United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 1, 2017

Decided May 30, 2017

Before

No. 16‐1366

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

AKEELAN L.J. PAULETTE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 14‐CR‐30152‐NJR‐05

Nancy J. Rosenstengel,

Judge.

O R D E R

Akeelan Paulette was caught transporting cocaine on an Amtrak train for the

benefit of his uncle, Ayiko Paulette. 1 He was charged with conspiring to distribute

controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and traveling

interstate in support of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. After the district

court refused to accept his untimely motion to suppress evidence, he pled guilty to both

charges. Paulette faced a presumptive statutory minimum of five years in prison because

of the drug quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), but he also qualified for an exception

to that minimum under the “safety valve” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). He was sentenced to

                                                 

1 Ayiko Paulette’s appeal, no. 16‐1099, is discussed in a separate opinion.

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16‐1366    Page 2

probation forfive years—a lucky break, given that probation is prohibited by statute even

when the safety valve applies. See United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 527–28 (7th Cir.

1991) (concluding that prohibitions against probation in § 841(b) remain even after

application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)), overruled in part on unrelated ground by United States

v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 906–07 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Green, 105 F.3d 1321, 1323–24

(9th Cir. 1997) (same as to § 3553(f)). The government did not appeal the sentence of

probation.

Paulette filed a notice of appeal, though. His appointed lawyer asserts that the

appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

(1967). Paulette has not responded to our invitation to comment on counsel’s motion

pursuant to Circuit Rule 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of

the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve.

Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects

that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel first considers a challenge to the district court’s rejection of Paulette’s

untimely motion to suppress. (Paulette specifically reserved the right to challenge this

ruling on appeal.) About a month before pretrial motions were due, Paulette’s lawyer

withdrew from the case and a new lawyer was appointed. The new lawyer moved to

continue the trial date, but she did not seek to extend the deadline for pretrial motions.

That deadline passed without action by Paulette’s lawyer.

Nearly five months after the deadline had passed, counsel asked for an extension

to file a motion to suppress. She explained that she was having “communication

problems” with Paulette but said he had told her he wanted to file a motion to suppress.

Counsel noted that she had been appointed late in the case and inherited “voluminous”

discovery. She asked the district court to accept her attached motion to suppress, which

argued that police had stopped Paulette illegally at the train station.

The district court denied the requested extension and struck the untimely motion,

finding that the lawyer had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. The court

explained that even though the lawyer had been appointed late in the case, she had three

weeks to ask for an extension but inexplicably waited until five months after the deadline

had passed. The court added that the motion was meritless anyway because, as the court

had detailed in denying the uncle’s motion to suppress, the agents had reasonable

suspicion for the investigatory detention. Paulette’s lawyer then filed a motion to

reconsider, asking the court simply to deny the motion to suppress on the merits. The
No. 16‐1366    Page 3

court denied that motion because Paulette’s lawyer still had not established good cause

for the delay.

We agree with appellate counsel that any challenge to the district court’s decision

would be frivolous. District courts have discretion whether to allow untimely motions to

suppress for good cause. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C); United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d

565, 568 (7th Cir. 2011). Under these circumstances, where the new trial lawyer waited

months before seeking leave to file a late motion to suppress and offered no good reason

for the delay, there is no sign that the district court abused its discretion. See United States

v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2008) (no good cause where new counsel never

requested extension).

Appellate counsel next evaluates a potential challenge on the merits of the motion

to suppress. But because trial counsel did not establish good cause and thus the motion

was not allowed, we could not consider the asserted ground for suppression, not even

for plain error. See United States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2015); United

States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the challenge would be

frivolous.

Finally, appellate counsel weighs and correctly rejects as frivolous a possible

attack on the validity of Paulette’s guilty plea, explaining that Paulette expressed some

interest in withdrawing the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir.

2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). The district court

substantially complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d

331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997). The court discussed the nature of the charges and possible

penalties, the trialrights Paulette was giving up, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines

along with the court’s discretion in applying them. Appellate counsel says that the district

court neglected to inform Paulette about any waiver of his right to appeal or to file a

collateral attack, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N), but Paulette did not waive these rights

under the terms of his guilty plea.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.