COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SUPER FRESH/GREAT ATLANTIC & 

 PACIFIC TEA COMPANY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0924-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 OCTOBER 29, 1996 

HILDA T. ROBINSON 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Mark M. Caldwell, III (Ralph L. Whitt, Jr; 

Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Craig A. Brown (James F. Green; Ashcraft & 

Gerel, on brief), for appellee. 

 This matter came before the commission on the application of 

claimant, Hilda T. Robinson, seeking temporary total disability 

benefits as the result of an alleged injury by accident arising 

out of and in the course of her employment with employer, Super 

Fresh Food Markets, Inc. The deputy commissioner entered an 

award in behalf of claimant, which the full commission affirmed. 

 Employer appeals, contending the commission erred in finding 

claimant suffered a compensable injury by accident. We disagree 

and affirm. 

 I. 

 Claimant testified as follows. Claimant worked as a cashier 

in employer's store. Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on August 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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9, 1994, claimant used her right arm to transfer a "suitcase" of 

beer from the register area to a customer's shopping cart. In so 

doing, claimant felt pain shoot quickly up her arm, across her 

shoulder, up her neck, and to the top of her head. Claimant 

completed her shift, working another sixty to ninety minutes and, 

for the rest of the day, found she had to use her left arm to 

support her right arm when she transferred heavy items into the 

carts. Before she left work, claimant told Joanne Cochran, 

employer's office personnel manager, she hurt her arm "[l]ifting 

heavy containers and putting them into the cart." Claimant did 

not know whether she told Cochran she injured her shoulder 

lifting a particular container or whether she referred to 

containers in general. Claimant phoned Cochran the following day 

to tell Cochran her arm was still hurting and she would not be 

coming to work. Cochran suggested that claimant see a doctor, 

and she told claimant she would report the incident to Keith 

Rankin, employer's safety supervisor. Rankin is the person to 

whom work-related injuries are reported. On August 12, 1994, 

claimant saw Dr. Frederick Griffith who directed claimant not to 

return to work. Dr. Griffith referred claimant to Dr. James T. 

Gable. Claimant related this information to employer who asked 

claimant to report to them anything she learned from the doctors. 

 In response to inquiry from both doctors concerning what 

happened, claimant stated that she was "lifting whatever the 

customer buys to put into the cart." 
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 Employer's First Report of Accident reflects that claimant 

sustained an injury on August 9, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. that was 

reported August 11, 1994. 

 Dr. Griffith's August 12, 1994 office note states, in part: 

 Mrs. Robinson developed a headache and while 

at work and doing a lot of lifting developed 

pain in her shoulder. Now it hurts to move 

her arm and has pain up in her neck. She has 

not had this problem before. . . . Has not 

had shoulder problems before. Doesn't 

remember any one specific injury. 

Dr. Griffith's August 22, 1994 note states, in part: 

 Continues to have pain in her shoulder. . . . 

She has never had problems before until it 

started bothering her that day at work when 

she was carrying things, although she doesn't 

remember traumatic incident with [sic] 

precipitated this. 

In both an "Attending Physician's Report" and an August 30, 1994 

letter to Dr. Griffith, Dr. Gable notes that claimant's injury 

occurred while lifting cases at work. 

 On cross-examination, claimant testified that one specific 

act caused her injury. She told Dr. Griffith she was lifting 

heavy items in the course of her normal job duties and developed 

pain. She could not recall whether she mentioned to Dr. Griffith 

the particular "suitcase" of beer, although she thought she had 

mentioned it. However, she admitted that if Dr. Griffith wrote 

that she did not remember a specific injury, then she guessed she 

told him that. She also admitted that she must have told Dr. 

Griffith she did not remember a traumatic incident because that 

is what he wrote. Claimant could not remember whether she told 
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Dr. Griffith about a particular case of beer; however, her 

present recollection was that she thought she had told him. 

 Joanne Cochran testified as follows. Claimant did not 

report the incident on August 9, 1994. Claimant contacted 

Cochran the next morning and told her she would not be at work 

because her shoulder hurt. Claimant told Cochran she thought she 

had slept on her shoulder wrong. Cochran asked if claimant's 

condition was work-related, and claimant responded that it was 

not. Claimant never told Cochran about a "suitcase" of beer and 

never described a specific injury to Cochran. Cochran suggested 

that claimant seek treatment because of her concern for claimant. 

 After claimant saw Dr. Griffith, she phoned Cochran and told her 

the doctor said her condition was not work-related and that she 

had not contacted Rankin because claimant thought her condition 

was not job-related. Nonetheless, Cochran related claimant's 

report to Rankin because Cochran was concerned the issue might 

come up later. About two weeks later, claimant phoned Cochran 

and told her the doctor said her condition was work-related. 

 Rankin testified as follows. On August 11, Cochran told 

Rankin that claimant was not coming to work because her shoulder 

hurt but that her condition was not job-related. The following 

day, claimant presented Rankin a bill from Dr. Griffith. 

Claimant told Rankin that Dr. Griffith could not say whether her 

condition was job-related, and claimant did not identify any 

job-related incident. Nonetheless, Rankin kept the bill on file 
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and discussed the incident with the store manager and regional 

safety manager, who together decided not to file an accident 

report. 

 "Upon viewing the claimant at the hearing," the deputy 

commissioner found claimant's description of the accident 

credible. The deputy commissioner noted that inconsistencies in 

both the medical histories and in claimant's own explanations of 

her condition existed because claimant often referred to "cases" 

in addition to the one "pain-producing case." The deputy 

commissioner also found claimant's submission of Dr. Griffith's 

medical bill to Rankin contradicted Cochran's testimony that 

claimant only reported she slept on her arm the wrong way and 

that she was not advised of a potential work-related injury until 

August 22. The deputy commissioner also found that Rankin would 

not have consulted so extensively with the store manager and 

regional manager about filing an accident report had employer 

thought claimant's condition was not work-related. The deputy 

commissioner found claimant suffered a compensable injury by 

accident which resulted in her temporary total disability. 

 The full commission affirmed the award. The commission 

found the evidence demonstrates that claimant associated her 

problem with work activities. It refused to place determinative 

reliance on the medical reports and, instead, deferred to the 

deputy commissioner's resolution of what it considered to be a 

credibility matter. 
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 II. 

 To establish an "injury by accident," a claimant must prove 

"an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event [that 

results] in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in 

the body." E.g., Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 

858, 865 (1989). A gradually incurred injury is not an "injury 

by accident" within the meaning of the Act. Middlekauff v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 247 Va. 150, 154, 439 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1994). 

 Thus, where the evidence demonstrates that a condition resulted 

from cumulative trauma rather than an identifiable event, the 

condition is not an "injury by accident." See, e.g., The Lane 

Co., Inc. v. Saunders, 229 Va. 196, 199-200, 326 S.E.2d 702, 

703-04 (1985). Furthermore, to be compensable, a claimant's 

disability must have been caused by the "injury by accident." 

See Southall v. Reams, Inc., 198 Va. 545, 548, 95 S.E.2d 145, 147 

(1956); Ratliff v. Rocco Farm Foods, 16 Va. App. 234, 239, 429 

S.E.2d 39, 42-43 (1993). 

 Here, employer contends that the commission's finding that 

claimant experienced "an identifiable incident or sudden 

precipitating event" is not supported by credible evidence. 

Employer also assails the commission's findings of causation at 

both levels. It argues the evidence fails to support the finding 

that the work-related event resulted in "an obvious sudden 

mechanical or structural change in [claimant's] body." It also 

argues the evidence fails to support the finding that the 
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work-related event caused her disability. 

 On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to claimant, the prevailing party below. See, e.g., 

R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 

S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We are bound by the commission's 

findings of fact if they are supported by credible evidence. 

E.g., Continental Forest v. Wallace, 1 Va. App. 72, 73-74, 334 

S.E.2d 149, 150 (1985). In light of these principles, we affirm 

the decision of the commission. 

 A. 

 Claimant's testimony clearly points to "an identifiable 

incident or sudden precipitating event." She associates the 

onset of her condition with her transfer of a particular 

"suitcase" of beer to the shopping cart of a particular customer. 

 "Upon viewing the claimant at the hearing," the deputy 

commissioner found claimant's description of the accident 

credible. We agree with employer that the record contains other 

evidence which would support a finding that claimant never 

identified the lifting of a particular case of beer. However, 

the fact that contrary evidence may appear in the record "is of 

no consequence if there is credible evidence to support the 

commission's finding." Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. 

App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). 

 We agree with employer that the commission was not 

necessarily bound by the deputy commissioner's finding that 
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claimant's testimony was credible. Indeed, the commission could 

have reversed that finding of credibility if it articulated a 

reasonable basis for doing so. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber 

v. Pierce, 9 Va. App. 120, 123, 384 S.E.2d 333, 335 (1989). The 

commission, however, affirmed the deputy commissioner's finding. 

 We find no basis to conclude that the commission erred by 

not reversing the deputy commissioner's credibility finding. The 

deputy commissioner not only found claimant credible, it found 

employer's witnesses incredible based on inconsistencies in their 

testimony and inconsistencies in the actions they took at the 

time of the incident. Furthermore, although the histories 

reflected in claimant's medical records do not disclose a 

specific lifting incident, that fact alone is not sufficient to 

support the conclusion that claimant's hearing testimony was 

inherently incredible as a matter of law. Cf. Dollar General 

Store v. Cridlin, 22 Va. App. 171, 177, 468 S.E.2d 152, 155 

(1996) (medical reports reflect results of physical examination 

and do not purport to establish cause of injury). 

 In short, the commission's finding that claimant experienced 

an "identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event" is 

supported by credible evidence. Accordingly, we affirm that 

finding. 

 B. 

 Relying, in part, on Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 

568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968), employer argues that the commission 
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must rely on medical evidence to determine whether the 

"identifiable incident" resulted in a "an obvious sudden 

mechanical or structural change in the body" and whether, if it 

did, the "injury by accident" caused the disability. We 

disagree. Hosey does not support employer's assertion. See

Cridlin, 22 Va. App. at 176, 468 S.E.2d at 154. Moreover, as 

this Court stated in Cridlin, 

 "To appraise the true degree of 

indispensability which should be accorded 

medical testimony, it is first necessary to 

dispel the misconception that valid awards 

can stand only if accompanied by a definite 

medical diagnosis. True, in many instances 

it may be impossible to form a judgment on 

the relation of the employment to the injury, 

or relation of the injury to the disability, 

without analyzing in medical terms what the 

injury or disease is. But this is not 

invariably so. In appropriate circumstances, 

awards may be made when medical evidence on 

these matters is inconclusive, indecisive, 

fragmentary, inconsistent, or even 

nonexistent." 

Id. at 177, 468 S.E.2d at 154-55 (quoting A. Larson, The Law of 

Workmen's Compensation § 79.51(c) (1995) (citations omitted)). 
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 Here, claimant's testimony clearly points to "an obvious 

sudden mechanical or structural change in the body." Claimant 

testified that, upon lifting the "suitcase" of beer, she felt 

pain shoot quickly up her arm, across her shoulder, up her neck, 

and to the top of her head. We find no evidence in the record to 

suggest claimant had merely exacerbated a preexisting condition. 

 On the contrary, claimant's medical reports support a finding 

that claimant had "never had problems before until . . . that day 

at work." 

 Employer argues the absence of evidence in the medical 

reports demonstrating an "identifiable incident" shows claimant 

did not suffer "an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change 

in [her] body." However, our finding that credible evidence 

supports the commission's finding that an identifiable incident 

occurred disposes of this argument. 

 In short, the commission's finding that the identifiable 

incident resulted in "an obvious sudden mechanical or structural 

change in [claimant's] body" is supported by credible evidence. 

Accordingly, we affirm that finding. 

 C. 

 Finally, the commission's finding that claimant's "injury by 

accident" caused her disability is supported by credible 

evidence. Claimant's medical records provide clear evidence that 

the disability for which her physicians treated her was caused by 

the work-related event. Cf. Hosey, 208 Va. at 570, 159 S.E.2d at 
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634 ("While the doctors' reports do not specifically spell out in 

so many words that claimant's work activity was the producing 

cause of the injury, their responses to the questions asked on 

the forms made it very plain that such was their opinion"). 

Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to support a contrary 

finding that some other event caused claimant's disability. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the award of the commission is 

affirmed. 

Affirmed.