* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-10859

Summary Calendar

_____________________

In The Matter Of: DICKIE WAYNE CLEMENT,

Debtor.

____________________________

DICKIE WAYNE CLEMENT,

Appellant,

versus

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOWIE,

Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(4:98-CV-224-Y)

_________________________________________________________________

December 14, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Dickie Wayne Clement, a debtor in the bankruptcy proceedings

underlying this appeal, challenges the bankruptcy court’s order

overruling his objection to a proof of claim filed by First

National Bank of Bowie (the “Bank”). The district court affirmed

the order. We conclude that the bankruptcy court properly allowed

the claim. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment.1 A Texas district court judgme nt, entered on May 22, 1995,

stated that the Bank could foreclose its judgment lien on the two

tracts of land.

2 I

Before discussing the bankruptcy proceedings, we recap some of

the events leading up to those proceedings. The relevant facts are

not in dispute.

In 1992, the Bank obtained a judgment, in state court, against

Clement in the amount of $73,283.23. The day the court issued the

judgment, the Bank recorded the abstract of judgment in the

Official P ublic Records of Real Property of Wise County, Texas.

The Bank was not the only party to act swiftly upon issuing of the

judgment. Also on the same day, Clement’s attorney recorded a deed

conveying Clement’s real property to a friend of Clement. The

Bank, however, successfully petitioned a Texas district court to

label the conveyance as fraudulent and set it aside. Soon

thereafter, t he local sheriff conducted an execution sale to

satisfy the Bank’s judgment.

At this sale, which occurred in 1995, the Bank purchased one

of Clement’s tracts of land for $58,400. The Bank credited this

amount against the judgment award owed by Clement. A little over

one month after purchasing the pr operty, the Bank resold the

property for $116,067.40. Meanwhile, to satisfy what it perceived

as a remaining deficiency in the judgment, the Bank set another one

of Clement’s tracts of land for e xecution sale. 1 Before the2 The bankruptcy filing also had the effect of staying other

pending litigation in the state court.

3 The relevant language of § 502(b)(1) provides:

(b) [I]f such objection to a claim is made, the court,

after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of

such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of

the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow

such claim in such amount, except to the extent that–

(1) such claim is unenforceable against the

debtor and property of the debtor, under

any

. . . applicable law for a reason other

than because such claim is contingent or

unmatured.

3 sheriff could carry out this execution sale, however, Clement filed

a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,

which had the effect of staying the execution sale. 2 See 11

U.S.C.A. § 362 (West Supp. 1998).

During the bankruptcy proceedings, the Bank filed a proof of

claim for $47,331.23. S ee 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 1993). Clement

objected to this claim under 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b)(1). 3 The

bankruptcy court issued an order overruling the objection. The

district court subsequently affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order.4 II

A

“We review the decision of the district court by applying the

same standard[] of review to the bankruptcy court’s

. . .

conclusions of law as applied by the district court.” Crowell v.

Theodore Bender Accounting, Inc. , 138 F.3d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir.

1998) (citations omitted). The bankruptcy court’s conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo

. I d. The parties have not brought before

us any relevant factual disputes.

B

Clement argues that the Bank’s claim is unenforceable under

Texas law. Although admitting that the actual sale price at the

execution sale left a deficiency, Clement argues that this sale of

his land has satisfied the judgment in full. This is so, he

argues, because the Bank, which bought the land at the execution

sale, turned around and resold the land, just one month later, for

$116,067.40—an amount far greater than the judgment award. Clement

urges us to recognize that, in this case, Texas law requires that

“persons against whom recovery of [a] deficiency is sought are

entitled to an offset against the deficiency in the amount by which

the fair market value

. . . exceeds the sale price.” T EX

. P ROP

. C ODE

A NN

. § 51.003( C ) (W EST 1995); see also id. § 51.004(c).5

The Bank, however, contends that fair marke t value plays no

role in computing the deficie ncy that remains after an execution

sale. Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code, the Bank points out,

only applies to foreclosure sales of property subject to a trust or

other contract lien. S ee id. § 51.004(a)(1) (“This section applies

if real property subject to a deed of trust or other contract lien

is sold at a foreclosure sale

. . .”); id. § 51.003 (referencing to

§ 51.002, which provides the procedure for conducting a sale of

real property under contract lien). In this case, the sheriff

conducted a foreclosure sale of property subject to a judgment

lien, not a deed of trust or any other contract lien. The Bank

argues that Chapter 51, therefore, does not apply to this case.

According to the Bank’s interpret ation of Texas’ common law,

Clement can only challenge the sheriff’s sale by showing (1) that

the price paid for the property was grossly inadequate, and (2)

that there were irregularities in the sale. Clement, however, has

stipulated that there were no irregularities in the sheriff’s

execution sale. We are thus left with the simple question of

whether Chapter 51 applies to this execution sale.

III

We agree with the Bank’s straightforw ard reading of Chapter

51. Chapter 51 limits itself to foreclosure sales of property

subject to a deed of trust or other contract lien. I d. §§ 51.002,

5 1.004. The property involved in this case was subject to a

judgment lien. The creation of a judgment lien is governed by4 Clement also offers a policy reason for expanding the

application of Chapter 51 to judgment liens. Clement contends that

by r estricting the application of Chapter 51 to its textually

defined limits, our court would create a loophole for creditors

wishing to deny hypothecators their protections provided by Chapter

51. Instead of foreclosing on the property subject to a contract

lien, Clement suggests, a creditor could sue on the defaulted note

and obtain a judgment. When the creditor forces an execution sale

producing proceeds less than the fair market value of the property

sold, the creditor could claim that Chapter 51 does not apply.

This sale of property would be the result of an execution sale, not

a sale “under power of sale conferred by a deed of trust or other

contract lien.” Id. § 51.002(a). If Texas’ Property Code allows

for the nefarious evasions that Clement thinks it does, only the

Texas courts or legislature, not the federal courts, have the power

to close the alleged loophole.

6 Chapter 52 of the Texas Property Code. S ee T EX

. P ROP

. C ODE A NN

.

§ 52.001 (West 1995). Section 51.001 specifically provides that

“this subtitle does not affect a lien that is not treated in this

subtitle, including a lien arising under common law, in equity or

under another statute of this state.” As Chapter 52 governs

judgment liens, and judgment liens are not treated in the

provisions of Chapter 51, the code provisions that Clement relies

upon do not provide any support for his argument. A plain reading

of the Texas code prompts this conclusion. It is not surprising,

therefore, that Clement has not directed us to any Texas cases that

apply the provisions of Chapter 51 to judgment liens. Because

Clement bases his sole objection to the Bank’s claim on the

provisions of Chapter 51, the bankruptcy court properly overruled

his objection. 4

The judgment of the district court is7 A F F I R M E D.