J-S26045-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MARCUS D. BROOKING,

Appellant No. 3172 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 24, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012983-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 03, 2018

Appellant, Marcus D. Brooking, appeals from the post-conviction court’s 

order dismissing, without a hearing, his first petition filed under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant contends 

that his PCRA counsel was given inadequate time to review his case prior to 

the court’s dismissing his petition. After careful review, we agree with 

Appellant. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order denying his petition and 

remand for further proceedings.

The facts of Appellant’s case are not pertinent to our disposition of his 

present appeal. We need only note that on December 8, 2014, Appellant 

entered a guilty plea to one count of third-degree murder, possession of a 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S26045-18

- 2 -

firearm by a person prohibited, and possessing an instrument of crime. He 

was sentenced that same day to an aggregate term of 23 to 46 years’ 

incarceration.

On December 16, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea, contending, inter alia, that his trial counsel had acted ineffectively by 

pressuring him into entering that plea. Following a hearing, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. He did not file a direct appeal.

However, on February 10, 2015, Appellant filed a PCRA petition seeking 

the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The PCRA court granted that 

petition, and Appellant filed a direct appeal with this Court, arguing that his 

guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that his counsel 

had acted ineffectively by inducing him to enter that plea. This Court deemed 

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim premature, and dismissed it without 

prejudice to his right to raise it on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. 

Brooking, No. 806 EDA 2015, unpublished memorandum at 8 (Pa. Super. 

filed February 8, 2016). Nevertheless, we concluded that the record 

demonstrated that Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

See id. Accordingly, we affirmed his judgment of sentence. 

On October 28, 2016, Appellant filed the timely PCRA petition that 

underlies the present appeal. Therein, he again claimed, among other things, 

that his trial counsel acted ineffectively in compelling him to plead guilty. The 

PCRA court appointed Lauren Baraldi, Esq., to represent Appellant. However, 

on June 27, 2017, Attorney Baraldi filed a petition to withdraw, stating that 
J-S26045-18

- 3 -

she had obtained new employment and was closing her law practice in 

Philadelphia effective July 17, 2017. The court did not immediately rule on 

Attorney Baraldi’s petition, and on July 11, 2017, she filed a second petition 

to withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 

544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.

Super. 1988). 

According to Appellant, at a court proceeding on July 14, 2017, Attorney 

Baraldi again informed the PCRA court that she must withdraw due to the 

closing of her law practice. Appellant’s Brief at 5. Appellant claims that David 

Rudenstein, Esq., happened to be in the courtroom and was asked by the 

PCRA court if he would “take on the case[,] ... review the matter[,] and ... 

advise the [c]ourt as to whether the [Turner/]Finley Letter [filed by Attorney 

Baraldi] was adequate.” Id. Attorney Rudenstein agreed to do so, and the 

court issued an order appointing him as Appellant’s PCRA counsel on July 14, 

2017. That same day, the court also issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its 

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition. The court set the ‘formal dismissal’ date 

for August 24, 2017. 

On August 9, 2017, Attorney Rudenstein requested a continuance of the 

August 24, 2017 dismissal date.1 On August 14, 2017, the PCRA court issued 

an order denying that motion without explanation. Then, on August 24, 2017, 

____________________________________________

1 Attorney Rudenstein’s motion for a continuance was not docketed, and is not 

contained in the certified record. The court acknowledges that such a motion 

was filed on August 9, 2017, in the August 14, 2017 order denying it.
J-S26045-18

- 4 -

the PCRA court issued an order, and accompanying opinion, denying 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. The court did not acknowledge, or discuss, its 

denial of Attorney Rudenstein’s continuance request. Instead, the court 

addressed the issues presented by Appellant in his pro se petition, concluding 

that they were all inadequately pled and/or meritless. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not order 

him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Herein, Appellant presents three 

issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Was [t]he [PCRA court] in error when [it] dismissed this case 

pursuant to the [Turner/]Finley Letter filed by prior counsel, 

but after appointing the undersigned to review the case and all 

without giving this counsel a meaningful chance or time to 

make said review?

2. Was [Appellant’s] underlying [g]uilty [p]lea to the charges 

made in an involuntary fashion?

3. Was [A]ttorney ... Baraldi ..., the second PCRA attorney on this 

case[,] ineffective when she drafted a [Turner/]Finley Letter 

which the [c]ourt ultimately accepted?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Our standard of review regarding an order denying post-conviction relief 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the court is supported by the 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 

A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). This Court grants great deference to the findings 

of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the 

record could support a contrary holding. Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 

1250, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2001). 
J-S26045-18

- 5 -

Regarding Appellant’s first issue, we recognize “that the decision to 

grant or deny a request for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court.” Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 

2009). We will only reverse a court’s decision to deny a continuance request 

upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. As we have consistently 

stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely an error judgment. 

Rather, discretion is abused when the law is overridden or 

misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, 

or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by 

the evidence or the record....

Id. (citations omitted).

Here, Appellant contends that it was an abuse of discretion to deny 

Attorney Rudenstein’s request for a continuance. He explains:

[T]he [c]ourt itself appointed [Attorney Rudenstein] to review this 

matter and [Appellant] was entitled to such a review as his 

previous counsel was getting out of the case before it was over. 

The [c]ourt did not permit counsel the sufficient time to make that 

review.[2] Perhaps more importantly, there was simply no reason 

then and no reason now for the [c]ourt to have refrained from 

affording [Attorney Rudenstein] an extra four to six weeks to 

make further review and report to the [c]ourt. Furthermore, 

____________________________________________

2 Attorney Rudenstein explains that, 

there are very few attorneys in Philadelphia who will accept PCRA 

appointments. This counsel is one of them and receives many 

such appointments. [The PCRA judge in this case] is very well 

aware of that. There is simply no way in the course of counsel’s 

practice that he could have made an investigation of a case, 

corresponded with his client[,] and evaluated the matter in five or 

six weeks. If it was the only case on counsel’s roster, counsel 

could have done it. However, counsel was unable to put this case 

ahead of many other cases which were waiting their turn.

Appellant’s Brief at 5 n.1. 
J-S26045-18

- 6 -

[Appellant] is prejudiced in that his counsel, as noted above in this 

[b]rief[,] would not simply have reported that previous counsel[, 

Attorney Baraldi,] did a good job but would have reported that 

[she] was perhaps in error when she filed a [Turner/]Finley 

Letter and where she should have filed an Amended Petition. That 

does not mean that [Appellant] would have eventually received a 

new trial[,] but he would have received his day in [c]ourt; he 

would have had [his trial counsel’s] actions reviewed and he could 

have had an appeal on the record if he lost. Thus, [Appellant] was 

indeed prejudiced.

Appellant’s Brief at 12. 

We are compelled to agree with Appellant. Attorney Rudenstein acted 

with reasonable haste in requesting the continuance on August 9, 2016, which 

was only a few weeks after he was appointed by the PCRA court. Additionally, 

the continuance request was counsel’s first, and it was made well before the 

formal dismissal date of August 24, 2016. The PCRA court did not offer any 

reason for denying the continuance request in the order doing so, nor in its

opinion accompanying the order denying Appellant’s petition. A PCRA 

petitioner is entitled to representation during the litigation of their first PCRA 

petition, regardless of whether their underlying claims have merit. See 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699-700 (Pa. 1998). Given this 

right to counsel, we conclude that the PCRA court abused its discretion by

appointing Attorney Rudenstein and then denying, without explanation, 

counsel’s request for more time to review Appellant’s case. Therefore, we

vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for the court to provide Attorney 

Rudenstein with an additional 60 days to review Appellant’s petition.
J-S26045-18

- 7 -

Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.

President Judge Emeritus Stevens files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/3/18