NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1524

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MICHAEL P. RIES, 

AMY RIES, h/w,

 Appellants

v.

CRAIG T. CURTIS; SUSAN L. CURTIS, h/w;

FOX & ROACH LP, d/b/a Prudential Fox & Roach

Realtors; NANCY H. PRESTI; AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL

RELOCATION SOLUTIONS, LLC; PENN LAND TRANSFER

COMPANY; LARRABEE, CUNNINGHAM & MCGOWAN, P.C.

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On Appeal from the District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-01400) 

District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 14, 2016

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge*

, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 22, 2016)

 * Judge McKee was Chief Judge at the time this appeal was submitted. Judge McKee 

concluded his term as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit on September 30, 2016
2

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OPINION**

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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

This is a suit under state and federal law alleging deceptive conduct in the sale of a 

residence. The purchasers contend the sellers, their realtor, and their relocation company 

concealed material defects during the sale.1

 They allege violations of the Pennsylvania 

Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”), 68 Pa. C.S. § 7301 et seq., the 

Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 Pa. 

Stat. § 201-1 et seq., the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2608, and 

common law fraud. The purchasers settled their claims with the seller, and the District 

Court granted summary judgment in favor of the realtor and the relocation company. The 

purchasers appeal,2 and we will affirm. 

I.

Michael and Amy Ries bought a house from Craig and Susan Curtis. The Curtises 

listed the property with Fox & Roach and Nancy Presti, a real estate agent employed by 

 

**

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 The Rieses also sued their title insurance company, Pennsylvania Land Transfer 

Company, and a law firm located at the same address—Larrabee, Cunningham & 

McGowan, P.C. The Rieses dismissed all their claims against these entities prior to this 

appeal.

2 The district court had jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 2614 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We 

have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

Fox & Roach. During the sale process, the Curtises prepared a Seller Property Disclosure 

Statement for prospective buyers. In the statement, they denied knowledge of past water 

leakage in the home, drainage or flooding problems, or defects in the flooring.3

 The 

Curtises’ relocation company, AIRES, also prepared a disclosure statement in which it 

“ma[de] no guarantees, warranty, or representation about the condition of this property,” 

because it was a relocation company and did not occupy the property. 

Prior to closing, the Rieses hired Homestead Inspections, Inc. to conduct a home 

inspection. Homestead found evidence of damage stemming from “moisture/rot” in the 

basement and said the grading in areas around the house sloped toward the house, making 

it vulnerable to water entry. But it said the patio, which the Rieses contend slopes toward 

the house, was in “serviceable condition.” Prior to closing, a contractor who inspected 

the home and generated an estimate for repairs also advised the Rieses of water damage 

in the basement. He told Michael Ries the patio sloped toward the house, which could 

allow water to enter. 

After the Rieses purchased the home, they discovered water entering underneath 

the kitchen door from the patio during a heavy rainstorm. Underneath a doormat at the 

kitchen door, they discovered small holes drilled into the kitchen floor.4

 The Curtises 

later admitted they drilled the holes to drain water into the basement, but they did not tell 

 3 They did acknowledge previous owners installed sump pumps in the basement to 

prevent water accumulation there.

4 We could find no reference in the record to the diameter of the holes or to the number of 

holes that were drilled. But based on a photograph included in the record, there appears 

to be four holes drilled into the grout of the tile. They appear to each have a diameter 

smaller than the screws in the door’s threshold—in other words, about the width of a 

typical household nail or screw, or a pencil. 
4

Presti or the Rieses. The doormat was apparently left behind after the Curtises moved out 

and remained there, concealing the holes during the selling process. Presti, Fox & Roach, 

and AIRES denied knowledge of the holes in the floor or the fact that the patio sloped 

toward the house. They also denied knowledge that water entered under the kitchen door. 

II. Claims Against Presti and Fox & Roach5

The Rieses contend Presti and Fox & Roach violated the RESDL, UTPCPL, and 

committed common law fraud by concealing material defects in the property during the 

sale process—namely, the holes in the floor and an improperly graded patio, permitting 

the entrance of water into the kitchen during heavy rainstorms.

A. Real Estate Settlement Disclosure Law Claim

 The RESDL requires sellers of property to disclose “any material defects with the 

property.” 68 Pa. C.S. § 7303. It also provides a real-estate agent is not liable unless 

“the agent had actual knowledge of a material defect that was not disclosed to the buyer 

or of a misrepresentation relating to a material defect.” 68 Pa. C.S. § 7310 (emphasis 

added). 

The Rieses cannot demonstrate Presti or Fox & Roach had actual knowledge of 

 5 We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. EEOC v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2015). Summary judgment may be 

appropriately granted where there “is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). “To be 

material, a fact must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case.” NAACP v. N. 

Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011). When considering 

whether summary judgment is appropriate, “we view the underlying facts and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). “An 

inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual 

dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 

(3d Cir. 2014).
5

these defects. They suggest that, because Presti occasionally checked on the property 

while it was unoccupied and routinely prepared it for open houses and showings, she 

must have noticed water entering underneath the kitchen door. For the same reason, they 

also believe she would have checked the rug underneath the kitchen door and seen the 

holes drilled there. 

In particular, the Rieses point to correspondence with AIRES, where Presti said 

she was going to inspect the property after Hurricane Irene blew through the state, 

depositing large amounts of rain. Although Presti claims she did not see water or other 

problems at the property after the hurricane, the Rieses say there must have been water 

and that if she actually visited the property, she would have seen it, along with the holes.6

We agree with the District Court these allegations amount only to speculation and 

“broad conjecture” that Presti or Fox & Roach had actual knowledge of these defects. 

Ries v. Curtis, 2014 WL 5364972 at *22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2014). More is needed to 

overcome a motion for summary judgment than “speculation and conjecture.” Halsey, 

750 F.3d at 287. In fact, in his deposition, Michael Ries admitted he had no evidence to 

support his allegation that Presti or Fox & Roach knew of the defects. Moreover, 

Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on real estate agents to conduct an independent 

inspection of the property. 63 P.S. § 455.606a(i). Because the Rieses cannot make a 

showing of actual knowledge, their RESDL claims fail and Presti and Fox & Roach are 

entitled to summary judgment. 

 6 Presti said in her deposition she could not remember if she visited the property, but 

knew of no reason why she would not have inspected it. There was no corresponding 

inspection report in the record, and she denies finding water damage or being aware of it.
6

B. UTPCPL Claim

Similarly, the “catchall” provision of the UTPCPL proscribes “unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices” in commerce, which includes “fraudulent or deceptive conduct.” 73 Pa. 

Stat. § 201-2(4)(xxi); 73 Pa. Stat. § 201-3. A claim under the catchall provision of the 

UTPCPL is similar to a claim of common law fraud. See Tran v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 408 

F.3d 130, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2005); Youndt v. First Nat’l Bank of Port Allegany, 868 A.2d 

539, 545 (Pa. Super. 2005) (describing the elements of common law fraud). A plaintiff 

must show a material misrepresentation, “made knowingly or recklessly,” among other 

elements, in order to prevail on a UTPCPL claim. See Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 

708 F.3d 470, 498-99 (3d Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the Rieses must show Presti or Fox & 

Roach made a misrepresentation concerning the holes in the floor with knowledge or 

recklessness about the falsity of the representation. Id. 

We agree with the District Court the Rieses cannot make this showing and there is 

no genuine dispute of material fact on this issue. First, the Rieses only contend Presti and 

Fox & Roach had actual knowledge of the defects, and for the reasons discussed above, 

we agree with the District Court there is no evidence they had actual knowledge. Second, 

there is no evidence the realtors were reckless as to the falsity of any representations they 

made about the condition of the house. The District Court said “the sheer absence of any 

deposition testimony, emails, notes, reports, contractor estimates, or weather-related 

expert evidence” would make any conclusion by a factfinder that Presti or Fox & Roach 

knew about the defects “starkly unreasonable.” Ries, 2014 WL 5364972 at *22. Because 

there is no genuine dispute of material fact on the UTPCPL claims, Presti and Fox & 
7

Roach are entitled to summary judgment.

C. Common Law Fraud

The Rieses common law fraud claim fails because, for the reasons discussed 

above, there is no evidence Presti or Fox & Roach made a material misrepresentation. 

Under Pennsylvania law, to show fraud, the Rieses must establish, in relevant part, that 

Presti or Fox & Roach made a material representation, “made falsely, with knowledge of 

its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false.” Youndt, 868 A.2d at 545. 

There is no evidence Presti or Fox & Roach had any reason to know of the defects in the

patio or the holes in the kitchen floor, let alone any evidence they had actual knowledge 

of these issues. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact on this claim, 

and Presti and Fox & Roach are entitled to summary judgment. 

III. Claims Against AIRES

A. Real Estate Settlement Disclosure Law Claims

The Rieses also contend AIRES violated the RESDL in two separate ways. First, 

they assert AIRES had knowledge of the material defects but did not inform the Rieses in 

the disclosure required by 68 Pa. C.S. § 7303. Second, they contend AIRES failed to 

deliver the disclosure prior to signing the purchase and sale agreement as required by 68 

Pa. C.S. § 7303. 

The Rieses present no evidence that AIRES had knowledge of material defects or 

should have known about them beyond the speculation and conjecture they offered with 

respect to Presti and Fox & Roach. Speculation about knowledge of a misrepresentation, 

without any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material 
8

fact on the issue.7

 Moreover, AIRES provided numerous disclaimers to the Curtises 

during the sale process, alerting them that “[w]e are a relocation company, and as such 

we have never occupied this property. We make no guarantees, warranty, or 

representation about the condition of this property.” We have reviewed the record and 

agree with the District Court there is no evidence even suggesting AIRES was aware of 

any defect. 

Second, the Rieses signed an addendum to the purchase and sale agreement which 

acknowledged prior receipt of the disclosure AIRES was required to make under the 

RESDL. The RESDL states receipt of disclosures may be acknowledged “in an 

agreement of transfer for the residential real property.” 68 Pa. C.S. § 7305. Because they 

acknowledged prior receipt of AIRES’s disclosure when they signed the purchase and 

sale agreement, the Rieses’ contention that they did not actually receive and acknowledge 

the purchase and sale agreement until two days later fails.

AIRES is entitled to summary judgment on the Rieses’ RESDL claim.

B. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Claim

The Rieses also contend AIRES’s addendum to the purchase and sale contract 

required them to buy title insurance from Larrabee & Cunningham in violation of the 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2608. This statute prohibits a seller 

 7 The Rieses do not clarify whether they also appeal their claims that AIRES violated the 

UTPCPL and common law fraud by not disclosing material defects. Although they do 

not discuss these claims in their brief beyond bare mention, we find they fail for the same 

reasons discussed above—actual knowledge of a misrepresentation, or recklessness as to 

whether there was a misrepresentation, is needed under these claims, and the Rieses offer 

no evidence beyond speculation that AIRES made any misrepresentation or was reckless 

as to the existence of any misrepresentation.
9

of property from requiring a buyer, “as a condition to selling the property,” to purchase 

title insurance from a “particular title company.” 12 U.S.C. § 2608. 

We agree with the District Court the record demonstrates the sale of the property 

was not conditioned on the purchase of insurance from a particular company. Although 

the addendum stated “[t]he company to issue the title insurance policy shall be Larrabee 

& Cunningham,” in fact, the Rieses ultimately bought title insurance from Pennsylvania 

Land Transfer Company (“PLTC”), a different company. 8

 Moreover, a different 

addendum to the purchase and sale contract, inserted by the Rieses’ own realtor, 

indicated title insurance should come from Camelot Abstract. But the addendum also 

told the Rieses, in large, bolded all-caps font, they were “free to shop around” for any 

insurance company “to determine that you are receiving the best services and the best 

rate” and were not bound to choose any particular title insurance company. The Rieses 

acknowledged this disclosure by initialing it, indicating their awareness of their freedom 

to “shop around.” The Rieses’ own realtor admitted during her deposition she had no 

discussions with AIRES regarding the choice of title insurance company that could have 

altered the understanding beyond what was written in the addendum. Further, she 

 8 The District Court held there was “no merit” in the Rieses’ contention that “PLTC is a 

title insurance company controlled by Larrabee & Cunningham.” Although PLTC and 

Larrabee & Cunningham share the same office and there is some overlap of employees 

and shareholders, the record does not indicate they are the same company. We agree 

with the District Court the “mere allegation—unsupported by any evidence of record—

that the two companies share some common shareholders and employees is irrelevant.” 

Ries, 2014 WL 5364972 at *17. The Rieses have simply shown no evidence whatsoever 

that PLTC and Larrabee & Cunningham are the same company. Moreover, nothing in 

the record supports, and the Rieses do not contend, they purchased title insurance through 

PLTC because they thought it was the same company as Larrabee & Cunningham and 

were trying to satisfy the addendum’s apparent requirements to use Larrabee & 

Cunningham.
10

testified she “explained to the Rieses that they were free to shop around for title 

insurance.” Moreover, the Rieses faced no penalty for purchasing insurance from PLTC, 

indicating the contract was not conditioned on choice of a particular title insurance 

company. They closed on the property without anyone objecting to the choice of title 

company. 

There is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether the Rieses were 

required, as a condition to the purchase of the property, to buy title insurance from a 

particular title company. Accordingly, AIRES is entitled to summary judgment against 

the Rieses on these claims.

IV.

Because there is no evidence beyond speculation and conjecture supporting the 

Rieses claims against appellees, we find there is no genuine dispute of material fact and 

appellees are entitled to summary judgment against the Rieses. We will affirm the 

District Court’s denial of summary judgment for the Rieses and its grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the appellees.