cold War era, employing simulations-based studies and

processes.44

The Way Ahead

TRADOC's battle dynamics work of the spring of 1992 brought

the war fighting component of doctrine to center stage in the revision effort.

By late May, those concepts were in full development. As their central

ideas and relationships were distilled, the period saw the future doctrine

take definite shape. At the same time, the airing by General Franks within

43. (1) Memo, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Cdr TRADOC to Lt Gen William A. Shoffner, Cdr

CAC, Lt Gen Samuel N. Wakefield, Cdr CASCOM, and Maj Gen Donald M. Lionetti, DCG TRADOC,

23 May 92, subj: Battle Laboratories Board of Directors. (2) OCH Notes, John L. Romjue, Doctrine

Development Seminar, 28 May 92. (3) By design, the Battle Labs would liberate the previous development process (the Concept Based Requirements System), which despite almost constant reform

attempts over the previous 20 years, retained built-in, process-fixed slowness. In the Cold War system, Army long-range planning guidance led to annual prioritization of materiel programs by functional

area, based on the Soviet threat. Prioritized "1-N" listings resulted, and out of such listings materiel

programs began or continued through an elaborate requirements documentation and review process.

In the revised system, annual branch conferences followed the Army long-range planning guidance.

Branch master plans were developed. The Battle Labs here entered the picture to examine and test

ideas. Then followed an Army modernization architecture designed by TRADOC, feeding into a HQ

DA Army Modernization Plan and a streamlined requirements process. HQ TRADOC "TRADOC Umbrella Brief," October 1992.

44. For a review of the rationale and establishment of the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers, see TRADOC

Annual Command History, 1992, pp. 17-29.

77
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

the Army of these as yet unfinished battle dynamics concepts, together with

the turn to the strategic sphere and operations short of war, prompted

continuing close vigilance by Army leaders concerned that the doctrine in

formulation was executable and right for the immediate period ahead—the

mid-to-late 1990s.45

On 5 June 1992, General Sullivan asked the TRADOC commander

to brief him on progress to date. Sullivan noted a mistaken belief in some

parts of the Army that the 100-5 effort was changing Army doctrine too

much. There was a need to correct that misapprehension. Franks, however, wanted to do some further intensive work before presenting the Chief

of Staff a package.46 He met with Sullivan in early July, and at that time the

Chief of Staff outlined guidance for the period ahead. Its thrust was the

assurance of a basis of continuity with 1980s doctrinal principles and tenets. Importantly, Sullivan directed adherence to the previous, 1986 FM

100-5 chapter structure, guidance that supported a war fighting emphasis

for the manual. In form, he wanted a manual simple in language.47 In

content, he specified acceptable, executable doctrine; minimal new terms;

use of historical examples relevant for the current generation; and a manual

telling how to think about operations, rather than explanations with details

that could better go into supporting field manuals.48

Franks' follow-on instructions to the SAMS writers in July were to

hold to an evolutionary, not revolutionary approach, and not to "surprise

the Army." He told them to turn their focus to conduct of operations, especially the notions of depth, versatility, agility in power projection, and leadership as an element of combat power. They should focus on writing the

how, versus the what, and to write clearly. There would be no radical change

from the 1986 manual's 12-chapter structure. The "baskets" or battle dynamics would go in.49

45. Franks Interview by Malone, 7 and 12 Jan 93.

46. Msg.DA [General Sullivan] to General Franks, Cdr TRADOC, 051737Z Jun 92, subj: Doctrine

Development, w/notes.

47. Franks had printed and distributed to planners copies of the concisely-and well-written 1941

manual. Printing of the 1993 manual included limited issue of a pocket-size edition.

48. Briefing slides, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., briefing to FM 100-5 Offsite Conference, Fort

A.P. Hill, Va., 4-6 Aug 92.

49. (1) MFR ATCD-P, 16 Jul 92, Commanders' Planning Group, subj: FM 100-5 Guidance. (2) Paper, Meeting Notes with General Franks, 1 Jul 92, Col Frederick Berry, 2 Jul 92, subj: Notes from CG

Off-Site Conference IPR. (3) McDonough Journal, 31 Jul 92.

78
|CjT CHAPTER

XL

CRYSTALLIZING A

POST-COLD

WAR DOCTRINE

In battle command, Franks refocused thinking

on the art of command, the thinking and leadership part of

command, as opposed to the

organizational-technicalfocus. Battle command, in itsfinal

formulation, was seen as an art, the activity ofagile,

imaginative leaders exerting an intuitive sense but always

subject to the effects of friction and chance.

1 he period July-December 1992 saw the new doctrine for the

post-Cold War take shape, as its outline and elements crystallized for

the TRADOC commander, his writing team, and doctrine assistants.

Significant in General Franks' conference methodology for soliciting

and airing ideas were two major meetings of the period—with the

TRADOC commanders and commandants at Fort McClellan, Alabama

in July, and with Army senior leaders at Fort Leavenworth in November.

The two conferences and "off-site" meetings immediately following

served in succession first to jell the new concepts, and second to

crystallize the final doctrine. The off-site discussions were important.

With his closest advisors and the writing team at the off-sites, Franks

worked out the conference results. TRADOC circulated a preliminary

draft of the doctrine in August, drawing wide response. A final draft,

presented by the SAMS director, Colonel McDonough to General Franks

in December, was published in January 1993 and further reviewed.

Following further work with his headquarters staff and with McDonough,

Franks made decisions on final points through the spring of 1993, and

the revised manual was published and presented to the Chief of Staff of

the Army in June 1993.

79
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Distilling Ideas

The Fort McClellan TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference held 27-

28 July 1992 was an important event for the development of the 1993 doctrine. The battle dynamics concepts were the focus, and General Franks

gave the SAMS team the responsibility to present them. By that means, the

TRADOC commander unified the SAMS writing effort with the headquarters-engendered battle dynamics project. Revised concept papers coming

out of the spring battle dynamics work were part of the basis for discussion.1

Franks thus focused this critical doctrinal meeting specifically on

the conduct of operations. He wanted concrete proposals for FM 100-5 to

come out of it.2For the upcoming conference, the SAMS director prepared discussion matrices treating critical doctrinal points. In the preceding days, writing team members travelled to pre-brief the commandants.3

General Franks wanted their involvement and their insights. Five battle

dynamics discussion groups, headed by the commandants, were set up and

received the SAMS presentations and discussion-matrices.4

The Fort McClellan groups focused intensively on the five battle

dynamics. In line with the spring 1992 concept for early entry, the commandants saw that notion as a significant change in the way the U.S. Army

ought to think about conducting operations. It applied across the whole

range or continuum of activity. The role of early entry forces was to deter,

win, and buy time.5 Clear in the discussion of depth and simultaneous

attack was the need felt to break the AirLand Battle mindset that linked the

deep fight to the close-in fight. Also urged was precision, and a different

emphasis on the principle of mass: commanders concentrated forces, but

massed effects—the effects both of direct and indirect fires. Fires were

1. Paper, Meeting Notes with General Franks, 1 July 1992, Colonel Frederick Berry, 2 Jul 92, subj:

Notes from CG Off-Site Conference IPR [in process review].

2. TSLC II Planning Papers, Army Doctrine Directorate, AO Notebook 23, Tab M, w/Franks marginal comment.

3. McDonough Journal, 14, 17, and 23 Jul 92.

4. At the 27-28 July TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference, the TRADOC commandants headed

the battle dynamics discussion groups as follows: Maj Gen John D. Robinson (Aviation School) early

entry, survivability, and lethality; Maj Gen Fred F.Marty (Field Artillery School) depth and simultaneous

attack; Maj Gen Robert E. Gray (Signal School) C2 and battle tempo; Maj Gen Jerry A. White (Infantry

School) battle space; and Maj Gen Kenneth R. Wykle (Transportation) combat service support.

5. (1) Paper, Lt Col Michael R. Rampy, Deputy Facilitator, on EE Discussion Group at TSLC II, 28

Jul 92. (2) MFR, 30 Jul 92, subj: Notes from TSLC II Videotape.

80
CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

seen as a decisive dynamic. Depth also meant pushing out the boundaries

of the commander's battle space through better reconnaissance.6

Battle space was, at this point, understood not as a specific area

with boundaries, but as a "visualization of the fight;" as a focus on the

commander's area of control, responsibility, and influence; and as the

commander's personal and intellectual approach to assist and gain threedimensional awareness. Related to the emerging battle space concept were

the commander's familiar assigned area of operations, area of interest, and

the segmented deep-close-rear battlefield of AirLand Battle doctrine. As

they grappled with the concept, the group did not see battle space as static;

it moved with the commander as he moved and maneuvered, expanding

and contracting according to the fighting capabilities he had available, and

as affected by the surrounding environment.7

Addressing another doctrinal point of change—command and control (C2) and tempo—later to be termed battle command, the commandants

endorsed the conceptual view that had begun to separate the function of

command from its control mechanisms. Emphasized was that the battlefield commander commanded on the move, from wherever he was positioned,

and not necessarily from a command post. Linked to this was the tempo of

battle. Tempo meant not merely a speeding-up, but a subtle accommodation to

need and circumstance. Fully integrated communications linkages and specifically channelled intelligence were crucial to this battle dynamic.8

Regarding combat service support, the TRADOC commandants'

consensus in late July was that Army doctrine now required a concept of

logistics preparation of the battlefield similar to the effective IPB or intelligence preparation of the battlefield method. Logistics doctrine also needed

expansion—to the space role and to full theater and joint and combined

concerns as well as to operations short of war.9

6. (1) MFR, 30 Jul 92, subj: Notes form Depth and Simultaneous Attack Discussion Group, 28 Jul

92, no author. (2) MFR, Lt Col Reitz, 29 Jul 92, subj: Notes from Depth and Simultaneous Attack

Discussion, 28 Jul, TSLC II. (3) MFR, 30 Jul 92, subj: Notes from TSLC II Videotape.

7. (1) MFR, Col Ricky M. Rowlett, 29 Jul 92, subj: Battle Space Working Group Discussion, TSLC

II. (2) MFR [Lt Col] McCarter [Army Doctrine Directorate], 28 Jul 92, subj: Notes from Battle Space

Discussion Group, 28 Jul 92. (3) MFR, 30 Jul 92, subj: Notes from TSLC II Videotape. (4) AP Hill After

Action Report.

8. Memo ATZL-SWV, Lt Col Edward E. Thurman, FM 100-5 Writing Team, 29 Jul 92, subj: TSLC C2

and Tempo Working Group.

9. (1) MFR, Lt Col CarrickT. Troutman, Jr., 28 Jul 92, subj: Notes from Discussion Group, 28 Jul 92.

(2) MFR, 29 Jul 92, subj: Notes from the Logistics Discussion Group, 28 Jul 92, no author.

81
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

In July 1992, the issue remained as to which service controlled the

air at the operational level in support of ground operations. Air Force control and allocation of sorties neglected the effects: this system required the

Army ground units involved to react to the Air Force target-strikes, rather

than to employ those strikes in an integrated ground and air campaign. It

was the ground element that had to make the maneuver decision beyond

such air-ground dividing lines as the forward support coordination line.

The nature of military campaigning argued for ground-commander dominance of assets most of the time.10

General Franks followed up the late-July commandant seminars at

Fort McClellan with a three-day retreat at Fort A.P. Hill, a quiet Army subpost near Fredericksburg, Virginia. There, important decisions on the doctrine resulted.'' Keeping the meeting small, Franks limited it to McDonough

and the writing team; Lt. Gen. Shoffner; Lt. Gen. Samuel Wakefield, the

Combined Arms Support Command commander; Brig. Gen. Grogan (who

had reassumed the major doctrinal role at the headquarters under Franks

upon the mid-July reassignment of Maj. Gen. Clark); Brig. Gen. Steele, the

CGSC assistant commandant; Colonel Frederick Berry, director of Army

doctrine at the headquarters; and several headquarters staff members.12

The A.P. Hill meeting addressed in succession the manual's structure and all three doctrinal focuses: operations short of war; force projection, mobilization, and deployment; and the conduct of operations—the

battle dynamics. Franks convened the gathering alternately in plenary and

group sessions, with group meetings reporting back. Writing team members led the battle dynamics groups. It was at this meeting that the doctrinal ideas that had been floated, furthered, and discussed in public and private forums since the fall of 1991 came together in basic form. Their relationship was determined, and a new doctrinal framework created. Out of the A.P.

Hill deliberations came the preliminary draft of the manual.

At the early-August meeting, planners used visual grids detailing

doctrinal issues at the three levels of war as a means to pin down

modifications and additions to the 1986 doctrine. Manifest in these

discussions was a pronounced sense of the history of military success and

failure. Outcomes in war were often conditional on the preceding peacetime

10. McDonough Journal, 23 Jul 92.

11. Franks' selection of the A.P. Hill site for these culminating deliberations had precedent in recent

Army doctrine history. During 1974-1975, the site served a similar purpose in the TRADOC

commander's (General William DePuy) formulation of doctrine for the 1976 FM 100-5 edition.

12. FM 100-5 Off-Site, Fort A.P. Hill, 4-6 Aug 92, After Action Report.

82
CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

Brigadier General Timothy J. Grogan

decisions for innovation or stagnation, safety or risk. The examples of

such imaginative thinkers as Heinz Guderian, Billy Mitchell, and Giulio

Douhet were reminders. So, too, were the tragedy of French doctrinal

unpreparedness in 1940 and the stagnation of the U.S. Army in the years

preceding the Korean War.13

The advent of the force projection Army put a premium on early

theater entry and all that it entailed. In the A.P. Hill discussions, General

Franks emphasized that an indispensable inclusion for early entry planning

was fullest preparation, including logistics, infrastructure, and advanced

13. A.P. Hill After Action Report.

83
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

foreknowledge ofthe nations and cultures involved. Foreign language skills

were imperative. "Early" was a critical part of the concept; it compelled, in

commanders, a habit of anticipating, forecasting, and sensitivity to the way

things started. Versatility was an important aspect of it. Discussion of this

battle dynamic was intensive. Related to early entry was the issue offorcible

entry. Some planners disputed any significant inclusion of surface forcible

entry, among them Lt. Gen. Shoffner and Lt. Gen. Wakefield.14Except for

its airborne troops, the Army did not have that ready surface capability, as

did the Marine Corps. To a degree, TRADOC approval in June of a separate

mobilization and deployment doctrinal manual acted to absorb thatrelated issue,

but early entry remained a key point of focus for the force projection Army.I5

The A.R Hill meeting gave further definition to battle space. Franks

believed that without a doctrinal way to view the battlefield in the new

world of joint warfare, "we are going to be all over the place." How to

describe the space within which ground forces operated? Doctrine had to

come to terms with the new geometry of the battlefield. Discussion raised

many points. Were diagrams useful in describing an intellectual concept?

And should an intellectual concept be doctrine at all? Franks viewed the

old standard, and dichotomy, of linear versus nonlinear warfare as a

shibboleth, now without meaning. Battle space was a new way to describe

the battlefield post-Gulf War. Insofar as it was based on the capabilities in

hand, battle space—as discussed earlier—moved as the commander moved

or maneuvered his unit, expanding and contracting.16Franks thought no

graphic was necessary for such a visualization. He noted an idea of General

William DePuy regarding the relatedness ofthe commander's intent, concept

of operation, and campaign plan: the land force operated in a given space,

sometimes with boundaries, sometimes without. Doctrine was needed that

would jolt the Army out of the old geometry of the battlefield.17

Doctrinal discussion of the C2-tempo battle dynamic centered on

the nature of battle command. At the A.R Hill meeting, Franks saw that

dynamic as having two clear components: operational and tactical decision

making, and leadership. He wanted a clear statement of that definition in

14. Notes on Fort A.P. Hill Meeting, H.O. Malone, TRADOC Historian.

15. MFR ATMH, H.O. Malone, Jr., Chief Historian, 16 Sep 92, subj: FM 100-5 Off-Site Conference,

Ft. A.P. Hill, Va., 4-6 August 1992. The referenced manual was FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment,

Redeployment, Demobilization, first published in October 1992.

16. Fort A.P. Hill After Action Report.

17. (1) Transcript of audiotapes, Ft. A.P. Hill Meeting. (2) Malone MFR, 16 Sep 92.

84
CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

the new doctrine. Franks also directed more articulation of the principle of

the commander's intent and the incorporation of the command and staff

maxim: "don't run out of options."18

It was at the August A.P. Hill meeting that Franks and his advisors

reached clear conclusions on the central issue of the doctrinal manual's

focus—as affected by the expansion into the strategic sphere. Whereas

1980s Army doctrine was oriented to tactics and operations—that is, to

battle itself—Franks and his planners had from the outset, as we have seen,

envisaged Army operations doctrine as transcending war and conflict proper

to encompass the whole range of peacetime engagement, as well as post

conflict activities. On the latter point, doctrine needed to allow for what

happened beyond the operational end state of victory, to include the strategic

end-state as well. A key to a clear picture of this broad "continuum" of

Army operations was the short-of-war category, itself diverse and various

and including both peacetime engagement and hostilities short of war. For

it, a different set of war principles applied.19

Planners considered that the operational continuum model that they

had inherited and modified from AirLand Operations continued to generate confusion—nor was it universally accepted. A significant shift at the

A.P. Hill meeting was Franks' scrapping of the operational continuum mode

as complicated and not apt. Though a continuum had to be visualized, a

new model was needed. More important than a list of all possible such

operations was a sufficient statement of principles that would encompass

any operation. The Army, Franks believed, did two things. First, it fought

and won wars. Second was the list of other things—and they were geared

to a different set of considerations. The TRADOC commander thought it

impossible to categorize that variety. Operations short of war were so different that the subject required a distinct chapter.20 The new term arrived at

18. Malone MFR, 16Sep92.

19. The range of peacetime engagement operations included: nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian assistance including disaster relief, support to counter-drug activities, support to

domestic civil authority, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism, support to insurgency/

counterinsurgency, and arms control. Hostilities short of war included: attacks and raids, noncombat

evacuation, demonstrations and shows of force, security assistance surges, operations to restore

order or peacemaking, counterterrorism, support to insurgency/counterinsurgency, and support to

domestic civil authority. The ruling principles earlier noted governing operations short of war were:

primacy of the political element, adaptability, legitimacy, perseverance, restricted use of force, and

unity of effort with other, nonmilitary government agencies. Fort A. P. Hill Meeting After Action Report.

20. (1) Transcript of audiotapes, TRADOC CG's Comments Made During FM 100-5 Off-Site Conference, FortA.P. Hill, 4-6 Aug 92. (2) Commanders Planning Group Notes, A.P. Hill Off-Site. (3) Franks

Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

85
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

by Franks and his chief doctrine writer, Colonel McDonough, was "operations other than war." That term, Franks believed, sliced through the haze

surrounding the operational continuum.21 The TRADOC commander rewrote some of the operations short of war sections ofthe manual himself at

the A.P. Hill meeting.22 The clear setting-apart of war doctrine from doctrine for operations other than war settled a problematic issue. The Combined Arms Center commander, Lt. Gen. Shoffner, saw adoption of the new

dichotomy as the major intellectual shift of the ongoing work.23

Other important points were treated at the early August meeting.

Discussion ofthe end state, a significant addition to the 1993 doctrine, owed

in part to earlier advice of the Eighth U.S. Army commander. General

RisCassi had pressed for the notion that planning a military operation had

to allow for the desired end state. Lt. Gen. Shoffner denoted the RisCassi

insistence as an illuminating "bolt of lightning."24 General Franks also

directed elimination of the emerging doctrine's "deter war" notion. It was

necessary to break the deterrence paradigm of the Cold War.25

The key utility of the new force projection watchword for American Army doctrine had become far more evident. Historical events had

dissolved the long-reigning dichotomy, enforced by the primary NATO mission, of major operations vis-a-vis contingency operations. As argued by

the CGSC assistant commandant, Brig. Gen. Steele, contingency in the new

strategic world was basic to all operations. The force projection Army was

indeed a contingency-based Army.26 Franks' planners believed the discussions offeree projection highlighted the planning need to avoid, with Moltke,

"error in the initial deployment of forces [which would] hardly be corrected

during the entire course of the campaign."27

Also noteworthy at the A.R Hill meeting was General Franks'

direction that doctrine would no longer address AirLand Battle or AirLand

21. MFR ATMH, John L. Romjue, Office of the Command Historian, 16 Nov 92, subj: FM 100-5 Fort

Story Off-Site Meeting, 5-6 Nov 92.

22. Action Officer Working Papers, Chap V—OOTW, Lt Col Reitz, 6 Aug Rewrite.

23. Notes on Fort A.P. Hill Meeting, H.O. Malone, Jr., TRADOC Historian.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Malone MFR, 16 Sep 92.

86
CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

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Lieutenant General Wilson A. Shoffner

Operations, but simply, "Army operations." The TRADOC commander

argued that eliminating the 1980s term would help eliminate the named

doctrine's narrow Air Force-Army image. In fact, operations were broader

and linked to all the services.28 Discussion also favored elimination of the

list ofAirLand Battle imperatives that prescribed key operating requirements

more specific than the principles of war or the AirLand Battle tenets. Not

the ideas, but the mechanical nature of "too many lists," was the objection.

28. Commanders Planning Group Notes, Ft. A.P. Hill Off-Site.

87
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Franks directed the writers to embed rather than list the imperatives.29

Another early August determination by the TRADOC commander

was to reorganize the key doctrine manual. General Franks eliminated the

team's earlier chapter organization and grouping into parts, in favor of a

simple chapter sequence akin to that of the current 1986 edition but minus

its superstructure. The structure was set at 13 chapters, with the possibility

of a separate fourteenth chapter on combined operations.30

Emerging Doctrine

The upshot of General Franks' August off-site meeting was a rewrite

of the first draft of the new doctrine at Fort Leavenworth between 7-14

August. Edited by Lt. Gen. Shoffner and Brig. Gen. Steele, the draft was

taken by Colonel McDonough on 14 August to Fort Monroe, where General

Franks, Colonels McDonough and Rowlett, and Brig. Gen. Grogan and the

doctrine staff discussed editorial changes. Following subsequent discussion

of revisions with his deputy at Fort Leavenworth, Franks presented the

preliminary draft in detail to General Sullivan upon the Chief of Staff ofthe

Army's visit to Fort Monroe on 21 August.31

Basically formulated at this point, the new doctrine would undergo

further important revision and refinement. Major new ideas distinguished

the emerging doctrinal bible for the 1990s. Of first importance was the

extension of Army doctrine to the strategic level of war, a spelling out of

Army roles and missions from a strategic perspective. Not only the battlefield, but projecting force globally to get there, fight, settle post-conflict

problems, and redeploy, was an Army concern and second major change.

Operations other than war was a third major emphasis, the plethora of nonwar activities that the passing of the Cold War had in great part opened up.

29. Notes on Fort A.P. Hill Off-Site Meeting, H.O. Malone, Jr., TRADOC Historian. The ten AirLand

Battle imperatives were: ensure unity of effort; anticipate events on the battlefield; concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities; designate, sustain, and shift the main effort; press the fight;

move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly; use terrain, weather, deception, and operations security;

conserve strength for decisive action; combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce;

understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders. FM 100-5, Operations, 5 May 86, p.

23.

30. (1) Notes on Fort A.P. Hill Off-Site Meeting, H.O. Malone, Jr., TRADOC Historian. (2) Malone

MFR, 16 Sep 92. (3) Paper, Meeting Notes with General Franks 1 Jul 1992, Colonel Frederick Berry,

2 Jul 92, subj: Notes from CG Off-Site Conference IPR.

31. (1) McDonough Journal, 10 and 25 Aug 92. (2) Memo, Jim McDonough to General Franks, 14

Aug 92, subj: FM 100-5, Operations, 1993—1st Draft. (3) Journal, FM 100-5, Operations, Lt Col Dave

C. Mock, Sp Asst to General Franks, Aug 1992, THRO

88
CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

Command Building, Headquarters TRADOC

A fourth important change was the much stronger commitment to joint and

combined operations. As noted, AirLand Battle, connotative of Air ForceArmy integrated action against a known enemy quantity, was dropped from

usage in favor of "operations" only, which were broadened to encompass

the sea services as well as allied forces. All these notions were woven

throughout the new doctrine.

For the battlefield itself, most of the doctrinal body of AirLand

Battle was carried forward into the 1990s doctrine. But there were important

shifts and changes, most notably in the Franks' battle dynamics focus, as

we have seen. No longer were deep operations specifically an activity to

shape or affect the close battle. Instead, the enemy would be attacked and

destroyed simultaneously throughout the depth of operations against him.

Of great moment, battle command replaced C2, command and control, and

its extensions: C3 (C2 plus communications) and C4-I (C3 plus computersintelligence) as the framework of what the commander did and how he

made decisions and provided leadership. This significant change broke the

C2 approach in favor of battle command explicitly as the commander's

function, undiverted by control and communications, the functions of his

staff. Battle space was introduced as a visualization of the fight and focus

89
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

on the area of the commander's control, responsibility, and influence. The

new operational design for logistics was an important change. Among the

changing dynamics of battle, finally, the emphasis on the early entry stage

was crucial to the success of force projection strategy.

Beyond strategic reorientation and new and changed battle dynamics, many new and important general points were going into the key postCold War doctrine. Important in the twilight world of international affairs

was a forthright notion of an American way of war, rooted in American

ethics and values and requiring discipline in its execution. The new doctrine included, in campaign planning, the idea that post-conflict activities

were an integral part of achieving the strategic end state desired. The

new doctrine expanded the idea of American reliance on its technological superiority, not only for its technology base, but individual and institutional proficiency in quickly integrating and mastering new technology. The impact of the news media upon military operations received much new emphasis in the wake of the CNN-reported war from

behind the lines. The doctrine enlarged the treatment of weapons of

mass destruction to include the proliferation and potential use by irrational opponents and powers.

Many new and retooled doctrinal ideas applicable to the battlefield

were also added, tempo, for example, and the land force's need for space

support. To be emphasized was the central wisdom of balance—between

attack and defense, fire and maneuver, and dispersion and concentration.

The 1990s doctrine would provide for getting intelligence from operational

and strategic sources to early-entry units, since those units could not, under

early-entry circumstances, furnish their own. The doctrinal necessity of

overwhelming force was addressed.

By the late summer of 1992, decisions on other points had also

been made, and Franks presented them to General Sullivan. The principle

of mass was in modification and would go beyond the critical massing of

formations to the massing of effects. The commander's intent was expanded

to stress its purpose of focusing subordinate commanders on the desired

end state of an operation. Versatility was to be added as a new, fifth tenet—

the ability not only to be agile on one battlefield, but to shift easily from

one mission to another, both in and out of war, or from one region to another. Meanwhile, the inherited tenets of depth, initiative, agility, and synchronization were in revision to incorporate the ten former AirLand Battle

imperatives. The METT-T principles—mission, enemy, troops, terrain-time

available—were expanded to make them applicable to both operational and

tactical levels of war. The discussion of operational level campaigning was

deepened. The new doctrine would expand the notion of anticipation by

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

the commander—intellectual involvement that kept him ahead ofthe game.32

General Franks further briefed the preliminary doctrine at this stage formally to Sullivan, General Dennis J. Reimer the Vice Chief of Staff, and

the Army Staff principals on 1 September, noting its "consultative" aspect—

the result of the conference methodology. Sullivan approved its staffing to

the Army.33

The Army Thinks It Over

Distributed widely within the Army and to senior retired commanders, and other service officials, the preliminary doctrine drew wide response.34 Franks' conference spadework facilitated generally favorable reception. Participants in its development, the TRADOC school commandants gave it a none the less close review, as did most major Army command and unified commanders and retired Army senior leaders. Receiving

their views and criticisms, Franks told his doctrine staff to reply to each

expeditiously and to assimilate the proffered points.35 An extensive subject and

name indexed record of the critique comments was assembled for use. Both

Franks and Colonel McDonough consulted comprehensively with the review

critics in efforts to get contested points across and reach consensus.36

Most readers found the doctrine, in its preliminary form, balanced

and on mark as a guiding body of ideas for force projection in the postCold War. They applauded its expansion into operations other than war

and its decisive link-up to the national security sphere. General Glenn K.

Otis, under whose command at TRADOC AirLand Battle doctrine had been

promulgated in 1982, saw the new FM 100-5 to be "a watershed for the

32. Draft memo, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA, 21 Aug 92,

subj: Preliminary Draft, FM 100-5, Operations, THRC.

33. (1) MFRATCG-P, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 1 Sep 92, subj: Briefing of FM 100-5, Operations, (Preliminary Draft) to CSA and ARSTAF, 011430 Sep 92. (2) Memo ATDO-A, Maj Gen Henry M.

Hagwood, Jr., CofS to CG TRADOC, 8 Sep 92, subj: FM 100-5, Staffing Action Plan. (3) Briefing,

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to ARSTAF, 1 Sep 92, subj: FM 100-5 Preliminary Draft, THRC.

34. Memo ATDO-A, Brig Gen Timothy J. Grogan, DCSDOC to distr, 30 Aug 92, subj: FM 100-5,

Operations. The preliminary draft was circulated to Army component commanders, army and corps

commanders, division commanders, school and college commandants, the Army Staff, retired senior

officers (CSAs, CINCs and commanders, TRADOC commanders), and joint agencies (CINCs, Air

Combat Command, Atlantic Command, Marine Corps Combat Development Command).

35. Franks' handwritten note on preliminary draft correspondence, 23 Sep 92, OCH files, THRC.

36. McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Army."37 Lt. Gen. Walter E. Boomer, assistant commandant of the U.S.

Marine Corps, supported the doctrinal statement for refocusing on the new

strategic world—particularly in joint operations, operations other than war,

and in its armored-light-special operating forces balance.38 Writing to General Franks, Admiral H.H. Mauz, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic

Fleet, found the emerging doctrine compatible with Navy doctrine and supportive ofjoint operations. He supported it as a basis for interservice cooperation.39 Similarly affirmative was the Air Combat Command commander,

General John M. Loh, although old differences remained with regard to

service sectors in the theater of operations.40 All in all, the new doctrine

overall was sound, with much appropriate new information, two former

doctrine writers, Brig. Gen. L.D. Holder and Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege,

responded. Wass De Czege and Holder, both primary doctrine writers for

the 1982 FM 100-5 that had introduced AirLand Battle, weighed in heavily

as influences on Franks and his chief writer, Colonel McDonough.41 General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., the commander of Forces Command, communicated positive support, as did his U.S. Southern Command counterpart,

General George A. Joulwan.42

None the less, many of the new notions remained unclear to

supporters and readers. Those objections Franks and his doctrine writers

worked hard to overcome in the ensuing weeks. The chief interpretive

problem was the clarity of the new battle dynamics and other notions. In

brief summary, battle space was viewed by most as too vague and its

relationship to the doctrinally familiar close-deep-rear battlefield and to

the commander's areas of interest and operations unclear. Battle command

aroused questions; it seemed to deny the inherent synergism of command

and control. Tempo, vis-a-vis speed, was not well understood. Not all

readers found a clear enough distinction between agility and the new fifth

37. Ltr, [General] Glenn Otis [USA Ret] to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG TRADOC, 21 Oct 92.

38. Ltr, General W.I. Boomer, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps to General Frederick M.

Franks, Jr., 29 Sep 92.

39. Ltr, Adm H.H. Mauz, Jr., CINCLANTFLT to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG TRADOC,

5 Sep 92.

40. Ltr, General John M. Loh, Cdr ACC to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG TRADOC, 21 Sep 92,

subj: Comments on FM 100-5, Operations.

41. McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93.

42. (1) Notes, GO Review of FM 100-5, THRC. (2) Packet, "GO Comments on Preliminary Draft,"

Army Doctrine Directorate, THRC.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

tenet of versatility. Depth and simultaneous attack was well articulated as

a contribution to the deep fight, but the difference between deep operations

and interdiction needed clarifying. Readers were very reluctant to abandon

the useful and ingrained battlefield operating systems43 for posited "battle

functions." Resistance to dropping "AirLand Battle" from the lexicon was

viewed by many as a serious and unnecessary abandonment of a well

understood and unifying doctrinal term. The commander's intent discussion

appeared to confuse concept with intent, and needed further elucidation.

While the emphasis on "quick, decisive victory" was good, readers believed

the doctrine shortchanged protracted operations. More clarity was advised

on the important idea of the requirements of conflict termination. An

explanatory preface was needed.44

Major objections were registered by General William R. Richardson,

former TRADOC commander and a principal force in the development of

AirLand Battle doctrine. Richardson saw the deletion of the widely recognized, identifying doctrinal term, AirLand Battle, as a distinct loss that would

weaken the Air Force doctrinal tie. Richardson also believed the critical

war fighting flavor was too weak and that operations other than war was

overdone. The former TRADOC commander argued for making clear the

land commander's responsibility, vis-a-vis the Air Force for deep operations: the land commander had the implementing means in maneuver forces

and fires.45 Echoing Richardson was Maj. Gen. Marvin L. Covault, commander of the 7th Infantry Division (Light). Covault argued to Franks that

future operations would not be describable as an "air-land-sea" battle. The

Navy fought on the sea, the Marines from the sea and, though there was an

important sea-land synchronization, the sea-land linkage did not dominate.

Air-land did, and continuously, through the theater.46

43. The battlefield operating systems were: maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and

control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service support.

44. (1) Bfg slides, bfg by Brig Gen Timothy Grogan to Senior Leader Warfighter Conference, 5-6 Nov

92 [FM 100-5 issues]. (2) Memo ATZL-SWJ, USACAC [Brig Gen William M. Steele, Dep Comdt] to

DCSDOC, with slides, 23 Oct 92, subj: FM 100-5, Operations. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen George A. Fisher, Cdr

JRTC, to General Franks, 7 Oct 92. (4) FM 100-5, Operations Preliminary Draft,21 Aug 92 ARSTAF

Review, n.d. [ca. 21 Oct 92]. (5) Memo DAMO-FD, Maj Gen Jay M. Garner, Asst DCSOPS, Force Dev

to DCSDOC, 23 Oct 92, subj: Review of FM 100-5, Operations (Preliminary Draft), w/encl ARSTAF

Comments.

45. Ltr, General William R. Richardson to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG TRADOC, 21 Oct 92.

46. Memo AFZW-CG, Maj Gen Marvin L. Covault to Cdr TRADOC, n.d., subj: Comments on

Preliminary Draft of FM 100-5.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

AnotherformerTRADOC commander, General Glenn Otis, came down

on the opposite side ofthe nomenclature argument. Otis believed thatAir Force

doctrine had already abrogated AirLand Battle and that the Army had transcended land-air in joint sea-land-air operations. Otis shared with others, however, questions about the clarity of some new battle dynamic concepts.47

General Franks' view was that the principles of AirLand Battle—

its maneuver and aggressiveness and the operational art—continued to obtain. Franks believed, however, that post-Cold War doctrine could not remain confined to those principles, to the "AirLand Battle box." The segmented close-deep-rear battlefield, the deep battle, the sequential battle,

shaping the battle, the linear structure—all had to give way to a different

tactical and operational vision. That vision would evolve in the coming

months as a battlefield in and upon which U.S. forces should act simultaneous throughout the whole depth.48

General RisCassi, Eighth U.S. Army commander and a primary influence on the 1993 doctrine, took issue with a number ofpoints. RisCassi offerred

subtle refining ideasto considerregarding operations injoint and strategic spheres

and to more clearly lay out the linkage between the Army, the National Military

Strategy, deterrence, and war. For RisCassi as for many others, some new

notions and their relationships required elucidation and clarity. Battle space

was foremost among the new terms not well grasped by the Army at large.49

General Franks continued to keep his commandants and fellow commanders close to the process in project updates to the TRADOC Commanders Conference at Fort Bliss, Texas in mid-September and the Fall Army

Commanders Conference in Washington, D.C. in mid-October 1992.

Receiving the reactions to the preliminary doctrine through the

headquarters' Army Doctrine Directorate, the writing team developed the

final draft. In that process, the built-in tension between the Headquarters

TRADOC staff and Headquarters Combined Arms Center/Command and

General Staff College was manifest. At this time and throughout the 1991-

1993 project, Franks maintained the effective authority of his chief doctrine

writer, Colonel McDonough, to craft and refine Franks' doctrinal points

which the TRADOC commander himselfintensively revised and fully edited.

Throughout 1991-1992, the work ofMcDonough and the team was regularly

reviewed, with contributing revisions, by the Combined Arms Command

commander. Lt. Gen. Shoffner held initially to a stricter command-control

47. Ltr, [General, USA Ret] Glenn Otis to General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG TRADOC, 21 Oct 92.

48. Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

49. OCH files.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

view. Differences were resolved at the conferences and off-site meetings.

Franks desired and solicited open debate in close advisors like Shoffner, in

his commandants, and in the wider Army circles he contacted.50 At the same

time, Franks wanted the headquarters staff—Brig. Gen. Grogan and the Army

Doctrine Directorate—involved. For their own intellectual attachment to, and

confident articulation of, the doctrinal ideas, he wanted their "fingerprints on

the doctrine" as well.51 That shared responsibility prevailed after Brig. Gen.

Lon E. Maggart replaced Grogan as doctrine chief in early January 1993.

The inter-headquarters tension, repeating the pattern ofthe AirLand

Battle project of the early 1980s,52 bears brief mention here. On 8 September 1992, TRADOC headquarters advised the subordinate commanders and

commandants that, with the successful presentation of the new doctrine to

the Army Chief of Staff on 1 September, the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Doctrine would lead the ensuing phase, with the Combined Arms Center in

support.53 The deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff

College, Brig. Gen. Steele, responded to Brig. Gen. Grogan several days

later. He advised that the SAMS team was ready to assist in the remaining

tasks, specifically incorporation of review comments into the final draft, as

General Franks and results of the upcoming fall conferences would determine. Steele also suggested the team's utility in the education phase—their

services to brief the field.54 General Franks wrote his deputy at the Combined Arms Center, Lt. Gen. Shoffner, in early October that he wanted the

writing team to carry out that role—to prepare a full briefing of the manual

for the school commandants. Secondly, he wanted them to make an analysis of how the new doctrine would affect all TRADOC's development missions. Lastly, though the team would soon be scattering to other assignments, Franks wanted their continued assistance with the FM 100-5 drafts.55

50. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93.

51. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Grogan Interview by Romjue, 22 Jan 93.

52. Memo ATMH, James T. Stensvaag, Chief Historian to Colonel Mike Starry, Dir, Future Battle

Directorate, 31 Aug 95, subj: FM 100-5 - 1982 and 1993 Timelines.

53. Msg, Cdr TRADOC (Ma] Gen Hagwood, CofS personal for) to distr, 081527Z Sep 92, subj: Preliminary Draft 100-5, Operations.

54. Msg, Comdt USACGSC to Cdr TRADOC (pers Steele to Grogan), 141000Z Sep 92, subj: Plan to

Produce the Final Draft of FM 100-5.

55. Memo ATCG, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to Lt Gen Wilson A. Shoffner, Cdr CAC, 5 Oct 92,

subj: FM 100-5, Operations, The Way Ahead, THRC (This memo was specifically directed to maintaining the SAMS team involvement. Franks Papers, FM 100-5 (Misc Documents folder).

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

General Franks cemented that continuing arrangement again with

Lt. Gen. Shoffner following his final decisions of early November 1992

after Army senior leaders endorsed the doctrine at the Warfighter Conference at Fort Leavenworth on 3-4 November and the second off-site meeting. Franks wrote Shoffner on 13 November, directing that McDonough

and the writing team incorporate the results of the field review and recent

conferences, coordinating the work with the doctrine staff. The doctrine

deputy, Brig. Gen. Grogan followed up with procedural guidance.56

The upshot of the doctrine "ownership" issue just related would be

Headquarters TRADOC assumption of editorial responsibilities following

the SAMS team's delivery of the final draft to General Franks at Fort Monroe on in mid-December. Subsequent revisions and editorial improvements

by Brig. Gen. Maggart and his doctrine director, Colonel Berry, however,

were in all cases brought into accord with General Franks' decisions. While

hearing out all sides, Franks worked through the manuscript closely, assuring himself that it stated his ideas as he and McDonough and the writing

team had crafted them. The Combined Arms Center commander and SAMS

writing team, unlike the major players on the doctrine staff at Fort Monroe,

were with the two-year doctrine project throughout, and were more solidly

grounded in it. Franks employed McDonough to review all the final work.57

Crystallizing the Doctrine

Army consensus for the emerging new doctrine, now close to final

form, was gained at the Senior Leader Warfighter Conference convened at

Fort Leavenworth on 3-4 November 1992. In attendance was the senior

Army leadership, including General Sullivan, General Reimer, ARSTAF

56. Grogan's message to Brig Gen Steele directed a several-step process: CGSC to send revised

chapters to DCSDOC for review and return to the team; the team then to forward completed chapters

to DCSDOC for editing, return for team review, and return again to DCSDOC; the team to bring the

final revised manual to HQ TRADOC for approval session with Franks and Grogan; the headquarters

to then staff the manual. All revisions would be accomplished using the preliminary draft. (1) Msg,

General Franks to Lt Gen Shoffner, 131238Z Nov 92, subj: FM 100-5. (2) Cdr TRADOC to Comdt

CGSC (pers from Brig Gen Grogan to Brig Gen Steele), 131410Z Nov 92, subj: FM 100-5 Revision

Process.

57. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov

93. Newcomers to the FM 100-5 revision often raised, as new, old points earlier settled. An example

of the close Franks-McDonough work was Franks' decision, in March 1993, to revoke a DCSDOC

revision eliminating operational-level applicability for the center-of-gravity notion. Franks supported

McDonough's contention that to deny that applicability was to deny the operational level itself. Final

points at issue were resolved in Franks' meeting with McDonough and the DCSDOC staff at Fort

Gordon, Georgia in early April 1993.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

principals, and major Army command and Army component commanders,

along with the TRADOC commanders and commandants. The meeting

endorsed the battle dynamic points and other fundamentals, noting

clarifications still needed. In their criticisms in point and detail, the senior

leaders echoed many of the concerns greeting the preliminary draft. But

the meeting also revealed the extent to which they had, by late 1992,

internalized the intellectual shift arising from the Army's new stance of

force projection.

The wide Army consensus was that the new doctrine had to be

consistent with the National Military Strategy and stronger in joint and

combined operations. The Army leaders reiterated that 1990s doctrine had

to transcend the former Air Force-Army set-piece of central Europe. It had

to emphasize war fighting and it had to apply to combat in large land campaigns, as well as to combat in a variety of other situations while acknowledging operations other than war. Principles, not prescription, should be its

watchword.58

At the early-November Leavenworth conference, Army consensus

in the post-Cold War doctrine was achieved. Emphasizing the strategic

magnitude of the passing of the Cold War, General Sullivan noted that not

in his military lifetime had he witnessed such a period as the Army found

itself in in the early 1990s—where such a significant intellectual shift was

required in how the Army approached its national obligation. The vehicle

for adjustment to that shift, Sullivan said, was the new FM 100-5. The

Army was turning the intellectual corner from the Cold War. It was in the

acceptance mode of that change. Institutionalization now had to follow.59

Most final doctrinal points were settled at the meeting on 5-6

November 1992 at Fort Story, Virginia, on Cape Henry, the outlying subpost

of the U.S. Army Transportation Center and Fort Eustis that served as the

training site for Army LACV and logistics-over-the-shore.60

Franks, his writing team, and his advisors were well aware of the

58. (1) HQ TRADOC bfg slides [for 3-4 Nov 92 conference] briefed to CG TRADOC 26 Oct 92, FM

100-5 Update. (2) MFRATACG, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 10 Nov 92, subj: Notes, FM 100-5

Off Site Conference, Fort Story, Virginia, 5-6 Nov 92, THRC (3) Msg, Cdr TRADOC to distr, 181405Z

Nov 92, subj: Moving Forward on FM 100-5.

59. (1) MFR ATCG, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 10 Nov 92, subj: Note, FM 100-5 Off Site

Conference, Fort Story, Va., 5-6 Nov 92, THRC. (2) MFR ATMH, John L. Romjue, 16 Nov 92, subj: FM

100-5 Fort Story Off-Site Meeting, 5-6 Nov 92, THRC. (3) Grogan Interview by Romjue, 22 Jan 93.

60. Franks chose the meeting site on the Capes of the Chesapeake not only for its convenience but

for its symbolism for the "joint" quality of the sea-land-air war fighting doctrine. Franks Interview by

Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

major intellectual shift which it was their task to articulate. At the Fort

Story off-site meeting, the TRADOC commanding general declared that

TRADOC was writing "doctrine for a different era." Franks asked whether

TRADOC might not indeed have underestimated the magnitude of the shift

occurring. The notion that the doctrine being written and acceptable could

not hope to encompass the whole measure of change would be pursued

further the following year.61 As it was, the cardinal doctrinal points received final full consideration in discussions that sharpened those points

and that brought decisions settling most remaining issues. The writing of a

final draft and extensive editing, together with additions and some revisions, would follow, but the Fort Story meeting essentially completed the

crystallization of the new doctrine. Conferees took up the digested comments from the field, together with issues discussed and agreed on early in

the week at Fort Leavenworth.

Depth and simultaneous attack, the very heart of the new battle

dynamics, was the major discussion point. Franks believed that the Army

had arrived "on the doctrinal edge" of something new in the vision of simultaneous attack throughout the battlefield depth. The whole notion required the commander to think in space and time—present and future. Yet,

simultaneity did not fit all cases—sequential battle sometimes did—and

current technology in any case didn't always permit it.

Simultaneity also seemed easy to confuse with synchronization.

We have already noted the doctrine writers' grappling with the related visualizing constructs of the familiar close-deep-rear, segmented battlefield,

and the commander's area of operations and area of interest. These elements, each clear in itself, were parts of a larger battlefield framework,

which Colonel McDonough presented at Fort Story as an organizing idea

and which would be written into the doctrine.

While the new FM 100-5 was indeed doctrine for a new time, Franks

cautioned that old paradigms could recur, that the United States could be

compelled again to fight outnumbered. The 1990s doctrine could not lose

sight of that. Yet the Gulf War, Franks reiterated, provided an arresting

contrast to the closed and set strategic situation previously prevailing. In

Operation Desert Storm, Air Force, Navy carrier, and U.S. Marine air had

mounted 1,400 sorties a day into Kuwait and Iraq. There were sensor plat61. This section is based on: (1) MFR ATCG, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 10 Nov 92, subj:

Notes, FM 100-5 Off-Site Conference, Fort Story, Virginia, 5-6 Nov 92. (2) MFR ATMH, John L. Romjue,

OCH, 16 Nov 92, subj: FM 100-5 Fort Story Off-Site Meeting, 5-6 Nov 92, THRC. (3) Memo, Off-site

Conference Recap, Col Rowlett [SAMS], 8 Nov 92. (4) Transcript Notes on Fort Story Off-Site

Conference, 5-6 Nov 92. (5) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

forms. A new range of doctrinal possibilities had opened. In the early

1990s, the Army found itself in the early expression of a new doctrine about

how to fight depth and simultaneous attack, and not to be boxed in by an

old concept. In the force projection Army, the whole notion of depth

changed.

Franks noted the deterring effect a dozen years earlier of deep attack doctrine. Though its application had taken four years to develop after

formal introduction in 1982, it had caused the Soviets to react. Depth meant

taking the battle to the enemy and increasing the commander's battle space.

Battle space, tempo, and logistics all defined the actions of the force projection Army. The commander's depth-vision and simultaneous attackmethod needed to be viewed in parallel. In the discussions at Fort Story,

there was general endorsement of the notion that simultaneity meant "taking the enemy down" all at once, rather than piece by piece, and that was a

new capability. Franks cited the example of VII Corps hitting the Iraqi

Guard command and control both "near-deep" and "far-deep." In the new

understanding, depth meant not only operational depth but operations in

the broadest sense. General Franks wanted that understanding clearly laid

out in the final refinement of the doctrine, an element of which was the

major effects of technological innovation.

The striking attraction of the new depth and simultaneous attack

doctrine, however, did not obviate the need to keep the close-deep-rear

construct. That was so at least for the transitional period—current field

manuals were oriented to it. Too much of the new could be counterproductive in a time of trauma for the U.S. Army—the ongoing builddown. The

idea of tempo helped the transition. Tempo, in blurring and transcending

close-deep-rear, was a means and aid to simultaneity.

For Franks, depth and simultaneous attack created a situation of no

sanctuary for the enemy. Combat power that was applied throughout the

depth of the battle space simultaneously stunned and rapidly defeated the

enemy. Franks, as VII Corps commander, had conducted that style of operations across the Iraqi border on 24 February 1991. Characteristic of

airborne and air assault operations, it occurred in Iraq by means of deepreaching, deep-firing ground forces. The coup-de-main of Operation Just

Cause, Franks saw as another such example. Depth and simultaneous attack he believed to be "an enormously valuable construct." Strategically, it

was a valuable deterrent.

The concept of battle space was now more closely defined, with its

major components distinguished. Starting from his general definition of

battle space as the commander's visualization of his now wider range of

operations, Franks saw it as both spatial and as incorporating a more

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

aggressive commander's view. These discussions pointed up the fact that

battle space as a concept exceeded physical space alone and was not limited

by the as-yet undeveloped means to carry it out fully. Just as with AirLand

Battle doctrine, there was a deterrent value in stating that U.S. forces would

do what they could not yet fully do. In the review of the McDonough

battlefield framework, the consensus was that the commander's battle space

overarched the areas of operations and interest and that it had two clear

dimensions: physical and intellectual. It could vary greatly, by commander

and task. It was attached to the commander and shifted with him, thus it

was personal. Yet it could be fluid, overlap, and be shared. The idea of

battle space, too, Franks believed, forced commanders to think outside of

their assigned "box"—to be much more aware of the totality of the

circumstances of their particular mission.

The intellectual component of battle space now took clearer form.

It was the commander's mental picture of his operating space in the broadest sense, transcending but including the physical space component. Franks

saw it as an art form, containing the factor of the commander's imagination, his freedom of mind to see the battlefield in all its aspects, potentials,

and unfolding possibilities. In the final doctrine, the relationship between

battle space, close-deep-rear, and the commander's areas of interest and

influence would be clearly related, with joint and technological considerations well tied in. Franks wanted the idea cogently expressed that technology would permit increasingly the concentration of effects without concentrating forces—a new gloss on the principle of mass.

In battle command, Franks refocused thinking on the art of command, the thinking part of command, and the leadership part of command,

as opposed to the organizational-technical focus. Battle command, in its

final formulation, was seen as an art, the activity of agile, imaginative leaders exerting an intuitive sense but always subject to the effects of friction

and chance. Franks saw the leap from a set of principles to their application in circumstances that differed each time as a true art form, similar to

the creation of a painting or a musical work. Battle command was "liberating the commander's imagination." For General Franks, "the emotion of

the fight" had to have a place in the doctrine—the pain and understanding

of the consequences of battle for some of the soldiers, but the courage to act

to accomplish the mission at least cost to them.

The Fort Story discussion affirmed the Tightness of the battle command focus, the culmination of an evolution since the 1960s-1970s operations-research heyday of accretions to the central idea of command. In

Franks' mind, the Army had in the 1980s come to neglect the central notion

of command. In the new decade, C2—command and control—was "Cold

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

War set-battlefield baggage." Control continued, but command overarched.

They weren't equal. Franks noted that simulation training, with its control

and communications components, gave commanders a false sense of their

ability to solve battle problems. The art of command was separate and not

part of a matrix. C2 lay with staff and subordinates. Commanding his unit,

the commander also commanded the staff in its control. Franks directed an

emphasis on command over control.

For Franks, battle command (with battle space) was the single most

important contribution of the new doctrine. He saw command as battle

command. He chose this term because it emphasized battle, and then command. It conveyed a different sense of commanding soldiers and units in

battle. In the course ofthe project, Franks also drew together and subsequently

published a record of commonalities in battle command techniques. The record

was built on interviews with Desert Storm and Just Cause commanders at all

levels. These side studies affirmed his view that battle command meant being

with soldiers, leading from the front, and commanding on the move.62

Command posts were a central aspect ofthe command issue. Franks

questioned their retention. Were tactical command posts coming to resemble

simulation headquarters? With the oncoming electronic aids for the more

interdependent battlefield, did the commander even need the traditional

command post? Had it outlived its usefulness—an anachronism from industrial-age warfare? Commanders needed to leverage control and use its

mechanisms, but on the more interdependent battlefield that was coming,

the commander should select those mechanisms that he needed. Significant issues were present here, which Franks' advisors discussed. "Command

on the move" might be coming, and the command post structure might disappear in pursuit actions, but it had not outlived its usefulness: command depended on it. The real problem was how to support the commander during

battle. Franks' decision was to maintain battle command as formulated but to

examine the need for command posts further: "Our CP mentality is Cold War."

Early entry into a theater encompassed difficulties and complexities

bound up in the force projection Army's need to deploy and land early,

forcibly or unopposed. As we have earlier noted, the Army's lack of a

capability for forcible entry over the shore, except by airborne or airmobile

insertion, was one such problem. Not all doctrinal points raised were to be

62. The studies were published and disseminated in a series, "Leadership and Command on the

Battlefield" (TRADOC Pams 525-100), as companion pieces to the new doctrinal manual. They covered the following topics: leadership and command in Just Cause and Desert Storm, battalion and

company, NCO corps, and family support. The projects were led by Lt Col Toby W. Martinez of Franks'

planning group, assisted by Dr. Susan Canedy of the Office of the Command Historian.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

fully resolved or were resolvable in the 1993 doctrine. But doctrine was

clearly needed that told how to protect the lodgement the early-entry force

established, and how that force transitioned to maneuver. Unknown factors

were endemic to every such mission, and Franks advised that the new

doctrine would have to state clearly how to think about that. Bad planning

decisions could be irreversible and lead to disaster at the entry point. Earlyentry operations were concurrent, not necessarily sequential—they were a

flow. General Franks directed a doctrinal stress, in the complexity of early

entry, on concurrency. The force projection Army needed a doctrine that

instructed how to get into a region where the United States had no presence—

how to begin a distant operation. The TRADOC commander stressed the

need to emphasize that early entry did not imply that force projection ended

at the port or airhead. He approved the draft manual's separate treatment of

forcible entry.

Logistics, the critical, unsung element of battle, was of coequal

concern. The Combined Arms Support Command had developed a concept

paper titled "Vision of Combined Arms Support," and General Franks

directed its integration into the doctrine. The manual to be published in

1993 noted that operations and logistics became indistinguishable at higher

command echelons. Franks directed that that idea be expanded. The logistics

for fighting the way into a theater were complex, and needed firming up.

Better concepts were needed for logistics in operations other than war.

Intermediate logistics bases remained indispensable. The ideal of theater

throughput, from the continental United States to the war theater, did not

work: there was not enough strategic lift, and the pipeline was immense.

For this doctrinal element, physical reality was a powerful determinant.

Yetsignificant improvements were apparent in the 1990s. Notably, they included

split-based logistics operations—that is, operating the logistics apparatus, flow,

and structure over assured secure communications from split locations in the

United States and in the theater. General Franks directed final work on further

logistics points: logistical support in operations other than war, embedding

logistics discussions in operations chapters, emphatic early statement of the

need for versatility and anticipation in logistics, and more discussion ofmanning

and personnel management as part of logistics.63

63. The contribution of Lt Col Nate Power, a forward support battalion commander who also observed logistics in the field in the ongoing Somalia operation, was important. The SAMS team's

logistics writer carried out Franks' and McDonough's determination to articulate a clear principlesbased doctrine, in the face of logistics planners' understandable desire to articulate concepts in terms

of new systems. The 1993 doctrine succeeded in barring inclusion of transitory specific materiel and

logistics systems and their doctrine-dating effect. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov

93. (2) Ltr, McDonough to author, 31 Jan 96.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

Operations other than war, the important non-war sector, had been clarified and largely settled at the August 1992 meeting at Fort A.P. Hill. With that

clarification, General Franks believed, the Army had achieved something notable. The remaining tasks were to make clear, in the doctrine, the difference in

how the principles of war applied to war and non-war operations, and to delineate the additional principles applicable only to the "other" category. Franks

believed historical examples were the key to clarifying the differences.

Cancellation of AirLand Battle as the descriptor for operations doctrine was, as noted earlier, a decision ofsignificance beyond mere terminology.

Though there had been considerable opposition to discarding a descriptive term

widely recognized and identified with successful fighting doctrine, Army senior leaders were in consensus by November 1992 that the label should be

jettisoned. Franks affirmed that outcome. Eliminating the descriptor signalled

that the Army had a new and broader doctrine that extended beyond air-land to

sea and space. "AirLand Battle" had served its purpose well. Most ofits tenets

and principles continued, but the label had become restrictive.

Numerous other doctrinal points were affirmed by decision at the final

wrap-up at Fort Story. Important were insertion of versatility as a fifth doctrinal tenet, inclusion of mission orders as a supporting element of commander

actions within the higher commander's intent, and retention of the familiar

BOSs—the familiar battlefield operating systems categories. Work remained

in the placing, relating, and balancing of doctrinal ideas so that important concepts did not lose efficacy through inadvertent under-or over-statement.

The doctrine writers needed to make deception more prominent in the

manual, for example, and to "embed" force projection so that it did not

dominate the mission.

Balance was an important point. Franks believed that clear distinctions, as in the 1980s manuals' setting-out of the three levels of war and the

offense and defense framing, were all-important. But he believed that they had

been overemphasized. The levels blurred naturally in practice, and the Gulf

War had demonstrated that. Offense and defense complemented one another.

In practice, there was a flow between them. Franks encouraged apt new expressions: English was an expansible language. But any new term had to be

legitimate, or be dropped.

Stressed at the advent offinal formulation was that the new FM 100-5

had to articulate clearly and convincingly—at the very beginning—the reasons

for change.64 Although those factors were being absorbed very rapidly by the

64. The factors that had required preparation of a new doctrine were: the recession of the Soviet

threat and the new strategic environment, the shift to power projection from the continental United

States, the need for an Army co-focus on operations other than war, a shift of attention (Continued).

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Army, they needed, General Franks emphasized, clear, forceful expression.

But cautions were necessary. The Army was measuring the effects of postindustrial warfare. That argued for higher technological investment and

probably smaller forces. The technological solution also presented an

interservice trap. Further, there might be large land campaigns again. Yet

it was clear that a major technologically engendered shift was occurring.

Franks believed a doctrinal leap was in motion, with microprocessors constituting a factor as significant as had the advent of radio communications

in the 1920s and 1930s. History would judge, Franks said. The U.S. Army

had to "come out on the right side of the river," as at Sedan.

The TRADOC commander issued the Fort Story decisions in a

guidance memo on 10 November 1992. Looking ahead, he directed completion and delivery to him of revisions by mid-December.65

Final Formulation

With the settling of doctrinal points at the Fort Story meeting in

early November 1992, the TRADOC commander directed the writing team

to put the doctrine in final draft form. Working from Fort Leavenworth,

McDonough's team completed the work with General Franks at Fort Monroe, presenting the final draft on 14 December.

In the interim occurred a major Army-Navy doctrinal meeting—an

indication of the growing Navy reorientation to support of the land warfare

mission in the wake of the Soviet collapse and sharp recession of the maritime threat. The "Army-Navy Board" meeting, held 23-24 November 1992

at Fort Leavenworth, was organized and attended by Army Chief of Staff

General Sullivan and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II

to open channels of common concern. Major Naval, Marine Corps, and

Army commanders attended, to be briefed by the Army on Army and joint

operations doctrine, deep fires, and joint fire coordination, by the Marines

on forcible entry, and by the Navy on strategic mobility, air defense and

theater missile defense, and Army helicopters aboard Navy ships. Though

primarily informational, the high-level meeting was an augery of the Navy's

growing doctrinal commitment to the new level of coordinated interservice

64. (Continued), away from the primacy of Europe to several world regions, the Goldwater-Nichols

initiatives leading to much-strengthened jointness, the new Navy contributions to jointness, technological advances leading to dramatically new battlefield capabilities, declining defense dollars, a smaller

force, and the public expectation of rapid low-casualty victory.

65. MFR ATCG, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 10 Nov 92, subj: Notes, FM 100-5 Off-Site Conference, Fort Story, Virginia, 5-6 Nov 92.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

planning and operations that was emerging in the early 1990s.66

Meeting with Colonels McDonough and Rowlett and with his doctrine staff in mid-December, General Franks directed that the writers make

sure the central new concepts were specific and concrete in the doctrine,

aided where necessary by examples, diagrams, and explanations. Franks

also wanted exploration of possible names for the new body of ideas—a

doctrinal feature that did not eventuate.67 Intensively reviewing and reworking portions of the December chapters, Franks released and published

the final draft of FM 100-5 on 19 January 1993, again circulating it widely,

on 1 February, to selected earlier readers for critical review.

Thus through formal engagement in the succession of conferences

held over the preceding eighteen months, and in his personal meetings and

communications as well as those of his chief doctrine writer, Franks facilitated deep Army participation in the development of the 1993 doctrine. He

called upon replies from many key current and former senior Army commanders and doctrine writers. McDonough's consultative net was also wide.

These contributions continued into the early months of 1993 in response to

the January final draft, the reaction to which was positive if—by many

readers—close and critical.68 Lingering confusion as to the clarity of the

doctrine's battlefield framework remained.69

Important perspectives on the 1993 doctrine came from both of the

chief AirLand Battle doctrine writers, Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege and

Brig. Gen. Don Holder, whose views Franks greatly respected.70 In

66. (1) Msg, DA to distr, 241236Z Sep 92, subj: Army/Navy Board, 23-24 Nov 92. (2) Msg, DA to

distr, 021320Z Nov 92, subj: Army/Navy Board: Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 23-24 Nov 92. (3) Grogan

Interview by Romjue, 22 Jan 93.

67. One choice, "full dimension operations," was ultimately preferred and noted in the June 1993 FM

100-5 by way of general description, other suggested tags were: force projection doctrine, force

projection strategy, land power doctrine, joint land power, ground power projection, and multidimensional operations. E-mail msg, Peggy Boone to [Col] Berry [Dir, Army Doc Dir], 18 Dec 92, subj: FM

100-5 Update.

68. Ltr, Col James McDonough to John L. Romjue, HQ TRADOC OCH, 24 Dec 93.

69. Responses critical of the battlefield framework and other issues included: (1) Ltr, Lt Col Rick

Gutwald, CSA Staff Group to Col Harper, 31 Jan 93, subj: Thoughts on Final Draft of FM 100-5. (2)

Ltr, Maj Gen Jerry A. White, Cdr U.S. Army Infantry Center to Cdr TRADOC, 18 Feb 93, subj: USAIS

Review of FM 100-5, Operations. (3) Memo DAMO-FDQ, Col Richard T. Rhoades, Ch, Con and Doc

and Force Policy Division, ODCSOPS, HQ DA to DCSDOC TRADOC, n.d. [Feb 93], subj: FM 100-5,

Operations (Final Draft).

70. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93. In the development of the 1993 FM 100-5,

McDonough ranked, after General Franks, a "big four": Wass de Czege, Lt Gen Shoffner, General

RisCassi, and Holder. (2) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

conversations and correspondence, both contributed to clarify the battle

space concept. In Wass de Czege's advisement, battle space was not an

ability but the commander's maintaining orientation, awareness, and control.

Wass de Czege saw battle command as a doctrinal step forward, and advised

strongly for a chapter-ordering that kept the all-important element of war

fighting first in emphasis, no matter the major signficance of the doctrine's

needed and valuable expansion into the strategic sphere.71 In subtle

criticisms, Brig. Gen. Holder urged textual shifts in emphasis to avoid

inadvertent weakening of the crucial war fighting notions of economy of

force, depth and simultaneity, and the ground commander's primary

responsibility for the airspace around his force. Holder urged integrating

logistics solidly into the planning and execution ofoperations, to correct combat

arms' officers tendency wrongfully to separate logistics from operations. Himself

a Desert Storm veteran, he cautioned against too much dependence, in historical

example, on that as yet insufficiently analyzed war.72

The Eighth U.S. Army commander's review produced valuable insights. General RisCassi found treatment of the enemy's will missing in the

drafts; the doctrine writers wrote it in. RisCassi argued early and successfully against the doctrine's inherited overlapping lists of principles, tenets,

elements, functions, etc., a criticism that led to better textual distillation

and integration. For combined warfare, the combined forces commander

in Korea argued for doctrinal points fostering the building of commonalities between alliance partners.73 Lt. Gen. Shoffner's involvement was active and substantive as the Combined Arms Center commander and CGSC

commandant commanding the School of Advanced Military Studies. A

close Franks lieutenant and advisor, Shoffner contributed substantively in

every major conference and off-site meeting and lent particular understanding and perspective to the progress of depth and simultaneous attack doctrine. Shoffner also brought clear articulation to the doctrinal separation of

command and control and to battle command. Lt. Gen. Samuel Wakefield,

71. (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Huba Wass de Czege, Asst Div Cdr (Maneuver), 1st Inf Div to Brig Gen Lon

E. Maggart, 12 Mar 93. (2) FM 100-5 Comments, Brig Gen H. Wass de Czege, ADC(M), Big Red One,

n.d. [ca. Feb 93], provided to CdrTRADOC

72. Memo ACCT-CG, Brig Gen L.D. Holder to Brig Gen Lon E. Maggart, DCSDOC, 17 Feb 93,

subj: FM 100-5 Operations, w/enclosed notes on the Jan 93 draft. Such criticisms resulted in direct

revisions, as for example, maintaining the main point of economy of force (FM 100-5, 19 Jan 93 draft,

p. 2-8; final edition, 14 Jun 93, p. 2-5).

73. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93. (2) TRADOC OCH files.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

Franks at a Fort Monroe ceremony

the Combined Arms Support Command commander, oversaw support to

logistics issues.74

Many voices spoke in the new doctrine. Development of the battle

space concept owed much to the work during 1992 of the Infantry and

Armor School commandants, Maj. Gen. Jerry A. White and Maj. Gen. Paul

Funk, respectively. Funk had commanded the 3d Armored Division in

Operation Desert Storm, and White had been a 7th Infantry Division (Light)

commander. Both contributed to the thinking on versatility. Their examination and articulation of the new notion of battle space at the July 1992

74. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov

93. (3) Grogan Interview by Romjue, 22 Jan 93. (4) Ltr, McDonough to author, 31 Jan 96.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference at Fort McClellan was convincing to

Franks, who directed its inclusion at that juncture in the doctrine.75 Maj.

Gen. Daniel W. Christman, the Engineer School commandant, also helped

develop the versatility concept. An important advisor, particularly at the

tactical level, was retired General Richard Cavazos, on issues of battle command, reconnaissance, and the mobile defense.76 An influential figure in

the work at Fort Leavenworth was retired Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, himself a Combined Arms Center commander during 1973-1977, who emphasized the personal nature and responsibility of battle command.77

As revealed in the actions documented throughout this study, the

primary author of the new post-Cold War doctrine was General Frederick

Franks. Self-possessed and introspective with an aggressive and inquiring

mind, a perceptive observer and listener, Franks was an intuitive thinker

and consensus seeker who was deliberate but decisive on the points of warfare he saw changing. He controlled the formulation and apparatus of the

doctrine project throughout. A one-time professor ofEnglish at West Point,

he recognized the critical nexus of exact language and clear doctrine.78

Franks' indisputably central vision was his experience of

transregional force-projection of the VII U.S. Army Corps and his conduct

of a major heavy-corps maneuver against the Iraqi Army on a battlefield in

technological transformation at the watershed of a new strategic era. From

his own experience as a battle leader in that major geopolitical event, he

shaped the post-Cold War doctrinal definition of the force projection Army

for war and non-war operations. Franks named and substantially defined

the changed battle dynamics of the technologically altered battlefield.

Early entry and its lethality and survivability requirements,

simultaneity of battle throughout the operational depth, and a restructured

75. Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. See General Funk's later exposition of battle space: Lt

Gen Paul E. Funk, "Battle Space: A Commander's Tool on the Future Battlefield," Military Review,

December 1993, pp. 36-47.

76. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov

93. Cavazos had figured importantly in an advisory role in the development of AirLand Battle doctrine

(Romjue, AirLand Battle, pp. 53, 55).

77. McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93. Lt Gen Cushman was also a strong advocate

of writing the manual from an expressly joint approach. (1) Fax message, Cushman to Col McDonough,

14 Aug 91, subj: Thoughts on the Revision of FM 100-5. (2) Ltr, John H. Cushman to Lt Gen Wilson A.

Shoffner, Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 9 Dec 91.

78. Franks was, for example, the author of the versatility tenet, an important and expansive doctrinal

addition which was clearly distinguished from battlefield agility. McDonough Interview by Romjue,

22-23 Nov 93.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

logistics were consequent products. So too were the distinctive twin concepts

of battle command and battle space—driven by the commander's

imagination on a battlefield of greatly enhanced tempo and technological

capability whose traditional strategic-operational-tactical neatness was

blurred. Franks' isolation and development ofthose changed battle dynamics

and their placement into the heart of the doctrine—aided in the formative

stage by his doctrine deputy, Maj. Gen. Wesley Clark—was his signal

contribution.

Franks paid doctrinal homage to two classic military theorists, Sun

Tzu and Clausewitz and, as earlier noted, to the contemporary British writer

Paddy Griffith. In his study, Forward Into Battle, Griffith surveyed the

increasing looseness or dispersion, through the 19th and into the 20th century, of military formations due to constant improvements in modern firepower. Griffith observed in his studies a trend to an ever "emptier" battlefield. Franks' concept of the long dimensions of a commander's battle

space was also supported by Griffith's suggestion that, if the enemy perceives your ability to reach and outrange him, he is likely or disposed to

retreat. It was the willingness of the soldier to close with the enemy that

determined the outcome. Franks also felt the heavy debt he owed to his

predecessor doctrine authors, Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry.79

Of major significance was the ground-laying decision for the project and

its firm support by the Chief of Staff ofthe Army, General Gordon Sullivan.

Franks' ideas were articulated and assisted by his chief doctrine

writer, Colonel lames McDonough, a widely respected military author and

forceful doctrinal thinker who, like Franks, saw combat in Vietnam and

who the following year would be assigned from the SAMS directorship to

brigade command in Italy. Franks considered McDonough a professional

soldier ofintellectual force and great depth, indispensable to him. In Franks'

intensive final editing of FM 100-5, McDonough was his closest collaborator.80 McDonough drew heavily on the talented six-man writing team headed

by Colonel Ricky Rowlett, who wrote the seminal planning and executing

operations chapter.81

79. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics

from Waterloo to Vietnam (Chichester, U.K.: Antony Bird Publications Ltd., 1981), pp. 101 ff., 141.

80. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Franks Interview by Malone, 7 Jan 93.

81. McDonough regarded the collective and individual contributions of the writing team highly. Franks

considered Colonel Ricky Rowlett, the team chief, and Colonel Ed Thurman, as major contributors.

Thurman worked notably in the areas of the strategic link of operations, and in operations other than

war. Lt Col Michael Rampy's dedicated focus on the doctrinal significance of war's end-state helped

secure Franks' acceptance of it into the doctrine. Lt Col Nate Power drew together (Continued)

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

The project was energetically supported in its all-important

consensus-gathering aspect by Franks' doctrine deputy, Brig. Gen. Timothy

Grogan and, after January 1993 in its final preparation, by Grogan's

successor, Brig. Gen. Bert Maggart. Franks valued the contributions of

both. He worked closely with Maggart, his former executive officer, a

brigade commander in Desert Storm, and earlier a doctrine writer under

General William DePuy, to strengthen and refine the pre-publication drafts.

Both Grogan and Maggart were professionally served by the headquarters Army

doctrine chief, Colonel Frederick Berry and the primary headquarters action

officer, Lt. Col. Bobby McCarter and his assistant, Captain Michael Whetston.

General Franks' personal editorial work was extensive during

the early part of 1993, as reviewers responded and as the pre-publication process began. With the final draft out for review in late January,

Franks placed editorial responsibility in the hands of his doctrine deputy,

Brig. Gen. Maggart and the headquarters Army Doctrine Directorate

headed by Colonel Berry. As noted, the manual's chief writer, Colonel

McDonough, working closely with the TRADOC commander, reviewed

and affected the final text.82

Late changes included a broadening and expansion ofthe battlefield

framework discussion in the manual, retaining the battle space concept

unchanged but also keeping the useful auxiliary construct ofthe close-deeprear battlefield. The discussion of battle command was also broadened.

The idea that the strategic end state of a military action had to be spelled

out was clarified and expanded, along with how military objectives supported

the end state. Editors added emphasis on rules of engagement as an element

of operations-other-than-war principles. The commander's intent concept

was made more concise and understandable.

Following the manual's first three chapters, treating challenges for

the U.S. Army, the foundations of Army operations, and force projection,

the joint operations and combined operations chapters were moved up, followed by the key chapter on planning and executing operations. This final

chapter-reordering expressly reflected the manual's war fighting and joint

81. (Continued), the manual's logistics concepts. Lt Col John Reitz developed the project plan to

obtain consensus in the doctrine by key government, academic, journalist, and industry figures. Lt

Col Gary Steele was instrumental in developing the manual's electronic packaging. All team members contributed to the writing process. (1) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93. (2)

Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

82. (1) MFR, John L. Romjue, OCH, 18 Jul 93, subj: Discussion with Colonel Fred Berry, Dir, Army

Doc Dir, ODCSDOC, 17 Jul 93, on FM 100-5, Hampton, Va. (2) McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-

23 Nov 93. (3) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

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CRYSTALLIZING A POST-COLD WAR DOCTRINE

Brigadier General Lon E. (Bert) Maggart

and combined emphases. The tactical chapters were also moved up—to

the middle of the field manual. Chapters 7 through 11 covered the offense,

defense, and retrograde. The final 3 chapters provided, in order, operations

doctrine for logistics, operations other than war, and the environment of

combat. The headquarters staff added diagrams, historical illustrations,

and a preface.83

83. (1) Bfg slides, Bfg-FM 100-5 Update, to Winter Senior Commanders Conference, 3-5 Mar 93,

Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (2) Memo ATDO-A, Brig Gen Lon E. Maggart, DCSDOC to Cdr U.S. Army

Quartermaster Center and School, 28 Apr 93, subj: FM 100-5, Operations. (3) MFR, John L. Romjue,

OCH, 18 Jul 93, subj: Discussion with Colonel Fred Berry, Dir, Army Doc Dir, ODCSDOC, 17 Jul 93 on

FM 100-5, Hampton, Va. (4) Interview of Brig Gen Lon E. Maggart, DCSDOC by John L. Romjue and

Henry O. Malone, Jr., 30 Sep 93, HQ TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Va.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Historical examples were all drawn—but for one Civil War note—

from the post-World War II period. A third of them came from the 1990-

1991 Gulf War operations, with another third illustrating operations other

than war. In the illustrations as elsewhere, the doctrine writers and editors

sought distance from an earlier strategic world.84

In early March, the Army's senior leaders convened at the Winter

Army Commanders Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and

reviewed and endorsed the doctrine. General Franks subsequently discussed

the final draft, chapter by chapter, with the Army Chief of Staff in Franks'

Fort Monroe quarters. In May, senior leaders and school commandants

made final reviews. The post-Cold War doctrine was published in a new

edition of FM 100-5, Operations, on 14 June 1993, the anniversary date of

the Army's establishment in 1775. The manual was formally presented in

ceremonies at the Pentagon that day.85

84. General Franks' example-selection was reflected in an interview comment: "Essentially I think

World War II ended about 1989 in terms of its major doctrinal influence on United States military

operations." Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

85. (1) Msg, HQ DA (Sullivan sends) to distr, 161456Z Jun 93, subj: Army Birthday Celebration. (2)

Franks review ms. marginal note.

112
CHAPTER

f

DOCTRINE FOR

A NEW TIME

The 1993 doctrine reflectedArmy thinkingfor a new strategic

era and reflected the shift to strongerjoint operations.

It allowedfor the increased incidence of combined operations,

and activity across the range ofmilitary operations. In the

new strategic world of force projection, the writers saw their

work as a doctrine for "full dimension operations."

.fourth in a noteworthy line of Operations manuals since 1976,

the 1993 volume, like its predecessors, reflected the renaissance and centrality of doctrine as the actuating spirit of the Army. In a press conference

on 14 June 1993, the Chief of Staff of the Army General Sullivan denoted

doctrine as "the centerpiece of everything that we do." In a message to

Army commands on 16 June, he described the new body of ideas as a significant marker in the Army's "intellectual bridge" to the future.1

As the Army doctrine for a new and as yet undefined strategic era,

what were that doctrine's assumptions, fundamentals, critical points, and

joint-service and combined-force guidelines? What were its strategic implications as a doctrine primarily for war fighting but also more sharply

attendant to the challenge of the whole category of operations other than

war? What was the new battlefield framework, and what was different in

the dynamic and face of war since the mid-1980s? This chapter presents a

digest of the key battle doctrine of 1993.

1. Msg, DA to distr, 221755Z Jun 93, subj: CSA-Transcript of CSA Conference. (2) Msg, DA to

distr, 161456Z Jun 93, subj: Army Birthday Celebration.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Full-Dimension Operations

General Franks and his doctrine writers made prominent the warwinning purpose of the manual and its necessary focus on all the levels of

war. Thus, it treated the strategic context ofthe application of force, it dealt

with operational art as the means by which battle was translated into strategic objectives, and it fixed tactics as the sound basis of all operations. The

1993 doctrine reflected Army thinking for a new strategic era and reflected

the shift to strongerjoint operations. It allowed for the increased incidence

of combined operations, and activity across the range of military operations. In the new strategic world of force projection, the writers saw their

work as a doctrine for "full dimension operations," a doctrine to deter the

enemy, despite the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Army inventory, and as a doctrine that, should deterrence fail, would enable the

U.S. Army to win as part of a joint force, globally projectable. The new

FM 100-5 was meant to reflect "the collective wisdom of our Army against

the background of history," conveying lessons learned from recent experiences and current strategic and technological realities.2

The new FM 100-5 specified doctrine as "the statement of how

America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war... the condensed expression of the Army's fundamental

approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and

deterring actions detrimental to national interests."3 The manual saw doctrine as establishing the Army's shared professional culture and approach

to operations, permeating the entire Army structure and setting the direction for modernization and training. Doctrine was versatile to enable forces

to deal with the gamut of challenges, including drug-trafficking, disasters,

regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, and extremist acts anywhere in

the world. Doctrine had to be sufficient to enable a force to shift rapidly

between types of commitment. It had to reflect and accommodate the most

advanced technology obtainable to give U.S. forces overwhelming and decisive combat power while minimizing risk. The new doctrine placed a

premium on quick force projection.4

The 1993 doctrine emphasized its roots in "the American way of

war" growing out of values stated in the nation's founding documents and

dependent on the special relationship between the government, the military,

2. FM 100-5, Operations, 14 Jun 93, pp. v, vi.

3. Ibid., p. 1-1.

4. Ibid., pp. 1-1 to 1-2.

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DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

and the people. Subordinate to the National Command Authority, Army

forces had to attend to the reality of the American people's requirement for

decisive victory and no unnecessary casualties, and to deal with the media

impact on events. The manual kept clear the three levels of war—strategic,

operational, and tactical—applicable both in war and operations other than

war and vitally linked.

All operations occurred in a strategic context set by current national security strategy. The U.S. military's fundamental obligations were

strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence in vital areas, effective

response to crises, and retention of a national capacity to reconstitute. Those

obligations led to the all-service strategic principles of readiness, collective

security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power

projection, technological superiority, and decisive force. Significant was forethought and preparation for operations leading to the desired strategic end-state.

The doctrine emphasized the Army as a strategically decisive force,

based on its ability to react promptly and on its strategic staying power. Its

requirements in the new era were a capability for full-dimensional operations; its trained readiness as part of a joint, combined, United Nations, or

interagency force; its packaged strategic deployability; its rapid

expansibility; and its capacity to attain decisive victory. The doctrine repeated an injunction going back to 1976: "On the day of battle, soldiers and

units will fight as well or as poorly as they are trained."5

Fundamentals of Army Operations

A key chapter laid out the doctrinal fundamentals of Army operations in the ambiguous post-Cold War world. The doctrine defined the

range of military operations to include war (both limited and general) and

two activities that were operations other than war—conflict, andArmy peacetime activities. Conflict comprised strikes and raids, peace enforcement,

support to insurgency, antiterrorism, peacekeeping, and noncombatant

evacuation operations. Peacetime activities employing or requiring Army

forces included counterdrug operations, disaster relief, civil support, peace

building, and nation assistance. The states of peacetime, conflict, and war

could all exist at once in a theater commander's realm. Noncombat operations might occur during war, and some operations other than war might

require combat. Notwithstanding the range of operations, the manual made

clear the primary focus of the Army: war fighting.

Ibid., pp. 1-2 to 1-5.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

More emphatically than before, the 1993 doctrine stressed that the

Army would not operate alone, but as part of a joint, combined, or interagency team. Operations would integrate all Army capabilities: active, reserve, and civilian; and armored, light, and special operations forces.

Balance was a key concept. The components of battle could exist

in complex combinations. Elements of the defense were within every offense, and vice-versa. Firepower permitted maneuver; and maneuver, firepower. Forces focused on the enemy, but attended to terrain. Unconventional and conventional warfare could exist side by side. Army forces always sought to increase their options while limiting the enemy's. The manual

cited a distinction made by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. There were

options that were risks and options that were gambles. Recovery was possible from a failed risk taken, but not from a gamble that went awry.6

The 1993 doctrine carried forward the Sun Tzu maxim that was at

the center of AirLand Battle: to throw the enemy off balance by striking

blows from unexpected directions. But the new doctrine shaded the maxim

to unexpected dimensions, including denial of the enemy's reconnaissance

and intelligence sensing. The doctrine emphasized as before the combined

arms, but now in more dispersed and noncontiguous formations and in a

full, synchronized manner overpowering and devastating to the enemy. The

new manual noted the U.S. strength in advanced technology of war which,

however, required integration with doctrine and required doctrine as the

engine to exploit it.7

The 1993 doctrine also emphasized the requirement for disciplined

operations: mental and physical toughness, close-knit teamwork, adherence

to applicable rules of engagement based in international law and in specific

condition and circumstance, limiting the collateral damage of combat, and

regard for human rights. "How the Army fights is a mark of what it is and

what it stands for."8

The new doctrine laid out the foundations of Army operations in

the nine Principles of War: directing military operations toward a clearly

defined, decisive, and obtainable objective; seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative; massing the effects of overwhelming combat power at

the decisive place and time; economy offorce; maneuver—placing the

enemy at disadvantage through flexible application of combat power; unity

6. Cited in Desmond Young, Rommel: Desert Fox (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).

7. Ibid., pp. 2-2 to 2-3.

8. Ibid., pp. 2-3 to 2-4. Quotation from p. 2-3.

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DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

of command and effort; security and never permitting the enemy an unexpected advantage; surprise by striking at the place or in a manner for which

the enemy was unprepared; and simplicity of plans and orders.9

The foundations of operations also included the tenets required for

victory. Initiative was imperative, with all that it comprised—an offensive

spirit, constantly depleting the enemy's options, anticipating events, acting

independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent, allowing the enemy no recovery, decentralization of decisions to the lowest

practical level. Agility was the ability to react faster than the enemy in

order to seize and hold the initiative, and it had both mental and physical

aspects needed to overcome the inevitable friction of war.

The significant tenet of depth, first introduced by AirLand Battle

doctrine, meant the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and

purpose in order to influence those operations throughout the depth of the

battlefield. In an important departure from the 1980s understanding of depth,

the doctrine shifted away from attacking deep in order to influence close-in

operations, to a new requirement to think in depth, forecast, and anticipate

in order to carry through simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the

battlefield with full joint capabilities in all modes and dimensions.

Synchronization was arranging activities in time and space to mass at the

decisive point, including massing the effects of combat power, jamming

enemy communications, suppressing enemy air defenses, shifting reserves,

and employing synchronized main and supporting attacks. Synchronization

was a paramount necessity for the force projection Army with its complex

requirements for distant contingencies, early entry, phased operations, and

joint and combined battle.

New in the 1993 doctrine was a fifth tenet—versatility, the ability

of units to meet the diverse mission requirements of the strategic world of

the post-Cold War. Commanders needed to be able to shift power, tailor

forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently

and in quick succession, across the full range of military operations.10

War fighting was fundamentally about combat power, created by

combining the four primary elements of maneuver, firepower, protection,

and leadership. Army doctrine in 1993 sought and stressed overwhelming

combat power to achieve victory at minimal cost. Maneuver was defined

as "the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage...to

deliver—or threaten delivery of—direct and indirect fires." Maneuver and

9. Ibid., pp. 2-4 to 2-6.

10. Ibid., pp. 2-6 to 2-9.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

firepower were "inseparable and complementary dynamics of combat."

Either maneuver or firepower might dominate, but it was the synchronized

effects of both that characterized all operations. Firepower provided the

destructive force essential to defeat the enemy, and the greater reach and

precision to which it had evolved were significant. Firepower effects applied

to and needed to be synchronized for all levels—strategic, operational, and

tactical.11 Protection had four vital components—operations security and

deception, soldiers' physical welfare, safety, and fratricide avoidance—the

latter a reaffirmed and media-highlighted lesson of the Gulf War.

The "most essential dynamic of combat power" was "competent

and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership." In development of that critical quality, the doctrine urged the study of leadership's

human dimension as well as its tactical and technical sides and recommended

the regular study and teaching of military doctrine, theory, history, and biography. It was the moral qualities of soldiers and leaders—duty, courage,

loyalty, discipline, combined with stamina and skill-that provided the decisive edge.12

Exercise of key combat functions enabled commanders to build

and sustain combat power: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense,

mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command. In the concept

of battle command, the 1993 doctrine introduced a significant distinction.

The relatedness of the functions of command, control, and communications and intelligence—the so-called "C3" and "C3I" agglomerates—had

acted over the years to dilute the centrality of command itself as the core

focus of the commander in battle. Against the size and complexity of the

information flow at a command post in the 1990s, the 1993 doctrine restored and clarified battle command as the commander's central focus.

"Commanders command while the headquarters and staff coordinate and

make necessary control adjustments consistent with the commander's intent." Command had two vital components—decision making and leadership. Decision making was knowing if, and then when and what, to decide;

leadership was taking responsibility for decisions and providing an atmosphere of loyalty, inspiration, teamwork, moral and physical courage, and

vision. Command was "more an art than a science...often guided by intuition and feel...." And commanders needed to know the intent of their own

commanders two levels above.13

11. Quotes from ibid., p. 2-10.

12. Ibid., pp. 211-12, quotes p. 2-11.

13. Quotes, ibid., pp. 2-14, 2-15.

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DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

Weighing heavily in combat power in the 1993 doctrine was its

exercise as a part of joint-service operations—the dominating framework

of U.S. military actions evolving since the late 1980s. The new doctrine

covered significant areas ofjoint war fighting and other operations. Those

included the rapidly expanding area of space operations, already remarkable in Operation Desert Storm, through space-based systems, joint interdiction, the many aspects of air operations including air interdiction and

close air support, joint maritime operations, joint surveillance and reconnaissance, the airlift and sealift operations critical to Army forces, and special operations. The doctrine specified the Army tactical unit types that

organizationally constituted combat power, and it laid out the functions of

the five types of infantry forces—light, airborne, air assault, Ranger, and

mechanized—as well as the combat roles and functions of the other Army

branches and supporting units.14

Force Projection

Prominent in the new doctrine and placed in a front chapter of the

manual was force projection, a key element of the U.S. strategic power

projection capability. Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield and Desert

Storm were vivid recent illustrations of the new force orientation and its

execution. In the new power stance, joint operations, rapid deployment,

forcible entry, and versatile mixes of types of forces—light, armored, and

special operations—loomed large. The doctrine designated contingencybound units as forward presence, crisis response, initial reinforcement, follow-on reinforcement, and reconstitution organizations.

The doctrine laid out important force-projection considerations, both

in war and operations other than war. Immense planning, intelligence,

mobilization, deployment, operations, and logistics difficulties were present

in the U.S. mission for global force projection to conduct operations whose

purpose itself could radically shift quickly. Credible, lethal force had to be

introduced early. Commanders had to be mentally anticipative and prepared

for deployment to the world regions of focus. Quick force tailoring to the

deployment's specific requirements was a necessity. Early arrival of key

intelligence units was essential, as was split-based intelligence, that is, not

only that tactical intelligence acquired by commanders on the ground, but

tactical intelligence provided in a timely way from national and theater

sources. Battle command presented major challenges in situations of

simultaneous deployment, entry, and combat. Logistics doctrine

14. Ibid., pp. 2-15 to 2-24.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

considerations included the need for tailorable flexible logistics dependent

on availability or nonavailability of in-theater stockage, host nation support,

and port and transportation infrastructure. The concept of split-based

logistics was significant in 1993 doctrine, a concept relying on assured

communications systems that allowed much of the logistics base to remain

in the United States; those elements received and acted on information and

sent necessary supplies forward. Training during contingencies needed to

be constant and relatable to such problems as separation of soldiers from

their full equipment. Force projection would frequently have to attend to

the requirements of combined operations with allies. Of great import in

modern warfare was the impact, by the media and media war images, on

operations at every stage; the requirement was to anticipate and deal with

such impact. Post-conflict considerations had to be anticipated at the outset

of actions, and the desired strategic end state and the transition to peace had

to be planned for.I5In this point, Army doctrine touched the political realm,

but did so of necessity. Versatility—strategic versatility and not only

operational and tactical—was central to the 1993 Army vision of its

responsibility for the outcome as well as the conduct of operations.

Force projection operations fell into the doctrinal categories of mobilization, predeployment activity, deployment, entry operations, operations,

war termination and post-conflict operations, redeployment and reconstitution, and demobilization. The elements of that sequence could well be

blending or overlapping. A new doctrinal manual, FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, was directed and written during the course of the 100-5 project and published in October 1992 to

provide focused guidance.

Joint and Combined Operations

Like force projection, joint operations became a more central

element of Army doctrine in 1993, and the new FM 100-5 gave it

prominence. Though historically integrated at the strategic level and

frequently at the operational level, the military activities of the Army, Navy,

Air Force, and Marine Corps had evolved increasingly toward joint

operations throughout the theater of war. Army doctrine in 1993 emphasized

the joint nature of most warfare and operations other than war in the period

ahead. The manual laid out the command relationships of the service

elements ofjoint forces, specifying the two distinct chains of command—

one for operations, tracing through unified and specified commands and

15. Ibid., pp. 3-1 to 3-7.

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DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

joint task forces; and one for administrative and logistics matters, tracing

through the separate service component chain of command. Also detailed

were the types of command—unified combatant command, specified

combatant command for broad continuing missions, joint task force for

limited missions of short duration, and service component commands—as

well as the theater structure.16

Combined operations also assumed increased importance with the

1993 doctrine. The recent GulfWar experience was a harbinger ofthat new

emphasis. In the realm of allied or combined operations, considerations of

military doctrine and training, equipment capabilities, cultural differences,

language, teamwork and trust all were important. The doctrine laid out

planning and execution guidelines in the areas of command, maneuver, fires,

intelligence, logistics, and liaison and combined staffs.17

Planning and Executing Operations

At the heart of the 1993 doctrinal manual was a chapter on planning and executing operations. Contained in that chapter was the doctrinal

framework not only for the conduct of war at the operational level but, as

introduced by the 1993 manual, the strategic link of operations. The manual

noted that in Cold War Europe, many strategic, operational, and even tactical choices had already been made before the day of war. In the new era, a

more open strategic, operational, and tactical horizon was apparent.

A significant change in the 1993 doctrine was the extension of

Operations into the strategic realm in keeping with the wide latitude of

U.S. military actions permitted by the collapse of the Soviet threat and the

new doctrinal emphasis on joint and combined operations and operations

other than war. All Army military actions were thus more directly linked to

the major U.S. strategic guides—the National Security Strategy, National

Military Strategy, Unified Command Plan, and Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan—and to strategic planning and a strategic vision generally. In

peacetime, theater commanders and their staffs conducted theater-strategic

planning, using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, or

JOPES, from which a family of theater operations plans were promulgated.

Strategic planning and, in wartime, strategic decisions, had direct bearing

on the conduct of operations. The 1993 doctrine stressed the importance of

conducting operations not in an open-ended manner but with a clear

16. Ibid., pp. 4-1 to 4-6.

17. Ibid., pp. 5-1 to 5-5.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

understanding ofthe desired strategic end state and with a readiness to shift

rapidly to other war aims or phases at that time as determined by the National

Command Authority.

Likewise a clear grasp ofthe levels of war and their interlinks placed

Army military actions in a clearer framework, as noted earlier. The levels

of war helped commanders visualize a logical flow of operations. Military

policy and requirements, deriving from strategy, were the starting points of

campaign plans. The campaign plan set theater-strategic goals and was the

basis for operational-level planning. The operational level was the vital

link between national-and theater-strategic plans and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield. At the operational level, joint and combined forces conducted subordinate campaigns and major operations, and

commanders exercised the operational art of weighing ways and means to

achieve their larger ends. Tactics was "the art and science of employing

available means to win battles and engagements."18

Joint operations planning required an appreciation of the

simultaneous nature of operations, an awareness of the total mission,

teamwork, sequencing operations, deception, rehearsals, and training against

the effects of weapons of mass destruction. The doctrine emphasized hightempo simultaneous operations with actions synchronized at each level of

war to destroy, disrupt, and demoralize the enemy. Total mission awareness

meant the commander's attendance on the big picture of events around him.

The doctrine emphasized the fundamentals for the commander of clear

mission, knowing and acting within the higher commander's intent, making

and continually updating commanders estimates, and developing a concept

of operations.

The doctrine pointed up the importance of will: "War is a contest

of wills....when will is lacking, so is combat power; when will is strong, it

multiplies the effectiveness of military forces." "Leaders are the main source

of will." Fundamentals of planning and conducting operations also included

massing effects against the enemy's identified center of gravity—his main

source of power, whether a mass of combat units, or an abstract factor such

as public opinion. Other important planning and operating concepts were

lines of operation, decisive points, culmination points in an attack or defense; the art of attack was to secure the objective before reaching culmination—the point where strength receded.19

18. Quote, ibid., p. 6-3.

19. Quote, ibid., p. 6-7.

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DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

The doctrine delineated the commander's need to determine the

best sequence of operations through planning and execution phases, branches

or contingency plans, and sequels or follow-ups for various outcomes.

Rehearsals both at tactical and operational levels, such as that of the VII

Corps in Saudi Arabia just prior to Desert Storm, were highly useful. The

need to prepare for action in hostile environments ofmass destruction weapons was a sobering requirement in doctrine pitched to the uncertain world

of the 1990s and beyond, and the manual laid out guidelines.

A significant element of the 1993 doctrine was the delineation of a

battlefield framework as a means to help commanders relate their forces to

one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. Within

a given strategic situation, a commander chose and erected his battlefield

framework or visualization according to the dictates ofthe doctrinal "METTT"—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available. A

major consideration of the battlefield framework was the commander's

designated area of operations.

Battle space, another new concept in the 1993 doctrine, was part of

the battlefield framework. Battle space was "a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It includes the breadth, depth, and height in which the commander

positions and moves assets over time." Battle space was in essence the

commander's view and vision of the space and means of operation that he

could affect. The commander visualized his battle space to organize and

arrange his forces and to synchronize deep, close, and rear operations. It

was a hallmark of the 1993 doctrine that such operations proceeded, where

called for, simultaneously for maximum effect.20 Recognizing in Operation Desert Storm that a blurring had occurred in the useful three levels of

war delineation, when advanced weaponry showed that it could strike the

enemy simultaneously at both tactical and operational depths, the 1993

doctrine highlighted that notion in its central chapter.21 The manual writers

employed the examples of Desert Storm for the offense and the Israeli defense of the Golan Heights at the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War for

the defense. The 1993 manual maintained clearly the offense as the decisive form of war. But it also noted that the defense could be stronger, and

laid out the METT-T conditions that necessitated resort to the defense.

20. Quote, ibid., p. 6-12.

21. The blurring occurred in the effects of a specific combat action. The level and scope of responsibility for the combat action—strategic, operational, and tactical— remained unchanged. Comments

by General John W. Foss, USA Ret., in letter to author, 8 April 1996.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Offense and Defense

Chapters on the offense and the defense and on planning and conducting those operations and on retrograde carried the strategic-operational

doctrine ofFM 100-5 more focally into the tactical realm. The 1993 manual

continued in the tradition of its predecessors to describe the offense as "the

decisive form of war." Seizure and retention of the initiative came with

offensive action. The main feature of an offensive battle was outflanking or

bypassing the defender, avoiding his main strength, turning him out of his defensive positions, forcing him to fight in an unintended direction over ground

he had not prepared, and destroying the coherence of his defense and support.

The doctrinal tenets came together in the violently executed attack—initiative, agility, synchronization, joined by surprise, audacity, and

the concentration of power to mass effects without massing large formations, although physical massing would probably still be necessary on occasion. Tempo, a combination of speed and mass, was significant in the

attack and was controlled, so as to be either fast or slow according to the

dictate of METT- T conditions. Since attack operations were increasingly

fluid, an ease in shifting between different forms of offense—movement to

contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit—was critical. As before, the 1993

volume emphasized maneuver, an art in the selection of whatever form—

envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, for example—to apply as the

commander's vision determined. As noted, depth in the 1993 volume was

advanced in meaning to denote offensive operations simultaneously throughout the depth of the battlefield. That sustained and continuous operation

required well-synchronized deep, close, and rear operations.22

Offensive operations were "characterized by rapid shifts in the main

effort to take advantage of opportunities by momentum and by the deepest,

most rapid, and simultaneous destruction of enemy defenses possible." Commanders at all levels planned and synchronized joint intelligence and fires

with their combat and combat support systems to gain full advantage of

their ability to see and strike the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth

and space of their area of operations. Brigades and divisions accomplished

major offensive tasks as part of corps orjoint task force operations. Battalions attacked, delayed, or defended as a function of the larger mission.

Unchanged, too, were the concrete considerations, in all actions, of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available.23

22. Ibid., pp. 7-1 to 7-14; quote, p. 7-0.

23, Ibid., pp. 8-1 to 8-3.

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DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

An idea unchanged from traditional doctrine was that defensive

operations were part of major operations and campaigns and were fought

in combination with offensive operations. Military forces defended "only

until they gain sufficient strength to attack." The characteristics of the defensive were preparation, including rehearsals and counterattack plans; security; disruption of the integrity of the enemy's attack; massing and concentration during the battle; and flexible planning and agile execution.

American doctrine specified mobile and area defense as the two

primary forms. Mobile defense emphasized drawing the enemy into exposed positions for counterattack by a mobile reserve. Area defense focused on retaining terrain from an interlocking series of positions and destroying the enemy largely by fires. A key element of the defense, as the

attack, was comprehensive simultaneous operations in depth—close, deep,

and rear. At the operational level, both defense forms were normally employed, and the factors of METT-T were ruling factors at tactical and operational levels. Successful operations at all levels depended on successful

reconnaissance, which was greatly enhanced by electronic resources, but

which was also dependent on unit and special operating forces actions. Reconnaissance ofthe sector was a prime ingredient of successful offense and

defense, and was a strong theme in the 1993 FM 100-5.24

Logistics

The 1993 doctrine writers saw unique logistics requirements arising

from the advent of the predominantly force projection Army. Not only

would future logistics operations be conducted joint and combined; logistics

for the American Army would mean global military supply—often to

undeveloped or little-developed theaters. U.S. Army logistics thus had

strategic as well as operational and tactical venues. The manual discussed

each and the links between them. Logistics characteristics included

anticipation ofrequirements and logistical conditions, integration oflogistics

with operations, all the factors assuring continuity, responsiveness across a

great variety of scenarios, and the gift and skill of improvisation.

Emphasized in the doctrine also was the concept of "total asset visibility."

In addition, logistics doctrine in the 1990s had to attend not only to the

great variation in operations, but to operations other than war. For both

categories, the logistics system based in the continental United States was

transoceanic and global.

24. Ibid., pp. 9-0 to 9-6, 10-1 to 10-6; quote, p. 9-0.

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AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

In 1993, Army doctrine introduced the split-based logistics concept: the carrying-out of selected logistics management functions from the

Stateside base or from the forward-presence location, as the situation dictated. That advance in logistics efficiency and responsiveness was newly

practicable because of the major advances in enhanced and secure communications. In the new split-based logistics doctrine, materiel management

center cells deployed to an area of operations with the force they supported,

electronically linked to the United States-based materiel management centers.25

Operations Other Than War

In the new strategic world of the 1990s, operations other than war

had assumed new importance. Those operations were not necessarily free

of combat. They were, however, operations where factors other than war

would be the key elements in achieving mission success. Although the

U.S. Army's primary responsibility was to fight and win the nation's wars,

the world presented many additional security challenges not classifiable as

war. Those noncombat contingencies existed in a considerable array whose

components sometimes straddled categories. Operations other than war

stood nonetheless apart as a different type of operations. They shared with

war operations some common principles and tenets, but they exhibited other

principles, too. Operations other than war tended to be longer in duration

than wars and conflicts. They involved often complex and sensitive political situations "when victory comes more subtly than in war." They might

precede or follow war, or occur simultaneously with it in the same theater.

Operations other than war included noncombat operations in the United

States. By doctrine, operations other than war were commonly joint operations, and might be combined operations as well. Other U.S. Government

agencies were frequently co-involved.

Thus, the prosecution of operations other than war required adherence to the war principles of objective, security, and as modified, unity of

effort. But also doctrinally central were three other principles. Legitimacy

meant sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the

government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Perseverance was preparing for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Restraint was applying appropriate military capability prudently.

Operations other than war were defined as including noncombat

25. Ibid., pp. 12-1 to 12-9.

126
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

In 1993, Army doctrine introduced the split-based logistics concept: the carrying-out ofselected logistics management functions from the

Stateside base or from the forward-presence location, as the situation dictated. That advance in logistics efficiency and responsiveness was newly

practicable because of the major advances in enhanced and secure communications. In the new split-based logistics doctrine, materiel management

center cells deployed to an area of operations with the force they supported,

electronically linked to the United States-based materiel management centers.25

Operations Other Than War

In the new strategic world of the 1990s, operations other than war

had assumed new importance. Those operations were not necessarily free

of combat. They were, however, operations where factors other than war

would be the key elements in achieving mission success. Although the

U.S. Army's primary responsibility was to fight and win the nation's wars,

the world presented many additional security challenges not classifiable as

war. Those noncombat contingencies existed in a considerable array whose

components sometimes straddled categories. Operations other than war

stood nonetheless apart as a different type of operations. They shared with

war operations some common principles and tenets, but they exhibited other

principles, too. Operations other than war tended to be longer in duration

than wars and conflicts. They involved often complex and sensitive political situations "when victory comes more subtly than in war." They might

precede or follow war, or occur simultaneously with it in the same theater.

Operations other than war included noncombat operations in the United

States. By doctrine, operations other than war were commonly joint operations, and might be combined operations as well. Other U.S. Government

agencies were frequently co-involved.

Thus, the prosecution of operations other than war required adherence to the war principles of objective, security, and as modified, unity of

effort. But also doctrinally central were three other principles. Legitimacy

meant sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the

government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Perseverance was preparing for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Restraint was applying appropriate military capability prudently.

Operations other than war were defined as including noncombat

25. Ibid., pp. 12-1 to 12-9.

126
DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities,

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids.26

The Combat Environment

Just as had the FM 100-5 editions of 1982 and 1986 embodying

AirLand Battle doctrine, the 1993 manual emphasized the human dimension

and the physical dimension of the environment of combat. Army doctrine

saw soldiers as "the centerpiece of the Army's doctrine and warfighting

ability." Soldiers were the most vulnerable and the most valuable part of

the war fighting system. Their spirit and perseverance, will to win,

ÜHBtüS

\

k

. £«l 'Tllti

Troops of the 1990s Army

26. Ibid., pp. 13-0 to 13-8; quote, p. 13-1.

127
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

dedication, devotion to their fellow soldiers and their unit were the human

elements that made the difference between victory and defeat. Operating

globally, U.S. Army soldiers faced a physical environment often severe.

Soldiers were "the foundation of the Army's will to win." Leaders

had special responsibilities toward them and the physiological, psychological, and ethical challenges they faced. Soldiers had to be physically hardened and healthy. In combat, they needed to be held together in teamwork

and mutual support against adversity. Soldiers had to adhere to the highest

standards of professional conduct reflecting the ideals of American values—to be "counted on to do what is right even when no one is watching."

The 1993 doctrine issued the reminder that "Wars are fought and won by

soldiers, not machines," and that the human dimension would be decisive

in the campaigns and battles of the future, as in the past.

The doctrine laid out the range and extremes of the global physical

environment in which the Army would operate, each presenting a unique

set of physical characteristics requiring a unique set of operational and tactical guidelines. Those operations included mountain, jungle, desert, coldweather, and urban operations. Terrain and weather had immediate impact

on every operation, offering both obstacles and opportunities. The infrastructure of varied areas of operations was a paramount reality and planning concern.27

Implementing the Doctrine

TRADOC planning to implement the Army's new fundamental doctrine had begun in late 1992, when General Franks directed the writing

team to find means by which the commandants could begin the educational

process in the schools.28 The SAMS response was a 35-mm. slide presentation with script introducing the manual—the initial element of a larger FM

100-5 education package assembled by the headquarters during 1993. The

package additionally supplied an introductory videotape filmed at the Patton

Museum at Fort Knox, Kentucky, a reader's guide furnishing an official

interpretation ofthe doctrine and its concepts, and a compact disc-read only

memory or CD-ROM. The CD-ROM presented an executive summary of

the manual and included technology permitting access and comparison between the 1986 and 1993 editions. Prepared at the initiative of the Army

Training Support Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, this versatile medium also

27. Ibid. pp. 14-1 to 14-5; quotes, pp. 14-1, 14-2.

28. SAMS briefing slides, Education Plan Concept, 7 Nov 92, THRC.

128
DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TIME

contained teaching points and new concepts with illustrated historical examples.29

In late February 1993, theTRADOC Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. John

P. Herrling, sent out an FM 100-5 educational campaign plan to the Combined Arms Center commander and to the doctrine and public affairs staffs

at the headquarters. The plan set up a means to communicate to wide audiences inside and outside the Army the reasons for the doctrinal change and

to gain support for the doctrine. Goals were to facilitate integration of the

new doctrine into Army operations, educate the force, and gain the support

of the other armed services and allies and of government and public-opinion leaders. The plan embraced wide distribution of the education package, briefings, published articles, the planned announcement ceremony, fact

sheets and information papers, press releases, interviews, as well as infusion of FM 100-5 concepts into joint doctrine.30

With those activities under way, General Franks also told his deputies for training and doctrine, the Combined Arms Center commander, and

commandants to develop packages to introduce the new manual into training and leader development. At subsequent TRADOC conferences, Franks

had selected commandants brief those plans for introducing the 1993 FM

100-5 into the curricula of their schools.31

As early as mid-April 1993, a conference of the TRADOC school

tactics directors convened at Fort Leavenworth, hosted by the resident Center

for Army Tactics and the Concepts and Doctrine Directorate, to discuss the

impact on subordinate Army doctrine and curricula. The aim was to quicken

the integration of the new doctrine and develop full, coordinated mechanisms to implement that aim.32 On 17 May, General Franks directed the

29. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Maggart Interview by Romjue and Malone, 30

Sep 94. (3) SSHR, ODCSDOC, CY 93/II, pp. 111-1 to lil-2. (4) A.J. Plunkett, "Combat Goes to Computers," (Newport News/Hampton, Va.) Daily Press, 23 Jan 94. (5) Ltr, McDonough to author, 31 Jan 96.

Mr. Bobby L. Oiler of the Multimedia Applications Division headed a four-man technical team that

developed the CD-ROM software and prepared the disc, working closely with SAMS writer Lt Col Gary

Steele. Steele and Oiler's 1993 FM 100-5 CD-ROM pioneered an important new doctrine and training

education tool.

30. Memo, Maj Gen John P. Herrling, Chief of Staff TRADOC to Commander Combined Arms Center

and TRADOC doctrine and public affairs staff, 25 Feb 93, subj: FM 100-5 Campaign Plan.

31. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Memo ATCG-P, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.

to distr, 19 Jul 93, subj: TSLC Fort Monroe, Va., 29- 30 Jun 93. (3) Maggart Interview by Romjue and

Malone, 30 Sep 93.

32. Msg, Cdr CAC to distr [TRADOC comdts], 161630Z Mar 93, subj: FM 100-5 Impact Analysis

VTC, 18 Mar 93. (2) Msg, Comdt CGSC to distr, 301402Z Apr 93, subj: After Action Report, Tactics

Directors Conference (TDC).

129
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

commanders and commandants to begin revising their programs ofinstrucTpnAnnT S had at that P

°

int alread

y

be§un the revisi°ns. The 1KADOC commandants were aggressive in implementing the revisions "

By early June, public affairs officers had produced media to publicize the doctrine that would be shortly published. Franks took a personal

hand in those activities. The effort included a news release, fact sheets on

the new manual and on the history of Army doctrine, and an FM 100-5

executive summary,- Franks requested production ofjournal articles from

a number ofseniorArmy leaders, division commanders, commandants, and

others. Many of these would appear in the ensuing period

7„n i otthn

C

°

UrSe °fthC laSt ha,f °f 1993'the new doctrinal ^eas of the June tyyj Operations came into the curricula of the TRADOC Armv

schools. Armor School programs, for example, focused initially on force

projection and battle command, using the "train the trainer" approach, and

that school also began the revision of its key doctrinal manual, FM 71-3

Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. At the Infantry School implementation started in the pre-command course, followed by exposure to the

small group instructors.35

va.,^9 JUJun93. (2) TRADOC Annual Command History CY 1993 nn 1fi/n QOQ th-,

**». of impiementa.ion at ,he Armor, Air Defense Artill.J. an^rtZSc^T """"*"

130
I C HA P T ER |

AN

ASSESSMENT

The new body ofideas was a

watershed in 20th century American Army doctrine,

a vision of a new battle terrain.

Advancing a significantly changed theory of future battle, the U.S.

Army's statement of operational doctrine for the post-Cold War was the

product ofthe Training and Doctrine Command's deliberate study and analysis of the nature of war fighting in the new strategic world. Sanctioned as

official doctrine in June 1993, it lay the basis for the changing Army of the

1990s. Its ideas also spawned a further process: the Army modernization

project for the early 21st century titled Force XXI.

The Ideas of 1993

Evolved from the previous AirLand Battle doctrine and the insights of

the new strategic era, the operations doctrine of 1993 joined continuity with

change. Reviewing theArmy project in September 1993, the TRADOC Deputy

Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Brig. Gen. Bert Maggart saw it to be a transition

doctrine. The Army's first post-Cold War manual for operations established

new basic intellectual constructs for change into the future. Maggart found it

much like the Active Defense doctrine of 1976 that had stimulated the thinking

thatresulted in the historic AirLand Battle doctrine ofthe 1980s.1Iftransitional,

1. Maggart Interview by Romjue and Malone, 30 Sep 93.

131
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

the new body of ideas was none the less a watershed in 20th century American

Army doctrine, a vision of a new battle terrain.

The dominating idea and critical change of the 1993 war fighting

doctrine was the new vision of depth and simultaneous attack. With that

concept, the 1993 ideas added to the three spatial dimensions of battle, time

as the predominant dimension of the Army's fighting doctrine. The twin

concepts of battle command and battle space clarified the essence and art

of command on the technologically-expanded battlefield. In the J.F.C. Fuller

triad of basic doctrinal notions—to move, to strike, to protect—U.S. Army

doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s presented the mirror of maneuver, firepower, and protection. To that triad, the 1993 doctrine added the integrating element of battle command—decision and leadership. Exemplified by

the advanced M1A2 tank firing on the move, maneuver, firepower, and

protection were synergized.2

It was the central notion of battle space that added, to the

commander's extended and flexible physical picture, the vital intellectualimaginative ingredient. In battle space were present the human elements of

prescience and creativity.3 Battle space and battle command made of the

doctrine, a commander's doctrine, liberating his imagination to the exercise of the art of war. These three notions—simultaneity, battle command,

and battle space—created a new vision of battle doctrine.

The primary author and crystallizer of those ideas, and the actuating spirit of the 1993 doctrine, Frederick Franks merited recognition as an

original contributor to the body of 20th century military doctrine. Although

the concepts of 1993 exhibited a shared patrimony, which the TRADOC

commander invoked and fostered, they bore his stamp. Moved by a vision

of warfare's change and an acute and dedicated sense of task, Franks'

achievement was remarkable. The cogent, intellectually informed presentation of ideas in the 1993 bible of doctrine owed in major part to Franks'

chief doctrine writer and advisor, Colonel James McDonough.

A significant immediate result of the 1993 doctrine was the translation of many of its important ideas into U.S. joint operations doctrine.

Key FM 100-5 ideas transposed into Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for

Joint Operations, published in September 1993, included the whole idea of

depth and simultaneous attack, split-based logistics and intelligence, and

operations other than war. The TRADOC commander's involvement in the

2. The author is indebted for these perspectives to Colonel James McDonough. McDonough Interview by Romjue, 22-23 Nov 93.

3. Ibid.

132
AN ASSESSMENT

project along with that of his doctrine writers, was close.4 Development of

both manuals was part of an important period of doctrine writing at Fort

Monroe in the early and mid-1990s in which TRADOC published a range

of key Army-theater and joint manuals.5

Reaction to the 1993 Operations was favorable. The new FM 100-

5 stirred little of the debate that had followed on the 1976 edition, nor did it

appear to dramatically ignite the imagination of the Army as had the 1982

AirLand Battle Operations. Both of those doctrinal revisions were key

events in the historic reform of the American Army of the 1970s-1980s

decades, occurring under the shadow of a resurgent Soviet threat. The 1993

doctrine issued into a less dangerous world. In addition, by 1993, much if

not most of the Army leadership had internalized its thrust and ideas—the

outcome of General Franks' consensus-seeking method.6

Doctrine Writing: the TRADOC Paradigm

Issuance of the 1993 doctrine on 14 June 1993 occurred on the eve

of the approaching twentieth anniversary of the major Army command established on 1 July 1973 to unify the Army's doctrine, organizational, training, and materiel development missions.7 Affirming doctrine as the Army's

4. (1) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (2) Maggart Interview by Romjue and Malone, 30

Sep 93. (3) Rowlett Interview by Romjue, 4 and 15 Feb 94. The direct influence of the June 1993 FM

100-5 on JP 3-0 was in part fortuitious. Earlier TRADOC drafts of the joint manual were suspended by

the events of 1989-1991 and by the lessons-digestion process. Consequently, TRADOC as the assigned author of the manual was able to develop the Army's own post-Cold War doctrine in advance of

the joint doctrine. The principal writer of JP 3-0 was Colonel Ricky Rowlett, head of the FM 100-5

writing team, who was reassigned to TRADOC headquarters in January 1993. See TRADOC Annual

Command History, CY 93, pp. 42-44 for a discussion of JP 3-0 and its controversies.

5. For information on the Fort Monroe doctrine activities, see TRADOC Annual Command Histories, CY 1993 and CY 1994 (draft).

6. Numerous interview and expository journal articles by TRADOC planners and others preceded

publication of the manual. See for example, Lt Col Michael R. Rampy, "FM 100-5, Operations: A

Paradigm for Adaptation," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul-Aug 1992, pp. 8-13; Lt Col John W. Reitz,

"Managing Intellectual Change: Army's Revision of FM 100-5," Army, Sep 1992, pp. 45-47; and Sean

D. Naylor, "Special Report: Much Ado About Doctrine," Army Times, 19 Oct 92, pp. 12-13. For summaries of the doctrine and its cardinal points, see the December 1993 issue of Military Review, especially General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., "Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change,

pp. 5-10; Col James R. McDonough, "Versatility: The Fifth Tenet," pp. 11-14; and Lt Gen H. Hugh

Shelton and Maj Kevin CM. Benson, "Depth and Simultaneity: Half the Battle," pp. 57-63. For a

critical endorsement of the published doctrine of 1993, see Maj Gen L.D. Holder, "Offensive Tactical

Operations," ibid., December 1993, pp. 48-56.

7. Leadership development and soldier development were added to the overall doctrine-organization-training-materiel missions as emphases in the 1980s.

133
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

very foundation and basis, the 1993 Operations continued and extended

the powerful roles that the key doctrinal corpus had played since the DePuy

manual of 1976 in the theory and practice of war fighting and in forming

the Army's view of itself. A by-product of the 1993 manual was a further

affirmation. The institutional wedding ofthe training and doctrine missions

twenty years earlier in one overall, influential development command that

"worked for" the rest of the Army constituted a tried and true paradigm for

U.S. Army doctrinal thinking and writing.

As early as the 1980s, the TRADOC mission-union had led to significant imitation by the allied armies, while the U.S. Army's own sister

services moved to form new similar doctrinal agencies. By the early 1990s,

the armies of the Republic of Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and

France all had established doctrine command organizations. In March 1993,

a new Naval Doctrine Command was formed in Norfolk, Virginia, followed

by an Air Force Doctrine Center at nearby Langley Air Force Base in July

1993. A similar Marine Corps agency earlier established at Quantico, Virginia, had been re-formed as the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in November 1987. In July 1993, a new Joint War Fighting Center

was reorganized at Norfolk Naval Air Station, and in October 1994 relocated to Fort Monroe.8 The TRADOC mission attracted wide endorsement as

the producing agent of the AirLand Battle ground maneuver of the Gulf War.

The key operations doctrine was internally developed from the early1980s on as a co-product. It was written from the thinking and guidance of

the TRADOC commanding general assisted by a doctrine-writing team based

in the Army's traditional center of tactical writing and instruction at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, the Command and General Staff College, the CGSC.

Within the college, the School of Advanced Military Studies had directed

the writing team beginning with the key Operations doctrine project of

1986. General Franks affirmed the TRADOC commanding general-CGSC

writing team nexus that both he and his predecessors, Generals Starry and

Richardson, had employed to formulate and revise operations doctrine.

Franks considered the Army's key doctrine to be the province of

the generation's senior Army leaders. He believed that it had to be reflective of the entire Army. The TRADOC commander saw key formulative

roles to lie in the responsibility of the command's leaders, in particular the

commanding general and the Combined Arms Center and deputy CGSC

8. TRADOC actively encouraged these establishments. (Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94).

In addition, several multiservice developmental and doctrinal agencies were active in the Hampton

Roads, Virginia area in the early 1990s. See TRADOC Annual Command History, CY 1993, pp. 4-13,

for an account of the emergence of Hampton Roads as a military doctrinal center.

134
AN ASSESSMENT

commanders, in close association with the Chief of Staff of the Army. But

Franks considered his drawing-in of the Army's leadership by means of the

Army and TRADOC commanders conferences as a highly productive

method. The leaders' involvement created a broad sense of ownership of

the change, while also collecting significant contributive thinking. The

process further enabled Franks to gauge how far to go with emerging, sometimes difficult, doctrinal ideas—which to retain and which to leave for the

next major revision.

Franks also believed that an owner's sense for fundamental doctrine needed to reside in the Army's senior tactical school—the Command

and General StaffCollege, with its intellectual resources including the School

of Advanced Military Studies. At the same time, he believed there needed

to be substantive ownership by the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for

Doctrine (DCSDOC), who was so intimately involved in the writing of

joint doctrine. Franks' preference was for employment of both the

Leavenworth school and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (had the latter been under TRADOC command) in the effort, with

both subject to DCSDOC oversight, as the best internal arrangement.9

Franks affirmed the Commanding General TRADOC-Command and General Staff College doctrinal connection as the right method, with headquarters doctrine staff assistance and participation in substance and process,

while recommending a closer relationship with the Army War College.10

Doctrine and Strategic Circumstance

Of all impelling influences on the Army's post-Cold War doctrine,

none was more dominant than the factor of strategic circumstance. The

end of the Cold War and the stunning collapse, between 1989 and 1991, of

the revolutionary historical imperative of Soviet communism, re-created

for the United States an open strategic vantage and realm of action. To the

assumptions of that new political reality, U.S. Army post-Cold War doctrine was crafted as the first war fighting vision of the new historical era.

In its development, the U.S. Army's "central idea" of 1993 followed a mixed line of 20th-century historical precedents. Lessons of the

unfolding Blitzkrieg of 1939-1940 were taken to heart by the authors of

9. The Army War College commandant, Maj Gen William Stofft, had been an important advisor.

Stofft had prompted Franks, early in the project, not to close down debate on the emerging battle

dynamics prematurely. Franks Interview by Ftomjue, 17 Nov 94.

10. Ibid.

135
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

U.S. Army doctrinal texts and disseminated lessons in World War II. The

implications of the Cold War, tardily and inaccurately apprehended by doctrinal thinkers in the 1950s, resulted in the aberrant pentomic doctrine of

that decade, and in the inadequate doctrinal provision and preparation for

the complexities of a Southeast Asian war in the 1960s.

The U.S. Army doctrinal renaissance ofthe 1970s and 1980s, which

we have noted earlier, confronted directly the advent of changed strategic

circumstance, and did so successfully. The lessons of doctrinal preparedness of the previous twenty years were fully felt in the anticipatory doctrinal impulse that, at TRADOC headquarters and in the Command and General Staff College in the early 1990s, led to the new battle-dynamics vision

of 1993. Strategic circumstance was a lesson not to be lost for future U.S.

Army doctrine formulation.

Toward the 21st Century Force

Redesign of the Army's fighting force—the tables of organization

and equipment, or TOE, of the tactical and support units in the field—

emerged as a need that was corollary to the post-Cold War doctrine revision. Involved here was revision ofthe Army ofExcellence tables on which

the Army had been structured since the early-and mid-1980s. TRADOC

had begun a preliminary design effort in January 1993 at General Sullivan's

direction. That move, however, was suspended by a Department of the

Army order three months later. A consensus had formed that such redesign

was premature—given the Army's fiscal and end-strength uncertainties and

the lack of a change-mandate from the field. Army leaders believed the

Army of Excellence tactical organizations could be successfully accommodated to the doctrinal changes for the short term."

At the same time, General Sullivan and General Franks began to

consider the idea of approaching the force redesign eventually needed by

putting together an experimental force. That idea had a familiar paternity

in earlier divisional tests and experiments outside the traditional combat

developments process. The most notable of those were the airmobility tests

of the 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, Georgia during 1963-

1964, the "tri-capability" division tests at Fort Hood, Texas in the early

1970s, the Division Restructuring Evaluation at the same post at the end of

that decade, and the High Technology Light Division and motorized division testing in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington during

11. (1) TRADOC Annual Command History, CY 1993, pp. 81-83. (2) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17

Nov 94.

136
AN ASSESSMENT

the 1980s. Two things, however, were new in 1993 in the idea of an indivision test. The first was the creation of the TRADOC Battle Laboratories the previous year. The second was the advent of digitization.

In the spring of 1993, Generals Franks and Sullivan believed that

the Battle Lab tests under way were already raising questions of such magnitude that they could no longer be answered within the laboratories themselves and that some kind of continuous experimental force was needed.

That idea took definite shape in the minds of Battle Lab planners at Headquarters TRADOC during the summer of 1993 and resulted in an experimental force concept.

The main idea of the experimental force initially was to convert

existent organizations into a test bed that would test-out and evolve into the

desired future force designs. The concept called for converting a TOE

brigade and division to that task. In December 1994, the Department ofthe

Army designated the 2d Armored Division (later the 4th Mechanized Infantry

Division) at Fort Hood as the Experimental Force, or EXFOR, under

TRADOC operational control. Subsequent planning pointed to developing

and testing a "digitized" brigade, to be followed by full-divisional testing.12

Digitization was a concept that promised a new, perhaps revolutionary military capability. In a word, the term signified the electronic linking

by digital circuits, of every weapon in a battle force, permitting shared "situational awareness" by all soldiers and leaders and allowing the commander

to synchronize all elements of combat power at a tempo far exceeding the

enemy's capability.

In the development of the digitization concept, Franks' early role

was important. Inspecting the new M1A2 Abrams tank equipped with the

Inter-Vehicular Instrumentation System (IVIS) atAberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland in December 1991, the TRADOC commander had seen the potential to apply and integrate the tank's IVIS link "horizontally" across the

other weapon systems of a combat force. Franks soon arranged shipment

of MlA2s to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California to lay

the basis for a test. At the same time, he directed his Armor School commandant, working with the Mounted Battle Space Battle Lab at Fort Knox,

Kentucky, to test out and integrate this capability horizontally across the

combined arms team.

The project went forward in a series oftests and simulations during

1992-1993, culminating in a so-called "advanced war fighting experiment"

12. (1) TRADOC Annual Command History, CY 1993, pp. 83-84. See this source for details of early

planning toward the EXFOR. (2) Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94. (3) TRADOC Annual Command History, CY 1994 (draft), Chapter IV describes further EXFOR planning.

137
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

(AWE) code-named Desert Hammer. Employing a troop training rotation

at the National Training Center, No. 94-07, the Desert Hammer experiment

of 1-23 April 1994 in effect proved the principle. In simulated instrumented

battle against the opposing force, a brigade-level task force composed of

units under the 3d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was

equipped with digitized communications that permitted all forces to receive and use near-real-time information on the National Training Center

battlefield. The 94-07 experiment also laid the basis for an ensuing series

of advanced war fighting experiments at Fort Irwin and elsewhere to explore related principles.

As worked out during 1992-1994, digitization was attained by

inserting integrated computer hardware and software components into

combat vehicles, helicopters, and individual soldier equipment. It increased

exponentially the information flow, bringing a simultaneous common picture

of the battlefield and greatly enhancing the ability of commanders at all

levels to see and synchronize the fire, movement, and support of their

systems. The digitization principle, when field-proven as a linking network

providing common situational awareness, would outfit the Experimental

Force to test force designs toward development of the 21st century Army.

General Franks believed the AWE 94-07 Desert Hammer Experiment of April 1994 to have begun a "revolution in the conduct of land

warfare" comparable in military significance to the experiments in mechanization of the early part of the century. Information-age, digital technology was to land warfare today, he believed, what the internal combustion

engine and wireless radio were to the experiments of the 1920s and 1930s.13

The Battle Lab and digitization planning by the Department of the

Army and TRADOC—soon joined by the Army Materiel Command, the

Under Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition,

and other Army agencies—inaugurated the major force structuring effort

termed Force XXI. General Sullivan announced that effort in March 1994.

This across-the-board plan for fighting-unit redesign from squad to echelons above corps would restructure and replace the 1980s tables and would

be organized around information-based battle command.

As the Force XXI project developed, it proceeded along three

parallel planning and execution axes, which were set out in a campaign

plan by the Department of the Army's Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force

in May 1994.

"Joint Venture" was the design effort for the fighting Army. Parallel

13. Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

138
AN ASSESSMENT

was a second axis, the development and acquisition ofrequisite digitization

technology by an Army Digitization Office newly established by General

Sullivan. The third axis of the Force XXI campaign plan was the redesign

of the institutional Army.

Sullivan approved the Joint Venture segment of the campaign in

July 1994. Its overall goal was the fielding of new organizational units by

the year 2000. Planners looked toward design of a Force XXI division in

1996, testing of a fully-digitized brigade during 1996-1997, and testing of

the experimental division in 1997-1998.14

A major TRADOC concept completed in 1994 furnished the Force

XXI conceptual basis. In April 1993, General Franks directed his doctrine

deputy, Brig. Gen. Bert Maggart to set up a "futures" directorate in the

headquarters doctrine office. He wanted those promising doctrinal notions

that were not yet ready for current doctrine to go into a new edition of the

Army's basic future operational concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, to be

published about a year after the 1993 FM 100-5 edition. To that responsibility, Franks named Colonel Gary B. Griffin, a speechwriter on his staff

and former Army War College Advanced Operational Studies Fellow at

SAMS.15 Griffin executed the work under Franks' guidance and direct participation, and was succeeded in the final phase of the task by Colonel

Michael Starry in early 1994. The concept pamphlet, Force XXI Operations, was published in August 1994.16

TRADOC offered the 1994 concept as the conceptual basis and

vision for the U.S. Army of the early 21st century and as the means to

frame future development. General Sullivan subsequently endorsed the

document for the Army, calling it a blueprint for the entire Army, not just

for the operational units. The framework presented was both doctrinal and

institutional.17

14. See TRADOC Annual Command History, CY 1994 (draft), Chapter IV, for further details of these

developments. (1) Msg, HQDA (DACS-ZA) to distr, 081145Z Mar 94, subj: Building the Force for the

21 st Century - Force XXI. (2) For further information on the acquisition and digitization axis, see the

Battlefield Digitization Issue of Army RD&A Bulletin, Nov-Dec 1994. (3) Msg, DA (DACS-ZA) to distr,

8 May 94, subj: Force XXI Campaign Guidance. (4) Msg, Cdr TRADOC to distr, 091649Z May 94,

subj: Force XXI Joint Venture Initiation.

15. Franks Interview by Romjue, 17 Nov 94.

16. (1) TRADOC Pam 525-5, Military Operations: Force XXI Operations, A Concept for the Evolution

of Full-Dimension Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century (Ft. Monroe,

Va.: HQ TRADOC, 1 Aug 94). (2) Franks review ms. marginal note.

17. Force XXI Operations, Preface, Foreword.

139
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Force XXI Operations described an operational environment in

which the speeded-up acquisition, processing, and rapid sharing of information would revolutionize the conduct and tempo of battle. The TRADOC

planners saw the coming fifteen years as a transition time between a century of pervasive conflict and a 21st century "information age," an unknown

era of strategic reordering in which the United States' security challenges

would be extremely diverse in type and technology and in which change

would be constant. The U.S. Army had to prepare doctrinally for all possibilities, including the actions of non-national armies. Not technology per

se, but innovative and imaginative combinations of technology, provided

the key to harnessing military change.

A key idea was that in the flow of battle information, hierarchical

or command channels would coexist with internetted nonhierarchical processes in combinations that would attain a new and potentially overpowering tempo. General Franks and TRADOC's concept-writers believed, that

already in the mid-1990s, a revolution in military operations was evident.

They argued that new doctrinal realities which the 1993 doctrine had brought

forward were themselves in further, significant evolution. Included were

new potentialities of battle command, extended battle space, and simultaneity rather than sequence of attack. Also significant in the changing picture were the effects of international satellite news reporting, and the eroding rules of war.

For future land operations, the 1994 concept spelled out five characteristics. Those were: doctrinal flexibility to meet the diversity ahead;

strategic mobility with emphasis on anticipation, pre-positioning, early entry, lightness, lethality, survivability, and investment in strategic lift;

tailorability and modularity fitting the particulars of contingency; joint,

multinational and interagency connectivity; and, finally, versatility—resting on qualitative edge and decisive power or over-match—in war and in

operations other than war.

All the battle dynamics of the 1993 doctrine were further developed in the TRADOC Force XXI Operations concept of 1994. Battle command signified a further shift from the positioning of forces to the orchestrating of those forces' lethal effects—in which internetting and digitization played critical roles. Battle space extended further the idea of the

commander's imaginative vision, unconfined by boundaries and aided by

the expanding time and spatial capability of modern and future weaponry

and equipment. In the evolving concept of depth and simultaneous attack,

Franks and his planners envisioned a possible reassessment of the traditional fire and maneuver relationship in the "seamless" and simultaneous

application of lethal power throughout the extended battlefield.

140
AN ASSESSMENT

Dramatic change was seen coming in the early entry aspect of operations, resting on pre-training and simulations and enhanced fast strategic lift—air and ship—and skillful pre-positioning of equipment, including

"afloat" stocks. Future combat service support rested on the basic idea of a

versatile, expansible, tailorable, partly modular, well synchronized system

of logistics components. In all, planners saw an evolution from threatbased AirLand Battle through current-capability full-dimension operations,

into the knowledge-based operations of Force XXI.

The aim of the new cyclically-structured but simultaneouslyexecuted fighting concept was to "induce massive systemic shock" to the

enemy through a seamless, fully synchronized, and multifaceted strike

involving all elements of U.S. and coalition power toward the objective of

strategic victory and control. Future doctrine was seen as a living doctrine

based on the fluidity ofthe strategic world and ongoing military operational

experience, changing technology, and simulations and Battle Laboratory

experimentation. Doctrine thus remained the engine of change.

In sum, Force XXI Operations called for an Army of globally

deployable forces unmatched in modern equipment, training, and doctrine,

that could succeed in the widest variety of major and minor security challenges. The U.S. Army had to evolve as a learning organization in a time of

great change toward its fundamental reorientation as a knowledge-based

force in the 21st century.18

As all military doctrine, the American Army's post-Cold War doctrine of 1993 was both a culmination of ideas and a point of departure. Its

advent was a significant point on the axis of change. Based soundly in

current doctrinal realities, it heralded the information age, a future environment of conflict that America's armed forces could ignore at their own peril.

To that necessity and the future structure to implement it, the doctrine of

1993 set the cornerstone.

18. (1) Ibid. (2) TRADOC Annual Command History, CY 1994 (draft), Chapter IV.

141
LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAR

ACH

AD

ADC

ADC(M)

ADCSCD

ADCSCDD

AFM

AO

ARCENT

ARSTAF

ATACMS

AWE

BDWG

CAC

CAC-CD

CASCOM

CD-ROM

CENTAG

CFE

CG

CGSC

CINC

CINCCFC/USFK

CIMCLANTFLT

CINCSOC

CINCUSAREUR

CONARC

CSA

CSS

after-action report

annual command history

armored division

assistant division commander

assistant division commander for maneuver

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine,

and Developments

Air Force manual

action officer

Army Central Command

Army Staff

Army Tactical Missile System

advanced war fighting experiment

Battle Dynamics Working Group

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command/Center

Combined Arms Command-Combat Developments

U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command

compact disc-read only memory

Central Army Group

Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)

commanding general

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

commander-in-chief

Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command/U.S.

Forces Korea

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe

U.S. Continental Army Command

Chief of Staff of the Army

combat service support

142
ACRONYMS

CY calendar year

C2 command and control

C3 command, control, and communications

C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

DA Department of the Army

DC division commander

DCS deputy chief of staff

DCSCD Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments

DCSCDD Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine,

and Developments

DCSDOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine

DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (HQ DA)

FM field manual

FMFM fleet marine field manual

FORSCOM U.S. Forces Command

FSCL forward support coordinating line

GO general officer

HQ headquarters

ID infantry division

IPR in-process review

IVIS Inter-Vehicular Instrumentation System

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

LIC low intensity conflict

MACOM major Army command

METT-T mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather,

and time available

MFR memorandum for record

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO noncommissioned officer

OCAFF Office, Chief of Army Field Forces

OCH Office of the Command Historian (HQ TRADOC)

ODCSDOC Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine

OOTW operations other than war

SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies

SLWC senior leader warfighter conference

SSCC spring senior commanders conference

SSHR semiannual historical report

SWA Southwest Asia

143
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

TAA Total Army Analysis

TAC U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command

TCC TRADOC commanders conference

TDC tactics directors conference

THRC TRADOC Historical Records Collection

TOE table of organization and equipment

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSLC TRADOC senior leaders conference

USAREUR U.S. Army Europe

VTC video teleconference

144
A NOTE ON SOURCES

This study is based, except in its background portion, on the FM 100-5

Operations project documents collected by the Army Doctrine Directorate of the

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, and by the Office of the Commanding

General, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at Fort Monroe, Virginia; and by the 1993 FM 100-5 writing team under the Director, School of

Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; together with interviews by the author with

principals involved in the development of the doctrine, as well as on memoranda

and notes made consequent to his attendance at conferences and meetings during the period.

The primary document files at Fort Monroe are the 1993 FM 100-5

Operations collection, consisting of the project planning papers, conference

briefings, memoranda, and correspondence collected by the Army Doctrine

Directorate and now a permanent collection within the TRADOC Historical Records

Collection (THRC) in the TRADOC Military History Office; and the personal papers

and correspondence, and FM 100-5 drafts of General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.,

which are in archival processing by the Military History Office for placement into

the Army Historical Archives System. The SAMS documents collected by the

Combined Arms Center (CAC) Historian at Fort Leavenworth are identified in

footnotes by CAC document group and file and are available in the Operational

Records Collection of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Library of the

Command and General Staff College.

Interviews related to the 1993 FM 100-5, all of which were conducted by

the author unless otherwise indicated, and which are on file in the THRC, are:

Maj. Gen. Wesley K. Clark, 8 Jul 92, Ft. Monroe, Va.

(author and Dr. Anne W. Chapman)

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 2 Jan 92, 20 Apr 92, 7 and 12 Jan 93,

Ft. Monroe, Va. (Dr. Henry O. Malone, Jr.)

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 17 Nov 94, The Pentagon,

Washington, D.C.

145
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Brig. Gen. Timothy J. Grogan, 21 Jan 93, Ft. Monroe, Va.

Brig. Gen. Lon E. Maggart, 30 Sep 93, Ft. Monroe, Va.

(author and Dr. Henry O. Malone, Jr.)

Lt. Col. Bobby McCarter, 16 Mar 93, Ft. Monroe, Va.

Col. James R. McDonough, 22-23 Nov 93, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

General Glenn K. Otis, 15 Feb 93, Newport News, Va.

General William R. Richardson, 24 Feb 93, Bethesda, Md.

Col. Ricky Rowlett, 4 and 15 Feb 94, Ft. Monroe, Va.

General Donn A. Starry, 19 Mar 93, Fairfax Station, Va.

146
INDEX

INDEX

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., 137 Army branch journals, 12

Abrams tank (M1), 67, photo 68 Army Commanders Conferences

M1A2, 132, 137 Oct 1991,51

Active Defense doctrine, 11 n, 16, 20, Mar 1992, 60, 70

131 Oct 1992, 94

Advanced warfighting experiments, Mar 1993, 112

137, 138, 139 Army Digitization Office, 139

Agility tenet, 117, 124 Army Doctrine Directorate (HQ

Air Force Doctrine Center, 134 TRADOC), 39, 45, 95, 110

AirLand Battle doctrine, 1, 3, 5, 14, 26, Army Expeditionary Forces, 6

27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 41, 43, Army Ground Forces, 14

46, 47, 63, 65, 80, 81, 86, 89, 90, "Army-Navy Board" meeting, 104-05

91,92,95, 100, 105, 116, 117, Army of Excellence, 20, 136

131,134, 141 Army school system, 12, 13

development of, 16-21, 21 n Army Science Board Study 1992, 73

elimination of term, 87, 89, 93, 94, Army Tactical Missile System

103 (ATACMS), 24, 54

AirLand Battle-Future concept, 24, 25, Army War College, 6, 12, 135, 135n,

26, 27, 28, 29 139

AirLand Operations concept and operational level of war, 6

(TRADOC Pam 525-5), 5, 23-27, 30, Arthur, Col. Robert, 12n

31, 32, 33, 40-41, 43, 47, 49-50, Atlanta, Ga., 75

51,53,56,63,85,86-87 Auftragstaktik, 19

Airmobility tests, 136

American way of war, 58, 90, 114-15, B

128 Balance in doctrine, 90, 92, 103, 116

Anticipation Basic Aerospace Doctrine for the

military concept of, 90-91,119, United States Air Force

125, 140 (AFM 1-1), 9

Apache helicopter, 54 Battle/Battlefield dynamics, 55 57,

Army-Air Force 4-Star Summit, Nov 60-64, 65, 69-73, 74, 76, 77, 78,

1991,51,54 80-81,82, 89,92, 94, 97, 108,

136

147
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Battle command. See also Command/

C2. 89, 92, 100-01, 106, 108,

109, 110, 119, 132, 140

Battle Dynamics Working Group, 70,

71,75

Battle functions, 93

Battle Laboratories, 57, 137, 138, 141

establishment of, 73-77

Battle space concept/doctrine, 61, 62,

64, 72, 73, 81, 84, 89-90, 92, 94,

99-100, 101, 106, 107-08, 109,

110, 123, 132, 140

Battle tempo, 61, 63, 66, 67, 72, 81,

84,90,92,99, 109, 124, 140

Battlefield framework, 98, 100, 123

Battlefield operating systems, 93, 103

Benson, Maj. Kevin CM., 133n

Berlin Wall, 22

Berry, Col. Fred, 42, 82, 88n, 110,

110n

Bigelow, John, 12

Blitzkrieg, 135

"Boathouse Gang", 35

Boomer, Lt.Gen. Walter E., USMC, 92,

92n

Braddock, Joe, 17n

Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 67

Branches and sequels, 53, 123

British Army Staff College, Camberley,

45

Bulgaria, 22

Bundeswehr Armor School Museum, 73

Burba, Gen. Edwin H., Jr., 48, 49, 55,

61 n, 92

C

Cambodia

U.S. military incursion, 7

Campaign, 122

Canedy, Susan, 9n, 23n

Cape Henry, Va., 97

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 70, 112, 135

Casey, Silas, 12

Cavazos, Gen. Richard E.,'45n, 108,

108n

Center for Army Tactics, 129

Center of gravity, 53, 122

Center for Strategic and International

Studies, 44

Chancellorsville, 70

Chapman, Anne W., 9n

Christman, Maj.Gen. Daniel W., 108

Civil War, 11, 12, 73, 112

Clark, Maj. Gen. Wesley K., 42, 42n,

photo 43, 50, 58, 61 n, 62, 64, 70,

74,82, 109

von Clausewitz, Carl, 11, 55, 109

Close air support, 9, 30, 32, 53, 54

Close-deep-rear issue, 29, 31, 38, 59,

67,81,92,94,98,99, 100, 110,

123, 124, 125

CNN, 90

Cold War, 7, 9, 16,20,86,88

end of, 2, 21-22, 97, 100, 101,

121, 135

Combat Developments Command, 15

Combat environment, 127-28

Combat Training Centers, 76

Combined arms operations/doctrine,

14, 116

Combined Forces Command/U.S.

Forces Korea, 49

Combined operations/doctrine, 89, 97,

106, 116, 120-21, 122, 125

Command and General Staff College

6,20,27,28,37,39,41,

photo 59, 70, 82, 94, 106, 134,

135, 136

148
INDEX

Command/command and control Defense, 124

issue. Defense Advanced Research Projects

See also Battle command. 29 61, Agency, 76

66, 73, 84-85, 89, 92 Department of Defense

command and control on the establishment-effect on

move, 62, 67, 72, 73, 81, 101 doctrine, 7

Foss command view, 28-29, 30 Department of Tactics (CGSC), 20

separation from C2/C3/C4, 66, Depth and simultaneous attack

72-73,81,89, 100-01, 106, 118 concept/doctrine, 38, 41, 61,

Command and General Staff College, 62, 66, 67, 69, 71-72, 80, 89, 93,

6, 20, 27, 28, 37, 39, 41 94,98-99, 106, 108, 117, 123,

Command posts, 101, 118 124, 125, 132, 140

Commonwealth of Independent DePuy, Gen. William E., 16, photo 17,

States, 22 18, 35n, 82n, 84, 109, 134

Communism, collapse of, 1, Desert Hammer, 138

21-22, 135 Desert Shield Operation, 23, 26, 28,

Concept Based Requirements 40,43,56, 119

System, 77n Desert Storm Operation, 5, 23, 26, 28,

Consensus-building plan, 44-45, 51, 31,32,40,43,46,61,64,98,

110n 101, 106, 107, 119, 123

Contingency force notions, 49, 86, 119 DS One-Year-Later Conference

Conventional Forces in Europe 65-70

(CFE) Treaty, 22, 27 lessons discussed, 65-70

Cork, Col. Stephen, 42 Digitization of combat elements, 137,

Corps 138, 139, 139n

V, 37 Digitized battlefield

VII, 38, 46, 99, 108, 123 genesis of concept, 73-74

XVIII Airborne, 20 Distributed free maneuver, 8n

Covault, Maj.Gen. Marvin L, 93,93n Division Restructuring Evaluation, 136

Culmination point, 53, 122 Divisions

Cushman, Lt.Gen. John H., 108, 108n 2dArmd, 137

Czechoslovakia, 22 3dArmd, 107

4th Inf (Mech), 137

D 7th Inf (Lt), 93, 107

Decisive force, 115 British 1st Armored, 46

Decisive points, 53, 122 High Technology Light, 136

Deep attack/battle doctrine. See also ROAD, 14

AirLand Battle doctrine. 14, 18, Doctrine. See also: FM 100-5;

37-38, 89, 93, 99 Strategy; Tactics; individual

Soviet, 17n, 72 doctrines/doctrine types.

149
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

definitions of, 6, 10, 114

institutional responsibility for, 12,

13-15, 133-35

levels of doctrine, 6-10, 27

19th century evolution, 10-13

20th century evolution, 10, 11

Doctrine commands

allied nations, 134

U.S. armed services 134

Doctrine Development Seminar,

May 1992, 71

Doctrine-writing issue, 94-96, 134-35

Doughty, Robert A., 11n, 14n, 67n

Douhet, Giulio, 83

Douhet thesis, 53

Early entry concept/doctrine, 48-49,

61, 67, 71, 80, 83-84, 89, 101-02,

108, 119, 140, 141

East Germany, 22

Eighth U.S. Army, 94, 106

An Elementary Treatise on Advanced

Guard, etc., 11-12

Elements of Military Art and

Science, 11

11th Air Assault tests, 1963-1964, 74,

136

"Empty battlefield", 109

End state. See also Post-conflict

concepts/doctrine. 85, 86, 90,

109n, 110, 115, 120, 122

Endicott, William C, 12

Erickson, Prof. John, 17n

Experimental Force, 136,137,137n,

138

F

Field Manual 71-3, Armored and

Mechanized Infantry

Brigade, 130

Field Manual 100-1, The Army, 30

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 6, 9

evolution of, 13-14

preliminary revision 1990-91

27-32

1976 ed., 8, 14, 16, 134

1982 ed., 7, 8, 16, 19,92

1986 ed., 19,20,78, 128, 134

1993 ed.

digest of, 114-28

education package/plan,

128-29

implementation, 128-30

publication, 112, 113, 133

Field Manual 100-17, Mobilization,

etc., 120

Field Service Regulations, 13, 14

Firepower, 117-18

Fisher, Brig.Gen. George, 93n

Foley, Maj.Gen. Thomas C., 63

Follow-on Forces Attack doctrine, 20

Force projection. See also Power

projection. 55, 61, 62, 66, 82, 86,

88, 102, 103, 108, 114, 119-20

Force tailoring, 119

Force XXI, 138-41

Force XXI Operations (TRADOC

Pam 525-5), 139-41

Forced/forcible entry, 32, 47, 54, 84,

102

FortA.P. Hill, Va.

off-site meeting, 82-88, 82n

Fort Belvoir, Va., 15

Fort Benning, Ga., 75, 136

Fort Bliss, Tex., 94

Fort Eustis, Va., 97

Fort Gordon, Ga., 75

Fort Hood, Tex., 136, 137

Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 75

Fort Irwin, Calif., 137, 138

Fort Knox, Ky., 74, 75, 128, 137

150
INDEX

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 6, 12, 20 39, VII Corps command, 37-38

40,41,60,71,74,75,79,88 96, view of doctrine responsibility

97,98, 104, 108, 129, 134 134-35

Fort Lee, Va., 70,71,75 view of 1993 doctrine, 97-98

Fort Lewis, Wash., 136 work with writing team, 38-42, 82-

Fort McClellan, Ala., 79, 80, 82 88,97-103, 104, 105

Fort Monroe, Va., 2,14, 35, 50, 60, 65, Fredericksburg, Va., 82

70,71,75,88,96, 104, 112, 33, From the Sea: Preparing the Naval

134 Services for the 21st Century, 9n

photo 15 Fulda Gap, 38

Fort Rucker, Ala., 63 Full-dimension operations, 105n, 114,

Fort Sill, Okla., 75 141

Fort Story, Va. Fuller, J.F.C., 10, 13, 132

off-site meeting, 97-103, 104 Funk, Maj.Gen. Paul E., 65n, 107,

Forward into Battle, 109

Forward support coordinating

line (FSCL) issue, 54, 82

Foss, Gen. John W., 5, photo 25, 37,

50n, 123n

and AirLand Operations, 24-27,

40

and doctrinal revision, 26, 27-32,

33

and operational art, 20n

France, 134

Franks, Gen. Frederick M., Jr., 3, 5,

34, 35, 48, passim.

and battle dynamics, 57, 60,

61-64,69-73

contribution to 1993 doctrine, 34,

108-09, 132

and digitization, 137, 138, 139

doctrine implementation, 128-30

establishes Battle Laboratories,

73-77

and Force XXI, 136-41

Gulf War experience, 38

influence on 1993 doctrine, 34

management approach, 42-45

precis basis, 41, 43, 46-47, 50, 56

photos, viii, 37, 107

108n

Galvin, Gen. John R., 39

Garner, Maj.Gen. Jay M., 93n

General Service and Staff College, 12

General staff system creation, 12, 13

German Army Staff College, 45

Germany, 23, 38, 134

Army doctrine, 8

and NATO defensive strategy, 7

reunification, 22

Global Positioning System, 66, 73

Global Reach, Global Power, 9n

Golan Heights, 123

Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization

Act, 1986,8

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 21

Grand tactics, 6

Grant, Ulysses, 35

Gray, Maj. Gen. Robert E., 80n

Great War. See World War I

Griffin, Col. Gary B., 139

Griffith, Paddy, 64, 109

Griffith, Lt. Gen. Robert H., 65n

Grogan, Brig. Gen. Timothy J.,

28n and passim., 42, 82,

151
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

photo 83, 88, 91 n, 95, 96,

96n 110

Guderian, Heinz, 83

Gutwald, Lt. Col. Rick, 105n

H

Hagwood, Maj. Gen. Henry M., Jr.,

91 n, 95n

Halleck, Henry W., 11, 12

Hardee, William Joseph, 12

Hawkeye system, 67

Henriques, Lt. Col. Richmond, 21 n

Herbert, Paul H., 8n, 14n

Herrling, Maj. Gen. John P., 129, 129n

Hertling, Maj. Mark P., 64n

Historical examples for doctrine, 112,

112n

Holder, Maj. Gen. L.D.(Don), 21 n, 45n,

49, 50n, 92, 105, 105n, 106, 106n,

133n

doctrine views of, 50

and operational art, 20n

Hubbard, Col. William, 74

Hughes, Daniel J., 31n

Human element in doctrine, 127-28

Hungary, 22

I

Improved TOW Vehicle, 67

Inchon landing, 7

Infantry Drill Regulations (1891), 13

Infantry in Battle, 13

Infantry Tactics (1862), 12

Information age, 140, 141

Initiative tenet, 117, 124

Intelligence considerations, 47, 53, 65,

66,67,72,90, 119, 132

Intervehicular Information System,

(IVIS), 73, 74, 137

Iraq, 47, 66, 98, 99

attack on Kuwait, 2, 5, 23

Iraqi Army Guard, 99, 108

Iron Curtain

fall of, 1,21-22,24

Italy, 109

Janes, Col. William H., 29n

passim.

Johnson, Lt. Gen. James H., 65n

Johnson, Lt. Col. Terry L., 23n

Joint doctrinal considerations, 2,

29-30, 31, 32, 42, 47, 48, 51, 53,

54,55,65,71,73,81,82,89,92,

97, 104, 116

Joint doctrine, 8,9,116,119,120-21,

122,125, 132

Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System, 121

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations, 132-33, 133n

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 121

Joint Surveillance and Target Attack

System (JSTARS), 24, 32, 54,

66,67

Jointventure, 138-39

Joint Warfighting Center, 134

Jomini, Maj. Gen. Antoine Henri, 11, 55

Jones, Archer, 6n

Joulwan, Gen. George A., 49, 92

Just Cause Operation, 22-23, 28, 56,

69,99, 101, 119

K

Keller, Robert L, 24n

Kelso, Adm. Frank B. II, 104

Knowledge-based operations, 141

Korea, 22, 26, 106, 134

Korean War, 7, 14, 83

Krause, Michael D., 7n, 8n

152
INDEX

Kuwait, 2, 5, 23, 98

Landpower decisiveness, 53, 54

Langley Air Force Base, Va., 134

Leadership, 78, 118, 122

Leadership pamphlets, 101, 101n

Legitimacy tenet, 126

Levels of war

"blurring" of, 38, 72, 103, 109,

115, 122, 123, 123n

strategic-operational-tactical

links, 51,60, 121

Lionetti, Maj. Gen. Donald M., 50n

Logistics considerations, 47, 48, 49,

52, 52n, 58, 61,62, 65, 66, 72,

81, 89, 102, 106, 119-20, 125-26,

141

split-based, 72,102,120,126,132

Loh, Gen. John M., USAF, 32, 92, 92n

Louisiana Maneuvers 1941, 74

Louisiana Maneuvers (1990s), 76, 77,

138

Low intensity conflict. See also

Operations short of/other than

war. 8,28,29, 31,49,51,54

Luck, Lt. Gen. Gary E., 65n

Luftwaffe

assault on Britain, 54

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 7

Maggart, Brig. Gen. Lon E., 95, 96,

110, photo 111, 131, 139

Mahan, Dennis Hart, 11-12

Malone, Henry O., Jr., 36n

passim., 84n

Maneuver, 16, 117-18, 124

Manual for Commanders of Large

Units (Prov), Vol I, Operations

(1930), 13

Marshall, George C., 13, 76n

Marty, Maj. Gen. Fred F., 63, 80n

Mass

massing of effects, 72, 82, 90,

100, 116, 124

Mass destruction weapons, 90, 123

Mauz,Adm. H.H., Jr., 92, 92n

McCaffrey, Maj. Gen. Barry R., 65n

McCarter, Lt. Col. Bobby, 42, 60n

and passim., 81 n

McCauley, Col. William T., 66n

McDonough, Col. James R., 33,

photo 39, 39, 40n, 45, 50, 63, 64,

74,79,80,82,86,88,91,92,94,

96, 96n, 98, 100, 105, 109, 110,

132

revision approach, 40, 41, 57-60

Media impact on doctrine, 90, 120,

140

METT-T, 90, 123, 124, 125

Military Policy of the United States,

The, 12

Military Review, 45, 46

Military success/failure, 82

Minie ball, 73

Mission tactics. See also

Auftragstaktik. 67

Mitchell, Billy, 83

Mitchell, Lt. Col. Thomas, 28, 29n

passim., 31, 40

Mobile Subscriber Equipment, 66

Mobilization and deployment

issues, 47, 48, 51, 52-53, 58, 60,

65, 72, 82, 84

Mock, Lt. Col. Dave C, 88n

Moenk, Jean R., 15n

von Moltke, Helmut, 86

Moral qualities in doctrine, 118

Morelli, Maj. Gen. Donald R., 44

and operational-level doctrine, 8n

Mounted Battle Space Battle Lab, 137

153
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Multinational corps, 53

Multiple Launch Rocket System, 67,

photo 69

N

Napoleon, 11

Napoleonic Wars, 11

National Military Strategy, 46-47, 97,

121

National Security Act, 1947, 7

National Security Strategy, 44, 115,

121

National Training Center, 137, 138

Naval Doctrine Command, 9n, 134

Naval Warfare, 9, 10

Naylor, Shawn D., 133n

Newell, Lt. Col. Clayton R., 7n, 8n

Nonlinear concepts, 24, 27, 28, 30, 84

Norfolk, Va., 134

Norfolk Naval Air Station, 134

Noriega, Manuel, 23

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 1, 14,24,30,86

defensive linear strategy/doctrine,

7, 17,20

and Persian Gulf War, 23

troop reductions, 22

North Sea ports, 38

Odom, Maj. Thomas P., 23n

Offense, 124

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces

(OCAFF), 14, 15

Oiler, Bobby L, 129n

194th Armored Brigade, 74

Operational art. See also Operational

doctrine. 7, 20, 47, 50, 114

Operational continuum, 26, 27, 29, 30,

32,42,47,49, 50,51,58,60,

85,86

Operational (-level) doctrine, 6, 7-8,

19,25,27,90, 122

Operations ofArmy Forces in the Field

(1968), 14

Operations other than war. See also

Operations short of war. 86,

88,91,92,97, 102, 103, 109n,

110, 115, 119, 120, 121, 125,

126-27, 132, 140

Operations short of war. See also

Operations other than war. 29, 30,

31, 32, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53,

61,78, 81,82, 85, 85n

Organization and Tactics (1895), 12

Otis, Gen. Glenn K., 37, 50n, 91, 92n,

94, 94n

and operational-level doctrine, 8n

Overwhelming force/overmatch, 90,

114, 117, 140

Pagonis, Lt. Gen. Gus, 65n

Panama, 21, 22, 47, 69

Patriot missile, 67

Patton, Gen. George S., Jr., 7

Patton Museum, 128

Peay, Lt. Gen. J.H. Binford III, 65n

Pentagon, 112

Pentomic doctrine, 136

Perseverance tenet, 126

Persian Gulf

oil supply, 2

Persian Gulf War, 1, 2, 3, 5, 21, 22,

23, 26, 31, 33, 35, 38, 40, 52, 53,

61,62,63,65-70, 84,98, 103,

112, 118, 120, 134

Platoon Leader, 39

Plunkett, A.J., 129n

Poland, 21

Polish Solidarity movement, 21

154
INDEX

Post-conflict concept/doctrine, 47, 48, Rhine River, 38

52, 55, 58, 65, 85, 88, 90, 93, 120 Rhoades, Col. Richard T., 105n

Power, Lt. Col. Nate, 41 n, 102n, 109n Richardson, Gen. William R., 16n, 18,

Power projection 50n, 134

U.S. Army, 2, 22, 26, 29, 32, 42, and AirLand Battle doctrine, 18,

46,64 20,93

Precis response to 1993 doctrine, 93,

formulation of, 41, 42, 43, 45, 93n

46-47, 51 Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, 12

response to, 48-50, 56 RisCassi, Gen. Robert W., 45n, 49,

Precis de l'Art de la Guerre, 11 54, 61 n, 86, 94, 105n, 106

Precision munitions, 65 Ritter, Maj. J.M., 29n passim.

Pre-positioning afloat stocks, 141 Robinson, Maj. Gen. John D., 80n

Principles of Strategy, 12 Rommel, Erwin, 116

Principles of War, 31, 38 Roos, John G., 54n

development by J.F.C. Fuller, 13 Root, Elihu, 13

in 1993 doctrine, 116-17 Ross, Lt. Gen. Jimmy D., 49

Protection, 118 Rowlett, Lt. Col. Ricky, 41, 81 n, 88,

98n, 105, 109, 109n, 133n

Q Rumania, 22

Quantico, Va., 10, 134

S

R Saint, Gen. Crosbie, 48, 55, 61 n

Rampy, Lt. Col. Michael, 41 n, 52n, Salomon, Lt. Gen. Leon P., 49

80n,109n, 133n Saudi Arabia, 38, 123

RAND, 44 Scales, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 23n

Reconnaissance, 125 Schneider, James J., 8n

Regulations for the Order and Schofield, Maj. Gen. John M., 12

Discipline of the Troops of School of Advanced Military

the United States, 11 Studies (SAMS), 27, 28, 31, 32,

Reimer, Gen. Dennis J., 91, 96 33, 35, 39, 40, 45, 57, 64, 70,

Reitz, Lt. Col. John, 41 n, 45n, 81 n, 106, 109, 128, 134, 135, 139

11 On, 133n doctrine writing team, 38-42, 44,

Reno, Lt. Gen. William A., 41 n 46-47, 51, 53, 57-61, 62, 71, 72,

Restraint, 126 78,80,82,94,95,96, 104,

Review responses to 1993 doctrinal 105, 109, 134

ideas, 48-50, 61, 91-96, 105-08, Second World War. See World War II

133 Sedan, Fr., 104

Revolution of 1989, 1, 21-22, 24, 27

Rhame, Maj. Gen. Thomas G., 65n

155
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

Senior Leaders Warfighter Conferences

Nov1991,51,55

Nov1992, 96

Shelton, Lt. Gen. H. Hugh, 133n

Sherman, William T., 12

Shoffner, Lt. Gen. Wilson A., 41, 50,

59, 71, 74, 82, 84, 86, photo 87,

88,94-95,96, 105n, 106

Shuegrue, Col. William J., 31 n

SINCGARS radio, 67

Situational awareness, 73

Soldier considerations, 127-28

Soviet Union

arms reduction, 21

Army doctrine, 8, 16, 17n

military power recession, 32

military threat from, 16, 21, 22,

37,48,75,99, 121, 133

political disintegration, 2, 9, 21,

22, 104

revolution sponsorship, 2

Space considerations/doctrine, 90,

119, 140

Spencer rifle, 73

Spiller, Roger J., 11n

SS-20 missile, 21

Starry, Gen. Donn A., 18, photo 18,

37, 50n, 64, 109, 134

and AirLand Battle doctrine, 17n,

18,20

Starry, Col. Michael, 139

Steele, Lt. Col. Gary, 41 n, 11 On, 129n

Steele, Brig. Gen. William M. 41, 82,

86, 88, 93n, 95, 95n

Stensvaag, James T., 95n

von Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm, 11

Stevenson, Lt. Col. Don, 70n

Stiner, Gen. Carl W., 49

Stofft, Maj. Gen. William, 135n

Strategic Defense Initiative, 21

Strategic level of war, 29, 30

link to operational level, 47, 55,

85,88,89,94, 121

Strategic lift, 141

Strategy, elements of, 6

Sullivan, Gen. Gordon R., 3, 31, photo

34, 36n, 40, 41,50, 55, 56, 60,

65,74,79,88,96,97, 104, 109,

113, 136, 137, 138, 139

Franks coordination with, 88, 90,

91, 112

guidance to Franks, 35-36, 42, 78

Summers, Col. Harry G., 9n, 23n

SunTzu, 55, 109, 116

Swain, Col. Richard M., 8n, 14n, 23n

Synchronization, 63, 98, 117, 124

Tactical ballistic missile operations, 66

Tactical nuclear weapons

removal from Army inventory, 114

Tactics

as basis of operations, 114

as doctrine focus, 6, 7, 13, 47

Technological shift/impact, 2, 35, 53,

90,99, 104, 116, 140

Tenets of doctrine, 117, 124

Tentative Field Service Regulations,

Operations, FM 700-5(1939), 13

3d Brigade, 24th Inf Div (Mech), 138

Threat. See also: Soviet Union,

threat; Warsaw Pact, threat.

post-Cold War, 47

Thurman, Lt. Col. Ed, 41 n, 81 n, 109n

Tilelli, Maj. Gen. John H., Jr., 65n

Total Army Analysis Conference,

Sep1991,46, 48

Total asset visibility, 125

Toti, Lt. Cdr. William J., USN, 9n

156
INDEX

TRADOC Analysis Command, 70, 71 U.S. Army Combined Arms Support

TRADOC Commanders Conferences Command, 49, 77, 82, 102, 106

Mar 1992, 70 U.S. Army Engineer School, 108

Sep1992, 79, 94 U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 63, 75

TRADOC Pam 525-5, See also: U.S. Army Infantry School, 75, 107

AirLand Operations concept; U.S. Army Intelligence School, 75

Force XXI Operations. 139 U.S. Army Materiel Command, 76, 138

TRADOC Senior Leaders Confer- U.S. Army Signal School, 75

ences U.S. Army Training Support Center,

Jan 1992, 63 128

Jul 1992,79,80-82, 108 U.S. Army Transportation Center, 97

Tri-capability division tests, 136 U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 75, 92

Troop reductions, post-Cold War, U.S. Continental Army Command

22,24 (CONARC), 15

Troutman, Lt. Col. CarrickT, Jr., 81 U.S. Forces Command, 15, 48-49, 55

U.S. Marine Corps, 23, 84, 92, 93,

U 120

Unified Command Plan, 121 Combat Development Command,

1948 plan effect on operational 10,75, 134

doctrine, 7 doctrine, 10

United Kingdom, 134 multiservice doctrine efforts, 8, 10

United Nations U.S. Navy, 64, 93, 104, 120

and Persian Gulf War, 2, 3, 5, 23 doctrine, 9, 10, 92

U.N. force, 115 U.S. Southern Command, 22, 49, 92

Upton, Emory, 12, 13 U.S. Special Operations Command,

U.S. Air Force, 89, 93, 120 49

doctrine, 9, 94, 97

multiservice doctrine efforts, 8 V

U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, Versatility tenet, 64, 71, 78, 90, 92-93,

92 103, 107, 108n, 117, 120, 140

U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command Vietnam War, 7, 39, 109

(TAC), 26, 29, 30, 32, 75 Vom Kriege, 11

U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Vuono, Gen. Carl E., 24, 25, 26, 27,

School, 75 33, 39, 40, 50n

U.S. Army Armor School, 63, 74, 75,

107, 137 W

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center/ Wagner, Arthur L, 12

Command (CAC), 18, 28, 30, 40, Wakefield, Lt. Gen. Samuel, 71, 82,

41,73,77,86,94,95,96, 108, 84, 106

129,134

157
AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

War fighting doctrine

centrality of, 30, 48, 55, 85, 97,

114, 115

Warfighting (FMFM 1), 10

Warsaw Pact

dissolution of, 1, 22, 26

threat, 1, 16, 17-18,20

Washington, Gen. George, 11

Wass de Czege, Huba, 21 n, 45n, 92,

105, 105n, 106, 106n

Weaponry

U.S. post-Vietnam modernization

and buildup, 16,21, 38

Weigley, Russell F., 11 n, 12n

Weinert, Richard P., Jr., 12n

West Point, N.Y., 108

Whetston, Capt. Michael, 110

White, Maj. Gen. Jerry A., 80n, 105n,

107

Will

effect on battle, 106, 122, 128

Willoughby, Lt. Col. Charles

Andrew, 6-7

Wishart, Lt. Gen. Leonard P. Ill,

28, 41 n

World War I, 13

World War II, 2, 14,62, 112, 136

Wykle, Maj. Gen. Kenneth R., 80n

Yeosock, Lt. Gen. John J., 65n

Yom KippurWar, 123

Young, Desmond, 116

158
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John L. Romjue was born in Washington, D.C., served on active Army

duty in Germany, and received baccalaureate and master's degrees in history at

the University of Missouri. He completed further graduate study in modem European history as a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Heidelberg, and at the

University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of books about the development of military doctrine and tactical forces in the American Army of the 1970s1990s, which include: From Active Defense to Airland Battle; A History ofArmy

86; The Army of Excellence: the Development of the 1980s Army; and, as coauthor, Prepare the Army for War. He has in addition published historical monographs in the area of Army field experimentation, and has contributed articles,

book reviews, and short fiction to military, public opinion, and literary journals.

Before joining TRADOC in 1974, Mr. Romjue served as a historian with

the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command and as the command historian of

the U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command. Since 1985,

he has been Chief, Historical Studies and Publication, Military History Office, U.S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command.

159