U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–613PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

THE HISTORIC AMERICAN ALLIANCE 

WITH EUROPE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, 

AND THE ENVIRONMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 26, 2019 

Serial No. 116–20 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

GREGORY MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking 

Member 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GABRIELLE GOULD, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Executive Summary presented from Representative Cicilline ............................. 5 

WITNESSES 

Burns, Nicholas, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice 

of Diplomacy and International Relations, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ............................................................................. 16 

Wormuth, Christine, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, Rand Corporation; ......................................................................................... 25 

Brands, Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor, School of Advanced 

International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Senior Fellow, Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ......................................................... 34 

Conley, Heather, Senior Vice President, Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, 

and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies .......................................................................................................................... 42 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 65 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 66 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 67 

(1) 

THE HISTORIC AMERICAN ALLIANCE WITH 

EUROPE 

TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE

ENVIRONMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. KEATING [presiding]. The hearing will come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on an historic 

American alliance with Europe. 

Without objection, all the members will have 5 days to submit 

statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. 

Mr. KEATING. I will now make a brief opening statement, and 

then, we will proceed to the hearing. 

I just want to thank the witnesses and apologize for the fact we 

have these nasty things called roll calls, and they occur from time 

to time. But I think the interruptions are over, I hope. 

I would like to welcome Ranking Member Kinzinger who is here 

with us, as well as Representative Cicilline, and we may be joined 

by other members as their interrupted schedules allow. 

A generation ago, the ties the United States had with European 

nations were valued. They were hard-earned. They were part of the 

American DNA, our history, our personal heritage. 

Like so many of us, my grandparents were Europeans who became Americans. In times of happiness, we celebrate. We renew 

this relationship with uniquely Americanized holidays like the recently observed St. Patrick’s Day, something very special to me; Columbus Day; our own version of Bastille Day. In times that are 

more poignant, we observe shared sacrifices and loss, Memorial 

Day, Veterans Day, and personal loss. My own uncle was killed defending democracy on French soil. 

Perhaps it is the fact that this relationship was so ingrained that 

we saw no need to share this with following generations. However, 

in conversations I have had with our counterparts on both sides of 

the Atlantic, they reflect the need to remember and, more importantly, to renew this relationship. 

One cannot help but be profoundly moved visiting the monuments at Normandy to see, even to this day, homes in the area displaying both French and American flags. The alliances we forged 

with our European partners during and after World War II were 
2 

a testament to the brutally hard-learned lessons that we cannot escape what is going on in the rest of the world. Instead, we learned 

that the best way to ensure our security at home is to promote 

peace and stability abroad. 

As a result, America committed to supporting a Europe that is 

whole, free, and at peace, and to working closely with our Western 

allies to define the rules and institutions that would hold nations 

accountable for respecting shared values and norms. Through these 

commitments, we would work to ensure that future generations 

would never witness the same terror and carnage of their 

forebearers. 

The United States invested heavily in economic terms such as 

through the Marshall Plan, but also in military and leadership 

terms, to make sure these institutions would hold. And to this day, 

we continue to benefit tremendously as a result. 

The Western alliance set the rules for the trade of goods and 

services, giving American businesses access to more predictable 

and profitable opportunities around the world. In fact, one-fifth of 

our trade today is with Europe. 

We also achieved a level of collective military strength that has 

since World War II, deterred another major attack on the U.S. by 

a foreign government. Even when we were attacked on 9/11, our allies came to our defense and triggered NATO’s Article 5. Since 

then, of the more than 3,500 men and women serving in coalition 

forces in Afghanistan, nearly one-third were not Americans. 

By coming together to forge institutions and rules grounded in 

our shared values of freedom, democracy, rule of law, and the entrepreneurial spirit, we have worked together to ensure that we 

could live in relative peace, security, and prosperity for nearly a 

century now. 

We are here today because we find ourselves again in uncertain 

times, facing grave threats to our security, and we cannot afford to 

forget why we committed to our alliance with Europe. Today, there 

are renewed threats from nuclear weapons, not only in Asia, from 

North Korea, but in Europe from Russia, and possibly, also, from 

Iran, if they, too, decide to pull out of the nuclear deal. The threat 

from terrorism is also not over. 

And while we can agree or disagree over the causes, climate is 

already affecting our military readiness, and there are estimates 

that effects from climate change could cost our economy 10 percent 

of GDP by the end of the century. 

Further, Putin has aggressively pursued hybrid warfare and tactics designed to undermine the very pillars of our security and our 

democracy and democratic alliances. And China has embarked on 

a strategy to reshape the global economy to its benefit at our expense. 

Automation and new technologies are also rapidly changing. 

They are changing our work force and our economy, and what it 

means to go to school and get a job, so the next generation is better 

off than their parents were. 

We can try to face all these threats and challenges alone. However, there has not been a single instance in U.S. history where we 

successfully did it alone. Rather, history teaches us that we are 
3 

stronger when our allies are stronger and we are working in lockstep together against common threats and adversaries. 

Any actions or rhetoric, therefore, that weakens our allies and 

our alliances with them, is against our national security interest. 

We must continue to strengthen our capabilities and cement evercloser ties with our European partners, and, in turn, embrace the 

same from each other and every one of them. 

The greatest difference-maker we have—and when I say ‘‘we,’’ I 

mean both the United States and Europe—the greatest differencemaker we have versus China or Russia is that we have this historically unprecedented coalition, and they do not. Our European 

friends and partners, our NATO and non-NATO allies, the EU, and 

our joint multilateral institutions have been synonymous with the 

American prosperity and security, and that continues unchanged 

today. 

So, I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us for this important discussion during our very first hearing this year of this 

subcommittee. 

And I will turn now to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger, for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here on the first hearing for this subcommittee. I could not think of a better topic to discuss. This is an 

issue that unites us all, and I think that is important to know. 

Since the end of the Second World War, America and European 

resolve has formed the cornerstone of national security policy for 

the post-war order. Through our partnership with European nations, we have successfully defeated communism, halted genocide 

in the Balkans, countered threats from terrorism, defended human 

rights around the world, and maintained cohesion with our likeminded democratic partners. 

While we no longer face the same existential threat posed by the 

Soviet Union, Western resolve and stability has helped to maintain 

peace in a world drowning with strawmen and in chaos. One of my 

growing concerns is our European allies continue to be reliant on 

oil and gas from Russian strawman Vladimir Putin who is using 

energy security to weaken our alliance. 

That is why I introduced, with Chairman Keating, H.R. 1616, the 

European Energy Security and Diversification Act, which last night 

passed the House with overwhelming bipartisan support. We know 

that the Russians are using energy as a weapon against our allies, 

and this bill reassures Europe and shows America’s willingness to 

help our transatlantic partners in their energy growth. 

Sometimes it seems like our enthusiasm, however, that we have 

in the United States for NATO is not always matched in Europe. 

I think Europe needs to step up in many cases, whether it is on 

their military spending, whether it is on a lean-forward attitude, 

or understanding, in fact, that they are on the front lines and, 

frankly, have the most to lose of any hostilities between Russia or 

any hostilities with terror or, frankly, the new cold war with China 

that is occurring even in Eastern Europe. Sometimes Europe comes 

across as tired. And I think if anybody needs to not be, it is Europe 

because they are on the front lines of this. 
4 

There are other challenges that we still have to address. There 

is a genocide in Syria that, despite a brief cessation on hostilities, 

I think is going to continue to get worse. We have the issue with 

Huawei and China, and we have allies that sometimes go to the 

lowest bidder, but put themselves in great harm and great possibility of harm by buying Chinese technology. And we have a new 

cold war with China, as I mentioned. 

And I think in many cases in the United States we have politicized what we spend on the military and made it a partisan issue, 

when, in fact, our underinvestment in the military is the reason 

that we now have parity, which we should never have. We have 

parity with some of our near-peer competitors like China and Russia. 

So, all these are very important. These are a lot of issues that 

unite us. But I look forward to asking the questions of our panel 

today. 

With that, I will give back 2 minutes and 20 seconds. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, I would like to thank the ranking member. 

That is quite generous and unusual in Congress to give back that 

time. And I have just cut into half of it by thanking him. 

[Laughter.] 

Our other members have the opportunity, if they so desire, to 

give a 1-minute opening statement as well. And I would like to go 

to Representative Cicilline from Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to 

thank you and Ranking Member Kinzinger for calling this hearing, 

so that we can have an opportunity to discuss one of the most important relationships in the world, the transatlantic alliance. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here and for 

their extraordinary public service. 

The partnership between Europe and the United States is an enduring alliance. It is a community based on a shared set of democratic values. It is a partnership that has fostered unprecedented 

peace and prosperity in Europe and the United States since the 

end of World War II. It is an alliance to celebrate and one we must 

continue to adapt for the future. 

As we gather today, we must be clear-eyed about the challenges 

to the transatlantic alliance and we must be proactive on what 

Congress can do to shore up this critical bulwark. In Europe itself, 

the strength of the alliance is being tested by Brexit, the rise of 

populism in Europe, alarming antisemitism, and concerning democratic backsliding in places like Hungary and Poland. Here at 

home, our own President poses one of the greatest challenges to 

transatlantic relationships. 

And I want to commend Ambassador Burns and Ambassador 

Doug Lute for your excellent report on ‘‘NATO at 70’’. I ask unanimous consent that that be made part of the record. 

Mr. KEATING. Without objection. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
5 

Executive Summary 

Approaching the seventieth anniversary of its founding in April 1949, 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the single most 

important contributor to security, stability and peace in Europe and 

North America. 

NATO provides the umbrella defending Europe from conventional and 

nuclear attack and a secure geopolitical landscape for the world's two 

largest economies-the European Union and the United States. NATO 

members comprise the largest and strongest alliance of democratic countries in th~ world. 'Ihey contain Russian aggression and protect over I 00 

million East Europeans who now live in democracy and freedom after the 

fall of communism. 1 Far from obsolete, NATO remains vital for the more 

than 900 million Europeans and North Americans who benefit from it 

every day.2 It is no overstatement that if NATO did not exist today, countries on both sides of the Atlantic would need to create it in a troubled, 

divisive 21 ''century where authoritarian powers are on the rise. 

'Ihe NATO allies, however, are confronting daunting and complex challenges that are testing both their purpose and unity. Based on extensive 

discussions with current European and North American leaders, former 

senior officials, academics and journalists during the past six months, this 

report argues that NATO needs to come to grips with ten major challenges 

this year. The list is long, with simultaneous challenges from within the 

alliance, from beyond NATO's borders and looming on the horizon. Most 

significant is a challenge NATO has not faced before: the absence of strong 

American presidential leadership. NATO's leaders need to act decisively 

in 2019 to meet these tests and heal the widening divisions within the 

Alliance before it is too late. 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy School 1 
6 

Challenges from Within NATO 

Reviving American Leadership of the Alliance 

NATO's single greatest challenge is the absence of strong, principled 

American presidential leadership for the first time in its history. President 

Donald Trump is regarded widely in NATO capitals as the Alliance's most 

urgent, and often most difficult, problem. NATO leaders, for example, 

considered not holding a 2019 summit to mark the seventieth anniversary 

this spring as they did in decades past. They feared President Trump would 

blow up a meeting in controversy as he has done each time he has met with 

NATO leaders during the past two years. Wary of his past behavior, NATO 

plans a scaled down leaders meeting for December 2019. 

President Trump's open ambivalence about NATO's value to the U.S., 

his public questioning of America's Article 5 commitment to its allies, 

persistent criticism of Europe's democratic leaders and embrace of its 

anti-democratic members and continued weakness in failing to confront 

NATO's primary adversary President Vladimir Putin of Russia, have hurtled the Alliance into its most worrisome crisis in memory.3 

There is no reason to believe President Trump's attitude will change for 

the better during the next two years. He believes NATO allies are taking 

advantage of the U.S.4 These are the same allies and partners who came 

to America's defense on 9/11, suffered more than 1,000 battlefield deaths 

alongside American soldiers in Afghanistan,5 are fighting with the U.S. 

now against the Islamic State and shoulder the main burden sustaining a 

fragile peace in the Balkans, in both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

President Trump is the first U.S. president to view the European Union 

as an economic competitor rather than a vital partner of both the U.S. 

and NATO. His troubling anti-NATO and anti-Europe bias has caused 

European governments to question the credibility of the U.S. as the leader 

of the West for the first time since the Second World War.6 The European 

public confidence in American leadership is also at historically low depths? 

Every American president before Trump has encouraged the strength and 

2 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
7 

unity of Europe as a core interest of the U.S. Trump may well cause even 

greater damage to the Alliance while he remains in office. 

For this reason, Republicans and Democrats in Congress must act together 

as a blocking force against President Trump's dangerous policies. Congress, 

on a bipartisan basis, should reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the Article 

5 defense clause in the NATO Treaty. Congress should pass legislation this 

year requiring Congressional approval should President Trump attempt 

to alter U.S. treaty commitments to NATO allies or to have the U.S. leave 

the Alliance altogether.8 Congress should continue to fund the "European 

Deterrence Initiative" to bolster U.S. military strength in Europe that is the 

primary deterrent against Russian adventurism. 

Restoring European Defense Strength 

NATO's European members and Canada pose their own challenge to the 

Alliance-the weakness of their collective defense spending for NATO's 

common defense. President Trump has been right to push allies to spend 

more on defense. He has the support of the U.S. Congress and many 

Americans in doing so. It is simply unfair that only five of the twenty-nine 

allies are currently spending at least 2 percent of their Gross Domestic 

Product (GDP) on their military budgets, while the U.S. is spending 3.5 

percent and shouldering much of the defense burden.9 

Germany, the largest and wealthiest of the European allies, has a major 

shortfall as it is currently spending only 1.24 percent of its budget on 

defense. Its coalition government has not summoned the strength and 

determination to convince the Bundestag and the German public to 

reach the minimum 2 percent level soon. Germany is thus abdicating this 

most basic obligation as a member of NATO. Italy, Canada, Spain, the 

Netherlands and other allies are also spending well below the agreed 2 

percent level. 10 

Having made his point, President Trump should also acknowledge 

that aggregate NATO defense spending trends are actually heading 

in the right direction, despite insufficient spending by some allies. 

NATO allies have produced four consecutive years of real growth for a 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ! Harvard Kennedy Schoo! 3 
8 

collective increase in spending of $87 billion, particularly in reaction 

to Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and President Trump's public 

pressure since 2017. 11 A majority of NATO members plan to reach 

the 2 percent level by the agreed target date of 2024. More than half 

will spend 20 percent of their defense budgets on new equipment and 

research and development. 12 This new spending is critical to produce 

added NATO defense capabilities, including intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, cyber and digital technologies. 

The challenge for President Trump on NATO defense spending is to pivot 

from chief critic to chief cheerleader. His administration should also 

support new European Union efforts to strengthen the EU's own defense 

capacity as long as it complements, and not duplicates, NATO's existing 

capabilities and programs. 

Upholding NATO's Democratic Values 

NATO is struggling to confront a potentially cancerous threat from within. 

Three allied governments-Poland, Hungary and Turkey-have undermined 

their own democracies in varying degrees by suppressing free speech and a 

free press and limiting the independence of the courts.13 As NATO is, first 

and foremost, an alliance of democracies, the actions of these governments 

threaten the core values-democracy, individual liberty and the rule oflawto which each ally is committed in the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Nearly every current and former NATO official with whom we talked for 

this report worried that a recommendation for NATO to discipline these 

anti-democratic governments would be highly problematic and divisive. 

Nonetheless, we believe NATO must find a way to shine a light on these 

recalcitrant allies. For example, NATO could review annually each ally's 

democratic practices, perhaps in a report prepared by a high-level, outside 

group. Allies that violate basic democratic standards could be suspended 

from NKfO military exercises or denied access to NATO training and 

common infrastructure funding. 

More than one European mentioned to us the ironic fact that the U.S. itself 

may be chastised for a deterioration of its own democratic standards in 

4 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
9 

such a process. Nevertheless, ignoring this challenge of democratic principles will undermine the core convictions that brought NATO together 

seventy years ago. 

Streamlining NATO Decision-Making 

NATO allies have always reached critical decisions by consensus. This 

continues to make sense for all allies to agree on how NATO should act 

on major issues. But, it is time for the Alliance to empower the Secretary 

General on the administrative and resource issues that impede focusing 

on more significant challenges. The Secretary General must have the 

operational power to move an often-unwieldy Alliance forward in the way 

it plans and operates on a daily basis. Also important is improving decision-making in crisis scenarios. 

Challenges from Beyond NATO's Borders 

Containing Putin's Russia 

NATO faces a challenge to deter further Russian aggression in Eastern 

Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin is destabilizing NATO partners 

Ukraine and Georgia by the continued occupation of their territories. He 

also seeks to weaken the three Baltic allies from within. 14 And Russian 

cyber attacks, political subversion and aggressive social media campaigns 

pose a threat to all the NATO democracies and their electoral processes. 

NATO allies thus need to take much stronger measures against Moscow 

than they have to date by: 

Reaffirming economic sanctions on Russia will remain in place for 

as long as it occupies Ukrainian territory; 

Sustaining indefinitely current back-to-back NATO rotational 

troop deployments to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, while 

adding enablers and improving readiness of reinforcements; 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy Schoo! 5 
10 

Addressing vulnerabilities in the area of hybrid warfare urgently, 

the most likely form of Russian aggression against the Alliance; 

Preparing cyber offensive options to deter Russia from further 

cyber attacks. 

At the same time, it makes sense for NATO leaders to maintain continuing 

contacts with the Kremlin on the many issues that divide NATO allies 

and Russia: Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereign territory, dangerous 

Russian air and sea maneuvers in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the 

Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) violation, 

Afghanistan and measures to prevent miscalculation that could lead to 

conflict that all wish to avoid. 

Containing Russian power will be a generational challenge until Putin's 

Soviet-trained leadership circle leaves power during the next decade, perhaps beyond. lhere is no more important external challenge for NATO. 

Ending the Afghan War 

NATO's largest and longest combat mission in Afghanistan is at a critical 

juncture. The war with the Taliban is at a stalemate. Afghan civilian and 

military casualties are at an all-time high. 15 Few believe the war can be 

won outright. President Trump appears determined to have the U.S. depart 

quickly sometime in 2019 after nearly 18 years of combat. President Trump 

and his advisors should proceed carefully, in close coordination with the 

Afghan government, to avoid a precipitous U.S. departure that would jeopardize American interests and risk further instability in Afghanistan. 

The Trump administration is right to engage directly with the Taliban to 

explore a political process to end the war. A durable, sustainable settlement 

ultimately must be made among Afghans, including the elected Afghan 

government and the Taliban. The interests and views of Afghanistan's 

neighbors and the NATO allies with troops on the ground must be considered as welL The U.S. should proceed slowly and carefully, conditioning 

troop withdrawals on the Taliban's meeting agreed security and political 

benchmarks beginning with a ceasefire and including agreeing to engage 

6 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
11 

with the Afghan government. NATO allies should adhere to the "in 

together, out together" principle, avoiding unilateral national withdrawals. 

Refocusing NATO Partnerships 

NATO maintains a partnership with forty-one countries outside the 

Alliance from Mauritania in West Africa to Japan. 16 Many states have 

been invaluable members of coalitions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans 

and in the fight against the Islamic State. Most important, NATO should 

strengthen its partnership with the European Union. Partnerships with the 

Gulf Coordination Council, the African Union and the Arab League could 

promote stability along NATO's periphery. 

Maintaining an Open Door to Future Members 

Following a historic two-decade expansion of the NATO Alliance with 

thirteen new members, NATO would be well advised to consolidate that 

expansion once North Macedonia joins the Alliance in the coming months. 

Over the next decade or two, however, NATO should keep the door 

open for any European democracy that meets the strict qualifications for 

membership. Georgia and Ukraine may not meet the conditions for years 

to come, but it is in NATO's interest to hold open the possibility of membership in the long term. No country outside the Alliance, most especially 

Russia, can have a veto over who NATO accepts as it pursues its goal of 

providing for a free and peaceful European continent. 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy School 7 
12 

Challenges on the Horizon 

Winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age 

NATO faces yet another critical challenge in adapting quickly to a rapidly changing, global, military technology landscape. Its often-byzantine 

defense planning processes date to the Cold War, long before the extraordinary, current advances in military arms powered by artificial intelligence, 

cyber, robotics, quantum computing and biotechnology-perhaps the most 

decisive change in military technology since the start of the nuclear age. 

NATO allies, led by the United States, must now commit a far greater share 

of their military budgets to acquiring these new military technologies, lest 

China and Russia gain a decisive advantage in the decade ahead. 

Competing with China 

While China does not pose a direct military threat to most NATO allies, it 

is emerging as a global competitor politically, economically and in seeking 

dominance in digital military technologies. Europe, the United States 

and Canada need to adopt a more cohesive approach to China. Beijing is 

emerging as the strongest strategic competitor of both North America and 

Europe in this century. The European allies need to focus more intently on 

the challenge from Chinese economic and technological power and industrial espionage. NATO allies should thus tighten restrictions on Chinese 

investments in key technology sectors on both sides of the Atlantic. And 

NATO should strengthen its military partnerships with Japan, South 

Korea, Australia, New Zealand and others. 

China will be the main geo-strategic competitor of the United States in the 

decades ahead. It is in the interest of NATO allies to take on the defense 

burden in the trans-Atlantic region more equitably, to enable the U.S. to 

focus increasingly on the competition with China. In this strategic sense, 

NATO's military strength and unity could be a potentially decisive factor in 

the long-term competition ahead in the Indo-Pacific. The goal is to live and 

work with China where possible, but to compete to maintain the primacy 

of the free, democratic countries in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. 

8 NATO at Seventy. An Alliance in Crisis 
13 

Mr. CICILLINE. It is a thoughtful analysis of the current state of 

the alliance and roadmap for its future. The report warns, and I 

quote, ‘‘President Donald Trump is regarded widely in NATO capitals as the alliance’s most urgent and often most difficult problem.’’ End quote. 

This is an extraordinary statement. NATO, an alliance founded 

by the United States and our closest allies in great part to defend 

the United States, now sees the President of the United States as 

a threat. Incredible. 

Today, I want to send a clear message to our European allies. 

The United States is committed to our partnerships with Europe, 

and Congress will continue to support the transatlantic alliance, as 

we stand together to face new threats to democracy, peace, and 

global stability. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative. 

Now no one else wants to have any opening statement. So, I 

would like to introduce our witnesses and thank them for their 

presence here today. 

Ambassador Nicholas Burns is the Roy and Barbara Goodman 

Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International 

Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. During 

his distinguished career as a member of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Burns served as Undersecretary for Political Affairs at 

the Department of State, as well as U.S. Ambassador to NATO. 

Not unimportantly, he resides in Massachusetts and spends a great 

deal of time in the wonderful community of Westport. 

Ms. Christine Wormuth is the Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center. She previously served 

as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense, and prior to that, as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 

Strategy, Plans, and Forces; Special Assistant to the President; 

Senior Director for Defense at the National Security Council, and 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense. 

Dr. Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced 

International Studies, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He previously served as Special 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning, and 

as a leader writer for the Commission on the National Defense 

Strategy for the United States. 

Finally, Ms. Heather Conley is a Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and Director of the Europe Program 

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, 

Ms. Conley served as Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Department of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 

We appreciate all of you for being here today and look forward 

to the testimony. 

Please limit, although we are not going to hold a clock over your 

head, testimony to the vicinity of 5 minutes. 

And without objection, any of your written statements will be 

made part of the record. 

I will start with Ambassador Burns for his statement. 
14 

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS BURNS, ROY AND BARBARA GOODMAN FAMILY PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY 

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JOHN F. KENNEDY 

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank 

you very much for the pleasure of being here. And, Mr. Chairman, 

as you said, I am happy to be here as one of your constituents from 

Westport, Massachusetts. 

I have submitted my testimony for the record. I just have three 

points in this short presentation. 

First, thank you for doing this. Thank you for focusing on what 

does unite us, as the ranking member said. We believe in NATO 

and we believe in the European Union. And if you think about it, 

they are the cornerstones of the democratic West. They have become that, the U.S. relationship with the European Union on economics and on political affairs, and on climate change, and our 

NATO alliance. 

NATO prevailed in the cold war. And when communism collapsed, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, who was a 

great transatlanticist, we found a Europe ‘‘whole, free and at 

peace’’. And that was a tremendous accomplishment for the United 

States. And the U.S. and the EU and Canada, correspondingly, created unparalleled prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 

We learned a lot of lessons over the last 70 years. NATO’s anniversary, of course, is next Thursday. April 4th of next week will be 

the 70th anniversary of the creation of the alliance. We learned 

that engagement with the world, and our leadership in it, strengthens the United States. 

And the major insight that the founders had, Truman and Eisenhower, Acheson and Dulles, Republicans and Democrats, was that, 

to defend the United States at home, we have to be deployed overseas. We have to be in Europe in alliance with the Europeans, and 

that is how we have kept the peace and great power relationships 

since the Second World War. That is my first point. 

My second point is that, much I think to everyone’s regret, certainly mine, much of what we have achieved may be at risk, as 

President Trump has belittled and, in my view, weakened NATO, 

and he has branded the European Union as a foe of the United 

States, the first President to do that. 

Congressman Cicilline mentioned the report that Ambassador 

Doug Lute and I have just authored on ‘‘NATO at 70,’’ which we 

term ‘‘an alliance in crisis’’. We say there that NATO’s largest problem is that, for the first time in its history, it lacks a strong, principled voice in the White House, in the American Presidency. We 

have always had Presidents, Republican and Democratic, who believe in NATO. And right now, we have a President who has failed 

to commit clearly and unequivocally that he will back up an Article 

5 scenario on attack, a threat of attack, against one of our allies. 

He has also failed to lead the alliance in responding to President 

Putin’s interference in the American election in 2016 and the 

Dutch, French, and German elections of 2017. And I think most importantly, he has become a constant critique of the small ‘‘d’’ democratic leaders, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Theresa May in 
15 

Europe, while he has embraced some of the anti-democratic populist leaders like Viktor Orban in Hungary. 

We hope, I certainly hope, that Congress can right the balance. 

You did at the Munich Security Conference on a bipartisan basis, 

and there are bills in Congress that would reaffirm our Article 5 

commitment, which I certainly believe Congress should act upon. 

Third and finally, this is not just yesterday’s story. There was an 

op-ed in The Wall Street Journal this morning essentially saying 

NATO was a great story, but it is yesterday’s story. This is about 

our future, because we cannot preserve a democratic, united, peaceful Europe without NATO in it. We are not going to have partners 

to fight in the anti-ISIS coalition, which has been very successful 

under both President Trump and President Obama’s leadership, 

without Europe. They are fighting with us in the Horn of Africa. 

They are fighting with us, as you know, in West Africa. They are 

important to us on climate change as a potential partner as we reenter—I hope we will—the climate change agreements in the future. They are important to us on Iran. 

And finally, I would say, we are going to fight two big battles 

with the authoritarian powers in the years ahead. One is the battle 

of ideas. The Russians and Chinese believe that their big idea, central planning, one political party, denial of the human and civil 

rights of a population, that that is the way forward, and they are 

saying that. That is Xi Jinping and Putin’s message. We need to 

defend our Western catalyst, rule-of-law societies. The United 

States and Europe have to be in that together. That is a first big 

battle. 

The second is the battle for technological predominance in our 

military with the Chinese. And that maybe is the most important 

for our future, that we retain technological military superiority. It 

is at risk. We need Europe and our East Asian allies to compete 

with the Chinese. So, we are tomorrow’s alliance, not just yesterday’s alliance. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:] 
16 

R. Nicholas Burns 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN E KENNLDY SCHOOL OF GOVFRNMENT 

Robert and Rent>e Belfer Center for Sdenre and International Affair~ 

The Historic Alliance between the United States and Europe 

tel (617) 496·3255 

Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the 

Environment 

Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns 

March 26, 2019 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our 

vital alliance with Europe. 

Maintaining U.S. leadership in the NATO Alliance and sustaining the critical relationship between the 

U.S. and the European Union will continue to be among the most vital strategic aims of the United 

States in the decade ahead. Both of our political parties and the great majority of Americans in recent 

public opinion polls support a continuation of American leadership in NATO. We should also continue 

to view the over 500 million people who live in the European Union as our allies, friends and economic 

partners. 

In my own Foreign Service career as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ambassador to Greece and Under 

Secretary of State, l saw time and again how the European allies and Canada are critical to America's 

security in a dangerous world. That remains true today as it will surely be in the future. 

Our Common History 

During the seventy-four years since the Allied victory in the Second World War, no part of the world 

has been more important to the security and prosperity of the United States than Europe. 

America's post-war leaders-Truman and Eisenhower, Marshall, Acheson, Dulles and othersunderstood that our experiences in the f'irst and Second World Wars and the advent of the Cold War 

compelled us to think in new ways about how to defend America in a dangerous world. 

They resolved that the United Stales could not, once again, retreat into isolation after the supreme effort 

we had made to defeat the fascist powers. We would have to lead, on a permanent basis, as the strongest 

economic, political and military power in the world. In order to do so, their great insight was that the 

U.S. could no longer defend its own borders without deploying American land, naval and air forces 

permanently in Europe well beyond the U.S. itself. This was a decision based on our own self-interest. 

It permitted us to defend our security and that of our allies in Europe and Canada who shared our most 

important values--democracy, human and religious rights, the rule of law, and a belief in free markets. 

This strategy led the U.S. to take two historic decisions, on a bipartisan basis, in the years after World 

War Two. 

Nicholas_Burns@hks.harvard.edu 
17 

R. Nicholas Burns 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN E KENNCOY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 

Roben and Renee Belft'r Center for Science and International Affairs 

The first was to create the North Atlantic Treaty ' Organization (NATO) here in Washington seventy 

years ago next week in April I 949. For the first time in its history, the U.S. committed to help defend 

the security of allied countries on a permanent basis. 

The second was to encourage the European countries, struggling to recover from war, to integrate their 

economies and political future in a new supranational effort that led from the Coal and Steel 

Community of the late 1940s to the Treaty of Rome in I 957, the Common Market, the Maastricht 

Agreement and the creation of the European Union we know and admire today. 

Every American President from Truman and Eisenhower to George W. Bush and Barack Obama shared 

the common strategic view that the success and freedom of Europe was critical to our values, interests 

and success in the world. 

In creating and leading NATO over the last seven decades, American leaders accepted the new reality 

that the U.S. would be stronger and more secure in alliance with others. In supporting European 

integration, the U.S. helped France and Germany to achieve a historic and permanent reconciliation. 

Together. NATO and the European Union became the twin standard bearers of the free world we 

worked to sustain. 

Through the decades, the U.S., Canada and Europe helped to create other important multilateral 

institutions such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade (GAIT) and many others that helped to form a network for democracy. human rights, free trade 

and free markets. 

A Europe Whole, Free and at Peace 

This historic American policy succeeded even beyond the hopes of its founders. NATO deterred a 

Soviet attack on Western Europe during more than four decades of the Cold War. The close U.S. 

economic and trade relationship with Europe and Canada produced unprecedented economic growth 

and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. The Cold War ended with the collapse of communism in 

Eastern Europe and with it the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. More than l 00 million East 

Europeans were freed from behind the Iron Curtain. 

This helped to create, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, a Europe "whole, free and at peace". 

The resulting transatlantic community is now the largest democratic group of countries in the worldnearly 900 million people living in free societies. protected by the mle of law and by the most powerful 

military alliance in history. 

Nicholas_Burns@hks.harYJrd.edu 
18 

R. Nicholas Burns 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOH~ f. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOV[RNMENT 

Robert and Rent!e Belfer Center for Science and International Affa1rs 

' The creation of this community is one of the great achievements of American foreign policy in our 

history. And it remains of incalculable benefit to the U.S. 

The Future of American Policy toward Europe 

As we consider our current and future strategy towards Europe. we should maintain and modernize this 

successful bipartisan policy of the last seven decades. 

One of our central aims should be to lead and continue to build a strong NATO. In a recent Harvard 

University repott entitled "NATO at 70: An Alliance in Crisis", Ambassador Doug Lute and I (both of 

us are former American Ambassadors to NATO), argued that NATO remains absolutely vital for 

America's most important strategic interests. 

NATO is the core organization that keeps Europeans and North Americans free and secure from 

conventional and nuclear threats. It deters Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading or seeking 

to destabilize our NATO allies in Eastern Europe. 

The NATO allies also share the burden with us of our military deployments outside of Europe. Many 

of the NATO allies are serving with our forces today in the successful anti-ISIS coalition in northern 

Syria, in counter terrorist efforts in the Horn of Africa and in West Africa. They have assisted the U.S. 

in Iraq. The European allies have taken over complete responsibility for the peacekeeping forces in 

Bosnia and the majority of the effoti in Kosovo. As you know, all of the NATO allies have deployed 

with us to Afghanistan since 2003. Many are still there with us today. 

I witnessed the value of NATO on 9/ll as U.S. Ambassador to the Alliance. The Ambassadors of 

Canada and the European allies came to me that afternoon at NATO Headquarters outside of Brussels 

to pledge to help defend us. Together, we invoked the Article 5 Mutual Defense Clause of the NATO 

Treaty for the first and only time the day after those horrible attacks. 

Our allies acted to defend us because they understood their security was linked directly with our own. 

Their decision to fight with us was also based on the knowledge that we are all stronger in alliance than 

on our own. And they believed in our leadership. 

Since going into Afghanistan with us, the NATO allies and partners have suffered more than 1000 

combat deaths. I have often reflected on this simple but central lesson from 9/ll-it is good for the 

United States to have such friends in the world who share our values and who stand with us when times 

are toughest. 

It would be a mistake, however, to view NATO solely through the prism of our history. NATO is also 

critical for our future. Because our armed forces have permanent access to a labyrinth of NATO 

Nicho\as_Rurns@hks.harvard.edu 
19 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNFDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 

Robert and Rente Be! fer Center for Science and International Affair:> 

• tel (617) 496-3255 

R. Nicholas Burns 

ground, air and naval bases throughout Europe, the U.S. is a continent closer to the threats we face in 

South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 

NATO is also the most significant power differential between the U.S. and our greatest adversary in 

Europe-the Russian Federation. We can call on twenty-eight other countries to share the strategic 

burden and the financial cost of our military operations. We have allies who see the world the way we 

do and will act with us. Russia does not have a single such ally. 

In similar fashion. the U.S. has relied on the European Union as our closest economic and political 

partner in the world. Our largest trade relationship is with the EU. The largest investors in the U.S. 

economy arc the countries of the Ell. We are the two largest global economies. We have been together 

the foremost advocates for free and fair trade in the world, for human rights and for the rule of law. 

During the George W. Bush Administration, the U.S. worked closely with the EU and its member 

states-France, Germany and the United Kingdom-to sanction Iran and pressure it to agree to 

negotiations over its nuclear weapons ambitions. During the Obama Administration, the U.S. and EU 

helped to lead the way toward the Iran Nuclear Deal as well as the Paris Climate Change Agreement 

of2015. 

This is not to argue that our interests are completely symmetrical with the Ell or the NATO allies. We 

are often competitors. as well as partners, in trade. U.S.leaders of both parties, Jed by President Trump 

during the last two years. have also long been rightly frustrated by low European defense spending, in 

particular by Germany, the wealthiest of all the European countries. The Trump Administration and 

its predecessors have also argued that Europe is excessively reliant on Russian natural gas exports. 

In addition, the Administration has been right recently to urge Europe not to become reliant on Chinese 

companies in the race for dominance in 5G and the other digital age technologies critical for the future. 

Over this past weekend, unfortunately, the government of Italy joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, 

giving Beijing unprecedented reach into the economies and industrial infrastructure of southern Europe 

to add to their investments in Greece and the Balkan countries. The U.S. will need to work hard to 

convince other European countries from taking the same step. 

There is no doubt, however, that the many positive benefits of our relationship with NATO and the 

European Union far outweigh such disagreements. Every President, Republican and Democrat, has 

understood that the U.S. is far stronger with the NATO allies than without them. 

President Trump, unfortunately, has chosen to become NATO's chief critic rather than its strong and 

unifying leader. As a result, we are experiencing one of the most profound transatlantic disputes since 

the creation ofNATO. 

Nicholas_Burns@hks.barvard.edu 
20 

R. Nicholas Burns 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN E KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMEN1 

R(Jben and Rente Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 

' Ambassador Lute and I stated in our recent report on NATO that the major challenge the Alliance faces 

in 2019 is the absence of strong, principled American Presidential leadership for the first time in its 

history, 

President Trump has failed to commit that the U.S. would honor its Article 5 commitments to allies in 

a crisis. This is the bedrock commitment that all our previous Presidents have honored. In addition. 

he has failed to stand up to President Putin's aggression towards our 2016 elections and to Putin's 

attempt to destabilize the Dutch, French and German elections in 2017. It was Congress, not President 

Trump, which insisted the U.S. impose sanctions on Russia in 2017 for this attack on western 

democracies. 

He has been a frequent and caustic critic of some of our closest friends in Europe-including Chancellor 

Angela Merkel, President Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister Teresa May and Prime Minister Justin 

Trudeau-while embracing publicly some of Europe's most authoritarian leaders such as Viktor Orban 

in Hungary, the Turkish and Polish governments as well as anti-democratic leaders in the Italian 

coalition. 

This jarring juxtaposition-the American President appearing to side with anti-democratic populists in 

Europe against the true champions of democracy and the rule of law-has done significant harm to the 

reputation and credibility of the U.S. in Europe. 

President Trump has also characterized the European Union as a "foe" of the U.S. That statement alone 

turns more than seventy years of carefully constructed American policy on its head. His open animus 

towards the European Union and his threats of a trade war with Brussels are deeply mistaken. 

The Trump Administration has spurned the partnership President Obama had created with Europe in 

forging the Paris Climate Change Agreement. It took the U.S. out of the Iran Nuclear Agreement that 

we had negotiated in strength alongside the EU, Britain, Germany and France. It is now imposing 

secondary sanctions on European countries that continue to trade with Iran. These steps and others 

have created a level of anger and frustration with the United States that I believe is unprecedented. 

He is the first American President to turn away from the close security, political, trade and diplomatic 

tics that have made our friendship with Europe the greatest force for democracy and peace in modern 

history. 

Policy Challenges.for the United Stales in 2019 

Maintaining the NATO Alliance and a close partnership with the European Union remain essential for 

the security and economic success of the United States. We have a number of tough challenges ahead 

on which we will need the support and strength of both institutions in 2019 and beyond. 

Nicholas_Burns@hks.harvard.edu 
21 

R. Nicholas Burns 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN C KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 

Robert and Renee Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 

First, we will need to strengthen NATO's armored capacity in Europe to contain Russian power, 

particularly in Eastern Europe. In this respect, the strong support of Congress in supporting and funding 

the European Deterrence Initiative (EDJ) to rebuild U.S military strength in Europe has been essential. 

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Dunford, told the Atlantic Council last week, it will 

also be essential to maintain American forces on the European continent as NATO provides the U.S. 

"a comparative advantage over Russia". 

NATO must also be much better organized under American leadership to counter Russia's hybrid 

offensive against our elections and in Moscow's attempt to destabilize our internal politics. 

The U.S. should continue to push the European allies and Canada to spend more on their defense hy 

reaching the 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product level expected of all allies by 2024. The allies should 

assume increased responsibility for NATO missions in the decade ahead. 

Second, the U.S. should supp01t those allies-Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 

and others-who are combating the threat of anti-democratic populism in Europe today. In this 

respect, the U.S. and the allies need to find ways to admonish and pressure those allies-Hungary, 

Poland and Turkey-whose governments are adopting authoritarian policies. This threatens the values 

that bind NATO together as an alliance of democracies. 

Third, we will also need to wage a broader, global "battle of ideas" against the power and selfconfidence of the major authoritarian powers, Russia and China. They are seeking to de legitimize 

democracy, free elections and human rights in favor of their authoritarian model. This contest of ideas 

is being waged within Europe and around the world. Just as John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and 

other American Presidents saw this as a fundamental test in the past, we should do so in our time as 

well. 

The U.S. will need the weight and moral authority of the European allies to help win this battle to 

defend our democratic and rule of law societies in the decade ahead. 

Fowth, we will also need Europe's support and active involvement as we wage a second global battle 

in the years ahead with China-the "hattie for technological dominance"-in Artificial Intelligence, 

Machine Learning, Quantum Computing, Biotechnology and other fields. This contest may well 

determine whether the U.S. can maintain in future decades the long superiority we have had in 

qualitative military power over our rivals. We cannot afford to lose this advantage to China. 

Given the damage President Trump has caused to our relationship with the EU and NATO, Congress 

should continue to exercise its constitutional responsibilities to reaffirm our treaty commitments to 

Nicholas~Burns@hks.harvard.edu 
22 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL Of GOVERNMENT 

Robert and Renee Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 

R. Nicholas Burns 

Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor 

of Diplomacy and International Relations ' NATO and the importance of our relationship with the European Union. Congress must limit and 

block, if necessary, the most dangerous policies of the President. 

Congressional resolutions in supp011 of NATO in 2018 were important in reassuring Europeans and 

their governments of our continued commitment. If the President moves to limit the U.S. troop 

contribution to NATO or. unthinkably, to seek to remove the U.S. from NATO altogether, Congress 

with the support of both pat1ies, must move to block him. 

Conclusion 

The great Transatlanticist, Winston Churchill, reminded Americans of our impm1ance to the free world 

at the height of the Second World War. In September 1943, Churchill said in a speech at Harvard about 

America's global role: "The price of greatness is responsibility." He added, ''one cannot rise to be in 

many ways the leading community in the civilized world without being involved in its problems, 

convulsed by its agonies and inspired by its causes." 

Churchill's war-time ally, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, echoed him by stating in his Fourth 

Inaugural Address in .January !945 when victory was imminent: "We have learned to be citizens of 

the world, members of the human community. We have learned the simple truth, as Emerson said, that 

"The only way to have a friend is to be one." 

Chairman Keating and Ranking Member Kinzinger, these central truths about America's role in the 

world are under challenge today by those who would have us retreat from global responsibility and 

power. 

I believe the United States is still the country that Churchill and Roosevelt described in their remarks. 

The U.S. is the greatest force for stability, for good and for peace in the world today. If we have learned 

one central lesson from World War Two until now, it is that to defend our country at home, we must 

remain engaged overseas with our democratic aiJics in NATO and the European Union. 

As we look to the future, Americans can feel confident that we will be more secure, more prosperous 

and more confident about the continuation of human freedom if we maintain our historic, successful 

and irreplaceable alliance with Europe and Canada in the decades ahead. 

Nicholas_Burns@hks.harvard.edu 
23 

Mr. KEATING. Ms. Wormuth. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE WORMUTH, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND 

CORPORATION 

Ms. WORMUTH. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, 

members of the committee, thank you for this hearing and for the 

opportunity to be here. 

Our cooperation with the countries of Europe is based on our 

shared values. This is picking up on something Ambassador Burns 

just said, our shared belief in democracy, in individual liberty, and 

the rule of law. And we have shared a common purpose with Europe to protect and advance these values. And I saw that time and 

time again in my government career, how important it is to work 

with our European allies and partners. 

I wanted to just give a few examples this afternoon of some of 

the benefits of the transatlantic relationship, looking at three different periods: the post-cold war period, the moments after the 9/ 

11 attack, and then, the era we are in now, and will be in, an era 

of strategic competition. 

Four decades of close cooperation with the Europeans during the 

cold war ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union just 2 years later. We immediately began 

working with Western Europe on Germany’s reunification within 

NATO and the larger goal of building a Europe whole and free. We 

and our European allies focused on engaging the former Warsaw 

Pact countries as well as the former Soviet Republics, working to 

help them transition and stabilize. 

Through programs like NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the SEED 

Act, and others, NATO nations helped these countries emerge from 

communism. Many of them eventually joined NATO, and many 

others also joined the European Union. And the work that we did 

during that period made both sides of the transatlantic relationship 

safer and more prosperous. 

After al-Qaeda attacked us on September 11th, 2001, Europe 

again showed their solidarity. NATO invoked the Article 5 collective defense pledge for the first and only time in its history. European nations fought with us in Afghanistan from the earliest days, 

losing more than a thousand military personnel on the battlefield. 

Under the NATO umbrella, many of the European countries are 

still with us in Afghanistan today. Some of our European allies also 

joined us in Iraq, fighting alongside our military, training Iraqi security forces, and working to rebuild Iraqi institutions. 

And then, in the summer of 2014, when the Islamic State seized 

territory in Iraq, many Europeans joined us in the anti-Isis coalition. Some joined the air campaign or contributed special operations forces. Others provided trainers on the ground, and still others gave weapons to the Kurdish peshmerga, and the Iraqi security 

forces. Many Europeans also provided much-needed reconstruction 

funding. Ending the physical caliphate, which just happened in the 

last few days, in Iraq and Syria would have taken much longer and 

cost much more without the support from our European allies and 

partners. 
24 

Our close relationship with Europe has given us basing and access rights that would help us not only defend Europe, if we had 

to, but also help us defend our own interests far from our shores. 

The network of American bases we have in the UK, Germany, 

Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey are strategic assets that help us 

respond more quickly, whether it is to conduct non-combatant evacuations, provide humanitarian assistance, or respond more quickly 

to crises. 

It is also important to note we have cooperated with Europe on 

a range of non-military challenges. In 2013, several European nations helped with the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. During the 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa, the UK and France sent 

military personnel, and the EU contributed substantial financial 

resources to the countries fighting the disease. 

As Ambassador Burns says, the Europeans also worked with us 

to negotiate the nuclear agreement with Iran and the Paris Climate Agreement. And although the United States has withdrawn 

from both of those agreements, the Europeans have stayed in both. 

Now, as we look to this new period of competition, Europe continues to help us pursue our strategic goals. They have been our 

closest partners in pushing back against Russian violations of sovereignty. For the past 5 years, together we have maintained sanctions against Russia because of its aggression in Ukraine. And 

standing together, the United States and 24 European nations expelled 115 Russian diplomats in response to the brazen chemical 

weapons attack on the Skripals. 

President Putin seems intent on undermining the rules-based 

order that the United States and Europe worked so hard to build 

all these many years. Preventing that outcome is going to require 

us to work closely with Europe and NATO. We have taken a number of measures already to shore up deterrence, including forward 

deployment of multinational battle groups in Poland and each of 

the Baltic States. 

Motivated substantially by the need to deter Russia, many 

NATO members are increasing their defense spending. A majority 

of them will be on target to meet the 2 percent goal by 2024. And 

although several European countries absolutely need to spend more 

on defense, the increasingly fraught debate over burden-sharing 

runs the risk of overshadowing the many benefits of the transatlantic relationship. 

I would just close by saying, looking ahead, the rise of China will 

likely be the most important geopolitical challenge for the foreseeable future. Our principal advantage in that competition, as the 

chairman has said, are our alliances with Asia and Europe, and it 

is one we cannot afford to jettison. So, just as we have worked together on security in Europe, we need to work closely with Europe 

today to form common political, economic, and security approaches 

to China. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth follows:] 
25 

The United States and Europe Since World 

War II 

A Mutually Beneficial Partnership 

Christine Wormuth 

CT-506 

Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment on March 

26,2019. 
26 

For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/pubs/tcstimonies/CT506.html 

Testimonies 

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Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 

©Copyright 20 J 9 RAND Corporation 

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www.rand.org 
27 

The United States and Europe Since World War II: A Mutually Beneficial Partnership 

Testimony of Christine Wormuth 1 

The RAND Corporatiml 

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment 

United States House of Representatives 

March 26, 2019 

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear today to share my perspective on how the U .S.-European 

relationship has advanced U.S. security and global security since the end of World War 

IL Our cooperation with the countries of Europe, with NATO, and organizations like the 

European Union is based on our shared values-our shared belief in democracy, individual 

liberty, and the rule of law. We share a common purpose with our European allies and friends to 

protect and advance these values, and we've been engaged together in that common task for 

more than seventy years. My testimony will focus on highlighting how the U.S. relationship with 

Europe has benefited the United States, with a focus on military and diplomatic cooperation in 

the post-Cold War period, the years after the September I I attacks. and the current period of 

strategic competition with Russia and China. 

The Post-Cold War Period 

Founded in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II, NATO's purpose during the Cold War 

was to deter the Soviet Union. Four decades of close cooperation with the Europeans, with the 

NATO alliance at the heart of that partnership. ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 

the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later. Winning the Cold War would not have been 

possible without Europe. What was not so obvious thirty years ago was how much the close U.S. 

relationship with Europe would continue to serve U.S. security interests in the coming years. 

1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as 

representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research. 

2 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make 

communities throughout the world safer and more secure. healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, 

nonpartisan. and committed to the public interest. 
28 

When the Berlin Wall fell, the leaders of West Germany, the United States, the UK, and 

France immediately began working together on Germany's reunification within NATO and the 

larger goal of a Europe whole and free, European allies and the United States focused their 

attention on engaging the former Warsaw Pact countries, as well as the former Soviet republics, 

working to help them transition and stabilize, Through programs like the Partnership for Peace, 

NATO helped these countries emerge from communism and begin reforming their militaries and 

ministries of defense, Many of these countries eventually joined NATO, and many also joined 

the European Union. The work the United States and its European allies did together during 

these years made the United States and Europe safer and more prosperous. 

In the 1990s, the United States and its European allies turned their attention to bringing 

stability to the periphery ofNA TO, primarily in the Balkans. Through Operation Deliberate 

Force in Bosnia and then Operational Allied Force in Kosovo, the United States worked with 

Europe to bring peace to the Balkans. Today, NATO continues to maintain a presence of about 

3,500 soldiers in Kosovo, with most of the personnel coming from European allies and partners.3 

U.S. Relations with Europe After the September 11 Attacks 

After ai-Qaeda attacked the United States on September II, 200 I, the nations of Europe 

immediately showed their solidarity. NATO invoked the Article 5 collective defense pledge for 

the first and only time in its history.4 European allies and partners fought alongside the United 

States in Afghanistan from the earliest days, losing more than one thousand personnel on the 

battlefield.5 Under the NATO umbrella, European countries remain part of the Afghanistan 

mission today. The Europeans also joined the United States in Iraq, lighting alongside the U.S. 

military, training Iraqi security forces, and working to rebuild Iraqi institutions. 

In the wake of the September II attacks, the long-standing U.S. relationship with Europe 

enabled close cooperation to strengthen intelligence sharing in the light against terrorism and to 

deepen law enforcement cooperation so that the United States and Europe would be better able to 

disrupt terrorist plotting, prevent future attacks, track foreign fighters, and identify homegrown 

extremists. These close intelligence and law enforcement partnerships continue to serve us well 

today. 

When the Islamic State seized territory in Iraq and threatened Baghdad in the summer of 

2014, many European countries joined the anti-·lslamic State coalition led by the United States. 

Some countries joined the air campaign or contributed special operations forces, others provided 

trainers on the ground, and still others provided weapons for the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi 

security forces. Many European countries also supported much-needed reconstruction efforts. 

3 NATO, "Kosovo Force: Key Facts and Figures," February 2019 

(https://www.nato.int/nato _static_ 1120 14/assets/pdflpdf_ 2019 _ 02/20190213 _ 20 19-02-KFOR-Piacemat.pdt). 

4 NATO, "Collected Defense: Article 5," webpage, last updated June 12,2018 

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics _II 0496.htm ). 

5 U.S. Department of Defense, "Casualty Status as of 10 a.m. EDT March 21, 2019," webpage, last updated March 

21, 2019 (https://dod.dcfense.gov!News/Casualty-Status/); also see iCasualties.org. 

2 
29 

The close U.S. relationship with Europe over the years has given us basing and access rights 

that enable the United States not only to help defend Europe should that be needed, but also to 

defend U.S. interests far from its shores. The network of American bases in the UK, Germany, 

Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey are strategic assets that enable the United Stales to respond 

more quickly, whether it is to conduct a noncombatant evacuation, provide humanitarian 

assistance, or respond to a crisis. Many U.S. military personnel wounded in Afghanistan, the 

Middle East, and Africa in the past sixteen years received lifesaving care within hours because 

there is a premiere U.S. military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany. Because the United States has 

access to the air base at Incirlik, Turkey, the United States was able to increase the number of 

strike sorties in Iraq and Syria, enabling it to intensify the fight against the Islamic State. These 

are just two examples of the benefits the United States gains from these arrangements. 

Beyond military operations, the close relationship the United States has with Europe has also 

resulted in cooperation on a range of other issues. Through the European Union, Europe has 

conducted anti piracy operations across the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia. In 2013, 

Norway, Denmark, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Finland each assisted with the destruction of 

Syrian chemical weapons, an effort led by the United States.6 During the 2014-2015 Ebola 

outbreak in West Africa, the UK and France sent military personnel to Sierra Leone and Guinea 

to assist with the response effort, and the European Union contributed substantial financial 

resources to countries battling the disease. France, Germany, the UK, and the European Union all 

worked closely with the United States to negotiate the nuclear agreement with Iran that put limits 

on Iran's nuclear program for 15 years-permanent prohibitions on nuclear weapons-related 

activities coupled with an intrusive inspection regime in perpetuity in exchange for relief from 

economic sanctions. The United States has withdrawn from the deal, but Europe continues to try 

to uphold the agreement, so far with success. The nations of Europe and the European Union also 

worked with the United States and many other countries worldwide to craft the Paris Agreement 

on climate in 2016, and although the United States has withdrawn, Europe remains in the 

agreement today. 

The United States and Europe in an Era of Strategic Competition 

Now, as the United States and its allies and partners around the world enter a new period of 

strategic competition, the close U.S. relationship with Europe continues to help the United States 

pursue its strategic goals. The Europeans have been our closest partners in pushing back against 

Russian violations of sovereignty, whether through military action or less visible means, such as 

interfering in the democratic processes of multiple countries. For the past five years, the United 

States, Canada, and the European Union have maintained sanctions on Russia for its aggression 

in Ukraine. Standing together, the United States and 24 European countries expelled more than 

6 Arms Control Association, "Timclinc of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2019," webpage, last updated 

March 20 19 (https://www .arm scontrol.org/factsheets/Timel ine-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity). 

3 
30 

115 Russian diplomats in response to the brazen Novichok chemical weapon attack against 

Sergei and Yulia Skripal on British soit.1 

President Putin seems intent on undermining the rules-based order that the United States and 

Europe worked so hard to build and wants to replace it with a Europe that is once again divided 

into spheres of influence. Preventing that outcome will require the United States to work closely 

with Europe and NATO to deter further Russian aggression and defend against other forms of 

Russian interference. The United States and European NATO members have taken several 

measures since 2014 to shore up deterrence, including a more robust exercise program, a major 

new readiness initiative, and forward deployment of multinational battle groups in Poland and in 

each of the Baltic states. Motivated substantially by the need to deter Russia, many NATO 

members are increasing their defense spending. Five NATO members already spend at least 2 

percent of their GDP on defense. 8 A majority ofNATO members are on target to meet the 2 

percent goal by 2024.9 More than half of NATO members will spend 20 percent of their defense 

budgets on new equipment and much-needed research and dcvelopmcnt. 10 Germany, Italy, 

Spain, the Netherlands, and Canada all spend well below 2 percent of their GDP on defense, and 

this will need to change ifNA TO intends to successfully meet the range of challenges it faces. 11 

Germany's inability to convince its public of the need to spend more on defense is particularly 

troubling and runs counter to its desire to be a leader in Europe and NATO. Although some 

European countries do need to spend more on defense, the increasingly fraught debate over 

burden-sharing runs the risk of overshadowing the many benefits to the United States of its close 

relationship with Europe. 

Looking ahead, the rise of China, which is increasingly competing for leadership of the 

international community, will likely be the most important geopolitical challenge for the 

foreseeable future. The United States and Europe both have a stake in this competition, and the 

close U.S. relationship with Europe provides a significant competitive advantage. America's 

alliances in Asia and Europe are its principal advantage in this competition, one we cannot afford 

to jettison. Just as the United States has worked with its European allies and friends on other 

security challenges and opportunities, the United States should work closely with the countries of 

Europe to develop common political, economic, and security approaches toward China. 

Looking back over the past seventy years, there are myriad examples of how the close U.S. 

relationship with Europe has benefited the United States, increased its security, and enabled its 

continued prosperity. The United States and Europe have not always seen eye to eye on every 

7 Angela Dewan, Milena Veselinovic, and Carol Jordan. ''These Are All the Countries That Are Expelling Russian 

Diplomats," CNN.com, March 28, 2018 (https://edition.cnn.com/20 18/03/26/europe/fult-list-of-russian-diplomatsexpe1led-over-s-intl/index.htm1). 

8 NATO, "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)," press release, July 10, 2018 

(https://www.nato.int/nato static~ fl20 14/assets/pdf/pdf_ 2018 _ 07/20180709 _18071 O-pr20 18-91-en.pdi). 

9 Kathleen H. Hicks, Jeffrey Rathke, Seamus P. Daniels, Michael Matlaga, Laura Daniels, and Andrew Linder, 

Counting Do!lars or Afeasuring f'alue: Assessing NATO and Partner Rurdensharing. Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, July 2018, p. 3. 

10 NATO, "Defence Expenditures ofNA TO Countries (20 11-2018)." 

11 NATO, "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2011-2018)." 

4 
31 

issue, and disagreements over specific political, economic, and security issues continue today. At 

the same time, Americans continue to continue to support NATO and the transatlantic 

relationship. A 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll found that 75 percent of Americans 

favor maintaining the U.S. commitment to NAT0. 12 Many Americans seem to understand what 

the 2017 National Security Strategy itself noted: ''The United States is safer when Europe is 

prosperous and stable, and can help defend our shared interests and ideals.'' 13 

12 See Dina Smeltz, lvo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Lily Wojtowicz, America Engaged: American 

Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2018. 

13 The White House, Tile National Security Strategy of the United States o(America, Washington, D.C., December 

2017, p. 48. 

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32 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Ms. Wormuth. 

Dr. Brands. 

STATEMENT OF HAL BRANDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, AND 

SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. BRANDS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, distinguished members, thank you for having me. I will jump right in, 

in the interest of brevity. 

The modern transatlantic relationship anchored by NATO 

emerged after World War II during the early cold war, and the creation of NATO, in particular, marked a historic departure in U.S. 

policy that was rooted in a threefold logic. It reflected a realization 

that America had a profound interest in shaping a favorable balance of power in Europe, and that persistent U.S. diplomatic and 

military engagement was the only way of doing so. It reflected the 

idea that only a U.S. security guarantee could provide the reassurance necessary to generate economic recovery and prosperity and 

protect democratic institutions in Europe. And finally, the U.S. 

commitment was meant to suppress historical rivalries between 

Germany and its neighbors, and thereby, facilitate European economic and political integration. 

Over the subsequent decades, the U.S. role within NATO and the 

alliance itself have evolved considerably, but for generations that 

relationship has produced a range of critical benefits, not just abstract global benefits, but concrete benefits for the United States. 

First, NATO has significantly increased America’s military 

punching power. During the cold war, European forces were vital 

to maintaining something like a balance of power vis-a-vis the 

Warsaw Pact. Since the cold war, NATO countries have made significant contributions to every major U.S. military intervention. 

America almost never goes to war alone, and a key reason for that 

is that it can draw on the support of European allies. For decades, 

the U.S. relationship with NATO has also provided access to bases, 

logistical facilities, and strategic real eState that make it far easier 

to project American power. 

Second, the relationship with NATO provides geostrategic influence and global stability. NATO binds some of the richest countries 

in the world to the United States. It, thereby, helps us maintain 

a significant overbalance of power vis-a-vis any competitor. NATO 

has deterred aggressive States that might be attempting to destabilize Europe or the broader national system. It has tamped down 

European instability by making it virtually unthinkable that war 

could occur between NATO members. NATO also acts as an impediment to nuclear proliferation by convincing historically insecure countries, such as Germany and Poland, that they do not need 

the world’s absolute weapon. 

Third, NATO enhances U.S. diplomatic leverage. Put bluntly, Europeans have to listen to us on European and global issues because 

the United States plays the leading role in NATO, and that makes 

it the central player in European defense. The United States has 

also used NATO and its institutional structures as vehicles for 
33 

deep cooperation on counterterrorism, counterproliferation, 

counter-piracy, and other challenges. 

Fourth, the relationship with NATO provides economic benefits. 

For decades, U.S. diplomats and trade negotiators have used the 

security leverage provided by its NATO commitments to extract 

more favorable terms in bilateral economic agreements. More 

broadly, NATO and other U.S. alliances sustain a climate of stability in which trade and free enterprise can flourish, thereby bolstering U.S. and global prosperity. 

Finally, the relationship with NATO provides political legitimacy. 

Formal alliances like NATO provide greater international legitimacy for the use of force, especially in cases such as the Kosovo 

conflict when we cannot secure a U.N. Security Council resolution. 

Allied support also enhances the perceived legitimacy of military 

action at home. 

For all these reasons, maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship is critical to U.S. interests. There are, of course, challenges 

that are currently testing the U.S.-NATO relationship, just as 

there have always been such challenges. I discuss those challenges 

at greater length in my written statement, but just a short list 

would include: building a stronger and more credible deterrent 

against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe; ensuring that key 

allies such as Germany are making necessary military investments; 

adapting the alliance to confront unconventional threats like political warfare and economic coercion; reconciling NATO’s collective 

defense mission with its out-of-area responsibilities; confronting 

growing political illiberalism within parts of the alliance, and, most 

importantly, reversing the erosion of U.S. credibility within the alliance as a result of statements questioning America’s Article 5 

commitment. 

The seriousness of these challenges should not be understated, 

but I believe that the transatlantic relationship can overcome 

them, just as it has overcome even greater challenges before, so 

long as the United States continues to provide the leadership that 

has proved so important for the past seven decades. And if anything, I think the relevance of NATO to American strategy is increasing today, not simply because of the Russian threat, but because it is hard to imagine any effective strategy for dealing with 

an autocratic, assertive China that does not include deep cooperation between America and its closest democratic allies in Europe. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brands follows:] 
34 

The Origins and Enduring Value of the Transatlantic Alliance 

Statement before the House l'oreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy. and Environment 

March 26, 2019 

Dr. Hal Brands 

Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor, Johns Hopkins-SA IS 

Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here. l am pleased to discuss the role that the 

transatlantic relationship, and the NATO alliance in particular, has played in advancing global 

security and U.S. interests since World War II. 

This is a vitally important subject, one I address in my work at Johns Hopkins-SA IS and the 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. I should make clear, though, that my testimony 

here reflects only my personal views, and not the institutional position of Johns Hopkins 

University, CSBA, or any other organization. 1 

The modern transatlantic relationship-and the NATO alliance that represents the core of that 

relationship-emerged in the wake of World War II, during the early days of the Cold War. The 

creation ofNATO marked a historic departure in U.S. foreign policy. lt reflected a realization 

that the United States had a profound, enduring interest in shaping a favorable balance of power 

in Europe, and that persistent diplomatic and military engagement was the only way to shape 

such a balance. Additionally, American policymakers realized that only a U.S. security guarantee 

could provide the climate of reassurance necessary to generate postwar recovery, lasting 

prosperity, and the survival of democratic institutions in Europe. Finally, the initial U.S. 

commitment to Europe was based on the idea that this commitment was essential to suppressing 

historical rivalries between Germany and its neighbors and thereby facilitating the process of 

European economic and political integration. 

Over subsequent decades, the U.S. relationship with NATO has evolved considerably, as new 

challenges have emerged and the alliance has taken on new roles and responsibilities. Moreover, 

NATO's membership has more than doubled since the alliance was created in 1949, and its 

geography has shifted as post-Cold War expansion pushed its front lines farther to the east. For 

generations, however, the U.S. relationship with NATO has produced a range of critical benefits, 

which l will briefly summarize before turning to some of the challenges the alliance currently 

confronts, 

1 Parts of this testimony draw on Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "What Are America's Alliances Good For?'' 

Parameters, Summer 20 17; Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and US Strategy in 

an Era q(Global Power Shijls (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017). See also Eric Edelman and 

Whitney McNamara, US. Strategy for Maintaining a Europe Whole and Free (Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, 2017); Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Trump's Transatlantic Crisis," Commentary, September 2018. 
35 

Benefits 

Military Punching Power. The primary measure of any alliance is whether it augments its 

members· military power. And although NATO is often described as a mechanism through 

which America defends other countries. the flip-side of this commitment is that NATO has 

significantly increased the military power America can bring to bear on a given battlefield. 

During the Cold War, European forces were vital to maintaining something approximating a 

balance of power vis-a-vis Warsaw Pact forces. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, key 

NATO allies such as France and the United Kingdom made large contributions of ground, air, 

and naval forces. NATO countries (either individually or as part of a larger alliance mission) also 

contributed troops or other capabilities to U.S.-led missions in Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the counter-ISIS campaign. The United States rarely goes to war 

alone, and a key reason for this is that it can draw on the support of its closest allies in Europe. 

Although there are always difficulties associated with coalition warfare, these allied 

contributions have been critical in easing the overall U.S. burden. For example, NATO 

contributions to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan helped sustain that mission and made it possible 

for Washington to surge 30,000 additional troops into Iraq at a time when its forces were strained 

to the limit. Additionally, the deeply institutionalized nature of the NATO alliance adds to the 

military benefits the United States receives from the alliance. The fact that the U.S. military 

engages in regular training, exercises, and operations with its NATO allies makes it easier to 

coordinate with them in a crisis, improving interoperability and reducing the frictions associated 

with mobilizing a coalition. And for decades, the U.S. relationship with NATO has afforded 

American forces access to critical bases, logistical facilities, and strategic real estate, all of which 

serves to significantly lower the costs and difficulties of U.S. power projection. 

Geostralegic Influence and Global Stability. IfNATO alliance thus makes America stronger in 

the conflicts it wages, it is more helpful still in terms of the conflicts it prevents and the 

geostrategic influence it confers. For decades, NATO has bound some of the richest countries in 

the world to Washington through enduring relationships of deep cooperation; it thereby helps 

America maintain a significant overbalance of power vis-a-vis any competitor. NATO has also 

acted as a strong deterrent to aggressive states that might be attempted to destabilize Europe or 

the broader international system, whether the Soviet Union during the Cold War or Putin's 

Russia today. Indeed, it is notable that Russia has behaved most aggressively toward countries 

(Georgia and Ukraine) that lack U.S. alliance guarantees, rather than toward those countries (the 

Baltic states or Poland) that possess them. This fact shows the wisdom ofNATO's post-Cold 

War expansion: The front lines oftoday"s U.S.-Russia competition are in the Baltic and 

elsewhere along the frontiers of the former Soviet Union, rather than farther to the west, where 

they were during the Cold War. 

Similarly, NATO (and the U.S. role therein) have long tamped down international instability 

more broadly, by suppressing potential security competitions within Europe and making it nearly 

unthinkable that war could occur between the countries that make up NATO's membership. It is 

remarkable that no one worries today about a war between France and Germany or Gennany and 

Poland, given the pre-1945 history of those relationships, and NATO has everything to do with 
36 

this achievement. Given that wars in Europe repeatedly reached out and touched the United 

States prior to 1945, moreover, this achievement directly serves American security interests. 

Finally, NATO acts as an impediment to dangerous geostrategic phenomena such as nuclear 

proliferation, by convincing historically insecure countries-such as Germany and Poland-that 

they can afford to forego possession of the world's absolute weapon. The guiding principle 

among the framers of the post-World War ll order was that massive instability, arms racing, and 

violence in key regions posed a threat that would ultimately imperil the United States. The U.S. 

alliance relationship with Europe has restrained precisely these phenomena. 

Diplomatic Leverage and Cooperation. Beyond its military, geostrategic, and political value, the 

NATO relationship greatly increases the diplomatic leverage U.S. leaders can bring to bear. To 

be blunt, Europeans are obliged to listen to the United States on European and global issues 

because Washington's leading role in NATO makes it the central player in European defense. To 

give one example, the United States has repeatedly been successful in preventing the European 

Union from lifting its arms embargo on China because of the security leverage it has through 

NATO. Similarly, the United States has used NATO as a vehicle for cooperation on counterterrorism, counter-cybercrime, counter-proliferation, counter-piracy, and other challenges. All of 

these efforts involve substantial intelligence sharing, pooling of information, and coordination 

across law enforcement and other lines of action-and that coordination is greatly facilitated 

when conducted through a deeply institutionalized alliance. 

Economic Benefits. Critics of the NATO alliance often allege that it costs the United States vast 

sums to defend its allies. Yet the economic costs of the U.S. commitment to NATO are lower 

than conventionally assumed, because the alliances allows the United States to project military 

power much more cheaply than otherwise would be the case, and also because those NATO 

countries that host American troops generally provide payments to offset basing/presence costs. 

Alliances such as NATO also generate numerous economic benefits. One analysis of the 

deployment of U.S. troops abroad and of U.S. treaty obligations shows that both of these forms 

of security commitments are correlated with several key economic indicators, including U.S. 

bilateral trade and global bilateral trade. Adding all the economic costs and benefits of these 

treaty commitments together produces the estimate that U.S. alliances offer more than three 

times as much economic gain as cost. 2 

For decades, moreover, U.S. diplomats and trade negotiations have used the security leverage 

provided by its NATO commitments to extract more favorable terms in bilateral financial and 

commercial arrangements. During the Cold War, for example, West Germany was willing to 

make "offset" payments to the United States-- -transfers that helped shore up the U.S. balance of 

payments-in order to preserve the American troop presence. Finally, given that NATO and 

other U.S. alliances sustain a climate of overall geopolitical stability in which trade and free 

enterprise can flourish, they bolster American and global prosperity in broader ways, as well. 

2 Daniel Egel and Howard Shatz, "Economic Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments Appear to Outweigh 

Costs, The RAND Blog, September 23, 2016, http://www.rand.org/blog/20 16/09/economic-benefits-of-us-overseassecurity-commitments.html 

3 
37 

Political Legitimacy. Beyond its military, geostrategic, diplomatic, and economic vittues, NATO 

provides important political benefits which facilitate the use of American power. Formal 

alliances such as NATO provide greater legitimacy for multilateral action, especially in casessuch as the Kosovo conflict in 1999-when the United States is unable to secure a UN Security 

Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. Allied suppott also enhances the perceived 

legitimacy of military action for domestic audiences, thus strengthening the political foundations 

for military ventures. The willingness of European allies (or other allied states) to participate in a 

military intervention can signal that the resort to force is a wise and necessary move, and that it 

has a reasonable prospect for success. Finally, the NATO allies have long provided useful input 

on use of force decisions. Pmticularly when the deliberations involve long-standing treaty allies, 

U.S. officials can have more honest discussions about difficult policy choices because the 

patticipants are "all in the family." Put another way, while every U.S. president reserves the right 

to use force unilaterally when U.S. interests demand, presidents have generally understood that 

the failure to persuade other partners to approve and join America in the effort is itself a 

powerful signal that the proposed action may not be viable. 

Challenges 

The transatlantic relationship and the NATO alliance in particular have thus provided a range of 

important benefits for the United States. Today as in the past, however, there are pressing 

challenges that are testing the U.S.-NATO relationship. Key challenges include: 

Forward defense. The combination of unfavorable geography and Russian military 

modernization presents severe challenges to NATO's ability to defend its easternmost states 

from a potential Russian assault. The alliance will need additional presence and a stronger 

regional force posture if it is to reestablish a credible deterrent to Russian aggression. 3 

Burden-sharing. Burden-sharing is a perpetual challenge within NATO. Yet it is fair to say that 

this issue has reached a crisis point when America's three most imp01tant European allies-the 

United Kingdom, France, and Germany-would each struggle to deploy and sustain a single 

armored brigade in combat beyond their own borders. 4 In general, alliance military spending has 

been moving in the right direction since 2015. But the performance of some key countries 

(namely, Germany) continues to be disappointing and Brexit is likely to further cwtail the 

resources the United Kingdom can make available for defense. 

Adapting to confi·onl emerging threats. While NATO faces traditional military threats in the 

East, it also confronts more novel, unconventional threats such as information warfare, 

cyberattacks, political meddling, and economic coercion on the part of authoritarian rivals. The 

alliance will have to rebuild its ability to repel conventional aggression while also improving its 

capabilities-perhaps in cooperation with the European Union··--to address emerging threats. 

3 See Providingfi>r the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National D~fense Strategy 

Commission (United States Institute of Peace, 2018). 

"Michael Shurkin, "The Abilities ofthe British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored 

Brigades in the Baltic," RAND Corporation, 20 I 7, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research reports/RRI629.html. 

4 
38 

Reconciling competing priorities. As NATO's geography has expanded, so has the difficulty in 

reconciling the alliance's competing priorities. Whereas states on the alliance's eastern frontier 

are most worried about Russian aggression, states on the alliance's southern flank are often more 

concerned about terrorism, refugee flows, and other challenges emerging from the Middle East 

and NOtth Africa. Similarly, as the prospect of state-on-state warfare in Europe increases, NATO 

countries will face increasing difficulties balancing that mission with "out of area" challenges 

such as the war in Afghanistan. 

Concerns about U.S. credibility. At the level of day-to-day policy, U.S. engagement with NATO 

has remained relatively steady, and the alliance has made progress both in improving readiness 

for a potential conflict with Russia and in focusing on non-traditional threats. At the political 

level, however, relationships with key European allies and leaders have frayed badly, and 

statements questioning America's commitment to NATO's Article 5 have produced concerns 

about the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee. In some European quatters, these concerns 

are leading to broader doubts about the long-term viability of the alliance. They are also leading 

some European countries to advocate the pursuit of"strategic autonomy" in the form of a more 

credible European Union defense capability, although progress toward that goal remains elusive 

so far. 5 Put bluntly, if confidence in the U.S. commitment to NATO collapses, so will the 

alliance. 

Authoritarianism within the alliance. NATO has had authoritarian members before, but in recent 

decades it had become an alliance of democratic states. Democratic backsliding in countries such 

as Turkey, Hungary, and Poland is now challenging that progress, and raising questions about 

how the alliance should deal with illiberalism within its ranks. The fact that Hungary and Turkey 

have established close relationships with Putin's Russia adds urgency to this challenge. 

Fragmentation of the European project. NATO developed in tandem with moves toward greater 

European integration, which provided the political and economic cohesion to accompany the 

military cohesion that the alliance provided. Today, however, the cohesion of the EU is being 

challenged due to Brexit, surging illiberalism within certain European countries, and a populist 

backlash against the European project. In the near-term, challenges to European unity will reduce 

the possibility of"strategic autonomy" and the development of alternative defense mechanisms 

that might eventually rival NATO. Over the longer term, however, such fragmentation will 

probably weaken the European pillar of the alliance and thus weaken the alliance itself. 

Conclusion 

The seriousness of these threats should not be underrated. Yet NATO and the transatlantic 

relationship have faced periods of crisis before-during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 

1980s, and the early days of the War of Terror. Some of the challenges that arose during those 

earlier periods-how to construct a viable deterrent to Soviet aggression, for instance, or how 

counter the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe--were arguably as great or 

greater than any the alliance faces today. The alliance survived these earlier tests, in part because 

'Hal Brands, "Europe Wants to Defend Itself from Russia? Good Luck with That," Bloomberg Opinion, August 30, 

20 18, htt ps:/lw"w. bloomberg.com/ opinion/artie les/20 18-08-30/europe-wants-to-defend-itsel f-from-russ ia-ooodluck-with-that. 

5 
39 

of its great resilience, and in part because the United States played a critical role in either holding 

the alliance together or repairing damage that had occurred. 

Moreover, even though the cockpit of geopolitical rivalry has moved from Europe to the AsiaPacific region, it does not follow that NATO and the transatlantic relationship are irrelevant to 

the geopolitical challenges the United States faces. For example, it is hard to imagine any 

successful democratic response to the rise of an aggressive, authoritarian China that docs not 

feature close cooperation between the United States and its closest democratic allies in Europe. 

The United States must therefore continue investing in the transatlantic relationship; it must 

provide the leadership that has proved so important in rallying NATO countries to overcome 

common challenges. There is no reason that NATO cannot continue to be an overwhelming net 

benefit to U.S. security, prosperity, and global influence, so long as America remains committed 

to the alliance that has served it so well. If. however, the United States weakens its commitment 

to the alliance and the broader transatlantic relationship, NATO will find it far harder to address 

today's challenges-and America will profoundly damage its own interests. 

6 
40 

Mr. KEATING. Ms. Conley. 

STATEMENT OF HEATHER CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC, AND DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member Kinzinger, members of this committee. What a privilege it is 

to be your kickoff hearing. Thank you so much. 

And let me just say thank you for the kind invitation to NATO’s 

Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to speak at a Joint Session of 

Congress next week. That sends such an important message. So, 

thank you for that leadership. 

Seventy years ago, the United States knew who we were, what 

we stood for, and what we needed to do to safeguard freedom. We 

were the good guys. We stood for freedom. We were those can-do 

Americans, said with equal parts envy and exacerbation by our allies. America’s Greatest Generation, having fought twice in Europe 

in the span of 28 years, understood the extraordinarily high cost 

of freedom and the scourge of nationalism and hatred. To honor 

that American sacrifice from two world wars, that generation of 

leaders knew that European stability was essential to ensure 

America’s security, exactly as you said, Chairman Keating, and it 

understood that strong alliances win wars against aggressors then 

and now. 

As I was preparing for this oral statement, I looked under my 

computer keyboard, and I keep a copy of Senator John McCain’s 

farewell message to the Munich Security Conference last year, 

which Mrs. McCain read, and it inspired me. And I just want to 

offer this quote to you from Senator McCain: ‘‘Together with our allies, we kept faith with those on the other side of the walls that 

divided the oppressed from the free. We were confident that they 

wanted the same things we did—freedom, equal justice, the rule of 

law, a fair chance to prosper by their own industry and talents. 

This is our greatest inheritance, and it did not happen by accident.’’ 

Today I would argue we are having a tough time answering the 

question of who we are and what we stand for. We are tired of 

spending funds overseas that are so urgently needed at home. We 

are frustrated and burdened by the yoke of leadership. We want 

others to shoulder that burden, and sometimes we appear as victims that other countries are taking advantage of. 

Congressman Kinzinger, you noted how weak our allies are acting right now. They are very divided. They are having a hard time 

resisting China’s economic strength, I would argue Russia’s malign 

influence. We cannot take America’s greatest foreign and security 

policy success, Europe, for granted. We need to engage them. We 

need to work with them. We need to push them very hard, but that 

requires deep American diplomatic, economic, and security engagement. 

But I leave you with this final thought: this discussion is really 

not about our allies. It is about who we are and what we stand for 

in the future. This anniversary gives us an opportunity to put forward the hard-fought wisdom, values, principles, and knowledge of 
41 

previous American generations, but we must bring it forward to a 

new generation. I have to convince my young daughters why NATO 

is as important to them as it is to me. As representatives of the 

American people, you must do this. As former officials that are sitting on this witness table, we must do our part as well. This is our 

greatest inheritance and we must fight every day to preserve it and 

strengthen it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:] 
42 

CSIS I CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Statement before the 

House Foreign Affairs Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the 

Environment Subcommittee 

A Testimony by: 

Heather A. Conley 

Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 

March 26, 2019 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building 

WWW.(StS.ORG 1616 RHODt ISLAND AVENUE NW TE.L (201) G:J7.0200 

WASH!NGlON, DC 10036 fAX {102:) 77'.'>.31')9 
43 

Conley: Written Testimony, HFAC Europe Subcommittee 03/26/20 19 2 

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on the historical impmiance 

of allies and alliances to the security and prosperity of the United States. But perhaps most 

importantly, thank you for the opp01tunity to underscore the importance of preserving this 

unique American strength and asset in the future. I am so grateful that you are holding this 

hearing, as I fear many Americans-including senior leaders in our own government-have 

either forgotten or through abject neglect are destroying the extraordinary inheritance that we 

received from the "Greatest Generation." As this generation, which fought and won the Second 

World War, leaves us, we must honor their sacrifice by rededicating ourselves to the task of 

renewing the transatlantic alliance so that it is available to future generations. 

The eve of the 70111 anniversary ofNATO is a timely moment to reflect on this rich inheritance. 

am delighted to offer some brief reflections on the origins of the transatlantic partnership and to 

offer tangible examples of how this partnership has uniquely benefited the United States. But I 

would also suggest that we view this anniversary not simply as an opportunity to reflect, but as a 

clarion call to action by Congress to strengthen and deepen this essential alliance. for far too 

long, American leaders, many of them in this chamber, have spoken eloquently about our 

historic alliance with Europe while at the same time endorsing actions that have weakened it. 

We cannot have it both ways. Grand statements ring hollow without leadership and sacrifice, 

just as transactional actions fall flat when devoid of values, principles, and integrity. 

We see this conflict play out in U.S. policy today: while the United Stales focuses heavily on 

military strength and might, we are diplomatically and economically undermining and eroding 

our core strength-the transatlantic alliance. As Secretary Mattis stated clearly in his resignation 

letter, and as any military officer will tell you, fighting alongside allies is the most difficult and 

painstaking political and military work one can do, but it is essential to ensure our prosperity. 

The 'Cost' ofNational Survival 

In 1940, Winston Churchill told the House of Commons in his first address as Prime Minister 

that "without victory, there is no survival."' Churchill knew perhaps better than any other leader 

that the United Kingdom could not achieve victory without the support of its allies, and certainly 

not without the aid of the greatest military power, the United States-despite our great reluctance 

to fully enter the conflict at that time. The survival of a nation is guaranteed by an alliance 

structure that will fight and make sacrifices for the survival of its members. At times, this 

sacrifice can be enormously high, as the American military cemeteries in 16 foreign countries 

attest in their silent dignity, and as evidence by the reverence with which citizens of these 

countries view these hallowed grounds. Allies ensure our survival as a nation. 

But for a nation that enjoys unmatched global military and economic power in the world, how 

can America's defense and survival depend on other countries? The United States does have 

1 "Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat," International Churchill Society, 

https :I /win stone hurc hi ll.org/resourceslspeeches/1940-the-finest- hourlblood-toi I-tears-and-sweat-21. 
44 

Conley: Written Testimony, HFAC Europe Subcommittee 03/26/2019 

remarkable power, but it is not unlimited. When America's allies join the United States in any 

task, our power is amplified and we are able to accomplish our objective. When the United 

States chooses to go it alone, we may have sufficient resources to accomplish the immediate 

task, but we will not achieve a durable solution nor can we bear the costs alone. 

The cost of America's alliances has been a topic of much heated debate for decades. But it has 

become a particularly potent political argument today, as some in our country have concluded 

that allies arc not "worth the cost" to the United States. Yet how can the American people 

appropriately weigh the '·acceptable" costs of alliances without understanding their intrinsic 

value'? This is where our conversation with the American people must begin anew: in an era of 

great competition where adversaries actively seek to weaken our allies and alliance system to 

weaken the United States itself, what are our alliances worth to us and to our national survival? 

Made by America 

America's alliance structure in Europe began to crystallize over a century ago during the First 

World War, when France, Italy, the British Empire, and the United States developed the concept 

of alliance warfare. These structures were further developed during the Second World War and 

continued to center on maintaining a unified political purpose and a unified theatre of operations 

and command to restore national sovereignty. For an alliance to be successful, both elements 

were understood as essential: unified political will and the capability and means to accomplish 

the task. 

At the end of the Second World War, these developed political and military structures were 

quickly called back into service as the Soviet Union rapidly transformed from wartime ally to 

postwar adversary. Europe's weakness and exhaustion following two devastating conflicts 

required American leadership to conceive and build new and more durable structures to meet the 

challenges of the Cold War. The 1948 Berlin Airlift, a massive U.S. and allied humanitarian 

effort to save people in West Berlin from the Soviet blockade, was a foretaste of the role that the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization would play to ensure the survival and freedom of the people 

of Western Europe. 

A year later in 1949, the preamble of NATO's founding document, the Washington Treaty, 

clearly stated the unity of purpose that binds the Alliance: "to safeguard the.fi·eedom, common 

heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 

liberty and the rule of law." Notice how similar it sounds to the Declaration of lndependence. 

The preamble and the simple, straightforward articles of the Treaty are the flexible operating 

system of a durable and growing alliance (12 members in 1949, soon to be 30 in 2020). In 1949, 

the unified political objective for NATO was to safeguard freedom from Soviet aggression, and 

the Alliance developed adequate military capabilities to fulfill that objective. In 2019, its 

political objective is to safeguard the alliance's democracies from Russian aggression but also 

against threats that emanate ti·om the M iddlc East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific region. 
45 

Conley: Written Testimony, HFAC Europe Subcommittee 03/26/2019 4 

Throughout the Cold War, NATO had to manage great tensions among members, unilateral 

decisions taken by members, and even members that temporarily lost their democratic 

credentials. There arc many examples: the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1966 French decision to 

remove its forces from NATO's unified military command, the advent of the junta in Greece in 

1967, the introduction of the concept of Ostpolitik or detente with the Soviet Union, U.S. calls to 

downsize its forces in Europe, and the 1983 Pershing missile crisis. But despite these crises, 

NATO endured and was able to respond flexibly to each challenge in large measure due to 

binding agents: the existential challenge posed by the Soviet Union, strong and confident 

American leadership that understood our security was tied to that of Europe's, and an alliance 

based on democratic values and principles. 

What the Alliance had not anticipated was its own success. The fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years 

ago and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union removed one of the main unifying elements 

in NATO's political and military purpose. But as it was at the end of the Second World War, 

NATO was quickly called upon to respond to a European conflict, this time in the Western 

Balkans. Though this was not on a member's territory, NATO had decided to redefine its 

purpose as expanding freedom, peace, and security in Europe and it understood this in the broad 

geopolitical sense--instability near member states risked instability in member states. The 

Alliance expanded its mission to safeguard freedom in Europe by enlarging its membership, 

which has simultaneously benefitted and challenged NATO. 

Post-Cold War Stress Fractures and Strategic Drift 

NATO's ability to understand that instability outside of its immediate borders was a growing 

challenge paved the way for the Alliance to address its defining post-Cold War moment: the 

terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, which led the Alliance to 

invoke Article 5 for the first time in its history. NATO has deployed and sustained forces in 

Afghanistan for the past 1 S years, at great human and financial cost: over 3,500 NATO and other 

coalition partners' soldiers have been killed since the beginning of the U.S. offensive in 

Afghanistan.2 NATO allies have collectively spent around $2.3 billion to support the NATOAfghan National Army Trust Fund, a key tool to support the country's security forces and 

institutions3 Although we seldom hear these numbers when American officials discuss the 

''costs" of NATO, no one should doubt that our allies have responded when the security of the 

United States was at risk. 

Yet over the course of these 18 years, NATO lost its balanced approach to political strategy and 

military means. Tactical military operations and force generation requirements overshadowed a 

deeper and more meaningful understanding of the Alliance's political objectives. Divisions grew 

among NATO members during the 2003 Iraq war in which only some allies participated, though 

NATO did ultimately support a training mission in Iraq. This lack of unity extended into the late 

2 ''Afghanistan Fatalities," iCasualties, http://icasualties.org/ App/ AfghanFatalities. 3 "NATO and Afghanistan," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 5, 2019, 

https:/ /www.nato. int/cps/enlnatohq/topics _ 8189.htm. 
46 

Conley: Written Testimony, HFAC Europe Subcommittee 03/26/2019 

2000s and early 201 Os: allies drew different conclusions from the 2008 Russian-Georgian 

conflict and the Alliance's further expansion, and in 2011 the United States, France, and the 

United Kingdom decided to intervene militarily in Libya against Gaddafi's brutal repression of 

popular unrest under the mandate of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973-an 

offensive that was hastily transitioncd to a NATO operation but exposed weaknesses in both 

political unity and sustainable military capability. Stress fractures began to form within NATO 

as the alliance grappled with rapid technological change, missile defense capabilities, cybcr 

warfare, disinfonnation, and energy insecurity. 

Russia's 2014 military intervention in Ukraine, both in Crimea and the Donbass, stemmed some 

of this fracturing and returned NATO to its founding mission and purpose, though it also 

exposed NATO's political and military atrophy in the face of a revisionist and aggressive power. 

U.S. leadership of NATO had been in decline for over a decade; the robustness ofNATO's 

political dialogue had diminished; the Alliance lacked a common threat assessment, with some 

members seeing the preeminent threat emanating from the cast and others from the south; it 

faced a gross underinvestmcnt in adequate European defense and war-fighting capabilities that 

had been honed for counter-insurgency in the desert; and the United States lacked war-fighting 

capabilities in Europe because until 2014, it had viewed Europe not as a theater of operation but 

rather as a place to develop partner capabilities and as a launching point to the Middle East and 

Africa. 

A Return to Safeguarding Freedom 

NATO's return to its founding mission and purpose in the past five years and the unwavering 

bipartisan support of Congress to enhance transatlantic security is a critical opportunity to restore 

America's strategic understanding of the value of alliances to our national security. There is 

little time to lose as we have entered a pmiicularly precarious moment in transatlantic history, 

one in which we risk taking NATO for granted so much that we could seriously jeopardize its 

future. 

NATO's purpose, as it was in the 20'h century, is to safeguard freedom in Europe and North 

America. NATO must protect its members from external threats, while increasingly guarding 

itself from internal threats to freedom driven by cthno-nationalism and illiberalism. NATO's 

fundamental task is therefore once again to stabilize Europe as it manages historical 

transformations from Brexit, the uneven development of German leadership balanced by french 

ambitions, Turkey's movement away from Euro-Atlanticism, and growing internal 

fragmentation. NATO must also manage American retrenchment, an increasingly unstable 

Russian Federation, terrorism, migration, China's economically driven inOuencc. global 

economic and climate insecurity, and technological change. 

It is an understatement to say that current and future demands placed on NATO are great in the 

quest to safeguard freedom. This is why the United States, while remaining a global security 

actor, must return to Europe: (1) physically through an enhanced security posture; (2) 
47 

Conley: Written Testimony, llFAC Europe Subcommittee 03/26/2019 6 

diplomatically with strong, confident, patient, and quiet diplomacy that is guided by democratic 

and value-based principles; and (3) economically through an enhanced trade and investment 

partnership. During the Cold War, values-based American leadership developed a policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states that kept faith with captive nations until 

they were rightfully restored to the Euro-Atlantic community. It is patient American diplomacy 

that after 27 years created the conditions through which the Republic of North Macedonia could 

join NATO with Greece becoming the first NATO member to ratify their membership. And 

someday. it will be a more confident American leadership that will challenge the growth of 

illiberalism and nationalism within NATO, not coddle it. 

NATO, like the United States, was built on the sturdy foundations of '"the principles of 

democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." It has always been NATO's vocation to 

safeguard freedom in an increasingly dangerous world. Victory is required, for our national 

survival is at stake. 
48 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Ms. Conley, and thank all the witnesses. In a very short period of time, I think you capsulized what 

this hearing is about. 

And I, too, had the privilege of going to the Munich Security Conference as part of the CODEL led by Senator McCain. What an experience that is, trust me, in every respect. But his patriotism, his 

love of this country, his understanding of the role of our country, 

and an understanding of the alliance that we are talking about, 

was as deep as any person I had ever met in my life, and he will 

be missed. One of the best legacies we can all serve to honor him 

is to do our best at this difficult time to move forward. 

Because, in my opinion, this is not just a hearing. This is really 

the beginning of a central mission of this committee during this 

Congress. Each of us is here and have been elected at different 

times in our country’s history, but I honestly believe that what we 

do as a Congress during this 2-year period, in particular, will have 

fundamental impact on our relations with our most important allies and create a bond of greater security and prosperity in our 

country in an area where we have never had such an ability to do 

so. 

I came back—and I saw Ambassador Burns there—from Munich 

with the Speaker and several other of our leaders just a little over 

3 weeks ago. We had the opportunity to go to Brussels after that, 

and in the whole course of that, met with most of the key European 

officials. 

Really what I want to get to is this: I was really taken aback by 

the depth of the challenge we have in front of us as a Congress. 

There was a poll in Germany that came out just about the time 

that we got there, and it showed that the German people had 85 

percent unfavorability toward the United States and only 10 percent favorability. The German people, those are among our closest 

allies, people that, as our witnesses detailed, have fought with us 

and lost lives. So, these are the critical issues we have in front of 

us. 

And also, we met with those leaders. And I will share with you 

without identifying them, because there are Chatham Rules that 

took place in these private meetings. But during those recent meetings, during those meetings that we had, the leaders were using 

words like ‘‘painful,’’ ‘‘hurtful,’’ describing our actions at that time. 

They centered, for instance, on the U.S. rationale for the tariffs 

that are imposed on Europe right now, and they wanted us to explain why we were using emergency security powers to impose 

those tariffs. They said, ‘‘When did we become your enemies? When 

did we become a security risk to your country?’’, our closest allies. 

So, if you could, that is why I led with this question. We have 

work to do with the people in Europe, and that is why we are here 

today. That is why this is central to what we will do, reminding 

them of the importance of this alliance. Because I think when people focus back on what we took for granted a generation ago, they 

will understand better how to invest personally, financially, and in 

terms of our security interests together. 

So, if I could, those two comments: what can we do to help improve as a Congress? And I must tell you, I am not casting our 

meeting just on those issues. I have been to many CODELs trav-
49 

eling as Members of Congress. I cannot recall a time that I felt as 

appreciated with us being there as Members of Congress as we did 

during that period. And that is encouraging. But what can we do? 

Because the people that will be making decisions—and there are 

elections coming this spring—will be guided by their own constituencies. And it is concerning to see that unfavorability that is there 

with a close ally, and also the work we have to do with these other 

officials, our counterparts in Europe. 

Mr. Burns? Ambassador Burns? 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would also say this: politics is a two-way street. Relations 

across the Atlantic are a two-way street. I think there are things 

that we need to do and they need to do. 

On our side, it was pretty clear from the Munich Conference— 

it was an extraordinarily insightful conference to hear from the Europeans—they are looking for a reaffirmation of the American commitment to NATO, especially focused on Article 5, because the 

President just has not done that. He has had his first visit in 2017. 

He did not mention Article 5. In fact, it was taken out of his 

speech. And then, last summer, on the day of the summit with 

President Putin in Helsinki, he was highly ambivalent about 

whether he would respond to an attack on Montenegro, a country 

that was attacked politically, an attempted coup by the Russians 

2 years ago. 

And the second thing that we need to do is reaffirm our relationship with the European Union. Every President since the Coal and 

Steel Community was created in 1948 has believed that the European Union is a partner of the United States. It is in our interest 

to see them succeed. The President consistently has called them a 

foe, a competitor, only looking at them through a prism of trade, 

but not also in our political partnership, which is very deep. 

I think on their side of the ledger—and here, the ranking member I thought made a very productive statement—we have to push 

the Europeans as well, as we always have. They are excessively reliant on Russian natural gas. They are endanger of being excessively reliant on Chinese capital investment through the Belt and 

Road Initiative. You saw that Italy joined it formally over the 

weekend. They are insufficiently distrustful of Huawei on the 5G 

issue. 

And so, I do think we have a right and an obligation in a twoway street relationship to push back. And the one that I feel most 

strongly about is German defense spending. It is the largest and 

most successful economy. They have a surplus. And yet, the Bundestag reported out last week a budget that will not get them to 

2 percent by 2024, which is the target. They may barely get to 1.5 

percent. President Trump is right to push them. President Obama 

was right to push them. The only silver lining there—I will finish 

on this—is that we have seen four consecutive years of real growth 

in European defense spending since Putin’s annexation of Crimea, 

mainly not in Germany, but in the other allies, and that is something we can push forward on with them. 

Mr. KEATING. My time is up, but I think that you will have the 

opportunity, the other witnesses, to address some of those issues 

with some of the other questioning. 
50 

So, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to swap places with 

Ms. Wagner. 

And I will say, from my side, if you could, let’s be very disciplined on the 5-minute clock because of the hour. 

But I will switch places with her, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I greatly appreciate the courtesy of the ranking 

member. I have to get to a Financial Services markup. And so, I 

am on roller skates today. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this hearing. 

And thank our witnesses. 

I had the great privilege of serving as a United States Ambassador in Western Europe, Ambassador Burns. 

And, Ms. Conley, I would like to associate myself with your opening statement greatly. 

Although we work closely with partners in the EU bloc, our goals 

are not always in step. We have historically relied on the United 

Kingdom to bridge gaps between the United States and EU countries. 

Ms. Conley, how will the UK’s departure from the EU affect EU 

policies in areas of interest to the United States, such as sanctions 

and trade and regulatory policies? 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you so much for that question. 

The European Union will be greatly reduced, should the United 

Kingdom depart the EU. On an almost daily, hourly basis, the 

story is in constant change. But, all things being equal, the United 

Kingdom provides for the European Union a very export-oriented, 

very market-economy-driven—it is driving the European Union on 

foreign and security policy. And this will be a great loss to the European Union when the United Kingdom leaves. 

If anything, we focus too much on the ins and outs of this extraordinary Brexit debate, but we have not focused enough in 

thinking about how much the EU will diminish, and in some ways 

how much the United Kingdom will diminish from being out of the 

European Union. This is why we are seeing in the EU the creation 

of what they are calling the Hanseatic League, which is Northern 

European economies that are trying to in some ways fill the space 

that the UK will leave in being market-driven, export-driven, much 

different from the Southern European economies. 

Mrs. WAGNER. There will definitely be a void. 

Ms. Wormuth, many of our European partners share the United 

States concerns regarding Russia’s non-compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF. The United States 

has since withdrawn from the INF with NATO support. I understand these recent developments worry some European stakeholders who fear resurgent U.S.-Russian competition will destabilize Europe. What is the future of arms control in Europe, and 

what role can European countries play in pressuring Russia back 

into compliance? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 

I am very concerned about the future of the arms control regime 

in the wake of the decision to withdraw from INF, primarily because I am concerned about what it means for whether we extend 

the New START agreement in 2021, which I think is very much 
51 

in the interest of the United States, despite the fact that we are 

in a very low period with the Russians. So, figuring out how to extend that agreement, which is in our interest, I think is item No. 

1 on that agenda. I think we need to continue to have our European allies and partners put pressure on Russia to work with us 

to extend that agreement and to call out their bad behavior, as 

they have in many instances. 

I do think that part of having a credible deterrent is showing a 

unified front. I think the way the United States withdrew from 

INF did not shore up that unity inside of the alliance. So, going forward, we need to coordinate, so that we show a unified front. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Ms. Wormuth. 

Ambassador Burns, during the cold war our alliances with European countries helped the United States maintain a durable balance of power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, preventing catastrophic 

conflict, frankly, between the great powers. Today, we are seeing 

China step into the balance or into the place, I should say, that the 

Soviet Union once occupied. What role will Europe play in countering the rise of China? 

Mr. BURNS. I think, as Heather Conley said, the Europeans seem 

to be disorganized and not united on how to respond to China, a 

great deal of divisiveness as the Chinese seek inroads. The Chinese 

are running and own the Port of Piraeus—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. The biggest port in the Eastern Med; 

significant investments in the Balkans, now in Italy. So, the European Union needs to organize itself. It needs to develop a common 

policy because this is a major threat. And they understand that the 

military advantage that the United States has had since the Second World War will be at risk if in AI, machine learning, quantum 

computing, biotechnology, our government does not have the ability 

to keep up with the Chinese in the technological arms race. Europe 

is going to be part of that. Their labs, their tech companies, their 

research universities have to be with us and united in that. 

So, I think that, on a NATO basis, China has become an issue. 

And in Ambassador Lute’s report that I did with him, that is one 

of our recommendations: we have to think about China as a threat. 

I would close on this, Congresswoman. General Milley said this 

morning when he testified up here on the Hill that he felt that 

Russia was still the great existential threat. I think we are facing 

two big authoritarian threats—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. I agree. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. In Europe. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I agree. 

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Again, I thank the ranking 

member for his courtesy. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Representative. Thanks for bringing that point across because one of the highest-ranking members 

of the EU that we had private conversations with said, if we are 

on the course we are now, and we could look back 30 years from 

the future, we would find out by far the greatest threat is China 

and their activities. 

I yield to Mr. Cicilline, who I understand might yield his position 

and time. 
52 

Mr. CICILLINE. My position, not my time. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COSTA. I thank my friend and colleague from Rhode Island 

for yielding this time. I have another subcommittee that is going 

on. 

We have an all-star group of testifiers today, and I want to thank 

you all for your service to our country and your efforts there. 

Chairman Keating, I want to commend you for this effort. I do 

agree that we are in a transitional time in world history, and I 

think this subcommittee will and can, if we do, play an important 

role in combination with our allies in Europe in being, in essence, 

the glue that reaffirms, as we have stated earlier, the importance 

of this transatlantic relationship. 

Seventy years—70 years—of this history is the longest peacetime 

period in Europe in over 1,000 years. I am certain that the majority of Americans, certainly the majority of Europeans, do not think 

about that. Probably the majority of them do not even know that, 

that these institutions that we have helped create from NATO to 

the other efforts with the European Union and stabilization of that, 

the World Trade Organization—the list goes on—these are things 

we did not just for Europe; we did for ourselves. Countries do what 

is in their own interest. And this peace dividend that has resulted 

in this 70-year transatlantic partnership must be reaffirmed. 

So, let me ask you a few questions here, and I just want to go 

quickly through it because of time. 

Ambassador Burns, do you view the European Union as our adversary? 

Mr. BURNS. No, they are our partner strategically. 

Mr. COSTA. Ms. Wormuth, do you view the European Union as 

our adversary? 

Ms. WORMUTH. No. I would affiliate myself with Ambassador 

Burns’ view. 

Mr. COSTA. Yes. And, Ms. Conley? 

Ms. CONLEY. Absolutely not. The European Union is our great 

partner. 

Mr. COSTA. And Hal Brands? 

Mr. BRANDS. The European Union has provided the political and 

economic cohesion to go along with NATO’s military cohesion. 

Mr. COSTA. Right. And I think that some of the comments made 

here earlier—certainly there are wealthy countries in Europe that 

should do more in terms of their commitment, Germany being one 

of them. And we need to continue to push them, as the previous 

administrations have done. But there are constructive ways that 

you can do that. And I know the chairman here and I, as chairman 

of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue, are committed to doing 

just that. 

I am looking for the four of you to give us some thoughts and 

suggestions on how at this transitional time in history we can use 

these institutions, these committees, these efforts with the NATO 

PA and Transatlantic Policy Network, to be this glue that reaffirms 

that America still cares. 

Because the comments that Chairman Keating made when I was 

at Brussels last month with him and others—these are questions 

that our European friends are asking, where is America? And they 
53 

are dealing with the same challenges that we are: populism, extremism, fear from immigration, racism, bigotry, antisemitism that 

not only is raising its head here, but in Europe as well. 

So, what suggestions would you have in terms of using our legislative tools with our partners in Europe over the next 2 years? Ambassador Burns, do you want to begin, quickly? 

Mr. BURNS. I would just say that Congress has a real opportunity here. If the administration is not willing to work with the 

Europeans on refugees or climate or Iran—and there is a question 

about whether or not the Trump administration actually sees the 

EU as a strategic partner—Congress can step forward, and these 

legislative exchanges are important. 

Mr. COSTA. I think it has been very clear, the administration 

sees these relationships as transactional and does not really believe 

in multinational partnerships. Clearly, that is what they have exhibited. It is just a different view and it is jarring, I think, for this 

partnership. 

Thirty years ago, the Berlin Wall fell. These are really historical 

things, if you think about it, and it is due, in part, to the success 

of this partnership I believe. 

Other comments? Yes? 

Ms. CONLEY. I would just add, I think, obviously, visiting often, 

traveling, speaking out, making sure that they are hearing other 

voices of support. I would also encourage you to think about how 

your district and the States can work more collaboratively with Europe, the sister city partnerships, economic relationships. If this 

cannot be a top-down approach, we have to stabilize and maintain 

it. Really energize your constituents to reach out to economic ties 

that bind, and continue to send the strong messages. 

Mr. COSTA. And working with AmCham; there is also the private 

and the public sector. There are NGO’s. There is a lot of things 

that are tools, Mr. Chairman, that I think we need to employ with 

our European colleagues as well. 

My time has run out, but I do not know if any of you care to comment. In 2013, the equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Russia, 

General Gerasimov, talked about a policy using democratic institutions, elections, to undermine the European Union and the U.S. as 

an economic force and as a military force, to play on those divisions. Think he has done a pretty good job so far with their limited 

hand? 

Mr. KEATING. If I could, perhaps that could be answered in the 

course of the other questioning, too. If you could filter that in, it 

would be appreciated. 

Thank you, Representative. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. 

Mr. KEATING. I now call on Ranking Member Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for enforcing the 5 minutes, because I know a lot of us have stuff to do 

this afternoon. 

Let me just say again, all of you, I appreciate you being here. I 

think this is a fantastic hearing. I think there is a lot that unifies 

us. 

I have heard a few shots kind of coming from the other side 

about the administration. Let me be clear. I think the administra-
54 

tion appreciates Europe and sees Europe as a friend. I think the 

administration appreciates NATO and sees NATO as a friend. But 

sometimes Europe and NATO do not like being called out when 

they are not doing what they need to do. And, I mean, it is a reality. 

Back post-World War II, Europe was in a position where they 

needed the United States, basically, to provide a whole lot, and 

there was a lot of benefit to us. Now we are in a position where 

we have a lot of very strong countries, and we all have to rely on 

each other for a security situation. 

I think it is important to note that we get as much out of NATO 

as NATO gets out of us. So, I think it is important. This is not just 

a United States doing a favor for Europe situation. But, that said, 

the fact that we all kind of have something to play, I do not think 

there is anything wrong with calling out Europe when they are 

falling short in those areas. 

I think looking at the issue with Russia, as the chairman mentioned and others mentioned, Russia is a huge problem. We see it 

in our own hemisphere as we get reports that Russia has landed 

troops in Venezuela, a socialist nation that is failing its people that 

are starving to death. And Russia, once again, appears to be using 

its military, as it did in Syria, to hold a terrible person in power 

because it benefits them in power. 

So, that is why pushing back against Russia through NATO in 

Europe, taking away energy as a weapon for them, pushing back 

against them in our own hemisphere, which we have neglected for 

too long, is very important. And we need our friends in NATO to 

step up with us. We need them to spend a little money with us, 

too. 

Ms. Conley, I want to touch on Germany with you and I want 

to ask you a question. Germany’s willingness to continue the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and to connect 5G with the 

Chinese telecom firm Huawei is only a few of the questionable 

choices that they are making. What does it say about the strength 

of the U.S.-European alliance when Germany, the largest economy 

in Europe, is taking actions that are counterproductive to our joint 

security interests? 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you, Congressman. 

That is exactly what we do; we work on tough problems. The 

challenge is Nord Stream 2 follows Nord Stream 1, and we should 

have been much stronger on Nord Stream 1. I think there is an 

awareness in the German government that they cannot proceed as 

to how they wanted to. Chancellor Merkel has said that she wants 

to ensure that Ukraine does have transit, gas transit, before the 

end of this. 

But you are absolutely right, this is where we have to roll up our 

sleeves and work very closely with them, not scream at them 

through Ambassadors, but work constructively with them. They respond to a parliament. They are just like our system. They can demand change. We let this go on for too long. 

I would argue we have been sort of in a benign neglect phase for 

over a decade. We are very transactional. We ask one thing, and 

then, we will come back and ask for another. We do not engage in 

a sustained way. 
55 

If we are concerned about Nord Stream 2, we had better be as 

concerned about TurkStream because TurkStream is a reconstituted South Stream. So, we have to look at this very holistically. 

The 5G issue, you are absolutely right, Europe is falling very far 

behind in IT infrastructure. They know that. And what they are 

trying to do is make sure the U.S. companies are affected to try to 

level the playing field. We have to join with them, and if we do not 

join with them, they will be very susceptible to our adversaries—— 

Mr. KINZINGER. Yes, I agree. And, look, this has been an issue 

that has come under Republican and Democratic administrations 

prior. We have let this kind of relationship sleep. We have basically 

said, OK, the fact that NATO exists is enough, and we have not 

taken into account these creeping problems that we are now having 

to deal with head-on. But I think we need to be careful not to assume that, when we take on these problems head-on that atrophied 

for so long under us, that is not disappreciating NATO or hating 

Europe that we are finding them as competitors. This is us saying, 

look, the future of the United States and the future of Europe is 

relying on this. 

Let me just ask you in only the 30 seconds left—Germany continues to be the member that does the most to stifle NATO growth. 

Year-in and year-out, they are near the bottom of defense spending. 

Why does Germany continue to be such a problem when it comes 

to defense spending and in reaching the 2 percent GDP target? 

And I gave you 18 seconds. You can topline it and figure the rest 

later. 

Ms. CONLEY. So, I am deeply concerned not only in the State of 

the Bundeswehr and the lack of functional capabilities in the maritime as well as their air and land power, but please understand we 

are talking about different scales of economies. So, when you talk 

about the German economy, it is not the Estonian economy. So, 

when we put this marker at 2 percent, we put ourselves into this 

corner where we benchmark at 2 percent. You can spend 2 percent 

to defend against another NATO ally, which is the Greek posture, 

or we can have allies that have capabilities that the U.S. can use. 

Mr. KINZINGER. It would be good if Germany had one of those. 

Ms. CONLEY. Well, Germany absolutely has to increase their defense spending, and we have to work very closely with them on 

Bundeswehr reform. But the Germans are also the lead framework 

nation in Lithuania and the NATO battalion. They are contributing, but we have to work much harder and hold them to account, 

I agree with you. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I think we all agree. 

With that, I am going to yield back just because of time. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. KEATING. OK. Thank you. 

Now I would like to recognize the very patient Representative 

from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you again to our witnesses for your really helpful testimony. 

Ambassador Burns, I want to start with you. As I mentioned in 

my opening statement, you referred to the challenges faced by 

NATO at 70, particularly as it relates to the failure or absence of 
56 

leadership from the U.S. President, and how unusual a circumstance that is. Although we are trying to do as much as we can 

as Members of Congress to reaffirm our support and our understanding of the importance of this relationship—we did a resolution 

which was overwhelmingly supported in a bipartisan way; we are 

having this hearing—my sense is still that world leaders look to 

the words and actions of the President and not the Congress. And 

so, I am wondering if you could speak a little bit about what the 

absence of American Presidential leadership in this moment has 

meant in terms of the future of NATO and what we can do to undo 

some of the damage that is being done by the President in this regard. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Congressman. 

One of the most striking things that Ambassador Lute and I 

heard—we took 6 months, interviewed 60 leaders, current and 

former on both sides of the Atlantic—one of the most striking 

things was that a lot of Europeans said there could not be next 

week a head-of-government summit here in Washington to celebrate the 70th anniversary because the European leaders and some 

of the Americans were not quite sure if President Trump would 

blow up the summit with rhetorical attack on NATO, the way he 

did the last two NATO summits in 2018 and 2017. That is a sad 

reflection. 

I think what we have lost is we have never had a President who 

is so ambivalent, and this is a kind characterization, about NATO. 

Article 5 is the key. A lot of people have been saying, watch what 

the administration does, not what it says. But, for deterrence to 

work, your words have to be clear and they have to be credible, and 

they have to be firm. If you backslide on Article 5, that does give 

an opening to an adversary like Vladimir Putin. It may not be a 

conventional attack of the type that we might have feared, and we 

did fear, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but now a hybrid attack or a 

cyberattack on our election system. And so, I think we have lost 

a lot. And we need the next President, whenever that President appears after a vote of the American people, to really dig us out of 

a hole. 

Congress does have an opening right now. Ironic for someone 

who is a creature of the executive branch—I served my entire career in the executive branch—to ask Congress to exercise its constitutional responsibilities. But I can tell you, what I have heard 

from Europeans is the resolutions you passed reaffirming American 

support for NATO did make a difference for them. And I think we 

saw that in Munich as well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I think one of the other things that we have heard a lot about 

is, obviously, the shared democratic values that both led to the creation of NATO and it has sustained it for these 70 years. But I 

think many of us are very concerned about, and you have written 

about this, the democratic institutions that are weakening, particularly in Hungary and Poland. I think it is also quite a stretch to 

claim that Turkey embodies democratic values. Populist parties are 

growing all across Europe, and you, Ambassador Burns, highlighted this in your report, this democratic backsliding as a cancer 

within NATO. 
57 

And so, I am curious to know what you think Congress can do 

to shore up the foundations of democracy at the core of the transatlantic alliance and what your assessment is of the State of democracy in Europe. And obviously, any of the other witnesses who 

want to contribute to that, answer. 

Mr. BURNS. Two big challenges. The biggest challenge in Europe 

right now, the existential challenge is the rise of the anti-democratic populists, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Alternative for 

Deutschland. They are contesting the European parliamentary 

elections. They may, unfortunately, do well in them this spring. 

Very important for the United States to be on the right side of 

that issue. And there is a perception, more than a perception, a 

strong belief that the President has embraced Viktor Orban in 

Hungary and the Polish government, and Salvini, the right-leaning 

leader in the Italian coalition. We should be behind the Christian 

democrats and the social democratic leaders, the true small ‘‘d’’ 

democrats in Europe like Angela Merkel, and we are not right now. 

And that is hurting us. 

On the NATO side, I have to tell you, when Ambassador Lute 

and I suggested in our report that NATO look into the democratic 

practices of Hungary, Poland, and Italy, there was widespread opposition among most of the people in NATO. They say, ‘‘It will divide us.’’ But NATO is not just a military alliance; it is a political 

alliance. The second sentence of the Washington Treaty is about 

our values, rule of law, democracy, human rights. We have got to 

pay attention to that. There ought to be an annual assessment of 

whether countries are backsliding. There have to be some penalties, but right now there is no agreement in NATO that we 

should do that. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative. 

And the chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Greg 

Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member 

Kinzinger. Thank you for holding this important meeting. 

I thank the panel for their service to this country, and thank you 

for being here today and providing a lot of information. 

In some of your written testimony, Ambassador Burns and Ms. 

Conley, you stated, NATO deters Russian President Putin from invading or seeking to destabilize our NATO allies in Eastern Europe. And two, the United States must return to Europe economically through enhanced trade and investment partnerships. 

I would like to discuss these items and switch gears a little bit 

from some of the things we have been talking about and talk about 

energy security. According to our congressional Research Service, 

the EU remains highly dependent on Russia for natural gas. More 

than 40 percent of total European gas imports are from Russia, 

and some EU members are almost totally dependent on Russian 

gas, as you know. 

At the same time, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use 

its energy resources to further its foreign policy. For example, Russia cutoff gas supplies to Europe for periods in 2006 and 2009, and 

has repeatedly manipulated flows through Ukraine. 
58 

NATO is not blind to this challenge. According to NATO, and I 

quote, ‘‘NATO’s role in energy security was first defined in 2008 at 

the Bucharest summit and has since been strengthened.’’ 

My question, is NATO, America’s greatest security asset, doing 

enough to enhance energy security in the alliance, and what more 

should they be doing, if not? And I ask each of the panelists. 

Ms. CONLEY. Congressman, thank you so much for that question. 

I think NATO certainly is at the center of thinking about security very widely and has created a center of excellence to focus on 

energy security. But, ironically, it is the European Union that has 

the most input into demanding diversification of European energy. 

The European Union’s Third Energy Package tries to break the upstream and the downstream requirements and tries to seek and ensure diversification. It has had successes; yet, it has had failures 

such as Nord Stream 2. 

We have to continue to work very closely with our allies to make 

sure that this cycle of dependency—and it is not just oil and gas; 

there is a malign economic influence that also comes as part of the 

dominance of, whether it is Gazprom or Rosneft, in NATO countries. We have to break that cycle of dependence. And this is exactly where NATO and EU cooperation is absolutely essential. 

NATO is the security provider, but the EU has the economic tools 

to try to help break this cycle of dependency. 

Mr. BRANDS. I would agree with that. I would just add, to the 

extent that the United States can promote or facilitate the export 

of LNG and other energy exports, that can provide a useful counterweight to Russian influence as well. 

The point I would make in terms of addressing this is that it is 

important for the United States to apply pressure and apply encouragement, but to do so in a constructive way. Because if it 

comes across as hostility or outright condemnation, that turns this 

issue or the defense spending issue into a referendum on the current political leadership of the United States, which is not an argument that we will win in Europe right now. 

Ms. WORMUTH. And just to amplify that, I very much agree with 

what Ms. Conley said about Germany and its need to step forward 

in the area of defense. But, unfortunately, I think because so much 

of the German government feels like they have been singled out by 

the current administration, they are letting that color their decisions. And it almost feels as if part of deciding not to spend as 

much on defense is a reflection of feeling like they have been singled out unfairly. 

And so, I think we really need to get to a place where we are 

pushing the Europeans, as the ranking member said, but we are 

doing that against the backdrop of the complete understanding of 

the positive relationship that we have and how much our European 

allies bring to the table. I think without grounding those hard conversations in that backdrop, it is very easy to have those conversations be unconstructive. 

Mr. BURNS. Congressman, NATO thought a lot about energy security at the beginning and the middle part of the cold war decades 

ago. We had to in terms of our contingency planning; less so now. 

NATO should think more about this, but I think, realistically, the 

EU is going to be the focal point of the institution that the U.S. 
59 

can work with most effectively. U.S. LNG, Norwegian, Algerian gas 

are substitutes, and we have got to work with the EU to get there. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative. 

The chair now recognizes the vice chair of the committee, Representative Abigail Spanberger. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to 

serve as the vice chair of this subcommittee as we continue to reinforce our shared fundamental values of international cooperation, 

mutual security, and democracy. 

My question today for the witnesses—and I thank you very much 

for joining us—relates to trade policy. Recently, we have seen the 

White House invoke restrictive trade policies, particularly the imposition of tariffs in response to trade imbalances and in the name 

of national security. Yet, it is the farmers, business owners, and everyday people across my district, central Virginia’s 7th district, and 

across the country who are hurt both by these tariffs and the retaliatory tariffs countries have imposed in response. 

Mr. Brands, in your view, and, Ambassador Burns—and to the 

other witnesses if you would care to respond as well—in your view, 

are these tariffs serving our national security interests or are there 

other, more effective diplomatic avenues for resolving trade disagreements that would not have this outsized negative impact on 

our own citizens that we should consider pursuing instead? 

Mr. BRANDS. I do not believe that the tariffs are serving the national interests. And I would simply add that I think they are undercutting U.S. goals in other respects as well. 

One thing I would give the administration credit for is trying to 

bring pressure on China to address its unfair trade practices, but 

that will be much more effective if we are not isolating ourselves 

by picking trade fights with our allies at the same time. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you. 

Mr. BURNS. Congresswoman, I would just say it is complicated. 

We have always competed with the EU in trade. We are going to 

have our differences, but we need to fight fairly. 

The smarter play for us right now is to combine forces with the 

EU and Japan and South Korea against China. The President is 

fighting. I think he has made a lot of good points about China’s 

predatory practices. We need that EU support, and right now we 

have got a divided team on our side. 

I would also say, in the mid to long term, we should go back to 

thinking about a U.S.-EU free trade agreement. Nine hundred million people, the two largest democratic spaces in the world, and the 

two largest economies in the world, and this could help our economy and it could help us to confront the predatory nature of the 

threat from the Chinese. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. And given the tenor that so many of these conversations have had related to our trade policy and related to our 

engagement with our allies, what do you see the path forward to 

dial back some of this aggression, to put us back on the right path, 

and potentially move toward, as you said, sir, combining forces, 

particularly in the face of the greater challenge, which is China? 

Mr. BURNS. You know what we do not have right now is a productive relationship between the American President and the Ger-
60 

man Chancellor. President Obama and President Bush, George W. 

Bush, both had very productive, frank relationships with Angela 

Merkel. You could work things out with her because she is the 

strongest leader; to a lesser extent with President Macron of 

France. We do not have those relationships. The President and the 

Chancellor, I am told, do not talk often. If you do not have a conversation between the two most important alliance leaders on 

trade, then you get into situations, very unfortunate, where we are 

threatening a trade war. 

And I think a lot of people fear, when the U.S.-China trade war 

ends, that the President is going to go after the EU for our next 

trade war, and that is going to hurt everything that I think the 

four of us have talked about this morning. It is going to have an 

impact on the military and political issues as well. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you. 

Ms. CONLEY. I would just add, Congresswoman, that we do, like 

in the other areas, we do have very big differences with the European Union on a whole range of trade issues from data privacy and 

protection and agriculture. We cannot shy away from those. We 

have to dig into those. 

But placing tariffs on steel, aluminum, threatening tariffs on 

auto parts, we are self-harming ourselves. And exactly what we 

should have done is create a Japan-EU-U.S. full-spectrum approach to China on State-owned enterprises, the whole sweep on 

the AI issues. We could have had a dramatic impact on China’s behavior. We just are choosing to fight our allies and our adversaries 

at the same time. We need to husband our allies and go after the 

same thing. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much for your time today. And 

I really appreciated your comment about fighting our allies and our 

adversaries at the same time. I think that is counterproductive. 

And I thank you for your comments this afternoon. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative, and thank you for that 

line of questioning because, as a person in the last Congress that 

cofounded the then-called TTIP Caucus, there is no question—and 

I reached a great reception, as a matter of fact, when we brought 

this up when we were in Europe just recently—that if we work together, even if we are not successful in standardizing even the majority of products we have, we will have one-half of the world’s 

GDP. If we really want to be effective with China, we should deal 

from strength. So, I appreciate that line of questioning. It was well 

received by the leaders there. I am not unmindful of obstacles we 

would have, but at least we will be going down the right road. So, 

thank you. 

And now, the gentleman from Mississippi, thank you for joining 

us. Representative Michael Guest, welcome to the committee, and 

thank you for being here. 

Mr. GUEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to turn my focus just for a few minutes on NATO spending. And I think there was, during some opening statements made 

by you, Ms. Wormuth, that, currently, of the 29 NATO countries, 

eight have met the 2 percent GDP, which is the NATO spending 

standards that have been set, is that correct? 
61 

Ms. WORMUTH. Congressman, it is actually five currently now 

who are meeting the 2 percent target. 

Mr. GUEST. Only five? 

Ms. WORMUTH. That is correct. 

Mr. GUEST. And you said that we are on track by 2024 to have 

additional countries that would meet that 2 percent GDP. What 

number? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I think we are expecting it to be somewhere between 14 and 15. I mean, these are projections, but it will be a majority of the 29 members. 

Mr. GUEST. So, we will still have, roughly, 14 or 15 then that do 

not meet that standard? 

Ms. WORMUTH. That is possible. 

Mr. GUEST. And some information that I saw—and tell me if any 

of you believe this is accurate or not—but some research said that, 

in 2017, the U.S. paid for over 70 percent of the combined defense 

expenditures of NATO. Does that number sound accurate to you? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Well, I think it is easy to mix up the math because there’s NATO common funding. There is sort of NATO budgets, and then, there are the individual national defense budgets. 

So, I am not sure which statistic that speaks to. 

Mr. GUEST. All right. Let me ask, I guess my question is, since 

we currently have only five of 29 countries that meet that, even in 

2024, we expect only to have, roughly, half—you believe 14 to 15— 

what can we do, as a Congress? I guess two things. What can we 

do, and then, what should we do to make sure that other NATO 

members are meeting their obligation? 

Ambassador, I will start with you, and I will work down the 

table from left to right. 

Mr. BURNS. You know, the real problem is in the parliaments of 

these countries, particularly in Germany where the Bundestag does 

not want to spend the money. And they have, as you know, a surplus in their budget. So, speaking to them legislature to legislature 

I think is something that our members, Republican and Democrat, 

should do. 

Second, there is actually no common standard to how to measure 

2 percent across the alliance. Individual allies measure it differently. We need a clean, regular metric that everyone can agree 

on. And I would say expand the 2 percent category to include 

spending on cyber defense and spending on intelligence, because 

some of the members, that is their comparative advantage. That is 

where they could help us. And right now, we are not counting what 

they are spending under 2 percent. This is a major problem, but 

it really has to focus on Germany as well. 

Mr. GUEST. So, is what you are saying that we need to expand 

the categories that we consider counting toward that 2 percent? So, 

we would not be putting money necessarily 2 percent GDP into soldiers and battlefield equipment, but that money could be counted 

in additional spending? Is that your suggestion? 

Mr. BURNS. That is a suggestion that Ambassador Lute and I 

made in our recent report, and it is striking to know that there is 

not a common assessment of how this is all measured. Some countries include pensions for military veterans and some countries do 

not, for instance. But cyber and intelligence, that is very important 
62 

to counter the Russian threat, which is the most pernicious threat 

to NATO now. 

Mr. GUEST. Ms. Wormuth, do you have any suggestion what we 

can do to get the majority, and ultimately all, of the countries to 

that 2 percent GDP amount? 

Ms. WORMUTH. I do, Congressman. I think, first, we have to continue to speak constructively and do the hard work and have the 

hard conversations with our NATO allies about the importance of 

meeting that target. The projection today is that, by 2024, a majority of the 29 will get there, but we still have time and we can work 

with those countries to get more of them closer to the target. And 

again, that, I think, means having those difficult conversations 

against a backdrop of recognizing that we are all in this together. 

Another point I would make is that 2 percent is about the input. 

What is as important, if not more important, is the output. What 

are we buying with that? I do not want to see our NATO allies 

spend more money on their pensions and on some of their personnel accounts. I want to see them buying new equipment. I want 

to see them investing in research and development. And I would 

say the NATO countries are doing better. Part of the Wales Defense Investment Pledge was to have 20 percent of their defense 

budgets go to new equipment and R&D, and several members are 

reaching that target. 

So, I think we need to be focusing on have those hard conversations and have conversations about what they are buying and making sure what they are buying is useful for the alliance and for deterring Russia and dealing with the range of other challenges 

NATO faces. 

Mr. GUEST. Dr. Brands, do you have any suggestions? 

Mr. BRANDS. I would endorse all this. I would also say, ‘‘single 

out the high-performers for praise and recognition.’’ 

Mr. GUEST. And then, finally—I know I am about over time— 

but, Ms. Conley, I will give you a chance to answer the question. 

Ms. CONLEY. Yes, thank you. 

And I think just to pull on Dr. Brands, I mean, we need to do 

more with those allies that are contributing more. More for more, 

is how I would put it. 

Also, appreciate that our allies provide host nation support in the 

basing, and that is a contribution. Many times when the U.S. invests in European security, there is a rebate. NATO, through its 

common funds, reimburses the alliance. So, it is not as clear and 

simple. 

But you are absolutely right, every leader at the Wales summit 

made a commitment to 2 percent to 2024. Now, like this Congress, 

they could not make a commitment of funding to 2024. They are 

democratically elected. But the trajectory has to be there. The capabilities have to be there. The message has been received, but, 

boy, we have to keep their feet to the fire and accept no excuses. 

Mr. GUEST. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going over and I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. As we conclude, I just want to institute quickly a 

second round, but make it more of a lightning round. I do not know 

if you have planes to catch or what your transportation issues 

might be, but a couple of issues just for brief comment. And I will 
63 

also give my colleagues any chance to put those questions in the 

queue as well. 

But we have not touched on Turkey and S–400, especially from 

its NATO implications. This is very serious. I did not want this 

hearing to go by without bringing up that issue because I do think 

it presents a very grave threat to our alliance if this continues. So, 

if you could comment on Turkey and the possible S–400 purchases 

from Russia? 

Ms. WORMUTH. Chairman, I am very concerned about the Turkish decision to acquire the S–400, and so concerned that I think, 

frankly, we are in a position where we need to reconsider going forward with the F–35s to Turkey. We cannot have our planes essentially plugging into an adversary air defense system. We have been 

having this conversation with Turkey for some years now, but it 

feels like we are at the tipping point. But I certainly would not be 

comfortable going forward with the F–35s. 

Mr. BURNS. I agree with Secretary Wormuth. The statements, recent statements, by Chairman Dunford and Supreme Allied Commander Scaparrotti I think have been straight on target. And that 

is, we cannot integrate this system into our alliance. And so, I 

agree with Secretary Wormuth. If the Turks proceed with this— 

and Erdogan is threatening to do that—then I think the F–35 

should be at risk. How can we have close strategic coordination if 

they are importing a Russian system in the NATO ally defenses? 

Ms. CONLEY. Chairman, I would just argue that the S–400 picture is a symptom of a much broader and larger strategic picture 

that Turkey is turning away from Euro-Atlanticism—its approach 

to Venezuela, its approach to Iran, its rapprochement with Russia, 

some of the instability in the Aegean Sea. This deserves a hearing 

from this subcommittee to look at the totality. 

And much of NATO’s containment strategic rationale was anchoring Turkey and Greece, Euro and the Euro-Atlantic community. This anchor is starting to push in a different direction. 

I would also argue, for the Congressman’s comment, Hungary, 

you need a hearing dedicated to Hungary and understanding what 

is going on and whether we can maintain NATO classified information with that country. Family first. These are important countries. 

We are losing them. We have to find a strategy and a way forward 

to return them to the Euro-Atlantic community. 

Mr. KEATING. Great. Well, I would like to thank the witnesses 

and say this has been a day of interruptions with the roll calls, but 

this has been so important. 

We had very good participation from the subcommittee members 

running in and out. A couple of them had to leave. And the members of the committee, those members or other members, will have 

the opportunity to ask additional questions in writing. And we ask 

the witnesses to please respond to those questions. And the hearing 

record will be open for 10 business days in order to receive those 

responses. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you so much for being here. This is just the 

beginning of an important journey. I think in the short time we 

had to discuss this we covered so much ground, but are left with 

so many more issues to pursue. 
64 

With that, I will adjourn this hearing and thank you for your 

participation. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
65 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 205!5-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurnsia, Energy, and the Environment 

William R. Keating (1>-MA), Chairman 

March 26,2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF TilE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You arc respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held 

by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment in Room 2 I 72 of the Rayburn !louse Oflice 

Building (and available live on the Committee website at https://l(lfeignaffairs.house.gov/): 

OATIS: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Tuesday, March 26.2019 

2:00pm 

The Historic American Alliance with Europe 

The Honorable Nicholas Burns 

Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International 

Relations 

John F. Kennedy School of Government 

f larvard University 

(Former Under Secretm)" olStatefi)/" !'o/itical Afklirs. U.S. Department o(State) 

The Honorable Christine Wormuth 

Director 

International Security and Defense Policy Center 

RAND Corporation 

(Former Under Secretary ol Defi!nsefilr !'of icy. U.S. Department of Defimse) 

Hal Brands, Ph.D. 

J lenry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor 

School of Advanced International Studies 

Johns Hopkins University 

Senior Fcllo\v at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

(Vormer SjJecial Assistant to !he SecrelmT qf Defense fOr Strategic Planning) 

Ms. Heather Conley 

Senior Vice Presid~nt, Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic 

Director, Europe Program 

Center for Strategic & Intemational Studies 

(Former Deputy Assistant Secretary t?f'~\'tate in the Bureau of European and Eurasian 

Afli1irs, U.S. Department ofStare) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
66 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ____ E_u_ro-'-'P_•,_E_u_ra_sl_a,_E_n_ergy.;_,_an_d_t_h•_E_n_vl_ro_nm_en_t ___ HEARING 

Day_-=.T,.::ue=s='lt.:.:.aJ,_' __ l>ate ___ ::;3/2=6/.:..:1c:.9 ___ Room, ___ 2::.:J:.;7..::'2c__ __ 

Starting Time --"'2.,.,·4"'5.,p __ Ending Time _ _,4-": l,_,O"p'--

Recesses __ L_to __ ) L_to __ )(___to__) (___to__) (___to__) (___to__) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Keating 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive {£!!!sed) Session D Televised [l] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

The Historic American Alliance with Europe 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Record~ taped) 0 

Stenographic Record LLI 

Keating, Cicilline, Costa, Spanberger, Gonzalez.~, Klnzinger, Wagner, Fitzpatrick, Pence, Guest, Burchett 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an • if they are not members of full committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(lf "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.} 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record) 

Ambassador Nicholas Burns 

Ms. Christine Wormuth 

Dr. Hal Brands 

Ms. Heather Conley 

NATO at Seventy (page II of the hearing transcript) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE----

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 4_:_10_o'P __ 
67 

Æ 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

PRESENT MEMBER PRESENT MEMBER 

X William Keating, MA X Adam Kinzinger,IL 

X Abigail Span berger, VA Joe Wilson, SC 

Gregory W. Meeks, NY :--.)(_ Ann Wagner, MO 

1 Albio Sires, NJ James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI 

I Theodore E. Deutch, FL Francis Rooney, FL 

X David Cicilline, Rl X Brian K. Fitzpatrick, P A 

Joaquin Castro, TX X Greg Pence, IN 

Dina Titus, NV Ron Wright, TX 

Susan Wild, PA X Michael Guest, MS 

David Trone, MD X Tim Burchett, TN 

X Jim Costa, CA 

X Vicente Gonzalez, TX