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i 

20–817 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–130] 

GOLDWATER–NICHOLS REFORM: 

THE WAY AHEAD 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 7, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

(Vacancy) 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Ham, GEN Carter F., USA (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Africa Command 5 

Hamre, Dr. John J., Former Deputy Secretary of Defense .................................. 2 

Zakheim, Dr. Dov, Senior Fellow, Center for Naval Analyses, Senior Adviser, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ham, GEN Carter F. ........................................................................................ 54 

Hamre, Dr. John J. ........................................................................................... 43 

Zakheim, Dr. Dov ............................................................................................. 57 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from retired senior military commanders ........................................... 69 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 73 

(1) 

GOLDWATER–NICHOLS REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 7, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Thirty years ago after five years of study and effort, the Congress 

passed the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act. I think virtually everybody would agree it has been tremendously successful. I also think 

virtually everyone would agree, in spite of 30 years of success, it 

needs to be looked at again and reviewed because no law that we 

pass is successful for all time. 

The House has roughly a dozen provisions related to GoldwaterNichols and strategic thinking and planning in the military; the 

Senate has about 20. And as we head towards conference, it 

seemed to me it was important to get some learned perspectives on 

the various proposals in our bill and the Senate bill and the things 

we need to be thinking about. 

I could not ask for a better panel of witnesses, either in previous 

jobs or in their current jobs, and to have a former Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, a former Under Secretary of Defense, a former combatant commander, a four-star, gives us a variety of perspectives and 

very helpful insights on the issues we face. 

Before turning to our witnesses, let me turn to the ranking member for any comments he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with your comments. I think this is a very appropriate time to revisit GoldwaterNichols, to look at the command structure, figure out, you know, 

what is the best plan going forward. And I also agree that we have 

three outstanding witnesses to give us some guidance in that. 

I think the issues that I am most interested in are, number one, 

is it too top heavy the way we have it structured with the command structures? That is one of the complaints I know that the 

Senators have made, is that as you, you know, create all these commands there then comes, you know, all kinds of bureaucracy that 
2 

comes with it, various sort of, well, I guess the government equivalent of middle managers. Is that necessary? Could we save some 

money by consolidating that and trimming that down? 

And then the second thing that I have been intrigued by is something General McChrystal has talked about, is the need for greater 

flexibility in terms of moving around DOD [Department of Defense] 

assets. And is the current combatant command structure the best 

way to do that? 

As a challenge arises, you want to be able to pull together the 

best team from wherever it is to confront that challenge. That is 

what General McChrystal basically did in response to Al Qaeda. As 

he said, it takes a network to defeat a network. And the network 

that was built, not just by him, but certainly by others, took from 

all across government, and not even just DOD, to maximize our intelligence assets and our military assets to confront that threat. So 

does the current combatant command structure allow for that level 

of flexibility? 

And then frankly something that I have, you know, always sort 

of puzzled over and don’t know that well is, you know, the Joint 

Chiefs versus the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] versus the combatant commanders, what is the chain of command? Who is in 

charge of what? And how do they all work together? And is there 

a way that they could work together better? 

So those are the three things that have arisen out of some of our 

discussions on our side and also in looking at what the Senate has 

done, that I hope we will hear from our witnesses today. 

And with that, I will yield back and I thank the chairman for 

having this very important hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I think he raises excellent points. 

Again, let me welcome our witnesses. We are pleased to have Dr. 

John Hamre, the president and CEO [chief executive officer] of the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]; General 

Carter Ham who is now the president and chief executive officer 

of the Association of the United States Army; and Dr. Dov Zakheim 

who is senior adviser at CSIS and also a senior fellow at the CNA 

Corporation. I am not going to take time to go through all of their 

qualifications. 

Again, thank each of you for being here. Without objection, any 

written material you would like to provide will be made part of the 

record. 

Dr. Hamre, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, FORMER DEPUTY 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. HAMRE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, thank you. It is a real 

privilege to be back in front of this committee. I think I have testified in front of this committee over 50 times. It hasn’t always been 

fun, this one is going to be a lot better than some of them, but I 

am honored that you would have me back. Thank you. 

If I might start with just two very brief observations and then 

I would like to comment on each of the five sections that you asked 

me to review. 
3 

First, I would just ask you as you are looking at this legislation 

and how it changes the Department, please be careful. We are in 

war. We have got at least two wars going on. We have got tense 

operations around the world. We are going to have a change in the 

government that is coming up. And so I would ask you to approach 

this with prudence, please. 

The second thing I would say is that, unlike 30 years ago when 

I was on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee when 

we passed Goldwater-Nichols, at that time we had failure in the 

field. We were failing as a military organization in the field. That 

is what motivated change then. We do not have failure in the field 

today. 

We have policy failure, but it is not military failure. And so I 

think we have to be very careful to understand why we need to 

make changes now. We need to make changes now because we 

don’t have enough resources to support the needs that we have. We 

have to find ways to make this organization more agile, more 

streamlined. 

And the question is, can that be the basis for a substantial reform agenda? 

So let me now take—there were five sections that you asked me 

to comment on. 

First, the Senate provision calls for elevating the stature of technology Director of Defense Research and Engineering [DDR&E] 

and diminishing the stature of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics [AT&L]. 

Let me say, we won the Cold War not because we had a larger 

military. We won the Cold War because we had superior technology 

on our side of the battlefield. 

And the Packard Commission, when it was formed, the Packard 

Commission wanted to make the Department of Defense a better 

buyer of things. They did not intend to diminish the DDR&E, but 

they did. In effect, we decapitated the head of the innovation ecosystem within the Department. 

The Director of Defense Engineering and Research was the capstone of a system that put superior hardware into the hands of our 

soldiers. We lost that. And I will tell you right now, we are losing 

the innovation agenda between us and the Chinese and the Russians. We are falling behind. 

I don’t think that you can turn the large organization of AT&L, 

and the numbers are between 1,500 and 2,500, I just can’t get a 

good number, they will never become an innovation organization. 

They are a compliance organization. 

If we are going to restore innovation to the Department, we have 

to create a lean, superior position in the Department, the numberthree position in the Department needs to be the chief innovation 

officer who is going to bring superior technology and put it in the 

hands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines going forward. 

So in this provision, I strongly support this provision. 

The second one you asked me to comment on is the provision in 

the Senate bill that would cut general officers and flag officers by 

25 percent. You have a modest provision in your bill that says that 

you should not have four-stars as sub-unified command officers. I 
4 

think that you have approached it with a principle about looking 

at the content, and I agree with that. 

I do think that this is a case where I think the Department understands we probably have too many general officers and both the 

House and the Senate do. What we don’t have is a coherent plan. 

And simply imposing a cut of 25 percent is pretty arbitrary given 

the time we are in right now. 

My personal recommendation is that you keep the 25 percent cut 

in place, but move the implementation date a year away and ask 

the Department to come back to you with a real plan on what it 

would look like. If you don’t like their plan you have a club. But 

let them have a voice on how they would shape this. I think that 

would be an important improvement when you come out of conference. 

You asked me to comment on the provision section 941 in the 

Senate bill on cross-functional teams. And I understand the sincerity of the proposal. But I think it is profoundly wrong for the 

Congress to dictate the operational activities within the Department. 

You establish structure and you establish goals; I don’t think it 

is right for the Congress to say how the Secretary of Defense 

should organize the internal activity of the Department. I think 

you ought to hold them accountable. If it isn’t functioning well, 

hold them accountable. 

But to dictate the procedures, I mean, you have got to have this 

many people in the meeting, they have got to meet every Tuesday 

and they have got to have a staff, I think that is wrong. I don’t 

think that is appropriate for the Congress to dictate to the Secretary of Defense. 

Hold him accountable, let him organize the Department the way 

it is best to accomplish those goals. 

Fourth, you asked me to comment on the provision that is in the 

Senate bill that would authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

to do certain administrative functions, but put him in the chain of 

command. 

Here I would say, you know, this is a very important issue. This 

is an issue of almost constitutional significance. In our system, I 

mean, democracies always struggle. How do you control authoritarian organizations with guns? And that is what the Defense Department is, it is an authoritarian organization. There is authority 

and people follow the chain of command. 

The way we have handled that problem in this democracy is by 

civilian control, started by George Washington who insisted on civilian control. 

Civilian control is to make sure only the President, and the 

President can never escape accountability for decisions to go to 

war, and you don’t put the military in the way that confuses that, 

either to give him clouded judgment or to give him an excuse. 

Now, the provision that the Joint Staff is recommending is to let 

them do small administrative things. And I would say civilian control is a toggle switch, it is on or it is off. It is not a rheostat; you 

can’t dial it. You either have civilian control or you don’t. 

Now, the issue that they say, you know, there are small administrative things that we should just give to the Chairman. For 4 
5 

years, I met every morning with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman and the Secretary, and I will just tell you it is not a problem 

to do those matters. Those things happen in minutes. 

So I think we are overstating the nature of the problem and we 

are understating the severity of the implications if you go down 

this road. I would strongly encourage you not to accept this provision. 

Finally, you asked me to comment on both the House and the 

Senate bills, past bills have provisions that would cap the numbers 

of people on the National Security Council [NSC]. 

Chairman Thornberry’s amendment has a different approach, 

which is to say the President can decide how big a National Security Council he wants, but if that National Security Council is more 

than a hundred people, it is really doing more operational things. 

Operational responsibility, the oversight needs to be with the Congress for that. 

OMB [Office of Management and Budget] has about 450 people 

and there are 6 members of OMB that are required for confirmation. The National Security Council staff today is about 450 and 

there is no oversight. 

If it is going to be an operational organization, if it is going to 

really be directing activities in the field, the Congress has a constitutional responsibility to oversee that activity, in my view. 

Now, the chairman’s mark, it is somewhat arbitrary. It says if 

it is a hundred people or less we will deem that that is a coordination organization. If it is more than a hundred, we will deem that 

that is an operational organization. Now, the precise number 

doesn’t matter, but the constitutional principle matters greatly. 

And I think it is exactly the right thing. It is forcing the debate 

we need to have in this country. Are we going to increasingly have 

the operations of the executive branch being run in the White 

House through the National Security Council staff? If that is the 

case, then Congress has an obligation to oversee that. I firmly believe that is a constitutional principle. 

So I would ask that you carry that into your deliberations with 

the conference. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamre can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Ham. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA (RET.), FORMER 

COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General HAM. Thank, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Smith 

and members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. 

I am honored to be here with two distinguished colleagues, Dr. 

Hamre and Mr. Zakheim, both long-serving, distinguished public 

servants and both of whom have far more experience and expertise 

in the realm of the management of the United States military than 

I do, but I hope I can perhaps bring some insight into the operational components of this. 

I would agree, Mr. Chairman, that this is an ideal time to review 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a law which, in my opinion, has had 
6 

overall significant, positive effect on the U.S. armed force and it 

has most certainly affected, frankly, my own personal and professional development. 

I was a captain when the law was passed, not a member of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee staff, so a pretty junior officer. 

And not long after the law was passed I was slated to go to the 

College of Naval Command and Staff in Newport. For a soldier, 

this was a very unusual thing to go to the Navy Staff College. And 

truth be told I resisted that assignment with great passion until finally somebody said you have your orders, report to Newport. 

And so just to emphasize the point, there were two other fellow 

Army majors at that time in the Naval College of Command and 

Staff, Army Majors Ray Odierno and Stan McChrystal. We were all 

in that class together. And I would say that that initial exposure 

to joint education set each of us on paths that would lead to multiple joint command and staff experiences and, in my view, none 

of which would have been likely absent Goldwater-Nichols. 

As a battalion commander, we deployed to Macedonia on United 

Nations duty under the auspices of Joint Task Force Provide Promise. Later I attended the Air Force War College. I served on the 

joint staff at U.S. Central Command on 9/11 and for 2 years after 

that. 

As a general officer, I commanded a multinational unit in Iraq, 

had two operations positions on the Joint Staff and, as the chairman indicated, concluded my active service at U.S. Africa Command. 

Again, I suspect that my path would have been far different had 

the Congress not passed Goldwater-Nichols. 

I would agree with Dr. Hamre, and that while I agree that some 

changes are required, I would urge an element of caution. The old 

adage of measure twice, cut once I think seems about right to me 

as we consider changes to this very, very important law. 

And for me from an operational perspective, one of the measures 

of effectiveness ought to be, will the changes that we are proposing 

and considering to implement, will they improve military effectiveness, not simply be change for change sake? 

And so I look forward to your questions and I am honored to be 

here. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Zakheim. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DOV ZAKHEIM, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, sir, and Mr. Smith, 

members of the committee, it is nice to be back to speak to you 

again. 

I tend to agree with both the previous speakers in general, particularly with many of the things John Hamre just said. The question as to why do it now is really important. We are not fighting 

the same kind of enemy that we fought when Goldwater-Nichols 

was first passed. We are fighting several different kinds, funda-
7 

mentally different kinds of enemies. We do everything from fighting Ebola to fighting ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] to worrying about conventional threats, and China and Russia are not 

identical conventional threats. 

So when you use the terms ‘‘agile and adaptive’’ I think you are 

absolutely right. There is no other way to deal with this. And although John is right that we have done pretty well and Carter is 

right that we need to be careful, we should ask ourselves, have we 

done as well as we could? 

And if you really think we have done as well as we could, particularly over the last 15 years, then I would argue you don’t have 

to change a thing. 

But if you don’t have a hundred percent feeling about that, then 

you really do need to look to change. And I commend this committee and, frankly, the Senate Armed Services Committee as well for 

saying no, we could be doing better. 

We are bloated, there is no question about it. We are not only 

bloated in terms of headquarters, we are bloated in terms of total 

civilians, we are bloated in terms of contractors. We don’t even 

know how many contractors we have. 

And therefore, when you talk, for example, about reducing the 

number of four-stars, and I would tend to agree with what this 

committee is saying, which is there are some obvious changes that 

can be made, you can have one task force commander and not 

three, four component commanders. I would argue you do need 

some numbers or some percentage. Otherwise, DOD is not going to 

do what you ask them to do. 

Do the numbers or percentages have to be as large as the Senate 

side recommends? I don’t think so. I think your side is probably 

closer to the truth on that. You have got to give some flexibility to 

DOD. You can point to some obvious changes, as I just mentioned. 

But nevertheless, some target has to be there. If there isn’t a target, they are not going to shoot at it. 

Regarding the acquisition side, I totally agree with John regarding the USDR&E [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering]. I would say this, though. We have a very undereducated acquisition corps. There is no mandate that every single person who is in the acquisition business get up to speed on modern 

technology. You can get a master’s degree and not go to another 

course again and wind up being in Senior Executive Service [SES]. 

And if you will come back and tell me, oh, yes, there is the Defense Acquisition University, I would ask you to take a look, go online and take a look at their curriculum and then tell me if that 

is adequate. And I guarantee you won’t. 

So it seems to me when you have a system that created its own 

rapid acquisition system to get around itself, which is what DOD 

did, something is fundamentally wrong. 

Now, the only question that arises if you want DOD to really 

focus on innovation is, how do you reach out to the commercial sector? And the ways and means for doing that are not the ways and 

means we operate with right now. Profit is seen in a very different 

light by the commercial sector than by the bureaucracy, for example. 
8 

We have different parts of the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] that address these. We tend to go to the more conservative 

route, the more mechanistic route. And the more we do that, the 

more we alienate the very kinds of cutting-edge technologists that 

we would really want to work with. 

And one other thing. If you want to get somebody who is really 

going to be great, another Bill Perry as it were, then you better 

make it a lot easier for them both to get confirmed and then to do 

the same work when they leave the Department. 

The kinds of people that we really need are exactly the kinds of 

people that don’t want to come. And I think we need to bear that 

in mind. 

Cross-functional teams, I think John Hamre dealt with that exceedingly well, and as well with the question of the NSC staff. 

I want to say one thing about the role of the Chairman. John’s 

experience may have been what it was, but it has not always been 

clear to me that the Chairman really is a source of independent advice to the President. And the Chairman should be, to the point 

where if the Chairman needs to disagree with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman should be able to do that without any repercussions at all. 

So the 4-year term for a Chairman is really important in that regard. If you know you are going to be turned over within 6 months 

or 12 months or 18 months, you are going to be very cautious about 

what you say because it is the Secretary that reappoints you. If you 

know you have got a 4-year term, you are going to speak your mind 

in front of the President. And I think the Nation needs that. 

If we are going to look at headquarters staff and the Joint Staff 

in particular, we had better start looking at agencies as well. One 

of the great shell games that we have played in the Department 

is the old Doc Cook game, right? They were told to cut headquarters staff in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], he created Washington Headquarters Services and everybody moved to 

WHS where they still are, by the way, and have grown by 70,000 

civilians in the last 15 years. 

When Secretary Gates closed down JFCOM [U.S. Joint Forces 

Command], what happened? Everybody floated somewhere else, 

and not just the military folks whom you could assign to other 

things like combat positions, but all the suits like me, they moved 

as well. That is not what you want. If you are going to reduce, you 

have got to reduce vertically, not just horizontally. I think that is 

critically important. 

Let me just close with one other point, having been comptroller 

in my last job. We have a system now called PPBE [Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution]. We added an E, I was the 

one that added the E actually for execution, but we don’t really follow execution terribly well. 

If you want to spend your money well, you need to be able to review your burn rates, as they are called in the commercial world, 

on a regular basis. We do it once a year in between the budget 

itself. That is not enough. At a minimum it should be every 3 

months. See what has come up. Look at ISIS; ISIS came up out of 

nowhere. 
9 

You need to move your money quickly. By the way, a little bit 

of help on the reprogramming side from the Congress wouldn’t hurt 

either, but you need to move your money quickly, you need to review where the money isn’t being spent as quickly as possible so 

you can move it into those things that are needed to fight an ISIS 

which bites you all of a sudden or an Ebola which bites you all of 

a sudden. 

We need 21st century financial management as well as 21st century acquisition management. 

I think I have run out of time, so I will stop here and take your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all, very interesting, helpful comments. 

I am going to reserve my questions until later and yield to the 

ranking member. 

Mr. SMITH. Just one very broad question, and this is something 

we discussed at a dinner at CSIS and had a very good conversation, I think, about the national security staff. But the question 

that sort of came up near the end was, you know, the National Security Council was created post World War II, and post-World War 

II we built basically an infrastructure for the national security 

threats that we saw at that time, basically to, you know, deal with 

the economic fallout of a, you know, devastated world, deal with 

the threat of communism. 

And we have built, you know, from the Marshall Plan to the NSC 

to all manner of different things to confront that. And I think we 

had a fairly clear idea both of the threat we were facing and what 

we were doing to respond to it. 

We are in a bit of a pickle on that at the moment in that I think 

we do have a clear understanding of the threats that we face. It 

is just that there is a lot of them. They are very, very different. 

Just, you know, to run through it, certainly there is terrorism in 

all its iterations, and then there is what Russia is doing, there is 

what China is doing, Iran, North Korea. And then as you mentioned there is the various things, like Ebola and other things, that 

come up that would play a role. And so I think you could fairly easily put out a matrix and say this is what we are trying to contend 

with. 

What you can’t really do is explain how our entire foreign policy/ 

national security apparatus is structured to meet that threat. I 

would say that there are two reasons for that, and I think the second one actually is more important. But the first reason is because 

of the sheer complexity of it. 

But the second one is we want to imagine that we have more 

money than we actually do. And also, worse than that, we keep 

hoping that at some point in the future more money will show up. 

Now, in 2010, Secretary Gates and the Obama administration 

did this sort of deep dive on national security strategy and looked 

out 10 years and said, yes, how much money are we going to have 

to deal with this, and built a budget around those threats. And 

those threats, A, have changed since 2010 rather dramatically, but 
10 

B, we have a lot less money and are going to have a lot less money 

than we thought we were going to have in 2010. 

So how would each of you sort of build a strategy so that we can 

get more out of what we have and recognizing we simply don’t have 

the money frankly to meet all of those threats in the ways that we 

would like to meet them. But given that, where should we spend 

our money? What are the two or three most important reforms to 

meet that threat environment that I just described? 

I think you went through each of them in a very helpful way, but 

not in sort of that, you know, comprehensive picture, here is the 

strategy, here is our limited resources, here is where we need to 

spend the money. 

So I would be curious, you know, it is like 1946 all over again 

and we are rebuilding our foreign policy/national security apparatus, what is most important for us to do? And again, be realistic 

in terms of what our dollars are that are available. 

Dr. Hamre, if you want to—— 

Dr. HAMRE. Well, let me take just a narrow piece of it. It is such 

a broad question. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Dr. HAMRE. But let me take just a narrow piece. And I think part 

of it is, you know, is the structure of our regional combatant commanders right for today? 

And I think to step back to say, what is our grand strategy 

today? Well, our grand strategy today, because we have such a 

multiplicity of threats, our grand strategy today is to build up allies and partners around the world that can join us to create a security environment that is peaceful and deters bad action. That is, 

I think, our grand strategy, that is what we did after World War 

II in Europe. We never really pulled it together in Asia; we are 

pulling it together now in Asia. 

So I think you do need forward-placed, regional commanders. I 

think calling them combatant commanders was a mistake actually. 

We ought to change that name. 

But it is a huge advantage for us to have these officers forward, 

four-star officers forward who can engage in a very proactive way 

building alliance partnerships. 

Now, when we passed Goldwater-Nichols, we had the assumption 

at that stage that we were going to actually fight wars through 

those regional combatant commanders. We have now formed task 

forces, joint task forces and combined task forces and I think that 

there is some capacity to make some structural change in how the 

Department is organized. 

Carter Ham was a combatant commander and so I think he 

needs to be the one to speak more about this. We cannot afford to 

lose those four-stars forward. We probably can make it more efficient on how we resource them, their structure, and how we bring 

things together for the task forces that are under them. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. I think the most important thing you said there 

and something that we need to more clearly include in our national 

security strategy is the building of partners because that is the 

only way we confront those threats. 
11 

Now, obviously, we were trying to build partnerships during the 

Cold War and all that, but we were still overwhelming dominant. 

That is not the case now. 

And, General Ham, actually that is a good segue to you because 

in Africa I know that, you know, that has been key. And you have 

sort of looked to the Horn of Africa where I think we have been 

reasonably successful because we have had decent partners and it 

is a sliding scale, I will grant you, but in Kenya and Ethiopia and 

Uganda to confront the threat in the Horn and the Arabian Peninsula. 

Whereas you look at Mali and West Africa, we haven’t been able 

to find those partners to confront the narco [narcotics] states, to 

confront the terrorism, to confront the problems spilling out of 

Libya. 

So if you could talk a little bit about that piece. How might we 

restructure, for instance, you know, work better with the State Department, work better with USAID [U.S. Agency for International 

Development], which are component parts of building that partner 

capacity? 

General HAM. Thanks, Congressman Smith. It won’t surprise you 

that having formerly sat in that seat I think there is value in having in the six geographic combatant commands a group of people 

who wake up every day focused exclusively on the United States 

relationship with the countries in that area of responsibility. I 

think there is a lot of goodness that derives from that. 

I would, though, agree that change is necessary. I will confess to 

this committee that frankly I was too timid as the commander of 

Africa Command on making adjustments and reducing the size of 

the staff and, frankly, the size of the headquarters budget. 

We made some modest reductions, about 5 percent each year. It 

wasn’t enough, given the fiscal realities that the Department was 

facing. So I think there is change that can be effective in looking 

for opportunities where common capabilities can be shared more effectively and efficiently across combatant commands so that each 

combatant command doesn’t have to have its own particular staff 

or command element that provides a certain function. 

In the development of strategy, I think we actually have a pretty 

good model, at least of military strategy. When I was still in active 

service and started with Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates, continued with General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta, which ultimately yielded the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012, that process, to me, was pretty good. 

It was led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, as you would expect it would be, and also by the Joint Staff. 

But the service secretaries, service chiefs, combatant commands 

were all part of that process. We all had the opportunity to provide 

our input, our advice and recommendations up to and including a 

conversation with the Commander in Chief as the product was 

nearing finalization. 

But then I think there was a next step which was done largely 

out of the public view, which was very, very important to me. 

Under the Chairman’s direction or General Dempsey’s direction, we 

then tested that Defense Strategic Guidance against the threats 

that we envisioned present and near term. And we assembled the 
12 

right people, the combatant commanders, the service chiefs and 

others and applied the capabilities that we envisioned, that were 

outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance against known and anticipated threats. 

And that yielded for the Chairman and I think for the Secretary 

of Defense a measure that says, can we in fact achieve the outcomes envisioned in the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 with 

the means that we think will be available to us? And what is the 

level of risk? 

So it is not just the development of the strategy, it is how do you 

then evaluate the level of risk for that strategy to be effective. 

Lastly if I could, Mr. Smith, on the national security staff, my 

perspective is different than my colleagues’, from two different perspectives as a combatant commander and then as the director for 

operations on the Joint Staff prior to that. 

As a combatant commander, I didn’t often have direct interaction 

with the national security staff, but sometimes would be brought 

in for deputies’ committees, sometimes for principals’ committees if 

there was a particular matter that was being discussed. 

I had a lot more engagement as the director for operations in the 

Joint Staff. And I think the way that former Secretary Flournoy 

described it is the tyranny of consensus I think was a real challenge in that environment where there was a seemingly almost 

endless review of deputies’ committees and other gatherings below 

the principals’ level on the National Security Council trying to address the various difficulties, challenges, sometimes objections that 

would be raised by one participant or another in that process. 

That seemed to me to be indicative of a lack of agility, a lack of 

responsiveness. So we have got to find some mechanism, I think, 

when the information is largely known, but there is disagreement, 

how do you still advance that issue ultimately for decision by the 

President or whoever the right body may be. 

Mr. SMITH. And I am sorry, I have taken up a lot of time, so if 

you have something just quickly, Dr. Zakheim, I want to let some 

other folks get in. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Just very quickly then. First, I think your question 

fundamentally goes beyond the Defense Department. It is a real 

issue of national strategy. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. We still haven’t figured out how to relate Defense 

to State to AID to the agencies you have talked about, not to mention Agriculture, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], a lot of 

others as well. So it starts there. That is where the White House 

is important. 

I don’t agree, as General Ham said, regarding the NSC staff because once they get too large they begin to think they are operational. They never really are. They are not qualified to be; it is 

not what they are supposed to be doing. But when you think you 

are operational and you tell the operators how to operate, you really make a mess and I think we have seen that several times. And 

it isn’t just one administration that has done that. 

But just very quick thoughts about what our national strategy 

might look like. I agree, allies are important. We ought to look at 

integrating them a lot more. You know, we have Australian deputy 
13 

commanders in WESTPAC [Western Pacific], you know, for our 

own combatant command we have foreigners as part of our chain 

of command. We ought to think about how to expand that, how to 

really make them functional allies and not just nominal allies. 

We ought to look at also at the fact that we no longer can think 

about everything as less or included cases. We used to do that during the Cold War and in many ways we still implicitly do. There 

are some cases that just are not less or included. We need to outline those, outline all the others, and then see, okay, where can we 

take greatest risk. 

And finally, I think it is terribly important that we have a better 

sense of when we intervene and when we don’t. We are never going 

to know for sure, at least let us have some guidance. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Chairman, thank you. 

And to each of you, let me echo what the chairman said about 

applauding you for your service to our country and thanking you 

for that. All three of you deserve that. 

I would like to expand a little bit on this strategy concept because there is a huge disconnect with even what we mean by the 

concept of strategy. When I hear people talking about our allies, it 

seems like we want to get bigger and bigger and broader and 

broader on our strategy until we get almost to the point like a 

beauty pageant where we are just talking about world peace and 

nobody can really argue with the strategy, but yet we don’t know 

how to make procurement decisions based on it. 

So we have general after general who retired that come sit before 

us and tell us DC is now a strategy-free zone. Andy Marshall 

would sit here and testify that a lack of strategy is probably our 

biggest threat. 

At some point in time, we can’t have a global strategy. We have 

to have something that this committee can look at and say this is 

our strategy, we are going to base procurement decisions on it. 

That 2012 defense guidance, General, that you mentioned, we 

had General Dunford testify it was based on four major faulty assumptions that, one, Russia was going to be cooperative; two, 

China was going to be cooperative; three, that ISIS wasn’t going to 

be a problem; and four, we are going to be out of Afghanistan and 

Iraq. 

But when all of those fail, that strategic guidance fails and every 

single person, based on procurement decisions, when we would lift 

that up and say can you make procurement decisions based on this, 

those guys, they just laugh, they laugh at us. 

So my question is this. When we look at threats like ISIS and 

we look at the rise of China and we look at Russia, do we have to 

structure at the Pentagon? What do we need to change so that we 

can create realistic strategies that we can then articulate to policymakers? Because if we are articulating them, it is being done somewhere that I haven’t found over the last 16 years because over and 

over again we are saying tell us that strategy. 

And then the third thing, how do we make those strategies so we 

can articulate them faster and so that we can then have some con-
14 

sistent procurement basis so that we can make the long-term procurement decisions we need to implement those strategies? 

And the last part of this. I know, and I am one of these, we love 

to have this great—we decry interservice rivalry. But at some point 

in time, does interservice rivalry actually play a good role in helping make sure we are not getting faulty assumptions and we are 

really getting the right strategies that we need to have? 

So I would throw that out to all three of you for your thoughts. 

General HAM. I will start, sir. So my point on the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance was the process, I thought, was very, very helpful. And I think it yielded a good product. Indeed, the conditions 

changed and I think we have not adapted to those changed conditions. 

But again, I come back to I think that was not a bad process to 

develop it. Maybe we ought to do it more frequently in order to adjust as the global security environment changes. 

With regard to, I think, a body whose voice is, in my view, not 

as influential as it should be in the development of strategy and 

in the implementation of operations is the collective body of the 

Joint Chiefs. The Chairman obviously has a primary role and advisory role to the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council. And I think the Chairman individually executes that function quite effectively. 

In my view, the body of the Joint Chiefs, the collective wisdom 

and military judgment that is resident in that body, I think that 

could be reinforced and strengthened, not to counter the Chairman, 

but to offer to the point that you raised, that there are sometimes 

different perspectives based on service culture, background experiences, operational experiences. 

And so I think that, in my view, the most senior policy and 

decisionmakers would be well-served by broader, more substantive 

engagement with the body of the Joint Chiefs, not only the Chairman. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is a good question. And part of it is that we tend 

to forget that strategy is talking about how to apply means to ends. 

And what has been driving many of us crazy is no one defines the 

ends anymore. 

So what are the ends? Well, we know some. We don’t want a 

fight at home, it is much better to be forward deployed. We want 

to work with allies, it makes a lot more sense that way. 

But there are other things as well. How do we define threats? Is 

every threat something that calls for military response? Are there 

those that don’t? Now, of course, issues will arise that we can’t predict, but in general how do we think about these things? We 

haven’t defined that at all. 

What we have done instead is create mechanistic formulas and 

mechanistic papers, like the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]. 

So every time a budget changes we come up with a so-called new 

strategy, but that doesn’t really mean anything. You know, if you 

change your strategy every other year, you don’t have a strategy 

at all. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

My time is expired, but I would love, Dr. Hamre, at some point 

in time to talk with you about this. 
15 

Dr. HAMRE. If I may just 1 minute just to say—— 

Mr. FORBES. He is the boss. 

Dr. HAMRE. I think we have a coherent strategy with China. We 

haven’t articulated it very well. We are not going to let China push 

us out of Asia, and our role is to make sure that we are there and 

that everybody in Asia feels comfortable and wants us there. That 

is working and I think we have a strategy. 

I think our strategy with Russia is very clear. We are going to 

buck up NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] again. We 

took our eyes off the ball, we are going to get NATO strong again. 

And we have got to ask that the Europeans do a better job of their 

own defense. It is a familiar theme. 

If we have a strategy in the Middle East, I don’t know what it 

is. I can’t see it. I don’t know how we are designing it. And I think 

we do need to have a strategy to know what we are going to do 

going forward. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will try to be a little more flexible on time, but 

I also want to get around to everybody. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith. 

I would also like to thank the witnesses for taking the time to 

be with us today and making critical decisions regarding the composition and the operation of our armed services. 

Goldwater-Nichols resulted in significant changes in the way our 

military plans, trains, and fights, and few would argue that these 

changes were generally beneficial in terms of operations and efficiency. 

I strongly, gentlemen, support reform that strengthens our 

Armed Forces while also allowing them to operate more efficiently. 

But I do oppose change simply for the purpose of change. 

Like some of my colleagues, I, too, am concerned that across-theboard cuts to GOs [general officers] and SESs, as described in the 

Senate NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], are unwise, 

given that each organization and headquarters faces different missions, operating environments, and challenges. 

I am in favor of reducing staffs if they have indeed become bloated. But we must be sure that we aren’t eliminating vital positions 

in the likely event that some of our organizations are truly running 

efficiently today. 

So I do want to thank you all for your comments. I also appreciate your commentary on security cooperation and building partner capacity. 

General Ham, I know you know this firsthand. As Ranking Member Smith noted, and I have appreciated your comments on the National Guard State Partnership Program which has unique capabilities to work around some of the bureaucratic challenges on a 

country-by-country basis. 

But I do have a question for Dr. Hamre. And I appreciate your 

answering very bluntly and forward your five points that we asked 

you to answer. 

Joint officer development, including JPME [Joint Professional 

Military Education], was a major part of the reform in 1986. Now, 
16 

this was imperative given the starting point that we faced on the 

heels of the Vietnam War and other significant military operational 

failures. 

Today as a result of the past 30 years, joint operations are more 

ingrained in our leadership and officers. So given the military of 

today versus the military of back then, 1986, do you feel that the 

very specific and often cumbersome officer development and education requirements of Goldwater-Nichols are still required to ensure joint knowledge? 

Dr. HAMRE. Thank you, it is a very key question. And I personally believe we need to do a fairly fundamental review of this. I am 

not smart enough and I haven’t done that review personally to give 

you a recommendation. 

I do feel that for 30 years we have had a calorie theory of management, not a vitamin theory. You know, we have put more 

money on it, we have made things bigger, but we really haven’t figured out what does it take to create a healthy organization and we 

have just let putting more money into it as being the answer. 

You know, we created the joint duty officer assignment about 10 

years after DOPMA [Defense Officer Personnel Management Act] 

was passed. And Congress created DOPMA. DOPMA creates a fairly rigid process by which officers have to advance. And we put joint 

duty officer on top of that. 

It is now a, in my view, too constrained a system. It needs to be 

re-engineered, but it has to be re-engineered by experts who really 

know personnel management. I do not have that background. I am 

not competent to be able to give you an answer for that. I do think 

you are right to press for it. 

And I think probably this would be one of those things where the 

committee asking for, you know, a genuine commission, you did 

very well with the commission you set up to look at retirement and 

health care, that sort of thing, something like that again, looking 

at how well we are doing managing officer talent would be, I think, 

very valuable. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

I have one final question. I am just curious, and maybe you don’t 

have the answer as well. But if we implement some of these 

changes, is there a significant cost saving? 

Dr. HAMRE. Well, I don’t think that, you know, cutting the number of general officers isn’t going to be a cost saving directly. What 

it is, it starts the process where we spend less energy friction internal to the system and more of our energy goes towards output. And 

we are going to find lots of opportunities to make our organization 

more streamlined if we start at the top and think how could we do 

things differently. I think there are a lot of opportunities for that. 

A little example, you know, we will have a thousand people managing a constellation of satellites where the private industry will 

have 10 people doing the same job. So you are not going to discover 

that until you really break open organizations saying, how do we 

do things differently? 

I think that starts with the top. That is why I would recommend 

that you seriously look at top changes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much to all the witnesses. 
17 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment about 

JPME? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. 

General HAM. So I think you are right, ma’am, that the cohort 

of officers serving today are much more attuned, much more comfortable operating in a joint environment than I was growing up. 

That is a result of what you did in the law, so we don’t want to 

lose that. 

I think there is measure for some greater flexibility in the application of joint duty assignments. There are lots of examples that 

two officers sitting side by side doing largely the same function, one 

gets joint credit and the other doesn’t. There are some improvements that I think could be done in that regard. 

I think there is merit in the proposal to reduce the timeline of 

assignments from 3 years to 2. That seems to be about right. 

But we don’t want to lose the goodness that this cohort of officers 

have, that feel very comfortable while retaining their service pride 

and culture, but they are very comfortable in the joint environment. That is a good thing for the Armed Forces and we want to 

make sure we continue that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, and thank you 

for your service to our Nation. 

I want to focus for a moment on the downsizing of the four-stars. 

I believe I think I read 41 down to 27 is being considered. Is that 

locked in stone or is that still just up for discussion at this point? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. My understanding is it is very much up for discussion. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay, all right, just asking. So my question is, just 

briefly because I have follow-up questions, what are the pros and 

cons? What do we give up by downsizing our number of four-stars? 

General HAM. So I will start. There are some modest savings in 

immediate staff of a four-star, unsurprisingly. A four-star’s immediate staff is a little bigger than a three-star, et cetera. But it is 

the downward effect of a four-star headquarters and then the cascading effect. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. 

General HAM. On the negative side, I think we ought to be a little cautious. Four-stars get access to places that sometimes threestars can’t. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes. 

General HAM. I am most familiar with Europe. I was the last 

four-star Army service component commander in Europe, that my 

successors have all been three-stars. It has been okay, but the reality is most of their counterparts are four-stars. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. 

General HAM. There are access challenges. It was tough sometimes for me as a four-star to have conversation with Russian counterparts. I know we are suspended from that right now. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes. 
18 

General HAM. I have heard that the same is true with China. 

The Army for a long time had a three-star Army service component 

commander in the Pacific, difficult for that commander to have discussions with their Chinese counterpart, easier now that that Army 

component is a four-star. 

Dr. FLEMING. Correct. 

General HAM. So there is balance. 

Dr. FLEMING. Sure. Well, the reason why I bring it up is you may 

recall, and I hate to bring up bad things that happen in history, 

but Barksdale Air Force Base is the Air Force base now home for 

Global Strike Command in Louisiana. They are in control, of 

course, of nuclear missiles and nuclear bombers. 

You may recall that back around 2007, 2008 there were several 

instances that happened with nuclear weapons that were very unfortunate. One was the transport, unauthorized transport of nuclear weapons from one point to another, which actually it was actually found and discovered at Barksdale itself. That led to standing up Global Strike Command, and now there is a four-star general in charge of that. 

And the reasons cited, among them was the fact that there was 

not a high-level general in charge of our nuclear weapons, which 

is arguably the most important tools of war that we have, certainly 

the most devastating in case of a mistake. 

One of the reasons cited for having a four-star in charge of Global Strike Command is to make sure that there is top-level access 

to discussion and resources. So I do have a concern, at least when 

it comes to the Air Force, about, again, the shedding of four-stars 

and how that could impact our nuclear armament. 

So I would love to have your comments on that. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, I would simply say that the way the House 

side has approached the issue with a smaller number of cuts to the 

four-star levels and essentially saying to the DOD look carefully at 

what is needed, so a case like the one you made probably would 

carry some weight over there. 

Dr. FLEMING. Sure. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Arbitrarily cutting whatever it is, 17, whatever the 

number is, probably is too far, too fast, and without enough 

thought. 

So there is a way to approach this, there is a case for reducing 

the number of four-stars. I am not entirely convinced that if you 

are a three-star you don’t have any clout at all. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Certainly that is not my experience when I was in 

the Department. 

Dr. FLEMING. Sure. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. But nevertheless, you have got to do this with 

some care and understanding. And I think the way this particular 

committee is approaching it is about right. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes? 

Dr. HAMRE. Just very briefly, I was on the Schlesinger Commission that reviewed that incident. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes, right. 

Dr. HAMRE. My personal view is that this was a long-term trend. 

It started when the Air Force transferred the bombers from the 
19 

Strategic Command to the Tactical Command. There was a fourstar in charge—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. 

Mr. HAMRE [continuing]. But he didn’t care about the nuclear 

mission. 

Dr. FLEMING. right. 

Dr. HAMRE. And are there ways that you can keep the focus for 

the nuclear mission with a three-star? I think you can and I think 

the Air Force has really embraced it now, but it does require the 

chief to understand that that is his responsibility to make sure that 

that part of the mission suite is healthy. 

And I take my hat off to General Welsh. He did a great job, I 

think. I am confident that General Goldfein will do the same thing. 

I understand your concern. But the real cause of losing a focus 

was when we took the bombers and gave them to the Tactical Air 

Command. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes? Okay. 

General HAM. So I would just add to what Dr. Hamre said in his 

opening statement. I think to afford the Department of Defense the 

opportunity to conduct a review, maybe a little bit more time, extending this a year, let them come back to you and say here is our 

proposal, that makes a lot of sense to me rather than trying to do 

it in the near term. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes, okay. 

Thank you, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would also like to thank each of you for your presentation 

and the questions that you have answered so far. You have really 

hit on, I think, the most critical, most fundamental aspects of what 

we do as Members of Congress. And you mentioned the separation 

of powers, the civilian control of the military. 

Dr. Zakheim, you said no one defines the ends anymore. 

General Ham, you talked about the tyranny of consensus and the 

importance that we escape that. 

All those are on my mind. And when I think about a defense 

budget of $610 billion that consumes half or more of our discretionary budget, I don’t know if that is too much or too little. I don’t 

know exactly what we are trying to achieve in the world and in 

specific areas like the Middle East, it is especially confusing. 

And so I know that much of what we are talking about today is 

about the executive’s authority, the NSC, whether it is too large, 

whether it is operational or merely coordinating, and I think those 

are important questions and you have helped me to better understand that. 

But perhaps each of you could spend a little bit of time guiding 

me as a Member of Congress in terms of what we could do to better 

define these ends, to have a defined strategy towards which we can 

apply the means, use to help us make decisions on specific weapon 

systems, force levels, total budget levels. 

The themes that you have touched on could not be more important to the job that I am trying to do. 

So, Dr. Hamre, I will ask you to begin. 
20 

Dr. HAMRE. Thank you. I was on the committee, the Senate 

Armed Services Committee back in the 1980s, into the 1990s. I remember the first year that I was on the committee our bill was 5 

pages long and our report was 96 pages long. This year, the Senate 

Armed Services Committee bill is 1,600 pages long. 

The Congress, and this is collectively, it is this committee, it is 

the Senate committee, everybody, is on the wrong path. You are 

not more powerful when you ask thousands of little questions. You 

are powerful when you focus on big issues. 

That used to be the historic role of the Armed Services Committee, focus on the big issues. What fundamentally is shaping the 

direction of the country and our national security? Instead, the 

committees have become trapped in chasing after thousands and 

thousands of little issues. And I think it has been to the diminishment of the committee. 

So I strongly would urge you to pull back from all of this mechanical stuff. I mean, the Department loves it when you do that, 

by the way, because they can throw a thousand colonels at you, you 

know, I mean, they will win. 

But when it comes to debating the big issues, the big issues of 

state and national purpose, you have the upper hand, but you are 

not playing in that court. And I would ask you to reconceptualize 

how you think about your role as a committee. 

General HAM. Sir, I would take a similar vein. We have talked 

a little bit about the development of national security strategy from 

which derives the national military strategy. And while this committee appropriately focuses most on the national military strategy 

and the role of the Armed Forces, it must be understood that that 

occurs in a context of a broader, you know, cliche phrase of wholeof-government approach that applies all of the instruments of national power. 

And for this committee to say how do the Armed Forces, how 

does the Nation’s military capability fit into that overarching national security strategy, I think we probably have, in my view, 

have, in many times and many cases, overemphasized and focused 

almost exclusively on the military component and not so much on 

the other underlying and albeit important, at least equally if not 

more important other elements of national power. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I would align myself with those points. I would also 

add this. You have the power of the purse. If you have a better 

understanding of the big questions the way John Hamre just laid 

them out, then you can ask, how does what the Department is asking you for fit in with those big questions? So if they want something that relates, say, to the Middle East, and I agree with John 

Hamre, we have no strategy in the Middle East, and you ask them, 

well, why should I pay for this if it is for the Middle East, what 

is it actually going to do for me when I don’t know what you want 

to do, those kinds of questions you can and should ask. 

And one other area which is terribly important, you have got to 

do the things that DOD will not do for itself. This whole hearing, 

the whole idea of acquisition reform, Goldwater-Nichols. Goldwater-Nichols wasn’t cooked up by DOD. I was in DOD at the time. 

When John was on the Hill, I was inside the Department. We were 

bitterly opposed to it. 
21 

So if you want and see a need for change, don’t bet on DOD 

doing it for you. And that is something else you should be doing. 

The CHAIRMAN. I just have to say I think Dr. Hamre and Dr. 

Zakheim are exactly right on both cases. One of my goals, which 

I have completely failed at so far, is to shrink the size of our bill 

over the last 2 years. A variety of reasons, but I think we have got 

to do better at focusing on the big stuff, so very good questions. 

Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

As you know and you have already spoken to this, the question 

on the NSC, the National Security Council, I was interested in the 

comments that former Secretaries Gates and Panetta when they 

talked about the National Security Council’s micromanagement of 

military operations. 

I am interested in hearing from all of you, but I just wanted to 

direct this first question to General Ham. From your perspective as 

a former combatant commander, how do you see this issue of 

micromanagement as Panetta and Gates have described? 

General HAM. As a combatant commander, ma’am, I didn’t actually perceive it as micromanagement because, frankly, our engagement with the National Security Council staff was pretty minimal. 

I mean, it was occasional with me personally. If there was a particular contingency or matter that was being discussed, usually at 

the invitation of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman, then 

I could have been brought in. 

My perspective as the director for operations, J–3 on the Joint 

Staff, was different. And there were the frequency and the level of 

detail that was requested by the National Security Council staff 

was beyond that which I felt was necessary for that body to make 

policy decisions and I think started a trend very much into operational matters. 

And so there was tension there and sometimes we would get 

guidance from the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to say simply, you know, we are not going to 

go down that path, we are not going to provide that level of detail 

because it is too operational. 

But it was, you know, near-constant dialogue, particularly if 

there was a pending contingency operation that was being discussed at those levels. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Yes, Dr. Zakheim, if you could kind of weigh in 

on what Dr. Hamre was talking about earlier, just your perspective 

on the Senate having a cap on members versus the House language 

which requires FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] and Senate confirmation, those two types of things. I am interested just to hear 

your perspective as well. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, I personally think that the House side’s approach is probably better in the sense that, look, if the NSC staff 

is relatively small, then it truly is an advisory staff and there is 

no need to confirm the national security adviser. Once it gets too 

big, it is operational. And John pointed out the size of OMB and 

the size of the NSC staff are roughly the same. 

So yes, the whole purpose of the national security adviser has 

just changed. 
22 

I would point out something else. General Ham speaks from his 

experience. But when you were the J–3 the NSC was smaller. The 

problem with the NSC staff is that it has gone up like that. And 

frankly, when you have all these people sitting around, they are 

going to look for something to do. 

And I will never forget, sometimes we would get a call when Mr. 

Rumsfeld was my boss, you know, the White House wants X or 

somebody would tell us the White House wants X. And the Secretary would say, well, who in the White House? I mean, the White 

House is a big place, it has janitors, too. 

So you get this tendency, the President wants, the White House 

wants, that is the part of the problem. When you have a small staff 

that understands its function and that is working full tilt at that 

function, you are not going to have these sorts of problems. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Dr. Hamre, you want to add anything to that? 

Dr. HAMRE. Just to say that when Henry Kissinger was national 

security adviser he had 40 people on his staff. When Zbig 

Brzezinski was national security adviser he had 44 on his staff. 

There are 450 right now. 

Now, that is qualitatively a different operation. And I hear it 

from all of my friends who are, you know, CINCs [commanders in 

chief] and the Joint Staff, they are getting phone calls from GS– 

11s telling him turn ships around. I mean, that is not the role of 

the National Security Council. 

And if it is the role of the National Security Council, the Congress has a responsibility, a constitutional responsibility to oversee 

it. We just have to decide how we are going to go here. 

That is why I think the Thornberry amendment and now the 

House approach is the superior way to proceed on this. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. And I would just add—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Sure. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I would think Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brzezinski 

were pretty good at their job with that small number of people. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. It is very insightful to hear your different 

perspectives on this. 

Dr. Zakheim, you talked about national security strategy as really being kind of the big-picture approach that we need to be looking 

at if we are looking at the cause and how we can improve the situation. 

You know, I think there is no argument that the security environment today is far more complex than it was during the Cold 

War, yet our national security strategies and processes have not 

necessarily evolved to reflect that reality. 

I think both the House and Senate bills have recommended 

streamlining the strategic planning within the Department by 

eliminating the QDR, replacing it with a top-down defense strategy, but it still does not go to the heart of the issue with what you 

raised, Dr. Zakheim, which is all of the other elements within the 

Federal Government that play an important role in this national 
23 

security strategy so that the DOD is not operating kind of in a silo 

or in a vacuum. 

You know, I think we have seen some marginal efforts and attempts to do this that really have not been particularly successful. 

You know, I don’t think they will happen on their own. 

So I would like to hear from you how we can develop or conduct 

a national security review that would accomplish that goal, what 

your recommendations would be of building this overall national 

security strategy wherein the DOD obviously plays a very critical 

role working alongside and in parallel with these other agencies. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Since you mentioned me I will start, Congresswoman. 

The first thing is to recognize that DOD is not the answer to 

everything. DOD has become the default position. My favorite anecdote about Afghanistan was the Iowa National Guard teaching 

farmers out there to farm because the Department of Agriculture 

wasn’t sending people because they didn’t have to. 

National security involves a lot of agencies. And this is something the National Security Council staff should be doing. Instead 

of giving operational guidance that drives people like General Ham 

a little bit crazy, they should be working on a comprehensive national security strategy reaching out to every single agency that 

has an input, that has a part to play, and rethinking the role of 

those agencies. 

And why is it that State Department people get killed and people 

in uniform get killed and people in the intelligence agencies, but 

somebody in the Agriculture Department who needs to go out to Afghanistan doesn’t have to go if he or she doesn’t want to. There is 

something fundamentally wrong with that. 

We need to reconsider what we mean by national security. To 

me, that is job number one of the National Security Council staff. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

General HAM. I would agree with that, ma’am, just to say it is 

much broader than the armed services and we have got to find a 

way, and I would agree with Dr. Zakheim that I think the national 

security staff is the right entity to forge the various elements of our 

government, craft a national security strategy from which derive 

all of the others. 

How do you get to that? How do you drive that? I think it is by 

asking those tough questions that Dr. Hamre said, the big questions rather than the specific questions. You know, what is it that 

we are trying to achieve? And then I think for this committee, you 

know, what is the military component of that strategy? 

But absent that broader, overarching strategy, we always say, I 

mean, uniformly everybody signs up and says there is no military 

solution to this problem or that problem or this campaign, but yet 

there is very little conversation about other than military solutions 

to those challenges. 

So again, broadening and deepening the conversation, I think, 

will be helpful. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Dr. HAMRE. Ma’am, the reason DOD is always tasked to do 

things is because we are the only part of the government that can 

mobilize capacity beyond what we are in peacetime. You know, we 
24 

do not buy extra policemen. You know, we make them work overtime when it is the 4th of July. We don’t have extra firemen, you 

know, we don’t have extra diplomats. 

But we do have the capacity in the Defense Department to fundamentally change ourselves when the President says you have got 

to do something. We can bring up reservists, we can bring in contractors. We know how to do that, that is why we are always the 

ones that get tasked to do it. But we are frequently being put in 

positions where we are not the best party to be doing it. 

This has to be something that the President makes a priority to 

get other agencies of the government to be working with us. So I 

strongly agree with my colleagues on that. 

I also feel that, you know, the Department needs to be held accountable to the big questions, not all the little questions. I mean, 

the little questions are mechanical, those are administrative. They 

have the responsibility to do it right, you need to be pressing them 

on the very large questions. What are we doing in the Middle East? 

What is our strategy? 

Ms. GABBARD. Yes. 

Dr. HAMRE. How are we going to turn that situation around? It 

is spiraling into chaos. What are we going to do? 

I think we have a strategy in Asia, we just haven’t gotten anybody in the administration to articulate it very clearly. 

So I think if you press, lift this debate up, lift this debate up so 

it is at the national purposes, what are we doing as a nation, what 

do we need for our people, this is why we asked you to serve to 

do those questions. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I just wanted to follow up quickly, Dr. Hamre, on 

that issue as you talk about, you know, the military does it because 

they have the bandwidth basically, whereas you would have an instance where USAID or Ag [Agriculture] or Justice or any number 

of different departments would be better qualified. 

At the end of the day, the reason for that is they don’t have the 

money, they don’t have the personnel. I don’t see that changing. I 

don’t see where that money is going to come from. I mean, the only 

logical place to take it from would be, well, if the DOD is doing 

something that it would prefer someone else to do, take the money 

from DOD, put it in the State Department, good luck with that. 

Am I wrong about that, first of all? Do you think that is a realistic approach to say, hey, let us move more money in there? But 

more importantly, short of that, if we can’t do that, is there a better way to do it than we are doing it now within the confines of 

the money that we have? 

Dr. HAMRE. Well, sir, I think there is no easy way to do it in the 

short term. For example, one of the reasons the Defense Department, we budget excess officers. You know, we have a TTHS 

[Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students] account where we 

buy 10 percent more officers than we need to fill all the jobs. But 

that is because some of them are in transit, some of them are in 

training. I mean, there are different reasons why. But you have 
25 

given us the permission to do that and we bake that into our budget. 

The overhead account in personnel in the State Department is 

one-half of 1 percent. That is long-term disability. They need to 

have a higher percent of authorized Foreign Service Officers so 

that they have the capacity to send people off to training, they 

have the capacity to mobilize and to get people into a theater on 

short notice. Right now they have to take it out of resources because they don’t have it. 

So honestly, it is a mechanical thing, but budgeting a small 

amount of overhead would help dramatically with this problem. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, may I follow up on Mr. Smith’s 

question? 

So I would agree with that and it certainly manifests itself in 

professional military education where a small number of civilians 

from various agencies across the government go to the National Defense University and other places. That is invaluable experience for 

them, but also for the uniformed officers who are in that. If we 

could increase that, that would be good. 

And lastly, as combatant commander, I really appreciated the socalled dual-key authorities that the Congress has given to the State 

Department and Department of Defense that you can go do something if both departments agree on that. That is a great way, 

again, to build the synergy between, you know, the State Department and Department of Defense in activities abroad and I found 

those to be very useful. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, one concern that I have, I think that the Congress 

has, is the extraordinary growth in the size of the bureaucracy in 

the Department of Defense. And now we are having a debate about 

reducing the number of four-stars. But it seems that the genesis 

or the origin and the growth is the rise of these combatant commands. 

And it seems that certainly some of them have a good focus. But 

it seems like in some of them they have become incredibly parochial as to their region. There are redundant functions with the 

State Department. So how would you state that we ought to look 

at the effectiveness of combatant commands and to what extent we 

ought to have them going forward? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, let me try to deal with that. 

The combatant commands may have generated some additional 

civilian slots because the military end strength is what it is. But 

I don’t think that is the major driver in the growth of civilian numbers. 

And I think what is needed is a far more careful look clearly with 

congressional legislation, otherwise it will never happen, at why we 

need as many as we have added in the last 15 years. 

I mean, it is arguable that as we have added the 7,000 civilians 

we haven’t gotten particularly more efficient. If we had, you might 

not be having this hearing today. So there is something fundamentally wrong and it goes well beyond the combatant commands. 
26 

As to the combatant commands themselves, I agree with you 

there needs to be some change. I think there should be a four-star 

cyber commander, for example. 

Whether you need a NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and 

a SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] separately is something 

that needs to be looked at. Whether you need a CENTCOM [U.S. 

Central Command] and an AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], 

given that the locus of Islamic terror is somewhere between the 

two of them, maybe you want to rethink that. 

I think there needs to be a closer look, again going back to John 

Hamre’s point, what are we trying to do in the world, and then, 

okay, what kind of commands do we need in order to do that. Unfortunately, that is not how the UCP works, the Unified Command 

Plan, and those aren’t the questions we have been asking. 

General HAM. It won’t surprise you, Mr. Coffman, that I feel 

pretty strongly about the value of geographic combatant commands. Again, as I stated earlier, I think there is great value in 

having a commander and a group of people who wake up every day 

focused on a specific region. 

I would agree, though, that they don’t need to be as large as they 

are. I failed in that in my time at Africa Command. I should have 

been more aggressive at reducing the size of the command and I 

regret that. So I think there is a time to do that. 

But I wouldn’t give up the goodness of the relationships that are 

developed between that combatant command and the military leaders in the area of responsibility. That is a very valuable component, 

I think, in our building partner capacity and reliance upon others. 

The point that the threats that we face today are no longer exclusively regional or transregional, some of them certainly are global 

threats, so mechanisms that allow greater agility in the application 

of force and capabilities across combatant command boundaries, I 

think those would be helpful. 

I always felt that I had a great relationship with European Command, Central Command, Pacific Command as we did things together. But frankly, it was more based on personality than it was 

on structure. So we need some structure that makes cross-combatant-command boundaries more effective and more efficient. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So when we look at Goldwater-Nichols, it seemed 

that the momentum for it was looking at military setbacks that 

have occurred with the failure during the Carter administration of 

the rescue in Iran and with the failure, ultimate failure of the Marine Corps presence in Lebanon under the Reagan administration. 

I was involved in the early phases, the unfortunate failure in 

Beirut that led to the loss of, I think, 241 U.S. military personnel. 

So when we look at the response in Benghazi and we look at our 

structure, what have we learned? Because I was in a Marine amphibious unit positioned off Lebanon to evacuate the U.S. embassy 

on order. And we were there, we were positioned there when things 

were getting hot in Lebanon. What have we learned in terms of our 

inability or our inertia in terms of responding to a Benghazi from 

the standpoint of looking at our overall structure? 

General HAM. I obviously have some familiarity with this subject 

and have appeared before this committee on this subject. 
27 

I think we have learned a lot. I think first and foremost, obviously, the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities is primarily the purview of the Department of State and host nations. There are some 

things that can be strengthened there. 

In terms of military response, I think some of the things that the 

Department of Defense has done over the past few years to decrease response time by establishing a Commander’s In-extremis 

Force dedicated to Africa which didn’t exist before, to establish the 

Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force in 

Spain that is postured to respond more quickly, I think those are 

all very, very positive steps that have occurred from a tragic incident. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to see all of you here. Thank you for your inputs and 

really all your service to the country. 

I wanted to ask you if you could, you know, this is probably a 

difficult thing to do, but I know that it is something you have 

thought about a lot, could you look at an Iraq-type decisionmaking 

process today and think about what would be different between 

now and, say, 2003? And what still needs to change, what would 

need to change in statute as well as internally at the Department 

of Defense? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I lived through that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I don’t know, is the answer. And the reason I tell 

you that is that when you get to the level of the President and the 

Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, those are 

decisions that are not going to be driven by a particular mechanism 

or indeed by some kind of structure. 

Those are the kinds of decisions that are made for a host of different reasons and different motives. And so as you saw perhaps 

just from what happened in Britain with Mr. Blair’s reaction to the 

really sharp criticism of Britain’s involvement in Iraq, on the one 

hand he was kind of penitent, but on the other hand he had his 

back up and said, no, you know, this is what I wanted to do. That 

is what Presidents do. 

I mean, ultimately, Truman was right, the buck does stop there. 

And for something like that, the buck will always stop there. 

General HAM. I will try, Mrs. Davis, and just say simply, you 

know, military planning we often develop plans based on what do 

we think are the most likely outcomes, most likely enemy or adversary reactions and then what are the most dangerous. 

And I think sometimes we get fascinated by the most likely and 

build all of our plans and contingencies based on what we anticipate will be the most likely outcome, and we are less prepared for 

the most dangerous, perhaps an unlikely outcome, but one that has 

very significant consequences. So we need to be prepared for that 

bad outcome as well as the most likely outcome. 

It is a reminder to all of us that when we begin military operations, there is not a lot of certainty as to what the outcome will 

be. And so making sure that we have the ability, the adaptability 
28 

to recognize when conditions are changing and then the flexibility 

to modify our courses of action and our policies as those conditions 

change. I think that is probably one of the lessons that we have 

learned over the past 10 or 15 years. 

Dr. HAMRE. Representative Davis, forgive me for kind of doing 

this, but I think this is why you want to have civilian control. I 

don’t think that the decisionmaking in 2003 was produced by the 

military demanding a war. I mean, you want absolute accountability for why things are done and it rests with the President, it rests 

with the constitutional officers that execute the President’s directions. 

And this is why you do not want to bring in a complicating factor 

where you can blame the military for what, in essence, is a political 

decision. This was back in a time when there was a great deal of 

fear in America and we didn’t really understand what had happened to us after 9/11. We reacted with anger and blind rage in 

many ways. 

But that was a political decision, it was not the product of military recommendations or the byproduct of the civilian/military relationship. It was unequivocally a policy choice and I think we have 

to always keep it that way. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Well, I certainly appreciate all of your answers. I 

think part of the concern as you were talking about how we, you 

know, strategically look at capacity, capacity on many different levels, and part of what I know I have always been concerned about, 

I think we all were, is whether we asked those appropriate questions. 

What capacity do we even have for understanding the situational 

awareness, if you will, and trying to get underneath? You know, 

what really lies at the bottom of some of those decisions? So I appreciate that. 

Dr. Zakheim. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, I was just going to say that is a role of both 

the Intelligence Community and the military to lay out as best they 

can what the situation looks like from their perspective. 

On the other hand, the decision is the President’s and his senior 

people, his political people. It is a policy decision, John’s absolutely 

right. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Hamre, I wanted to begin with you. You wrote an article 

back in March speaking about the role of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, saying specifically that they shouldn’t be inserted into the 

chain of command, the role should be advisory so they can be more 

directive from that perspective rather than in the chain of command. 

Subsequent to that in April, Secretary Ash Carter came out and 

said that he wanted to look at ways to clarify the role and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And he also wanted to 

make sure that the Chairman maintained his independence within 

that particular realm of duties. 
29 

Give me your perspective on where you think the Chairman 

should function in the role between the Secretary, the administration, and the Joint Chiefs and staff, therefore? 

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think this is, of course, one of the most complicated questions. And I would say the role of the Chairman is 

probably the most complicated job in the world if you think about, 

because his job is to ensure that the President understands the implications of choices he or she wants to make, but is objective about 

those recommendations to the President and so he can’t become an 

advocate for what comes up through the chain of command to the 

Secretary. 

His role is really to be this superior counselor to the President, 

that can give him military judgment and advice as he thinks about 

it. And I think the chairmen have actually done a good job of that. 

I think they have worked very hard at that because they were not 

invested in the recommendation that sat in front of the President. 

They certainly knew about it, they helped to shape it, but it was 

their job to give independent advice to the President. I think we 

want to preserve that. 

And I don’t think we want to cloud in any sense it is the President’s decision if he is going to put somebody in harm’s way. It is 

the President’s accountability to the public. We can’t let that get 

confused by somehow thinking, well, the military were the cause 

of that. The military cannot be the cause for political decisions. 

Now, I think the issue at hand and I think the way that your 

committee dealt with it was to acknowledge the Secretary has a lot 

of delegation authorities that he could exercise. And that is within 

the prerogative of Goldwater-Nichols that was established and I 

think you are right to highlight that and to say, why doesn’t that 

become an appropriate vehicle for dealing with what are truly administrative matters? 

But I know the political power of the Joint Staff and I would be 

very loathe to give the Joint Staff more political power when it ultimately is a political decision that has to be accountable to the electorate. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Zakheim, I want to shift gears a little bit here. You spoke 

earlier about efficiencies within the Department of Defense and 

specifically where dollars are going. And I am very much concerned 

along the same realm, and that is that we are getting dollars directly to readiness. And in many situations, they are not getting 

there. 

You pointed out, I think very eloquently, that about 40 percent of the total Pentagon budget or spending, which is about $240 billion out of the base budget, goes to overhead and support. So it 

doesn’t get directly to the warfighter, it doesn’t get to the things 

that we need to be doing, whether it is training, whether it is the 

overhead of operations and maintenance and modernization. 

And you have also seen, too, that since 2009 the workforce there 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown by more than 

2,000 people or 18 percent, and the Joint Staff grew from 1,286 to 

4,244, an increase of 240 percent. 

I think all those things are very, very significant in looking at 

that element of growth. 
30 

Tell me this. How do we in the future reshape the direction of 

resources to make sure that we are indeed focusing that on rebuilding readiness? You know, the full-spectrum readiness is not a place 

where we are going to be until sometime in the 2020s. To me, the 

way to short-circuit that, sans all the issues we deal with, sequester and those kinds of things, is to create efficiencies within the 

Pentagon. 

Give me your perspective. I know you spoke a little bit about it, 

but I wanted to get you to drill down a little bit more about how 

we get there. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, starting with the Office of the Secretary and 

the Joint Staff, I mean, clearly you can legislate a ceiling for both. 

It has been done before. What you have to watch out for is another 

WHS or the siphoning off to other agencies. And unless you put in 

language there that says these people really have to go, they are 

not going to go. So that is number one. 

Number two is one of the biggest black holes in budgeting, and 

I think John Hamre will probably agree with me on this, he was 

a comptroller before he was a deputy, is base operations. What do 

we mean by base operations? There are things that we really need 

to spend money on and there are things that maybe we shouldn’t 

be spending money on. 

And I think getting to the bottom of that is daunting, but it is 

very important if you are looking for the kinds of efficiencies that 

you could then turn the money over toward procurement and R&D 

[research and development] and the other things you are talking 

about. 

And finally, as I said, getting your arms around the contractor 

corps. What does it mean? 

One thing that I have suggested over the years is you put a 2- 

year moratorium on anybody leaving the Department, whether 

military or civilian, before they can become a contractor that is 

doing staff augmentation, which is really the problem. Because 

what they do is they flip their badge and they go back to the same 

job, but meanwhile somebody else has replaced them as well and 

all of a sudden you have got two people doing one job. 

There ought to be a moratorium set on that. You ought to make 

it much, much harder for people just to flip their badges. Once that 

happens, they are going to look elsewhere and that will start bringing the numbers down, too. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Hamre, an important role of the AT&L Under Secretary is 

serving as a milestone decision authority for major defense acquisition programs. So in that role, as we know, the Under Secretary 

is a key decisionmaker in the DOD in whether a program starts, 

whether it moves into development or into productions. So even 

though the fiscal year 2016 bill encourages AT&L to push that authority down to military services in more cases, the Under Secretary still retains the authority to serve as a milestone decision 

authority on programs. 
31 

So the Senate has a proposal to break up the Under Secretary 

for AT&L and it is not 100 percent clear on whether or not the new 

Under Secretary for Research and Engineering would continue to 

serve in that role as the decision authority. 

So a couple of questions, do you support the Senate’s idea of a 

new Under Secretary retaining this milestone decision authority? 

Or should Congress make clear in whatever language you need to 

come up with where that authority sits? 

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think my personal view is we need to lift up 

the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to make it the 

number-three position in the building again. It once was, we need 

to put it back there again. You cannot have that be the numberthree position and not let him have milestone acquisition authority. 

You are going to have to keep that role with the DDR&E. 

But we don’t need a giant compliance organization surrounding 

him and that is what we have had. And I think putting a lot of 

the responsibility back to the services, which is what you did last 

year, was the right thing to do. 

This year I think it would be a mistake to try to separate the 

milestone authority and put it into another Under Secretary. You 

need to keep that with the DDR&E and I think you can fix that 

when you are in conference. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Zakheim. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I agree with that. I think that General Milley, the 

Chief of Staff of the Army, has proposed a number of other things 

that can be devolved back to the military, which will, again, reduce 

the need for these massive staffs that support the current Under 

Secretary. 

I think the intent and the focus should be on innovation and 

technology development. That is why the suggestion that you 

change the nature of what the Under Secretary does is so important. 

And most of the acquisition work, leaving aside the milestone 

issue that was just discussed, belongs with an Assistant Secretary 

for Acquisition who should do that job. That is not where we go if 

we really want to innovate. That is where we have been. And everybody agrees we are not innovating. 

So you need to have this focus that, you know, what Harold 

Brown did when he had that job, what Bill Perry did when he had 

that job, that is what they should be doing. And if you look at their 

records and what they brought in and the records of what DOD has 

done over the last many years actually, compared to what is going 

on in the commercial sector, you will see that something is amiss 

and maybe we should go back to that original model. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Senate is coming up with some interesting proposals regarding military structure, so I would like to focus on two of these proposals. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I have here a letter to start out with from 

11 retired senior military commanders, including former STRAT-
32 

COM [U.S. Strategic Command], PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command], 

and NORTHCOM commanders, expressing concern with Senate 

section 502 which would repeal the requirement for the director of 

the Missile Defense Agency to be a three-star officer as part of the 

imposition of an across-the-board cut to general officer/flag officer 

billets. 

The letter gives five reasons why the director of this critical $30 

billion agency should be a three-star and not a lower-rank officer. 

So I would ask unanimous consent that this be entered into the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. So my question for the witnesses is, given the importance of missile defense, do you agree that experience has 

shown that the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] should be led by a 

three-star military officer? Who would care to comment on that? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I will be happy to. I was there in 1983 when General Abe [Abrahamson] was the first three-star officer in charge of 

what was then called SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. 

There is no question in my mind that you should have a threestar. I don’t know if my colleagues will agree with me or not. As 

long as missile defense is an important national defense priority, 

then you should have a three-star dealing with it. And the reason 

is very simple, there are tons of two-stars. 

I know of one person who once held my job who would only see 

four-stars. I thought that was pretty outrageous myself. And believe me, the services that had to deal with that individual were 

not happy either. 

But there are just a lot of two-stars. And when you have an 

Under Secretary or a Secretary or Deputy Secretary, and John 

Hamre can speak for the latter, they are just not going to deal with 

a two-star the way they deal with a three-star, nor with—would I 

argue, I suspect, would the Hill. I can’t speak for the Hill, but that 

is my suspicion. 

As long as it is a major and priority American defense activity, 

it should be a three-star, it should be run by a three-star. That is 

my view. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Any other comments? 

General HAM. Just very quickly. I think obviously missile defense 

is a vital component of an overarching strategy. The decision as to 

individual positions and officers, I think, ought to be part of a 

broader, more comprehensive review of the general and flag officer 

ranks within the Armed Forces. 

In the particular case of the Missile Defense Agency, one advantage of having a three-star is that that requires a specific nomination and confirmation process, obviously why you all obviously still 

confirm promotions to major general, it is more individual and tailored at the three-star level. And that level of scrutiny may be appropriate given the importance of missile defense. 

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, this is the first I have learned of this and so I 

haven’t had a chance to study it. 

I would just like to step back and reflect. I mean, we had a onestar Army general that brought together the Manhattan Project. 
33 

You know, the man who did mobilization for armored combat vehicles—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. If you could wrap up in about 20 seconds because 

I have got a second—— 

Dr. HAMRE. Yes—for armored combat vehicles, he was a colonel. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I have got a second question. 

Dr. HAMRE. I mean, so all I am saying, it is the context of general officer structure, which is what General Ham said. I personally am not convinced you need to have four-stars heading up acquisition commands. And so I think it needs to be put in the scale 

with a thoughtful review that needs to be done by the Department. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

My second issue is Senate section 903 would establish an Assistant Secretary for Information. And this would combine oversight of 

space and cyber. 

Now, do you think it is a good idea to combine those two fields? 

And would it possibly make one of them, like space, be relegated 

to a lesser status or overseen by having that new position? 

Dr. HAMRE. Well, if I may on this. Sir, assistant secretaries do 

not oversee four-star generals. Let me just be candid. I mean, so 

when you are talking about CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], 

you are talking about one of the biggest things and most important 

areas. 

Right now, the only position right now that you can adequately 

oversee that is the Deputy Secretary of Defense. So this is new to 

me. I personally would doubt that an Assistant Secretary would 

have the throw weight to be able to oversee the scale of issues that 

are inside those two areas. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Any other comments before my time is up? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. No, my experience is exactly the same. 

General HAM. I would agree. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all three for being here. And I really appreciate, 

I think, just in the brief time I have been here the stress on a national security strategy and the idea of interagency cooperation, obviously that has always been a goal, but the three of you with the 

expertise you bring. 

And it might be somewhat encouraging to you, we just came, 

some of us, Colonel Gibson and Chairman Conaway who are over 

chairing an Ag Committee hearing on the intersection of agriculture and national security, focusing on the agri-business development teams in Afghanistan and some of these things about how 

we can use all our smart power, exactly what you are talking 

about. 

And General Ham, I think I would start with you. Just recently, 

your successor, General Rodriguez in AFRICOM, asked for congressional authority to be able to move funds over to USAID for this 

very purpose. We can train and equip all we want, but if you have 

got a food-insecure population as a basis, we are not going to get 

anywhere. 
34 

And can you explain from your perspective when you were in 

there of how that hampers you, that ability of what he was asking 

for? 

General HAM. Absolutely. I think what has happened over the 

past couple of years was that appropriately we are taking a broader, more current, comprehensive view of what constitutes security. 

It is not just military forces, it is food security, it is water security. 

And so it goes back to the comments before of a national security 

strategy that embraces all of that and how do we most appropriately bring the many tools that the government has to bear in 

these issues. 

And so the Department of Defense has capabilities, both personnel, other resources. Can we find ways to have the authority to 

use those resources to achieve a security objective that might be 

nontraditional, might be nonmilitary? So greater flexibility is most 

appreciated and most helpful. 

Mr. WALZ. Can any of you explain the dynamics of what is happening here? When we were doing the NDAA, we were asked about 

this and I had that amendment. And the combatant commander 

was obviously asking for it, the folks were asking for it. But when 

we tried to put this forward, folks at DOD seemed to be resistant 

to it, which seemed so counterintuitive to me about did the right 

hand know what the left hand was doing. 

What do you think the dynamics of that was of what was going 

on there? Because it was a shift of money, it was basically taking 

DOD money and sending it to State, which apparently seemed like 

a major threat, but it was for the purpose of giving that combatant 

commander the exact flexibility you are asking about. 

General HAM. I think that is exactly the issue is obviously in a 

resource-constrained environment that, you know, one department 

is loathe to apply its resources for another department or another 

agency with some concern that there will be a shortfall in its own 

functions and, frankly, what the precedent might be. 

Mr. WALZ. A legitimate concern, a legitimate concern. 

And I don’t want to appear naive or whatever, but I think we 

need to fix this, we need to get this done. Who is the person can 

make that happen? Is that with the President’s national security 

strategy and forcing this issue down? Or is this so institutionally 

siloed and ingrained that it just—— 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It can be dealt with. First of all, and I will speak 

as somebody who actually did agree to transfer money to State 

when I was comptroller, I did it through OMB. And that is where 

you have to start looking. You know, everybody brings Congress because, you know, you have got the oversight committees and they 

have their own budgets, but it all starts with OMB. OMB is the 

one that allocates. 

And what they always say is, well, we can’t allocate more to 

State because if we do Congress won’t accept it. So there is an inbuilt excuse for not changing very much. That is number one. 

Focus on OMB, they will hate it. 

Number two, money alone is not the solution. Let me give you 

an AID example. AID has become a contracting agency. It is moving away from that. It is fundamentally a contracting agency. 

Mr. WALZ. Yes. 
35 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is not what it was during, say, the Vietnam War. 

One of the things they do is that the people who are actually out 

in the field risking their lives, people in OTI [Office of Transition 

Initiatives], are not even allowed to become part of AID because 

they haven’t checked the right boxes on the application form, all 

they have done is serve the country at the risk of their lives. 

So the nature of what AID should be should change. And that 

is not a dollar thing. That is an internal culture thing. And that 

may be something you want to discuss with your colleagues on the 

other committees. 

So it is really a combination of things and there is no one solution. But is there a way to solve this thing? Absolutely, we don’t 

have to keep going the way we are going. 

Dr. HAMRE. I would just say, sir, that the further away you get 

from Washington, the more cooperation you get across agencies. 

Mr. WALZ. Yes. 

Dr. HAMRE. If you gave authority for General Ham when he was 

AFRICOM to use some of his money and transfer it to another 

agency to help him with a job, we would get a lot of this out. This 

is not a problem. This is a Washington problem. 

I was the comptroller, Dov was the comptroller. I fought like hell 

to make sure that the State Department didn’t get my money. You 

know, that is my job, that is my job for the Department of Defense. 

But in the field, these guys are looking for people to work with all 

the time. 

So I think a lot of this could be solved if we created some authorities for local commanders to reach out and find people where 

they can get that kind of help. We don’t let them do that now because of the way we structure control over dollars. 

Mr. WALZ. Well, I appreciate the three of you, your candid and 

refreshing remarks on this, because we have got to get this right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And I recall that there was some controversy about the flexibility 

that the commanders, say, in Iraq and Afghanistan. What was 

that, commander’s something? Yeah, yeah. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Oh, CERP [Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program], yeah. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, the CERP money. You know, and that was 

controversial because you couldn’t figure out where it was going to 

go. But I am very sympathetic with what you all are talking about, 

more flexibility on the ground by the people who have to live there 

makes a lot of sense. 

This has been terrific. Let me just touch on a couple of things 

right quick. 

Dr. Hamre on the AT&L, DDR&E issue, if you keep milestone 

decision authority with DDR&E, doesn’t DDR&E have to have the 

apparatus to evaluate whether a program is appropriate for the 

next milestone? In other words, doesn’t it have to have the bureaucracy to make that decision? 

Dr. HAMRE. It is going to have to have some bureaucracy to help 

make that decision. If you have an Assistant Secretary, AT&L that 

is an Assistant Secretary, most of the mechanics of that will be 

done in that office. 
36 

And I am hoping that the reform that you put in place last year 

by moving milestone authority back to the services, by making the 

service chiefs accountable is going to lower the obligation to have 

OSD have a giant organization that is checking every little box. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, okay. I hope so, too, but I just wanted to 

check on that. 

Dr. Zakheim said he thought extending the term of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 2 to 4 years was a good thing. Do either of the other of you have an opinion on that? 

General HAM. I fully support a 4-year term for both Chairman 

and Vice Chairman. Ideally they would be offset. I am not sure you 

want to legislate that. I think you still want the Commander in 

Chief and the Secretary of Defense to have a degree of flexibility, 

but 4-year terms would be helpful. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I also agree. A 4-year term, I think, is a good 

thing. 

I would ask you also to look at another element inside the Senate 

bill, which precludes the Vice Chairman from ever becoming the 

Chairman. I am not sure that that is a healthy provision. You 

know, that is, in essence, taking the Vice Chairman and making 

him the least important guy on the Joint Chiefs. Given the role 

that the Vice Chairman plays, I am not sure that is a healthy thing 

to do. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. And can I speak in support of that point, too, Mr. 

Chairman? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I wasn’t aware it was in the Senate bill. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is in the bill. And what you are essentially doing 

is saying to the Vice Chairman this is your terminal position, you 

are a lame duck from the first day you have taken this job. That 

is not a good thing. 

And quite frankly, if the Vice Chairman is talented enough, why 

shouldn’t he or she be promoted? It is ridiculous. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Lastly, I think the conversation we have 

had about broader strategy has been very helpful. I am going to 

narrow down for just a second. Do any of you have views about the 

specific QDR replacement that we have in our bill, which tries to, 

number one, have it not be so expensive and time-consuming and 

worthless, in my view, but does replace it with something where 

you start out with an outside panel and then come back with the 

Secretary’s defense guidance and then the plans that go from that? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I think it is a good idea because QDR, like some 

other things that go on in the Pentagon, if you actually were at one 

of those meetings, the walls are lined with people who are falling 

asleep or are asleep. And it becomes this massive group exercise 

not to mention the fact that the language is totally anodyne because, again, it is this culture of consensus. So it becomes a total 

waste of time almost from the time it is published, maybe even before it was published. So I certainly support your idea. 

Whether that goes as far as one could, I don’t know, but it is a 

great start. And I would be totally behind it. 

General HAM. I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman, because 

I think a new strategic review begins with a question of trying to 

define the ends, which we have talked about here, rather than be-
37 

ginning from a conversation of the ways. It seems to be often begun 

with the ways and say what we can fit inside the available ways 

rather than having the larger conversation first. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Dr. HAMRE. Mr. Chairman, forgive me for not having studied 

that provision, and so I am going to make a comment in ignorance. 

But the reason that the QDR has become so worthless as a process is because you all are looking at it. I mean, they do not want 

to expose their deliberations in a way that takes the international 

deliberations and make them public. And they have a right of privacy to figure out what they want to do for their recommendations. 

I personally think the committee could have enormous impact if 

you took a select group of, say, 10 members of the committee, 11 

members of the committee to preserve the majority, and say you 

guys write a national strategy for the committee and then we are 

going to debate it ourselves. I promise you, you will transform the 

way this town thinks because for the first time you are going to 

be looking at a national strategy. And then you bounce that off 

against the executive branch, it will change the nature of how you 

think what your role is. 

Your role is, I mean, you are the chairman of the board and this 

is the board for the Nation, thinking about our national strategy. 

But you are behaving like third-level program managers in a corporation. You are looking at all the little stuff. Please, I plead with 

you, look at big issues. 

You can’t do that with a committee this big. You are going to 

have to create a special task force to try to work through something and say this is going to be our national strategy document, 

this is what we think the Nation is going to need for the next 10 

years and we are going to debate it inside our committee. 

I think you would transform things because you also change the 

way your committee would be thinking about itself. 

The CHAIRMAN. Interesting. 

Dr. Hamre, CSIS, as you know, produced a report, I think it was 

in 1999, called ‘‘Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.’’ One of the key elements, to me, that stood out was the point you made very well that 

when you go to battle with the majors we are not asking the big 

questions and we inevitably lose. And so I take your point. 

It has been challenging for me to figure out how from the legislative branch we encourage or require a real strategy rather than 

this thing that the QDR has become. It is hard for us to make that 

happen. 

You know, so maybe your thought or your idea is worth pursuing. 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that maybe it is 

a combination of both. In other words, as long as you have something like the QDR it is going to be useless. So change that and 

maybe John’s idea alongside it, so then you get a real discussion 

as to where we want to go as a nation. 

Dr. HAMRE. There is nothing like competition. If the executive 

branch knows you are going to be writing a strategy and you are 

doing it on a bipartisan basis so that it really has, you are going 

to cause them to look at it other than this is just an exercise. And 

I thought the last national strategy was meaningless. 
38 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Well, we are in agreement with that. And 

I appreciate it. 

Adam, do you have something else? 

Mr. SMITH. No, I guess just a comment. I think it is a very good 

idea to have our committee perhaps do that. I think, you know, 

personally I think we could replace the O&I [Oversight and Investigations] Subcommittee and that would be a more useful use of 

our time. We have got all kinds of oversight and investigations we 

do within this committee and, of course, with OGR [Oversight and 

Government Reform] and all over the place. It would, I think, be 

a more useful committee if we had a bipartisan group that tried 

to do that, that tried to come up with a strategy for us and then 

we could, you know, hopefully base our bill off of that strategy. 

But other than that, very, very helpful. Thank you very much. 

If nothing else, you educated all of us on what the Senate’s been 

up to. So we appreciate that. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. For better or for worse. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. I really appreciate you all’s time. I told you we 

would try to finish at 12. We are done. Thank you all very much. 

It has been very helpful. 

The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 7, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 7, 2016 

(43) 

Statement before the 

House Armed Services Committee 

A 

Ph.D. 

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense 

7,2016 

2118 Rayburn House Office 
44 

Hamre: Testimony, House Armed Services Committee 07/07/2016 2 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank 

you for inviting me to appear today to discuss reforms to the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act. I 

was a member of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time the committee 

deliberated on the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation. I knew it was very important work, 

but I had no idea how profoundly it would improve the Department of Defense and our national 

security. This truly was landmark legislation, and demonstrates the enmmous impact of welldesigned legislation. 

Let me start with a fundamental point. Back in 1986 we needed to reform the 

Department of Defense in significant ways because we were failing on the battlefield. Today I 

believe there is a need to reform the Department and amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but let 

me state clearly that the Department of Defense is NOT a broken organization. We are not 

failing in the field. In every time zone on the globe, American military personnel are perfmming 

effectively on essential missions. 

Yet there is a need to reform the Department again, and I commend the leadership of this 

Committee and all Members for their serious commitment to getting it right. The Department is 

far too inefficient in using resources and cumbersome in adapting to changing challenges. We 

need to reform the Department to make it more agile and innovative. 

Your letter of invitation asked that we address five issues: 

• Eliminating the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT &L), 

the elevation ofthe Director of Defense Research and Engineering to the former 

stature of AT&L, and the creation of a new Under Secretary for Management (aredesignation of the Under Secretary for Business Management and Information). 

• A proposed 25% reduction in general officers/flag officers and in the ranks of the 

Senior Executive Service; 

• Establishing "cross functional teams" 

• A new authority to authorize the Secretary of Defense to delegate transfer of forces 

across combatant commands to the Chairman, effectively putting the chairman in the 

chain of command. 

• Imposing caps on the staff of the National Security Council and requiring the 

National Security Adviser to be confirmed by the Senate under stipulated conditions. 

I will briefly comment on each of these issues, and obviously would be pleased to answer any 

questions you might pose to me and the other members of this panel. 

Eliminating USD/ AT &L, and raising the stature of the Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering 

Back in 1986, the Congress established the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 

Technology. It was part of a series of recommendations proposed by the Packard Commission to 

make the Defense Department more proficient in procuring major systems. The legislation made 

the mechanics of acquisition the most important goal in the overall acquisition process. An 
45 

Hamre: Testimony, House Atmed Services Committee 07/07/2016 

unintended consequence was the diminishment of the Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDRE). 

In essence we elevated the prominence of"gunsmithing" and reduced the importance of 

marksmanship. The DDRE was the key position that brought innovation to the Department of 

Defense. We won the cold war, not because we fielded a larger military than the Soviet Union, 

but because we harnessed the innovation of science and technology to give our forces 

technological superiority on the battlefield. Great innovators like Harold Brown and Bill Peny 

epitomize the type of leadership we had that made innovation a centerpiece of our defense 

strategy. 

3 

Creation of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and 30 years of 

additional legislative restrictions has turned the AT &L organization into a giant compliance 

organization. Compliance organizations will never foster innovation. The best evidence of this is 

to see how recent Secretaries of Defense have side-stepped the acquisition bureaucracy to 

introduce new capabilities. Secretary Bob Gates famously sidestepped the Army acquisition 

command in order to introduce blast-resistant combat vehicles. Secretary of Carter ha~ created 

innovation centers outside the purview of the acquisition community, in order to bring in 

technology innovation into the department. 

I know the Members of this Committee know the facts better than do I. But we are seeing 

startling technological advances by Russia and China that seriously challenge our capacity to 

operate in combat conditions. America is at risk of losing the defense innovation race. 

We have a giant compliance organization where instead we need a lean innovation organization 

to transform the acquisition process in the Department. I strongly encourage the Committee to 

positively consider the Senate provision (Section 90 I). I have no doubt that the provision can be 

improved through give and take between the two committees in conference, but I hope the 

Committee embraces the need to make structural changes to restore a focus for innovation in the 

Department. 

The Senate provision (Section 901) would also re-designate the recently established Under 

Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information as the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Management and Support, and provide this position with the responsibility to 

oversee the business operations of the Department. I also think this is a positive 

recommendation. There are four primary "line" operations in the Department-the Departments 

of Army, Navy (including Marine Corps) and Air Force, and the collection of Defense Agencies. 

The Defense Agencies are operating organizations, like the military depmiments. They now 

spend nearly a quarter of the total base budget every year, but there is no direct senior line 

management responsible for their operations. The oversight of the Defense Agencies is left to 

the staff organs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I strongly believe that the defense 

agencies should have dedicated line management, as do the military departments. The offices of 

the Secretary of Defense should continue to exercise oversight on policy matters, but we need 

competent management of the business activities of the defense agencies. For these reasons, I 

support Section 90 I in the Senate bill. 
46 

Hamre: Testimony, House Armed Services Committee 07/07/2016 4 

It is quite important to note, though, that for this Under Secretary for Management to be 

successful, we must change the way the Congress approaches ethics restrictions and conflicts of 

interest It is virtually impossible to recruit a highly skilled, senior individual from industry to 

work for the Defense Department these days because we have made it so onerous to avoid the 

theoretical conditions of potential conflict of interest We are seriously blocking great talent 

from serving because of onerous and intrusive de-confliction rules. The reforms envisioned in 

Section 901 will not succeed unless we also reform the restrictiveness of the confirmation 

process. Much of this can be done by the Senate Armed Services Committee adopting the same 

ethics rules that arc used by other committees in the Senate. This is an essential prerequisite for 

success of this reform initiative. 

Reduce by 25% the number of general officers and flag officers, and members of the Senior 

Executive Service 

The Senate bill contains a provision (Section 50 I) that stipulates which command positions may 

be led by 0-10 officers. The House bill contains Section 910 that would stipulate that 

component commands may be led by only an officer of0-9 rank. Section 1112 of the Senate 

Bill also imposes a 25% reduction on the ranks of the civilian Senior Executive Service. 

I remember something that Secretary Bill Perry once said to me. He said "reductions produce 

reform, reform does not lead to reductions." In the abstract, bureaucracies do not envision 

dramatic reform. As a friend of mine once said "candlemakers will never invent electricity." It 

takes an external challenge to enliven imagination about how work can be done more efticiently. 

So I start with the bias that an enforced reduction in numbers of senior leaders is needed to 

stimulate bureaucratic reform. 

Secretary Carter has stated that he sees value in reducing the number of senior officers and 

civilians in the Department May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you move the implementation 

date for your mandated cuts to take place one year after the next Secretary has submitted his or 

her budget proposals. If the Department fails to undertake these reforms, your provision would 

remain in place and impose cuts. We arc presently fighting three wars at this time-In 

Afghanistan, in Syria/Iraq and more generally against ten·orist organizations world-wide. We 

also are leading a campaign against intimidation by China in the South China Sea and in Eastern 

Europe by Russia. We will have a new President and a new Administration in six months. We 

really do need to ask the current senior military leadership to give us a thoughtful plan. They 

have received the message that change is needed. I have heard that from each of the Service 

Chiefs. I believe we should give them the chance to give us the plan on the most effective way 

to reduce senior leadership. 

Establishing "cross functional teams" 

You have asked us to reflect on Section 941 in the Senate-passed bill. Section 941 outlines an 

elaborate structure to create integrated cross-functional teams in the Department. I believe I 

understand the aspirations of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I do not think this is the 

right way to do it. In general, I believe the Congress should express to the Secretary of Defense 

broad guidance and objectives. You should leave it to the Secretary of Defense to faithfully 
47 

Hamre: Testimony, House Armed Services Committee 07/07/2016 

implement your guidance. I believe it is hugely inappropriate to dictate to the Secretary how he 

must accomplish your guidance. 

Section 941 is a fundamental violation of the doctrine of checks and balances. The section not 

only tells the Department what the Congress wants accomplished, but stipulates the method by 

which the Department must implement the broad guidance. The Con~:,rress cannot run the 

Department of Defense and it should not try to do so. If the Congress believes that the 

Department needs improved integration of mission planning and execution, stipulate that, but 

leave it to the Department to decide how best to implement that guidance. 

Hold them accountable for outcomes. But do not dictate how the Secretary of Defense should 

accomplish those goals. 

Authorizing the Secretary of Defense to bring the Chairman into the Chain of Command 

The Senate-passed bill contains a provision (Section 922) that would authorize the Secretary of 

Defense to give command authority to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStafffor limited 

actions. Specifically, the Senate has indicated it should be the right and responsibility of the 

Chairman to transfer forces from one combatant command to another without the Secretary's 

direction. 

Again, I understand the intent ofthe Senate concerning this authority, and the desire to make 

some mechanical functions less onerous. But with great respect, I think this provision is a 

mistake, and I think it is dangerous. 

5 

Let me say a word about civilian control. All democracies wrestle with a fundamental question. 

They depend on military establishments for national security. But military establishments are 

not democratic in content or nature. Military establishments are hierarchical, authoritarian and 

command-oriented. Military departments are dangerous f(x democracies, and democracies need 

to establish structures and procedures to control these authoritarian establishments. 

America was blessed that our first President-George Washington-was a military man, but he 

enshrined civilian control as a foundation for our democracy. 

When the Congress adopted Goldwater-Nichols, the leadership of the House and Senate Armed 

Services Committees wrestled with this key question. The central design criteria for reform was 

to strengthen civilian control. I believe that still should be the premier design goal of this reform 

agenda. 

Section 922 of the Senate bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to place the Chairman in 

the Chain of command for selected administrative matters. This may sound like an insignificant 

matter. But I would also argue that transferring units from one command to another constitutes 

an insignificant burden on the Department. These arc matters that are dispensed with in minutes. 

When I was Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen would host a meeting every morning, 

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Vice Chairman and me. We met every day, even 

when one of the four of us was not in town. We dealt with issues like this all the time. It took 
48 

Hamre: Testimony, House Armed Services Committee 07/07/2016 

only a few minutes to discuss and resolve an issue. It was not a burden on anyone. And it 

preserved the sacred principle of civilian control. 

6 

I know that the Joint Staff has argued that this would be a step toward efficiency to give the 

Chairman the authority to deal with small matters like this. But civilian control is a toggle 

switch---either on or off. It is not a rheostat where you can dial some level of civilian control 

and give powers directly to the Chairman. If delegation authority for force movements is needed, 

a premise I do not accept, then the Secretary should be allowed the ability to delegate to the 

Deputy Secretary or the appropriate Under Secretary, not to a military officer. 

The purpose of civilian control is to establish an unequivocal accountability for military action to 

the President of the United States. No President can blame outcomes on the military. The 

awesome decision to take America to war rests exclusively with the President, through the 

Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs needs to be unencumbered as an honest 

adviser to the President. He should have no conflicted judgment because he was accountable for 

actions that succeeded or failed. 

I know that the Senate's recommendation was honestly considered to be minor and 

administrative in nature. But it is the start of a path that is dangerous. 

Managing the evolving activities of the National Security Council 

Both the S. 2943 and H.R. 4909 contain provisions that deal with the role and activities of the 

National Security Council (NSC). The Senate bill (Section 1089) would impose an absolute cap 

of 150 people, either direct employees or detailees, who may serve on the staff of the National 

Security Council. The Thornberry Amendment would stipulate that "if the staff of the council 

exceeds I 00 employees at any point during a tem1 of the President and for the duration of such 

term ... the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be appointed by the 

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 

These two provisions are enorn10usly important. We are dealing with an issue that is at the fault 

line of American constitutional govemment. The Constitution requires that the Congress oversee 

the activities of the Departments of the Executive Branch. Officers of those Departments must 

be confim1ed by the Senate. They may operate only pursuant to funds appropriated by the 

Congress. But it is also clear that the President has a right of privilege and privacy in operating 

the Executive Office of the Presidency. 

So the status of the National Security Council rests at the fault line of the Constitution. Is the 

NSC an extension ofthe work of the departments, where the Congress has oversight? Or is the 

NSC an extension of the President where the right of presidential privilege gives privacy and 

autonomy to its deliberations? 

I strongly believe that the Thomben·y Amendment is a superior approach to this issue and should 

be adopted. 
49 

Hamre: Testimony, House Armed Services Committee 07/07/2016 7 

If the NSC is to function as a coordinating element of the Executive Office of the President, I 

believe it should not be subject to Congressional oversight. If the NSC, however, is to become 

an operating arm of the Executive Branch-and there is enormous evidence that it is becoming 

just that-then I believe there is a constitutional obligation for the Congress to oversee the NSC, 

The Thornberry Amendment makes a judgment that a statT of fewer than l 00 would be deemed 

to represent a coordinating NSC. A staff that exceeds l 00 would be deemed to be an operating 

arm of the Executive Branch and subject to oversight. I should note that currently the NSC staff 

exceeds 400 and that OMB, which has about 450 staff, includes six senior officials who require 

Senate confirmation. 

This provision does not threaten the prerogatives ofthe President unless the President decides he 

wants to direct military forces from the White House, not through the Secretary of Defense. I 

believe this provision honors the constitutional imperatives of both the Presidency and the 

Congress. Therefore, I strongly endorse the House provision, and encourage its adoption by the 

Congress. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee, there are no 

more important issues that this Committee will deliberate than the issues we have discussed this 

morning. This hearing reflects the fundamental responsibility of this great Committee to lead the 

Nation on fundamental matters of national security. l congratulate you for holding this hearing, 

and thank you for giving me a modest role in your deliberations. l stand ready to answer any 

question you might pose. 
50 

Dr. John J. Hamre 

John Hamre was elected president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and lntemational 

Studies (CSIS) in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. deputy 

secretary of defense. Prior to holding that post, he was the under secretary of defense 

(comptroller) from 1993 to 1997. As comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the 

secretary of defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and 

management improvement programs. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Dr. 

Hamre to serve as chairman of the Defense Policy Board. 

Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for I 0 years as a 

professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time, he was 

primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research, and 

development programs, defense budget issues, and relations with the Senate Appropriations 

Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he 

became its deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs. In that 

position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the I louse of 

Representatives and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D., with distinction, in 1978 from the 

School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., 

where his studies focused on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. In 

1972, he received his B.A., with high distinction, from Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South 

Dakota, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a 

Rockefeller fellow at the I larvard Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
51 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives tbr the ll41

h Congress requires nongovemmental witnesses 

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(including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a 

foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either 

by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter 

of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before tbe House 

Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy 

ofthese statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy 

(including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic 

form not later tban one day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if 

necessary. 

Witness name: __ 0..:.,--_o_h___:.Tt _ _:_..::·_4.L..:.;ot..:.fl1....!...:.~-=------ Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

{!2Individual 

QRepresentative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

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Federal Contract or Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before tbe 

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52 

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54 

TESTIMONY BY 

GEN CARTER HAM, USA RET. 

FORMER COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND 

SUBMITTED TO 

UNITED STATES HOUSE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

114m CONGRESS 

Hearing 

July 7, 2016 
55 

Per Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5) of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives 

for the 1141

h Congress, I have not received any federal grants or contracts 

relevant to the subject matter of this testimony during the current or previous 

two fiscal years. 

BIOGRAPHY 

GEN Carter F. Ham, USA Ret. 

President & Chief Executive Officer, Association of the United States Army 

General Ham is the President and Chief Executive Officer ofthe Association of the 

United States Army. He is an experienced leader who has led at every level from 

platoon to geographic combatant command. He is also a member of a very small 

group of Army senior leaders who have risen from private to four-star general. 

General Ham served as an enlisted infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division 

before attending John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. Graduating in 1976 

as a distinguished military graduate, his service has taken him to Italy, Germany, 

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Macedonia, Qatar, Iraq and, uniquely among Army leaders, 

to over 40 African countries in addition to a number of diverse assignments within 

the United States. 

He commanded the First Infantry Division, the legendary Big Red One, before 

assuming duties as director for operations on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon where 

he oversaw all global operations. His first four-star command was as commanding 

general, U.S. Army Europe. Then in 2011, he became just the second commander 

of United States Africa Command where he led all U.S. military activities on the 

African continent ranging from combat operations in Libya to hostage rescue 

operations in Somalia as well as training and security assistance activities across 

54 complex and diverse African nations. 

General Ham retired in June of2013 after nearly 38 years of service. Immediately 

prior to joining the staff at AUSA, he served as the chairman of the National 

Commission on the Future of the Army, an eight-member panel tasked by the 

Congress with making recommendations on the size, force structure and 

capabilities of the Total Army. 

He resides with his wife, Christi, in Arlington, Virginia. 
56 

Opening Statement: 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith -thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before this committee. I am honored to be here with Dr. Hamre and Mr. Zakheim, 

both distinguished public servants. 

I agree that now is an appropriate time to review Goldwater-Nichols, a law which, 

in my opinion, has had overall positive effect on the U.S. Armed Forces and has 

most certainly affected my own professional development. 

Not long after the law was passed, I went to the College ofNaval Command & 

Staff in Newport. And, just to emphasize the point, fellow Army Majors Ray 

Odiemo and Stan McChrystal were in my class. That initial exposure to joint 

education set each of us on paths that would lead to multiple joint command and 

staff experiences, none of which would have been likely absent GoldwaterNichols. 

As a battalion commander, we deployed to Macedonia on U.N. duty under the 

auspices of Joint Task Force Provide Promise. Later, I attended the Air Force War 

College, served on the staff at U.S. Central Command on 9/ll and for two years 

after. As a general officer, I commanded a multinational unit in Iraq, had two 

operations positions on the joint staff and concluded my active service at U.S. 

Africa Command. Again, I suspect that my path would have been far different had 

the Congress not passed Goldwater-Nichols. 

While I agree that some changes are required, I'd urge some caution. The old 

adage, measure twice, cut once seems about right to me. Let's be sure the changes 

to the law are likely to improve military effectiveness, not simply change things. 

I look forward to your questions. 
57 

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD 

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Dov S. Zakheim 

July 7, 2016 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Committee: 
58 

It is an honor to appear again before you, today to discuss the way ahead for an updated 

version of the Goldwater-Nichols reform. 

At the outset, I wish to note that the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation fundamentally 

changed, for the better, not only the nature of the chain of command, but also altered in a 

material way the balance of power and influence in the Department of Defense by ensuring that 

the best and the brightest officers constituted the Joint Staff. This had not previously been the 

case when the Joint Staff was a terminal assignment for most officers. 

Nevertheless, the Defense Department faces far more complex challenges in today's 

international environment than it did when Goldwater-Nichols became law. These challenges 

require a DoD and its military and civilian staffs that in the words of HR 4909 is "agile and 

adaptive." This unfortunately is far from the case today. Our national security planning system 

has not kept up with the challenges to our security; staffs are too large, and their product is too 

mechanistic and all too often overtaken by unanticipated events. In a similar vein, our 

acquisition corps is too slow-moving to keep up with cutting edge technological developments in 

the civilian sector, too often insufficiently educated to be sophisticated consumers, and too 

hidebound by regulations to work in tandem with non-defense industry. 

Although military end-strength continues to drop, headquarters are bloated and cumbersome. 

Despite a marked increase in civilian personnel since 2000, the Department is probably less 

efficient than it was then. There are not only too many admirals, generals, and presidential 

appointees, but too many civilian staffers, and far too many contractors serving in staff 

augmentation positions. All in all, DOD overhead now accounts for over 40 per cent. of the 

Pentagon budget more than twice total defense budgets of Britain and France combined. The 

cost of DOD headquarters alone exceeds $40 billion. 

Streamlining and Updating the Combatant Commands 

I applaud both Armed Services Committees for coming to grips with the need for an updated 

version of Goldwater-Nichols, even if their solutions are not identical. with respect to 

headquarters rationalization, there is much to commend the proposal to reduce the number of 

four-star flag and general officers, as long as their civilian staffs, and even more so, civilian 

contractors, are reduced commensurately and not transferred elsewhere, as was the case when 

the Joint Forces Command was disestablished (military staffs could be reassigned to more 

operational positions). It is important to apply a number, or alternately, a percentage, to the 

proposed reductions; but, apart from eliminating four-star billets from component commanders, 

other reductions should be left to the Department of Defense. With respect to what are currently 

component commands, the proposal to instead create joint task forces combining all the 

services has much merit in a world where rapid and urgent response to a host of different 

situations is the order of the day. 

There is a strong case for creating an independent four-star Cyber Command, given the 

importance of cyber in today's security environment. At the same time, however, there is an 

equally strong argument for combining the Northern and Southern Commands. Moreover, some 

consideration should be given to combining the Central and Africa Commands, since 

CENT COM's area of responsibility already includes Africa's most powerful nation, Egypt. 

Reassessing the Responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
59 

Both committees have rightly focussed on the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

All too often, the chairman has not been as independent a source of advice for the president as 

the original Goldwater-Nichols Act anticipated. This situation must be remedied; the Chairman 

should be able to provide military advice to the Commander-in-Chief even if it conflicts with that 

of the Secretary of Defense. In that regard, it is important that the Chairman and Vice Chairman 

be appointed to staggered four-year terms so as to reinforce their independence. Moreover, the 

Chairman should have authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense to allocate resources 

and capabilities among the combatant commanders; this has often been the case in practice (it 

certainly was the case with respect to resources when I served as the Pentagon's Comptroller). 

On the other hand, the Joint Staff should not be converted into a General Staff, as some have 

recommended. A General Staff would be too divorced from operations; moreover, history has 

demonstrated than General Staffs can undermine civilian control, the bedrock of our national 

security structure. The size of the Joint Staff must be reduced, however. From just 2010 to 2012 

it grew by 230 per cent, from 1286 to 4244 personnel. Proposed reductions to levels below 2000 

personnel, with no more than 1500 on active duty, are very much in order. Again, civilians and 

contractors should not be reassigned to other positions, nor should new Joint Staff agencies be 

created to absorb those subject to headquarters reductions. 

Streamlining the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Since 2009, the size of the civilian workforce in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has 

grown by nearly 18 per cent. or more than 2,000 people. OSD's staff size has expanded in part 

because more and more Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries are added to its ranks, all 

of whom, like the Under Secretaries have staffs, as do their principal deputies. There is no 

reason why there should be a separate layer of principal deputies, with staffs all their own. One 

Assistant Secretary should be dual-hatted as the principal deputy, with a single staff to support 

both functions. 

The is some merit to the proposal that the Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics, be recast as focussing on research and engineering, or better yet, research and 

development, given steady and rapid technological breakthroughs as forecast by Moore's 

Law. Yet unless the Congressional confirmation system is radically streamlined, it is unlikely 

that persons most familiar with commercial advances in hi-tech will be willing, or indeed able, to 

serve in that position, however it is redefined. It is right for Congress to stress the importance of 

appointing people to manage rapid technological change; it must not at the same time deter the 

most qualified people from seeking those appointments. 

Over the years the Services have suffered a decline in influence over acquisition decisions. 

Building upon additional authorities given to them in the FY 2016 NDAA, the Services have 

requested an even greater say in a system that, on the one hand, despite best efforts of the 

current DOD leadership, remains bloated and slow moving, and, on the other, directly affects 

their ability to organize, train and equip their personnel. There is much merit in General Mark 

Milley's call for de-layering OSD oversight by allowing the Army, rather than OSD, create 

independent cost estimates; maintain complete control over analyses of alternatives to any 

given program; certify technology-readiness levels; and have full responsibility for testing. 

Finally, there must be a concerted effort to ensure that the entire civilian acquisition corps 

receives the same level of continuing education as does its military counterpart. The Defense 

Acquisition University's course-load does not fill that bill. Even then, there is no mandatory 

requirement for ongoing professional education; too many civilians have not taken a course in 

any field relating to advanced technology since they obtained their Master's Degree. 
60 

There are other opportunities for creating a more efficient OSD beyond addressing the 

acquisition corps. There is no reason why there should be more than one Assistant Secretary 

for international security relations. Nor is it clear why the Assistant Secretary for Strategy and 

Plans, a position which not long ago was held by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, should not 

incorporate special operations and homeland defense, with a commensurate reduction in 

staffing. Other reductions in the number of Assistant Secretaries, or at least downgrading to 

their former non-confirmable positions--for example the Assistant Secretaries for Logistics and 

for Readiness--are also worthy of consideration. 

The proposal to re-designate the newly created Under Secretary for Management and 

Information into the Under Secretary for Management and Support. The role of a CIO is very 

different from the role of a COO, or, in the case of the Under Secretary, a deputy COO. 

Moreover, many of the agencies currently under the aegis of the present team of Under 

Secretaries receive too little oversight. They would be better managed by an Under Secretary 

whose primary role would be to ensure their effective operations. I would counsel, however, that 

both DFAS and DCAA remain with CFO/Comptroller. Both are normally functions that in the 

civilian sector fall under the CFO. Moreover, since the new Under Secretary for Support would 

be dealing with major contracts, and would have them managed by the Defense Contracts 

Management Agency, it would be inappropriate for the same official to manage the auditors who 

would be reporting on the proper management of those contracts. 

Lastly, I commend those proposals to do away with the Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR 

involves far too many staff doing far too little of consequence. It is a prime example of 

government inefficiency. Reducing personnel is but one way to create a more agile and 

responsive OSD. Eliminating unnecessary paperwork exercises like the QDR is another. 

TRICARE Reform 

The Congress continues to press for improvements in the TRICARE system. As a former 

Commissioner on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, I can 

only say that the Commission's proposals would go much further in upgrading this important 

benefit for service members and their families. The Commission proposed a complete overhaul 

of TRICARE, and the creation of TRICARE choice that would more closely resemble the 

excellent and efficient health insurance program that is available to civilian government 

employees. I still believe that our recommendations would be welcomed by the vast majority of 

military personnel by providing more flexible, responsive and tailored plans for military families. 

Toward More Efficient Budget Implementation 

I would be remiss if I did not mention two major reforms that I believe are long overdue in the 

current process known as Planning. Programming, Budgeting and Execution, PPBE for short. 

When I formalized the inclusion of budget execution--the E--into the process, I hoped that the 

Department would undertake more than one mid-year review. I felt that given the changing 

demands for resources that emerged during the budget year, and the variance in the rates of 

expenditure, or burn rates, from those initially forecast, it was important that budget reviews take 

place on a quarterly basis. My views have not changed in this regard. 

Coupled with such reviews is the need for far more flexibility with respect to prior approval 

reprogramming ceilings. These are much too low, and too constrained, and prevent the timely 
61 

adjustment of accounts for a host of programs. I would urge the Congress, including this 

committee, to raise both the aggregate and the individual account ceilings, so as to ensure that 

financial responsiveness keeps pace with operational responsiveness. 

The National Security Council 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, among your many excellent proposals is that 

which reduces the size of the National Security Council staff to 100, and requires that the 

National Security Advisor be confirmable if the staff exceeds 150. The NSC is a staff 

organization that has operated under the dangerous illusion that it plays an operational role in 

national security. It does not; that is the function of the State Department, DOD and other 

executive agencies. The NSC staff is just that, a staff, and one that support an official who 

serves the President in a special advisory capacity. It is well known that former National 

Security Advisors have been shocked by the growth of their former staffs; it is not clear that 

such growth has led to more effective or efficient decision-making. Some would argue that it has 

had the opposite effect The proposal that this committee has put forward would remedy the 

current situation; I hope it is enacted into law. 

The Congress has taken the important step of attacking the stodginess of our national security 

processes on a host of fronts. I hope that this is but the first step in a process that could, and 

should, take several more years before it is fully realized. 

Thank you. 
62 

Honorable Dov S. Zakheim 

Dov S. Zakheim is Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Senior 

Fellow at the CNA Corporation. Previously he was Senior Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton 

where he led the Firm's suppmi of U.S. Combatant Commanders worldwide. 

From 200 I to April 2004 he was Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial 

Officer for the Department of Defense, serving as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on 

financial and budgetary matters, leading over 50,000 start: developing and managing the world's 

largest budgets, and negotiating five major defense agreements with US allies and partners. From 

2002-2004 Dr. Zakheim was DOD's coordinator of civilian programs in Afghanistan. He also 

helped organize the 2003 New York (UN) and Madrid Donors conferences for Iraq reconstruction. 

From 1987 to 200 l he was both corporate vice president of System Planning Corporation, a 

technology and analysis firm based in Arlington, Va. and chief executive officer of its subsidiary, 

SPC International Corp. During the 2000 presidential campaign, he served as a senior foreign 

policy advisor to then-Governor Bush. 

From !985 until March !987, Dr. Zakheim was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning 

and Resources in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), playing an active role in 

the Department's system acquisition, strategic planning, programming and budget processes. Dr. 

Zakheim held several other DOD posts from !981 to 1985. Earlier, he was a principal analyst in the 

National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office. 

Dr. Zakheim has served on numerous government, corporate, non-profit and charitable boards. 

His membership of government boards and panels includes the United States Commission for the 

Preservation of America's Heritage Abroad (1991-93); the Task Force on Defense Reform (1997); 

the Board of Visitors of the Department of Defense Overseas Regional Schools (1998-200 !); 

Defense Science Board task forces on "The Impact of DOD Acquisition Policies on the Health of 

the Defense Industry" (2000) and "Urgent Operational Needs" (2009); the Secretary of the Navy's 

Advisory Board (2008-20 I 0); the International Business Practices Advisory Panel, which he 

chaired (2008-2010); and the Commission on WaJiime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2008-

20 11 ). He currently serves on the Commission on Military Compensation and Retirement 

Modernization, is a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, and of the Defense 

Business Board, which he helped establish, and on which he served first as a member from 2004-

2010 and then as a Senior Fellow from 2010-2013. 

Dr. Zakheim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; the International Institute for 

Strategic Studies and Chatham House/The Royal Institute ofinternational Affairs. He is Vice 

Chairman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Board of Trustees, and of the Board of 

Directors of the Center for The National interest; he is also a member of the Board of Control of 

the United States Naval Academy. Dr. Zakhcim was elected a Fellow of the Royal Swedish 

Academy of War Sciences in 2011. 

A !970 graduate of Columbia University with a B.A., summa cum laude, and a member of Phi 

Beta Kappa, Dr. Zakheim also studied at the London School of Economics. He holds a doctorate in 
63 

economics and politics at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, where he held three graduate 

and post-graduate fellowships. Dr. Zakheim was an adjunct Senior Fellow of the Council on 

Foreign Relations and an adjunct Scholar of the Heritage Foundation. He has been an adjunct 

professor at the National War College, Yeshiva University, Columbia University, Georgetown 

University and Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., where he was Presidential Scholar. 

The author of a dozen books or monographs, and of numerous articles, Dr. Zakheim has lectured 

and provided print, radio and television commentary on national security policy issues domestically 

and intemationally. He blogs for Foreign Policy/Shadow Government and The National Interest. 

He is the recipient of numerous awards for his government, professional and civic work, including 

the Defense Department's highest civilian award in 1986, 1987 and 2004. 
64 
65 
66 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 7, 2016 

(69) 

June 24,2016 

Senator John McCain 

218 Russell Senate Ollice Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Senator Jack Reed 

728 Hart Senate Ollice Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Senators McCain and Reed, 

There is a provision in the Senate version of the FYI7 National Defense Authorization Act 

which would repeal the following statutory requirement: 

§203. Director of Missile Defense Agency 

ff an officer of the armedforces on active duty is appointed to the position of Director C!f the 

Missile Defense Agency, the position shall be treated as having been designated by the President 

as a position of'importance and responsibility/or purposes ofsection 601 of this title and shall 

carry the grade of lieutenant general or general or, in the case of an officer of the Nmy, vice 

admiral or admiral. 

We strongly urge you not to rescind this requirement for several reasons. 

First, the scale, scope and complexity of the position demands the minimum grade of a lieutenant 

general or vice admiral. The incumbent serves in several capacities including the Acquisition 

Executive and Head of Contracting Authority for the Ballistic Missile Defense portfolio of 

programs valued at more than $30 billion. These include land- and sea-based sensors and 

interceptors as well as air- and space-based sensors. The elements of the Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS) are also globally deployed from Romania to the UK to Greenland to 

California to Alaska and Japan. The ongoing development of the BMDS involves the entire 

spectrum of weapon systems acquisition from basic research to development to production to 

deployment and sustainment. 

Second, the position involves establishing working relationships with very senior allied military 

and political leaders where the executive experience and savvy of at least a three star is required. 

The quality of these relationships can mean the difference in success or failure in integrating 

U.S. and allied capabilities which can have a direct effect on our ability to provide defense for 

our deployed forces, allies and friends. Examples include the co-development of the SM 3-IIA 

interceptor with the government of Japan and the development and construction of interceptor 

sites in Europe. 

Third, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency must engage with very senior industry leaders 

to include CEOs of the top major defense contractors. This is critical to ensure the proper 

management and resourcing of the programs to achieve their cost, schedule and operational 

performance objectives. 
70 

lieutenonl. 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 7, 2016 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The House-passed version of the NDAA includes a provision I offered with my friend Joe Wilson to expand talent-exchange authorities so that DOD 

employees may gain experience at private companies, and to bring innovative industry leaders to DOD. I believe we need to see more efforts like these incorporated 

into Department-wide reform initiatives. In what ways can we reform GoldwaterNichols, specifically to empower the workforce within the Department to improve 

strategy-making, as well as better collaborate with industry to manage costs, enhance capabilities, and fulfill requirements? 

Dr. HAMRE. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. When Goldwater-Nichols was first enacted, the international security environment was already demanding, and has only become more complex and 

unpredictable in recent years. As the United States continues to face challenges 

across the globe—such as ISIL in the Middle East, proxy warfare in Ukraine, and 

island-building in the South China Sea—and as we look to reform Goldwater-Nichols, how can we best frame this effort to make the Department more agile while 

retaining its strength and taking into account emerging security challenges? 

Dr. HAMRE. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The House-passed version of the NDAA includes a provision I offered with my friend Joe Wilson to expand talent-exchange authorities so that DOD 

employees may gain experience at private companies, and to bring innovative industry leaders to DOD. I believe we need to see more efforts like these incorporated 

into Department-wide reform initiatives. In what ways can we reform GoldwaterNichols, specifically to empower the workforce within the Department to improve 

strategy-making, as well as better collaborate with industry to manage costs, enhance capabilities, and fulfill requirements? 

General HAM. The requirements in the law that address the professional development of the officers of the Armed Forces have yielded, in large part, a cohort of senior uniformed leaders with broader understanding and experience in joint service 

matters. That has been, in my opinion, a significant contributor to the increased 

operational effectiveness of the force as a whole. Similar focus on the professional 

development of the Department of Defense’s senior civilian staff would likely result 

in broader understanding and experience across that important cohort. Given rapidly changing technologies, increasing opportunities for Department of Defense senior leaders to interact with, and learn from, private enterprises (perhaps not limited 

to industry) would be of significant benefit to the Department. A side effect would 

be to enhance the private sector’s understanding of the Department of Defense. In 

order to do this, though, the Department would need authority, funding and manning above authorizations (much like the Army’s Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and 

Students (TTHS) account) so that individuals detailed to opportunities with the private sector would not leave gaps in their parent Service or organization. Lastly, 

there may be an opportunity to leverage the vast private sector experience resident 

in the reserve components to strengthen the linkages between the Department and 

the private sector. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. When Goldwater-Nichols was first enacted, the international security environment was already demanding, and has only become more complex and 

unpredictable in recent years. As the United States continues to face challenges 

across the globe—such as ISIL in the Middle East, proxy warfare in Ukraine, and 

island-building in the South China Sea—and as we look to reform Goldwater-Nichols, how can we best frame this effort to make the Department more agile while 

retaining its strength and taking into account emerging security challenges? 

General HAM. The complexities of the current (and envisioned future) strategic 

environment require a national decision-making process that is agile and responsive. This is an area that requires improvement. Goldwater-Nichols (rightly, in my 

opinion) strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but, over 

time, the role of the collective Joint Chiefs of Staff seems to have been diminished. 

The body of the Joint Chiefs represents the most senior, most experienced military 

advisors of our nation. Their collective views, not just the view of the CJCS, ought 

be more prominent in national security decision-making. While the Combatant Com-
74 

manders (acknowledging that I previously served as one) are ideally suited to plan 

and conduct regional activities and operations, they do not bear responsibilities for 

the long-term health and readiness of the force nor for the consequences that operations in one region might have in another region. That is why, in my view, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff must be increasingly engaged in national security decisionmaking. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The House-passed version of the NDAA includes a provision I offered with my friend Joe Wilson to expand talent-exchange authorities so that DOD 

employees may gain experience at private companies, and to bring innovative industry leaders to DOD. I believe we need to see more efforts like these incorporated 

into Department-wide reform initiatives. In what ways can we reform GoldwaterNichols, specifically to empower the workforce within the Department to improve 

strategy-making, as well as better collaborate with industry to manage costs, enhance capabilities, and fulfill requirements? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. When Goldwater-Nichols was first enacted, the international security environment was already demanding, and has only become more complex and 

unpredictable in recent years. As the United States continues to face challenges 

across the globe—such as ISIL in the Middle East, proxy warfare in Ukraine, and 

island-building in the South China Sea—and as we look to reform Goldwater-Nichols, how can we best frame this effort to make the Department more agile while 

retaining its strength and taking into account emerging security challenges? 

Dr. ZAKHEIM. A major reason for the Department’s inability to react quickly is its 

heavy bureaucratic structure combined with a risk-averse culture. There are simply 

too many layers in the DOD’s decision-making and acquisition processes. To a great 

extent, this is due to an oversized civilian bureaucracy, coupled with an overly 

heavy military staff structure. Moreover, to some extent professional military education, and to a far greater extent continuing education for civilians, both fall woefully short in encouraging independent thinking, risk-taking and experimentation. 

The bureaucracy is totally risk-averse, and prefers pursuing well-trodden strategic 

and technological paths rather than experimenting with bold new concepts. As a result, there is insufficient original strategic thinking for coping with the complexities 

of today’s international environment, nor is there a sufficiently well-educated staff 

to foster creative technological advances. Far greater efforts should be exerted to 

foster strategic thinking at senior service schools and the National Defense University. Military officers attending these schools should all ‘‘major’’ in strategy; graduates should be fully conversant with strategic thinking. In addition, upon graduation they should have published at least one original piece on some aspect of future 

U.S. strategy in an increasingly complex international security environment. This 

is not to denigrate the importance of other subjects such as the PPBE process, but 

learning about process does not foster creative thought. Although the vast majority 

of flag and general officers have attended senior service school, this is not universally the case. For those officers who will later be involved in strategy development 

and formulation, senior service school should be a prerequisite for promotion to flag/ 

general officer rank. Similarly, and without exception, civilians who are likely to 

play a role in the formulation of strategy should not accede to the Senior Executive 

Service unless they have spent a year at one of these schools. The current effort 

to realize a ‘‘Third Offset Strategy’’ bears promise. Nevertheless, it cannot succeed 

unless accompanied by a serious reduction in the many layers of bureaucracy, in 

other words, a reduction in the size of the civil service in particular, as well as by 

a fundamental change in the Pentagon’s culture. The latter can only take place if 

DOD alters its traditional system for measuring and rewarding its officials. Military 

officers serving in the acquisition corps should not achieve general or flag officer 

rank, and civilians should not enter the Senior Executive Service, unless they will 

have completed at least two semesters either in a leading institute of technology. 

Nor, for that matter, should either officers or civilians be designated as program 

managers, at the O–6 or GS–15 level, unless they have pursued a similar educational program. In addition, risk-taking should be encouraged, not undermined, 

and officials who develop innovative ideas should be rewarded, not punished, for 

thinking ‘‘outside the box.’’ 

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